Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Agent 012339 is back on duty. China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has deployed its AI anchor once again, this time to warn citizens about the perils of “scaling the wall,” or fanqiang (翻墙) — Chinese internet slang for using VPNs to access blocked foreign websites. The uniformed digital spokesman delivers his message with characteristic earnestness: digital freedom, he says, is actually a trap that threatens both your bank account and the nation.
In late October, CMP reported on the launch of Agent 012339 by the MSS as a new form of messaging to the public.
The MSS WeChat post frames VPN use as a series of escalating dangers. First come the personal risks: stolen credit card information, compromised passwords, and identity theft. The ministry illustrates this with the tale of one user whose credit card was fraudulently charged “thousands of dollars” six months after using a VPN to pay for materials from a foreign institution.
Then comes the espionage angle: VPNs secretly controlled by “foreign forces,” or jingwai shili (境外势力), or even developed directly by foreign intelligence agencies, are designed to plant trojans and steal sensitive data. One employee at an unspecified “classified unit” who downloaded a VPN to access foreign academic forums, Agent 012339 explains, ended up having their phone and computer remotely controlled, leading to the theft of classified research materials and criminal prosecution.
But the ministry’s most revealing concern is ideological contamination. The post warns that citizens browsing foreign websites “without any precaution” are vulnerable to “fraudulent information, extremist ideology, and political rumors” — a cascade of consequences that can transform “curious browsing” into “active participation” in illegal activities. To illustrate, the MSS describes a state-owned enterprise employee who was arrested after regularly visiting “anti-China websites” overseas, watching videos containing “political rumors about us,” and downloading and spreading such content.
What to do instead? Reject VPNs entirely. Individuals and organizations with legitimate academic or business needs should use “legal and proper channels approved by the state” — though the post does not specify what those might be. Everyone else should stick to official media and authorized platforms, avoid downloading apps from unknown sources, and cultivate “healthy internet habits.”
And if you spot someone scaling the wall? Agent 012339 reminds you that the 12339 hotline is always open for tips. The Great Firewall isn’t just about keeping information out — it’s about keeping tabs on who’s trying to peek over.
Former Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin (胡锡进) marked China’s Journalists Day on Saturday with an unusually pointed critique of local authorities’ handling of news coverage, warning that official “blue background” statements are marginalizing journalists and weakening society’s resilience.
In a Weibo post on November 8, Hu — who served as the Communist Party tabloid’s editor for more than a decade — urged local governments to grant reporters greater access to breaking news events. “Currently, in some places where incidents occur, local governments completely prevent media involvement, allowing only official agencies to investigate and then issue a brief statement in white on a blue background, effectively marginalizing journalists,” Hu wrote. “This is highly unacceptable.”
A blue background notice issued by police in Chongqing regarding Taiwanese lawyer and legislator Shen Bo-yang (沈伯洋).
Hu’s reference to “blue background” statements points to the tongbao (通报), official notices increasingly used by local police and government agencies to announce incidents without allowing the most basic reporting, to say nothing of more in-depth journalistic investigation. These terse, formulaic “white on blue” (蓝底白字) announcements have proliferated across Chinese social media in recent years, often serving as the sole official word on accidents, deaths, and other sensitive local news events.
They are often picked up by prominent news outlets such as Shanghai’s The Paper (澎湃) and The Beijing News (新京报). While they may be attractive sources of free and politically safe content, they have no independent verification and are often worthless as information.
Hu Xijin argued that such rigid controls “sacrifice the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of communication, and more importantly, undermine society’s long-term resilience and capacity to withstand pressure.” He called on authorities to show greater confidence and reduce restrictions on journalists.
In a perfect illustration of the exclusive, lazy use of the blue background notice that now typifies much reporting in China today, Hu’s old newspaper, the Global Times, reported late last week on an investigation by the Chongqing Public Security Bureau into Taiwanese lawyer and legislator Shen Bo-yang (沈伯洋), who is also known as Puma Shen. The Global Times story began with the blue notice, after which a summary repeated the same information, without any additional reporting or context.
True to form, the veteran Global Times editor took a bow to the Party and its press control principles even as he decried the damage done to journalism by the rising tide of blue notices — making clear that he was not talking on China’s Journalists Day about the type of journalism practiced in free societies. He emphasized that journalists must be able to play their proper role under CCP guidance. “The community of journalists is a supporting force for orderly social governance under Party leadership, an organic and important part of it,” Hu wrote. “Once this force is weakened, the harm to society’s long-term harmonious operation will definitely outweigh the benefits.”
