Last week Chinese censors reiterated a prior ban on all coverage of an incident at a county school in China’s western Gansu Province where the principal was allegedly found to have drawn blood from scores of pupils over several years to “cure” them of diseases, according to CMP sources. The story, first reported by Hong Kong’s Wenweipo and later by other media in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, is a good case study about why Chinese media censors sometimes ban stories that have little apparent impact on leadership circles.

Wenweipo, a newspaper run by the central party in Beijing but outside the purview of the central propaganda department (being in Hong Kong), reported on September 13 that the principal of an elementary school in the county of Weiyuan, Gansu Province, used a razor blade to cut the neck or abdomen of his pupils, and then sucked blood from the wounds. More than 30 students are reported to have suffered since the principal’s appointment to the position in 2000. The principal allegedly explained to his pupils that drawing blood was a cure for disease. He reportedly threatened pupils with expulsion if they revealed to others what he had done. Investigators are also alleging sexual abuse of some of the students.
The story did not appear in mainland print media, but was picked up by news editors at two mainland Websites, China Finance Information Network and 21cn, on September 15. Both sites mentioned Wenweipo as the source of the story.
Several days after the above-mentioned web coverage, propaganda leaders took notice of the story. By September 10, according to CMP sources, a ban was in place.
The news was also posted under aliases on a number of small websites and personal blogs, most of which also sourced the Wenweipo report. One netizen noted back on September 15 that the item had not appeared in domestic media: “Who would have thought such a thing could happen, and it’s reported by people in Hong Kong. Media here on the mainland probably wouldn’t dare cover it”.
So why are censors worried about the story now, weeks after the first news came out? And what is the danger to begin with in reporting a story about a local incident of abuse by a school principal? After all, Chinese media have been reporting small-time cases of official abuse of power and corruption under the mandate of “supervision by public opinion” (or “watchdog journalism”) since the late 1980s.
We can only speculate as to the particular motives of bans in China, which are delivered informally over the telephone or at “breeze sessions”, or chuifenghui, but we do know Chinese leaders are highly sensitive to human rights-related criticism from outside China. It is possible censors are concerned that the Gansu story might fuel more international coverage turning attention to the rights of children there. This is an area regularly watched by international press and human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch.
In the past, censors have banned similar news stories for the perceived damage they could cause to China’s human rights record. Back in 2005, CMP sources cited bans on a story about an orphanage in Hunan Province that was found to have been trafficking babies for profit. Mass media were ordered not to report on the case, which “involved sensitive problems such as human rights”, the CMP source said.
Another possible motive for banning the Gansu story is its link to the sensitive area of education in China. There have been a number of cases lately involving issues of student rights or welfare. A student riot at Zhengzhou University in Henan Province on June 15 was not reported on the mainland [coverage at ESWN].
A final observation about the recent Gansu report is the increasing boldness of Hong Kong’s Wenweipo, which has pushed the envelope on a number of recent stories despite the fact it represents the views of the central party in Beijing. When Chinese media reported the crash of a military “transport” plane in June this year, the Wenweipo revealed that the plane was actually an Airborne Warning and Control System (Awacs) aircraft, representing a bigger strategic setback for the Chinese.
[Posted by Brian Chan and David Bandurski, October 19, 2006, 10:25am]

As the end of 2006 approaches the likelihood of China taking action on the proposed Ordinance on Information Disclosure [Caijing’s Hu Shuli at FEER], entered in the State Council’s legislative calendar this year, unfortunately diminishes. But public access to information has become an issue of growing importance in recent years — not just to media, who increasingly see themselves as defender’s of the public’s right to know, but also to the ordinary citizens, who see it as an effective way of checking runaway corruption. This year the debate over China’s draft emergency management law and a row between Fujian provincial party officials and outside commercial media and the national Xinhua News Agency brought the issue of information disclosure into focus.
The following chart, using data obtained from the Wisenews database of mainland Chinese newspapers, shows the rapid rise of “information disclosure” and “information transparency” as terms of importance.

