The chairman of the Internet Society of China said yesterday that China is exploring and progressively trying out a system of “limited real-name registration” for the Internet capable of “balancing personal privacy, the public good and the national interests”, Chinanews.com reported. But it was not clear from Chinese media reports how this newly announced approach to the proposed real-name registration system differs, if at all, from previous proposals.
During yesterday’s “2006 Convention on Promoting Information Technology in China” (二00六中国信息化推进大会), held in Beijing, Hu Qiheng (胡启恒) said: “In the past the recognition of personal privacy has tended toward absolutism. But now not only China but the whole world recognizes that there needs to be a balance between personal privacy and national interests, and we should not make personal privacy absolute”. Hu Qiheng did not specify the particular shifts in global views on privacy to which he was referring.
Addressing the recent wave of public opinion against the proposed blog registration system, Hu Qiheng said China’s “limited” registration system would involve only “backstage” registration (后台实名) – that is to say, users would be required to provide their ID cards and the “necessary documents including their real name” when registering accounts on blog or bulletin board sites (BBS). But when they were “onstage” (前台) users would be free to use whatever aliases they wished. This is unlikely to appease opponents of the real-name registration, many of whom have pointed out that the vitality of China’s Internet and protection of privacy require that users feel their participation is free from government intrusion.
Other Sources:
The Real-Name Blogger Registration System (ESWN)
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 29, 2006, 11:20am]

November 20 [not included in previous almanac] — China’s primary broadcast overseer, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), announced it would tighten controls on so-called “legal programming” (法制节目) in China, a category that deals generally with programs showing law-enforcement activities such as police raids. Programs of this kind (resembling the “COPS” series in the United States) have grown rapidly in popularity in recent years. SARFT said regional “legal programming” had problems in 11 categories of behavior, including “leaking of secrets, violence and content of a sexual nature”. [Chinese coverage here].
November 21 — The resignation of top CCTV sports commentator Huang Jianxiang drew attention to the political workings of the state-run network. Rumors circulated in the media and on the Web said Huang had been forced to resign by an internal letter of criticism from a colleague at CCTV.
November 21 – China’s official People’s Daily reported the launch of the Communist Party’s annual “Three Points” program for indoctrination of young reporters and journalism students in the spirit of party journalism. The annual “Three Points” forums, which tour major cities in China, are designed to familiarize journalists with such concepts as the Marxist View of Journalism, “correct” public opinion guidance and other major party media policies. [Chinese coverage here].
November 23 — A prominent Chinese columnist for Southern Weekend, Dang Guoying (党国英), took the opportunity afforded by Chinese President Hu Jintao’s recent public praise of Vietnamese reforms at the APEC meetings in Hanoi to issue an understated challenge to the president to speed up political reforms in China. The editorial suggested that any leader of a large nation (such as China) who led the drive for political reform would ensure his place in history. Such use of a public statement from a political leader to safely write what might otherwise be regarded as too bold is called in Chinese jieti fahui (借题发挥), or, translated roughly, “using a current topic of conversation to put out one’s own ideas”. [Chinese article here].
November 24 — As two scandals in China’s entertainment industry topped the news in China, Southern Metropolis Daily turned in its editorial page from the more superficial aspects of the stories to ask what kind of action, if anything, would be taken to address serious issue lurking behind the news.
November 25 — Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao reported a record number of former propaganda officials taking up provincial party secretary appointments in China. The article, re-run in scores of Chinese newspapers, implied this new group of “news officials” pointed to a shift in central party appointments and said the officials were working to improve public relations for the regions they represented. CMP sources called the logic of the Ta Kung Pao report misplaced, and said it is not unusual to find officials with media or propaganda department backgrounds — notably, Bo Xilai (薄熙来), China’s current minister of commerce. [Chinese report here].

Over the last week in China two entertainment scandals have topped headlines and chatrooms. Today, in one of the first editorials approaching the scandals from a larger social perspective and pointing out blindness to more fundamental issues raised by the cases, such as sexual abuse and harassment, Southern Metropolis Daily criticized China’s speech controls implicitly and media and Web users directly for turning speech into a “mechanism for sealing oneself off and obviating the need for any sort of action whatsoever”.
The first case involves actress Zhang Yu’s (张钰) online posting of a short video showing a young woman purportedly hired by Zhang having sex with a film director for what Zhang says was exchange for a more prominent role in a production, and her revelation to media of more than 20 tapes of herself having sex with well-known actors and directors. The second case surrounds actress Rao Ying’s (饶颖) online postings of diaries detailing her alleged sexual abuse by CCTV director Zhao Zhongxiang (赵忠祥). Both stories have brought widespread media coverage and a firestorm of postings from Web users. [ESWN on Zhang Yu Affair]. [ESWN on Rao Ying Affair]. [Zhang Yu page at Sina.com].[IMAGE BELOW: Special page devoted to Zhang Yu Affair at Sina.com].