When Liu Fei (刘非), the Communist Party secretary of Hangzhou, visited the city’s main newspaper group last week ahead of its 70th anniversary, he had no words of wisdom, only perfectly echoed directives from the very top of the political hierarchy. And though this was not news in the general sense of the word, Liu’s speech was splashed across local news media over the weekend, illustrating how CCP control over the media is hammered down through layers of bureaucracy through constant, insistent repetition.
Liu’s October 31 visit to the Hangzhou Daily Press Group (杭州日报报业集团), a Party-run media conglomerate that operates the flagship Hangzhou Daily (杭州日报) and the popular metro daily City Express (都市快报), demonstrated the ritualistic nature of Party control. Speaking to editors and reporters, Liu emphasized that “media run by the Party and government are the propaganda positions of the Party and government, and must be surnamed Party” — language that Xi Jinping placed at the center of press controls with his February 2016 speech on media policy.
Even the imagery emerging from the Liu Fei’s visit to the group bore unmistakable echoes of Xi’s visit to the People’s Daily newspaper more than a decade ago — the top leader staring at new media products and historical displays while accompanied by a troupe of fellow (male) officials.
Liu instructed journalists to “firmly uphold the principle of the Party managing media” (坚持党管媒体) and “establish a Marxist view of journalism” (牢固树立马克思主义新闻观), all boilerplate language reinforcing the subordination of news organizations to the CCP.
The only point of semi-freshness in Liu’s anniversary activities came as he toured the newspaper group’s “AI Media Innovation Center” (新质AI媒创新应用中心), where he emphasized another point of overlap with central policy: The need for constant innovation. Liu stressed that “media convergence” (媒体融合), or the integration of the latest technologies with the media, is “the direction of the times and the general trend” — once again, verbatim Xi Jinping. Liu called on the press group to harness artificial intelligence to “empower and increase efficiency” (赋能增效) in news production.
Whatever efficiencies AI might bring to the city’s newsrooms, the core message in Hangzhou was the same as everywhere else across the country. The media must embrace technological innovation and modernize their operations, but the fundamental mission of amplifying the Party’s voice — and staying within its carefully policed boundaries — remains immutable.
“Openness brings prosperity, closure brings decline.” This declaration opened a commentary in yesterday’s People’s Daily emphasizing China’s commitment to trade openness in the midst of President Trump’s visit to Asia this week, which is expected to culminate in a much-anticipated sideline meeting with Xi Jinping in Seoul, where a “framework” trade deal is on the agenda.
The commentary appeared under the pseudonymous byline Huanyu Ping (寰宇平), which translates something like “universal peace” — and in which the last character ping (平) is a homophone for “commentary,” or pinglun (评论), marking it as a specialized voice for key issues in global affairs. Like other pen names in the People’s Daily, this is not an individual author but rather a writing group (写作组) representing the consensus of the central leadership.
Addressing the upcoming APEC summit in South Korea, the commentary, “Gathering Asia-Pacific Strength to Continue Leading the Tide,” cited survey data from the People’s Daily showing that over 80 percent of respondents believe their countries benefit from APEC cooperation, and that 75 percent support deeper participation.
People’s Daily Pen Names
笔
People’s Daily Pen Names: A Guide to Party Voices
Click to view table
▼
Pen Name
Romanization
What It Represents
钟才文
Zhong Caiwen
Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission commentary
任仲平
Ren Zhongping
People’s Daily Important Commentary (homophone: 人民日报重要评论)
国纪平
Guo Jiping
Important Commentary on International Affairs
钟声
Zhong Sheng
China’s Voice on international affairs (homophone: 中国之声)
仲祖文
Zhong Zuwen
Central Organization Department article
钟轩理
Zhong Xuanli
Central Propaganda Department Theory Bureau commentary
钟华论
Zhong Hualun
Xinhua News Agency leadership commentary
钟纪轩
Zhong Jixuan
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection propaganda
钟政轩
Zhong Zhengxuan
Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission commentary
何振华
He Zhenhua
“How to Revitalize China” commentaries (homophone: 如何振兴中华)
王兴平
Wang Xingping
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) commentary
皇甫平
Huangfu Ping
Liberation Daily (Shanghai) collective pen name, used for reform commentaries in 1991-92
郑青原
Zheng Qingyuan
“Getting to the Source” – commentaries on political reform (homophone: 正本清源)
宣言
Xuan Yuan
Central Propaganda Department (homophone: 宣传 “propaganda”)
本报评论员
Commentator from this Newspaper
Important staff-written piece representing senior leadership views
Interestingly, this same survey, conducted by the International News Department of the CCP’s flagship newspaper — under the direction of the Party’s Central Propaganda Department — was ceremoniously released earlier this month during the China-South Korea Media Cooperation Forum (中韩媒体合作论坛) in Seoul. That event, logged in our Lingua Sinica database, was a representative case in how China exploits ostensible media diplomacy to advance foreign policy objectives, often ahead of key diplomatic events.
