On a day when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is headline news all over the world, with commentators everywhere speculating on how China will react, it might seem strange that the story does not top the front page of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily.

In fact, the first article on the paper’s front page to mention Pelosi at all is tucked away in the bottom-right corner, fifth in order of importance – after an article about Xi Jinping’s recent meeting with provincial officials; an article about scientific farming techniques used in Jilin province; an article about provincial leaders studying the spirit of an “important speech” (重要讲话) by Xi; and an article about the critical importance of “united front work.”

Pelosi touching down in Taiwan has brought full-throated condemnation from China along with threats of retaliation. Is this story really of secondary importance to farming techniques in China’s northeast?

Things become clearer when we understand that these stories about provincial leaders and farming techniques are ultimately stories about the most important matter before the country  – the power and prestige of its top leader, Xi Jinping, and his elevation at the upcoming 20^th National Congress of the CCP.

Even what some are calling the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis could not break through the rigidity of purpose at the People’s Daily.

The article on farming? A nod to Xi Jinping’s inspection there two years ago, and a testament to the miracles that can happen when “the wishes of the general secretary are borne in mind.” The articles on the meetings of provincial leaders? Both emphasize Xi’s pre-eminence, the first concluding: “Let us more firmly unite around the Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core, upholding Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as our guide.”

Recognize the power dynamics at play behind the scenes in China and you’ll understand one of the most important factors that will guide China’s leadership in responding to Pelosi’s visit in the coming weeks.

A Parade of Official Statements

So how has the People’s Daily covered the Pelosi story? The lineup in the newspaper today is a rather typical gathering of condemnations from various ministries and committees, all following a commentary from the paper (本报评论员) that relays the view of the leadership.

The commentary is called “The Determination of the Chinese government and the Chinese People to Realize the Reunification of the Motherland is Rock-solid” (中国政府和中国人民实现祖国统一的决心坚如磐石). It begins with a laundry list of solemn violations and outrages that are echoed in the pieces that come after, on page three of the newspaper:

For US House Speaker Pelosi to visit China’s Taiwan region in spite of China’s strong opposition and serious representations seriously violates the one-China principle and the stipulations of the three joint communiqués between China and the US, and has a serious impact on the political foundation of US-China relations. [It] is a serious violation of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, a serious breach of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and sends a gravely wrong signal to the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence.’

After running through China’s official position on the matter, the commentary addresses reunification as an inevitable matter of the public will. “Public opinion cannot be violated, and the great trend cannot be turned back,” it says. “The motherland must be unified, and it will be unified.”

A notice printed below the commentary then points readers to page three of today’s newspaper and five separate statements. These are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; the CCP’s Taiwan Work Office; the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); and the Ministry of National Defense.

The sixth Taiwan-related story on page three is a statement about planned “joint military operations” (联合军事行动).

At the top of page three is the Xinhua release on the response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizing that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory,” and that “the government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all of China.” The release begins with a stern condemnation of Pelosi’s visit, which it labels a “violation of the one-China principle” (一个中国原则):

On January 2, 2012, U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan despite China’s strong opposition and solemn representations. It sends a serious wrong signal to the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence’ (“台独”分裂势力). China resolutely opposes and severely condemns this, and has made serious representations and strong protests to the US side.

The statement is stacked with formalized language familiar to anyone who has observed China’s protestations over the Taiwan issue through the years. Matters concerning Taiwan are China’s internal affairs (中国内政), in which the US has no right to interfere. The US must desist from playing the “Taiwan card” (台湾牌), and “using Taiwan to control China” (以台制华). Taiwan is of course referred to as “China’s Taiwan region” (中国台湾地区). The word “separatist forces” (分裂势力) is used repeatedly in the release.

Directly below the MOFA-related story is a Xinhua transcript of a “talk” by a spokesperson from the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) “on behalf of the NPC Standing Committee” that again registers China’s opposition to Pelosi’s visit – making largely the same points as the first piece.

But the NPC Standing Committee statement also suggests more clearly that the Pelosi visit is the latest in a series of actions that go against the “solemn commitments” (郑重承诺) the US has made to China on Taiwan. “In its actions,” the statement says, “[the US] has continued to enhance substantive relations and official contacts between the United States and Taiwan, connived to support the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence,’ and engaged in ‘controlling China with Taiwan.’”