The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, once again, links these cases with larger questions of free speech and social responsibility. The points are relevant to other ongoing debates, such as the proposal for a nationwide real-name registration system for blogs in China. While the word most often on the tongues of proponents of the registration system has been “responsibility”, editorials like this one beg the question: How is responsible speech possible in a system where speech is not protected or respected?
The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial follows:
Southern Metropolis Daily
November 24, 2006, A2
“As Public Opinion Trends Toward Entertainment, Online Denunciations are Futile”
[Summary of Zhang Yu and Rao Ying cases] … In [an informal] study of 100 stars in the entertainment world, only one responded that there were “unwritten rules” [in the profession]. But this doesn’t prevent the Internet world from believing overwhelmingly that what Zhang Yu says is true, or at least the tapes she’s presented are true. About three years ago Zhang Yu went purposely to a newspaper to expose ugly rumors about [film director] Huang Jianzhong’s (黄健中) sexual behavior. But at that time there were some who believed it and others who didn’t, and eventually the story vanished from the media. Perhaps this was because no one actually heard the tapes that were rumored to exist. Actually, in that case mainstream media were not sufficiently on their game. They did not follow up on the story until there was a breakthrough, perhaps because they had scruples about going up against the entertainment world (their long-term and regular sources for news). This time is different. We can see that Zhang Yu has succeeded in grabbing the headlines and gaining an audience that, seeing the evidence she had provided, believes her story.
The turning point of the story this time is the strength of her evidence – a video broadcast directly on the Internet. There is one camp that believes that by doing this she [Zhang Yu] has violated the rights of the person in the video, and that this is illegal. Setting aside for a moment the issue of the law, this incident shows us once again the immense power of the Internet. Some believe online public opinion might become a new form of moral supervision, remedying the division and fuzziness about morals that has come with the greater anonymity of urban life. This is one point of view about the Internet’s power, but as to the actual function such power might serve, this forecast might be a bit too optimistic.
Why? Because we can see from the Zhang Yu and Rao Ying affairs that online opinion is trending clearly toward [bottom-line] entertainment. The people anticipate live sex videos and serial diary entries. They hanker for the snowballing of events and the uncovering of personal affairs in a climax of rave excitement. Just as the motives of both Zhang Yu and Rao Ying imply hatred and the desire for revenge, so does the storm of language conjured up by Web users harbor a kind of fatuous anger and boldly self-assured linguistic violence. What Web users spout out for any story – be it the Zhang Yu and Rao Ying affairs, news of official corruption or stories about miscarriages of justice — are the same sort of obscenities marked with the same sort of fury. Perhaps it’s that they know at the very moment they post their words that saying them is pointless, and if they’re “pointless” why not just put a little more bite into them? [NOTE: “Pointless” here implies China’s censorship regime]. Who anywhere is treating this news seriously? Who anywhere is putting real pressure on those concerned? Can the kind of strict moral judgment Zhang Yu is expecting truly be rendered on the Internet? Relying on language alone, can people truly achieve judgment and lead a [successful] crusade?
Follow-ups on the Zhang Yu affair are already appearing in the traditional media. But the traditional media too are going through a wave of news as entertainment [NOTE: a blurring of the boundaries, in other words]. Of course, this isn’t what’s most important. What’s most important is that no matter whether on the Internet or in the actual world, language is becoming a kind of mechanism for sealing oneself off and obviating the need for any sort of action whatsoever. No one will, on the basis of a serious and principled report in Southern Weekend, go and organize a protest, urge the creation of a new law, or boycott such and such a director’s film. And that means no one in the entertainment world will step out to seriously protest or offer up an explanation of any kind. All we see are monologues of heartfelt anger from two female characters. All we see are a number of media and netizens coming out to have a good time of it. Like those involved we can probably safely suppose that just as happened a few years back this will all blow over. When language fails to prompt action, when it results in no actual consequence, it becomes a house of cards [“built on stilts”], a game and recreation, something to be taken trivially – and the status quo can roll on with its brutal chain of interests.
And why, in fact, has China’s Internet world been marked from its very beginnings with such a fierce emotionalism? Because there are so many things we have to get off our chests. And also because, as people have long understood habitually, our most earnest words, even should they not bring us trouble, cannot really and truly change anything.
Other Sources:
“Xinhua: Actress shows sex tapes to media“, Danwei.org
“China’s Yellow Journalism“, David Bandurski, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2006
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 24, 2006, 3:30pm]