Participants in a media cooperation forum in Seoul earlier this month read a survey produced by China, purportedly on social views in the region on deepening APEC cooperation.
In a written response to CMP following the event, Kim Jin-ho (金珍镐), a professor at South Korea’s Dankook University who was quoted in the People’s Daily, said his remarks at the Seoul forum were “carefully coordinated in advance with reporters from both the Maeil Business Newspaper and the People’s Daily.” Kim was quoted in the People’s Daily as remarking that media should “channel public opinion toward positive interaction” (引导舆论正向互动), language that echoes official CCP framing on media control, suggesting the primary role of media is to support bilateral relations.
Yesterday’s Huanyu Ping commentary emphasized that “open cooperation” has driven regional success over the past 30 years while warning that “protectionism has become one of the most severe challenges to regional development.” It quoted Chilean President Gabriel Boric as saying, in a clear but veiled reference to US President Donald Trump, that “launching trade wars leads nowhere.” These remarks were first reported in China’s state media back in May this year, when Boric made a visit to Beijing.
A second commentary yesterday appeared under the byline Zhong Sheng (钟声), or “Voice of China,” a homophone representing central leadership opinions on foreign affairs. This piece reported on US-China trade talks held October 25-26 in Kuala Lumpur, stating the two sides “reached basic consensus on arrangements to address respective concerns” on maritime logistics, shipbuilding tariffs, fentanyl enforcement, and agricultural trade. The commentary stressed the principle that “cooperation benefits both, while confrontation harms both,” a line that China has tread consistently, portraying itself as the voice of global responsibility in a time of turmoil.
The Zhong Sheng piece also referenced the recently concluded Fourth Plenum, which approved proposals for the 15th Five-Year Plan and called for “steadily expanding institutional opening, [and] maintaining the multilateral trade system.”
The deployment of both commentaries on the same day, using distinct pseudonymous voices standing in for the consensus view of the central leadership, exemplifies China’s messaging approach around major diplomatic events. The Seoul media engagement, survey release, and now these twin commentaries represent a coordinated narrative strategy — with the hope of preparing elite opinion ahead of the high-stakes diplomacy in Seoul.
Yesterday the front page of the CCP’s official People’s Dailypushed strongly on Xi Jinping’s global quartet of signature policy initiatives ahead of next week’s Fourth Plenum and the anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. Today, the paper followed with a common propaganda tactic — quoting foreigners to rubber stamp the party’s wisdom and genius.
The piece, titled “The Four Great Global Initiatives: A Clear Roadmap to a Multipolar World” (四大全球倡议,迈向多极世界的清晰路线图), appears on page three under the “International Forum” (国际论坛) column — a typical and oft-used feature showcasing foreign voices that validate Beijing’s narratives. The byline belongs to Abdelkader Berrich, identified as an Algerian member of parliament and economist. His commentary faithfully echoes the framing from Xi’s Qiushi article, praising China’s “responsible major power role” (负责任的大国担当) in reshaping the international order. Berrich argues that each initiative “precisely responds to global challenges in specific domains,” together forming “a complete vision for pushing the world toward balanced development.”
This deployment of foreign voices is standard propaganda practice. By featuring ostensibly independent international commentators — particularly from the Global South — Chinese state media seek to demonstrate that Xi’s vision enjoys legitimacy beyond China’s borders. The timing of the “Four Great Initiatives” push is deliberate — coming ahead of next week’s plenum and the UN anniversary, as China tries to emphasize its role as a responsible, global power, and signal legitimacy internally within the party.
Echoing the language of yesterday’s promotional read-out on Xi Jinping’s featured article in the Party journal Qiushi (求是), the text of today’s article describes the “decline of the unipolar order” (单极秩序的式微) — a reference to the United States — as “an irreversible historical trend.” It positions China’s initiatives as the inevitable alternative.
