Author: Dalia Parete

Dalia is a CMP researcher with a background in Chinese foreign policy and Taiwan studies. She previously worked at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the Royal United Service Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

China’s Sentinel State

China Media Project researcher Dalia Parete spoke with Pei about the titular idea behind his latest book, The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China. Pei tells us about what makes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) brand of mass surveillance unique, considering how it anticipates rather than simply reacts to dissent and how it combines the latest technology with grassroots mobilization and internalized censorship, involving citizens in the very machinery controlling them. It’s a system as old as the PRC itself, but one that has changed dramatically in the past few years and which will only continue to evolve.

Dalia Parete: What is the “sentinel state,” and how does it differ from the more familiar concept of the surveillance state?

Minxin Pei: In my book, I introduce the concept of distributed surveillance, highlighting how China conducts its surveillance distinctly. While all dictatorships employ repression, the most sophisticated ones, like China, lean heavily on preventive rather than reactive measures — essentially ex-ante repression versus ex-post repression. The real challenge lies in designing an effective system for this preventive repression. Should all surveillance responsibilities be concentrated within a single agency or distributed across multiple entities? Each approach has its trade-offs. For instance, if you go the route of a centralized agency like the Stasi [East German secret police], you invest heavily in a large bureaucracy that could ultimately threaten the ruling party itself.

On the other hand, China’s strategy involves decentralizing tasks horizontally across various security agencies, and vertically by incorporating civilian involvement. These civilians, while formally part of the security apparatus, take on key surveillance functions. This creates a unique system where surveillance is distributed and multifaceted, allowing the government to maintain control without the vulnerabilities that come with a single, centralized authority.

While all dictatorships employ repression, the most sophisticated ones, like China, lean heavily on preventive rather than reactive measures. 

DP: Which is more important for this sentinel state — the technologies of repression or the human resources of state control? 

MP: There’s often too much focus on technology itself. While it can be a useful tool, it is used by people. And let’s not forget that technology has lots of blind spots. It can accomplish many tasks, but if people implement countermeasures, technology becomes ineffective. For example, if someone wears a mask or a hood, facial recognition systems struggle to identify them. Similarly, if you hide your phone in a Faraday bag, the government loses track of your movements. There are lots of limitations to technology. This is why I believe the most effective approach combines human intelligence and technological resources. China has both advanced technology and a highly organized structure. 

DP: What did the Covid-19 pandemic reveal about China’s surveillance capabilities? 

MP: During the pandemic, China’s approach to enforcing lockdowns was truly remarkable, particularly in how it used cell phone monitoring. The most crucial part was the actual collaboration projects with private companies like Alibaba and Tencent, as they developed health tracking systems. 

Another significant aspect was the use of so-called “grid management” (网格化管理), which is much more labor-intensive and human-focused than technology-driven. This approach proved to be quite effective during the pandemic. China implemented a system where communities are divided into several grids, typically comprising around 1,000 people or 300 families. Each grid is closely watched by an individual who not only monitors these families but also provides various community services.

How “gridding” works at the neighborhood level: a single unit of an urban grid, with color-coded sections and clearly labeled street names and sub-districts.

To effectively lock down a community, you need active participants. So, those two elements — phone monitoring and grid management — played vital roles. Interestingly, traditional tools like facial recognition and video surveillance were not very useful during the lockdown since people were confined indoors.

DP:  Would you say the pandemic was a trial run for China’s technological capabilities? 

MP: Because of the uniqueness of the pandemic, it was a limited test. There was a lot of self-enforcement because people also did not want to get sick. So, during the pandemic, the government didn’t need to resort to heavy-handed coercion. About half of the population probably complied with regulations simply out of self-interest and a desire to stay safe.

DP: What role does the Chinese media, including state-run outlets, play? Are they part of the sentinel state? 

MP: In this case, official Chinese media don’t play a significant role. Their primary function is to disseminate government-sanctioned messaging. I think that social media is the main target for surveillance because the government has a very sophisticated and effective way of monitoring what’s happening on social media. If a particular topic starts trending, they swiftly intervene to suppress it. There is a very good system in place in that sense. 

In my book, I don’t focus on the output side of this — essentially, how the government employs censorship. One lesser-known aspect of China’s internet surveillance is how they monitor who is accessing the internet. They’ve created effective technology to ensure that anyone using the internet has their identity recorded by the authorities. This way, they maintain tight control over online activity.

DP: What lies behind the Chinese state’s paranoia and need for control?

MP: This system was developed in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. This taught the Chinese Communist Party a very important lesson: they needed to be aware of what was happening in society. Like other dictatorships, the Chinese Communist Party is very fearful of dissenting voices, especially activists, because they need to deter the population from engaging in protests, in anti-regime activities. Most of the time, these activities can be led by a small number of activists. Because they set an example, they show the rest of the population that they are not afraid. To make sure this does not happen, the government relies heavily on surveillance. If somebody dares to challenge the Party’s authority openly, that person will be discovered and punished. 

In my book, I discuss what I call “key individuals.” These are people who are subject to close monitoring by human assets and technological means. There are even “internet key individuals” whose online activities are closely tracked. Some of these individuals are restricted from accessing certain websites or services to further limit their influence.

Surveillance camera at Tiananmen Square. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

DP: What do you make of China’s plans to introduce a national cyberspace ID scheme?

MP: From the Party’s perspective, the more control they can exert, the better. That’s their mindset. However, we also have to consider the law of diminishing returns. In this context, the additional benefits the Communist Party might gain from implementing a cyber ID are likely quite limited. Given how effectively they control the internet, I’d estimate they oversee about 95 to 97 percent of online activity. To capture that remaining two to three percent would require a substantial investment of resources, leading to high marginal costs that probably don’t yield significant benefits. You have to hire people to monitor. You have to actually harass people if you catch them. Then what if they keep posting? It will probably cost them a lot of manpower. 

This feels excessive, especially considering that the party can quickly identify who is online. When you use home internet from state-owned providers, your IP address is already known. The same applies to your phone. Even in public places like cafes they have surveillance systems to track IP addresses. So why introduce a cyber ID? It seems largely unnecessary. Additionally, many people in China are already quite cautious about their online behavior, leading to considerable self-censorship.

DP: So why do you think these plans are being rolled out right now?

MP: Xi Jinping has been emphasizing a comprehensive approach to security. National security is not just about defense against external enemies but also maintaining social stability and cybersecurity. So, under that guideline, Chinese censorship agencies and domestic security agencies will ask, “How can we carry out the top leadership’s instruction?” So, they propose all kinds of measures, such as cyber IDs. From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a clear response to new directions from the central authority, prompting the bureaucracy to take action. When we look at the current circumstances, like the slowing economy, there’s probably more social unrest. There will be a lot more public dissatisfaction. The government aims to suppress expressions of this dissatisfaction and potential social unrest. 

By introducing something like a cyber ID, the Party hopes to enhance self-censorship, as people will be afraid to express their dissatisfaction online. However, this approach might backfire. If individuals feel they can’t voice their frustrations online without repercussions, they may resort to more destructive means of expression. That’s why I believe this strategy may not be beneficial. Over time, this will also depend largely on the economy, as the Chinese security apparatus is primarily funded by local governments. If these local governments do not have the resources, both the human and technological components could suffer. They won’t be able to recruit more informants or maintain and upgrade their technology, which, as we know, can be quite costly.

By introducing something like a cyber ID, the Party hopes to enhance self-censorship, as people will be afraid to express their dissatisfaction online.

DP: Finally, what are the scenarios in which the sentinel state might break down?

MP: If the economy breaks down, it will be the first sign of trouble. You’ll likely see a degradation of the security system and a rise in public discontent.  Another concern is the potential for corruption within the system itself. Those in charge of security wield significant power and have access to resources. Instead of using funds for informants or upgrading the system, they might enrich themselves, leading to better facilities and higher salaries rather than enhancing security.

Additionally, there’s the issue of overreach. The demand for security can seem insatiable, like a beast that can never be fully satisfied. This could result in unnecessary spending on resources — like an excessive number of surveillance cameras using the latest technology — when it may not even be needed.

Married to the Motherland

When teachers Wan Yi (万亿) and Guo Yong (郭勇) tied the knot in Shanghai on September 22, they shared their special day with over 5,100 other couples. All of them were taking part in a series of mass weddings held in 50 locations across China, organized by the country’s official women’s rights organization together with various government agencies. The Communist Party secretary for the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), Huang Xiaowei (黄晓薇), officiated the ceremony, congratulating the newlyweds for “acting as practitioners and advocates for a new marriage and child-rearing culture.”

Huang’s patriotic blessing jars with the romantic ideal of marriage as an expression of love between two individuals, but it encapsulates an increasingly prevalent attitude in PRC state media. As China struggles with a slowing economy and looming demographic crisis, the number of Chinese couples getting married has fallen to a 12-year low. And with the number of marriages closely tied to the number of births, policymakers are determined to boost the country’s shrinking population. State media is doing its part by exalting marriage and reproduction as patriot acts. At the same time, organizations like the ACWF, set up to advance women’s role in society, now harken back to their roles as mothers and caretakers instead. 

Alongside the ACWF, the mass wedding was backed by China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs (民政部), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs ( 农业农村部) and the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (中央军委政治工作部) — a roster that signifies the issue’s importance to PRC authorities. As press coverage of the mass weddings shows, marriage is an expression of love for the motherland.

Wedding Nationalism to Natalism

Secretary Huang’s line about a “new marriage and child-rearing culture” borrows from a speech by Xi Jinping to ACWF leaders in August 2023. Xi instructed the organization to “encourage women to uphold the traditional virtues of the Chinese people” (传统美德) and “promote positive family traditions,” emphasizing the need to “actively foster a new culture of marriage and childbearing” (新型婚育文化) among the nation’s women. The goal of this new culture, as Xi put it, is to “promote the improvement and implementation of policies to support childbearing, improve demographic development, and actively cope with the aging of the population.” In simpler terms, what Xi is pushing is straightforward natalism: the pursuit of higher birth rates to promote economic growth and project greater national power.

Similar public policy concerns can be observed throughout the region. Neighboring Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are all grappling with slowing population growth or even demographic decline and the knock-off effects on the economy. To reverse this trajectory, governments have been offering various incentives: “baby bonuses,” subsidies for assisted reproductive technology treatment, easier access to childcare and early education, and even the long-taboo topic of easing immigration. China seems to be taking a two-pronged approach, clearing some bureaucratic red tape —  the Ministry of Civil Affairs introduced new proposals to streamline marriage registration in August — while also promoting a return to traditional Confucian values that hold up parenthood as both an innate virtue and a social responsibility. The more weight put on the latter, the less onerous the former will be on state expenses.

