In the last decade, India’s media landscape has experienced dramatic digital transformation, resulting in both opportunities and vulnerabilities that foreign actors have sought to exploit. The country’s vast media ecosystem—comprising over 100,000 registered publications across 23 official languages and hundreds of television channels—has grown rapidly since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. This expansion has also introduced new challenges, particularly around misinformation and foreign influence operations.

China has emerged as a sophisticated actor in this space, deploying influence campaigns that exploit India’s open media environment despite deteriorating bilateral relations following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. Unlike countries with significant Chinese diaspora communities, India’s minimal Chinese-speaking population has forced Beijing to adapt its strategies, utilizing AI translation, English-language content farms, and academic infiltration to reach Indian audiences.

Dalia Parete: For those of us who are unfamiliar with the media landscape and journalism practice in India, could you get us situated just briefly with the essentials? How would you characterize India’s media landscape?

Sriparna Pathak: Indian media is boisterous and noisy, but it’s a symbol of how a democracy should work. The Indian media landscape is vast, diverse, and dynamic, shaped by the country’s massive population.

In terms of diversity and scale, India has one of the world’s largest media networks with over 100,000 registered publications, including newspapers and magazines in multiple languages such as Hindi, English, Tamil, and Bengali. We have roughly 900 television channels and millions of internet users consuming digital media, alongside a booming social media scene.

Traditional print media, especially regional language newspapers, are highly influential, particularly in rural areas. Major dailies like Times of India, Dainik Jagran, and Malayalam Manorama reach a big audience. Television dominates both entertainment and news through numerous channels, including NDTV, Republic TV, and various regional networks. Given that we’re living in the internet age, there’s been a huge digital explosion in India. Digital media is surging through platforms like YouTube, Instagram, and X for news and entertainment, as well as online news portals like The Wire and Scroll. Regional media holds significant sway due to our linguistic diversity. Content in languages like Telugu, Marathi, and Kannada often outperforms national media. 

DP: It’s been over a decade since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014. As a media expert who has closely observed this period, how would you characterize the transformation of India’s media landscape during the Modi era? What are the most significant changes you’ve witnessed?

SP: Indian media today is much more connected and inclusive than before. We still deal with trolling and online hate speech—that comes with digital anonymity. But overall, the transformation has been really remarkable. We’ve successfully leveraged technology to create a more accessible, diverse, and engaging media ecosystem that serves India’s complex, multilingual democracy. 

Indian media is boisterous and noisy, but it’s a symbol of how a democracy should work.

The most defining characteristic of India’s media landscape over the past decade has been its digital revolution. When Prime Minister Modi took office in 2014, India had roughly 250 million internet users. By 2025, we’re projected to reach 900 million—a transformation that fundamentally reshapes how Indians consume media. This transformation was pushed forward by government initiatives like Digital India, launched in 2015. 

The impact has been profound. Platforms like YouTube, Netflix, and homegrown OTT services became mainstream. Social media emerged as the primary source of news and information for millions. Media companies responded by creating content in multiple languages that focused on what users wanted, designed for India’s diverse and young population. The focus shifted to engaging people under 35, using regional languages and understanding local cultures across India’s 22 official languages.

DP: You mentioned the shift toward younger, multilingual audiences. Can you give me a specific example of how a major media company adapted its content strategy during this period?
SP: This focus on inclusive content was a big change from the more centralized, English-heavy media approach of previous decades.

The government itself embraced digital engagement in unprecedented ways. The Prime Minister’s monthly radio program “Mann Ki Baat,” launched in 2014, exemplifies this shift—reaching millions across rural and urban India through multiple platforms, creating more direct communication channels than traditional diplomatic approaches.

With this digital boom, India has to face several challenges like the rise of misinformation. This prompted significant investments in fact-checking journalism and verification systems. Initiatives like “Sach Ke Saathi” (Friends of Truth) prioritized credible reporting, while media houses adopted data-driven approaches and advanced tools for more accurate content production.

DP: Modi was one of the first politicians to really leverage X, the former Twitter, strategically. How did his approach to the platform change political communication in India?

SP: Absolutely, it was a game-changer. Politicians need direct audience connection to survive—if people don’t understand your policies, you’re at a disadvantage.

Modi’s Twitter strategy is brilliant because it is immediate. Instead of waiting for monthly radio addresses, citizens can track what he’s doing in real-time. Even I check Twitter first thing in the morning—it’s become our primary source for political updates.

This made him incredibly accessible compared to traditional political communication. When I lived in China, people asked why India uses Western platforms instead of creating our own. The reality is India embraced existing cost-effective tools like Twitter and Facebook as part of technological globalization.

Modi simply mastered these platforms better than anyone else. He created a template for direct political engagement that leaders worldwide now follow—proving that strategic social media use could transform political communication entirely.