Hu Shuli, editor-in-chief of China’s influential Caijing magazine, was listed on the Wall Street Journal’s list of “Ten women to watch in Asia” on November 20. Hu Shuli is “worth watching”, said the Wall Street Journal, “because of her deftness in pursuing hard-hitting journalism while working her publication’s Communist Party connections”. Caijing can be seen as a pioneer of more independent journalism in China, managing to walk a line between the party’s media control regime on the one hand and the pressures of media commercialization on the other [Caijing on Wikipedia].

The China Media Project has maintained close contact with Caijing journalists in recent years, including Hu Shuli, managing editor Yang Daming, editor Wang Shuo and investigative reporters Yang Haipeng and Kang Weiping.
Caijing has in the last two years been unrelenting in its criticism of the government’s handling of the real estate market in China. In her editor’s letter for the November 13 issue of Caijing, Hu Shuli criticized the central government for not doing enough to curb manipulation of the market for their own benefit. “In a number of public policies, from the residential housing reforms of July 1998 … to National Section 6 in early 2005, we can see the government is clear in principle about its role [in regulating the runaway property market]”, Hu Shuli wrote.
“But in the actual implementation, this overarching policy direction has not, and has no way of, being actualized in the public measures chosen by local governments. Rather, the influence of powerful pockets of entrenched interest has steered the policy this way and that; added to this, the slow opening up of the land market, as well as the current system of allocation of land-sale proceeds between the local and central governement, strengthen the impulse on the part of local governments to seek personal profit in the development of the real estate market.”
Related Articles:
[The Most Dangerous Woman in China, Danwei.org]
[Leading business editor pushes China to the limit, Asiamedia]
[Nieman Report, Harvard University, on SARS coverage]
[Enthusiastic blog on Caijing coverage of recent draft emergency management law]
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 22, 2006, 12:22pm]

Since his resignation from China Central Television (CCTV) last week, celebrity sports commentator Huang Jianxiang (黄健翔) has topped news headlines in China, and some media have suggested popular animosity toward CCTV and its political culture lies at the heart of interest in what might otherwise be a story of relative insignificance. [IMAGE: Screenshot of Sina.com homepage today. Huang Jianxiang coverage circled at right, directly below coverage of Hu Jintao].

Since his resignation on November 16, Huang has tried to quell rumors that he was forced out and insisted he was leaving CCTV for “personal reasons”. But whispers in the media and on the Internet have suggested there are deeper reasons for Huang’s departure. Hao Hongjun (郝洪军), a sports journalist and former editor of Football Daily, wrote on his blog shortly after Huang’s resignation that “XXX of the Sports Channel [at CCTV] wrote a letter informing on Huang Jianxiang”. This blog posting fanned speculation that Huang had indeed been the victim of internal political battles at CCTV. [NOTE: Letters of this kind were a common feature of work units under the state-controlled economy. Often politically driven, they concerned not necessarily work-related matters, but could also be criticisms of personal lifestyle.]
Huang Jianxiang, seen by many football fans in China as a youthful and energetic alternative to the dry and wooden commentators often associated with state television, has lately been the source of much controversy. Huang provoked anger from some football fans back in June when he expressed clear bias for the Italian side after it ousted Australia from the tournament in a last-minute penalty kick. He later apologized to Australian football fans for his outburst. [Huang commentary during Italy-Australia match via YouTube]. [BELOW: Special feature page at Sina.com devoted to Huang Jianxiang and news of his resignation].