[NOTE: Search conducted for “information disclosure” or “information transparency”]
The terms were virtually missing in 1999, with the database showing only five articles for that year. In the first nine months of this year occurrence by article totaled 2,897, on track for a 16 percent increase over 2005.
Below is an October 12 editorial appearing in Western Economic Daily, a commercial paper in Lanzhou in China’s western Gansu province. It is a good example of how predominantly commercial media are approaching the issue of information disclosure and the public’s right to know. In this case the issues are environmental protection and official cover up:

Western Economic Daily
Lying Officials are Harmful to Government Honesty
By Lu Zeguan (staff editorial writer)
An inspection team for “cleaning up illegally polluting enterprises” comprising officials from seven State Council ministries including the State Environmental Protection Administration and the Development and Reform Commission … arrived at Guizhou’s Liupanshui City. Liupanshui’s vice-mayor, Ye Dachuan (叶大川) lied through his teeth to the inspection team.
That a government official lied through his teeth is not news. China Central Television’s “Focus” [an investigative news show started in the 1990s] regularly reveals cases in which plenty of officials face the camera and lie through their teeth, their eyes steady, their faces not flushing, their hearts not quickening … [Talks about case of Shaanxi official jailed 13 years for lottery-related corruption].
[Talks about corrupt behavior and lying among officials as basically rooted in poor morality] … Of course, in building up a knowledge and sense of honesty, of speaking the truth to the people, mere moral education is not enough. More important is the creation of institutions and guarantees.
Creation of a mature system can check the power of officials, ensuring they cannot cheat the people with lies. First of all, government information must be open and transparent. If there is not open and transparent information and all situations are locked in official safe boxes, well then, officials can completely lie to the people. It’s in the human character to be self-interested and think about benefit to oneself. When personal interest and reputation are involved, anyone might do what they can to protect their interests and reputation. If a government official’s hold on information is exclusive and the vast majority of people are kept in the dark, well then, in all probability they will choose the language most beneficial to themselves and avoid language that is disadvantageous. So disclosure of information is the precondition for putting an end to official lies.
Secondly, under this precondition of information transparency and the public’s right to know,
we must safeguard the right of the people to supervise [leaders]. The people should have the right to supervise and make inquiries of government bodies and the work of government officials by entrusting representatives to make inquiries before the People’s Congress, making petitions by letter and call, or through the mass media. While the people’s right to supervise power is guaranteed by the Constitution, there are no specific laws or regulations that make this actually happen. With open and transparent information and with people empowered to monitor government power, leaders who lie through their teeth will become laughingstocks before the people. Officials with government and social status will doubtless be more fearful when they open their mouths to speak …

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 16, 2006, 2:55pm]

When news came late last month of the sacking of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu on corruption charges, there was little sign of dissenting opinion in China’s domestic media. All news reports and commentary were carefully controlled. But in a Page 2 editorial today, purportedly written by a newspaper reader, Southern Metropolis Daily asked slightly tougher questions about the Chen Liangyu case and its relationship to larger questions of governance and public opinion in China:
Letter to the Editor
Southern Metropolis Daily
October 6, 2006
The big news of last month should have be the uncovering of a corrupt official at the highest levels. On the day the news came of this official’s removal, I, the humble Mr. Li, searched tens of thousands of Web pages. What I, the humble Mr. Li, found were all positive reports about Chen, singing his praises. Only when I clicked “most recent news on Chen Liangyu” did I find news of his removal.
On the Xinhua News Agency website [xinhuanet.com.cn] there were more than 10,000 postings for the news of the high official’s fall. If these comments were really from the hands of ordinary Web users, they might be said to be the seething of popular opinion. Those postings that could make it onto the site all voiced the same message, primarily that “Chen Liangyu’s removal from office gave satisfaction to the general population”. Judging from their language those making comments felt intense anger at Chen. But what is harder to understand is where exactly this popular opinion was before Chen Liangyu was removed from office? When you search for news about him before his removal, absolutely everything is positive, everything sings his praise! I, the humble Mr. Li, am not suggesting I don’t believe Chen Liangyu wasn’t corrupt. What I wonder about is of those officials now in their posts singing hymns of anti-corruption, how many are actually clean? Mr. Li feels saddened by this suppression of popular opinion.
Another form of opinion [on the Internet] is of the “Long Live!” variety. But the way I see it, even though ordinary people can cure their diseases, get educations, purchase homes, get jobs, earn their pensions, all of this should just be the basic responsibility of leaders. With the burden of “The Four Mountains” [living space, education, healthcare, pensions], and given how tough it is to find a job, why should we have to cry out “Long Live!”?
As Mid-Autumn arrives, the humble Mr. Li would like to go off on his own spiel:
In the city in which the humble Mr. Li lives, we refer to our leaders, big and small, as “Spring and Autumn Officials”. “Spring and Autumn” refers to the Spring and Mid-Autumn Festivals! [At these times] companies big and small are busy giving out “gifts of regard” [money or gifts to officials]. This is about building up personal connections rather than just working! What more can we possibly say?
Li Yilong
(This column reflects only the personal views of the writer)
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 6, 2006, 12:32pm]

