In the bulletin emerging last week from the Fifth Plenum of the 19^th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping was praised as the “pilot at the helm,” or lǐngháng zhǎngduò (领航掌舵), a reference with strong echoes of China’s Maoist past. The relevant text in the bulletin read:

“With Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Central Committee of the CCP, and the pilot at the helm at the core, with the whole Party and full unity of people of all ethnic groups in the country, tenaciously struggling, we will surely be able to overcome the various difficulties and obstacles that appear on the road forward, and we will surely be able to energetically advance the forward progress of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.”

The invocation of Mao-like status, even if oblique, was unmistakable, and it was noted in coverage outside China. In recent days, the “pilot at the helm” phrase has popped up repeatedly in the official media and on official government websites.

Among his several laudatory sobriquets, Mao Zedong was referred to as the “great helmsman,” or wěidà de duòshǒu (伟大的舵手). But Mao Zedong was not in fact the first leader in China to be honored in this way, with terms like “helm master” (舵师) or “helmsman” (舵手).

The image below is an official commentary from the May 18, 1945, edition of the Central Daily News, the flagship propaganda organ of the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist Party of China. The headline reads: “The Helms Master of China’s New Era” (新时代中国的舵师). This refers, naturally, not to Xi Jinping – the helmsman of China’s 21^st century “new era” – but rather to Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石), the Republic of China’s top leader, and Mao’s bitterest enemy.

The term used here for Chiang Kai-shek is “helms master,” or duoshi (舵师). But the nearly identical honorific “helmsman,” or duoshou (舵手), so closely associated now with Mao Zedong, was also used for Chiang.

The image below is from a magazine cover in 1941, the same year the Allies declared war on Japan. The text directly below the illustration, which shows Chiang literally at the helm of a ship (something rarely seen), reads: “Our Great Helmsman” (我们伟大的舵手). The language here, as we can note from the propaganda image from the Cultural Revolution further above, is already identical to that eventually used for Mao.

In the late 1940s, as the Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious over the forces of the Kuomintang, there was a popular song praising the CCP that was called, “You Are The Beacon” (你是灯塔). The lyrics went: “You are the beacon, shining on the ocean before dawn. You are the helmsman, piloting us forward.” These words, which of course refer to Mao Zedong, are some of the earliest to use helmsman in reference to China’s revolutionary leader.

But Mao was not in fact the only helmsman at that time. If we search the archives of the People’s Daily, which was launched in 1946, we find that “helmsman” appeared quite early. Lenin was referred to as the helmsman. Stalin too was the helmsman. And Mao was the helmsman. In all instances they were referred to as the duoshou (舵手).

On the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we can find reference to Mao as both the “great leader” (伟大的领袖) and the “helmsman,” as in one article appearing in the People’s Daily on September 26, 1949: “Great leader, guide, and helmsman, Comrade Mao Zedong! When we say your name, we feel glory and pride, and we find courage and strength.”

Just days later, however, the honorific “helmsman” is used in the paper to refer not just to Mao but to the Party’s senior leadership group. The news item, dispatched from Nanjing by Xinhua News Agency, read: “Nanjing, once the center of the Kuomintang’s reactionary rule, rejoiced last night and unanimously supported the helmsmen of the people – the elected Mao Zedong, chairman of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, Vice-Chairman Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Song Qingling, Li Jishen, Zhang Lan, and Gao Gang.”

Several months later, on February 21, 1950, the People’s Daily published a verse by the poet Tian Jian (田间) that praised both Stalin and Mao. Written in a time of deep friendship between the CCP and the Soviet Union, the poem was called: “Two Good Helmsmen, in the Same Boat” (两位好舵手，同御一条船).

By the beginning of 1956, the Sino-Soviet friendship had turned cold, as Mao bitterly opposed the de-Stalinization of the USSR. At the 8^th National Congress of the CCP, held in September that year, Liu Shaoqi praised Mao Zedong, saying that he had “served an important role as the great helmsman in our revolutionary cause.”

Ten years later, at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, the term “great helmsman” became inseparable from the figure of Mao Zedong, beginning with the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee. It was at this meeting that Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were sidelined, criticized as the “bourgeois headquarters” within the Central Committee. The Cultural Revolution from this point went into full swing, accompanied by the revolutionary song, ““Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman” (大海航行靠舵手), written by Wang Shuangyin in 1964.

Below is the front page of the August 15, 1966, edition of the People’s Daily. The lead commentary under the image of Mao Zedong bears the title of Wang Shuangyin’s anthem: “Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman.”

“Great helmsman” became one of the “Four Greats,” the standard set of honorifics for Chairman Mao: “Great Guide, Great Leader, Great Commander, Great Helmsman.”

For many, many years after Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976, no Chinese leader claimed the helmsman honorific for himself. In fact, there was just one instance of the word’s use for a senior leader, and this came after Deng Xiaoping’s death in February 1997. A report about Deng’s sea burial mentioned that in “the Spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping again came to the seaside, and like a helmsman, again pointed the direction of the voyage for China’s reform and opening and modernization.”

Jiang Zemin never sought the honorific for himself. Nor did Hu Jintao. Both governed in times of growing collective leadership, during which “the legitimacy of the general secretary has progressively become based more on rational authority than charismatic authority.”

The equations have changed in Xi Jinping’s “new era.” In November 2016, at the Sixth Plenum of the 18^th Central Committee, Xi was first honored as the “core” (核心) of the CCP. In January of the next year, months ahead of the formal removal of presidential term limits at the NPC, the People’s Daily ran a piece called, “The Choice of History, the Expectations of the People: Comments on National Governance with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core Since the 18^th National Congress of the CCP.” The article included this passage: “In moving forward toward our dream, the first priority is the helm; to overcome difficulties, we need more leadership.” And this one: “This leader, which America’s Time magazine called ‘the central figure in China’s new round of transformation,’ is like a helmsman who has resolutely declared it is ‘time for reform,’ and is leading this reform in every detail.”

It was from this point, we can say, that Xi Jinping became China’s new “helms master” (舵师),  “helmsman” (舵手) and “pilot at the helm” (掌舵人).

At a gala yesterday to celebrate the 71^st anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Luo Huining (骆惠宁), director of the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong, gave an address in which he used a phrase with menacing freshness: “For those who are Chinese,” said Luo, “love for the country is not a choice but an obligation.”

Luo’s address was full of talk of patriotism and its benefits. At one point he said, for example: “Only by strengthening the social and political foundation of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, and enhancing the sense of national identity, belonging and national pride, can Hong Kong set the right direction in the great process of national rejuvenation, and only then can the individual values ​​of citizens be better realized.” But his assertion about patriotism as an “obligation,” or yiwu (义务), deserves special scrutiny, particularly as Hong Kong police have been out in force today to prevent dissent after authorities denied permission for a protest march.

Are all Chinese – and of course Luo means to include all Hong Kong residents of Chinese ancestry – really under an obligation to love China? Surely, the question of obligations to the country is not one that can simply be addressed haphazardly. China’s Constitution, after all, deals rather clearly with citizens’ obligations. What are its stipulations?