The track record of the People’s Daily on foreign voices — in bylines as well as in direct quotes and paraphrases — urges caution around such examples of validation. Last month, the paper published a commentary under the byline of NBA star LeBron James, praising Chinese “enthusiasm and friendliness” and framing basketball as “a bridge that connects us.” Representatives for James quickly disavowed the piece, saying he had only ever conducted interviews with Chinese media. The People’s Daily issued no correction. When politics trump professionalism at the Party’s flagship newspaper, foreign endorsements — whether fabricated or faithfully rendered — serve the same propaganda purpose.
Explicit CCP Terminology Used in the People’s Daily Commentary by Algeria’s Abdelkader Berrich
October 17, 2025
Community of Shared Future for Mankind
人类命运共同体rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ
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Xi Jinping’s signature concept positioning China as architect of a new global order. Unlike universalist frameworks based on individual rights, this concept emphasizes state sovereignty and “common interests” defined by the CCP. It appears throughout party discourse as the overarching vision for the Four Great Global Initiatives.
Responsible Major Power Role
负责任的大国担当fùzérèn de dàguó dāndāng
▼
Self-congratulatory phrase used to portray China as a benevolent global leader. The term “担当” (dāndāng) implies shouldering responsibility — suggesting China is stepping up where others (implicitly the US) have failed. Standard in CCP discourse about China’s international role.
China Solution / China Plan
中国方案Zhōngguó fāng’àn
▼
Implies uniquely Chinese (CCP-designed) answers to global problems, positioned as alternatives to Western approaches. Part of propaganda framing that presents the CCP’s authoritarian governance model as exportable wisdom rather than simply China’s domestic political system.
Decline of the Unipolar Order
单极秩序的式微dānjí zhìxù de shìwēi
▼
Anti-US framing presenting American-led international order as inevitably collapsing. The term “declining” (式微), or shìwēi, suggests historical inevitability, drawing on Marxist historical materialism. Used to position China’s “multipolar world” vision as the natural successor.
International Discourse Power
国际话语权guójì huàyǔquán
▼
A uniquely CCP concept viewing global narrative control as a form of power to be seized and wielded. Not about free exchange of ideas, but about the authority to define terms and frame debates in international forums. Reflects the party’s view that whoever controls the discourse controls legitimacy — a key concern as Beijing seeks to reshape global norms.
The front page of today’s People’s Dailyannounces the publication of a major policy article by Chinese leader Xi Jinping (习近平) in the party’s flagship theoretical journal Qiushi (求是), bundling together what the party now characterizes as “Four Great Global Initiatives” (四大全球倡议) — a quartet of related solutions for international challenges. The article, titled “Promoting Implementation of the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative,” collects Xi’s statements from September 2021 to September 2025, organizing them around his concept of a “community of shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体).
The piece is meant to synthesize China’s response to what the party characterizes as four critical “deficits” (赤字) facing the world. These are: the “peace deficit” (和平赤字); the “development deficit” (发展赤字); the “security deficit” (安全赤字); and the “governance deficit” (治理赤字).
Xi’s Four Great Global Initiatives
四大全球倡议
Global Development InitiativeDevelopment Deficit
全球发展倡议
→
发展赤字
▼
Emphasizes “inclusive” economic globalization with six core principles, including development prioritization, people-centered approaches, and harmony between humanity and nature. Positions the Belt and Road Initiative as a practical vehicle for achieving these goals.
Global Security InitiativeSecurity Deficit
全球安全倡议
→
安全赤字
▼
Promotes “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” while rejecting countries “pursuing their own so-called absolute security”—a clear reference to U.S. security policy. Advocates for a security framework based on cooperation rather than zero-sum competition.
Global Civilization InitiativePeace Deficit
全球文明倡议
→
和平赤字
▼
Emphasizes respecting “diversity of world civilizations”—an implicit challenge to universal values that promotes China’s concept of “common values for all humanity.” This formula emphasizes the power of the nation state over citizens, with the “rights” of countries and their systems taking precedence over individual rights.
Global Governance InitiativeGovernance Deficit
全球治理倡议
→
治理赤字
▼
Confronts what Beijing portrays as threats from “Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism” — coded language for U.S. policies. Argues that global governance has reached a crossroads, with the implication that the world must turn in China’s direction.
This suite of global initiatives, the People’s Daily read-out today says, is China’s effort “to resolve the above deficits and promote the building of a better world” (破解上述赤字, 推动建设一个更加美好的世界). This framing positions Xi as a responsible and responsive global leader offering comprehensive solutions to international challenges. In this equation, the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路), lionized during Xi’s first and second terms, is subordinated as a practical vehicle for these loftier aspirations.