Bowing to public pressure, the Chinese municipality of Chongqing revised regulations requiring private at-home Internet users to register by October 30, according to a local newspaper [Coverage at Sina.com here].
The revisions, announced today in the Chongqing Evening Post, specify that: “Those requiring registration at the Public Security Bureau are limited to Internet companies (互联单位), corporate users (接入单位) and information service companies (信息服务单位). [Individual] users are not required to go through these procedures”.
The original regulations, made public on July 7, prompted criticism from media and online chatrooms. Many Chinese, including those outside Chongqing, felt the regulations went too far, infringing on personal freedoms. “So is everyone who goes online a criminal?” asked one netizen responding on Sina.com shortly after the regulations were announced. “Do they think that by [requiring] registration they can control criminal online behavior? … Those who made this policy should study those portions of the Constitution dealing with the people’s basic rights. So can you trample on people’s basic rights just to control criminal behavior?”
One month after local officials made the announcement, national media continued to debate the issue. Caijing, a leading Chinese business magazine, said in an August 7 editorial directly addressing the Chongqing policy that the Internet is an important tool for citizen participation in debates over public policy. The editorial called apathetic citizens the “greatest enemies of freedom”.
Coverage of the revised regulations in today’s Chongqing Evening Post said the July announcement had brought “widespread attention from city residents”.
A few postings from Sina.com concerning the revisions follow:
I don’t know which person in a high place it was who thought of this rotten idea. But recognizing the error of it and making changes, that’s a very good thing.
—————-
From the time these regulations came out you could see the level of Chongqing city leaders — primary school graduates.

—————-
This really is the pride of the people of Chongqing. I’m so happy.
—————-
You don’t have to drop your pants to fart.
—————-

Do you have to register to crawl into bed in Chongqing? Well then, everyone should just avoid the place.
—————-
To put it softly, whoever thought of having people going online in their homes heading to the Public Security Bureau to register wasn’t right in the head! But seriously, this impacts the international perception of China. They can see how far we are from a political culture of governing by established principles.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 27, 2006, 11:55am]

Web users responded quickly to news of the removal of Shanghai’s top leader, Chen Liangyu in a broadening pensions scandal. The removal of Chen, a close protege of former president Jiang Zemin, has intensified speculation that Hu Jintao is moving against political enemies ahead of a key leadership conference next year. [Coverage from Bloomberg][Coverage from AFP][Coverage from People’s Daily]

Web postings, or gentie, responding to news of Chen’s removal posted at the top of popular Web portal Sina.com had reached 9,210 by 4:03pm Beijing time. One hour later the number had risen to 14,998.
Chinese media coverage of corruption cases can often amount to a ritual demonization of the official in question and generally shuns exploration of institutional factors. Many of the postings at Sina.com seem to follow this pattern, venting anger and praising Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. But cooler voices are there too. Translations of selected postings follow:
My first thought was total surprise, my second thought was that Hu [Jintao] and Wen [Jiabao] have a lot of guts, my third thought was that the ordinary people of China have hope!!!!!!!
————-
Throwing the book at corrupt officials means the central party is serious in its war on corruption. The people are in support!
————-
The important thing isn’t getting corrupt officials it’s doing reform to get rid of the systematic [problems] that provide a fertile ground for corruption. Otherwise, we’ll just have the following soap opera: one the one hand we’ll be getting rid of corrupt officials and on the other our current system will be constantly creating new ones. Getting corrupt officials and system reforms is a question about fundamentals versus quick fixes.
————-
I think the central party should look into this further and find out who it was who promoted this corrupt official! They should look into his predecessors and the predecessors of his predecessors.
————-
This makes people so happy, that the central party represents the interests of the grassroots and does something real. Thank you! These kinds of things are actually common in Shanghai. They’ve all been covered up and people don’t dare open their mouths because they’re afraid. I want the address and contact telephone for the 100 person corruption investigation team [working in Shanghai].