Let’s look at Chapter 2 of the Constitution, “Fundamental Rights and Obligations of Citizens” (公民的基本权利和义务). The chapter outlines four specific “obligations,” which are:

First, in Article 52: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall have the obligation to safeguard national unity and the solidarity of all the country’s ethnic groups.” Second, in Article 54: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall have the obligation to safeguard the security, honor and interests of the motherland; they must not behave in any way that endangers the motherland’s security, honor or interests. Third, in Article 55: “It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People’s Republic of China to defend the motherland and resist aggression. It is an honorable obligation of citizens of the People’s Republic of China to perform military service or join the militia in accordance with law.” And fourth, in Article 56: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall have the obligation to pay taxes in accordance with law.”

To sum up, these four passages outline four basic obligations incumbent upon the Chinese citizen: 1) to safeguard national unity, 2) to safeguard national security, 3) to perform military service and 4) to pay taxes. Nowhere in China’s Constitution is there any mention of patriotism being an obligation.  

Well then, what does Hong Kong’s Basic Law say? In Chapter III, on the “Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents,” there are 19 articles (24-42), and of these 18 specify the rights enjoyed by Hong Kong residents, while just one, Article 42, deals with the question of obligations. Article 42 states: “Hong Kong residents and other persons in Hong Kong shall have the obligation to abide by the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”

No law, it seems, either in China or in the SAR, obligates Hong Kong people to love the country. But Luo, of course, is playing at politics and emotion, with very real consequences for Hong Kong. “To build Hong Kong as a home,” he says, “we must stimulate feelings for the home country.” Only then can Hong Kong “rise with the nation.”

And the rights guaranteed by Hong Kong’s laws? How far, one wonders, must they fall?

On June 15, the Study Times, an official journal operated by the Chinese Commumnist Party’s Central Party School, ran a commentary that took up its entire front page. The article, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristic for a New Era is 21^st Century Marxism,” was written by the school’s deputy head, He Yiting (何毅亭), one of the key political thinkers in Xi Jinping’s circle. It made the bold claim, as the headline suggests, that Xi Jinping’s signature political concept, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” is “21^st Century Marxism.”

Here is how Mr. He laid out the Marxist lineage in his piece:

The thought of Marx and Engels can be called “19^th century Marxism,” while Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and the socialism with Chinese characteristics of which Deng Xiaoping Theory was the original principle and chief content, can all be called “20^th century Marxism.” Xi Jinping Though on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era can be called “21^st century Marxism.”

As it happened, June 15 was also General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 67^th birthday. There was some suggestion on social media and in the Hong Kong press that the publication of the flattering front-page piece in the Study Times was a “birthday gift” for Xi.

If this was indeed a gift, how was it delivered? And what does the gift mean?  

At around 10:30PM on June 14, He Yiting’s article was published on the website of the Central Party School. The next day, the piece enjoyed a peak of attention, shared principally through websites and public accounts on WeChat. Official CCP and government sites, public accounts and apps played an important role, the article appearing on the “Study Xi Strong Nation” (学习强国) app, at People’s Daily Online, at China.org.cn, at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ CSSN.cn, at the official website of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (and its WeChat public account), at the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and so on.

He Yiting’s piece did not appear in other print publications, judging from data through June 20. So far as CMP can ascertain, it appeared just once in print – on the front page of the Study Times on June 15, the morning after it appeared online. The table below logs appearances of the article from June 14 through June 20 on WeChat (green), on websites (light blue), in newspapers (yellow), in online forums (grey), in blogs (orange) and in news apps (dark blue).

While quite a number of various media did re-run the He Yiting article, it should be noted that there were no commentaries or responses to the article in other media.

Wearing the Marxism Crown

Marxism is written into the CCP Constitution as one of the core guides of conduct. Association with the legacy of Marxism is also regarded within the Party as a crucial to staking claim to legitimacy and influence. In the version of the CCP Constitution passed on October 2017, this is how Xi Jinping’s predecessors, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, are associated with Marxism:

Deng Xiaoping Theory is the product of combining the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with contemporary Chinese practice and the characteristics of the times; it is a continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought under new historical circumstances; it is a new stage of Marxism in Chinese development; it is Marxism for contemporary China; it is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party, guiding the forward progress of socialist modernization in our country.

The “Three Represents” is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, reflecting the new requirements made on the work of the Party and the state as a result of developments in the present-day world and China; it is a strengthening and advancing of Party construction, a powerful theoretical weapon for promoting the self-improvement and development of our country’s socialism; it is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party; it is a guiding thought that must be adhered to by the Party over the long term.

The scientific view of development is a scientific theory in line with and extending with the times Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the important thought of the “Three Represents”; it is an embodiment of Marxism’s world view and methods concerning development; it is a major fruit of the Sinicization of Marxism; it is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party; it is a guiding thought that socialism with Chinese characteristics must adhere to over the long term.

Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of the “Three Represents,” and the scientific view of development; it is the latest fruit in the Sinicization of Marxism; it is the crystallization of the experiences of all the entire Party and the entire people and the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party; it is an integral part of the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics; it is the guide of action for the entire Party and the entire people in the struggle for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and it must be adhered to and steadily developed over the long term.

While all four successive generations of leaders since Mao Zedong have sought to establish their close connection with Marxism, none have previously elevated and held up their own banner terms as “21^st century Marxism,” giving them parity – at least in appearance – with the “original” Marxism of the 19^th century.

When we search through the People’s Daily, we find that the phrase “Marxism oriented toward the 21^st century” (面向21世纪的马克思主义) appears after 2000. But before 2015, the third year of Xi Jinping’s first term, the phrase appears only rarely – in a total of just 10 articles over the fifteen-year period.

After Hu Jintao came to office, the “Three Represents” banner term of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, was on a number of occasions praised as “Marxism oriented toward the 21^st century.” On September 30, 2003, the People’s Daily published an article that quoted Li Yuanchao (李源潮), then the CCP secretary of Jiangsu province, as saying:

Raising up a new tide of study and exercise of the important thought of the “Three Represents” is a major strategic deployment made by the 16^th National Congress of the CCP, and it is the principal political task of the moment for CCP organizations at various levels. Comrade Hu Jintao has many times provided specialized and systematic elaboration [stating that] from the standpoint of unifying the legacy and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, it is expounded that the important thought of the “Three Represents” is Marxism oriented towards the 21^st century.

At the National People’s Congress in 2004, the “Three Represents” was entered into China’s Constitution. On March 12 that year, the People’s Daily ran an article called, “Entry of the Important Thought of the ‘Three Represents’ Into the Constitution Accords with the Popular Will.” The piece quoted Zhao Yong (赵勇), a member of the standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, as saying that “the ‘Three Represents’ is Marxism oriented towards the 21^st century.”

Adulator-in-Chief

He Yiting’s earliest published works include the 2006 book New Developments in the Creation and Practice of Theory (实践上的新创造和理论上的新发展), and the 2007 book On the Significance of the 17^th National Congress of the CCP (论十七大的重大意义). These are works devoted unmistakably and committedly to the praise and elevation of the supposed achievements of the Chinese Communist Party at the 16^th and 17^th national congresses in 2002 and 2007 respectively.