Taking issue with a statement by a CCTV official that Huang Jianxiang had resigned under increasing pressure brought on by negative media coverage (or “spoofing”), an editorial in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily suggested the real problem was CCTV’s culture of “rigid correctness”, or zhenggao (正搞), a term the author coined to contrast with the concept of “spoofing”, or e’gao (恶搞). This is a problem that has been argued repeatedly in recent years, as CCTV has attempted to balance its role as a key propaganda mouthpiece with its need to be more commercially savvy in a changing media marketplace [ESWN on CCTV versus Super Girl]:
Southern Metroplis Daily
November 21, 2006, A31
pdf_southern-metro-daily-on-huang.pdf

Up to this point a number of details about Huang Jianxiang’s resignation are still foggy … Huang Jianxiang has written on his blog that “it owes entirely to personal reasons and has nothing whatsoever to do with other people or other matters”. Clearly, this [explanation] amounts to a kind of “official line” (官方表态) [on Huang’s part], and fails to convince the public. According to the head of CCTV’s Sports Channel, Huang Jianxiang’s letter of resignation points to media spoofing (恶搞) [of Huang] as the principle reason for his resignation, that while Huang wished to get on with his work a number of media persisted in reporting malicious rumors, quoting Huang out of context, fabricating stories and putting him under a great deal of stress … (November 20, Beijing Star Daily). I don’t know whether this was truly Huang Jianxiang’s intention [in resigning], but this focusing on media spoofs avoids the important and dwells on the trivial. If there were indeed “malicious and fabricated news” involved, CCTV or Huang Jianxiang could have dealt with these through legal means. [The news of Huang’s] resignation, far from putting an end to rumors, can only set them off.
Regardless of what relationship the resignation does or does not have with storm over [Huang’s] words during [the recent] World Cup, the controversy surrounding Huang Jianxiang must be the starting point for any discussion of what’s happening here in this most recent case. There were more than a few storms [surrounding Huang] last World Cup …
Huang Jianxiang has said he wishes to “lay low for a short time” but contrary to his state wishes he has become the central figure in the news. Saying [Huang’s resignation] was sparked by media attacks is not as accurate as saying it was due to long-standing [culture of] “rigid correctness” at CCTV – that is to say, [the network’s] persistent stance of self-righteous superiority. What the public is interested in is not perhaps any particular commentator so much as [what the situation] reveals about differences over news concepts [at CCTV]. When CCTV recently announced it would switch out news anchors for “News Relay” [CCTV’s nightly newscast] people had hope that these changes signaled the rise of a new concept of journalism in China, but in fact they were due purely to considerations of the age of [“News Relay”] anchors [and signaled no real change]. While the public made too much of the changes at News Relay, their reaction underscored their desire to see change to a new concept of journalism [or media]. The Huang Jianxiang Case can be seen as the latest installment in the conflict between old media values and new media values.
Whether or not the media have spoofed [Huang Jianxiang] is in question; but the fact of CCTV’s “rigid correctness” has long left viewers dissatisfied. Perhaps Huang Jianxiang does object to spoofing [by the media], but the the reason viewers love him is possibly also because he has distanced himself [in his work] just a bit too far from CCTV’s “rigid correctness”.
In a November 18 editorial, Southern Metropolis Daily criticized the “work unit” culture at CCTV, saying the network was locked in a contradiction between its traditional role as a propaganda tool and agent of the serious and the needs of commercialization:
From these two incidents [Huang’s resignation and his controversy back in June] we can see the China Central Television is not only a “work unit” lying somewhere in between the administrative agency and the corporate enterprise, but that it is also a unit lying between the propaganda agency and the media enterprise. This kind of work unit with naturally display a degree of division in the language it broadcasts, for example the strict and sober “News Relay” versus the “Happy Dictionary” [game show] so well liked by ordinary people, and to boot investigative programs with a strong sense of social responsibility [like “News Probe”]. But compared with the media domain as a whole, CCTV has a definite air of self-righteous superiority. This is precisely why “China Dream” [an American Idol-style singing contest] is always compared [unfavorably] against “Super Girl” [a very successful program from Hunan Satellite Television].
During the controversy surrounding his commentating [for the World Cup] many people felt that Huang Jianxiang’s behavior was unprofessional. But many of those who got worked up about the incident were still able to step back and see that his actions were the product of “enthusiasm”. For the sake of enthusiasm and entertainment value they were willing to support him and accept his apology. “Enthusiasm” and “entertainment” should be par for the course in television programming, particularly for football matches. Why should people be overly guarded about such things? Clearly, in the view of some there is a power in wider society that stands against enthusiasm and entertainment.
———————–
[Selected Web postings from Sina.com]
[IP:219.154.211*]
I can’t stand any other commentators on CCTV 5. I won’t be able to stand not having Huang’s commentating. Huang, come back please! Don’t worry about what those petty people said. The football fans of China will stand beside you!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
[mobile user 135****2568]
Huang’s departure means the end of an age.
[IP:202.101.38*]
Huang Jianxiang doesn’t even speak clearly. How can he be a commentator??? And these people even want to open a “commentating school”!
[IP:218.25.77.*]
Without Huang Jianxiang, football isn’t worth watching!
[mobile user 135****1010]
I support Huang Jianxiang’s leaving CCTV, because no matter where he goes he’s a talent, and his leaving is a big loss for CCTV … This whole thing just shows how bad things are in China.
[sunli790822]
Without Huang Jianxiang I’m not sure I’ll bother to watch football anymore!!
[xiepeng65]
You should have gone a long time ago. Your commentary is shameful for the world of football. Ive always muted the sound when I’ve watched CCTV-5. Your commentary wears me out.
[IP: 221.219.60*]
I’ve watched European football [on CCTV] for some many years, and last week suddenly watching it made my head hurt — the reason is the changing of anchors! You people at CCTV, you can go to hell!!!
OTHER LINKS:
Italy-loving Chinese football announcer gets the boot (Nov. 21)
Sports host to tackle rumours (Nov. 19)
China’s anti-Aussie rant commentator quits (Nov. 18)
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 21, 2006, 6pm]

