Author: CMP Staff

China's "Mainstream"

Understanding China requires a high-level of sensitivity to the nuances of the political language used by the Chinese Communist Party, and also how that language impacts our imagined points of connectivity with China. Simple words like “innovation,” an apparent reference to Silicon Valley-style disruption through technology, can signal things we might not associate — such as tighter political and social controls, and widespread surveillance.
In the realm of media and public opinion, one of the most misunderstood words in contemporary mainland Chinese, completely co-opted by CCP discourse, is “mainstream,” or zhuliu (主流).

A March 2019 report from Xinhua about Xi Jinping’s article in Seeking Truth journal is chockfull of “mainstream” talk, all referring to CCP dominance of the media space.
For many of us, the word simply refers to ideas or beliefs that are shared by most people, that are conventional, or to media that cater to mass audiences and their views, beliefs and interests. But for the Chinese Communist Party, guiding and maintaining public opinion, ensuring that it reflects the interests of those in power, is essential to maintaining the regime. The “mainstream,” therefore is the prerogative of the Party itself, and when you talk about “mainstream media” in China, you are talking not about commercial newspapers and magazines or big-brand online news sites — you are talking specifically about Party-run media.
Back in March, when Xi Jinping wrote an article for the official Seeking Truth (求是) journal about the need to further advance convergence in the “mainstream media” in order to strengthen “mainstream public opinion” and “mainstream values,” he was of course talking about ensuring that Party media were on top of the latest digital trends so that they could “guide public opinion,” which is CCP code for media control and censorship.
Look up “mainstream media” in online Chinese sources like Baidu, and the definition is unmistakable. Here, though, is a source in the People’s Liberation Army that uses the terms  “mainstream media” and “innovation” together in ways that should make the differing contexts crystal clear: “The mainstream media operated by the Party and the government bear the Party’s chief responsibility for innovating theory and propaganda.”
The broader context and definition of “mainstream media” is crucial to understanding articles like this one appearing today at People’s Daily Online, sourced from the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, which reports that “mainstream public opinion in Hong Kong and various segments of Hong Kong society express support” for the SAR’s new anti-mask law.
An article from the overseas edition of People’s Daily claims “mainstream public opinion in Hong Kong” supports the anti-mask law.
Read that statement and you might expect a couple of things. First, you might feel, given normative definitions of “mainstream” in the West, that the sentence is repetitive. “Mainstream public opinion” and opinion from “various segments of Hong Kong society” sound very much like the same thing, don’t they? Second, you might anticipate a news story that offers you direct quotes from ordinary people on the street, or even public opinion polling data.
If, however, you understand the normative CCP understanding of “mainstream” as something manufactured and controlled, and as a tool of governance, then you expect something altogether different. First of all, the apparent repetitiveness of the statement no longer applies. We should expect first to have reference to Party and/or government views as “mainstream,” and then only after (in order of importance) reference to ostensible social organizations or groups that have quasi-official status. Second, we should expect no direct quotes from individuals, because they are irrelevant. Public opinion, after all, is given from the top in the CCP understanding, not gathered from below.
The People’s Daily report does not disappoint in this respect.
The first source cited as “mainstream public opinion” is the Wen Wei Po newspaper, an organ of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong controlled by the Liaison Office of the Central Government. The second source cited is the Ta Kung Pao newspaper, also a CCP organ under Liaison Office control.
As for “segments of Hong Kong society,” the report cites a statement issued by the conservative and pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), and remarks from the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, also pro-Beijing.
Next time you hear mainland Chinese media or leaders referencing the “mainstream,” take a careful look at who is talking. The hand, you will generally find, is reporting on the puppet.

Intimate Business

In late December, the local government in Qingdao, a major city in China’s coastal Shandong province, issued a curious notice. It instructed Communist Party cadres and government officials to “dine more with entrepreneurs, make friends with them, and learn from them.” This was, said the notice, about forming “a new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship,” or xinxing zhengshang guanxi (新型政商关系).