DP: India has dropped from 140th to 151st in the World Press Freedom Index since Modi took office in 2014. As a media expert, what do you see as the key factors driving this decline? 

SP: The World Press Freedom Index has significant limitations. When the Press Council of India sought to understand Reporters Without Borders’ methodology, we received no response. This lack of transparency is concerning—credible rankings require clear, justifiable indicators.

Our investigation found the index relies heavily on perceptions rather than hard data, making it susceptible to bias. The specific weightage and data sources remain undisclosed. Consider India’s complexity: 23 official languages and media in hundreds of languages. How can any foreign organization comprehensively assess this without linguistic expertise or methodological transparency?

The index also doesn’t address media ownership concentration, which we acknowledge as a legitimate concern in India’s media landscape. There are now discussions about India developing its press freedom ranking to offer alternative global perspectives.

DP: Setting aside the international rankings, what’s your assessment as an Indian scholar of the current state of press freedom in the country? Are there specific developments that concern you?

SP: The Indian media landscape has become increasingly challenging to navigate, especially online media, where fact-checking and bias verification are questionable.

Let me share a personal example: during the latest India-Pakistan tensions, I was not in the country, and one morning I saw an online report claiming that New Delhi had been hit. Despite knowing this was unlikely, as someone with young children in New Delhi, I panicked. Even though I work on disinformation, I fell for it due to emotional vulnerability.

This fear-mongering is widespread in our media. Even after the India-Pakistan ceasefire, reports continued claiming that one or the other country did not respect it. News portals now resort to sensationalism as standard practice – I recently saw repeated stories about Macron allegedly being slapped by his wife. Why is this relevant to Indian audiences? Pure sensationalism for eyeball attraction.

Meta identified India as being at the highest risk for misinformation last year. Much originates from foreign content farms, particularly China. There is also concern about the lack of awareness among our journalists about foreign information manipulation. 

While the government has been proactive in leveraging the internet, there should be equal concern about tackling misinformation. The situation has become so problematic that I often wait for physical newspapers because they undergo more rigorous fact-checking. Civilians like me suffer from this information chaos, and protecting citizens from harmful misinformation should be a legitimate concern for the government.

DP: The term “Godi media” — meaning lapdog media, if I understand correctly — has become mainstream to describe outlets acting as government mouthpieces. Prominent journalists, such as Ravish Kumar, have used this term to criticize the media for no longer questioning authority. Could you explain this term?

SP: “Godi media” is indeed a pejorative term popularized by journalist Ravish Kumar to describe outlets perceived as lapdogs of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP since 2014. However, if you look back, there were always media houses that functioned as lap dogs for Congress or opposition parties, too. 

While there are pro-BJP outlets, there are equally pro-Congress ones. Take The Wire, an excellent but left-leaning portal. During India’s latest retaliation against Pakistan, the Information Ministry requested the media not disclose troop movements for security reasons – a reasonable directive lasting just two days. Most media complied, but The Wire invited Pakistani academics to discuss the unfolding conflict, inadvertently revealing coordinates and troop movements, and adding misinformation fueled by Pakistan.

Outlets commonly labeled “Godi media” include Republic World, Times Now, and Zee News, which amplify the BJP agendas and sometimes spread misinformation. This stems more from corporate ownership and revenue considerations than ideology. Educated Indians largely ignore Zee News, recognizing its sensationalism.

However, “Godi media” isn’t universally accepted. It dismisses outlets aligning with Indian ideology while failing to distinguish between party and country. BJP isn’t India, and India isn’t Congress.

DP: How does this phenomenon compare to state-media relationships you’ve observed in China? Is India adopting a Chinese model of control, or developing something distinctly different?

SP: India’s media landscape remains diverse, with over 100,000 registered publications and thousands of TV channels. Even if four outlets are pro-government, that’s negligible compared to the overall landscape.

The comparison with China is telling. Chinese media operates under direct CCP control through entities like Xinhua, with strict censorship via the Great Firewall. The content aligns with state priorities, downplaying issues such as Xinjiang or Hong Kong. During the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese media echoed Pakistan’s narrative, framing India’s counter-terrorism response as provocative while ignoring the terror attack that killed 26 Indians.

India operates differently. There’s no centralized censorship or Great Firewall. The term “Godi media” itself represents dissent—something impossible in China. India’s media landscape is pluralistic with independent outlets, social media, and citizen journalism challenging mainstream narratives. China’s media is monolithic, filtered through state approval.

India’s Constitution protects press freedom despite corporate pressures. China offers no such safeguards, with journalists facing imprisonment for dissent.

The real comparison should be between Western media and Chinese media, which are becoming increasingly similar. 

India operates differently. There’s no centralized censorship or Great Firewall. The term “Godi media” itself represents dissent—something impossible in China. 

DP: How would you characterize the current state of media relations between China and India? 