The third article in the page three series today is the statement, again released by Xinhua, from the Taiwan Work Office of the CCP Central Committee. The article, which begins by calling Pelosi’s visit “an escalation of Taiwan-US collusion, its nature terrible and its consequences dire,” focuses more than the other two pieces on the issue of reunification. Twice the article references Xi Jinping’s notion of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” First, it accuses the US of “obstructing the complete reunification of China and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Pelosi’s visit being the latest and most egregious example. Second, it calls “Taiwan separatism” the greatest obstacle to the “reunification of the motherland” (祖国统一),  and the “hidden danger for national rejuvenation” (民族复兴的严重隐患).

The Taiwan Work Office article concludes:

We urge the US side to look at the historical details of the Taiwan issue, recognizing the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, and to take practical action to abide by the one-China principle and fulfill the three US-China joint communiqués – not sliding further and further down the wrong path.

The fourth article on page three of the People’s Daily today is the statement from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (全国政协外事委员会). Like the others, it voices “strong condemnation” (强烈谴责) of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and emphasizes the inviolability of the one-China principle. Like the MOFA statement, it warns against “underestimating” the determination of the Chinese people on this issue: “No one should underestimate the strong determination, the firm will, and the powerful ability of the Chinese people to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity!”

Fifth comes the statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense (国防部) that again voices “strong condemnation” and “firm opposition” (坚决反对) to the Pelosi visit. The statement reads:

China has repeatedly made clear the serious consequences of the visit to Taiwan, but Pelosi has knowingly and maliciously provoked and created a crisis, seriously violating the one-China principle and the provisions of the three US-China joint communiqués, seriously impacting the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations, and seriously damaging the relationship between the two countries.

The statement says that the People’s Liberation Army is now in “high readiness” (高度戒备), and that it plans “a series of targeted military operations to counteract [the move], and defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Last, but certainly not least, comes the statement about “joint military operations” that are reportedly underway “around the island of Taiwan.” “The actions,” the release says, “are a serious deterrent against recent negative and escalating moves by the US on the Taiwan issue.”

As for the rest of the newspaper, there are two full pages on the glories of the “New Era.” There is, in “important news,” an entire page about “Studying Xi Jinping” (学习习近平). When it comes to what, or who, amounts to news – this is not a time for doubt, or for questions.

Earlier this week, a prominent headline on the homepage of People’s Daily Online announced new regulations from the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party placing stronger restrictions on the business activities of the partners and children of Chinese officials – and that, moreover, a commentary on the subject had been written by “Zhong Zuwen” (仲祖文).

Who was this mystery writer, and what made their appearance so noteworthy? We might picture a hardened senior anti-corruption official putting pen to paper and sounding off about the need for tougher governance: “Strengthening the management of the commercial activities and businesses of the spouses and children of leading cadres is an important political task set by the CCP Central Committee,” the commentary read.

But “Zhong Zuwen” is not a person at all. The byline is just a pen name, an onion-skin layer of brittle pretense covering over an obvious homophone. In fact, this is the piece of writing from the Party office in charge of staffing positions, the zhongyang zuzhi bu (中央组织部). The “wen” at the tail end is Chinese for “article” – so that taken together the nom de plume becomes: “article of the Organization Department of the CCP.”

Such “propaganda codes,” or “homophonous pen names,” are in fact quite common in the Party-state media, and in the halls of power. They form an internal system of not-so-secret codes by which those in positions of power, both departments and individuals, can voice their official positions and put their stamp on a course or policy.

Once you understand how to parse the names, they seem to crop up everywhere.

A Party Unit by Any Other Name

On Friday last week, days before the “Zhong Zuwen” piece made its appearance on page two of the People’s Daily, another commentary made the rounds in state media attributed to a certain “Wang Xingping” (王兴平). The article praised Xi Jinping’s persistence with China’s “dynamic zero” approach to Covid, and as we noted in our analysis at CMP, the commentary resorted to the Mao-era concept of “policies of greater benevolence” (大仁政) to justify suffering under constant lockdowns.

Who wrote this piece of sycophantic loyalty signaling? The article first appeared on the WeChat public account “CAC China” (网信中国), which is run by the China Cyberspace Research Center (中国网络空间研究院) of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the powerful internet control body. “Wang” (王) is one of the most common Chinese surnames. But it is also a homophone of “wang” (网), the word for “net” or “network.” “Xing” (兴), meaning to “rise” or “flourish,” is a homophone of “xin” (信), the first character of the word “information.” Finally, “ping” (平), meaning “peaceful,” is a homophone of the first character of the word “commentary,” pinglun (评论).

“Wang Xingping,” then, stands in for “commentary of the Cyberspace Administration of China” (网信办评论). Beginning to see how the game works?