In each political cycle, He Yiting has been generous with his praise. In 2016, just four days after Xi Jinping’s status as the “core” was established at the Sixth Plenum of the 18^th Central Committee, he penned an article that appeared anonymously on the front page of Study Times called, “The Solemn Choice of the Chinese Communist Party: On the Designation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Core Status at the Sixth Plenum” (中国共产党的郑重选择——论六中全会明确习近平总书记的核心地位). The article was complimented in the People’s Daily, which said it “drew widespread attention in China and overseas.”

“The most important thing for us in enhancing the ‘four consciousnesses,’ is to unite more closely around the CCP Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core,” He wrote, “to more firmly maintain the authority of the CCP Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, and to maintain a high level of consistency with the CCP Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core in terms of our ideological and political consciousness.”

It was after his “core” article earned the praise of the People’s Daily that He Yiting began using the phrase “21^st century Marxism” to praise Xi Jinping. On May 18, 2018, also on the front page of Study Times, He wrote an article on precisely this topic, this time clearly identifying himself as “director of the Research Center on Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era at the Central Party School.” This corresponded with the bicentennial of Marx’s birth on May 5, 1818.

On January 16, 2019, the People’s Daily published an address given by He Yiting to a research conference held to commemorate the 40^th anniversary of China’s reform and opening policy. In the speech, He said:

In sum, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era is the guiding principle, banner, and soul that leads socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, and evinces the truth and glory of contemporary Chinese Marxism and 21^st century Marxism.

In March 2020, He Yiting published a new collection of writings called New Era, New Ideas (新时代·新思想), which also deals at some length with the question 21^st century Marxism. On May 15, the People’s Daily promoted He’s new book with a piece written by He’s colleague at the Central Party School, Han Qingxiang (韩庆祥).

With the formal removal of term limits for Xi Jinping at the National People’s Congress in 2018, in the wake of the CCP’s 19^th National Congress (and the elevation of Xi’s banner term), it is now possible that Xi’s rule will extend further into the 21^st century. To designate Xi’s “thought” as “21^st century Marxism” just one-fifth the way into the still very new century is to wish boundless longevity for Xi, his leadership and his legacy.

An appropriate birthday gift, indeed, from one of China’s most prominent adulators.

As I read through the Chinese media last week and saw the remarks of a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs attacking the United States over the coronavirus epidemic, there was one word in particular that popped out. Here is an image of a related report from Xinhua News Agency, published on April 22.

The word I’m talking about here is fèngquàn (奉劝), which essentially means “to offer a bit of advice”, or to “advise.” But the tone, far from being constructive or consultative, is withering. The headline reads: “Foreign Ministry Advises Certain People: Put More Energies into Doing Your Own Business Well.” It advises, specifically, against talk of China paying reparations over its role in the COVID-19 epidemic.

The tone is also very familiar. Below you can see another article, this time an editorial dating back to December 12, 1957, and appearing in the People’s Daily.

In this case, the editorial addresses former UK Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell, who at the time spoke on the issue of Taiwan, incurring the outrage of the Chinese Communist Party. The two reports are separated by a space of 63 years, but they assume the same tone and use the same language. There are many other reports in China’s state media that employ similar discourse – what we might characterize as an “advisory vocabulary” (奉劝体).

The word fèngquàn (奉劝) is an ancient word in Chinese. Consult your Chinese dictionary, and you’ll find that fèng (奉) originally had the same meaning as the word gōngjìng (恭敬), which in adverb form means “deferentially” or “respectfully.” Fèngquàn originally had the sense of speaking in such a way as to respectfully advising or persuading someone. For example, one could “advise” others to drink wine at a formal banquet by using the word fèngquàn.

With the development of the Chinese language, however, the word fèngquàn gradually came to shed its sense of respect, morphing into a word having the sense of advising, or guīquàn (规劝), with more satirical overtones, to eventually bearing an unmistakable sense of warning or admonishment (警告). This transformation, and linguistic use, is shared whether one is in mainland China, Hong Kong or Taiwan.

When we look at the use of fèngquàn in China after 1949 to see who exactly was on the receiving end of such “advisory” language from the Chinese Communist Party, we find that the list is very long indeed.

In the 1950s, we find that the CCP most often advised both the Kuomintang Party in Taiwan and the United States. At the National People’s Congress in July 1957, one delegate was quoted as saying: “I sincerely advise military and government officials in Taiwan: How can Taiwan have freedom under the tightening control of the United States? I hope you can cast aside your concerns and quickly render a decision, striving for the peaceful liberation of Taiwan to reach true freedom.”

The US president too was subjected to such advice: “Eisenhower, I am truly ashamed for you!” raged a September 1958 poem by Guo Moruo (郭沫若) published in the People’s Daily. “You have no need again to lose face on behalf of the American people. I advise you to seek healing for your brain post haste. The American people are equally in search of peace, and I believe they will not embrace such a cheat as you!”

In addition to the US and Taiwan, advisories in the 1950s targeted the UK (as shown above), the actions of a French general in Tunisia, the words in support of Taiwan spoken by Japan’s ambassador to India, an Indian National Congress politician, the Dalai Lama and others. The Chinese military commander Chen Yi (陈毅), then China’s foreign minister, wrote a poem in 1959 urging the Dalai Lama, by that point already in exile, not to think of returning: “I have advice for you,” he wrote. “Do not stop on your way home. The CCP Central Committee has always been lenient. The Buddha said that looking back [and correcting one’s mistakes] is the way to the shore.”

There was of course also a great deal of “advice” directed internally. Rural landlords were “advised” in the midst of the land reform process in the early 1950s, and various “reactionaries” (反动分子) of all stripes (but particularly so-called “rightists”) were “advised” in the midst of repeated political movements.

There was even a case during the Great Leap Forward of the “advising” of unspecified “idle” (懒惰) women. Here is how the People’s Daily spoke in May 1958 of such women: “During the say they rest in bed with their eyes open, and in the middle of the night they get up to make fried rice that they gobble down; when you tell her to produce she won’t go, but says: ‘I won’t go even if the emperor calls me.’ These lazy women are advised to quickly set their bad habits in order!”

Not surprisingly, Mao Zedong could also be found “advising” the Chinese people on the correct path for the country. In 1955, he wrote of the experiences of a number of collectives, and encouraged cadres to go among the masses and learn from these experiences, saying: “This is effective medicine to cure stubborn right-leaning tendencies, and I advise people to give it a try.” By the end of the decade, Mao’s prescription for the country would prove disastrous, as the people’s communes and the ill-advised Great Leap Forward led to mass starvation.

In the 1960s, as relations with the Soviet Union soured, it was time to advise another external adversary. From September 6, 1963 to July 14, 1964, a series of nine strongly worked editorials appeared in the name of the editorial departments of both the People’s Daily and Red Flag magazine that criticized the “revisionism” (苏联修正主义) of the Soviet Union. The word “advise” appeared in each of the last three of these, later collectively known as the “Nine Commentaries” (九评).

“We wish to advise the leaders of the Soviet Union to consider cool-headedly what will ultimately be the result of the revisionism and separatism you encourage,” said an editorial on February 4, 1964. “We wish to advise the leaders and comrades of the Soviet Union to consider how many opportunists and revisionists have in the past been thrown onto the trash heap of history, and must you follow in their footsteps?” said another on March 31, 1964. And the final volley came on July 14, 1964: “Concerning the Soviet Union’s restoration of capitalism, how great are the hopes embraced by imperialism! How delighted they are! We advise the lords of capitalism to revel in their delight. Even if Khrushchev’s revisionist clique serves you, this cannot save imperialism from the inevitability of its destruction.” Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the “social imperialism” of the Soviet Union became China’s number one enemy, and the object of much “advising,” including over China’s border war in Vietnam and Laos.  