SP: Media relations between India and China are significantly strained and heavily adversarial, primarily due to geopolitical tensions, particularly since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, where China infiltrated Indian territory. Chinese state media like Xinhua and Global Times consistently frame India’s actions as provocative while hiding the fact that it was primarily the People’s Liberation Army that infiltrated. They seem to forget that satellite imagery is easily accessible on the internet — and unlike China, internet access is very cheap in India.

Both countries have severely restricted journalistic access. By 2023, India expelled nearly all Chinese journalists, but this was in response to China starting this trend. India cited unfair treatment of its journalists, and by mid-2020, there were no Indian journalists left in China. This tit-for-tat expulsion has made direct reporting very challenging, leading to a greater reliance on official sources and social media, which in turn increases the risks of disinformation.

DP: Has coverage become predominantly adversarial, or do meaningful journalistic exchanges still exist between the two countries?

SP: China’s influence operations architecture is extensive, encompassing state-controlled media and troll farms. During India’s recent elections, these operations actively pushed narratives aimed at influencing voter choices. While governments worldwide face such challenges, India’s problem is more acute due to our shared border and the fact that we host the Central Tibetan Administration.

The general question is: how long can India tolerate this when we have no practical way to push back? As a democracy, we won’t resort to unethical practices, but we also can’t ignore constant attacks. Consequently, India has blocked Chinese social media accounts and content that constantly push anti-India narratives. Even though India is currently the world’s fastest-growing major economy, China continues promoting orientalist stereotypes – “land of snakes and snake charmers.”  

After the most recent India-Pakistan tensions, Chinese outlets like CGTN and Global Times actually echoed Pakistan’s narrative, further demonstrating their adversarial stance.

Meaningful journalistic exchanges between India and China have essentially ceased, replaced by state-driven propaganda and influence operations.

Meaningful journalistic exchanges between India and China have essentially ceased, replaced by state-driven propaganda and influence operations.

DP: You already mentioned the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which marked the deadliest border confrontation in 45 years. I am wondering how the Indian media coverage of this incident reflects broader changes in how China is portrayed. 

SP: The Galwan clash was a turning point. Indians had grown tired of constantly extending the hand of friendship, only to receive another slap from China. The perception truly tanked after COVID-19. Even those of us who speak Chinese and studied in China faced backlash. 

Chinese state media and online Chinese nationalists made things worse by targeting Indian audiences with doctored videos showing Chinese forces supposedly defeating Indian soldiers. But this backfired spectacularly—much like threats against Taiwan make Taiwanese more anti-China, these videos only increased hatred and animosity in India. Even after last year’s disengagement at Depsang and Demchok [in the Eastern Ladakh border region], Chinese narratives continued claiming “China has defeated India.” How can China hope for friendship while portraying India as inferior?

Through my work with Taiwan’s Doublethink Lab, I’ve found that academia and media are China’s biggest influence vectors in India. Despite being a democracy, our newspapers give space to Chinese ambassadors writing about how China’s actions in Hong Kong are justified. When journalists like me push back, we’re labeled “Godi media” or ultra-nationalists, in Hindi “Hindutva”—even when simply saying that normalizing occupation isn’t okay.

However, some journalists do the opposite: when some Indian journalists were invited to visit Tibet, upon their return, they started calling it “Xizang” in their articles—the CCP’s preferred term for the region. They wrote about how “Xizang has done well under the CCP.” 

When I critique China’s influence operations, the attacks are personal: “She’s upper caste,” “She’s patriarchal,” “She’s religiously brainwashed.” No sane person wants to be called brainwashed, so many step back from writing on China. It’s effective, tacit censorship.

DP: Given the absence of Chinese-language newspapers in India, the relatively small Chinese diaspora, and restrictions on major Chinese digital platforms like WeChat, how do Chinese-language media outlets attempt to reach and influence Indian audiences?

SP: You’re right about the diaspora being tiny. I met them in West Bengal’s Chinatown back in 2015. When a Chinese delegation, including Hu Xijin, visited, I had to translate because the diaspora couldn’t understand Chinese. They spoke Bengali better and told the visitors, “India is now our motherland – we’ve been here for decades and can’t even speak Chinese.”

I’ve found that academia and media are China’s biggest influence vectors in India.

But China has adapted cleverly to the Indian public. First, they use AI translation – Chinese content farms post on Twitter/X in Chinese, which automatically translates to English or Bengali depending on your settings. Second, they operate directly in English through accounts like Shanghai Panda, recognizing most Indians won’t learn Chinese. I’ve also noticed coordinated Facebook profiles—Chinese women dressed in saris as display pictures. I saw 12-13 identical ones in a single day, clearly orchestrated.

DP: Beyond these digital tactics, how are they building deeper institutional influence within India itself?