The bundling of Xi’s “Four Great” initiatives has gathered pace particularly since late August and early September, taking the stage during the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The push to promote the concepts has redoubled this month with a crucial CCP plenum next week and the upcoming 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. The quartet signals Xi’s effort to consolidate his standing with both domestic party elites and the international community.
The People’s Daily read-out hailing the Qiushi article referred to this year “an important moment to remember history and create the future together” (铭记历史、共创未来的重要时刻). And the central idea here is that Xi Jinping is claiming this crossroads for China under the rule of the CCP.
Page 6 of the overseas edition of the CCP’s People’s Dailyon October 13, a huge feature on China’s role in founding the UN (erasing the ROC from the story).
In recent weeks, before and through the grand military parade held in Beijing on September 3, state media have promoted a revisionist view of history in which China — meaning the current People’s Republic of China under the leadership of the party — played the most decisive role in the founding of the United Nations. Among these efforts, a large feature story in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily on Monday focused on China’s “immense contributions” to the founding of the UN, with framing that completely erased the role of the Republic of China (ROC) — the current name for Taiwan. The feature story showcased materials from the first session of the UN General Assembly now kept in Chongqing, the wartime capital of the ROC.
When it comes to China’s gaze on the future as glimpsed in Xi’s Qiushi article, there is an implicit but unmistakable message about the values of the West as failing to be “inclusive” (包容). Language about the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) speaks of respecting “diversity of world civilizations” (世界文明多样性), an implicit challenge to the notion of universal values that promotes China’s own concept of “common values for all humanity” (全人类共同价值). While those may sound superficially similar, China’s formula emphasizes the power of the nation state over citizens and communities — the “rights” of countries and their systems taking precedence over individual rights.
Another clear message between the lines is about the United States as an irresponsible force. The Global Governance Initiative (GGI) directly confronts what the party portrays as threats from “Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism” (冷战思维、霸权主义、保护主义) — barely coded language that is a clear reference US policies. The article argues that while the UN emerged from the “painful lessons” (痛定思痛) of two world wars 80 years ago, “the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation, and global governance has reached a new crossroads” (世界进入新的动荡变革期,全球治理走到新的十字路口).
The underlying message is unmistakable: Standing at this crossroads, the world must turn in the direction of China.
When it comes to China’s economy, the future has never been brighter. That is the point forcefully made this month by a series of eight commentaries published in the official People’s Daily, which repeatedly stress that “to believe in China is to believe in tomorrow.” The articles were written by Zhong Caiwen (钟才文), a very prominent economic expert that no one on earth has ever heard of — because, of course, he does not exist.
Zhong Caiwen is a pen-name for a collaboration between writing groups at both the Central Propaganda Department (中宣部) and the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission (中央财经委员会), the bodies within the Chinese Communist Party that are responsible for political messaging and supervision of the financial system respectively. Such homophonous pen names are common in Party-state media, allowing powerful departments to voice official positions while signaling their authority to other Party insiders.
People’s Daily Pen Names
笔
People’s Daily Pen Names: A Guide to Party Voices
Click to view table
▼
Pen Name
Romanization
What It Represents
钟才文
Zhong Caiwen
Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission commentary
任仲平
Ren Zhongping
People’s Daily Important Commentary (homophone: 人民日报重要评论)
国纪平
Guo Jiping
Important Commentary on International Affairs
钟声
Zhong Sheng
China’s Voice on international affairs (homophone: 中国之声)
仲祖文
Zhong Zuwen
Central Organization Department article
钟轩理
Zhong Xuanli
Central Propaganda Department Theory Bureau commentary
钟华论
Zhong Hualun
Xinhua News Agency leadership commentary
钟纪轩
Zhong Jixuan
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection propaganda
钟政轩
Zhong Zhengxuan
Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission commentary
何振华
He Zhenhua
“How to Revitalize China” commentaries (homophone: 如何振兴中华)
王兴平
Wang Xingping
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) commentary
皇甫平
Huangfu Ping
Liberation Daily (Shanghai) collective pen name, used for reform commentaries in 1991-92
郑青原
Zheng Qingyuan
“Getting to the Source” – commentaries on political reform (homophone: 正本清源)
宣言
Xuan Yuan
Central Propaganda Department (homophone: 宣传 “propaganda”)
本报评论员
Commentator from this Newspaper
Important staff-written piece representing senior leadership views
Roughly summarized, the series says that thanks to “Xi Jinping Economic Thought” (习近平经济思想) — this being the buzzword under Xi’s self-aggrandizing signature “banner term” dealing with economic policy — China’s economy is seeing steady development and resilience in the face of global turmoil and US tariffs. Through prioritizing innovation, social security and international openness, the two departments say the Party has improved livelihoods, consumption, graduate opportunities, and foreign investment opportunities. The eight-article prelude reads as an extended lecture on keeping faith with “Xi Jinping Economic Thought,” which has been something of a laggard among Xi’s banner term-related formulas as the economy has experienced difficult headwinds internationally.
