By Cheng Jinfu (程金福) — I don’t know when it was that sporting events, so simple perhaps at their origin, became inextricably linked with politics. As we are often reminded lately, many countries boycotted the Olympic Games when they were hosted by Hitler’s Germany back in 1936. And of course, it was table tennis that brokered improving relations between China and the United States in 1971 after years of stand off. [Homepage: Image of Qing general and reformer Zeng Guofan, see below.]
Just last month, when Spain became the European Cup champions, the whole nation was jubilant, the king and the president both came out to celebrate, and we all got a glimpse of sports and politics working hand-in-hand.
Now, as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games approach, the Olympic emblem of five interlocking rings, representing unity among nations, has morphed into a horrifying image of interlocking handcuffs on the Reporters Without Borders Web site.
Nowadays, it is pointless even to think that we can separate sports from politics.

[ABOVE: Image from the RSF website of 2008 Olympics handcuffs.]

Ever since 1949, China’s relations with the West have been marked by frequent tension and less frequent ease. From the earliest days of PRC rule ideological hostilities drove a wedge between China and the West, between China’s socialism and the West’s capitalism. Tensions deepened in the years following June 4, 1989, as the West imposed sanctions against China, employing economic means to urge China to part ways with its politics of brutality.
Today, ideology seldom takes center stage in international relations. China and the U.S. have established a number of strategic partnerships on issues like anti-terrorism and trade. As China’s economic power grows, China and the global economy are increasingly interdependent, and economic sanctions long ago ceased to be an effective means of dealing with China.
This is perhaps one important reason why a major international sports event like the Olympics is now seen by many in the West as an opportunity to pressure China to improve its human rights situation on a range of issues, including freedom of speech.
China no longer stubbornly asserts the superiority of its socialism over the capitalist countries of the West, and it can be said that international dialogue has successfully broken through this myth of China’s isolationist period. Faced with the fact of Western civilization and its advancement, China also hopes to project a favorable image of its own civilization. This is why it made the Olympic pledges it did, in areas ranging from environmental protection to air quality to the relaxation of restrictions on foreign journalists.
We cannot expect that all of these pledges will be carried out to the fullest extent possible, but at the very least they tell us that China today is no longer as obstinate as it once was, that it is beginning to learn the art of compromise.
The Olympics are an opportunity and a turning point. For China, these international pledges are an opportunity to push for improvements that have been waiting in the wings for years. China is not stubbornly unaware of its own problems. At the same time, another powerful impetus is China’s earnest wish to present a favorable image internationally, and not only as an economic superpower.
For many in the West, this is an opportunity to apply pressure on China and bring it in line with Western, or global, values. On the issue of Tibet, for example, many in the West hope that China can engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama and relax its tight grip on Tibet. On the issue of human rights, in cases like that of activist Hu Jia, many in the West hope China will improve its human rights situation. On the issue of speech freedoms, many in the West hope that China can put an end to its manipulation of the media.
But while both sides could be said to share common goals and interests, lack of trust has always been a problem in mutual relations between China and the West. And distrust is particularly strong on the Chinese side.
Having faced decades of shame at the hands of foreign powers, before and since the so-called “Eight-Power Allied Forces” (八国联军) attacked China in 1901, and having lived through decades of ideological opposition, Chinese can often interpret Western hopes and ideals as “anti-China” attacks.
Some academics in China accept the idea of “universal values” and hope that China will adopt them. Meanwhile, many Chinese oppose these values out of “nationalist” resistance. This opposition is grounded in deep layers of historical experience with outsiders, which gives the resistance camp the upper hand and defines the social mainstream. This makes it difficult for China and the West converse on a basis of mutual trust and rational understanding.
Many Chinese believe that banners hung in various locations in Paris during the international torch relay and bearing “Free Tibet” slogans must have had the behind-the-scenes support of the French government, and this perception clearly arises from a lack of understanding about how democratic governments work.

[NOTE: Many Chinese were reading online in April 2008 that a banner on the city hall building in Paris had a “Free Tibet” slogan. In fact, my own searches suggest that “Free Tibet” banners were placed in other locations by RSF and the City Council building in fact had a banner bearing the slogan, “Paris supports human rights around the world”].