SP: China Radio International broadcasts in Hindi, Bengali, and Urdu. But their most effective method remains planting academics and targeting the media. Until recently, my university had an “India-China Study Centre” run by a Chinese professor, proudly funded by the Chinese embassy. I attended events where Chinese academics flew in specifically to push narratives – like claiming the US is responsible for dividing India and China, or portraying China as gender-sensitive when it’s just as problematic as anywhere else.

Ambassador Xu Feihong regularly invites media figures who advocate friendship “even at the cost of India’s sovereignty.” People like Indian scholar Sudheendra Kulkarni get multiple invitations and photo opportunities.

While we don’t have the level of United Front Work that China deploys in Taiwan, Europe, or the US, they’ve still found ways to influence through academia, English-language content, and the diplomatic cultivation of sympathetic voices in the media.

DP: Tibet remains a sensitive issue in India-China relations, yet India hosts the world’s largest Tibetan exile community, including the Dalai Lama. How does India balance its support for Tibetans with its relationship with China? And are there concerns about Chinese influence on how Tibet is portrayed in Indian media?

SP: Tibetans are treated equally here. I work closely with the Central Tibetan Administration and Tibetan journalists on a regular basis. They organize events almost weekly, discussing China, Tibet, and India. I’ve hosted several such events at my university.

We treat Tibetans like us because we understand oppression. There’s a religious connection too.  Buddhism originated in India, so we feel responsible for protecting a population persecuted simply for  being “un-Chinese.” 

We’ve even started the International Buddhist Confederation in 2023, inviting Tibetan monks from India and abroad. The Dalai Lama has graced these occasions, and our Prime Minister attends to showcase support for Tibetan Buddhism. 

Tibetans can choose citizenship or not; it’s up to them. They’re essentially like us now. They speak Hindi and English with heavy Indian accents, and they’ve become as chaotic and democratic as we are.But Tibetans do raise one serious concern: Indian journalists visit Tibet on Chinese-sponsored trips and return using Beijing’s terminology—calling Tibet “Xizang” as the pinyin rendering of Tibet (西藏) and praising CCP rule. This isn’t just offensive—it’s a security threat. By accepting the term “Xizang,”  we risk normalizing China’s claim on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as “Zangnan” (藏南), a  term that literally means “South of Tibet,” implying that Arunachal Pradesh is merely an extension of Tibet, therefore under the CCP rule.

Once known for quality print journalism, Italy’s media industry has suffered several financial strain in recent decades that has in many ways weakened professional values. Traditional reporting has increasingly given way to “infotainment” — a trend pioneered since the 1990s by former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Mediaset empire, the country’s largest broadcaster, which prioritizes entertainment over substantive news. Cash-strapped outlets struggle to maintain journalistic standards, resulting in declining salaries for reporters and cautious approaches to digital innovation and AI integration. Against this backdrop of economic vulnerability, China has been strategically expanding its influence throughout Italy’s weakened media landscape. 

Despite having nearly 285,000 Chinese residents, Italy has few Chinese-language media outlets. Meanwhile, collaborations between Chinese state media and Italian news agencies have facilitated the spread of Beijing’s narratives into mainstream discourse. To better understand the complex interplay between Italian media and Chinese state narratives and media engagement, we spoke to Italian journalist Giulia Pompili. As one of the few journalists who has critically covered the on-and-off saga of Italy’s involvement in Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, Pompili offers a unique perspective on Beijing’s information strategy and its ongoing impact on the Italian media landscape.

Dalia Parete: When we look at media landscapes globally, each country has its unique characteristics and challenges. What are the most important things to understand about how media works in Italy today?

Giulia Pompili: The main challenge for Italian media is financial. Print media do not have the income or budgets they once had when they had large paid-for circulations. Television is still a strong presence in the media landscape. But over the past 40 years, it has increasingly shifted toward “infotainment” — a blend of information and entertainment. This means fewer programs are focused on delivering substantive information, and more segments are designed primarily to entertain viewers rather than inform them.

Regarding the “infotainment” trend in Italian media, [former Prime Minister] Berlusconi pioneered this transformation. He fundamentally changed how Italians consumed information with his three television channels under Mediaset Italia S.P.A. He was also the first in Italy to envision using media manipulation to cultivate public support. 

After Berlusconi, all Italian channels, including the national public broadcasting company Rai, considered the “Italian BBC,” transformed the way they presented information to follow the Mediaset path. So, there is now more “infotainment” and less information across the board. 

Newspapers lost many readers in the early 2000s, and printed information experienced a major crisis at that time. In the past decade, Italy has attempted to expand into digital media through websites and social media. But it has lagged behind countries like the United States. We’ve also seen the rise of influencers and information websites that often translate foreign articles. More recently, informational podcasts have gained some traction, but the business model remains unclear. No one has figured out how to monetize these platforms effectively. Nevertheless, this shift has once again changed the media landscape.

DP: What significant challenges and transformations do you see on the horizon for Italian media? For instance, how are developments like AI or changing consumption patterns affecting the industry?