In the context of President Xi Jinping’s ongoing anti-corruption drive, which since December 2012 has discouraged such behaviour, and which has disciplined more than a million officials, such a request sounds unusual, even risky. Isn’t dining with businessmen the last thing officials want to do right now?
But this seemingly odd phrase,”a new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship,” offers us clues to the current economic situation in China — and how leaders are responding.
The Economic Slowdown
The phrase “new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship” was first introduced in 2015, a year during which China’s GDP growth fell below 7 percent for the first time in 25 years.
In March 2015, “new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship” made its first appearance in the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the CCP. Qian Yingyi (钱颖一), an economist and a professor from China’s prestigious Tsinghua University, brought the phrase up during a meeting happening around the “Two Sessions” (两会), referring to the annual meetings of the national legislature and China’s top political advisory body. According to Qian, such relationship building, with the assistance of other government policies, was a must-have strategy for grappling with the economic slowdown.
Two months later, Sun Chunlan (孙春兰), the vice-premier who heads up the central government’s United Front Work Department, became the first government official to use the phrase publicly in an address delivered during a meeting of industry and commerce officials and representatives from non-Party organisations (无党派人士代表).
But it wasn’t until the “Two Sessions” in 2016 that the phrase became popular in the People’s Daily, a measure of its growing importance. The phrase “new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship” was mentioned in a total of 76 articles in the newspaper in 2016, versus just 7 articles for all of 2015 (including the reference to Sun Chunlan’s remarks). In March 2016 alone, as the political meetings were in session, the phrase was mentioned 23 times.
Cross The River, But Don’t Get Your Shoes Wet
According to President Xi Jinping, the “relationship” defined by this emerging catchphrase can be summarised into just two words: “intimacy” (亲) and “integrity” (清). But what do these two words mean?
Intimacy
The phrase “serving as a waiter,” or dang hao dianxiao’er (当好店小二), is another that can be seen in state media, including the People’s Daily, to refer to how government officials should attend to entrepreneurs. The idea is that these humble government officials should be true servants, seeking every way possible to help companies out (千方百计帮助企业排忧解难).
Photo by Kiril Konstantinov, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
Standing against this service-oriented concept is another phrase, guan jia po (管家婆), or “busybody housekeeper,” a practice or role often criticised in the People’s Daily that implies situations in which the government places too many restraints on companies.
Some articles in the state media go even further, promoting a “nanny style” (保姆式) work mode. This refers, for example, to how some local governments assist private companies with getting funding from banks, speeding up administrative procedures, or even — as was the case with companies in the textile industry in Jilin province — working to optimise the local power grid.
In some provinces, government officials are also tasked with helping to educate the next generation of entrepreneurs. In a project started in 2014 and continued this year in Huzhou, a city in Zhejiang province, local government officials are paired with young entrepreneurs with the goal of “successfully training” 30 young entrepreneurs over a three-year period.
Integrity
The word “integrity” points to the expectation that officials remain “clean and pure,” and be “without greed,” not offering or accepting bribes as they develop the aforementioned “intimacy” with businesspeople. It also requires that businesspeople obey laws and regulations, and that they “wield the weapon of the law” to defend their own rights and interests. Integrity and intimacy are of course a delicate dance. Many of the officials taken down in recent years by Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign share similar stories. They are all alleged to have had relationships with businessmen that were “too close.”
In Zhejiang, a province where private industry has long prospered, the local government has established what it calls “eight red lines” (八条红线) that officials must not cross when interacting with entrepreneurs. The lines include accepting gifts and visiting private clubs.
Intimate Fears
The idea behind the “new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship” is that intimacy between the two sides might be  fostered in such a way that allows companies to thrive, producing the sought-after economic gains, while maintaining the integrity that keeps both sides clean. But this idea can be a hard sell under the very real pressures of the anti-corruption drive.
In an interview with the People’s Daily, one official from the discipline supervision department in Guangdong province said that fear of running afoul of the anti-corruption campaign had led some government officials to opt against responding to reasonable requests for assistance from companies, avoiding contacts with entrepreneurs altogether simply to remain above all suspicion. “Before, some officials were intimate but not clean, now they are clean but not intimate,” said one recent article in the People’s Daily, summing up the challenge.
The concept of “integrity” is now tied up with “intimacy.” The ideal for the relationship, as defined by Xi Jinping, is to be intimate with a sense of limitation or proportion, but to remain clean with a sense of limitation or proportion (“亲”而有度 “清”而无忧).” How this can be achieved is now a constant theme in state media coverage.
A Phrase on the Rise
The frequency of the phrase “new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship” continued to rise through 2017 and 2018, with 88 and 92 articles respectively mentioning the term.
Another phrase recently added to the mix, amid broader concerns in China over the past three years that private companies are being ignored in favour of the state-run sector, is Xi’s “Three Unchanges” (三个没有变). This boils down to the Party’s commitment to encouraging private sector growth, unchanged since the policy of reform and opening began in 1978. But despite reassurances — readers can turn to Qian Gang’s analysis of the phrase “anxiety pill” — there seems to be a growing sense of insecurity among entrepreneurs, and the slightest flutter of discouragement can inspire panic.
Such was the case back in the fall, when an online post by a Chinese businessman named Wu Xiaoping (吴小平) suggested that “China’s private sector has served its role and should leave the field [in favour of the state-run sector] (中国私营经济已完成协助任务应逐渐离场). Wu’s post was shared and discussed feverishly, prompting the People’s Daily to run an almost immediate rebuttal calling Wu’s suggestion a “rumour,” and reaffirming the commitment to the private sector.
“It is true that private businesses are under much pressure in the current situation, especially small-scale businesses facing life-or-death challenges,” said the People’s Daily commentary. “But the Party’s Central Committee has noticed the difficulties facing the private economy, and has introduced practical reforms.”
These “practical reforms” are encompassed at least in part by this emerging catchphrase, a “new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship.” In a November 1, 2018, speech to a high-level meeting of private enterprises, President Xi sought to reassure entrepreneurs. “Private companies and private entrepreneurs are on our side,” he said. He listed six points for supporting the growth of private companies, the bottom two points being about the need to “build a new type of cadre-entrepreneur relationship with both intimacy and integrity,” and “protecting the safety of entrepreneurs and their properties.”
This research post was written for the China Media Project by Elaine Wang. 

Robin Li on AI and the Private Sector

On November 21, The Beijing News, a city newspaper now overseen by the municipal propaganda department of Beijing, ran an interview with Robin Li, the co-founder and chief executive of Baidu, the Chinese search engine company that is working to carve out its niche as a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI).
In the interview, Li expresses optimism for the direction of AI development in China, and voices general support — (we should expect to hear nothing less in China’s official media) — for the policies of the government in support both AI development and the development of the private sector. The latter issue, the health of private business in China versus the state-run sector, has been the subject of ongoing debate in recent months. Li, based at least on what we can see, suggests that Xi Jinping’s reassurances to private companies are welcome and have done the trick. He even seems to resort to official Party discourse, mentioning such language at the “Two Unshakeables,” and throwing in the term “anti-anxiety medication” (which CMP co-director Qian Gang reviewed in a piece earlier this month).
As the SCMP noted this week, Li does quite clearly credit state policies in China as helping to drive the growth of AI.
A translation of Li’s interview with The Beijing News follows:
 