In keeping with the mass wedding’s nationwide character, news outlets from around the country covered the nuptials. In Guangdong, where close to 300 couples said their vows, the provincial Party-backed Nanfang Daily reported on a woman from Hong Kong who wed a man in Guangzhou, using the story to illustrate the advantages of the Greater Bay Area project to integrate Hong Kong more closely with nearby cities in the mainland. The newspaper also reported that 89 couples in Dongguan “issued a proposal to promote the new marriage and child-rearing culture” advocated by Xi.

Newlyweds cradle their “Honorary Certificate for the Promotion of New-Style Rural Marriage Customs” in Yinchuan. Source: Xinhua.

The official Xinhua News Agency filed from Yinchuan, the capital of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. There, couples posed before a banner that read, “The Family and the Nation Bear Witness to Happiness Together” (家国同庆 见证幸福). In their hands, they held “Honorary Certificates for the Promotion of New-Style Rural Marriage Customs” (农村婚俗新风光荣证). Reporting from the nation’s capital, The Beijing News (新京報) offered a different perspective on the couples’ motivations, emphasizing the more practical incentives behind mass weddings. “We didn’t need to worry about the venue, make-up, photography, and other expenses,” said a groom from Jiangsu province. “It made everything so much simpler, saving us a lot of money and worry.” It isn’t hard to see how participating in a mass wedding ceremony, even one decked with propaganda slogans, just makes financial sense in this economy.

New Traditions for the New Era

Women of China (中国妇女), the official publication of the All-China Women’s Federation, devoted reams of coverage to the mass weddings over the course of the week. Besides full-spread splashes profiling couples like Wan Yi and Guo Yong in Shanghai, the paper also spoke with the “cultural consultant” for the ceremonies, Jia Wenyu (贾文峪). Jia places heavy emphasis on the aesthetics of Chinese tradition: the red lanterns, red silk, and red double-happiness symbols that, she says, “carry forward fine traditional Chinese culture” (传承中华优秀传统文化) — another of Xi’s catchphrases.

Xi lectures the All-China Women's Federation in August 2023. Source: Xinhua.

There have, however, been important “innovations” to these traditions. For instance, Jia points out, mass wedding participants did not bow to each other, to their parents, and to the heavens as tradition dictates. This was replaced with a “newlyweds’ oath” wishing glory and prosperity upon the motherland and the “extension of the family line.” These changes, says Jia, “guide each small family to be more closely connected to the greater family of the motherland, and to give thanks to the motherland with deep love and affection.” Paraphrasing Xi again, she terms this a “new style of household civilization” (家庭文明新风尚) — or, as the oath puts it, “a new style of socialist household civilization” (社会主义家庭文明新风尚). The goal, explains a civil affairs official,  is to “link personal happiness with national glory.”

Back in Shanghai, Women of China tells us that Guo Yong couldn’t hold back his tears at the altar. It’s a common and relatable reaction for many grooms on their wedding day. But Guo Yong wasn’t choking up as his bride walked down the aisle or said “I do.” Instead, it was when he heard the word “motherland.” His betrothed, Wan Yi, provided this pitch-perfect line to round out the feature: “We will live up to the [New] Era. We will not let down the nation. This is our meager contribution to the great rejuvenation of the motherland.” That’s one way to characterize what others might call the happiest day of their lives.

A New Shade of Chinese Feminism

China’s nascent feminist movement has been one of the many victims of authorities’ crackdown on independent civil society and other perceived threats to Communist Party rule over the past decade. In recent years, the tightening of state controls and the introduction of restrictive laws on domestic NGOs has led to a new stage where digital platforms are more crucial than ever for feminist expression. Coupled with the rise of online nationalism, this has given rise to what media scholar Eva Liu of Ohio University calls “pink feminism” — an amalgamation of feminist discourse and ideals with the jingoism of China’s online nationalists, popularly known as “little pinks” (小粉紅).

Is this a true marriage of two ideologies traditionally considered at odds with one another, or just a way for digital feminists to get their voices heard without incurring the government’s wrath? Might “pink feminism” also contain some valuable kernels of truth about the origins of feminism in China? CMP researcher Dalia Parete spoke with Eva Liu to discuss these and other important questions.

Dalia Parete: I know it’s a bit ask, but could you briefly tell us about the history of feminism in China? 

Eva Liu: I don’t want to oversimplify the complex history of Chinese feminism. Drawing from Chinese feminist historians, the first wave of Chinese feminism emerged at the turn of the 20th century, primarily led by male intellectuals and nationalists. This wave viewed the vulnerability of Chinese women as the root cause of the nation’s weakness and aimed to strengthen the nation by liberating its women. 

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established a socialist regime, and I’m sure everybody is familiar with Mao Zedong’s famous slogan, “Women hold up half the sky.” During this historical period, public gender discourse emphasized the “sameness” between women and men, encouraging women to enter the public sphere of waged labor. Although this paternalistic discourse of women’s liberation never explicitly used the label of “feminism,” the educational level and workforce participation of Chinese women significantly improved then.

After the “Reform and Opening Up” in 1978, Western feminist theories began to enter China, and some Chinese universities started offering Women’s Studies courses. In 1995, China hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, which not only facilitated more cultural exchange between Chinese and international feminist scholars and activists but also introduced the concept of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to China. After that, feminist NGOs began to spring up across the country.

In the 21st century, the Chinese government withdrew its support for local feminist NGOs, and the Foreign NGO Law, coming into effect in 2017, also prohibited local NGOs from receiving overseas funding. Since then, Chinese feminism has rarely mobilized through formal organizations, but individual expressions on social media become the primary force of feminist voices in China today, just like in many other countries.

“Women hold up half the sky” in Mao-era propaganda.

DP: How would you define the relationship between feminism and nationalism in the context of Chinese digital feminism? Does this complicate traditional feminist movements?

EL: It is quite complex. In a recent article, I wrote how many Chinese anti-feminist influencers now stigmatize Chinese feminists as “Western hostile forces,” even if there is a clear lack of substantial evidence. At the same time, many gender-related discussions on social media are intersecting with nationalist sentiments. For example, during the Paris Olympics, numerous Weibo posts were celebrating the achievements of the 2021 Tokyo Olympics and the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. 

Many women have demonstrated their patriotism to the authorities by actively participating in nationalist campaigns such as the 2021 Xinjiang cotton controversy. These show that female citizens can be more “patriotic” than their male counterparts, who continue to watch NBA games after its executives showed support for the 2019 Hong Kong protests. This somewhat challenges the male-dominated nationalist narrative.

Many women have demonstrated their patriotism to the authorities by actively participating in nationalist campaigns.

It is important to avoid making hasty conclusions about whether these posters genuinely embrace both feminism and patriotism or if they are merely using nationalist discourse to “legitimize” feminist expressions in an increasingly restrictive online environment. The focus should be on emphasizing this “complexity,” both within digital feminist movements and in a broader context, including the Chinese setting.

DP: How do you think online censorship influences the strategies and discourse of Chinese feminists? Are there specific examples where censorship has hindered or inadvertently promoted feminist activism?

EL: Unfortunately, even some “moderate” feminists who do not directly criticize the state may still have their accounts deleted, be temporarily silenced, or be shadow-banned, meaning that fewer followers can see their posts in their feeds. It’s clear that there are double standards in how these platforms are managed, as online harassment against feminists often gets overlooked and online harassment against feminists is often tolerated.

In these circumstances, some feminists seek alternative platforms to express their opinions, which is not easy but worth trying. Others stay on mainstream platforms and confine themselves to a few “safe topics,” such as celebrating Chinese sportswomen.

Interestingly, when male users express dissatisfaction with certain content, feminists sometimes respond with nationalist rhetoric. Eileen Gu is a prominent example. Gu is viewed as a feminist for her empowering messages and also as a “nationalist” for renouncing her US citizenship and representing China, as reflected in the CCP’s official rhetoric. When male netizens criticize Gu — often over her dual citizenship — her female supporters frequently defend her by referencing official media coverage. These responses are particularly significant in today’s landscape, where alternative platforms are increasingly scarce.

DP: You recently co-authored a paper with Professor Han Ling on the phenomenon of “pink feminism” on Chinese social media. What do you mean by “pink feminism?”

EL: The term “pink feminism” has been circulating online for some time, and our work in this paper was to theorize it. It’s important to note that we do not define it as a feminist camp or identity, as very few people would call themselves pink feminists. Rather, the term is often used by those who are critical of it. We understand “pink feminism” as a practice, or more specifically a way of doing feminism in a highly restricted environment.

DP: How does this form of activism differ from more confrontational feminist approaches, and what are its potential strengths and weaknesses?

EL: I want to stress that pink feminism encourages young feminists to reexamine our indigenous history and corpus. In recent years, early Chinese feminists like Qiu Jin and He-Yin Zhen, along with socialist feminists, have been rediscovered by feminist communities.

Young Chinese feminists aren’t just passively studying Western feminist theories without thinking about local differences. They’re actively continuing the fight for gender equality, a goal that generations of Chinese feminists have worked towards.

This not only acknowledges the contributions of local feminist predecessors but also resists Western hegemonic interpretations of feminism. It is also an important step in countering the popular misconception that feminism is from the West.  Young Chinese feminists aren’t just passively studying Western feminist theories without thinking about local differences. Instead, they’re actively continuing the fight for gender equality, a goal that generations of Chinese feminists have worked towards.

Two of China’s early feminists, He-Yin Zhen (何震) and Qiu Jin(秋瑾). Source : Wikimedia Commons (for He and for Qiu).

The limitations are quite clear: regardless of whether participants fully embrace nationalism, they are forced to avoid overt criticism of state policies. In other words, they end up compromising the critical edge of feminism just to increase their chances of staying safe.

DP: You suggest that pink feminism may reinforce existing power structures that feminists aim to dismantle. Can you provide examples of this?

EL: Yes, some pink feminist practices might indeed end up reinforcing neoliberal consumerism and state authoritarianism. When young feminists come across sexist ads, they usually take one of two approaches. One is through economic action — they’ll boycott the product, rally others to join in and look for alternatives. The other is more political — they’ll report the issue to the authorities. These actions show that women are using their power both as consumers and citizens. However, it’s important to remember that being a gender-conscious consumer often requires some level of class privilege.”