When it came to political unrest in 1989, the blame was thrown again in the direction of the United States. An article in the People’s Daily in July 1989, more than a month after the crackdown, resorted to two advises: “We advise the American government and people at all levels of society to prioritize the overall state of US-China relations, not to interfere in China’s internal affairs, and also not to harbor vain hopes of fomenting a ‘peaceful evolution’ in China. The counter-revolutionary chaos in China’s capital has already quieted, and those who orchestrated the chaos have been defeated. We advise people not to have a myopic view of China.”

And as political change swept through the Eastern Bloc, Premier Li Peng (李鹏) felt in November 1989 that he had to “advise certain people not to be prematurely delighted with changes in Eastern Europe.”

In the 1990s, there was a downturn in the use of “advise” in the People’s Daily. At home, Deng Xiaoping promoted reform and opening, and in foreign policy the emphasis was on “concealing strengths and biding time” (韬光养晦). The idea was that it was in China’s advantage for the world to be focused on peace and development. Deng also emphasized “not casually criticizing or blaming others, not saying things that cross the line, and doing things that cross the line.”

In the Party media, “advise” is an aggressive and hostile posture. Since the 18^th National Congress of the CCP, China has spoken confidently about “Awesome China” (厉害了, 我的国), and has made enemies left and right, attacking on all sides. Toward the outside world, the language has become increasingly arrogant. Correspondingly, we have seen a clear rise in the Party media of use of the word “advise.”

In 2016, in the midst of dispute over the South China Sea and the International Court decision in the case between China and the Philippines, the latter was sharply “advised” by the former. When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida voiced concern about the militarization of the South China Sea during trips to Europe and Southeast Asia, China’s foreign ministry said that China “advised Japan not to hype up a ‘sense of presence’ on the South China Sea issue.”

In 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) “advised” South Korea, issuing a warning over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), an American anti-ballistic missile defense system.

In 2019, as the United States and China were engaged in a prolonged trade war, the US was frequently advised in the pages of the People’s Daily, and nearly all uses of advise were directed at the US. Here is a graph of all uses of “advise” in the newspaper from 2013 through 2019:

This high level of use of the admonishing “advise” has continued so far this year. The “advisory vocabulary” of the Chinese Communist Party is something we should watch closely in the party-state media as an indicator of China’s attitude and tone in its foreign relations.

The “loyalty dance,” or zhongziwu (忠字舞), was a collective dance that became prevalent during the Cultural Revolution, at a time when Mao Zedong and his image reigned supreme over all aspects of life in China. The dancers, grasping their copies of the “little red book,” Quotations From Chairman Mao, would dance, leap and shout to the impassioned ring of the music – all to express their boundless loyalty to the Chairman.

One slogan older Chinese may remember from that time, related to the loyalty dance, is the “Three Loyalties” (三忠于): loyalty to Chairman Mao; loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought; loyalty to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. It is tempting to think of the loyalty dance and the “Three Loyalties” as relics of China’s political past. But in fact, there are unmistakable echoes in the present.

How, in Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Era,” does one dance the loyalty dance?

Last month, CMP wrote about how the top leader in the city of Wuhan stirred up trouble as he tried to signal his “gratitude” toward Xi Jinping, suggesting that the people of Wuhan, then still in recovering from the coronavirus epidemic, should undergo “gratitude education.” This leader, Wang Zhonglin, was previously the top Party official in the city of Jinan in Shandong province, and when official media recently reported the news of Wang’s replacement taking up his post, certain words caught my eye.

As Shandong’s provincial Party secretary praised Wang Zhonglin’s replacement in Jinan, we had a pair of loyalties: “He is loyal to the Party,” said Shangdong Secretary Liu Jiayi (刘家义), “and loyal to the General Secretary.”

When exactly did the music start in this present-day loyalty dance?

After Xi Jinping came to power, the word “loyalty” was, at least on the surface, applied to the Party and not to any individual. Xi said during his first five-year term: “Absolute loyalty to the party lies in the word ‘absolute’, which is the only, thorough, unconditional, uncontaminated, and undiluted loyalty.” Xi is of course unlikely to talk himself of the need to be loyal to himself; signaling the need for such expressions of loyalty is something that can be left to others at the top of the CCP.

But as Xi consolidated power at the top and emphasized the need for loyalty to the Party, Li Hongzhong (李鸿忠), the top leader in the municipality of Tianjin, offered what could be considered the most innovative (and perhaps humorous) rendition of the loyalty equation: “If loyalty is not absolute, then it is absolutely not loyalty,” he said.  

In October 2016, as the Party held its 6^th Plenum, Xi Jinping’s status as the “core,” or hexin (核心) became definitive, an unmistakable sign of his solidified position. In fact, the writing had been on the wall through much of 2016, and local leaders correspondingly signalled their loyalty. In February 2016, Chen Quanguo (陈全国), then Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, led the way, introducing the phrase “firmly protecting, supporting and remaining loyal to the core that is General Secretary Xi Jinping.”

After the 6^th Plenum a slew of different phrases denoting loyalty to Xi cropped up in the Party media. These included:

“Trusting the core in thought, loyal to the core politically, loving the core emotionally, and maintaining the core in action.” – vice-governor of Qinghai province Zhang Guangrong (张光荣), appearing in the Qinghai Daily on November 24, 2016

“Clean, and loyal to General Secretary Xi Jinping.” – Pan Wujun (潘武俊), political commissar of the Ningxia Military Region, appearing in Ningxia Daily on January 11, 2017

“To General Secretary Xi Jinping, absolute loyalty and pure loyalty.” – Jilin Party Secretary Bayanqolu, appearing in Jilin Daily on January 11, 2017

“Loyalty to the Party, loyalty to the General Secretary.” – spoken first by a forestry official in Jilin province, appearing in the Yichun Daily on December 22, 2017

Liu Jiayi’s use of the “two loyalties” (两个忠诚) as he introduced the new leader in Jinan is only the latest example. But so far, the “two loyalties” and related phrases have not yet appeared in the People’s Daily. The loyalty dance is not yet a national dance, and whether it will become so remains to be seen.

Generally speaking, the Chinese Communist Party has three attitudes toward political slogans and key phrases. The first is to welcome and promote slogans, encouraging their use, which applies to mainstream CCP phrases like “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” the “two protections,” or “Belt and Road.” The second attitude is to prevent or restrict the use of certain phrases, particularly those regarded as sensitive, including “judicial independence,” “freedom of speech,” and so on. These are often blocked outright, prohibited from appearing in the media or online.

Finally, there are those terms on which the Party’s attitude might be characterized as ambiguous. These are words or phrases that can, depending on context, be regarded as either sensitive or non-sensitive. In the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, for example, terms like “constitutionalism” and “civil society” were not necessarily regarded as negative, and could be found in the media (particularly the commercial media), but these terms were never used by top leaders, and they could seldom if ever be found in the flagship People’s Daily. Since 2013, these terms have been more explicitly designated as unacceptable, and have virtually disappeared from use in the media.