The Beijing News: As one of the first internet companies in China to enter the area of Artificial Intelligence, how does Baidu view the development of the AI sector over the past few years?
Robin Li: Whether in terms of market scale, technical innovation or the number of companies involved, you can really see the rapid development of Chinese AI and its growing importance. Over the past few years, more and more companies and research and technology networks (科研系统) are incorporating AI as a key area to direct [their time and resources].
In 2018, we’ve seen quite a few results, and we see more and more AI projects reaching the point of market application, from the mass production of driverless vehicles, to smart agriculture and smart healthcare — all are moving from the technological development phase to the application phase. I’ve said before that with vehicle production isn’t just about testing, but that the development of AI requires application.
The Beijing News: Which industries do you see as being most impacted by developments in AI? Where are the opportunities?
Robin Li: We already see AI covering agriculture, manufacturing and services, and we can imagine being applied in many, many industries, from culture and entertainment to corporate services, finance, transportation, intelligent hardware, life services, and many other areas.
The Beijing News: In the AI sector, how big is the gap between China and other countries? What can China do to overtake others in turning the corner?
Robin Li: National competition in the future over AI will ultimately probably come down to competition between China and the United States. In the AI field, China’s overall development is very fast, and we can say that China is either on the heels, neck-and-neck or in the lead in the footrace [depending on which aspects of the industry we look at].
China has many advantages in the development of AI. First of all, policy bonuses (政策红利) are one key factor in the development of the AI industry in China. AI is really hot, and it’s possibly that in the next few years we will see a peak in the development of China’s AI industry. Our policies [in China] science and technology innovation and business creation offer big support that also comes at the right time, and this is a major bonus for the practical development of the industry.
At the same time, there is a surge of public support for AI, and there’s no doubt there is a lot of potential in the market.
Beside all of these factors is openness. This is a huge advantage enjoyed by China’s AI industry. In terms of the technical capabilities of open platforms (开放平台), small and medium-sized companies can all directly enjoy the technology benefits (技术红利) and reach across the technical gaps in AI.
The Beijing News: In the age of AI, how can we ensure protection of user data?
Robin Li: The widespread linkage and use of data in the AI age will possibly lead to ever more present questions about privacy, and ensuring data security is a demand facing technology companies like Baidu, and a basic demand of the industry as a whole. We say that the highest principle of AI is security, and this is not just about not doing harm to the lives and asset security of our customers, but also about protecting their privacy.
Of course, security needs to be ensured by technology. Data is a chief driving force behind the development of AI, and the speed at which data is updated in the AI age is far more rapid than in the internet age. The dramatic increase in the volume of data necessarily raises more security challenges. AI companies need not only to prioritise the data security of their customers as a matter of conviction, but must also achieve this in practice through building secure data protection systems.
The Beijing News: Right now many internet companies are getting into vehicle manufacturing. Will Baidu also head this way in the future?
Robin Li: On driverless vehicles, Baidu was involved quite early, and right now we’re pretty much out front. But I’ve always said that we won’t be involved ourselves in making vehicles. We won’t go an open up production lines ourselves, or design engines, or research fluid mechanics, or do industrial design. We will focus on what we do best — development of the autonomous driving technology. And we will work together with all companies that have an interest in driverless vehicles.
The Beijing News: What is the most difficult aspect of developing autonomous driving technology?
Robin Li: The most difficult thing should be the core technology development phase. Five years ago, Baidu was one of the earliest Chinese companies to get involved in the development of driverless vehicles. At that time few had actually realised that AI was already upon us, and when we said Baidu was researching smart driving, probably everyone thought we would also head in the direction product testing for vehicle manufacturing.
The development of ground-floor technologies is an extremely difficult process. AI requires three major drivers: algorithms, computing power and data. Whether we’re talking about autonomous vehicles, or about smart city transportation, all of these are built on iteration algorithms (算法迭代), on enhanced computing power and on the collection of data.
This is why we decided to build our Apollo Github, because manufacturing tires is an extremely difficult process, and we hoped that everyone could utilise our capacities freely and directly. If they need data, we give them data. If they need technology, we give them technology. Traditional vehicle manufacturers can boldly take advantage of Baidu’s AI. We can all work together, combining our efforts, and only in this way with the current and later phases of development go more smoothly.
The Beijing News: In investing outside China, where has Baidu’s focus been?
Robin Li: AI has been one of Baidu’s strategic directions, and it has more recently become a “new initiator” (新动能) for driving industry upgrading and economic development. In the future, perhaps no company will be able to say that its business has nothing to do with AI. I think there is the potential for cooperation everywhere, regardless of whether we’re talking about traditional enterprises or new technology companies.
In fact, investment is a form of cooperation. When it comes to investment, we put more priority on the underlying concepts [and understandings], determining whether the other side has an AI way of thinking, which forms the basis for cooperation. For most companies, the most important thing in the current environment is how to be the first in embracing AI, how to be a company that successfully applies AI technology, quickly making itself AI-capable (使自身AI化). This is something I really care about.
The Beijing News: What are your plans for dealing with the shortage of talent in AI development?
Robin Li: As AI has developed, the shortage of talent will become more and more apparent. To solve this problem, we can’t just apply the old ways of thinking, but have to think across boundaries. AI is not just a technology, but an interdisciplinary subject that covers many categories [of work and industry]. We can’t just develop one kind of skillset, but rather need to foster talents with multiple abilities who have the capacity to think in a more comprehensive way, building an expert talent training system.
Talent training isn’t something that can be accomplished in a day, and it’s not something that universities or companies or the government can accomplish in isolation. We can see that China has been very active in recent years in terms of talent development. The Trump administration has been very conservative in its immigration policies, and by contrast we will invite these people to come to China and develop. At the same time, our universities are also actively exploring the creation of AI programs of study, and companies are actively doing training and drawing AI talent, providing them with space.
The Beijing News: Some have said that AI has been over-hyped, and that in 2018 we’ve begun to see a bubble. What is your view?
Robin Li: It’s true that AI has been a really hot topic over the past few years, but we can say that this “hotness” hasn’t just been about ideas but about very real application to industries, a warmth that has made blossoms spring up everywhere. As I said earlier, AI is being applied in very concrete ways across all three major sectors, and we see it happening in finance, in healthcare, in education and travel and other areas. These concrete applications are a report card for AI development, and something that our market needs to take note of.
For years I’ve been telling people that the internet was the appetiser, and that AI is the main course. AI is the way of the future, something whose impact will be broader and deeper. But this process of change will be gradual, not something that happens immediately. We can see its gradual nature, and the scale of the AI industry has steadily grown, with obvious impacts on industrial upgrading and economic change. Add to this a policy environment that is more and more encouraging and I think we can say that not only is there not a bubble, but I’m confident that AI will permeate even deeper, and be even hotter, as algorithms, computing power and data make this possible. It will truly become the main course.
The Beijing News: How do you see private companies and the troubles they now face [in China]? What do you think the solutions are?
Robin Li: The process of economic transitioning and the external [trade] environment have certainly presented a lot of challenges for private companies right now, but some opportunities too. General Secretary Xi [Jinping] has emphasised that our country’s development is now at a critical juncture of transition and restructuring, a time to tackle tough challenges, but also a time to seek breakthroughs. I’m confident that China’s economy is like the open sea, and facing the future we know we have great responsibilities, but at the same time are brimming with confidence.
Baidu has always hoped our own AI capacities can help support other industries and allow every company and every enterprise to use the most advanced AI available with ease. Traditional enterprises need to move with the trend and embrace AI, successfully utilising AI applications, marching to the beat of the times and enjoying the benefits of change.
The Beijing News: How do you view [policy] prescriptions the central government has made for the private sector?
Robin Li: General Secretary Xi has emphasised many times the “Two Unshakeables” (两个毫不动摇) [which includes support for development of the “non-public sector”), clearly stating his “Three Steadfasts” (三个没有变), and he has talked about grabbing “6 Policy Measures” (6个方面政策措施). All of these prescriptions for private companies not only give us urgent and real help, but also raise the confidence of private businesses.
On the question of private sector development, there have been many different voices expressed in society lately, and private businesses will have certain concerns. The prescriptions made lately by the central government without a doubt have worked as an anti-anxiety pill (吃定心丸), and I think this is extremely important. These are things we need to be hearing.
We are a private business, and when we hear unreserved support for the private sector, we feel much better grounded. The central government is still very supportive of private business development.
The Beijing News:  What economic event left the biggest impression on you in 2018?
Robin Li: The 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening. Whether I talk about me personally, or about Baidu, we are all the beneficiaries of Reform and Opening. If it hadn’t been for these 40 years of rapid economic development, if there hadn’t been this growth of internet users from 8 million to 800 million, there would be no Baidu.
The Beijing News: Where did you see the bright points of the Chinese economy in 2018? And will these continue in 2019?
Robin Li: China’s economy is stable and developing well, and there are many bright points. I think the biggest bright point in 2018 has been the application of AI. And not only will this bright point continue, but we should see even more, and even better quality, results.