In both of the above cases, these commentaries would most likely have been written by “writing teams,” or xiezuozu (写作组), within the respective offices, the Organization Department and the CAC. They would then be circulated to top officials – perhaps even, in the case of the CAC, to Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文), who in the past has placed Xi beside Mao – who would offer feedback and suggest changes.

Pen names backed by such “writing teams” include the Zhong brothers, “Zhong Xuanli” (钟轩理) of the Theory Office of the Central Propaganda Department (中宣部理论局), and “Zhong Zhengxuan” (钟政轩) of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (中央政法委). There is “Wei Minkang” (卫民康), the team writing soaring CCP prose for the Ministry of Health (卫生部).

At the People’s Daily, there are writing teams, no doubt with overlapping members (写作组组员), for various themes and intensities. There is Mr. Important, “Ren Zhongping” (任仲平), reserved for “important People’s Daily commentaries” (人民日报重要评论) – this being the homophone. There is Ms. Make-It-Better, “He Zhenhua” (何振华), whose commentaries deal with “how to revitalize China” (如何振兴中华) – again the homophone.

Crucially in the era of tense relations between China and the United States, there is Mr. Miffed, “Zhong Sheng” (钟声) – literally “bell tone,” but also a homophone of “China + voice” – the official pen name used routinely for important pieces on international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its often scathing view. Finally, there is Zhong Sheng’s slightly calmer cousin, “Guo Jiping” (国纪平), standing for “important commentaries about international [affairs]” (有关国际的重要评论), who sounds off just a bit more rationally from the paper’s international desk, but who can rarely resist the emotional finish: “No one can stop the historical course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation!”

Struggling with Secret Codes

In a 2013 paper on “writing teams” for The China Quarterly, Taiwanese scholars Wen-Hsuan Tsai (蔡文轩) and Peng-Hsiang Kao (高鹏翔) wrote that “the pseudonyms of the Party unit writing teams function as a form of secret code.” This code works, they said, to alert other Party officials to the views of certain departments or units. In the late reform era, these codes, or pen names, became more regular, what Tsai and Peng refer to as a “process of institutionalization.” Consider that “Guo Jiping,” the international affairs writing team at the People’s Daily, was first introduced in October 2005, in a piece about the 60^th anniversary of the United Nations. It has since then appeared 104 times, the latest just last Saturday.   

In the past, however, these pen-named commentaries, written by teams and powerful individuals, have marked points of struggle and strife within the CCP.

One of the earliest pen names was “Ding Xuelei” (丁学雷), first used in early 1966 by a Shanghai writing team controlled by polemicist Zhang Chunqiao (张春桥) and cultural critic Yao Wenyuan (姚文元), both members of the radical political alliance that would later become known as the “Gang of Four.”  Attacks by “Ding Xuelei” on prominent writers in February 1966 were some of the earliest signs of the violence and chaos that would be unleashed later that spring as the Cultural Revolution began in earnest.

On February 12, 1966, Shanghai’s Liberation Daily ran a commentary in which “Ding Xuelei” savaged Hai Rui Submits His Memorial (海瑞上疏), a play by Peking opera actor Zhou Xinfang (周信芳) that tells the story of a principled Ming Dynasty official who speaks out against the actions of a cruel and self-indulgent emperor. Some at the time saw Zhou’s play, along with Wu Han’s Hai Rui Criticizes the Emperor (海瑞骂皇帝), as an allegory about Mao’s purge of Peng Dehuai (彭德怀) during the Lushan Conference for speaking out against the errors of the Great Leap Forward.

On May 28, 1966, nearly two weeks after the May 16 Notification, which directly mentioned Wu Han’s play, the People’s Daily maintained the pretense that “Ding Xuelei” was a human being. Of Ding Xuelei’s February screed in the Liberation Daily, the paper wrote that “Comrade Ding Xuelei’s article correctly unveiled, adequately unveiled and powerfully unveiled” the fact that Zhou Xinfang’s play, like that of Wu Han, was a “poisonous weed against the Party and the socialist system.” The play had “pointed its spearhead at our great Party.”

The “Gang of Four,” which included Mao Zedong’s fourth wife, Jiang Qing (江青), excelled at the creation and weaponizing of pen names. Another was “Liang Xiao” (梁效), a homophone of “two schools” (两校), marking commentaries written by a writing team comprising people from Peking University and Tsinghua University.  These writings were commanded by Mao and Jiang, as were those of “Tang Xiaowen” (唐晓文), a homophone of “Party School writing” (党校文), marking the work of the “Central Party School Writing Team” (中央党校写作组).