————-

Actually, the power of Chinese officials is too great. It’s lack of oversight that has created this situation.

————-
The hope of the Chinese people lies in President Hu and Premier Wen!
————-
We need to go further in understanding the protracted nature and complexities of the war against corruption … Party organizations at various levels need to actively strengthen education and management of party cadres, particularly those in leadership positions … and the checking and supervision of power needs to be strengthened …
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 25, 2006, 5:03pm]

A Web user from a city south of Guangzhou is suing a popular local Website for blocking his login ID, shutting down his mailbox and erasing his Web postings, according to a report in Southern Metropolis Daily. The case has been accepted by the Zhongshan Intermediate Court.
The Web user, named in the report as Mr. Liang, is suing the Website for allegedly violating his personal copyright. He is asking that the site reinstate his ID and Web postings.
In China, where the Internet is strictly controlled by legions of Web police and various government offices, including the Public Security Bureau, the case also implicates the state’s censorship regime. A representative from the Website told Southern Metropolis Daily that Mr. Liang’s postings, made under the Web alias “Xiandai Ximin” (现代刁民), included “negative content damaging to government organs” and that they had “received a notice from Internet management authorities”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 22, 2006, 12:40pm]

Public disclosure of information has been a major topic of debate in the Chinese media this year. June brought controversy over China’s draft emergency law (we still haven’t heard the last word on this). In July came a row over disaster coverage, which focused on how to ensure release of reliable information about events like floods and typhoons. Most recently, China’s highest court announced new rules limiting media coverage of judicial proceedings, which some media have called backstepping on court transparency. Backgrounding it all, we have the proposed “Ordinance on Government Information Release” (政府信息公开条例) on the State Council’s legislative calendar this year, which Caijing magazine editor Hu Shuli has called “another new milestone” [SEE Hu Shuli, “The Imperative of Information Freedom”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2006, p. 62-63].
In an editorial in Beijing Youth Daily on September 18, Ma Shaohua (马少华), a professor of journalism at Renmin University, wrote about the Chinese court’s announcement that it was building a press announcement system (新闻发布体制), which came alongside the new limitations on court coverage. He wrote: “At the core of the above prohibitions is the formation of the press announcement system. The press announcement system did not originate with the courts. Over the last two years it has been built up progressively by government at various levels. What is its basic goal? Is it to give the people a faster and more authoritative channel for information, or is it to limit, lessen and control information?”
Yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily featured a second editorial from Ma Shaohua, in which he attacked the court’s reasons for limiting media coverage. CMP wrote on September 14 that Chinese media were citing the problem of “public opinion verdicts” as the court’s reason for the new limitations. Some Western media have tacked the court rules onto the long list of recent disappointments on press freedom, suggesting all are part of a concerted crackdown ahead of the 2008 Olympics [See “Silent Games”, Newsweek]. That conclusion is premature and probably too reductive.
In his Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, Ma Shaohua returned to the question of “public opinion verdicts”, or what he called “media verdicts” (媒体审判). He responded to suggestions by Chinese officials that China is not alone among modern nations in limiting court coverage: “The rather strict limits on media coverage of court trials in some countries is not primarily to limit [the media’s] influence on judges of cultivated experience, but to prevent their influence on those ordinary people who comprise juries — because those standing in the important position of deciding innocence or guilt are ordinary people, and so may be influenced by the media. Our justice system does not have such juries”. Western judicial systems, said Ma, did not simply deal with media coverage by issuing bans. What was most important, he said, was balancing the various interests involved in a case (the public’s right to know, the right to personal privacy, etc.). This should not mean the outright denial of one of these (i.e., the public’s right to know).
All of these issues — from disaster coverage to judicial transparency — hinge on the relationship between the public welfare and the public’s right to know. The theme was raised again yesterday in yet another Southern Metropolis Daily editorial. This time the issue was public safety:
Southern Metropolis Daily
September 21, 2006
Two weeks ago a rumor circulated in Zhuhai and Zhongshan: a criminal was on the loose in Zhongshan who had repeatedly plundered homes and murdered people. The mood of terror spread. The emellishment of certain details pressed young girls to stay off the streets. The impact on citizens was enormous. Only on September 10, when Zhongshan Daily finally printed a wanted circular issued by the public security bureau, did the mood simmer down.
My first recollections of serial killers take place in northeast China . . . I remember fliers with black-and-white pictures posted on electric poles and shop doors. At the time there was no Internet and even telephones were scarce. Those fliers on the electric poles were talismans that meant criminals would find no place to hide. In the Internet age, Ma Jiajue (马加爵), who murdered four people, and drug kingpin Liu Zhaohua (刘招华) who had pursued by police for years, were captured shortly after their stories appeared on China Central Television. The sources coming forward were ordinary people. This tells us that only with disclosure of information can popular terror be avoided and the power the people contribute to breaking cases.
Zhongshan’s Public Security Bureau has always placed importance on information disclosure, and has regularly publicized public security information . . . in relevant media, which have reported and publicized [information]. In this case, appropriately timed public disclosure of information about a criminal suspect not only helped people understand the real situation and increase their knowledge of how to protect themselves, it also showed that political and public security organs have the ability to make people confident their safety is protected.
But we should notice that there is still a gap between the beginning of the investigation and disclosure of information. Of course, details that might help put people on guard and protect themselves, such as the suspect’s mode of operation and target profile, are still unclear during this time. But this has to do with China’s lack of a safety information disclosure system (危险信息公开的制度) or detailed rules on how to handle [such information]. Moreover, the readers reached by media publicizing such information are limited, and vast populations of migrants find it difficult to access such information. These are issues that the Public Security Bureau, the media and the people should consider more closely for dealing with dangerous incidents (危险事件). Southern Metropolis Weekly recently published “A Personal Safety Guide for the City”, which offered readers knowledge on how to manage the safety of their persons, family and property. Created with assistance from police, it included safety maps of a number of cities, including Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing, revealing areas of high crime. This was an innovation in the publicizing of city safety information.
Government offices have said that provincial and local level cities are in the process of establishing a network of political and public security organs. As a member of the justice system, the writer earnestly hopes that related Websites can forge a way to a system of safety information disclosure, telling [people] how to prevent crime, teaching ordinary people how to protect themselves . . .making public those areas where crime is highest and providing information about modes of operation and target profiles, publicizing information about murder cases, and using example cases to educate the population. We deeply believe that only by uniting the people and the police [through information disclosure], by mobilizing citizen participation, can we protect persons and property and ensure the criminals have no place to hide.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 22, 2006, 12:05pm]