At the other end of the ambiguity spectrum are terms of praise or positivity that run the danger of being unseemly owing to historical associations or the potential for blowback. One of the most classic recent examples might be “great leader Xi Jinping” (伟大领袖习近平), a phrase that appeared in at least one local newspaper but was subsequently removed.

The phrase “loyalty to the Party, loyalty to the General Secretary” can be regarded as an ambiguous phrase under the current political environment, meaning that, though positive from the standpoint of CCP leaders, it does not appear in the People’s Daily or high-level speeches or other documents. But local officials know, at the same time, that there is little or no risk for them in shouting the phrase to the heavens, which might actually put them in good favour with senior officials.

Liu Jiayi, the Party secretary of Shandong province, knows this principle only too well, which is no doubt why he chose to express his loyalty to Xi Jinping and the CCP while inviting a new city leader to his post.

Nor is this Liu’s first time going beyond the call of duty to shower praise on Xi Jinping. Shortly after the 19^th National Congress in October 2017, the CCP issued a notice standardizing the discourse of praise for Xi, okaying the use of “a leader cherished by the whole Party, loved and respected by the people, and worthy of the title” (全党拥护, 人民爱戴, 当之无愧). But even this moderated phrase, designed to tone down the parade of unctuous accolades for Xi, was soon withdrawn amid concerns of the emergence of a personality cult around the general secretary.

In Shandong, Liu Jiayi was determined to keep the adulation going. He spoke of Xi Jinping as “the staunch core, wise leader and great commander” (坚强核心, 英明领袖, 伟大统帅), the last of this trinity redolent of the title “commander” given in the pre-reform era to Mao Zedong.

So far, Liu Jiayi is in a league of his own when it comes to dancing the loyalty dance. Since January 2020, the country has focused on fighting the coronavirus. When we search newspapers over the past few months, we find Liu is the only leader in the country openly signalling loyalty to Xi Jinping. Liu’s remarks appeared only in Dazhong Daily, Shandong’s official Party mouthpiece, the newspaper directly under Secretary Liu’s thumb, and a few other local Party papers – though they were included in several online sources (including on the People’s Daily news app, shown below).  

These days, there are no signs anywhere else in China’s official Party media of phrases of obeisance such as “loyal to General Secretary Xi” (对习总书记忠诚), “loyal to General Secretary Xi Jinping” (对习近平总书记忠诚), “loyal to the General Secretary” (忠诚于总书记), “treating General Secretary Xi with loyalty” (忠诚于习总书记) and so on.

In this “New Era,” will the loyalty dance become as popular as it was during the Cultural Revolution? As we observe Chinese politics, this is another interesting question to bear in mind, looking for signs of the dance in the ever-shifting discourse of the Party.

Xi Jinping took part yesterday in a video teleconference with G20 leaders to address the coronavirus epidemic. The news is reported prominently on the front page of today’s People’s Daily, just below the masthead. The headline, running vertically alongside an image of Xi, emphasizes his role in the teleconference: “Xi Jinping Attends G20 Leaders Special Summit on New Coronavirus and Delivers Important Speech.”

What was this “important speech”? It was called, “Working Together to Fight the Epidemic” (携手抗疫 共克时艰). China’s deputy foreign minister, Ma Zhaoxu, summarized Xi’s speech, saying that its chief purpose was to introduce “China’s experience,” set forth “China’s proposition,” put forward a “Chinese initiative,” and outline pledges for “China’s contribution.”

Ma praised the speech for “adhering to the concept of a community of common destiny for mankind,” a reference to Xi Jinping’s key foreign policy phrase. He said the speech “integrated China’s practical experience in fighting the epidemic, laying out a series of important propositions, and playing an important guiding role for strengthening international cooperation on epidemic control and stabilizing the global economy.”

In fact, Xi Jinping’s speech was incredibly brief, consisting of just 1,411 Chinese characters. Particularly of note is the fact that just a small portion of the speech, about 106 characters, or seven percent, deals with China’s experience at all. Here is what that section, found right at the outset of the speech, actually says:

Faced with the sudden rise of the novel coronavirus epidemic, the Chinese government and the Chinese people did not shrink from adversity, but placed people’s lives and health above all. With firm resolution, mutual aid, scientific prevention and precise policies, we undertook a people’s war against the epidemic through national mobilization, joint prevention and control, and openness and transparency.

During his inspection tour in Beijing on February 10, Xi Jinping used the terms “people’s war” (人民战争), “total war” (总体战) and “battle” (阻击战) to describe the challenge facing China. All three of these terms appeared in the most prominent headline in the next day’s edition of the People’s Daily.

This trinity of terms has been central to sloganeering in official propaganda in the midst of Xi’s “war” against the coronavirus epidemic. The terms have been used in concert through February and March as successive Politburo Standing Committee meetings have been held, and as Xi visited the city of Wuhan, the epicenter of the epidemic.

During the G20 video teleconference, as Ma Zhaoxu tells us, Xi introduced “China’s experience,” using the term “people’s war,” a term going back to Mao Zedong. As Xi Jinping addressed the global response, he also spoke of a “battle,” or zujizhan (阻击战), using another term in his anti-epidemic trinity.

But the third term in the trinity, “total war,” or zongtizhan (总体战), was missing from Xi’s G20 speech. Why would this erstwhile crucial term suddenly be dropped? My guess is that the speech writer, having some knowledge of world history, made necessary adjustments. Why? Because speaking of “total war” before the leaders of the United States, the UK, Germany, France and Russia could invoke shades of the Second World War and seem completely out of context.

For China’s leaders, talk of “total war” may sound determined and resolute. But the  phrase, in fact, is not a positive one. It is generally attributed to general Erich Ludendorff, Germany’s chief military leader during the First World War, whose ideas, some have said, “paved the way for Hitler,” and who has been called “the first Nazi.”  

Below is an image of the cover of a Chinese translation of Ludendorff’s 1935 book Total War.

And here is an image of Ludendorff standing alongside Hitler, taken in Munich in April 1935 to mark Ludendorff’s 70^th birthday. Hitler had ordered celebrations of the day across Germany, and the general was, according to the New York Times, “officially restored to the ranks of Germany’s heroic figures.”

The notion of “total war” meant that a nation would mobilize all available resources for the purposes of war. The term came into wider use in 1943 as the situation in the Second World War took a dramatic turn. The German army was defeated at the Battle of Stalingrad, which began in September 1942 and lasted for several bitter months, and suffered grave setbacks in other key engagements. Finally, on February 18, 1943, Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda, delivered his infamous “Sportpalast speech” during which he called for “total war,” urging the German people to continue the war at all costs in order to turn back the threat of Bolshevism.

The term seen here on the banner flying over the grand stage at the Berliner Sportpalast in February 1943 – “total war,” or Totaler Krieg – is the very same word as the Chinese zongtizhan (总体战) that has formed part of Xi’s trinity of anti-epidemic slogans since last month.

Search for information on “total war” in the Chinese search engine Baidu, and you quickly come to the following entry on Goebbels’ speech, which also notes that “after the speech Goebbels ordered the closure of luxury hotels and entertainment venues in Berlin.”