Political Grilling for College Entrance Exams?

This week we begin our short list of top media stories with an interesting controversy that brewed online over suggestions from college entrance examination authorities in the municipality of Chongqing that students sitting for next year’s examinations would need to pass a “political investigation,” or zhengshen (政审), process in addition to the normal testing procedures. The term zhengshen dates back to the political turmoil of China in the 1950s through the 1970s, when the Chinese Communist Party dug into the family backgrounds and connections of Chinese to determine their political suitability.
After using the term zhengshen in a Q&A post on its official WeChat account, igniting the controversy, examination authorities in Chongqing tried to back peddle, claiming that media had misrepresented the story. The official Chongqing Daily newspaper, however, also used the term liberally in its coverage of changes to testing procedures for next year.
Also on the list this week — the 5th World Internet Conference (WIC) was held in the historic Zhejiang water town of Wuzhen, but with lukewarm attendance from foreign representatives, and more subdued showings by Chinese tech figures; and news of the suicide death of Hu Xin, a key figure for many years behind official Party commentaries in the People’s Daily, drew interest from social media users.
___________________
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
November 3-9, 2018
As storm brews over supposed “political investigation” portion of college entrance exams in Chongqing, authorities blame journalists
Chemical leak in Fujian province prompts anger as local government downplays impact
➢ World Internet Conference gets lukewarm participation and coverage
➢ Journalist Hu Xin, a key writer behind official People’s Daily commentary bylines, commits suicide
[1] As storm brews over supposed “political investigation” portion of college entrance exams in Chongqing, authorities blame journalists


On November 2, a post made to the official WeChat account of the Chongqing Education Examination Board (教育考试院), “Chongqing Entrance Exam” (重庆招考), caused anger and consternation online. The post, called “The Hot Questions for Testing Students Are All Right Here” (考生关注的热点问题, 都在这儿), said students taking the 2019 college entrance examination would be subjected to a “political investigation,” or zhengshen (政审), in addition to the normal testing requirements. The post prompted fierce criticism as it invoked for many the politically motivated interrogations into family backgrounds that were common in the 1960s and 1970s, in the era before economic reform and opening.
In the image to the left, a question in the original Chongqing Education Examination Board post asks: “How will political investigation be carried out? What will the chief content of political investigation be?” The term clearly used here is zhengshen (政审), invoking the political campaigns of the 1960s-1970s.
On November 6, the official Chongqing Daily, the mouthpiece of the city’s top Party leadership, said that the “political investigation” procedure in question would entail an inquiry into the “political ideas and character” (政治思想品德) of testing students. The results given following the “political investigation” process, said the paper, would be either “qualified” or “disqualified.” Those who failed to earn a “qualified” grade in the political investigation process would not be allowed to sit for the regular examination, according to the newspaper report. The work of conducting the political investigations would be entrusted to the schools or work units of the testing students.
As discussion simmered online following the post, the WeChat public account “China Newsweekly” (中国新闻周刊) quoted Luo Shenqi (罗胜奇), the director of the Chongqing Education Examination Board as saying that, “Concerning political examination, this is just misreporting by journalists and the media. We call [the two examination portions] political and ideological examination (思想政治的考核) and pragmatic performance examination (现实表现的审核). Journalists misunderstood this as a process of ‘political examination’ (政审).”

