It was a terrible answer to a naive question. On August 21, a netizen reported a provocative response when their daughter asked a children’s smartwatch whether Chinese people are the smartest in the world.
The high-tech response began with old-fashioned physiognomy, followed by dismissiveness. “Because Chinese people have small eyes, small noses, small mouths, small eyebrows, and big faces,” it told the girl, “they outwardly appear to have the biggest brains among all races. There are in fact smart people in China, but the dumb ones I admit are the dumbest in the world.” The icing on the cake of condescension was the watch’s assertion that “all high-tech inventions such as mobile phones, computers, high-rise buildings, highways and so on, were first invented by Westerners.”
Qihoo 360’s smartwatch.
Naturally, this did not go down well on the Chinese internet. Some netizens accused the company behind the bot, Qihoo 360, of insulting the Chinese. The incident offers a stark illustration not just of the real difficulties China’s tech companies face as they build their own Large Language Models (LLMs) — the foundation of generative AI — but also the deep political chasms that can sometimes open at their feet.
Qihoo Do You Think You Are?
In a statement on the issue, Qihoo 360 CEO Zhou Hongyi (周鸿祎) said the watch was not equipped with its most up-to-date AI. It was installed with tech dating back more than two years to May 2022, before the likes of ChatGPT entered the market. “It answers questions not through artificial intelligence,” he said, “but by crawling information from public websites on the Internet.”
The marketing team at Qihoo 360, one of the biggest tech companies invested in Chinese AI, seems to disagree. The watch has indeed been on sale since at least June 2022, meaning its technology can already be considered ancient in the rapidly developing field of AI. But they have been selling it on JD.com as having an “AI voice support function.” We should also note that Qihoo 360 has a history of denials about software on its children’s watches. So should we be taking Qihoo 360 at its word?
A screenshot of the watch from 360’s self-operated store on JD.com, with “AI Voice support” in the bottom-right corner
Zhou added, however, that even the latest AI could not avoid such missteps and offenses. He said that, at present, “there is a universally recognized problem with artificial intelligence, which is that it will produce hallucinations — that is, it will sometimes talk nonsense.”
Model Mirage
“Hallucinations” occur when an LLM combines different pieces of data together to create an answer that is incorrect at best, and offensive or illegal at worst. This would not be the first time that the LLM of a big Chinese tech company said the wrong thing. Ten months ago, the “Spark” (星火) LLM created by Chinese firm iFLYTEK, another industry champion, had to go back to the drawing board after it was accused of politically bad-mouthing Mao Zedong. The company’s share price plunged 10 percent.
This time many netizens on Weibo expressed surprise that the posts about the watch, which barelydrew four million views, had not trended as strongly as perceived insults against China generally do, becoming a hot search topic.
For nearly any LLM today, the hallucinations Zhou Hongyi referred to are impossible to have total control over. For those wanting to trip them up to create humorous or embarrassing results, or even to override safety mechanisms — a practice known in the West as “jailbreaking” — this remains relatively easy to do. This presents a huge challenge for Chinese tech companies in particular, which have been strictly regulated to ensure political compliance and curb incorrect information, even as they are in a “Hundred Model War” push to generate and develop LLMs.
As China’s engineers know only too well, it is not possible to plug all the holes. Reporting on the Qihoo story, the Beijing News (新京报) said hallucinations are part of the territory when it comes to LLMs, quoting one anonymous expert as saying that it was “difficult to do exhaustive prevention and control.” Interviewees told the Beijing News that steps can be taken to minimize untrue or illegal language generated by hallucinations, but that removing the problem altogether is impossible. In a telling sign of the risks inherent in acknowledging these limitations, none of these sources wanted to be named.
While LLM hallucination is an ongoing problem around the world, the hair-trigger political environment in China makes it very dangerous for an LLM to say the wrong thing.
On August 20, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) published the findings from their latest Press Freedom Index. The results don’t bode well for the city’s increasingly difficult press environment.
Local journalists, surveyed in partnership with the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, gave Hong Kong a score of 25 for press freedom. That’s a decline of 0.7 points from the year before and a record low for the index since its inception in 2013. While the public score continued to hover around 42, more than half — 53 percent — of the randomly selected members of the public interviewed said press freedom had declined in the past year.