Participants need to stay reflective and not just accept government decisions without question. If the government doesn’t take action, it doesn’t automatically mean that feminists’ concerns are unreasonable. And if the government does take action, it’s crucial not to overlook the issue of procedural justice. Take Kris Wu’s sexual assault scandal in 2021 as an example. His social media account was deleted while he was under arrest, even though he hadn’t been convicted yet.

DP: How do you suggest Chinese feminists navigate the challenges of nationalism and engage with pink feminism without compromising their principles?

EL: In this paper, we want to highlight the internal diversity within Chinese feminism. We cannot label them as simply pro- or anti-state, and nor can we assume the superiority of feminisms that openly criticize the CCP.

For example, during the Olympics, we saw a lot of social media posts celebrating the achievements of Chinese female athletes. Even though female athletes have been winning more medals since China started competing, the sports fandom is still pretty patriarchal, and mainstream media often focuses more on male athletes. These social media discussions not only help boost the visibility of female athletes but also offer role models for young girls, encouraging them to be active and pursue fitness rather than aiming for unrealistic body ideals.

However, this “happy feminism” shouldn’t overshadow the need for feminist critiques of deeper structural issues, and it definitely shouldn’t be co-opted by state propaganda. While some critiques might struggle to get through on mainstream platforms because of censorship, we can look for alternative platforms that offer more freedom, even if that means losing some media visibility. Most importantly, even if the state or the neoliberal market seems to promote a certain type of feminism, feminists mustn’t let this biased form become the only version that’s seen as legitimate.

Married Out

Xi Jinping is so proud of women and all of the “extraordinary achievements” they have made in “all walks of life,” the People’s Daily reported this week, that he sent a congratulatory letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Women’s Forum, which opened in the city of Qingdao on Wednesday. He praised women for their contributions to one of his flagship foreign policy concepts, the “community of shared destiny” (命运共同体).

Xi’s words exemplify how state narratives in China can utilize the language of empowerment and progress, including for women, while simultaneously reinforcing existing power structures. 

Xi Jinping’s letter to the SCO Women’s Forum in Qingdao takes the prime spot in today’s People’s Daily, right under the masthead.

When it comes to many of the concrete issues women face in China, the Party has been slow to act. In his letter, reflecting the Chinese Communist Party’s recent focus on “high-quality development,” Xi leaned again on technological and digital advancements — as though these alone could be used to spur “women’s development” (妇女事业发展). The reality, however, is that women face social, cultural, and institutional limitations — including, as statistics have shown, significant discrimination in the workplace — that are not at all technological in nature.

Last week, for the New York Times, Vivian Wang highlighted an important form of discrimination women continue to face in rural China, as those who marry outside the area of their household registration — known as “married-out women”( 外嫁女) — often face the deprivation of their rights, particularly concerning land rights and village membership. This is an issue The Economist also touched on in brief coverage last year

In fact, the issue has quietly simmered in China for several years, as female villagers have pushed for greater attention to the systematic denial of their benefits as members of village collectives. Two and a half years ago, in February 2022, The Paper (澎湃新闻), an online news outlet under the official Shanghai United Media Group, examined the case of Fengwei Village (凤尾村) in China’s coastal Fujian province. There, residents were being systematically deprived of village benefits because they were “married-out women” or their children. The outlet described how local authorities persistently discriminated against “married-out women” and their children, withholding benefits even when a court had ruled in their favor. 

A graphic for The Paper labeled “Lead Editorial” about the issue of “married-out women” shows a portion of a handwritten petition that reads: “‘Married-out women’ are equivalent to ‘shareholders,’ and other ‘shareholders’ cannot use a ‘vote’ to deprive these women of their right to village dividends.

The coverage by The Paper highlighted the gap between local practices and national laws, underscoring the need for more robust regulations and enforcement mechanisms. Without addressing these discrepancies, it argued, protections intended for individual rights remained ineffective — exposing a significant flaw in the implementation of legal reforms. In this instance, however, it was Lu Jing (卢景), the son of the “married-out woman,” who spoke up. Could this detail account for why the issue received more serious coverage in the Fengwei Village case?

In recent years, several media outlets in China have tried to push on the concrete question of female villager disenfranchisement. A lengthy report in 2020 from The Journal of Law Application (法律适用), a periodical published by the Supreme People’s Court, laid out the legal and historical challenges in cases involving “married-out women.” An important piece of the issue, for example, has been the legal protections around village self-governance, set down in a law on Village Committees first promulgated in 1987 and amended in 1998. “Restrictions and exclusions on the property rights and interests of ‘married-out women’ often happen in the form of village rules and regulations,” The Journal of Law Application wrote, “which on the surface appear to have the legitimacy of villagers’ self-governance.”

Related cases brought by women have been on the rise since the early 2000s in China, and they seem not to have abated. A report on social media from Guangdong’s official Nanfang Daily in 2021 noted that the local government had become involved in mediation for three sisters fighting against village officials for their benefits.

For their part, state media at the central level have continued to send empowerment signals, like today’s prominent Xi Jinping letter in the People’s Daily, or to maintain the pleasant fiction that legal reforms are doing their part. One recent example comes from China Women’s News, the official newspaper of the All-China Women’s Federation, China’s official women’s rights organization. Back in May, it ran a report emphasizing the judiciary’s positive actions through related legal reforms, while conspicuously omitting critical reporting and analysis on the systemic issues standing in the way of these rights.

In the sometimes differing treatment by media at the top and those at the provincial or city levels on this issue, we can glimpse the pull between institutional inertia and media propaganda, and those who hope to make real progress — and seek real exposure — on a grassroots issue that has stubbornly persisted. 

As the magazine Agricultural Wealth (农财宝典), published by Guangdong’s Nanfang Daily Newspaper Group, rightly noted nearly four years ago addressing the issue of women’s rights to village benefits, “[the] ability to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of women and children is an important indicator of a society’s harmony, civilization and progress.” 

China’s Growing Presence in Afghan Media

The Afghan media landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces. Once a vibrant sector with over 11,000 journalists and media workers, the industry now faces significant challenges. The Taliban’s strict control over media operations has led to the closure of more than half of the country’s media outlets and many journalists, particularly women, have been forced out of their jobs, creating an environment of fear and repression for those who remain.

In this context, China’s media engagement, particularly under the Taliban regime, reflects a strategic approach that aligns with its broader regional interests. While China’s media presence in Afghanistan has been comparatively modest, it has made notable inroads through support for local Pashtun media networks and leveraging its own media channels to project a favorable image of the Taliban. 

Last week, CMP’s Dalia Parete sat down with Dr. Hazrat Bahar to discuss the Afghan media landscape, the role of Chinese media in the country, and how they have been managing the challenges and constraints they face. When Kabul fell under Taliban control in August 2021, Dr. Bahar was on the ground in Afghanistan’s capital city, in the midst of writing his Ph.D. dissertation about the impact of social media on public policy. He is now based in Leipzig, Germany. 


Dalia Parete: By some estimates, the media sector in Afghanistan flourished after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, with a significant increase in the number of media outlets and journalists. At its peak, Afghanistan had 597 active media outlets and over 11,000 journalists, supported by international investments and a growing civil society.  Is that a fair assessment of the state of things in Afghanistan up to 2021? How did the media landscape in Afghanistan evolve before the latest Taliban takeover?

Hazrat Bahar: It’s helpful to look back at the media situation before the Taliban took over in 2021. Before 2001, during the Taliban’s first rule, Afghanistan had very limited media. There was only one government-controlled radio station and a few newspapers and magazines, mainly in Kabul. After the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the media in Afghanistan expanded rapidly and became much more democratic, a change the country had never seen before. 

The international community, particularly the United States, invested heavily in Afghanistan—nearly 1 billion dollars with over 800 million dollars coming from the US. These investments significantly boosted and diversified the media landscape. By 2004, Afghanistan’s new constitution supported a free press, and a media law passed in 2009 reinforced this by guaranteeing freedom of speech and the establishment of media outlets.

At one point, there were reportedly over 1,000 media outlets, though officially only around 600 were operational. Many outlets were short-lived, created for specific projects and ending when those projects did. Despite this, the media in Afghanistan was quite accessible and able to criticize the government and hold it accountable, even questioning high-ranking officials.

At one point, there were reportedly over 1,000 media outlets, though officially only around 600 were operational.

However, this freedom came with risks. Journalists faced threats, arrests, and torture from various sources, including the government, international forces, and insurgent groups like the Taliban and Daesh. Despite these challenges, the media enjoyed significant freedom and a strong regulatory framework during those two decades, marking a notable period of media progress in Afghanistan.

Dramatic Changes

DP: The media landscape in Afghanistan has undergone significant transformations, particularly following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. What are the primary challenges facing journalists in Afghanistan today?

HB: After the international community withdrew and the Taliban took control, there was a significant shift in governance, freedom, and media conditions. The Taliban understood the media’s influence and imposed strict, ongoing restrictions, which are still in place today. These restrictions create numerous obstacles for journalists in Afghanistan. Many media outlets cannot cover sensitive topics deemed off-limits by the Taliban. Journalists often practice self-censorship to avoid risking their lives, as those who report on restricted topics face severe consequences, including torture and arrest. 

International media outlets like BBC, VOA, Deutsche Welle, and even Chinese media such as CRI can no longer broadcast their content in Afghanistan. The financial support for media, once provided by international aid and local advertising, has significantly diminished, leading to reduced staff and limited coverage.

Taliban Humvee in Kabul, August 2021. SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons

Additionally, many experienced Afghan journalists fled the country after the takeover, leaving a void filled by less-trained individuals. This has led to a lack of critical journalism, with some new media voices supporting the Taliban rather than challenging it. Consequently, the portrayal of Afghanistan from the outside may seem misleading compared to the reality on the ground, as shared by those who remain in the country. There are considerable challenges related to media access, freedom of speech, and censorship under the Taliban, which enforces a strict boundary on what can be reported.

DP: Do you think the withdrawal of the United States impacted the media landscape in Afghanistan? 

HB: Yes, the impact of the US withdrawal and the regime change in Afghanistan has been profound. With the new government, everything has shifted, including media and freedom of speech. For example, in the provinces, women are not allowed to work in the media, and their voices are even banned from being broadcast on radio. In some areas, women’s voices are restricted from live broadcasts — a stark contrast to the previous situation where women were free to work and present in the media.

Many experienced Afghan journalists fled the country after the takeover, leaving a void filled by less-trained individuals.

Protests, particularly those led by women, are not allowed, and media coverage of such events is heavily restricted. The media is also barred from reporting on attacks by armed opponents or ISIS activities unless they are major incidents. Many smaller incidents go unreported.