GP: One of the biggest challenges is declining compensation for journalists. For example, if you are a freelancer, you cannot afford to pay rent for an apartment. And if you are a staff writer or a TV producer,  you likely have a very low monthly income. 

Italy remains quite conservative in the media sector. AI hasn’t been widely implemented in newsrooms, and significant fear surrounds it. Whenever I discuss this with colleagues, especially those from older generations, they express the concern that AI will take their jobs. 

From the consumption side, Italy has a significant information literacy gap because there is no education on media literacy. Most of the population is illiterate when it comes to media. They struggle to distinguish between information from influencers, reporters, staff writers, investigative journalists, and activists. This is especially problematic among younger generations, who often can’t differentiate between a TikTok influencer discussing Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang region, for example, and a professional journalist who has thoroughly investigated the topic. Ideological perspectives create substantial barriers between activists, influencers, and traditional journalists — representing one of our biggest challenges.

Younger generations often can’t differentiate between a TikTok influencer discussing Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang region and a professional journalist who has thoroughly investigated the topic.

DP: Despite Italy hosting nearly 285,000 Chinese nationals, few Chinese-language media outlets exist. What factors, in your view, have contributed to this limited media presence, and how does this affect information flow within the Chinese community?

GP: In Italy, it often seems that the large Chinese diaspora is already closely aligned with the Chinese Communist Party — though there is no specific research or data about this. They may not demand dedicated media because the Party already maintains a strong influence over diaspora groups, and pro-China content is known to dominate the media that are present. The main Chinese-language radio station, China FM Italia focuses primarily on entertainment rather than news. Another outlet, Cina in Italia (世界中国) began as a book publisher. They tried to publish educational books in Italian and Chinese. It was originally a cultural company, but it has now changed its business model, working directly with the official China News Service [under the United Front Work Department of the CCP].

Another unique character of the Chinese community in Italy is that you rarely hear any form of dissenting opinion. As the white-paper protests that began in Shanghai spread internationally in late 2022, there were attempts to organize demonstrations in major squares in Bologna and Rome — but these barely made an impact. Compared to similar protests in Germany, France, and the UK, which were much larger and more visible, the level of dissent in Italy was negligible. In Italy, such activities are notably absent.

DP: So, how would you characterize China’s approach to media or media engagement in Italy?

GP: The media engagement approach has been simple. Embassy personnel have built relationships with Italian editors, editors-in-chief, press agencies, and individual journalists. 

Before 2019, Chinese media had numerous bilateral contracts and cooperation programs between Chinese and Italian media. We engaged significantly with the official China Media Group [under the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department], which maintains the most prominent presence everywhere. In reality, they were paying for advertising in Italian newspapers. They would pitch original Chinese-language articles translated into Italian. Like everywhere in Europe, they tried to coordinate with Italian media outlets to publish Chinese dossiers written by the embassy or agencies working with the embassy. Generally, they attempted to use Italian media as a powerful tool to share their narratives. 

In 2019, something changed. Xi Jinping came to Italy for an official state visit. During that visit, Italy officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative, establishing numerous institutional cooperation agreements. One of the most notorious agreements for the media was between Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA), our country’s leading news agency, and the Chinese government’s Xinhua News Agency. ANSA is a primary news source for Italian journalists, so this partnership allowed Chinese state narratives to directly enter Italy’s mainstream news ecosystem. 

DP: How did the COVID-19 pandemic affect China’s information strategy in Italy?

GP The COVID-19 pandemic was a turning point for Italy, revealing China’s information manipulation tactics more sharply. A key example was when the Chinese Red Cross sent masks to Italy. Our former Foreign Affairs Minister Luigi Di Maio, who had signed the Belt and Road MOU the previous year, was entirely absorbed by Chinese propaganda and disinformation to rehabilitate China’s image as the country where the virus originated. 

We engaged significantly with the official China Media Group, which maintains the most significant presence everywhere. 

By late March 2020, China was building its image as Europe’s savior. This tactic worked quite well in Italy. They manipulated the situation by sending masks and supplies to the Italian Red Cross, creating a major political event. However, these weren’t donations but rather purchases made by Italy. We still have numerous legal proceedings regarding emergency funds spent on Chinese supplies. The critical point is that during this emergency, China used Italy as an experiment to see how effectively they could manipulate information to craft their image as a savior amid the pandemic. 

DP: How did Chinese officials typically engage with foreign journalists, like yourself, who were critical of their policies? 

GP: At the time, I was one of the journalists who extensively covered Chinese-Italian bilateral relations. I was also among the few who criticized Italy’s joining the Belt and Road Initiative. At the time, the appointed spokesperson of the Chinese embassy confronted me at the Quirinale Palace during Xi’s visit. He aggressively told me, “You must stop saying bad things about China.” The next day, we published the news headline, “We are not in Beijing.” In the article that chronicled this confrontation, we included the spokesperson’s full name, which made him very angry.