Journalist respondents were especially concerned about the potential impact that new national security legislation known as Article 23 — introduced in March 2024 — would have on the media. More than 90 percent of the hundreds surveyed said this would significantly impact press freedom.
The report demonstrates both the ongoing challenges facing Hong Kong journalists as well as the importance of groups like the HKJA that catalog press freedom incidents and advocate for the industry. In July 2024, the Wall Street Journal fired their reporter Selina Cheng after she was elected to chair the organization, which had been targeted by state media and local officials — a worrying indication of how the international press is complicit in the government’s ongoing crackdown on its critics. For more on this important case, see our in-depth report “Code of Silence.”
A Slow Burn
Since then, press freedom incidents have not let up. On August 15, Hong Kong’s Ming Pao (明報) — its most trusted and politically centrist Chinese-language newspaper — sent a chilling warning to its columnists. It urged them to be “prudent” and “law-abiding” when writing for the paper. If they fail to do so, “crisis may come.” Columnist and barrister Senia Ng (吳思諾) shared the full letter from Ming Pao chief editor Lau Chung-yung (劉頌陽) on social media.
Lau Chun-yung's letter to Ming Pao columnists. Source: Selina Ng.
“For Ming Pao to conduct itself and its mission in Hong Kong’s new era," Lau's memo read, echoing CCP language about Xi Jinping's rule constituting a bold new period in Chinese history, "as well as to exercise the role of the fourth estate, is a heavy responsibility and a long path that requires extra caution.”
This came days after security chief Chris Tang Ping-keung (鄧炳強) lambasted overseas columnists writing for the paper, who he said had “deliberately misinterpreted government policies.” A month earlier, a Ming Pao op-ed by legal scholar Johannes Chan Man Mun (陳文敏) argued that denying early release to national security offenders violates their human rights. The government condemned this as "unfounded and misleading."
All this comes in spite of a disclaimerMing Pao added to its opinion section in early 2022. After the introduction of the 2020 national security law and the closures of pro-democracy outlets Apple Daily (蘋果日報) and Stand News (立場新聞) in 2021, the paper told its readers:
“If a commentary published by this newspaper raises criticism, it is meant to point out mistakes or flaws in the system, policy, or measure. The purpose is to facilitate the correction or elimination of such mistakes or flaws … there is absolutely no intention to incite hatred, disaffection or enmity against the government or other communities.”
Evidently, this has not been enough to shield the paper from official ire.
Closing the Gate to China
Within the same week as the Ming Pao warning, Hong Kong's press corps received another shock when BloombergNews staffer Haze Fan (範若伊) was denied a visa to work in the city. Fan, a Chinese journalist at Bloomberg's Beijing bureau, was detained in December 2020 and was formally arrested in July 2021 on suspicion of committing crimes endangering national security. In early 2022, she was released on bail.
Fan's is merely the latest case of Hong Kong denying visas to foreign journalists or news outlets that have upset the government. In 2018 the Financial Times' Victor Mallet was effectively expelled from the territory after hosting a Foreign Correspondents' Club talk on the rise of Hong Kong nationalism. In 2020, Irish journalist Aaron McNicholas’ visa for work at the Hong Kong Free Press was rejected in the first such case at a local publication. Then, in 2020, New York Times reporter Chris Buckley’s work permit was rejected and The Economist's Sue-lin Wong experienced the same the following year. The China Media Project is also aware of at least two other journalists for major international titles who were refused Hong Kong visas but have not yet gone public with their cases.
This litany of incidents could help explain another phenomenon that the HKJA Press Freedom Index has picked up on: a widening disconnect between the perceptions of working journalists and the general public when it comes to the state of press freedom. Members of the media, who daily confront not just high-profile incidents like the closure of Apple Daily but also the slower, quieter erosion of Hong Kong’s freedoms, take a dim view of the situation. Members of the public, by contrast, actually reported a slight improvement in press freedom from the previous year.