Clearly, one key point of the series is to gainsay international economic detractors. “Recently,” one article in the series said on October 3, “some voices, both internationally and domestically, have argued that investment and development in China have passed their golden age and that opportunities are dwindling.” But there are hints of grudging admission too. On October 2, another article confessed that “prices remain sluggish,” businesses were seeing difficulties, and that domestic demand was “weak.”
An October 2 commentary by “Zhong Caiwen” on page 2 of the People’s Daily.
The timing of the series also matters. It arrives just weeks ahead of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP’s Central Committee, scheduled for October 20-23, which will set the groundwork for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan covering 2026-2030. These plenary sessions are pivotal moments in Chinese policymaking and political positioning. Let’s remember: It was the Third Plenum in 1978 that launched “reform and opening up,” and the 2018 Second Plenum that eliminated presidential term limits for Xi. This year’s plenum faces the uncomfortable task of addressing mounting economic pressures, including a 29 percent drop in foreign direct investment and the ongoing impact of tariffs from the United States and the EU.
At base, the series is an attempt to set the tone for the Fourth Plenum before the harder conversations begin.
To this end, the series deploys a familiar tactic of redirection — looking aside from present and persisting problems to make a bigger sell on the future. The October 4 installment of the series says at one point that “China’s future is entirely predictable.” And repeated five times throughout the series is the phrase, borrowed from Xi Jinping’s March remarks to international businesspeople, that “to believe in China is to believe in tomorrow, and to invest in China is to invest in the future” (相信中国就是相信明天,投资中国就是投资未来).
But this bold declaration of confidence, republished by multiple media outlets within China, suffers from a fatal flaw hardwired into how China’s ruling Party continues to communicate even well into the 21st century — a kind of repetition complex. If someone reassures you that everything is just fine, you relax: Good, that’s good to hear. If they say it again, there is a frisson of doubt. And when the reassurance comes a third time, it begins to sound like something other than confidence. You are sure there is much more they are not saying.
Eight definitive declarations of confidence is enough to sow doubt in all but the firmest of believers.
In China’s digital landscape, even feelings can be subject to government regulation. On September 22, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced its latest “Clear and Clean” (清朗) campaign—this time targeting the “malicious incitement of negative emotions” (恶意挑动负面情绪) across social media, short video, and livestreaming platforms. The two-month campaign promises to crack down on everything from “group antagonism” to “excessive rendering of pessimistic emotions.”
How will run-of-the-mill negativity be distinguished from the incitement of negativity? Is feeling and speaking with positivity now the law of the land? The next enforcement step, naturally, will have to be vigilant policing of the use of extravagant positivity to maliciously poke fun at the leadership. Sound ridiculous? It is already policy elsewhere, in the Chinese Communist Party’s active posture toward “low-level red” and “high-level black” — more in this paper on the topic.
Just the latest absurdly overweening action by the CAC, the notice is a prime example of how political and legal enforcement operate under the CCP. Rather than relying on consistent, transparent rules applied uniformly across platforms, China’s officials and regulators turn to sweeping “special actions” (专项行动) announced throughout the year, granting officials across the country’s vast bureaucracy broad discretionary power to pursue vaguely defined violations and make examples of bad actors — all with the goal of instilling fear and reshaping online discourse.
And fear is the point — whether we are speaking about the ethos of the regulators themselves, or about their tactics. Fear is the fundamental tool applied by agencies like the CAC and offices like the Central Propaganda Department to enforce political controls. A fearful journalist or editor, unable to see the red lines, will think twice. A fearful platform, like RedNote or Bilibili, will turn up the pace on deletions and account suspensions to ensure they “comply.”
A lingering sense of anxiety forms the foundation of China’s media and information policy today — going back to the political upheaval of 1989 that fundamentally transformed the Party’s approach to press control.