He aggressively told me, “You must stop saying bad things about China.” 

This incident also marked the first time that the Italian political establishment realized that the silencing of journalists was something that could not go unanswered. 

DP: Despite claims of a tougher stance toward China since Italy’s exit from the Belt and Road Initiative, how would you assess the reality of Italian-Chinese relations, notably regarding media partnerships and Meloni’s broader political agenda?

GP: We are saying that we are restricting Chinese influence, right? Italian printed media generally reduced Chinese content partnerships, but some outlets still publish Chinese state-sponsored content for financial compensation. While the “Chinese dossiers” appear less frequently, Italy remains an outlier in Europe by continuing to monetize the publication of Chinese government messaging in its media landscape.

The Chinese government’s official Xinhua News Agency changed cooperation partners from ANSA to Agenzia Nova, a popular online news source. So, it is still doing what it was doing with new partners.

From a political perspective, Meloni’s core focus as Italian president is immigration — she doesn’t think about much of anything else. She knows that China is the only country that can help her in Africa because China currently has the most significant political influence there.

She understands that she cannot effectively deal with Libya, Algeria, or Egypt without support from Chinese officials and institutions. For Meloni, the only priority is this very concrete issue, and she is ready to do whatever it takes to achieve her singular foreign policy goal: managing immigration. She knows that she needs China to stabilize the relationship with Africa.

The African media landscape has become a contested space where global powers vie for influence and narrative control. While Western media have historically dominated, Chinese and Russian outlets are gaining ground, using their own distinct approaches to shape public opinion. Amid this competition, local media and audiences are also asserting their agency, pursuing their personal interests and presenting worldviews that have been uniquely shaped by the region’s past.

We spoke with Dani Madrid Morales, a media scholar at the University of Sheffield, about how China and Russia have been navigating the African media landscape — where their approaches converge, and where they sharply diverge. Our conversation covered how historical anti-colonial sentiments continue to shape the reception of foreign media, and how African journalists and audiences engage with these competing global narratives.

Dalia Parete: How do China and Russia make use of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments in Africa to push their narratives? 

Dani Madrid Morales: We were interested in how people talk about Chinese and Russian disinformation in Africa and how much focus there is on whether their stories are spreading and how effective they are. Everyone talks a lot about how compelling their narratives are — like blaming NATO for the war in Ukraine and saying it’s not Russia’s fault — but we wanted to dig into why some African countries don’t buy into that. The key thing we found is the prevalence of anti-US sentiment, which has deep roots in the Soviet Union and China pushing anti-colonial ideas in the 60s and 70s. 

Back then, China was seen as a victim of colonialism, so that message resonated. Now, China is sometimes accused of being the colonizer itself in Africa, but the reality is a lot of African countries still feel exploited by the West. China and Russia know how to use that. Like when George Floyd was killed, and all the racial tension kicked off in the US, China jumped on that, using it to describe America as a racist country. And while it’s not all false, it has some truth. So, the thing is, China’s not doing straight-up disinformation in Africa — they just pick and choose facts and frame them in ways that connect with people’s lived experiences, which makes it hard just to call it all lies.

China’s not doing straight-up disinformation in Africa — they just pick and choose facts and frame them in ways that connect with people’s lived experiences.

DP: How else do China and Russia’s approaches differ in Africa?

DMM: China and Russia use very different methods in Africa. Russia tends to use more aggressive, hostile tactics, like fabricating attacks or spreading false accusations, especially in places like the Sahel region covering Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. They treat information like a weapon in a war, similar to how the US or France have used these tools in the region.

China doesn’t typically go that route. It has a softer approach. While it does spread misinformation on issues like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, it is more about protecting its interests and image globally, not specifically in Africa. China does not only directly accuse the West of wrongdoing but also highlights the differences between itself and Western countries — for example, how China isn’t a colonial power. It frames things like low-interest loans and medical aid as positive. Still, it often hides the negative side, like how Chinese companies exploit Africa’s mining sector with poor conditions for workers.

While Russia is more about information warfare, China is about shaping its image through PR. Both countries use these tactics based on their different goals. China’s approach shifts if it feels threatened, like during the COVID pandemic, when it adopted more aggressive tactics to defend its image.

DP: What have African residents themselves been doing to counter these efforts?

DMM: Some people in Africa, like journalists or influencers, get exposed to China and end up repeating China’s narratives. For example, a journalist from Ghana might go to China, spend some time there, and then return to Ghana, appearing on Chinese media like CGTN or Xinhua, repeating what China wants them to say. Some genuinely believe in China’s progress, such as the claim that China has lifted 100 million people out of poverty.