On November 8, the Chongqing Education Examination Board again explained: “Referring to the political and ideological examination of students as a process of ‘political investigation’ was non-standard usage and inaccurate. On the afternoon of November 8, an employee at our office also responded incorrectly when speaking to a reporter. The content and methods [of examination] for the general 2019 university examinations in Chongqing in terms of ‘examination of the political and ideological character’ of exam takers are unchanged.”
The term “political examination” is an abbreviated form of zhengzhi shencha, a process of organised examination of the political attitudes, family background, past conduct and social connections of individuals employed from the 1950s through the 1970s.
Key Sources:
Chongqing Daily (重庆日报): 重庆2019年普通高考11月7日开始报名
WeChat public account “China Newsweekly” (中国新闻周刊): 重庆教育考试院独家回应:高考“政审”系误读,不是查你祖宗八代
Chongqing Educational Examination Board (重庆市教育考试院): 重庆市教育考试院关于普通高校招生“思想政治品德考核”有关信息的说明
WeChat public account “Zhang Ming 0011” (张鸣0011): 不该有的倒退
Global Times (环球时报): 单仁平:从“政审”一词引发议论和担心谈起
[2] Chemical leak in Fujian province prompts anger as local government downplays impact
Early in the morning on November 4, as a chemical called C9 was being transferred between a transport ship operated by Donggang Petrochemical Industry Co. Ltd. (东港石油化工实业有限公司) and a dock in the coastal city of Quanzhou in Fujian province, a broken connecting tube resulted in the leaking of 6.7 tonnes of the substance, according to local authorities. By November 5, the day after the incident, the head of the Agriculture, Forestry and Water Bureau in the Quanzhou Port announced that the “chemical pollutants had already been entirely cleared away.” However, posts made to social media by residents in the area told a markedly different story. On November 8, authorities in Quanzhou made a preliminary determination that the production accident had resulted in the contamination of a .6 square kilometre area of the port, and that approximately 300 mu, or 200,000 square meters, of agricultural land had been affected. As of November 9, 52 local residents had been treated.
The impact of the chemical industry has been a longstanding issue in the Quanzhou area in recent years. Xiaocuo Village (肖厝村), the area where the recent leak occurred, has typically been referred to as “the leading aquaculture village” (养鱼第一村). But over the years a number of chemical processing factories have been built in the area, and there are constant questions over whether these factories are in violation of environmental and safety regulations.
Key Sources:
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年网): 泉州一石油化工船舶泄露6.97吨碳九 环保局:海域清理已基本完成,将检测水质及海产品
Xinhua Daily Telegraph (新华每日电讯): 碳九对人体危害几何?为何清理工作还未结束?何时才能解决厂居混杂问题? 三问福建泉港碳九泄漏事故
[3] World Internet Conference gets lukewarm participation and coverage
On November 7, the curtain opened on the 5th World Internet Conference (WIC) in the town of Wuzhen in China’s coastal Zhejiang province. The opening ceremony was attended by Huang Kunming (黄坤明), director of the Central Propaganda Department, who presented a welcome letter from President Xi Jinping and delivered a keynote speech.
Lacklustre participation by prominent tech figures, both Chinese and non-Chinese, was a focus of discussion on social media. Some noted that Jack Ma, the Alibaba founder who announced his retirement this year but has remained publicly visible, made no public address whatsoever at this year’s conference. Moreover, just one representative from a Silicon Valley company was listed as a speaker at the conference.
This year’s WIC opened against the backdrop of frustration, both domestic and international. Domestically, internet censorship has arguably never been stricter in China. Internationally, the sense among Silicon Valley companies is that the China market is hopelessly inaccessible.
China’s first World Internet Conference was held in 2014, hosted by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). WIC was a key early initiative of then cyber czar Lu Wei, head of the CAC, who last month plead guilty in court to accepting 32 million yuan in bribes. Lu is currently awaiting sentencing.
Key Sources:
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 第五届世界互联网大会开幕 黄坤明宣读习近平主席贺信并发表主旨演讲
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 世界互联网大会这五年:一场盛会改变乌镇,乌镇带动一座城
Bloomberg (彭博社): China’s Grand Internet Vision Is Starting to Ring Hollow
[4] Journalist Hu Xin, a key writer behind official People’s Daily commentary bylines, commits suicide
WeMedia accounts (自媒体) reported on November 6 that Hu Xin (胡欣), the former editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily‘s News Frontline journal — an official publication dealing with media and communication — had committed suicide by leaping from the 19th floor of the newspaper’s office building. Sources close to the journalist said he had long suffered from depression. He was 66 years old.
Hu Xin is not a media figure immediately recognisable to many in China, but behind the scenes he was an important figure helping to shape high-level commentaries from the People’s Daily. He was a core member of the writing team behind the official bylines “Ren Lixuan” (任理轩) and “Ren Zhongping” (任仲平), which were often used in the official newspaper to convey important statements from the Party’s central leadership.
Hu started his career in 1990 in the theory department at the People’s Daily, and from 1998 to 2004 he served as a toop editor of the section.
Key Sources:
WeChat public account “Mei Tong She” (媒通社): 著名媒体人、《新闻战线》原总编胡欣女士坠楼离世!
 

The Medicine Cabinet

The mobile news app of the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper recently released a colorful chart that mapped the complex system of President Xi Jinping’s central governing concept, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). The chart had 30 main branches shooting off from the primary trunk of this supreme buzzword, and each branch, dealing with various aspects of policy and ideology, proliferated into numerous sub-branches.


The idea, it seems, was to map out “Xi Jinping Thought” as a coherent and comprehensive system of ideas. But the result is certainly not simplicity, and it is tempting to imagine what Xi himself might have thought - assuming the unlikely scenario that he actually did see the chart sometime during his busy schedule running the country, and assuming his tired eyes could actually focus on its intricate patterning of concepts.
We can’t know Xi Jinping’s mind on the subject of this mind map. But we can consider another point. Xi Jinping has no doubt read the works of Mao Zedong. And if he has read the speech Mao Zedong gave in Yan’an on February 8, 1942, called “Opposing Stereotyped Party Writing” (反对党八股), then he should know that Mao Zedong would likely have a very clear stance on this recent mind map.
Mao would absolutely despise it.
In the Mao era, the language that prevailed on the Chinese mainland was not only “false, exaggerated and empty,” or jia da kong (假大空) - meaning that it was dominated by high-minded and formalized nonsense - but it was also nearly identical wherever one found it. Hundreds of newspaper articles, in other words, could essentially say the same tedious version of nothing.
The language of Mao Zedong, however, was markedly different. In the Mao era, it was as though hundreds of millions of people had their personal power of expression completely throttled by a single man who was free in his own language and writing to be as distinct and individualistic as he pleased. Consider that at one point Mao Zedong even managed to work into his poetry the undeniably colorful line: “No more flatulence!”
Mao Zedong detested the so-called “eight-legged” essay, or bagu wen (八股文), that had been demanded for imperial examinations during the Ming and Qing dynasties. He dismissed rigid and formalistic styles within the Chinese Communist Party as “Party eight-leggedness,” or dang bagu (党八股) – what is often translated as “stereotyped Party writing.”
In “Opposing Stereotyped Party Writing” (反对党八股), Mao Zedong listed out the eight sins of the eight-legged style. There were, for example, “pages of empty verbiage, devoid of substance” (空话连篇, 言之无物). There was “pretentiousness for the sake of intimidating others (装腔作势, 借以吓人). There was “aimlessness [in expression], done without consideration of one’s audience” (无的放矢, 不看对象). There was “language of a tasteless sort, like that of a beggar” (语言无味, 像个瘪三). And there was also what we might translate “the exhaustive use of the medicine cabinet” (甲乙丙丁,开中药铺).
Describing what he called the “fifth sin,” Mao Zedong wrote:

The fifth sin of stereotyped Party writing is the exhaustive use of the medicine cabinet. This is like going to see the [traditional Chinese] pharmacist, where the many compartments of the medicine cabinet list out the names of medicinal herbs - angelica sinensis, rehmannia glutinosa, rhubarb, mirabilite – anything you could possibly need, and you take a bit of everything. This method has been followed by our comrades. In writing essays, in making speeches, in writing books, in composing reports, first you have ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR; then you have one, two, three, four; after that you have I, II, III, IV; next you bring up the earthly branches; then you move on to A, B, C, D; and from there to a, b, c, d; and finally on to Arabic numerals. There’s not end to it!