The “special action” approach to governance also lays bare its own ineffectiveness. The most recent action from the CAC is to extend over two months. What then? An end to negativity? Surely not. But one thing you can be sure of: the necessity of the next, and then the next, “special action.”
___________
CAC “Clear and Clean” Special Actions Timeline – China Media Project
CAC “Clear and Clean” Special Actions Timeline
A selection of crackdowns since 2024
February 2024 (Duration: Seasonal)
Spring Festival Environment Cleanup
CAC launches comprehensive campaign targeting misleading travel content, viral drama videos, and year-end commentary during Chinese New Year period. Sets template for seasonal content control.
March 2024 (Duration: Ongoing)
Corporate Defamation Crackdown
“Optimizing Business Environment” campaign targets accounts spreading false information about companies and entrepreneurs, including alleged “extortion” through negative coverage.
August 2024 (Duration: 1 month)
Livestream Chaos Cleanup
Month-long campaign targets fake charity streams, pseudo-expertise, and “soft pornography” in live broadcasts. Requires professional certification for medical, legal, and financial advice.
June 2025 (Duration: 3 months)
AI Technology Abuse Campaign
Three-month intensive targeting AI deepfakes, unauthorized voice cloning, and algorithmic manipulation. Requires content labeling and platform detection capabilities for synthetic media.
July 2025 (Duration: 2 months)
“Self-Media” Misinformation Targeting
Two-month action requires independent creators to cite sources, obtain professional certification, and face platform liability for unverified content.
September 2025 (Duration: 2 months)
Negative Emotions Policing
Current two-month campaign targets “malicious incitement of negative emotions” including pessimistic content, conspiracy theories, and excessive self-deprecation across all major platforms.
For the Chinese leadership, the 80th anniversary of the country’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan in World War II is a major milestone — an opportunity to signal the power of the ruling Chinese Communist Party to people at home, and the country’s global ambitions to audiences abroad. These goals were on full display during the ritualized pageantry of the military parade yesterday in Beijing, attended by Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un.
Preparations for the celebrations, coinciding with this week’s Tianjin meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an event that has sparked lively discussion and speculation about whether or not we are witnessing a fundamental shift in the world order, were months in the making. In recent days, the logistical preparations have brought the center of the capital to a literal standstill.
But in the days ahead of this week’s parade of high-tech weaponry, ideological moves of equal or greater importance have prepared the way for the CCP’s new historical consensus. This view rewrites the history of global war and peace to firm up the narrative of China’s centrality. It was the CCP, the story goes, that decisively won the war for Asia and for the world.
Backbone Narratives
On Sunday, the China Youth Daily, an official newspaper under the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), ran an article by Shi Quanwei (史全伟), a research fellow at the Party History and Literature Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee. Shi argued the CCP had been the “backbone” (中流砥柱) of the entire nation’s resistance during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Furthermore, Shi says it was the united front leadership, guerrilla warfare tactics, and exemplary governance of the CCP that made it crucial to China’s wartime resistance.
“The experience of three revolutions, especially the War of Resistance, has given us and the Chinese people this confidence,” he wrote. “Without the efforts of the Communist Party, without Communists serving as the backbone of the Chinese people, China’s independence and liberation would have been impossible.”
Just as the celebrations yesterday invited talk of the conspicuous sidelining of the United States as a global leader — and by extension what state media like to call the “US-led West”(美西方) — reconstructed narratives made much of the historically inflated importance of the US in the global conflict 80 years ago.
Quoting from several global talking heads, the government-run China Daily pressed the point that the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the quintessential inflection point in American narratives of fascist resistance, had been given too central a role in the broader global story — as had the role of the United States in the Pacific theater. Instead, it was the CCP that had led the decisive grassroots resistance years before the belated American entry. As the descendant of one Soviet pilot was quoted as saying, glossing over the role of Republican forces in China at the time: “China’s resistance war was already underway before the Pearl Harbor incident. Chinese forces long tied down Japanese military strength and manpower, preventing them from extending their influence to the Pacific and the entire Far East region at that time.”
This wave of writing and commentary on WWII history was promoted through traditional state-run outlets and new social media accounts all through August. According to these pieces, the emphasis on the US role had for decades overshadowed, or inexcusably sidelined, China’s role in the global conflict.
On August 16, an article appeared on WeChat that claimed American academia had deliberately downplayed China’s role — which was to say, the role of the CCP. In recent years, the author wrote, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US had led American historians to overlook China’s role in the Pacific theater, “fully exposing the United States’ political manipulation of history to gain political advantage.”
