Frequently used in the context of China’s external propaganda aims, this specialized term with roots in Western academic discourse points to a straightforward political goal: redrawing the lines of acceptable global discourse on China in ways that emphasize China’s positive role, that define the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party, and underscore the uniqueness of its civilizational values against those of the West.
The fate of Qin Gang has been the subject of endless speculation in recent weeks, as he has disappeared from public view. The apparent erasure this week of all official news releases including his name within the ministry’s own website is another bizarre twist.
Anti-Jewish content and conspiracies take up significant real estate among the top results on Chinese media platforms including Douyin, WeChat and Bilibili. Though borrowed from the West, they have taken on a localized identity.
New regulations for independent content creators in China are a reminder of how political priorities in the oversight of digital platforms undermine regulatory action that might protect the public.
An important phrase used actively by the Chinese Communist Party since 2022 and leading through to Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term, “era-ization” serves to reinforce Xi’s power by defining him as a crucial modernizer of Marxism for the current era.
These days, Chinese media must be loud and clear in declaring their political loyalty to Xi Jinping and the CCP. The annual “social responsibility reporting” process, in which media tout their most praiseworthy acts of praise, is a sickening gaze into a political system that has lost the ability to see itself clearly.
First raised by Mao Zedong in 1957 as he asserted his personal power over the media as a means of consolidating political power, this concept remains core in the Xi Jinping era to the notion that the Party must have direct control over traditional and digital media outlets to avoid challenges to the CCP-led regime.
Four and a half decades after Deng Xiaoping called for Marxism to adapt to China’s “material conditions,” Xi has added that it must also match “China’s outstanding traditional culture.” But the “Two Combines,” as this formula has been christened, is aimed squarely at legitimizing and justifying his own uncontested power.
China’s new draft law on “enhancing patriotic education” looks to add to the leadership’s legislative toolbox for repression and ideological control.
The visual treatment of reports in the official media on the appointment of Chinese ambassadors, and the acceptance of foreign ones, bears an important message about the imperial ambitions of China’s top leader.