Many people in China believe that when non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accept contributions they must necessarily take marching orders from donors and become mouthpieces of anti-China forces, and this perception arises from a lack of understanding about the character of NGOs.
Many Chinese also believe that pressure on China from Western countries must stem from an “anti-China” ideology or a sense of “fear” or “jealousy” about China’s rise. They do not think it is possible that these criticisms are made with sincerity or out of good-natured hopes. This arises from an underestimation of Western societies and their degree of goodwill.
We should not be under any illusions. People in the West are not perfect, Western countries certainly consider their own national interests, and they are not entirely free of the influence of ideology. There are still many people in the West who are fearful of the historical lessons of communism and who feel hostility toward China. But does this mean China should throw the baby out with the bathwater and cut itself off from the West and everything it stands for?
In China’s current social climate, it is a dangerous business to speak in defense of the West. There is now soaring demand for language expressing opposition to the West, however intolerant it may be.
But this attitude of blind resistance does more harm than good for China’s continued progress and development. China has a popular saying about the advantage of using the strengths of others to remedy one’s own weaknesses (取他人之长补我之短). If we are to put this idea to practice, we must apply wisdom and reason as we look at ourselves and the West.
The late-Qing Dynasty military general and reformer Zeng Guofan (曾国藩) presumably felt and understood the hatred Chinese had harbored against outsiders since the Southern Song Dynasty.
This hatred had, by Zeng’s time, already congealed into a historical tradition that favored violent resistance over peace and negotiation. Each time conflict arose between China and outsiders, the emphasis was on resisting and fighting back. Yue Fei (岳飞), a general of the Southern Song who supported war against the Liao invaders, became a popular patriotic hero. By contrast Qin Hui (秦桧), who brokered peace with the Jin empire, was vilified as a traitor. For a long time after, Chinese visiting the city of Hangzhou would spit on the statues of Qin Hui and his wife on display there to express their patriotism.

[ABOVE: Image of statues of Qin Hui and Lady Wang kneeling in Hangzhou, via Wikipedia.]