Within the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, the “people’s war” is a now classic “red discourse” (红色词语), but in fact “total war” has always been what can be called “black discourse” (黑色词语), associated with capitalism and capitalist forces. In educational texts for national defense, the theory of “total war” is rejected as “an important guiding ideology of the imperialists in engaging in war,” as can be seen in the following image of related online study materials from the Ministry of Education.

In 1948, as the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang Party were locked in a bitter civil war, the People’s Daily, which had been launched two years earlier, ran a report with the headline: “After a Month of Brave Fighting By Liberation Army Soldiers in Jiangsu, the ‘Total War’ of the [KMT] Bandits Has Been Shattered.”   

This history of “total war” was the reason for my astonishment as I spotted the term in the front-page headline in the People’s Daily on February 11. I’m sure others like me who are familiar with the discourse of the CCP felt exactly the same way.

In recent years under Xi Jinping, many old Maoist terminologies have been dusted off and given new life – phrases like, “East, south, north and center, Party, government, military, society and education – the Party rules all” (东西南北中，党政军民学，党是领导一切的). At the same time, a number of former “black words” seem to have been rehabilitated and appropriated – phrases like “in the highest position” (定于一尊), once decadent and imperial but now a positive expression of the lofty power of the top leader.

The simplest explanation for this inconsistency is the fact that in the so-called “New Era,” the functionaries in charge of penning speeches and official documents are not as sensitive as they once were to the CCP’s own history, much less to world history. They have no direct experience of Mao era, nor do they necessarily have a very deep sense of the early reform era under Deng Xiaoping. This has led to the absurd situation – absurd according to the internal logic of CCP discourse – that we find black words mixed into with the red.

In the case of Xi’s G20 video teleconference speech, the “total war” once shouted out by Goebbels cannot be found. But this does not mean the term has been shut out in the cold. A separate commentary in the People’s Daily today again chants the trinity on the new priority of getting the economy humming again, asserting that “the active and orderly return of production . . . concerns comprehensive victory in the people’s war, total war and battle to contain and control the coronavirus epidemic.”  

“Total war’ is almost certainly missing from Xi Jinping’s G20 speech out of recognition of its potential sensitivity in this context. The important question now is whether and how Xi Jinping might continue to use this dangerous phrase domestically — even long after the war against the epidemic has been won.

This month, as China has moved into a new phase in the fight against the novel coronavirus epidemic, and as CCP leaders have been keen to claim victory, the question of gratitude has become a contentious one – both inside and outside China. On March 4, a commentary from Xinhua News Agency balked at the suggestion from a host on Fox News that China, as the origin of the virus, owes the world an apology.

Recently, a view is being promoted that China owes the world an apology. This is extremely absurd. China has made massive sacrifices in fighting the coronavirus epidemic, and paid an immense economic cost to cut off the path of transmission of the coronavirus. No other country has made such huge sacrifices and put in so much effort in the midst of this epidemic.

The commentary then turned the tables, suggesting that the world in fact owes China a debt of gratitude. “Right now we should firmly say that America owes China an apology,” it said, “and the world owes China thanks.”

Gratitude now figures heavily in messaging from state media on the coronavirus epidemic. On March 16, following the arrival in Italy of a Chinese shipment of medical supplies and personnel, the People’s Daily ran a story called, “Thanks to the Special Team From China,” which reported contested claims that Italians in one residential area in Italy had played the Chinese national anthem and shouted “Grazie Cina!” – Thank you, China! – from their apartments.

One Italian site convincingly cast doubt late last week on the authenticity of related videos posted by top officials from China’s foreign ministry, including spokeswoman Hua Chunying, by locating sources of footage used to create the Chinese video. Below, for example, is a screenshot from the video playing on Hua Chunying’s Twitter account, alongside a screenshot from the original video – of Italians applauding Italians – from Italy’s AGTW.

The question of gratitude was also the source this month of controversy inside China. On March 7, on the eve of Xi Jinping’s visit to Wuhan, Wang Zhonglin (王忠林), who has served as the top leader of Wuhan for just over a month, announced that he planned to carry out “gratitude education” (感恩教育) for residents of the city, who should “thank the General Secretary, and thank the Chinese Communist Party.”

As soon as news of this statement from Wang came out, it was met with a wave of anger. Journalist Chu Chaoxin (褚朝新) wrote angrily: “No one with a modicum of decency would demand that the Wuhan people, just recovering from shock, would show their gratitude.” Wang Zhonglin’s talk of thanks brought a wave of such recriminations that continued for an entire day before it was completely brought under control. As the image below shows, the original post about Wang’s remarks from “Wuhan Release,” the official WeChat account of the local government, was deleted within hours in the face of the backlash.

For many Chinese speakers outside mainland China, in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, “gratitude” is a plain and ordinary word for a commonplace sentiment. But when did “gratitude” become transformed into a political slogan in mainland China?

Tracing the Spread of “Gratitude”

Searching for the origins of discourse is not entirely unlike the work of investigating the origins of an epidemic. The use of databases and search engines can help us to trace the paths that certain words and phrases have taken through history.

In ancient Chinese, there is a word “gratitude” that is used in such idiomatic expressions as “being grateful for a kindness” (感恩戴德). The object of gratitude in most of these uses, judging from my search of Taiwan’s Scripta Sinica database, is the sovereign ruler (君王). In the newspapers of the Republican period, after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the word “gratitude” appears in many instances having to do with religion, with talk of “Thanksgiving Day” (感恩节) and so on (searching Shanghai’s BKSY database). And newspapers can be located in Taiwan that continue with uses of “gratitude” that accord more or less with either the traditional Chinese sense or the Western religious sense, with a number of instances of “gratitude” to leaders also appearing – such as after the death of Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan’s Infolinker database).

Now, I grew up “drinking red ink,” and I know by heart practically every red slogan of the Chinese Communist Party that has ever been. But I don’t have any strong recollection of “gratitude” being a part of this tradition. So I had to do my homework, and look back through the People’s Daily database to see what I could find. What I found was that since the newspaper’s launch in 1946, up to the end of the Cultural Revolution and the start of the reform and opening era in 1978, a period of 32 years in the Mao Zedong era, the word “gratitude” appeared in just 163 articles – less than once every two months, or about five per year.

This pie graph shows four different contexts for the word “gratitude” in the People’s Daily throughout this period:

“Being grateful for a kindness” (感恩戴德) and “endless gratitude” (感恩不尽) are both phrases that the Chinese Communist Party views as having shades of feudalism. Meanwhile, “Thanksgiving Day”(感恩节), being a Western term, is associated with imperialism and capitalism. These uses account for 84 percent of the total.

The “other” uses, seen in yellow, aside from a very few that are positive uses – for example, the “gratitude” of the people after Communist forces occupied former Kuomintang territory), and one use for a place name, “Gratitude County” (感恩县) – all have negative connotations. For example, they might deride the “gratitude” that the running dogs of imperialism show to their masters, and so on.

In the Mao era, “gratitude” was a word belonging to the sphere of feudalism and capitalism. But even as “gratitude” was seldom used, and rarely positive, the headlines were full of slogans like, “Our gratitude to Mao Zedong is higher than the sky” (毛主席的恩情比天高), “Thanks to Chairman Mao!” (感谢毛主席), “Thanks to the Chinese Communist Party!” and so on.