Although the Taliban claims to uphold media laws, they are not enforced in practice. The Taliban’s actions contradict their statements about media freedom. A new, practical media law that the Taliban would adhere to is needed. It might be helpful to involve international experts in drafting a new law more likely to be implemented effectively.

Access to information is also a significant issue. Journalists often face difficulties obtaining the information they need, as the Taliban controls the flow of information and is not responsive to requests. This situation hampers critical and investigative journalism in Afghanistan. 

Separate Spaces for Women

DP: Could you explain the situation in Afghanistan for women in the media? 

HB: Gender did not previously impact a journalist’s ability to work freely in Afghanistan. Both men and women could report on various topics without major issues, but traditional customs somehow restricted their work or attire. However, there have been significant restrictions on women in the media since the regime change.

Najiba Ayubi, Afghan jounalist and activist. SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons

Initially, the Taliban mandated that women and men work in separate spaces. Later, they imposed further restrictions, requiring women to wear masks while working. In the provinces, women have been almost entirely removed from the media landscape, with additional bans on women being broadcast.

These restrictions extend to education as well; women are currently barred from studying at universities and receiving media training in Afghanistan. This systematic approach effectively limits women’s participation in media. As a result, once the current female journalists leave the country, Afghanistan may face a severe shortage of women reporters.

Currently, around 60 percent of journalists have lost their jobs, with 80 percent of those being women. This has led to a significant reduction in female journalists. Although there is an increase in female bloggers, their content often avoids criticism of the regime. It may even indirectly support it, giving a misleading impression of the situation in Afghanistan.

Laws and Regulations

DP: With the current laws and regulations that journalists face when reporting, is it still possible to do professional journalism? 

HB: Currently, there are no formal laws governing media. Instead, the Taliban has introduced various directives and rules that journalists must follow. Although there is a commission intended to handle complaints and promote access to information, it has not improved media access. If someone refuses to share information, there is no mechanism to address or report this non-compliance.

The Taliban has issued around 11 directives outlining what media can and cannot report. These rules largely restrict reporting on internal Taliban affairs, including corruption within their ranks. Reporting on issues that might negatively impact the Taliban’s image, such as security concerns or internal conflicts, is also prohibited.

The situation is further complicated by the need for more unified regulations nationwide. Media conditions can vary significantly from one province to another. For example, media freedom is generally better in the northern provinces, like Mazar or Kunduz, compared to the southern and eastern regions, where restrictions are stricter. In Kandahar, where the Taliban leadership is based, media restrictions are particularly severe.

In Kabul, the situation may appear relatively better, partly because the presence of foreigners makes it essential to project an image of media freedom. However, this does not reflect the reality in the provinces, where journalists face intense self-censorship due to unclear and inconsistent regulations. The lack of clear guidelines creates fear among journalists, who are uncertain about what content might be considered risky or acceptable. This fear leads to self-censorship, as journalists avoid reporting on topics that might provoke an adverse reaction from the Taliban.

Overall, the regulations are vague and open to interpretation, contributing to a climate of fear and uncertainty among journalists. The Taliban’s approach appears to intentionally create this ambiguity to suppress bold reporting and maintain control over media narratives.

DP: What barriers do Afghan citizens face in accessing accurate and reliable information?

HB: Access to media and information in Afghanistan is a significant issue. The public is largely exposed to government propaganda, whether through state media or pro-regime bloggers. Critical media is scarce for several reasons. International media faces restrictions, and the available online media is limited by low internet penetration. Less than 18 percent of Afghans have internet access and only about 11-12 percent use social media.

Due to heavy censorship, local media cannot produce accurate or critical information. This lack of diverse perspectives means that people mostly rely on the Taliban’s narrative and what is propagated by supportive bloggers. The public sphere is thus highly controlled, with limited opportunities for critical discourse.

Attempts to provide critical information from outside the country are often met with hostility. Those who challenge the Taliban are frequently labeled as foreign agents or traitors, further stifling dissenting voices. This environment fosters misinformation and disinformation, reinforcing the Taliban’s narrative and suppressing alternative viewpoints.

Additionally, Afghanistan's limited media literacy makes it difficult to differentiate between propaganda and accurate information. This contributes to the Taliban’s ability to control public perception, as people tend to accept at face value what they see and hear.

A journalist reporting in Kunar Province, Afghanistan. Source: Wikimedia Commons

China's Role in the Region

DP: Media engagement has been an essential way for China to influence countries in the region. Are you seeing media engagement by China with the Taliban? What impact, if any, do you think engagement like this is having? 

Hazrat Bahar: In the past, the media sector in Afghanistan was heavily influenced by the Western and international communities, with significant investment and involvement, though China also played a role. While Western countries and regional players like India were prominent, China’s involvement was limited and was involved in two main ways.

First, China supported Afghan media networks, such as Shamshad Network and Axon Media Network. Shamshad Network received some support from China, while Axon Media Network, which included outlets like Spogmai Radio, also had ties to Chinese backing. These networks primarily operated in Kabul.

Second, China had its own media presence in Afghanistan. China Radio International (CRI) Pashto contracted with Spogmai Radio, part of the Axon  Network, broadcasting CRI’s programs twice daily in Kabul and Kandahar. CRI Pashto’s social media page gained significant traction, with over three million followers, which is notable compared to many popular Afghan media outlets.

Additionally, China Global Television Network (CGTN) produced and is still producing content about Afghanistan, mainly in English. Kabul News Television created a documentary about the Belt and Road Initiative in Afghanistan in 2017. While China’s involvement was less extensive compared to the Western community, it still made notable contributions to Afghan media and provided training for Afghan journalists in China.

DP: Are there any concerns or reservations among Afghani journalists regarding their relationship with Chinese media? 

HB: Afghan journalists were cautious about forming close relationships with China. For instance, I spoke with the owner of a prominent Afghan media outlet while researching a chapter on China’s media involvement in Afghanistan. He shared that many journalists avoided visiting the Chinese embassy out of fear that their presence might be noticed by Western diplomats, who might view it unfavorably. This concern was compounded by India's support for Afghan media and the ongoing tensions between India and China, as well as between China and Western countries.

Additionally, China's support for Afghan media was relatively limited and targeted. They mainly supported media outlets ideologically aligned with China or critical of Western involvement in Afghanistan. This selective support may have contributed to the Afghan media's limited interest and involvement in China.

DP: How does Chinese media coverage of the Taliban and its regime in Afghanistan differ from that of Western media, and what impact might this have on the perception of China in Afghanistan?

HB: Even now, Chinese media continues to support the current Afghan regime. They use carefully chosen terms to describe the situation, such as "the acting government of Afghanistan," instead of referring to it as the "Taliban regime" or similar terms. This terminology aligns with the language used by Chinese officials and reflects the close relationship between China and the Taliban. Unlike Western media, which often has a critical stance, Chinese media portrays a more positive image of the Taliban.

Unlike Western media, which often has a critical stance, Chinese media portrays a more positive image of the Taliban.

Chinese media coverage emphasizes security and development, often attributing any negative issues in Afghanistan to international involvement while crediting the Taliban and Chinese investment for improvements. They downplay concerns about human rights and women's rights, framing these issues as internal matters of each country and not areas for external criticism.

DP: Generally speaking, how do the public and media audiences view China? 

HB: From my analysis of Chinese media coverage over the past two decades, China has been viewed positively in Afghanistan. Even though China’s media presence is not as prominent as that of international outlets like BBC or VOA, the general perception of China remains favorable. Chinese media has been less active in promoting its interests compared to its Western counterparts, but it has still maintained a positive image in Afghan media.

Recently, Chinese media has increased its engagement with high-ranking officials in the Afghan government, as reported by both Afghan and Chinese media. Despite this, the Taliban has restricted international media, including Chinese outlets like China Radio International (CRI), from broadcasting within Afghanistan. For example, CGTN attempted to livestream the International Olympic Games in 2013 but was unsuccessful due to these restrictions.

Overall, while Chinese media continues to have a significant presence and influence, particularly among Pashtun communities in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s restrictions on international media limit their ability to operate freely.

DP: How has China targeted its media outreach in Afghanistan, and is there any notable difference in how it is received by different ethnic groups? 

HB: The Chinese media networks I mentioned are primarily owned by Pashtuns, reflecting a strong China-Pashtun connection. I found no evidence of Chinese support extending to non-Pashtun media outlets. For instance, the CRI Pashtu page is quite popular in Afghanistan, whereas the CRI Persian page has much less engagement. This indicates that Chinese media is specifically targeting the Pashtun population, which, in turn, shows a greater interest in Chinese media.

Regarding Chinese language media, I haven’t seen any Chinese-language publications aimed at the Chinese-speaking population in Afghanistan. There is also a Confucius Institute in Kabul that teaches Chinese, but I haven’t seen any media or content published exclusively in Chinese. Before the government's collapse, there were some private Chinese language courses in Kabul, largely driven by economic ties with China. 

Many Afghans who travel to China for business or education learn Chinese primarily for practical reasons, but I haven’t observed any significant presence of Chinese language content in Afghanistan. Most Chinese language materials sent by CRI were brochures and promotional items for their regular listeners.

When Meloni Met Xi

When Italy officially withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) late last year, following weeks of confidential negotiations and a few diplomatic missteps, the complete silence about the reversal in China’s state media was a telling measure of the prevailing mood. The visible exit of a G7 economy from Xi Jinping’s massive, multi-billion dollar signature program was a humiliating about-face. 

As Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Beijing this week, China seemed keen to shift the narrative, underscoring the benefits of the economic relationship. Those benefits, many Italians would say, were scarcely visible during Italy’s four-year involvement in the project, which yielded few tangible economic benefits for Italy despite initial enthusiasm about the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). But Meloni’s government has also wanted to maintain a heightened relationship with Beijing, proving that Italy does not necessarily need to be in the BRI to become a stable economic partner of China.  

Before Meloni arrived in the Chinese capital on July 26th, media coverage in China of her trip was relatively low-key. Most notable was an article from the state-run Global Times, published by the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily, that took a critical stance – hinting again at China’s understanding of Italy’s December 2023 decision as a scorn.

The article suggested Italy was arriving in China, hat in hand, to apologize for its withdrawal from the BRI. It cited Zhao Junjie, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as saying the visit was “likely aimed at making up for the regret of withdrawal and personally clarifying some misunderstandings.” The article also undermined the notion of Italian agency, implying the country had only backed out of its MoU with China because it had been pressured to do so by the United States. “[Meloni] also needs more cooperation and support from China, especially after her previous visit to the US clearly did not bring her any real benefits,” said Zhao.