However, the average African person might not care much about Xinjiang or Tibet. What they do care more about is anything that paints the West negatively, which is a strong sentiment across the continent. So, they’re more likely to engage when they hear Chinese or Russian narratives criticizing the West.

DP: Based on your findings, to what extent do citizens actively engage with or resist these narratives, and what factors influence their responses? 

DMM: There are people like the Swiss-Cameroonian Nathalie Yamb who spread Russian narratives, but not many influencers push Chinese narratives. However, some political groups in Africa, especially those on the extreme left, are using these anti-US and anti-colonial ideas alongside Chinese and Russian examples.

That’s where China has succeeded — it’s created space for people to feel neutral.

Most Africans aren’t concerned with issues like Xinjiang but care about the more significant global power struggle. They might have sided with the US in the past, but now they’re more ambivalent. That’s where China has succeeded — it’s created space for people to feel neutral or even lean toward China rather than the West. It’s not that they’re super pro-China but they’re not anti-China either.

DP: How do local media outlets fit into this strategy?

DMM: Some African media outlets help spread messages from China in various ways. One significant method is through Chinese diplomats publishing opinion pieces in local media. These pieces are often presented as equally valid as other voices, giving them a platform to influence public opinion. For example, after an editor in Burundi visited China, his newspaper became almost entirely pro-China. When the Chinese foreign minister visited, the paper ran several editorials praising China. The content in these pieces often blurs the line between fact and propaganda—it’s more opinion than hard news. China is very strategic about this and even tracks how successful these efforts are, measuring how many opinion pieces written by ambassadors are published in foreign media.

DP: How do China and Russia distribute their content through African media, and why do local outlets participate in these arrangements?

DMM: Another method is content-sharing agreements, where China and Russia provide media outlets with free content. Chinese news agency Xinhua and Russian outlets like Ruptly supply articles and video content, which local media may republish. Often, the source isn’t disclosed, making the content appear as though the local outlet created it. This practice is referred to as “information laundering.” For example, in South Africa, the African News Agency (ANA), which has close ties with China, often distributes Xinhua’s content as if it were its own.

To them, content from Xinhua is just another news source, just as trustworthy as anything from outlets like the BBC.

As for why local media outlets do this, the motivation isn’t always clear-cut. Many editors don’t have a specific agenda and simply publish content as part of their regular duties, treating foreign content, whether from Xinhua or Agence France Presse, like any other. In some cases, though, like with Independent Media in South Africa, there is a clear financial or political interest in promoting China’s viewpoint. The owner of that media group has close connections with China’s Communist Party and supports China’s global initiatives. Generally, while European people might be more skeptical of content from outlets like Xinhua, many people in other parts of the world don’t see it that way. To them, content from Xinhua is just another news source, just as trustworthy as anything from outlets like the BBC.

DP: What informs African journalists’ views on foreign media and foreign influence?

DMM: How journalists in Africa view media from different countries, especially China, Russia, and the West, differs significantly from the mindset many of us might have in places like Europe or the U.S.

For example, when I worked at Spain’s national broadcaster covering international news, my colleagues and I would always see the BBC’s reports as trustworthy — though we’d still stay skeptical, like any other journalists — and see Russia’s or China’s CGTN’s news through a very suspicious lens. We were trained to believe that the BBC was pretty independent, while anything from authoritarian regimes like Russia or China was viewed with serious doubt. But when I’ve been in African newsrooms, I’ve noticed that many journalists don’t share that same mindset. To some, the BBC also has an agenda, and they don’t automatically trust it just because it’s from the West. The BBC might align with some of their values, but they’re not blindly following it like we might.

I remember interviewing journalists in Lesotho, a small country in Southern Africa, and I asked them about these concerns with Chinese media. One journalist stopped me mid-interview and asked, “Why are you questioning me about China and not CNN or BBC? Why do you assume that Chinese media is bad?” That threw me off because, from my perspective as someone who cares deeply about media freedom, I could never see China as a good partner for journalists. But to him, it wasn’t about that — his issue was that I was treating China differently from Western media outlets. I think this comes back to a deeper historical context of anti-colonial feelings. 

“Why are you questioning me about China and not CNN or BBC? Why do you assume that Chinese media is bad?”

Question from a journalist in Lesotho

DP: Do they see Western media organizations like the BBC as more or less reliable than Chinese or Russian state media?

DMM: The BBC has a different legacy for older African journalists — especially those who lived through colonial rule. They remember it as a tool of British colonialism, even though the UK and its foreign policy have changed. In their view, whether it’s China, Russia, or the UK, all these foreign powers come into their countries with their interests. And none of them are genuinely looking out for the local people. So, for many African journalists, it’s not about trusting or distrusting one foreign power more than the other. They tend to be equally cautious of all foreign media, viewing them through a lens shaped by their history with colonialism.