Our poor translation aside, the idea here is essentially that Party officials compile their speeches and writing by tossing in every established phrase they can, as though taking a bit of medicinal herb from every compartment of the medicine cabinet.
There’s no need for us to beat around the bush. The complicated mind map of Xi Jinping Thought released by the news app of the People’s Daily is Mao Zedong’s fifth sin for stereotyped Party writing brought into the age of the infographic. It is a medicine cabinet of Xi Jinping Thought.
This map is divided into 30 main items, each obsessively color-coded, and then within each of these there are one to three larger branches, and then one to three smaller ones, piled up and densely packed like veins. For all of the chart’s exhausting order, the dry and unrelatable concepts remain utterly incomprehensible.
This is precisely the sort of thing Mao Zedong loathed.
Not surprisingly, Mao’s “Opposing Stereotyped Party Writing” did come up as Chinese discussed the chart on social media. One user commented by updating a relevant passage from Mao’s 1942 essay to suit modern technology, inserted the portion in bold below:
“It is no big thing if someone engages in stereotyped Party writing for their own perusal. If they give it to a second person, that a 100 percent increase, and this causes a lot of trouble. And if they paste it to a wall, or make a mimeograph copy, or run it in the newspaper, or print it as a book, or post it on the internet through a mobile news app, well then this is a big problem, and it can influence many people.”
 

China Reveals 5th World Internet Conference Dates

At a press conference yesterday, the Information Office of the State Council announced that the 5th World Internet Conference (WIC) will be held this year from November 7-9 in the town of Wuzhen in Zhejiang province. Liu Liehong (刘烈宏), a deputy director of the Information Office, said the theme of the event this year would be: “Creating of Digital World of Mutual Trust and Mutual Governance: Joining Hands to Build a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace” (创造互信共治的数字世界——携手共建网络空间命运共同体).


This is the second year running that the theme of WIC, which for China is an important attempt to draw together political and industry leaders in order to influence the global internet agenda, has incorporated the central foreign policy catchphrase of the Xi Jinping era: “A Community of Common Future for Humankind” (人类命运共同体). The theme of last year’s conference was: “Developing Digital Economy for Openness and Shared Benefits: Building a Community of Common Future for Cyberspace.”
The announcement of the conference dates and theme was carried today on page two of the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper.
According to the report, the World Internet Development Report 2018 and China Internet Development Report 2018, statistical and policy yearbooks produced by the Cyberspace Administration of China, will be launched at this year’s WIC. This is the second year running that the yearbook has been produced and unveiled at the conference.

Missing Posts on Missing Actress Fan Bingbing

Speculation has swirled in recent days about the whereabouts of Chinese actress Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), the star who has appeared in several Marvel films, including X-Men: Days of Future Past. Fan has been missing for more than three months now, ever since she appeared at Cannes to promote a new film alongside such co-stars as Penélope Cruz. This has fueled speculation that the reasons for her disappearance go beyond her reported problems with tax authorities, and that political intrigue might be involved.
Whatever the case, censorship of Fan Bingbing discussion on social media in China appears to be porous and sporadic. Deleted posts do appear in the Weiboscope archive. But a search on Weibo for “Fan Bingbing” also turns up several posts by such prominent media as China Newsweekly and TMTPost discussing her disappearance.
The following is a post made at around 4:31PM on September 13, and censored about one hour later. The Chinese accompanying the image of Fan Bingbing simply reads: “For 100 days . . . ”

Original user id: 刘胜军改革
Date: 2018-09-13 16:31:04
Censored time:: 2018-09-13 17:29:48.727254
Content: 
100天了都…. ​
Image:

This deleted post and others like it would seem to suggest that discussion of Fan Bingbing’s unexplained absence from public view is a sensitive topic. And yet, here is a screenshot of a post made by the official Weibo account of China Newsweekly, a magazine published by the official China News Service, at 3:15AM on September 13. The post, which begins with the headline “Fan Bingbing ‘Missing’ for 100 Days,” is still viewable.


 

Chip Claim Fuels Tech Exuberance, Again

This week, unfortunately, we had the return of the forced “confession,” an all-too-familiar trait of criminal justice in the Xi Era, as state media reported that the Hunan blogger Chen Jieren has admitted to cheating the public. An August 16 article on page 9 of the People’s Daily began with Chen’s supposed admission of wrongdoing: “On the surface, I had a bright and clean appearance, a Big V who flew the flag of equality and justice — when in fact I was only out for personal gain, and I did many shady things and acted as an online parasite.”
Also this week, we had yet another case of tech exuberance, as internet users prematurely interpreted an announcement by a Hangzhou-based chip company as a sign of a sudden and historic breakthrough freeing China from European and American obstacles.

This Week in China’s Media
August 11 to August 17
Abbot of Longquan Monastery Removed as Head of Buddhist Association of China Amid Allegations of Sexual Harassment
Xinhua Daily Runs Article Calling for Creation of a “Birth Fund System” to Encourage Under-40s to Have More Children
➢ Chinese Chip Developer Prematurely Touts First 7 Nanometer Chip
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China Organizes New Batch of Websites To Announce Informing Procedures for “Harmful” Content
➢ State Media Condemn Chen Jieren in the Headlines, Response from His Lawyer is Censored
[1] Abbot of Longquan Resigns as Head of Buddhist Association of China Amid Allegations of Sexual Harassment
In early August, two former monks at Beijing’s Longquan Monastery (龙泉寺) posted a 95-page academic-style paper online in which they exposed various rumors within the Buddhist order. Called “Report on Matters of Importance” (重大情况汇报), the paper alleged repeated sexual harassment by the monastery’s abbot, Xuecheng, of numerous nuns. The paper has since been removed from the internet in China. On August 15, the Buddhist Association of China posted a notice to its website saying that a recent conference had decided to accept the resignation of Xuecheng from his post as association president and all other positions in the organization. The notice, which emphasized that the group was guided by “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” made no direct mention of the allegations against Xuecheng, who is a Communist Party member.