A Fresh Start

During the course of Meloni’s three-day visit to China, there was a clear sense in China’s state media that a new chapter was unfolding. The visit was covered prominently, with Meloni standing beside Xi Jinping on the front page of the People’s Daily the day after her arrival. The meeting did not quite get prime position, below or to the right of the newspaper’s masthead. That went, perhaps tellingly, to the visiting president of the small Southeast Asian nation of Timor Leste, whose GDP – and China cares about such things – is .06 percent that of Italy’s.

The People's Daily front page on July 30, 2024, shows Meloni (at right) shaking hands with Xi. 

This looked visually very much like a demotion of Italy’s stature, a tiny but significant act of revenge. But the prevailing sentiment, treated with an attitude of Chinese acceptance, was that Italy had come seeking forgiveness, and hoping for a fresh start in its diplomatic relations with China.

The People’s Daily forefronted Xi Jinping’s remarks about the long-standing amicable relations between China and Italy, framing their historical ties as an unshakable foundation for future collaboration. The reference to the ancient Silk Road was particularly notable, as it evoked the Party's favored narrative of shared economic and cultural, even civilizational, exchange. “China and Italy should uphold and carry forward the Silk Road spirit,” the article read, noting that both China and Italy are “ancient civilizational states” (文明古国).

State media coverage portrayed the factors impacting the relationship as being primarily about geopolitical forces rather than about real determinations of mutual interest. The relationship remained constant in the midst of change, according to the People’s Daily article: “Despite the profound evolution of the current international situation, China's will to emphasize and develop China-Italy relations remains unchanged, the win-win nature of China-Italy relations remains unchanged, and the friendship between the two peoples remains unchanged,” the newspaper said, relating Xi Jinping’s sentiments.

This language of stability and continuity was meant to convey the image of a patient and benevolent China willing to forgive Italy’s mistakes.

Whatever the realities of China-Italy trade, the relationship was, according to China, “win-win” – a term China’s leaders frequently use to convey the idea that arrangements are good for everyone involved, but that often implies glossing over differences that are only too real. In this respect, it is certainly true that Italy seeks a strengthening of its economic ties with China. But the partnership faces significant hurdles. As Meloni made a point of highlighting during the Italy-China Business Forum, held in the midst of her visit, and as she sat next to Chinese Premier Li Qiang, investments from China in Italy are currently only a third of those made by Italian businesses in China. “It’s a gap that I’d like to see narrowed in the right way,” she told the audience of officials and business leaders.

Meloni appears beside Premier Li Qiang during the recent Italy-China Business Forum. Source: Palazzo Chigi

Indispensable China

Typical of much external propaganda by official state outlets on foreign affairs, China Radio International  (中国国际广播电台) cherry-picked quotes from a range of Italian commentators, many with long-standing proxy relationships with China. The overarching message of the coverage was that China is absolutely essential to Italy’s continued development. 

One quote came, for example, from Mario Bosselli, the president of the China Italy Foundation, which promotes economic, commercial, and cultural relations between Italy and China. The Foundation also maintains a close relationship with the Chinese embassy in Italy, with the latter being a counselor in its Council of Administration. Bosselli emphasized the importance of investment in China for Italian companies: “Investing in China is of great significance to Italian companies and will help high-quality Italian products enter the Chinese market,” he was quoted as saying. Ahead of Meloni’s visit, Bosselli was also quoted by the Global Times as saying that Italy was the perfect “gateway” for Chinese products heading for third-country markets. It is worth noting that the “gateway to Europe” argument has been made, with encouragement from Chinese state media and economists, for almost all countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.

The overarching message of the coverage was that China is absolutely essential to Italy’s continued development. 

Another quote in the CRI story came from Adolfo Urso, Italy’s Minister of Economic Development. Urso again urged the importance of the Chinese market, which he called indispensable. “China is an indispensable market and a key partner for Italian companies.” he was quoted as saying. “Cooperation between Italy and China in areas such as green technology and electric vehicles is becoming increasingly important.”

As the official Xinhua News Agency reported on Meloni’s visit, Bosselli of the China Italy Foundation was again the source. The outlet ran an “exclusive” interview with the association president. In the way typical with interviews in Chinese state media, this was delivered as a series of paraphrased statements as opposed to direct quotes, beginning with “Bosselli expressed.” Bosselli’s talk of “respect and trust,” “dialogue and cooperation,” and his appeal to history over substantive trade seemed to echo China’s official line: “​​Next year will mark the 20th anniversary of the Italy-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and we look forward to both sides upholding respect and trust, maintaining dialogue and cooperation, and capitalizing on this opportunity to add new meaning to the Italy-China relationship,” read the paraphrasal.

Chinese state media coverage of Giorgia Meloni’s visit has tried to strike a fine balance between admonishing past disappointments and welcoming a fresh diplomatic reset. At the same time, Meloni and her government came to the country to strike a different kind of balance: one that will let Italy become a critical economic partner for China — like the other G7 economies — without having to rejoin the Belt and Road Initiative, and, in so doing, fall back into its political orbit.

A Fire That Can’t Be Extinguished

Those who play with fire will get burned. As Lai Ching-te (賴清德) was sworn in yesterday as the fifth democratically elected president of the Republic of China (ROC), the official name of Taiwan, seething sentiments like this one blazed across China’s official media.

Such language contrasted sharply with Lai’s message of “peace and mutual prosperity” (和平共榮) for both sides of the strait, delivered during a lively ceremony outside Taiwan’s Presidential Office whose theme for the day focused on national unity and democratic values: “Weaving Taiwan together; progressing democracy.”

Fiery Rhetoric

In a commentary on Lai’s speech posted online shortly after midnight today, China’s official Xinhua News Agency painted a portrait of Lai as a vocal proponent of what it called “the separatist fallacy of ‘Taiwan independence.’” In typical fashion, the headline — which included the fiery reference above — referred to Lai only as “the regional leader of Taiwan” (台湾地区领导人), emphasizing China’s claims to sovereignty over the islands.

Line by line, the Xinhua commentary dissected Lai’s speech, exposing what it claimed to be deceitful and separatist undertones, and responded with emotive and polemical attacks. Lai, it said, was a “worker for Taiwan independence” (台独工作者); a “troublemaker” (麻烦制造者). According to the news agency, his speech was “a naked confession of Taiwan independence.”

Lai’s message of peace and mutual prosperity was brushed aside. “The hope for cross-strait dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation is false,” said the Xinhua commentary, “and the continued deterioration of cross-strait relations is true.”  The article urged the Taiwanese to oppose independence and support unification.

With even harsher language, the Cross-Straits Voices channel of the CCP’s official China Media Group (CMG) adopted an adversarial tone. In the face of efforts toward Taiwan’s independence, it said, “peace in the Taiwan Strait is like fire and water” (台海和平水火不容).

Lai’s message of peace and mutual prosperity was brushed aside.

The channel characterized Lai’s speech, which focused on the four themes of stability, self-confidence, responsibility, and solidarity, as a blatant attempt to “lean on foreign [countries] to push independence” (倚外谋独), “internationalizing” the Taiwan question. The commentary was chockful of snide and aggressive characterizations of Lai’s words and intent. He “stubbornly adhered” (顽固坚持) to the notion of Taiwan independence, or “blatantly propagandized” (大肆宣扬) it. And he “incited” (煽动) the people of Taiwan to “hate and fear China” (仇中恐中).

By the outlet’s admission, there was nothing Lai could say to alleviate China’s concerns about his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has now won its third consecutive four-year presidential term — a first since Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996. “No matter what Lai says or how he says it, nothing changes the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China,” said the outlet.

The CMG piece was widely syndicated across Chinese websites and social media channels, often identified as being from “Watching the Taiwan Strait” (看台海), a social media brand under CMG. The article appeared in such outlets as the Shanghai Observer (上观), an online publication under Shanghai’s official Liberation Daily (解放日报); Guangming Daily Online, a website operated by the Central Propaganda Department’s chief newspaper, and the myriad social media accounts of Global Times.

The article was also shared through “Watching the Taiwan Strait” accounts on foreign social media platforms, including Facebook and YouTube, where its official CCP affiliations are not clearly labeled.

Full-Page Fury

In today’s edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper, the entire space of page four is devoted to official responses to Lai’s inauguration in Taiwan — with nine separate pieces in all.

Along the left-hand margin of the page is a report from Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan, where Wang Yi, visiting to attend a meeting with ministerial members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), is quoted as emphasizing that “the one-China principle is the lynchpin for maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait.” This is followed to the right by a pair of statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Page four of today’s edition of the People’s Daily.

Another large article on the page gathers together several international remarks that affirm China’s sovereignty over Taiwan — a typical tactic in CCP propaganda, which historically relies heavily on foreign voices. The voices ostensibly supporting China on the Taiwan question include the speaker of Sri Lanka’s parliament, a spokesperson from Pakistan’s foreign ministry, a Congolese education official, parliamentary speakers from Botswana and Malawi, and a deputy prime minister of Uganda, to name just a very few.

But one of the strongest tones comes at the bottom of the page, in a commentary attributed to “Zhong Yiping” (钟一平). This is almost certainly a homophonous official pen name for an opinion representing the central CCP leadership. In many such pen names, the character “Zhong,” literally “bell,” is a stand-in for China. In this case, the second two characters in the name likely refer directly to “one China” and “peace” — essentially a homophone of the notion of “peaceful unification.”

Not surprisingly, the need for “peaceful unification” is the central theme of this page-four commentary, which concludes by urging both sides to “jointly pursue the bright future of peaceful unification.”

Social Silence

Today, as yesterday, social media platforms inside China are restricting posts and searches about Taiwan’s newly inaugurated president. As Chinese-language outlets outside China have reported, searches on the popular Weibo platform for the hashtag “#Lai Ching-te” (#赖清德) turned up a message yesterday that read: “According to relevant regulations and policies, the content of this topic cannot be displayed.”

Screenshot of Weibo on May 21, search for “Lai Ching-te.”

Searches today on Weibo for “Lai Ching-te” do yield results — with one serious limitation. All of the posts listed in the search results are from CCP-run media, listed hierarchically. At the top is the official account of the People’s Daily, followed by its spin-off, the Global Times.

Historically, elections in Taiwan have been a topic of interest for internet users in China, and the authorities are keen to contain and “guide” any related news and discussion. During Taiwan’s presidential election back in January, Weibo censored all hashtags associated with the presidential elections in Taiwan, which briefly trended.