November 13 — While national television media in China were under orders not to report on the Qin Zhongfei (秦中飞) case in Chongqing, in which a government employee was jailed for writing and transmitting by mobile phone a poem satirizing local leaders in the municipality’s Pengshui County, coverage of the case did appear from China’s central Xinhua News Agency. In a November 13 feature story Liaowang, an official magazine published by Xinhua, criticized the actions of local officials in Chongqing in dealing harshly with Qin Zhongfei, and called their suppression of the right to free expression a “huge step back in an age of democracy and rule of law”.
November 12 – Chinese writer Tie Ning was appointed chairman of the China Writer’s Association (CWA), an official organization that nominally represents the interests of professional writers but which some have said serves as a tool of ideological control. Following in the footsteps of writers Mao Dun and Ba Jin, Tie Ning is the first female chairman of the organization, a post that has been empty since Ba Jin’s death just over one year ago. She is also the first chairman under the age of 50. Tie Ning’s appointment comes as China’s world of arts and letters stands at what some say is an important crossroads, with the role of the writer in society in question. In its extreme, uneasiness about the state of Chinese letters has led to cries of the “death” of Chinese literature, a question writer Ye Kuangzheng (叶匡政) addressed in a recent online essay.
November 18 — China Central Television’s annual advertising auction concluded in Beijing, with the state-run network drawing in 6.8 billion yuan (US$833 million) in ad revenues, up 15.7 percent over last year. This year’s “big king”, or successful bidder from the most-coveted spot just before the daily national nightly newscast, was Proctor & Gamble, which paid 420 million yuan (US$51 million). [Chinese coverage at MediaChina.net].