In the Deng Xiaoping era, the words “gratitude” and “thanks” in reference to leaders or the government was quite rate in the People’s Daily. In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party issued mild criticisms of Mao Zedong, passing its Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the PRC. The People’s Daily ran an article called “Feelings of Gratitude Cannot Replace Scientific Analysis (感恩之情不能代替科学分析) that said, using the sense of “leader,” or lingxiu (领袖) that Xi Jinping has now claimed for himself: “If we begin from a sense of gratitude, we are unable to accurately recognize the historical role of the leader, but can easily confuse the distinction between respect for the leader and the cults of personality around Lin Biao and the ‘Gang of Four.’”

Deng Xiaoping was wary of personality cults. It goes without saying that while he was in power we did not see phrases like “showing gratitude to Deng Xiaoping” (感恩邓小平). But even expressions of “thanks” (感谢) towards Deng were rare. One example occurred in 1987, when a Tibetan monk from Qinhai was quoted as saying in the People’s Daily: “[We offer] thanks for such a good policy made for us by Grandpa Deng.” There have certainly been instances where Chinese made genuine gestures of thanks to Deng Xiaoping. The most obvious example was perhaps during the National Day march in 1984, when students hung out a banner that read, “Hello, Xiaoping!” (小平您好).

“Gratitude” Heats Up in the Hu Era

If we look at how the word “gratitude” trends in the People’s Daily through the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, this is the pattern we see, where orange represents Deng, yellow Jiang and green Hu:

In the Deng and Jiang eras we find the word “gratitude” clearly in evidence. As China opened up to the world, “Thanksgiving Day” became an objective noun, without negative connotations. There was even coverage during Jiang Zemin’s visit to the United States of American workers introducing the customs of American Thanksgiving.

But the real increase in use of the word “gratitude” came in the Hu Jintao era. In the 10 years of Hu Jintao’s tenure in office, there were a total of 1,639 articles in the People’s Daily including the word “gratitude.” In the final year of Hu’s tenure, there were 320 articles, making the word a “hot” term according to the CMP heat scale for political discourse.

Some observers have said that the transition from Mao to Deng, Jiang and Hu marked a steady progression from “strongman politics” (强人政治) to “ordinary man politics” (常人政治). As Hu Jintao introduced his slogan “harmonious society” (和谐社会), the word “gratitude” heated up in the state media. For example, one article in September 2006 said: “Always be grateful, and there will be more harmony and less division between people; more unity and less friction; more understanding and less complaining.”

This was the first time in the Hu Jintao era that the world “gratitude” appeared in a headline in the People’s Daily. At the time the whole country was in the midst of its fight against SARS, and the author of the piece praised science and technology workers and health workers, saying: “Disaster reminds each and every one of us that we must have a grateful heart.” “It’s only when you have a grateful heart that you can better understand respect. Respect life, respect labor, and respect creativity.”

In the Hu Jintao era, “gratitude” had many meanings in the media. These included: the gratitude felt by people in disaster areas for disaster relief workers (2006 being the 30-year anniversary of the Tangshan Earthquake); the gratitude felt by poor Chinese in the countryside for relatives that helped them; gratitude children felt for their parents, and so on. Below is a report in the People’s Daily from December 2006 about two sons who built a cart called “The Gratitude Express” (感恩号) to take their elderly mother traveling.

In 2005, the city of Shanghai added a clause to its High School Regulations about “learning to be grateful” (学会感恩). One commentator wrote in response to this change that this was a “required course for life,” and that a sense of gratitude was ”the soil in which social responsibility and patriotic hearts are nurtured.”

During this period, in the early Hu Jintao era, we also begin to see more frequent use of “gratitude” in the context of institutions, so that we begin to see “gratitude toward the organization” (感恩组织), and “gratitude toward the Chinese Communist Party” (感恩共产党). In 2010, the United Front Work Department organized a “gratitude movement” for private enterprises in which companies were encouraged to “show gratitude toward the Party, gratitude toward the nation, and gratitude toward the people.”

From this point, as we approach the Xi era, it seems, the word “gratitude” takes on a clear political coloring and association with the Chinese Communist Party. But in the Hu Jintao era, there was no giving of gratitude toward the “leader.” In fact, this was impossible, because Hu Jintao, quite unlike his successor, Xi Jinping, was never designated as “the core” (核心). All of this would change by 2013.

Gratitude for the General Secretary

As Xi Jinping came to power, he launched a concerted campaign against corruption in the CCP’s ranks. In some cases, officials were criticized for corrupt ways of thinking about the their relationship to others in society, and we see the notion of “gratitude” used in a critical way in this context. In 2013, an article in the People’s Daily called “Being Alert to Erroneous Concepts of Gratitude” (警惕错误的感恩观) said that “under the long-term influence of feudal ideas and [incomplete] social development, certain erroneous concepts of gratitude have permeated relations between the Party and cadres, and between different groups.” It continued: “Certain leading cadres regard the gratitude given by the masses for favorable policies by the Party and the government as the fruit of their own labors.”

From 2013 to 2017, during Xi Jinping’s first -five-year term, there were 1,164 articles in the People’s Daily using the word “gratitude,” showing a marked increase from the Hu Jintao era. Before 2015, however, while the phrase “gratitude toward the Party” (感恩党) could be found, expressions of gratitude toward the person of the leader himself did not occur.

On July 23, 2016, the People’s Daily ran a long report on the front page about Xi Jinping’s inspection tour of Ningxia. The article said that “the prosperous people who had thrown off poverty expressed gratitude toward their guide Xi Jinping.” This was a precursor to a phrase we see now, “gratitude for the General Secretary.”

Three months after this report, Xi Jinping took an important step further up the ladder of personal power.

At the 6^th Plenum of the 18^th Central Committee of the CCP, Xi Jinping was formally designated as “the core” (党的核心). The emergence of a new CCP phrase, “the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core” (以习近平同志为核心的党中央) resulted in a reshuffling of political discourse, the upshot being a tidal wave of adulation for Xi Jinping before and after the 19^th National Congress of the CCP in the fall of 2017.

Here is the front page of Xinjiang’s Aksu Daily, the official CCP mouthpiece in Aksu prefecture. The headline tells us about a disabled girl who wrote a poem “to express gratitude to the General Secretary.”

On September 17, 2017, in a huge special report ahead of the 19^th National Congress, Guizhou Party Secretary Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) became the first top provincial official in the People’s Daily to shout the slogan “Thanks to General Secretary Xi Jinping” (感恩习近平总书记). Not to be outdone, many top officials at that time, including Wu Yingjie (吴英杰), Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, expressed their “gratitude” toward Xi in this way during the 19^th National Congress – and this brought a notable rise in the phrase in the People’s Daily.

This is the front page of the November 9, 2017, edition of Guizhou’s Qianxinan Daily. Notice the wall behind the women in their colorful garb. There is a portrait of the general secretary, along with a red caption that reads: “Great Leader General Secretary Xi Jinping” (伟大领袖习近平总书记). This is a level of elevation of Xi we rarely see even now, putting him squarely on par with Mao Zedong. The headline reads: “The sound of gratitude crosses the river.”