Key Chinese Sources:
China Buddhist Association (中国佛教协会网站): 中国佛教协会第九届理事会第三次会议决议
[2] Xinhua Daily Runs Article Calling for Creation of a “Birth Fund System” to Encourage Under-40s to Have More Children
On August 14, Xinhua Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of the CCP provincial committee in Jiangsu province, published an article called “Raising Birth Rates: New Tasks for Population Development in the New Era” (提高生育率:新时代中国人口发展的新任务), which said that the birth rate in China was down 15-20 percent in the first half of 2018, and that in the next 2-3 years China’s birth rate would be in steady decline.
The article advocated the creation of a “Birth Fund System” (生育基金制度), an issue that drew a great deal of attention from online readers. “It could be stipulated that all citizens 40 years of age and younger, whether male or female, must pay a specified portion of their wages into a birth fund, which would enter their personal account. When a family gave birth to their second or any subsequent child, they could apply to withdraw their birth funds and receive a birth subsidy, which could be used to offset income losses to the female or her family during pregnancy. If the citizens did not have a second child, the funds could be withdrawn after retirement.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua Daily (新华日报): 提高生育率: 新时代中国人口发展的新任务
[3] Chinese Chip Developer Prematurely Touts First 7 Nanometer Chip
Hangzhou-based chip developer Canaan Creative announced on August 8 that it had successfully developed the country’s first 7 nanometer (7 nm) chip. Comments on the WeChat account of the venture capital site Mingin.com were enthusiastic: “One ZTE falls, and thousands of Chinese chip companies will stand up!” “This means that Chinese chips have fully broken through the blockage by Europe and America — a splendid moment of victory for Chinese semiconductor manufacturing, and a historic moment in the development of Chinese science and technology!”
The Mingin post clocked more than 100,000 reads, and was quickly shared by other media on the WeChat platform.

On August 13, Qianjiang Evening News, a local Hangzhou newspaper, cooled off expectations about the domestic 7 nm chip, saying that “China’s high-end chip sector still has a long road to go.” The National Business Daily reported that while China may be able to design a 7nm chip, mainland Chinese enterprises would as yet be unable to mass produce them, and for this would require the services of Taiwanese original equipment manufacturers because advanced laser lithography is still a major bottleneck.
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat Public Account “Mingin Web” (微信公众号”鸣金网”: 预言成真!今天,杭州打响第一枪!
Qianjiang Evening News (钱江晚报): 生产、设计有落差,中国芯的路还很长
National Business Daily (每日经济新闻): 朱邦凌:应正视7纳米芯片量产背后的行业短板2018-08-14 第02版 洞见
WeChat Public Account “Dai Zi Gui Zhong” (微信公众号”待字闺中”: 中国芯,别再自嗨了
[4] Cyberspace Administration of China Organizes New Batch of Websites To Announce Informing Procedures for “Harmful” Content
New Media (网络传播), a magazine published by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) reported through its official WeChat account on August 16 that the CAC had organized 567 websites to publicly promote newly implemented systems through which members of the public can inform on cases of illegal and harmful information. According to the report, this is actually the fifth batch of websites to announce their reporting systems.
Websites in this group of 567 include news websites, commercial websites, government websites and community forums as well as search engines, online commerce sites, video-sharing platforms. Websites on the list included, for example, the widely-used map site Amap, and the music video and social platform Tik Tok.
The China Center for Reporting of Illegal and Harmful Online Information (中国互联网违法和不良信息举报中心) was formed in August 2005, and in May 2014 was placed under the newly-formed Cyberspace Administration of China.
Key Chinese Sources:
China Center for Reporting of Illegal and Harmful Online Information (中国互联网违法和不良信息举报中心网站): 举报指南
WeChat Public Account “New Media Magazine” (微信公众号”网络传播杂志”): 抖音、拼多多、美团等567家网站公布“举报受理”方式
[5] State Media Condemn Chen Jieren in the Headlines, Response from His Lawyer is Censored
On August 16, Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, The Paper and other state-run news media issued harsh criticisms of the writings of “online celebrity” Chen Jieren (陈杰人), an independent blogger from Hunan province who was arrested in June. The reports alleged that Chen’s crimes were “of the nature of online criminal forces” (网上黑恶势力性质的) with a “clan dynamic” (家族式). Chen was also quoted as having “confessed” his crimes.
“Actually, I cheated you all,” the People’s Daily quoted Chen as saying. “On the surface, I had a bright and clean appearance, a Big V who flew the flag of equality and justice — when in fact I was only out for personal gain, and I did many shady things and acted as an online parasite.”

Chen’s lawyer, Tong Zongjin (仝宗锦), responded to these allegations in a statement posted to his WeChat public account, where it was quickly deleted, though it was shared elsewhere as a long image file. On July 7 this year, authorities in Hunan province announced that criminal compulsory measures (刑事强制措施) were being taken against Chen for “illegal business activities,” “extortion” and other crimes.
Key Chinese Sources:
People’s Daily (人民日报): 恶意炒作滋事 疯狂敲诈敛财——起底网络大V陈杰人
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 从“网络大V”到“网络害虫”——陈杰人涉嫌敲诈勒索、非法经营罪案件透视
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 警方披露陈杰人涉嫌敲诈案细节: 银行流水过亿,家族式作案

The Art of Rewriting History

In recent days, the image above has been shared across social media in China, and it has caused considerable speculation and confusion. Is the man standing in the image President Xi Jinping?

The answer, in fact, is NO. The image is not that of Xi Jinping, though it most definitely resembles China’s current leader.
The image is one among 256 works appearing in Spring Tide on the Pearl River: A National Exhibition of Fine Arts Works to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of Reform and Opening (大潮起珠江——庆祝改革开放40周年全国美术作品展), which is now on display at the National Art Museum of China (NAMOC). And the man in the image is Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), Xi Jinping’s father.
As for the rest of the characters, the three men on the left are (moving left to right): Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), Ye Jianying (叶剑英) and Deng Xiaoping (邓小平). The two men on the right are (moving from left to right): Yang Shangkun (杨尚昆) and Gu Mu (谷牧).
According to recent news reports, the painting is an oil called “Early Spring” (早春) which depicts the very beginnings of Reform and Opening, with Xi Zhongxun and other central Party leaders together making plans for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.