On November 10 the Legal Evening Post, a newspaper published by Beijing Youth Daily, began serializing a novel by journalist Zhu Huaxiang (朱华祥) that gives readers an inside look at the lives of “news workers”, including interactions between fictional editors and fictional propaganda officials, and selective fictional bans on news coverage recalling very real news stories in China, from the draft emergency management law to student protests. The first installment follows:
At 9:30am after he had sent out “Demands Concerning Sudden-Breaking News in Dongfang City” and the propaganda department’s second publicity notice, He Dalong, director of the Office of Information of the Dongfang City Propaganda Department, began doing what he did everyday — he read all the newspapers of Dongfang City. Stacked on his desk were all the papers published in the city that day: The Legal Reporter, Information Express, Dongfang Economic Daily, Dongfang Commercial Daily, Dongfang Evening Post …
He Dalong simply scanned the first few papers, looking mostly at the headlines. The last paper he read was always the city’s venerable old Dongfang Evening Post, which held a pivotal position and had to be scrutinized carefully.
“Ding! Ding! Ding! …” The phone rang. He glanced quickly at the number listed and then immediately picked up the receiver. His tone grew respectful: “Department Head Zhang! It’s Dalong.”
It was Ma Cheng, head of the propaganda department of the Dongfang Municipal Party Committee. He had just received a notice from the provincial propaganda department ordering media not to carelessly build up stories of conflicts involving university students.
“Dalong, the Information Office needs to send out this notice. The student problem is getting more and more complicated. We have to be on our guard, otherwise things will get really chaotic. Has next week’s regular news meeting been planned?” He Dalong answered: “Everyone [all the media] has been notified, it’s just that Sun Qiangqing of Dongfang Evening Post has asked to be excused, and for the assistant editor, Gu Chengshi, to go in his place”. Ma Cheng’s voice grew a bit hostile: “That old Sun is trying to avoid the propaganda department”. He Dalong said: “Yeah, he’s avoided coming to quite a few meetings. Do you want to call him in to talk?” “Talk about what? If we really call him out and bring him in to talk he’ll lose face. Ok, let’s just keep our eyes on the ball.”
He Dalong hung up the phone, sipped his tea and began flipping through the day’s Evening Post. He had never thought that at the age of 34 he would be serving as the commander in chief, [as it were], of this particular newspaper.
It was at about this time that Chen Yuan, acting assistant editor of Southern Times was at the wheel of his Santana [sedan], caught in bumper-to-bumper traffic along the main road of the special economic zone. It wasn’t uncommon for him to sit in 40 minutes of traffic on the way to the office each day.
As he sat at the red light, Chen Yuan belted out a song and thought out a number of newspage issues at Southern Times. The executive committee of the newspaper [including top editors and the director, generally a cadre] had demanded that the arrangement of the paper be adjusted. For those newspapers that were drawing readers in China, it was mostly a question of style. Like those metro newspapers in Chengdu, Sichuan, that drew the eye with bold headlines. Chinese newspapers were all crazy about redesigning themselves. Whenever a new director or editor-in-chief came on board, the first thing they did was change the front page, which they saw as an accomplishment in itself.
The light turned green and Chen Yuan eased the car forward. Chen Yuan thought that he wanted to change the layout of the newspaper to something like that of the U.S. Wall Street Journal, but he worried that the executive committee might not approve. That was a great layout, one that had stood the test of time. But did it suit Chinese readers? He had no idea. He thought changing the layout to something more like the UK’s The Sun might stand a better chance of passing muster. This style was also suited to attracting readers.
Just as he was thinking this, his mobile phone rang. It was his wife.
“Are you coming home for dinner tonite?”
“Not tonite, I have to meet with the CEO of Ruidong Group”.
“What do they do?”
“I’m not sure. I’ve heard they’re paper manufacturers. Someone else introduced him, but we haven’t met yet”.
“Oh. Well, don’t drink to much.”
“Don’t worry. I’ll still have to be on the night shift”.
Right after he finished speaking to his wife the news desk at the paper called. They said an electrical components manufacturer in the special economic zone was searching its employees everyday, and that some of the security guards had touched the female workers inappropriately. “Jerks!” said Chen Yuan. “Send a reporter over, and ask someone from the photography desk to go along. Do a good job of it.”
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 17, 2006, 12:39pm]

According to CMP sources, national television media in China have been under orders since late October not to report on the Qin Zhongfei (秦中飞) case in Chongqing, in which a government employee was jailed for writing and transmitting by mobile phone a poem satirizing local leaders in the municipality’s Pengshui County. Despite the order against television coverage, delivered by Central Propaganda Department officials, a major feature story on the case appeared on November 13 in Liaowang, an official magazine published by the central Xinhua News Agency. The story was re-printed yesterday in Jinghua Times, the commercial spin-off of the official People’s Daily, and in Henan’s Dahe Daily. Sichuan’s Chengdu Business Daily ran its own story on November 13 raising four questions about the Pengshui case [see below and PDF above] and reprinting in full the poem that set off the controversy. [PDF: November 13 Chengdu Business Daily story on Pengshui SMS Case].
So what exactly is going on here?
Southern Metropolis Daily said recently in its wrap-up of major journalism events in 2006 that Xinhua News Agency had made a number of “breakthroughs” this year, perhaps referring to cases like Xinhua’s coverage of Typhoon Saomei. The Liaowang feature might be seen as the latest example of “breakthrough” coverage by Xinhua, meaning that top officials at the official newswire, perhaps under commercial pressure to offer more than empty publicity (to be more relevant, in other words), might have chosen to disregard propaganda orders against coverage — not an unlikely scenario given the power of top Xinhua cadres. At any rate, possible changes in behavior at Xinhua are something that should be watched closely.
However, a more likely explanation for the apparent disjoint between television bans and Xinhua coverage is that the Pengshui SMS case is being used by top officials via Xinhua News Agency to highlight local leadership problems in the run-up to Seventeenth National CPC Congress next year. The case might be used to send a message to recalcitrant local officials urging them to cooperate with the policy spirit of the center, particularly Hu Jintao’s notion of a “harmonious society”. The Liaowang feature story comes, significantly, as the party is trying to push the idea (or, at the very least, the perception) of greater participation by larger society in political affairs, which can be seen in the much-touted decision this week to increase by five percentage points the number of “candidates” for People’s Congress delegate positions, which theoretically raises the level of competition [BELOW: Front page article in Jinghua Times, November 13, announces increase in ratio of National CPC Congress candidates to delegates].