While journalists who studied in the West might still give more respect to French or British media, that’s not the case across the continent. The general sentiment is much more skeptical of foreign press, even if they treat Western media like the BBC differently from Chinese or Russian outlets. And that’s where the real difference lies. Western journalists might see China or Russia as dictatorships that control information, which requires caution when handling their news. However, for many African journalists, that same level of skepticism should also be applied to French or British outlets, given that they, too, have agendas. 

DP: How has China become involved in Africa’s media landscape? 

DMM: China has been in Africa’s media game since the late 1950s when Radio Peking [now China Radio International] began broadcasts in Arabic for North African countries and Xinhua set up a bureau in Cairo. Despite going through tough times like the Cultural Revolution in the 70s and 80s, China never left the African media space. In the late 90s and early 2000s, China began a push to change how it was seen globally. They used Africa as a testing ground, and by 2004 China had opened a local radio station in Nairobi — the first time they broadcasted locally via FM radio instead of long-wave.

DP:  How has their presence changed since then?

DM: The digital era brought a complete transformation in China’s strategy. They established CGTN’s office in Nairobi, produced documentaries showcasing China’s positive impact on Africa, and highlighted significant projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. They were smart about hiring local journalists and investing substantial resources to strengthen their digital presence.

By the 2010s, China shifted its approach. This led to more strategic moves: embedding content in local African media, forming partnerships with media outlets, and having Chinese diplomats take a more active role in public discourse. The real turning point was 2018-19 when their approach became more assertive. Instead of promoting China’s achievements, they actively challenged Western narratives, especially around issues like Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Covid-19.

DP: What are some trends in China’s messaging that you’re now noticing?

DMM: In recent years, CGTN Africa has focused heavily on Africa, producing two hours of news daily. But there’s been a noticeable shift. While CGTN used to be somewhat more neutral and pragmatic in the early days, there’s now much more ideological content, especially around Xi Jinping and China’s global influence. They cover the US much more, but it’s usually pretty negative — highlighting flaws in American democracy and social issues. It’s not all global politics, though — CGTN Africa mostly sticks to regional matters, like the Sahel region or events in places like Niger and Mali.

China takes a unique approach to covering Africa: it almost always sides with the ruling party.

However, China takes a unique approach to covering Africa: it almost always sides with the ruling party. For example, when elections took place in Mozambique, China’s media congratulated the incumbent before the results were announced. There’s relatively little focus on opposition parties. And just like with other Chinese media, if the government wants a specific topic covered, it will push it.

DP: Can you assess the impact of Chinese media in Africa? 

DMM: The impact of China’s media on Africa is complicated. In most African countries, China isn’t a topic in the daily press. It only becomes a focus when a significant event, like a controversy or a state visit. Before Covid-19, Chinese media barely had any presence in local news. After the pandemic hit, coverage exploded, but China’s day-to-day media impact is still minimal. People’s opinions on China tend to come from their personal interactions with Chinese workers or products — not from the media.

For example, during a trip to Kenya, I visited rural areas and asked locals about their views on China. The people had positive views, but it wasn’t because they were watching CGTN or Chinese films but primarily because of their experiences with Chinese workers building infrastructure or running small businesses. It’s the same with Chinese products — people recognize they are often low quality, influencing their opinion of China.

There are no permanent African correspondents in China… most news comes from agencies like Xinhua or Reuters, not local reporters.

Also, the media landscape makes a difference. There are no permanent African correspondents in China. So, most news comes from agencies like Xinhua or Reuters, not local reporters. This lack of local coverage means China isn’t a daily topic in the news. You might hear about the US or Europe, but China rarely makes the front page unless there’s something big going on.

DP: What about the impact of social media?

DMM: Social media does have an impact, but it’s mostly just for a small group of people — like young, urban folks who are somewhat educated. In places like South Sudan, only 10 percent of the population is online, so social media isn’t significant for most people. But it’s a different story in countries like Ghana or Kenya, where more people have smartphones. Social media, especially TikTok and YouTube, is more important for the younger crowd.

It’s hard to say how much social media directly changes people’s opinions. The big difference is that online spaces have more room for debate and controversy than traditional media, which tends to be controlled by those in power. Like, remember when Chinese businesspeople were accused of mistreating Zimbabweans? That went viral on social media, which wouldn’t have made the news otherwise. China’s getting better at handling these situations, though. 

But, honestly, there’s not a massive wave of anti-China sentiment in Africa. Sure, there are small pockets, but it’s pretty marginal. People aren’t talking about China in politics or elections. It just doesn’t come up much. Even if there’s some criticism online, it’s not a big deal. Most of the time, China’s pretty popular.

China is also good at subtly influencing things. CGTN, for example, will back up the government more than the opposition, but it’s not like they’re openly pressuring the media to shut down critical stories. It’s not like in Europe, where Chinese diplomats will put pressure on journalists to kill damaging stories. China’s influence in Africa is much more low-key, and public opinion stays positive.