Thanks to China’s conscientious filters on Taiwan, any curious reader in China who tries to search “Lai Ching-te” on social media will be faced with a wall of fire and fury.  

Additional research contributed by David Bandurski.

A Feminist Odyssey

Lü Pin began her involvement in women’s rights in the 1990s, as a new generation of women’s activism was bubbling in the wake of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995. Then a recent graduate of Shandong University, she was working as a journalist for China Women’s News (中国妇女报), the official publication of the All-China Women’s Federation or ACWF (中华全国妇女联合会), a Communist Party-affiliated “mass organization.”

After a decade at the paper, Lü set off on her own to found Feminist Voices (女权之声), an independent outlet based on Weibo and WeChat. Also known in English as Women’s Voice, it advocated for women and offered a support network for this new generation of activists, helping them analyze and discuss feminist issues. The online platform was permanently shut down by the authorities in 2018, by which point Lü was continuing her writing and activism from the United States, fearing harassment for her work in China. Now pursuing a PhD at Rutgers University, Lü Pin’s passion for advocacy and activism has never faded. She continues to moderate the Facebook group Free Chinese Feminists, where she shares news and updates on the state of women’s rights in China. 

Last month, CMP’s Dalia Parete sat down with Lü Pin to discuss her journey as a feminist and the ways women’s issues are portrayed in China today. 

Dalia Parete: I know you’ve been engaged with women’s issues and feminism in China for many years, but perhaps you could start by telling us how you first became interested in, or concerned about these issues. What got you involved?

Lü Pin: In 1994, after graduating from university, I was offered a job as a reporter at the China Women’s News. At that time, I had not been exposed to feminism and had little interest in women’s issues. Knowing nothing about feminism, I became exposed to women’s issues through my work at a time when preparations for the upcoming Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing were in full swing. I attended the NGO Forum at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 as a reporter and was greatly impressed by the fervent feminist spirit and the diverse range of issues discussed by participants from all over the world.

The year following that conference, a few of my colleagues and some gender scholars founded a volunteer group dedicated to media and gender equality, though I was not actively involved with this group until about 1998. Around International Women’s Day that year, I participated in a gender awareness training session organized by a colleague along with other female journalists. During an icebreaker activity when asked, “Who are you?” I responded with “a journalist.” The facilitator showed her response to the same question as “a female journalist.” This experience was among my earliest realizations that incorporating a gender perspective into my work was not only possible but could also make a significant difference.

Two issues that initially caught my attention were gender bias in mass media and domestic violence against women. As a result, my colleagues and I, in collaboration with some gender studies scholars, formed a writing group and established a column in China Women’s News. This column, which ran for about three years, focused on critiquing the prevalent issues within the mass media at the time, specifically how the media discriminated against, demeaned, and ignored women in various aspects. 

My engagement with the issue of domestic violence also began through the media, by raising awareness among media workers and enhancing the media coverage of domestic violence issues. Starting in 2002, I led a program that organized seminars and training sessions for journalists in Beijing and other cities, invited them to cover advocacy activities, and facilitated the creation of a guide for reporting on domestic violence. In 2003, I distributed press releases on proposed legislation for the Law Against Domestic Violence to journalists at the “Two Sessions,” which was finally enacted in 2016 after more than a decade of collaborative efforts.

Lü Pin writing a report on an All-China Women’s Federation event at the Great Hall of the People in 1999. Photo: Lü Pin.

DP: Earlier in your career, you worked as a reporter for China Women’s News, which is a state-affiliated publication. What was that experience like? How was it possible, and maybe not possible, to talk about the issues that concerned you?

LP: I worked for China Women’s News for a total of ten years, from 1994 to 2004. The newspaper is directly controlled by the Party, but it is almost the least important newspaper of the Party’s national propaganda system. The newspaper’s motto was “to publicize women to society, to publicize society to women,” implying that it struggles with the marginalization of the women’s issues it advocated within the dominant ideology. While working at the newspaper, I did a lot of propaganda work that I was instructed to do, much of which I didn’t realize was problematic at the time.

For instance, during the so-called enterprise reform, many women were forcibly dismissed and left without social protection. However, the newspaper portrayed the unemployment issue as a result of women’s “low quality” and promoted the notion that women should “stand on their own feet” as a solution to the problem.

At the same time, the newspapers’ advocacy for gender equality has led to a critical examination of women’s rights issues, including violence against women and gender discrimination in the family, education, and the workplace. This also opened up the newspapers to engage with the activities of women’s organizations and to consider the perspectives of feminist scholars on several issues, fostering a more inclusive and informed discussion on women’s rights. I am most grateful for the exposure to feminism and civil women’s organizations during the ten years I worked for the newspaper.

I did not have many real readers because China Women’s News, like other state-affiliated newspapers, has never been marketed to the broader public.

A fact that might not be known to many is that media directly affiliated with the state at the time allowed journalists considerable autonomy, as they did not strictly regulate the content beyond the bottom line of not overstepping red lines and fulfilling the propaganda tasks entrusted to them by the state. Although I diligently wrote many reports about women’s rights and gender issues, I did not have many real readers because China Women’s News, like other state-affiliated newspapers, has never been marketed to the broader public.

Nor was there any reward for excellence or hard work within the newspaper. My experience has taught me that the rigidity and staleness of content in state-affiliated media outlets are not solely due to censorship and propaganda. A considerable factor is also their lack of competition in the marketplace, although marketization does not necessarily imply an increased interest in gender equality. Ultimately, it was the demoralization and sense of meaninglessness in the work environment that led me to leave China Women’s News after ten years of working for it.

DP: Drawing on your experience in the media sphere and also as an activist, how would you assess reporting in China today on women’s issues? And what would you like to see?

LP: This is a big question. Simply put, we should dynamically assess media coverage of women’s issues in light of changes in both China’s socio-political environment and its media ecology. I’m also viewing it from a feminist activist’s perspective. In the era when marketized traditional media replaced state-affiliated media as the major public agenda setters, the problem continued to be mainly the marginalization of women and gender issues, characterized more by the virtual absence of references to them rather than overt manifestations of discrimination and symbolic exploitation.

When marketized media replaced state-affiliated media as the major public agenda setters, the problem continued to be the marginalization of women and gender issues.

For a period, I did observe a quantitative increase in mass media coverage of women’s rights claims, although it remained limited in overall proportion. The reason for this surge was that the media at the time was drawn to the controversial advocacy approaches adopted by feminists. However, as the feminist movement faced increasing repression in 2015 and the political environment in China tightened, it became difficult for mass media to spotlight feminist advocacy.

The rise of the feminist movement, against the odds of repression, nevertheless introduced a new variable: the opportunity and possibility for the mass media to communicate feminist claims when they become very prominent. In the boom period of the #MeToo movement, which began in 2018, there was a lot of effort by the media to report, with those media reporters consciously viewing their reporting as supportive of the movement and as a form of defiance against censorship. Despite many reports not making it to the presses and others being deleted later, the media coverage significantly fueled the #MeToo movement’s efforts to raise public awareness. Additionally, the media’s shift to the Internet has facilitated more comprehensive coverage of gender issues, allowing for representation in lengthy and multimedia formats. 

As feminism becomes further politically stigmatized and the media faces increasing restrictions against investigating controversial issues, the gender perspective in news coverage is diminishing, appearing only occasionally and subtly in “non-fiction” stories. In the cases of gender-based violence that attracted a great deal of concern since 2022, such as the case of the chained women, the media was powerless to reveal the truth, and to a considerable extent was only able to convey the official narrative frame. In China’s context, media coverage of women’s issues is increasingly becoming a matter of what reporting is permitted — that is, a question of freedom of expression.

In fact, I’m fairly certain that covering women’s issues would be greatly in the media’s interest at this time. Women’s rights are arguably one of the hottest topics in China, and yet both the amount and depth of media coverage in this area are simply not commensurate with the needs of audiences. I’m not suggesting that easing censorship would fully resolve gender inequality in the media, but rather it’s no longer realistic to discuss improving media coverage when heavy censorship has significantly curtailed the autonomy of media reporting.

Lü Pin reporting on the 1995  World Conference on Women’s Non-Governmental Forum. Photo: Lü Pin.

DP: I wonder if we could turn to your work at Feminist Voices. What was the idea behind starting this project?

LP: My motivation for founding Feminist Voices in 2009 was as much about dissatisfaction with the mass media as it was with the feminist movement back then. Rather than negotiating with mass media workers to encourage more focus on women’s issues, I opted for a more efficient strategy: directly disseminating the feminist perspective through alternative media. I also aimed to reorganize the feminist movement by engaging with the general public beyond the confines of feminist circles dominated by the intellectual elite. 

It was a period when civil society was burgeoning in China, and I was driven by a strong desire to ensure that the feminist movement did not become disconnected or marginalized. In the years after having the idea to create an alternative media outlet, I lacked the resources to make it real. All I managed to do was establish a feminist blog on my personal MSN account, which has been discontinued. That blog received up to 2,000 hits per post before being banned before the 2008 Olympics. So, when I finally secured a bit of funding to create Feminist Voices, I had confidence that it was going to work.

For the first two years of Feminist Voices, I was the only part-time employee and handled everything. Almost all weeks, I distributed a Word file containing several original articles through an e-mail group I managed, which had over a thousand members — perhaps almost all the active feminists around the country at that time.

I would also upload some important articles to social media. Weibo had not been launched yet, but there was Kaixin and Douban. The highest number of reads I received on a single post was 20,000, and almost every week I received enthusiastic feedback telling me how my articles inspired them and suggesting topics they would like me to discuss. From such feedback, I recognized that there were already some very passionate young feminists in China who were eager to take action. The alliance between Feminist Voices and these young people contributed to opening up an era of greater popularization and politicization of the feminist movement in China. The main point of recalling this history may be to highlight the great potential that media and communication may contribute to social change. 

Feminist Voices was banned long ago but today numerous other feminist alternative media outlets are currently active in China. Many of them lack a large following and are highly vulnerable to suspension due to exhaustion and censorship, but they collectively form a vast network of feminist communication that tenaciously remains the community base of feminism. There may be only a few at the vanguard of a movement, but the resilience of the movement is something that countless people unite to hold onto.

The table of contents for a 2010 edition of Feminist Voices.

DP:  In 2018, while you were living in America, the #MeToo movement surged in China. How did you see the movement?