A man identified as a descendant of a World War II-era Soviet fighter pilot praises China’s central role in the Pacific theater, accusing the US of broad historical revisionism.
That argument, of course, has many flaws — not least the absurd assumption that US historians (like Chinese ones?) are an organized and geopolitically-motivated force, lacking professional integrity and unable to distinguish between the present-day People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). This latter was China’s recognized government during World War II.
But the nature of the messenger in this and many other instances of historical redrafting in recent weeks is perhaps more telling than the substance. The author of this piece, “How Has American WWII Historical Research ‘Drifted’?,” was a scholar from the American Academy (美国研究所), a unit within the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) — a front organization operated by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and charged with engaging with foreign scholars.
And what of the outlet that published this piece — a drop in the wave of efforts to re-center China at the expense of the truth? It is a website launched in 2021 called “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era” (习近平外交思想和新时代中国外交), an outlet under the China International Communications Group (中国外文出版发行事业局), or CICG. The office, which masquerades as a press group, operates scores of online outlets including such government sites as China.com.cn, and has been tasked by Xi Jinping as a key vehicle for the CCP’s international communication. CICG’s parent is the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee.
The social media account of “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era” — whose Chinese moniker bears the name of Xi Jinping himself — has been pushing a variety of articles on World War II in recent weeks. These mostly re-interpret the conflict through the lens of current geopolitics, colored with familiar state narratives, including contemporary Chinese claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea.
As the soldiers, tanks, missiles and drones goose-stepped and rolled along Chang’an Avenue on Wednesday, and Vladimir Putin had his smiling moment with Xi Jinping, some might have felt a sense of America sliding out of contemporary relevance. But behind the physical demonstrations of military might and the cementing of partnerships, there was an insistent narrative effort on all fronts to re-position China — and by extension, the CCP — at the center of the global historical narrative. For the leadership’s vision of a “new type of international relations,” nudging American leadership out of contemporary geopolitics is only half the battle; ensuring that it slips out of the history books may be equally important.
Earlier this month, China Daily, the Chinese government’s flagship English-language newspaper, signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Shaanxi provincial committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The agreement, following the trend of central-local coordination in state-led soft power attempts, illustrates the persisting role of the newspaper group and other central CCP-run media outlets in China’s international messaging efforts.
The framework agreement between China Daily and the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee’s Propaganda Office was signed in the provincial capital of Xi’an on August 18, with China Daily Editor-in-Chief Qu Yingpu (曲莹璞) and Shaanxi Party Committee Standing Committee member Sun Daguang (孙大光) presiding over the ceremony.
Sun highlighted that the provincial party committee’s recent plenary session passed opinions on accelerating the construction of a “culturally strong province” (文化强省), which include new deployments for international communication work. He described China Daily as “a main force in our country’s international communication.”
Representing his outlet, Qu outlined its role in implementing President Xi Jinping’s directives and the party’s policies, stating the organization is “promoting systematic changes and building a more effective international communication system” (推动系统性变革,构建更有效力的国际传播体系).
Selection of China Daily Strategic Partnerships Since 2020
The partnership reflects President Xi Jinping’s broader directives to remake China’s external propaganda efforts, including his call during a collective study session of the Politburo in May 2021 to present China as “credible, lovable and respectable” (可信、可爱、可敬) to international audiences. Xi has emphasized the need for China to enhance its global narrative power and improve its international image through coordinated messaging between central and local authorities.
Part of this strategy has brought about the nationwide formation of a growing network of international communication centers (国际传播中心), or ICCs. These leverage local media groups and focused local narratives, with the aim of expanding China soft power efforts from the bottom outward. But the partnership between Shaanxi province and China Daily is also a reminder of how important well-funded central-level state media remain to China’s external propaganda efforts.
The China Daily agreement with Shaanxi this month establishes cooperation in content supply. The two sides have also committed to expanding international communication channels, which could mean co-running accounts on major overseas platforms like Facebook and Instagram that are blocked in China. As talent is a persistent shortcoming at the provincial level and below, they have also agreed to build international communication talent teams, as well as strengthen youth international communication and exchange.
This framework mirrors similar partnerships China Daily has established with other provincial authorities as part of a coordinated strategy to localize international messaging efforts and support local jurisdictions — and even universities (see table above) — that are often less familiar with global media dynamics.