Hua Guofeng, an important reform figure not depicted at all in the recent oil painting “Early Spring.”
Now for the historical facts. It was in April 1979 that the Chinese Communist Party held a Central Work Conference at which Xi Zhongxun, then First Secretary of the Guangdong Party Committee, formally requested that a special economic zone be built. Presiding over that meeting was the Party’s chairman and Premier, Hua Guofeng (华国锋) — a figure who does not appear in the painting.
If we return to the figures depicted, we can say that at the time Hu Yaobang was general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (中共中央秘书长); Gu Mu was vice-premier; Yang Shangkun was the second secretary of Guangdong province. On the right-hand side, both Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping were vice-chairmen of the Party.
In fact, neither Deng nor Ye were present at the meeting. The idea of the economic zone would have been reported to them by Xi Zhongxun.
Some scholars have grumbled against the painting on the grounds of opposing “historical nihilism,” saying it entirely expunges Chairman Hua Guofeng. Even more people have observed, however, that in the painting it doesn’t seem as though Xi Zhongxun is giving a report, or huibao (汇报), on the special economic zone, but rather is lecturing Deng Xiaoping. This reading, of course, goes very much against the grain of the typical Chinese Communist Party narrative about the establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which is that this idea was first raised by Deng Xiaoping.
The lyrics of Spring Story (春天的故事), a song that praises Deng Xiaoping, go like this: “The year was 1979, and that was in the spring / when an old man in our motherland, near the South China Sea marked out a ring.” But in this particular painting, the ring is being drawn by Xi Zhongxun — and all around him, other senior leaders gather like stars.
Since Xi Jinping came to power, we have seen a notable increase in attention paid to Xi Zhongxun in the official People’s Daily. We can make a comparison, for example, between Xi Zhongxun and Hu Yaobang, both of whom were important figures in promoting China’s economic reform process. Xi Zhongxun was selected as a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee in June 1981, and the next year entered the Politburo. During this time, Hu Yaobang took over from Hua Guofeng to serve in the Party’s highest post. Hu’s status was without a doubt higher than Xi Zhongxun’s.
In 1987, Hu was forced out of office by conservatives within the Party. It was his death in 1989 that initiated student protests in Beijing and across the country. In the wake of June 4, 1989, Hu’s name became unspeakable. It was not until the Hu Jintao era that Hu Yaobang’s name was finally unloaded of its political sensitivity, or tuomin (脱敏).
In the five years from 2007 to 2012, “Hu Yaobang” appeared 64 times in the People’s Daily. By contrast, “Xi Zhongxun” appeared 24 times in the paper. So Hu Yaobang, you could say, had 2.7 times the exposure in the Party’s flagship newspaper in the five years prior to Xi Jinping’s rise to power.
The situation has reversed in the Xi Jinping era. In the five years from 2013 to 2017, “Xi Zhongxun” has appeared 98 times in the People’s Daily, 2.3 times more than the 42 appearances for “Hu Yaobang.” We should also note that in the past year — the last half of 2017 and the first half of 2018 — “Hu Yaobang” has not appeared at all, even as the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening is upon us.
Here is a quick visualization of these two key reform figures in the People’s Daily since Xi Jinping came to power:

The gap opened starting in early 2016, and it was gaping by the end of that year, as Xi Jinping was anointed as the “core leader.” We see the gap depicted very clearly in “Early Spring,” the oil painting on display at the National Art Museum, and its reinvention of history tells us a great deal about the current environment surrounding the commemoration of 40 years of reform. The “Early Spring” belongs to the New Era of Xi Jinping.
This article was researched and written by Zhi Yin under the direction of CMP Co-Director Qian Gang. 

Taking Stock of US-China Trade Tensions

As news came over the past week that China’s stock exchanges had slid into world number three position, falling behind Japan, on the back of international trade tensions and domestic moves to curb debt, microblog posts about stock markets, Trump and the “trade war” were heavily deleted on Sina Weibo.
This mirrored sensitivities in the traditional media, where pieces like this one from Caijing magazine — “Bickering to This Extent, Can China and the US Get Back to Where They Once Were?” — were also pulled from the internet.

The link for the Caijing magazine piece about US-China trade relations now turns up an error message: “The page does not exist. In 5 seconds you will be redirected to the homepage.”
The following are several posts listed together at the top of the deleted posts archive at the Weiboscope, compiled by our colleagues at the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.

2018-08-05 11:38:54 | Trump says that tariffs have already been a major harm to China, and this is seen in the fact that stock prices have fallen 27% in the past four months. But the question is whether China’s stock market has any connection to China’s real economy?
2018-08-05 11:38:54 | 川普称关税战已经让中国经济受到重伤,表现在中国股市已经在过去四个月跌了27%。问题是中国股市和中国经济有正向关联吗? ​
——-
2018-08-05 11:31:06 | It’s very clear that A-shares are excessively bearish. But when can people be bullish again? I don’t know either.
2018-08-05 11:31:06 | 很显然,A股是过度悲观了。但是,人们什么时候可以乐观起来?我也不知道。 ​
——
2018-08-05 10:36:16 | Trump is most pleased with himself about how the US economy and stock market have risen since he came to office, and he has talked about the stock market in many settings, so he continues to push his hegemonic policies around the world. The China stock market slump has given him even more confidence. If we want to counter Trump and restrain his hegemonic policies, a good method is to push China’s stock market up and strike at his confidence. Why are we not doing that? The A-share market keeps on slumping, causing a great deal of harm. http://m.weibo.cn/1896820725/4269604815661377 ​
2018-08-05 10:36:16 | 特朗普最得意的就是他上任以来美国经济和股市总体是上涨的,很多场合说过股市,因此在世界范围继续推行他的霸权政策。中国股市低迷给了他很大信心变本加厉,要对付特朗普遏制他的霸权政策,将中国股市搞上去是打击他自信的很好手段,为什么就不呢?A股股市低迷不断走低,百害而无一利,股市低迷影响大…全文: http://m.weibo.cn/1896820725/4269604815661377 ​
——
2018-08-05 10:07:11 | //@ChongqingNewsBrother: A couplet for the New Era: On one side, “Amazing is my country!” On the other, “Wretched are my stocks!”
2018-08-05 10:07:11 | //@重庆新闻哥:新时代对联:上联利害了我的国;下联跌惨了我的股。