Cutting Down the Poisonous Weeds

As the “Gang of Four” were arrested in October 1976, just weeks after Mao’s death, these poisonous pen names were unmasked. In the years that followed, writers like Zhou Xinfang and Wu Han were rehabilitated (though both had died under persecution years earlier).

In September 1978, the People’s Daily decried the bitter criticism of Zhou Erfu’s (周而复) novel Morning in Shanghai (上海的早晨) in a 1969 article by “Ding Xuelei” that had appeared in the paper’s own pages. “The Great Poisonous Weed that Sounded the Gong for Liu Shaoqi’s Restoration of Capitalism,” the headline had read. “Ding Xuelei” was referred to by then as “a pen name for that counter-revolutionary deployment force of the Gang of Four, the Shanghai Committee Writing Team” (上海市委写作组).

In an indictment of the “counter-revolutionary group” that included Lin Biao (林彪), Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and others, published in the People’s Daily on November 21, 1980, Jiang, Zhang and Yao were singled out for “leading writing teams that included ‘Liang Xiao’ of Peking University and Tsinghua University, ‘Luo Siding’ (罗思鼎) of Shanghai, ‘Chi Heng’ (池恒) of the Red Flag journal, and ‘Tang Xiaowen’ of the Central Party School.”

The next month, Yao Wenyuan was quoted as having confessed before his court of accusers: “I asked them to write.”

But even as China left the Cultural Revolution behind and began a slow transformation, the pen name remained as a secret code for the voices of the powerful. On November 14, 1979, a front-page commentary appeared in the People’s Daily called, “We Can Talk About Political Issues Too.” Bylined “Guo Luoji” (郭罗基), the piece appeared against the backdrop of internal Party division over the so-called Democracy Wall protests (1978-1979) and the arrest of activist Wei Jingsheng (魏京生). It argued, as Wei languished in prison, that “no one should be held guilty for speaking out” (言者无罪).

The article incensed Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木) and other CCP hardliners. But as the former People’s Daily editor-in-chief Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟) revealed in 2004, it had in fact been reviewed and edited by the liberal senior official Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦).

Writing teams continued to play an important role in secret code writing after 1979, one of the most outstanding examples being the “Huangfu Ping” (皇甫平) team, which published a series of commentaries in support of reform policies in 1991 and 1992, ahead of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.” The articles, in a series called “Reform and Liberalization Need New Thinking,” were written by a team that included the veteran newspaper editor Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金). They played a crucial role in arguing for continued openness and reform in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, which had ushered in a period of relative isolation and conservatism.

Why “Huangfu Ping”? The pen name derives from two homophones, the first meaning “Huangpu River commentaries” (黄浦江评论), a reference to the river running through Shanghai, a key city on the “tour,” and the second meaning “assisting Deng Xiaoping” (辅助邓小平).

A Secret Code for Political Reform

In late October 2010, shortly after the Fifth Plenum of the 17^th Central Committee, and at a time when there was more urgent talk of the need for substantive political reform to grapple with long-term economic development and social inequality, a series of commentaries placed prominently in the People’s Daily and at People’s Daily Online prompted widespread speculation. They appeared under the byline “Zheng Qingyuan” (郑青原), which many internet users surmised was a writing team, and a homophone for “clearing up the source and getting to the bottom of things” (正本清源).

Five articles from “Zheng Qingyuan” appeared in total, the first on October 21, 2010, and the last on November 2. The most outspoken of these, “Promoting Reform with Greater Determination and Courage,” twice mentioned the term “political reform” (政治体制改革), including a forward-looking statement about the need for the CCP to “actively and steadily promote political reform.”

The writings of “Zheng Qingyuan,” which clearly suggested the need to grapple with China’s challenges at the root, surely came from senior officials in the Politburo Standing Committee. Given Premier Wen Jiabao’s repeated references through 2011 and 2012 to the urgent need for political reform, he is impossible to exclude as a key figure behind the pen name.

Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi Jinping has shown an entirely different face, and in retrospect it is difficult to imagine that he too endorsed the words of “Zheng Qingyuan.”

Talk of political reform and constitutionalism has all but disappeared since 2013 – the latter appearing not at all and the former appearing only in references to the past, including the resolution on history introduced in November last year. For Xi, the solution to China’s future lies in the rule of the CCP with himself at the helm and at the “core.” And to accomplish his objectives, he must ensure that the Party is protected from its own excesses, that its “leading cadres” are loyal and clean, and their family members blameless.

Just ask “Zhong Zuwen.”