The feature article in Liaowang loudly criticizes the actions of local officials in Chongqing in dealing harshly with Qin Zhongfei, and calls their suppression of the right to free expression a “huge step back in an age of democracy and rule of law”. Considering the source, this should be taken with a grain of salt. But the message is clear — in the run up to the Seventeenth National CPC Congress, top leaders wish to project a gentler, more inclusive image, emphasizing the goal of a “harmonious society”. Here are key portions of the Liaowang article:
People on the street believe that despite rapid [economic] growth in Pengshui the common people have not seen the benefits and salaries for government employees are too low. County leaders should take the words of the poem and see them as admonishments promoting [better governance], recognizing them as signs of active participation in political and government affairs by common people, who have an ardent yearning for the healthy development of Pengshui. For them [the officials] to go against this principle in wildly suppressing free expression is a huge step back in an age of democracy and rule of law.
One government cadre in Pengshui who did not wish to give his name said that popular opinion isn’t just a hole that lets the wind through [ie,”gives rise to rumors”] but has increasingly become an important force in monitoring government. County leaders should learn how to have better dialogue with common people, interacting with them more, using various effective means to carry out publicity and education. Using government power to suppress public opinion violates the central [party’s guiding] spirit of “building the party for the public, governing for the people” and is a sign of weak intelligence.
Wang Xuehui (王学辉), assistant director of the Political and Government Affairs School of the Xinan University of Politics and Law says that democracy and rule of law are important components of a harmonious society, and the “Pengshui Case” just a few lines criticizing the county secretary [top leader] and county governor were regarded as crimes and more than 40 people were summoned for trial. This is the kind of thing we have seen only in the [old Qing Dynasty tradition of “imprisonment or execution for using language in error” (文字狱).
[NOTE: There are a number of well-known examples from the Qing Dynasty of wen zi yu, or “imprisonment or execution for using language in error”. In one case a scholar wrote of the wind whisking through his study: “For the pure breeze words can have no meaning/Why then does it turn these pages?” (清风不识字/何必乱翻书). The first character, qing, or “pure”, is the same as the character for the Qing Empire. When the poem was discovered, the writer was executed.]
The November 13 report in Chengdu Business Daily addressed what it said were four key problems in the Qin Zhongfei case:
Q1: Why were county officials troubled by an SMS message? Officials considered that this was a highly sensitive time given the upcoming leadership changes [to come with the Seventeenth National CPC Congress], and some officials might be removed. In order to keep the situation from getting out of hand, authorities pursued the case [against Qin Zhongfei].
Q2: Why was the suspect [Qin Zhongfei] arrested and punished despite insufficient supporting evidence? Local police forces often handle cases in the spirit of, “How can the son sit idle when Father is being attacked?” The police did not handle critical tasks in the case as they should have, including the arrest and case filing. Officer HE (the police chief in Pengshui), placed too much trust in his subordinates. Moreover, despite the extreme sensitivity of the case, police in Pengshui did not report it to Chongqing municipal police. The case was referred to the courts without the knowledge of authorities in Chongqing.
Q3. Why was an earnest criticism from the public being attacked [by authorities]? As the investigation went forward some officials in Pengshui County persisted in holding that the content of the poem written by Qin Zhongfei was problematic. Some senior officials maintained that while the poem had not violated any laws its contents were [politically] incorrect. The investigation turned up no evidence to suggest [Qin Zhongfei’s actions] constituted a crime of national security.
Q4. How can the phenomenon of “imprisonment or execution for using language in error” be effectively avoided and civilian requests heard? The poem sent by Qin Zhongfei via short message was a form of expression. But in this case, officials in Pengshui took action against public opinion solely in their own interests and applied the law to exact revenge. This is not permitted under the laws and regulations of our nation and our Party. Criminal Law has established clear rules on abuse of official authority, and the behavior of officials in Pengshui clearly constitutes a miscarriage of law. Moreover, the incident shows that some frontline authorities [local and regional officials] do not possess the correct attitude towards public opinion. They have therefore abandoned the fair tradition of self-criticism within the party.