The portrait actually appeared on the newspaper’s front page the very next day:

This was the triumphal atmosphere that spawned the phrase “gratitude for the general secretary.” In 2018, the Party leadership actually moved to regulate the tide of enthusiastic praise for Xi Jinping, which risked going overboard. Qianxinan Daily quietly removed the November 9, 2017, front page from its online archive, replacing it with a fake front page. The Central Committee issued a notice specifying that the phrase “cherished by the whole Party, loved and respected by the people, and worthy of the title” (全党拥护，人民爱戴，当之无愧) could be used to praise Xi Jinping. But even this phrase fell out of use rather quickly. What did remain, and continue to flourish, was the phrase “gratitude to the general secretary,” which we can find in many articles in state media. 

In Guizhou, Party media chanted the slogan, “Forging ahead with gratitude” (牢记嘱托感恩奋进), and Party secretary Sun Zhigang managed to say in his report to the provincial people’s congress in 2019: “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s gratitude for the people of Guizhou is heavy as a mountain, and the people of Guizhou will forever be thankful to the General Secretary!” In the city of Ningde, in Fujian province, the Party Committee stated in its mouthpiece newspaper, the Mindong Daily, in January 2019: “[We] must in our ideology express gratitude to General Secretary Xi Jinping, love and respect General Secretary Xi Jinping, moving with the General Secretary in our actions, and protecting the General Secretary.”

In his “Spring Address” early this year, Zhangjiakou’s Party secretary, Hui Jian (回建) “express[ed] gratitude to General Secretary Xi Jinping for the unprecedented opportunities he has brought to Zhangjiakou.” Also in January, Liu Ning (刘宁), the governor of Qinghai province, wrote the phrase “showing gratitude to General Secretary Xi Jinping” into his government work report. And a report from the standing committee of the municipal CCP committee in Xi’an said in January that “[we must] always remember and always have gratitude toward General Secretary Xi Jinping for his care and concern for Xi’an.”

Through January this year, as the coronavirus outbreak exploded in China, and the entire country was prioritizing the fight against the epidemic, the People’s Daily stubbornly maintained its focus on the anti-poverty series it had already planned for the year. And twice these special reports spoke of having “gratitude for the General Secretary.”

This larger political context, and the cult of gratitude emerging around Xi Jinping, is crucial to understanding why Wang Zhonglin made his remarks about the need for “gratitude education” in Wuhan.

But in fact, Wang Zhonglin’s idea was not at all new. Others blazed this trail after the 19^th National Congress of the CCP. Here is a report from Chun’an County in Zhejiang province. The headline reads: “Our county carries out ‘gratitude for the general secretary, advancing bravely in the new era’ study and propaganda education campaign” (我县开展”感恩书记, 奋进新时代”专题学习宣传教育活动). 

Wang Zhonglin was merely following what has become mainstream direction on managing public opinion since the 6th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee back in 2016. He was reading from the same hymnbook as other CCP officials, with the same lyrics, his thought being to express his loyalty to the General Secretary. His failure was in misapprehending the current state of things in China. As Chinese face life and death concerns and harbor deep resentment over early missteps in dealing with the epidemic, their nerves are especially sensitive to the way leaders seem so keen on showering themselves with tributes and praise.

The evolution of “gratitude” can tell us a great deal about political evolution in China today. It can tell us, we might also say, about the evolution and spread of the political virus that has infected the body of the Chinese Communist Party.

Like me, Xi Jinping grew up “drinking red ink.” Since coming to power, he has revived many red terms from the Mao era, including phrases like: “East, south, north and center, Party, government, military, society and education – the Party rules all” (东西南北中，党政军民学，党是领导一切的). But in Xi’s new era, “gratitude,” that black word once associated with feudalism and capitalism, has become a bona fide red political slogan – and this is something entirely new.

(Additional research for this article was contributed by David Bandurski.)

Xi Jinping’s train of titles seems to grow longer and longer. In an article posted earlier this week to an official WeChat account of the National Radio and Television Administration, the CCP’s general secretary was lauded with the phrase “proletarian revolutionary” (无产阶级革命家).

What is this phrase? Where does it come from?

Here is a screenshot of the post dealing with the response to the coronavirus epidemic, which is headlined: “Following the Example of General Secretary Xi Jinping, For a Loyal and Heroic Struggle for Early Victory.”

The post begins by talking about events six years ago in February 2014, when Xi Jinping’s “imposing figure” appeared in Nanluoguxiang, a well-known alley in Beijing, at a time when dangerously smoggy air was a hot topic across the country. The stunt was meant to signal to the public at the time that their leader was human and accessible, ready to breathe the same air. Yesterday’s post reads: “He did not wear a face mask that time. The news at the time said, ‘The smog has not dissipated, but the general secretary has already emerged.’”

The post includes a photo of Xi Jinping wearing a face mask during a tour of a Beijing neighborhood on Monday, part of a series of visits meant to show that he is present on the front lines of the fight against the coronavirus.

The phrase in question, which I’ve highlighted above, comes a bit further down in the post. “Great proletarian revolutionaries are always filled to the brim with the optimistic revolutionary spirit,” it reads.

Since the People’s Daily newspaper was launched on May 15, 1946, 40 people have been described in this way, which may seem to suggest the term is not so exceptional. However, we should note that aside from Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, all of those mentioned as “proletarian revolutionaries” were labelled as such only after their deaths, and often in official obituaries.

It is exceptional to be designated a “proletarian revolutionary” during one’s lifetime.

The label was used early on and with some regularity for Mao Zedong, accounting for the majority of instances we find in the People’s Daily. For Deng Xiaoping, the title came only after his resignation as chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989.

As for the others, here is a taste of the distinguished group:

Karl Marx
Friedrich Engels
Former Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin
Former Soviet leader Josef Stalin
Former Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito
The novelist Lu Xun
Revolutionary-era figures Peng Pai, Fang Zhimin and Chen Tanqiu
German Communist Party founder Rosa Luxemburg
Liu Shaoqi
Zhou Enlai
Zhu De
Li Xiannian
Zhang Wentian
Ye Jianying
Peng Zhen
Deng Yingchao (a rare woman on the list)
Hu Yaobang

The group also includes Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, who after his death was praised as an “excellent proletarian revolutionary” (杰出的无产阶级革命家).

But the reference to Xi Jinping as a “great proletarian revolutionary” faced a quick death online. The post was removed within 24 hours, yielding the following error notice reading: “This message is not viewable as it violates regulations.”

This is an interesting turn of events. A post made to WeChat by one of the chief regulators in the information terrain, the National Radio and Television Administration, is deemed to be in violation of regulations.

According to its public description, the account, “National Radio and Television Archive” (国家广电智库) is operated by the Development Research Center of the National Radio and Television Administration” (国家广播电视总局发展研究中心), and works to “explain policies in the radio and television sector in a timely manner, posting leadership speeches, industry news, development plans, radio and television laws and regulations, research reports and so on.”

But in this case, the account’s praise for Xi Jinping appears to have gone too far. It was very likely regarded as an embarrassing case of “high sarcasm,” or gaojihei (高级黑), damning through the act of praise.