Over the weekend domestic media questioned proposed measures that would mean deportation of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from Beijing before the 2008 Olympic Games.
The measures, reportedly announced by Beijing 2008 Environmental Construction Headquarters officials on September 14, would mean use of a strategy of “comprehensive return to the countryside” (整建制劝返回乡) and “strengthening of aid programs” to deal with Beijing’s massive population of migrant workers and vagrants, including an estimated one million construction workers [Reuters coverage via The Guardian].
The news, reported by Beijing media on Friday, met with denial from officials. But several papers continued to express their doubts the next day, and a prominent editorial a Henan commercial newspaper dragged in the issue of freedom of expression, saying China’s less privileged should have a voice in policy decisions directly impacting them:
Henan Commercial Daily
September 16, 2006
The Beijing Olympics are Olympics for the whole of the country, not an Olympics to be held after the peasants have been weeded out; the Beijing Olympic site is being constructed with the sweat of migrant workers, and without their labors there would be no beautiful Olympics. Now, in order that the Olympics show her prettiest side to the world, and because this group, migrant workers, obtrudes the city’s image, they are to be “returned to the countryside”. This kind of dispensing of people once they’ve done their task goes against the spirit of a humane Olympics.
But what I care about more than the idea of this “returning” is the question: were peasants included in the discussion about this “returning”. According to news reports, “returning” [of migrant workers] is Beijing’s initial suggestion for dealing with [this issue]. What we can be sure about is that the voices of policy-makers are included in this suggestion, the voices of Beijing residents might be included in this suggestion – but the voices of peasant workers have been excluded. This is an intrusion on the rights of participation of a group that has done its part for the Olympics.
If migrant workers had been consulted in this opinion about “returning”, I am confident these migrant workers would not have wished to accept it, and not simply because they want to be a part of the Games themselves. The Olympics are one thing, but for these migrant workers the most important thing of all is being able to work and make money to support themselves and their families …
The disregard for those governed in governing measures has lately become a common sight in social management. One recent example is the resumption of the “residency permit” system in Zhengzhou City. We won’t talk here about whether these methods [in Zhengzhou] are pertinent or not, but clearly in the discussion of reinstituting the “residency permit” system, there was no inclusion of the voices of the migrant groups who were affected.
Freedom of expression (言论自由) is the greatest freedom. Without freedom of expression there can be no equality of rights and benefits. By looking at the decisions of Beijing concerning the “return” of migrant workers we can see the trueness of this. Because if there is no opportunity for equal expression, then there is no avoiding the implementation of those measures that are disadvantageous to oneself and intrude on one’s rights. For the weak segments [of our society], the opportunity to speak is more important than a table of food.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 18, 2006, 11:53pm]