LP: The rise and growth of the #MeToo movement demonstrates the adaptive resilience of the feminist movement. The “Feminist Five” case, in which five feminists were arrested and detained for organizing an anti-sexual harassment action, occurred in March-April 2015. It underscored the government’s deterrence against the organizing of high-profile women’s rights advocacy. However, despite the shrinking and going semi-underground nature of core feminist activist groups, the reach of the feminist movement expanded dramatically through the internet, fostering active public debate on various topics. The #MeToo movement represented another phase in the feminist movement’s evolution, led by a generation of young feminists who centered their activism around issues rooted in their own gendered experiences, and a more spontaneous and decentralized approach to mobilization.

Portrait of the Feminist Five (Li Tingting, Zheng Churan, Wei Tingting, Wu Rongrong, Wang Man) by David Revoy.

#MeToo highlights the remarkable courage and vitality that feminism can ignite, evident in its ability to break through censorship, shaking up society and amplifying women’s voices countless times for the last six years. But #MeToo could not halt the deteriorating political climate in China, resulting in waves of violence against its participants, including activists and survivors who came forward.

As collective action has become almost impossible, and as legal and institutional changes appear increasingly unlikely, the #MeToo movement, and indeed the feminist movement as a whole, increasingly shifts towards engaging in discursive debates surrounding culture, relationships, behavioral norms, and lifestyles as a means of adaptation. Certainly, discursive debates are crucial for effecting far-reaching social change, and the expansive feminist community fostered by the #MeToo movement in China stands as a significant bastion of resistance within the current Chinese landscape.

DP: What strategies do you think the feminist movement in China will employ to maintain its momentum and adapt to the evolving political climate, given the challenges it faces in terms of censorship?

LP: We know that censorship does not block all dissemination of information, but merely draws boundaries or raises the threshold for it. As a result, cases that achieve great emotional or moral mobilization can still be widely disseminated and evoke strong anger, while messages that do not directly resort to resistance may also still circulate. Of course, things have become so unpredictable and unstable that no one can confirm what would survive censorship. I mean, with regard to women’s rights, there’s still space for discussion within the Great Firewall (GWF) at the moment, but when it comes to building momentum for the movement, that’s really impossible to plan and anticipate.

Further, we have been witnessing a strategy become more prominent — namely, information backwash, which is spreading information into GFW from sites outside GFW. Yet there are no examples of the feminist movement being able to forge mobilization in this way, and this strategy is being risked by transnational repression. My own current interest is in the creation of insightful critical and activism-oriented knowledge that aims at the empowerment of the community. Keeping our members from being ignorant is essential to maintaining our movement in the long term and at the forefront.

DP: Finally, I’d like to ask about a term that has garnered significant attention in Western discussions of Chinese feminism — the concept of “leftover women” (剩女). This term, which refers to unmarried women over a certain age, has been widely discussed in Western media. Does it still significantly influence how women are portrayed in China? If so, how does it impact the broader discourse on women’s roles and expectations in Chinese society?

LP: A fundamental aspect of the severe patriarchal constraints faced by Chinese women is the demand for them to conform to gender-specific norms and fulfill gender-specific obligations, such as marrying and bearing children by a certain age. 

I think one of the most prominent conflicts in China is that women have progressed but the state and society have not.

The term “leftover woman” functions as a stigmatizing label, symbolizing society’s denial of the dignity of women who deviate from expected gender behaviors and serving as a cautionary message to other women. On the other hand, the term has emerged precisely because more and more women are postponing marriage or even declaring that they will not marry. This phenomenon is a manifestation of women’s increased level of education and independence of livelihood, and also their increased awareness of women’s autonomy. In fact, I think one of the most prominent conflicts in China is that women have progressed but the state and society have not.

Today, if I am asked whether the term “leftover woman” still wields significant power to harm women demanding lifestyle freedom, my answer is not as much as it did 10 or 15 years ago. This is because more women today are resisting the imposition of patriarchal norms on them.

Indeed, one of the most prominent initiatives remaining in the current feminist movement is “no marriage and no childbearing to protect ourselves.” This radical attitude represents the cutting edge of the feminist debate on lifestyles.

New Frontiers in Foreign Propaganda

In its home market, the Discovery Channel has earned a reputation for never letting reality get in the way of a good story. Once home to respected wildlife documentaries and science specials, the network is better known these days for such colorful titles as Naked and Afraid, Deadliest Catch, American Chopper, and, of course, Shark Week. The network’s volte-face from education to entertainment has even become something of a pop culture punchline.

But what Discovery stands accused of with regards to China is no laughing matter. According to a group of US Congressmen, the channel is “whitewashing genocide” against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in far-western Xinjiang. In an open letter last month to the president and CEO of parent company Warner Bros. Discovery, six Republican representatives called World’s Ultimate Frontier — a new co-production between Discovery and CGTN, the international division of state-run broadcaster CCTV — “an obvious work of propaganda on the part of a totalitarian, adversary regime.”

Known in Chinese as “Entering Xinjiang” (走進新疆), the first trailer for the series features a cast of starry-eyed foreigners marveling at the sights, sounds, and tastes of the region, where the UN Human Rights Office says crimes against humanity have been carried out by the Chinese state. As mass detention, torture, cultural persecution, and forced labor go on behind the scenes, the hosts eat snacks and gawk at happy, dancing minorities.

In their letter, the congresspeople urge Discovery to “suspend this partnership with CGTN immediately and to abstain from entering into any similar partnership with any other agent of CCP influence.” In fact, when it comes to co-producing with the CCP, this latest venture is far from Discovery’s first — and likely will not be its last. At CMP, we’ve cataloged a few of these conspicuous collabs, including a documentary series extolling the virtues of Xi Jinping’s leadership, and (in what masquerades as a straightforward survival series) another that traces the route of the Red Army’s Long March in the 1930s.

The difference, this time, is the heights from which support for World’s Ultimate Frontier seems to have come.

Productive Partnerships

In an article published in May last year in the pages of Research on Ideological and Political Work (思想政治工作研究), a journal published by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, China Media Group chief Shen Haixiong (慎海雄) — himself a deputy propaganda minister — highlighted World’s Ultimate Frontier as an essential “external communication brand” for the Party.

The May 2023 edition of the CCP journal Research on Ideological and Political Work includes an article from deputy propaganda minister and China Media Group chief Shen Haixiong mentioning World’s Ultimate Frontier.

“We have worked to build a Chinese discourse and a Chinese narrative system, so as to make the image of a credible, lovable and respected China more vivid and lively,” said Shen, directly referencing remarks on global propaganda Xi Jinping made at a collective study session of the Politburo two years earlier. Shen continued by saying that CMG would “optimize mechanisms of cooperation with international mainstream media, creating such foreign communication brands as Entering Xinjiang and Rooted in China.” This passage by the head of the group overseeing Discovery’s co-production partner, CGTN, clearly indicates that the Entering Xinjiang (World’s Ultimate Frontier) program was conceived on the Chinese side as directly serving the external propaganda goals of the state.

China has made clear in policy-related statements on international communication that what the CCP now calls a “Chinese discourse and narrative system” relies largely on borrowed foreign distribution channels, particularly as efforts to build credible state-run channels overseas have in many ways faltered. For more than a decade, the Singapore-based subsidiary Discovery Networks Asia-Pacific has been one of China’s most reliable avenues of foreign distribution for state-backed television productions, giving them the potential access to a global broadcast network reaching over a billion viewers in more than 230 countries and territories.

China Media Group chief Shen Haixiong — himself a deputy propaganda minister — highlighted World’s Ultimate Frontier as an essential “external communication brand” for the Party.

Starting in at least 2012, according to Chinese media reports, Discovery Networks Asia-Pacific launched cooperation with the China International Communication Center (CICC), again directly linked with the Party’s Central Propaganda Department, which yielded a string of co-productions included the 2017 China: Time of Xi, an unctuously positive three-part documentary on Xi Jinping that aired ahead of the Party’s 19th National Congress. The 2022 production Journey of Warriors (勇敢者的征程), the six-episode series retracing the Long March, was released by Discovery along with a several Chinese partners, including the Central Propaganda Department’s Overseas Promotion Office (中宣部对外推广局) and CICC.

These deals seem to have been brokered at Discovery Networks Asia-Pacific by vice-president Vikram Channa, who has overseen an extensive China portfolio and regularly taken part in state-led cultural initiatives. Channa is, according to state media reports, a member of the expert committee for the Orchid Awards, which honors individuals and organizations in the cultural arena who have contributed positively to what the CCP calls people-to-people exchanges. The awards are organized by the China International Communications Group (中國外文局), or CICG, which like both the China Media Group and CICC is directly under the Central Propaganda Department.

Discovery Networks Asia-Pacific vice-president Vikram Channa (first from left) attends the May 2023 launch of the Understanding China documentary series. Standing second from the right is Li Zhihui (李智慧) of the Central Propaganda Department’s Overseas Promotion Office.

CICG is one of China’s most prolific producers of official documentaries, many through its China Review Studio (解读中国工作室). Among its recent productions is the 2022 A Long Cherished Dream (柴米油盐之上), directed by the Oscar-winning director Malcolm Clarke, who said he hoped the film could “make China a little bit more sympathetic to the rest of the world.” The documentary, which was distributed by Discovery across Southeast Asia, was held up by state media as a prime example of a domestic documentary achieving maximum effect overseas. “A Long Cherished Dream innovatively employs a multi-participant Sino-foreign co-production and collaborative distribution mechanism, achieving a substantial international dissemination impact,” the propaganda department-run Guangming Daily reported.

In November last year, Discovery’s Channa was credited as a co-director for a series of documentaries called Understanding China (读懂中国), and took part in a related launch ceremony in Guangzhou. The series is a cooperation between Warner Bros. Discovery and the China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy (CIIDS), a center under the Chinese Academy of Sciences which states, in clear echo of the external communication strategy outlined by Xi Jinping in 2013, that it is “committed to telling China’s story and spreading China’s voice.”

Telling Whose Story?

In World’s Ultimate Frontier, Xinjiang is presented as a magical holiday destination: a playground for outsiders where you can explore the snowy wilderness on horseback, experience a cultural melting pot in historic Kashgar, or relive the storied Silk Road trading routes. Its version of the restive and long-suffering region is a lot like the typical portrayal for domestic Han audiences in PRC state media. This, we are essentially being told, is what it means to “tell China’s story well.”

Camel trains, dances, motorsports, and desert off-roading — there are many ways to redirect the message in Discovery’s latest co-production with CGTN.

Discovery may indeed be engaged in storytelling as it works directly with the leadership in Beijing to tell China’s story. Audiences might find these stories compelling, at times even exhilarating — like the romping, sand-kicking journey the hosts make through the dunes of Xinjiang’s Taklamakan Desert in episode two of World’s Ultimate Frontier or the daring motorsports of episode 4.