Since early May, when Xi Jinping said during a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) that China must “persist” in its “dynamic zero” (动态清零) policy toward the containment of Covid-19, the message has remained clear – stream-rolling over criticism of the painful impact the approach has had on the lives of individuals, families, residential compounds and entire cities.

“Dynamic zero” is here to stay. State media have argued consistently that the policy not only cuts viral transmission in the shortest time possible domestically, but also that it has “brought tangible benefits to the whole world.” This despite the fact that lockdowns have persisted in waves in cities like Shanghai, with a broad and undeniable impact on local businesses and government finances that will have a ripple effect globally.

This week, as state media pundits stretched for justifications of a policy that has continued to draw domestic and international criticism, one commentator called up a rhetorical ghost from China’s Maoist past: “policy of greater benevolence” (大仁政).

What does this phrase mean?

The Long and the Short

This “policy of greater benevolence” notion was first raised by Mao Zedong in September 1953 during a speech about China’s “victory” in the Korea War that also addressed the war’s human and financial costs. A stalemate had been reached that summer, and the Korean Armistice Agreement signed in July. But there were apparently grumblings in China about hefty taxes on agricultural production. “Certain friends,” said Mao, “had spoken.”  

Mao went on to explain to his fellow Party leaders that these “certain friends” had spoken of the need to implement benevolent policies (施仁政) – “as though,” he said snidely, “they represent the interests of the peasants.” On the question of benevolent policies, he explained, this was already being done.

But what is the greatest benevolence? It is the resistance to the United States. To implement this policy of greatest benevolence, there must be sacrifice, and this means using money, and it means collecting more agricultural taxes. You collect more agricultural taxes and some people cry out, and say this stuff about how they are representing the interests of farmers. I do not agree with this opinion.

In a nutshell, achieving longer-term strategic goals required sacrifice, and sometimes this sacrifice was painful. Nevertheless, the policies necessary to achieve these goals, however they might lead to short-term misfortune, could be considered benevolent. Mao then outlined for the first time his view on the two types of benevolence in policy-making:

There are two kinds of benevolent policies: one is for the current interests of the people, and the other is for the long-term interests of the people, such as fighting against the United States and building heavy industries. The former kind is a policy of lesser benevolence, and the latter is a policy of greater benevolence.

Mao’s logic of the “greater benevolence” was a sledgehammer to pulverize all dissent over the pain caused by his policies. In the pursuit of long-term vision – always the exclusive prerogative of the visionary leader – all short-term costs could be justified as being in the interests of the people. Why should we concern ourselves with “policies of lesser benevolence” (小仁政) when we can cast our vision to the future, to “policies of greater benevolence” (大仁政)?

The Benevolence” of Dynamic Zero

On June 15, 2022, “CAC China” (网信中国), the official WeChat public account of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), ran a commentary bearing the byline “Wang Xingping” (王兴平) that again defended “dynamic zero.” Even as the piece acknowledged that the policy remains a “hot topic” on social media platforms, where Chinese have vented plenty of homegrown outrage, it could not resist denouncing “those with ulterior motives in America and the West” who have dared to question its wisdom.

The “CAC China” post was re-posted at People’s Daily Online and scores of other websites, both party-state and private.

After affirming the “entire correctness” of the Covid policies implemented by the CCP “with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core,” the commentary explained the legitimacy of the “dynamic zero” using the language of benevolent policymaking first introduced by Mao Zedong (a leader Xi has been at pains to emulate):

Comrade Mao Zedong profoundly described the principle of the ‘small benevolent policy’ and the ‘great benevolent policy’ at the 24^th Conference of the Central People’s Government [in 1953], emphasizing that there are two types of benevolent policymaking. One is to about the immediate interests of the people, and the other is about the long-term interests of the people. The former is ‘policy of lesser benevolence,’ and the latter is ‘policy of great benevolence.’ The two must be balanced, and to not balance them is wrong. So where should the priority be? The priority should be on the policy of greater benevolence.

China’s epidemic prevention and control approach, said the commentary, was “at present a matter of the overall situation and the long-term” – “a ‘policy of greater benevolence’ for the fundamental interests of the people.”

It is worth noting that Mao’s sledgehammer of benevolent policymaking has not been seen in China’s official discourse for a very, very long time. The last time it appeared in the People’s Daily, in fact, was an article on May 19, 1977, on the study of The Collected Works of Mao Zedong.

When it comes to justifying persistence in China’s current Covid-19 policies, the CCP is really scraping the bottom of the discourse barrel.