Toward the end of the Qing Dynasty, as China endured the gunboat diplomacy of Western powers, many insisted that China fight back even in the face of continuous defeats. Negotiation of any kind amounted to treachery, and fighting to the death was the ultimate expression of patriotism.
Only Zeng Guofan and his successor, Li Hongzhang (李鸿章), dared faced accusations of treason to embark on a self-strengthening movement that meant learning from and facing up to the technological strength of the West.
Modern Chinese history has branded these men as traitors. But looking back today, while it can be said that negotiations for peace meant relinquishing territory, and that self-strengthening ultimately failed, we should admire the extraordinary sober-mindedness of these men, who struggled against the grain and took practical actions in view of China’s social and historical circumstances. Most importantly, they opened up a new path by which China could learn from the West. They showed wisdom and reason in their actions.
In its Olympic year, China has been plagued with natural and human disasters. China has experienced a great deal – from the storm over the international torch relay, to unrest in Tibet, to the Sichuan earthquake.
What lessons will China take away from these experiences? That, of course, will depend on the attitude each of us takes in approaching and understanding these experiences. Can we welcome the West (and even their criticisms) with wisdom and reason?
Where are you hiding, all of you Zeng Guofans?
[Posted by Cheng Jinfu, July 15, 2008, 3:35pm HK]
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Below is a Chinese version of my editorial. Readers will note that there are some differences in the language of the two versions.
奥运年的反思
原本可能极为单纯的体育不知何时与政治开始了千丝万缕的关系，当2008年西班牙国家队赢得欧洲国家杯足球赛冠军的时候，西班牙举国欢腾，国王与总统出面欢庆，人们看到了政治；当中美关系持续僵化多年难解的时候，乒乓球成了政治大使；当奥运会在希特勒统治下的德国举办的时候，很多国家开始抵制；当2008年奥运于中国举办的时候，原本象征团结的五环旗在“记者无国界”的网站上变成了狰狞恐怖的手铐五环、、、、、、今天，体育再想和政治切割，事实上已不可能。
中国在1949年之后，与西方世界一直维持着一种紧张多而缓和少的关系，从早期的意识形态的敌视，中国以社会主义与西方的资本主义划清界限，西方则对中国的共产主义体制深怀警惕；到1989年之后西方的经济制裁，西方试图通过经济的手段迫使中国走出野蛮政治。时至今日，意识形态已甚少走向国际政治的前台，中美之间也可以凭借反恐、贸易等议题结成战略伙伴关系；在中国经济实力日益强大的背景下，国际经济的相互依赖越来越强，经济制裁对中国早已失效。于是，奥运体育似乎成了西方世界当前所能找到的唯一可能有效地推动中国“政治改善”的路径。因为今天的中国已不再固执地宣称我是“君子”，它是“小人”，国际交流的频繁已经打破了当初闭塞时的“神话”，面对西方世界的文明与发达的现实，中国也希望展现自己文明的形象，这才做出种种奥运的许诺，包括环境上空气质量的改善，包括外国记者新闻采访限制的放松等等。我们不能期望这些承诺完全变成现实，但至少展现了，今日中国不再固执，它开始在学习妥协。
奥运是一个契机，对于中国来说，中国也许可以用国际承诺来推动多年积弊的改善，中国并非对自身的问题固执无知；同时也许是更为突出的动机，中国迫切希望展现自己良好的国际形象，不仅仅是一个经济强国。对于西方世界来说，这是一个向中国施压，迫使中国按照西方的思路改善的良机，譬如在西藏问题上，西方希望中国能进行对话，以改变对西藏的管制；譬如在胡佳事件的议题上，西方希望中国能改善人权，扩大言论空间；譬如在新闻自由的议题上，西方希望中国能取消对新闻的控制、、、、、、
但是，中西对话从来都缺乏相互信任的基础。特别是中国，在经历了八国联军的民族屈辱之后，在经历了意识形态的多年对立之后，西方世界所有的对于中国的希望，都极有可能演变成为“反华”的解读。面对西方的种种价值观，一部分中国学者以“普世主义”的认同而希望中国接受和采纳，一部分中国人则以“民族主义”的反抗而加以抵触；而中国独特的历史积淀，又使得后者每每占据上风，成了社会主流，从而使得中西交流依然缺乏互信基础上的同情，也缺乏理性基础上的理解。
在中国，很多人以为法国州议会大厦上的藏独标语一定是有着法国政府在幕后的支持，这分明是一种对西方民主政治中政府角色的陌生；很多人以为，非政府组织接受捐赠就一定会任人指使，甚至会成为反华势力的代言人，这分明是对非政府组织的性质的无知。很多人以为，西方对中国的施压，要么是出于“反华”的意识形态，要么是出于对中国崛起的“恐惧”或“嫉妒”，而根本不可能有真诚的动机和善良的愿望，这同样是对西方文明程度的漠视。
不错，西方世界里没有圣人，它也有国家利益，它也不可能完全没有意识形态，出于对共产主义历史教训的恐惧而仇视中国的人也大有人在。但中国是否可以因此而因噎废食呢？
当今中国的社会心态下，为西方辩护是危险的，而抵触西方，无论如何偏执，都是有市场的。这样的社会心态，对于中国的进步与未来发展，无论如何都是弊大于利的。取他人之长补我之短，是中国人比较普通的智慧。但这样普通的智慧要想发挥作用，不仅需要明智，还需要理智。
中国清朝末期的曾国藩曾经深感南宋屈辱之后中国人对于外族的仇视，每有冲突，言必开战，抗争抵触，决不言和。岳飞言战，成了爱国英雄，秦桧言和，成了卖国之贼。及至清末，朝野上下，无视西方船坚炮利，一味言战，且屡败屡战，言和成了卖国，战死成了爱国。唯有曾国藩冒着卖国贼的骂名，一方面不囿于书生之见，身体力行，另一方面嘱托其继任者李鸿章，在承受屈辱言和的同时，兴办洋务，学习西方的长处，为我所用。师徒二人在中国近代史上长久承受着“卖国贼”的骂名。今日回首，虽言和丢失了国土，洋务也未竟功业，但他们以难能可贵的清醒，不为社会潮流所趋，审时度势，为中国赢得了和平的社会环境，开启了虚心学习外族西方的新路。这是一种明智，更是一种理智。
奥运之年，天灾人祸不断，中国经历了太多，圣火传递风波、西藏骚乱、四川地震、、、、、、
但中国能借此形成怎样的反思呢？当年的曾国藩影响了近半个世纪的中国社会，今日中国的曾国藩何在？