The Beijing News added its dissenting voice to the issue of court transparency in a page-two editorial today. The criticism follows articles by Southern Metropolis Daily and Shanghai Securities News arguing that new rules limiting media access to judicial information in China, announced Wednesday, are a step in the wrong direction:
Let’s first look back on a moment in history. On April 15, 1998, Xiao Yang (肖扬), newly serving as director of the Supreme People’s Court said in an education and reorganization meeting of the national court system: “The open hearing of court cases, aside from allowing free observation by the people, should progressively allow live television and radio broadcasting, and permit news media to report according to the facts with an attitude of responsibility toward the law.” This expression was read as an implementation of the principle of open hearings (公开审判) by the People’s Court, and a symbolic turning point for the strengthening judicial transparency.
People expressed a high degree of support for this position. And when analyzed, the statement explained quite well the relationship between the courts (judicature) and the media: for the courts, “cases [should be] heard openly” (公开审案), according to the law; as for media, they should report according to the facts, and with “responsibility toward the law”.
Eight years passed, and on September 12, 2006, Xiao Yang again expressed his principle of open hearings, and his understanding of the relationship between judicature and the media. He said: “The political responsibilities of judicature and the media are one and the same, and [in their goals of] strengthening, promoting and protecting social equality and justice, they are one and the same. Positive cooperation and well-intentioned communication should lead their relationship.”
. . . But then, the very same day, at a national court conference on press relations (新闻宣传工作会议), some news gave the public cause for misgivings and uneasiness. This news was of “forbidden areas” in the release of internal information, including “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released” . . . Peoples’ misgivings are: have the principles of court transparency the Court has been proposing and putting into effect been shaken in some way? Has the media’s situation of reporting according to the facts and with “responsibility” now met with limitations? And will the actions of the courts, for this reason, be position outside the purview of supervision by public opinion (舆论监督) [NOTE: this refers to media supervision or Chinese watchdog journalism]? . . .
Now a number of industries have like the court system set up their on press release systems. The appearance of press spokespersons has no doubt remedied some oft-seen insufficiencies of information disclosure of the past, and can move us from “passive revelation” (被动披露) to “active disclosure” (主动公开). However, the relationship between any organ of official power and the media is not just one of making “positive” news public, but assumes media supervision of official power organs according to the law – clearly, the likelihood of press spokespersons taking the initiative in inviting the press to do critical news reports is not very high.
The people have expressed uneasiness at “limitations on court reporting”, and this is about their expectation of judicial impartiality under media supervision. If the eyes of society and the public are present in our stately courts, and judges feel the power of supervision on all sides, only then can judicial impartiality be realized beyond doubt.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 15, 2006, 12:22pm]

Chinese media responded today to moves by the Supreme People’s Court to limit media access to court information. The criticisms, which argued for a more robust role for the press in monitoring the courts, were reminiscent of media attacks against China’s draft emergency management law in June this year.
Two of the most outspoken responses came from Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily and Shanghai Securities News. Both articles said the rules, announced by top court officials on Tuesday, went too far, limiting the media’s ability to play a role in greater judicial transparency.
The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial suggested the new rules were designed to prevent “public opinion verdicts”, cases in which media coverage and Internet opinion purportedly influence judicial outcomes and negatively impact the independence of the courts [pdf_southern-metro-daily-lede-editorial.pdf]. But the paper stressed that the public’s right to know should not be violated on the pretext of preventing “public opinion verdicts” from occuring, and said the court should restrict access only when merited in specific cases. [A Washington Post story said the move was part of a crackdown on news media ahead of a leadership conference next year and designed to limit domestic coverage of sensitive corruption cases like that against former Beijing vice-mayor Liu Zhihua].
Selections from the Southern Metropolis Daily and Shanghai Securities News editorials follow:

Southern Metropolis Daily
September 14, 2006
HEADLINE: The Public’s Right to Know is a Valuable Basis for Favorable Interaction between Media and the Administration of Justice

In the last few days, a representative of the Supreme People’s Court made explicit its discipline rules on information release, and a number of measures have drawn attention. Among these are: the formal establishment of an information release system for the two levels of the court; for those cases that are major, particular, or which have national influence, the Supreme People’s Court will be responsible for the release [of information]; five categories of content, including “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released”, must not be disseminated without exception; without the approval of judges and other personnel, no media interviews will be accepted.
While the Supreme People’s Court insists these measures are for the sake of the courts and society, they are without a doubt a tightening of controls on media speech (媒体舆论) …
… The right to know about judicature is an important part of the public’s right to know, and it behooves judicial bodies to thoroughly respect this … There’s no doubt that the role of spokespersons as gatekeepers of information for government offices far exceeds the role originally conceived, as communicators of government and public information …
This time the Supreme People’s Court has clearly prohibited the release of five types of information, including “other information the leaders of the court determined could not be released”, and this puts media supervision of the courts between a rock and a hard place. Actually, as of recent the right of our country’s media to cover the news (新闻采访权) has not been given a clear guarantee by law. In other words, the media, whose voice lacks protection, is clearly in a position of weakness relative to judicial bodies that serve as units of public power (公权部门). In such a situation, without persistent advances in openness of the judicial system, media supervision of the courts is a mere theoretical possibility …
This is an instance of the Supreme People’s Court wishing to resolve the problem of what have been called “public opinion verdicts” [media and Internet opinion mobilizing public outrage and influencing the outcome of court cases]. Media should unconditionally support the idea the courts not be intruded upon, that they reach decisions impartially, but as to these “public opinion verdicts”, we must be very clear about narrow-minded understandings that might exist on [this issue]. Only when there is a twisting of case facts [by the media], or the media seek to pressure the court’s decisions … does this constitute a “public opinion verdict” [NOTE: the implication seems to be that the court should intervene only on a case-to-case basis]. When media reports on the courts are impartial and objective, the right to interview and report must not be violated on the pretext of [stopping] “public opinion verdicts”. In a modern country, opinion freedom [NOTE: writer avoids saying “freedom of speech”] and impartial courts are two fundamental values, neither of which can be discarded. If opinion freedom is sacrificed in the name of “public opinion verdicts” then even the impartiality of the courts will be difficult to safeguard.
—————–
Shanghai Securities News
September 14, 2006
[Introduction to Supreme People’s Court measures]
… The writer believes these measures need to be discussed. Media access to court information is beneficial in promoting transparency of the courts, beneficial to supervision by the public, beneficial to getting rid of court manipulation and achieving an impartial justice system …
In March 1999 the Supreme People’s Court formally promulgated its “Regulations Concerning Strict Implementation of a Public Court Decision System”, which emphasized: with approval of the People’s Court, news reporters may make a record of, record, photograph, film and broadcast court proceedings live. This kind of specific regulation respected the news reporter’s right to interview (采访权) and protected the public’s right to know, because “media opinion supervision” (新闻舆论的监督) is actually supervision by the people, the people supervising the party and government through the vehicle of the press. But now the Supreme People’s Court dictates that “judges and other [court] personnel must not without exception make bold to accept interviews from reporters” — this is clearly disadvantageous to the interchange of information between the public and the courts, and could possibly put an end to what has been an improving relationship between the courts and the media …
… The public’s right to know arises to a decisive degree from reporting by the media. Only by obtaining their right to know can the people come to understand the activities of the government, the courts and other manifestations of public power, and offer suggestions and criticism to carry out a supervisory function. Lately the media’s right to interview has met with obstacles from local [governments] or [government] offices. If the courts again “draw boundaries” on news coverage, this might worsen the situation. Our country’s constitution stipulates that people have the right to criticize or offer opinions to any government office or government official. Any kind of rule placing curbs on this stands the risk of violating the constitution. Therefore, any “boundary drawing” on the right to interview is unfortunate, and I advise it be corrected quickly.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 14, 2006, 3:45pm]