[Posted by David Bandurski and Brian Chan, November 15, 2006, 3:08pm]

Chinese writer Tie Ning was appointed chairman yesterday of the China Writer’s Association (CWA), an official organization that nominally represents the interests of professional writers but which some have said serves as a tool of ideological control. Following in the footsteps of writers Mao Dun and Ba Jin, Tie Ning is the first female chairman of the organization, a post that has been empty since Ba Jin’s death just over one year ago. She is also the first chairman under the age of 50.
Tie Ning’s appointment comes as China’s world of arts and letters stands at what some say is an important crossroads, with the role of the writer in society in question. In its extreme, uneasiness about the state of Chinese letters has led to cries of the “death” of Chinese literature, a question writer Ye Kuangzheng (叶匡政) addressed in a recent online essay.
According to a report in today’s Jiangnan Times, there have been a number of high-profile requests by writers to drop their association membership in recent years. In 2003, writers Xu Kaiwei and Huang Heyi, in historic firsts, applied to withdraw membership. Explaining his action at the time, Xu Kaiwei said the CWA was “internally a mess and full of conflict, leaving the association in a state of paralysis”.
The sole media voice today to tease out the importance of Tie Ning’s appointment and the deeper issues facing writers in China was Southern Metropolis Daily. The column points out that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the China Writer’s Association has been unique worldwide in being a nominal association of writers in fact operated by a national government. According to Southern Metropolis Daily, the association has ministerial rank and is fully supported by the central government, with a staff of over 6,000 nationwide.
In typical Southern Metropolis Daily style, the editorial argues that the China Writer’s Association should move in the direction of a civic organization, representing the interests of freely creating writers over and against party ideology. The fifth and eighth paragraphs of the editorial follow [pdf_southern-metro-daily-on-tie-ning-and-writing.pdf]:

No matter when, where or under whatever system, true writers must represent the spirit of human freedom – independent thought and free imagination form the foundation of their act of creation

. Therefore, the first task of the China Writer’s Association must be to do as much as possible to protect writers’ freedom of creation, and not to limit that freedom through the hardening forces of power and ideology as an official organization. Parochial ideology and wrangling over benefits [to the party] all have the potential to stifle free creation. Writers, who are dispersed, often do not have the strength to resist [these trends]. It is incumbent on the China Writer’s Association, as for any professional association, to gather that strength and clear away these obstacles in the cultural arena so that literature can be resplendent …
In comparison to the two previous chairmen, who concurrently held several positions, onerous social responsibilities and poor health … we place great expectations on the youthful Tie Ning — not only that she might continue to write good works after her appointment, but more that she might, through the peculiar organization of the China Writer’s Association [IE: an officially-controlled professional association] beat her drum for the creative conscience of China’s writers.

[Posted by David Bandurski, November 13, 2006, 5:30pm]

November 8 – Chinese media rang in the country’s seventh annual Journalist’s Day with a range of buzzwords expressing various views on the role of journalism in China, but topping the list by a long shot was President Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious Society”. “In a CMP analysis of eight key buzzwords, “harmonious society” logged more than double the references of any other buzzword. On a day purportedly dedicated to the profession of journalism in China, there was no mention whatsoever of the term “professionalism” in the party or commercial press.
November 13 — Chinese writer Tie Ning was appointed chairman yesterday of the China Writer’s Association (CWA), an official organization that nominally represents the interests of professional writers but which some have said serves as a tool of ideological control. Following in the footsteps of writers Mao Dun and Ba Jin, Tie Ning is the first female chairman of the organization, a post that has been empty since Ba Jin’s death just over one year ago. She is also the first chairman under the age of 50. Tie Ning’s appointment comes as China’s world of arts and letters stands at what some say is an important crossroads, with the role of the writer in society in question.
November 13 — Former JMSC Assistant Professor Andrew Lih reported that blocks were being progressively lifted in China on the Chinese version of online encyclopedia Wikipedia. [More at Andrewlih.com].
November 12 — An estimated 2,00 people demonstrated at a hospital in China’s Sichuan Province after learning of the death of a three year-old boy who was reportedly denied emergency treatment after he had ingested a pesticide because his parent could not pay the fees up front. Two articles on the incident appeared in Chinese media over the weekend, but there was no mention of the demonstrations and emphasis was placed on an official investigation announced by local leaders. [New York Times coverage].
November 13 — Chinese search engine leader Baidu.com announced the signing of an agreement with U.S.-based online auction service eBay. The cooperation covers a co-branded toolbar in China as well as advertising and online bill payment. [TechNewsWorld coverage].