But from China’s standpoint, the ultimate goal of the series is to distract global audiences with spectacle and banter, turning their eyes away from the real and tragic story facing many thousands of Uyghurs that have been incarcerated, displaced, exiled, and painfully separated from their loved ones in the ongoing campaign of repression.

There is nothing entertaining about the reality facing many in Xinjiang, away from the cameras and documentary crews. If Discovery profits by offering a global audience for Beijing’s efforts to obscure and distract from this reality, it at least has a moral obligation to be upfront about who is ultimately footing the bill.

One Election, Two Reactions

When Chinese state media reported on the results of Taiwan’s presidential and parliamentary elections earlier this month, they gave nothing away: “Results show that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidates Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim were elected as the leader and deputy of the Taiwan region,” a terse official release from Xinhua News Agency reported. This was the first big election in a global year of democracy, unfolding just across the strait, and with far-reaching consequences for Beijing’s foreign policy — but it was summed up in just 75 words.

For observers expecting fire and brimstone in the wake of an election that Beijing has watched closely, the relative quiet of the Xinhua release, which set the tone for “mainstream” coverage, might have come as a surprise. But fiery language could be found elsewhere. In English and other languages, state media were fuming by comparison, condemning President-elect Lai and the DPP.

During Taiwan’s election on January 13, 2024, presidential ballots at a local polling station are called out (唱票) one by one (at left), placed in their respective piles on the table, and then noted for each candidate on strips of white paper using the character “zheng” (正).  Image: David Bandurski.

How do we account for this dichotomy? The stiff poker face in Chinese, and the snarling wolf warrior in English? In fact, these varying reactions, which have played out in the past for international stories China’s leadership regards as highly sensitive, offer a glimpse at how state media handle sharply differing priorities for domestic and international audiences. 

While China insists Taiwan is an internal affair, and that the rest of the world should simply keep its nose out, the bulk of the coverage of the elections in state media was directed externally, at foreign readers. Internally, silence reigned.

Tight Lips for the Domestic Audience

Xinhua, with its three-line official release, or tonggao (通稿), was the first PRC source to break the news. In all likelihood, given the sensitivity of the matter, other media across the country would have been instructed to follow Xinhua’s lead, even if that meant there was little to go on. The release referred to Lai Ching-te (賴清德) and Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) only as the “elected leader and deputy leader of the Taiwan region” (台湾地区正副领导人), emphasizing what China insists is Taiwan’s subordinate position as a Chinese province, and sidestepping any recognition of Lai and Hsiao as the president and vice-president-elect of the country.

Taiwan’s President-elect Lai Ching-te. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Meanwhile, the release said nothing about the political positions of the DPP, or why the party’s win might be significant. The voting results for Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan (立法院), were also briefly outlined, but what each party stood for and how the body’s composition had changed were not. Had the goal of the Xinhua release been to convey the official position of the Chinese leadership on the elections, this would have been a curious omission. After all, the DPP’s commitment to defending Taiwan’s sovereignty and strengthening ties with democratic allies has been a point of contention for China, and the DPP’s failure to secure a majority in the parliament might be interpreted as favorable to China’s interests.

But these details were left out because revealing them in a domestic media report from the CCP’s official news agency would potentially invite discussion internally of the details of the election outcome — including that the DPP won an unprecedented third term in the Presidential Office. As the Xinhua release was meant to “guide” the tone of domestic coverage, the leadership opted for a cautious approach.

The Xinhua notice was reproduced, unaltered, in the next day’s edition of the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily (人民日報), where it appeared on page four, and in scores of other state media, including the China Daily (中國日報), published by the State Council Information Office, China Youth Online, the news website of the Chinese Communist Youth League’s China Youth Daily, and Taiwan.cn, a website operated directly by the CCP’s Taiwan Work Office.

One notable, but only slight, exception to the clipped Xinhua coverage in official Party media was a report that appeared in Fujian Daily (福建日報), the official mouthpiece of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the CCP. It published additional remarks from Zhang Ming (張明) Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, who repeated official talking points about territorial integrity. “The People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory,” Zhang said.

A small report on page six of the official Fujian Daily on January 15, 2024, adds official talking points from Zhang Ming (張明), secretary-general of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

It is not uncommon for official Party media in Fujian province, which sits directly across the strait from Taiwan, to offer slightly more coverage of Taiwanese affairs, always with an emphasis on matters of sovereignty and territorial integrity — or playing up the shortcomings of the Taiwanese government in content directed at Taiwanese as well as local populations that often have close social and kinship ties across the straits. Kinship ties also figure prominently in Chinese state propaganda on cross-strait relations.

The same role over election news was played by the Taiwan Affairs Office (國台辦), where spokesperson Chen Binhua (陳斌華) stressed that the election results were irrelevant to the “inevitable” force of unification. The outcome, said Chen, demonstrated that the DPP no longer represented mainstream public opinion in Taiwan, since the party won less than 50 percent of the popular vote.

Loose Cannons for the Outside World

In stark contrast to the subdued and largely restrained coverage by state media internally, the reaction to Taiwan’s elections from international-facing, foreign-language state media was considerably more colorful. Leading the charge was the Global Times, a commercial spin-off of the official People’s Daily that generally strikes a more combative tone on international affairs. The newspaper’s online English-language commentary warned that “the initiative on solving the Taiwan question firmly lies with the Chinese mainland” and “the mainland has both the strength and determination to resolve the Taiwan question once and for all.” This thinly veiled threat of military force should Lai “cross the red line” was complemented by another article threatening economic consequences should Taiwan move in the direction of de jure independence.

In a commentary piece for the China Daily, again in English, Chinese University of Hong Kong sociology professor Lau Siu-kai accused Taiwan, under the DPP, of becoming “increasingly arrogant and overbearing.” In this framing, Taiwan — routinely subject to threats of armed violence and economic coercion like those issued by the Global Times — was portrayed as the true source of cross-strait tensions. Despite the fact that it was the Taiwanese themselves who determined the direction of their government through a democratic election, Lau dismissed the country as a mere “pawn” of the United States, saying that it had “no autonomy and dignity left.”

In fact, threats to Taiwan’s autonomy from Beijing have likely been a decisive factor in handing the DPP repeated presidential election victories. Recent polling from the Pew Research Center has shown that 66 percent of Taiwanese view China as a major threat, as opposed to 45 percent who say the same of US influence in the region.

In externally directed coverage like the above, academics and other commentators were often used as channels for more hardline viewpoints that were absent from official state media coverage internally, and this was combined with redirection away from questions of democratic governance and toward major power rivalry and alleged interference.

Two days after the election, the Global Times shared a short interview with Victor Gao (高志凱), a guest professor at China’s Suzhou University who contributes a regular column to the outlet. Gao labeled Taiwan “Washington’s proxy” and said that if Taiwan’s government cared about its people it would acquiesce to China, which has “momentum on [its] side.”

In externally directed coverage, academics and other commentators were often used as channels for more hardline viewpoints that were absent from official state media coverage internally.

Adding to the torrent of externally directed statements on the Taiwan election was China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which remained active on this issue through its array of global social media accounts on platforms like Twitter (X) and Facebook. The ministry issued a clipped release in English on January 13, the day of the election, that was not included in Chinese on the MFA site. It also weighed in at a press conference on January 15, two days after the election, emphasizing what is a sticking point for the Chinese leadership, that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”

But the focus again was away from electoral politics in Taiwan, and squarely on questions of external interference, particularly from the United States. A statement from the US State Department on the election earned a strong rebuttal from the MFA on January 14, which foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying (華春瑩) recapitulated through her account on X: “The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations,” she posted. “We urge the US to stop interactions of an official nature with Taiwan and stop sending any wrong signal to the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan independence.’”

Nationalist Outliers on the Taiwan Question

Exceptions to the above-mentioned pattern — of state media restraint internally and active amplification of state talking points externally — were exceptionally rare in the wake of the Taiwan elections. However, one of the most prominent examples was Shanghai’s Guangcha.cn (观察者), a privately-held outlet founded in 2012 by Chinese venture capitalist Eric X. Li. Guancha, or “Observer,” maintains close ties with influential figures who have the leadership’s ear, including Zhang Weiwei (张维为), the staunchly nationalist and anti-Western intellectual who heads up Fudan University’s China Institute (and who also led a collective study session of the CCP Politburo in May 2021 dealing with external propaganda.)

Guancha, which has built a strong domestic audience among young Chinese around nationalist talking points that often intersect with those of the Global Times, offered internally-directed coverage of the Taiwan elections that mirrored the tone and character of much external propaganda. It also applied the aforementioned two tactics — namely, focusing on sovereignty and Western interference, and citing ostensibly independent experts with close state ties supporting CCP positions.

The day after the election, Guancha posted an interview-based article — the outlet is prevented under its registration from reporting news — that led with the basic Xinhua release content before a play-by-play of an interview by the BBC with Wang Wen (王文), dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. Like Zhang Weiwei, who has claimed him as a “close friend,” Professor Wang is an oft-cited critic of the West and a proponent of nationalist positions. The article quoted Wang Wen’s viewpoints, including those on sovereignty and territorial integrity, as though the scholar was in conflict with the BBC journalist.

At one point, the article read: “During the interview, although the BBC presenter kept falsely relying on so-called ‘democracy’ to lead the conversation, claiming that ‘independence’ sentiment is getting stronger, Wang Wen said this was an ideological gap that would be closed with time, and there is a need to guard against the interference of the US and other external forces.” At several points, the article mentioned the scholar’s “refutation of the other side” (反驳对方) in a way that seemed to mirror China’s “wolf warrior” approach to foreign policy. The headline relayed Wang’s hardline assessment of the situation following the DPP victory, stating outright that “if the DPP authorities dare to declare ‘Taiwan independence,’ then the result can only be unification by force.”

This more directly provocative take on the Taiwan elections and China’s position was not shared across other websites inside China, where such cross-sharing is limited to a sanctioned list of sources, though it was re-posted through the Sina News app. Meanwhile, Guancha‘s Weibo post on the Wang Wen BBC interview received little engagement, a possible sign, given the outlet’s strong following of close to 20 million, that the reach of the post was being limited through technical means in order to avoid a spillover of social media discussion.

For the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan remains an issue of extreme sensitivity, and this is especially true at election time when the free and open nature of the political process across the straits has the potential to reflect on deeper questions of political legitimacy in China. When it comes to domestic Chinese audiences, the less said about Taiwanese democracy the better.