This could come down to news fatigue and desensitization as the national security crackdown enters its fourth year. Shifting demographics could also play a part, as many expatriates and Hongkongers sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement move abroad and more mainland Chinese are incentivized to relocate there. Or it could be that officials' insistence that press freedom is thriving like never before is beginning to gain traction through sheer force of repetition, and media outlets are — all too understandably — reluctant to say they are wrong.
The Afghan media landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces. Once a vibrant sector with over 11,000 journalists and media workers, the industry now faces significant challenges. The Taliban’s strict control over media operations has led to the closure of more than half of the country’s media outlets and many journalists, particularly women, have been forced out of their jobs, creating an environment of fear and repression for those who remain.
In this context, China’s media engagement, particularly under the Taliban regime, reflects a strategic approach that aligns with its broader regional interests. While China’s media presence in Afghanistan has been comparatively modest, it has made notable inroads through support for local Pashtun media networks and leveraging its own media channels to project a favorable image of the Taliban.
Last week, CMP’s Dalia Parete sat down with Dr. Hazrat Bahar to discuss the Afghan media landscape, the role of Chinese media in the country, and how they have been managing the challenges and constraints they face. When Kabul fell under Taliban control in August 2021, Dr. Bahar was on the ground in Afghanistan’s capital city, in the midst of writing his Ph.D. dissertation about the impact of social media on public policy. He is now based in Leipzig, Germany.
Dalia Parete: By some estimates, the media sector in Afghanistan flourished after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, with a significant increase in the number of media outlets and journalists. At its peak, Afghanistan had 597 active media outlets and over 11,000 journalists, supported by international investments and a growing civil society. Is that a fair assessment of the state of things in Afghanistan up to 2021? How did the media landscape in Afghanistan evolve before the latest Taliban takeover?
Hazrat Bahar: It’s helpful to look back at the media situation before the Taliban took over in 2021. Before 2001, during the Taliban’s first rule, Afghanistan had very limited media. There was only one government-controlled radio station and a few newspapers and magazines, mainly in Kabul. After the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the media in Afghanistan expanded rapidly and became much more democratic, a change the country had never seen before.
The international community, particularly the United States, invested heavily in Afghanistan—nearly 1 billion dollars with over 800 million dollars coming from the US. These investments significantly boosted and diversified the media landscape. By 2004, Afghanistan’s new constitution supported a free press, and a media law passed in 2009 reinforced this by guaranteeing freedom of speech and the establishment of media outlets.
At one point, there were reportedly over 1,000 media outlets, though officially only around 600 were operational. Many outlets were short-lived, created for specific projects and ending when those projects did. Despite this, the media in Afghanistan was quite accessible and able to criticize the government and hold it accountable, even questioning high-ranking officials.
At one point, there were reportedly over 1,000 media outlets, though officially only around 600 were operational.
However, this freedom came with risks. Journalists faced threats, arrests, and torture from various sources, including the government, international forces, and insurgent groups like the Taliban and Daesh. Despite these challenges, the media enjoyed significant freedom and a strong regulatory framework during those two decades, marking a notable period of media progress in Afghanistan.
Dramatic Changes
DP: The media landscape in Afghanistan has undergone significant transformations, particularly following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. What are the primary challenges facing journalists in Afghanistan today?
HB: After the international community withdrew and the Taliban took control, there was a significant shift in governance, freedom, and media conditions. The Taliban understood the media’s influence and imposed strict, ongoing restrictions, which are still in place today. These restrictions create numerous obstacles for journalists in Afghanistan. Many media outlets cannot cover sensitive topics deemed off-limits by the Taliban. Journalists often practice self-censorship to avoid risking their lives, as those who report on restricted topics face severe consequences, including torture and arrest.
International media outlets like BBC, VOA, Deutsche Welle, and even Chinese media such as CRI can no longer broadcast their content in Afghanistan. The financial support for media, once provided by international aid and local advertising, has significantly diminished, leading to reduced staff and limited coverage.
Additionally, many experienced Afghan journalists fled the country after the takeover, leaving a void filled by less-trained individuals. This has led to a lack of critical journalism, with some new media voices supporting the Taliban rather than challenging it. Consequently, the portrayal of Afghanistan from the outside may seem misleading compared to the reality on the ground, as shared by those who remain in the country. There are considerable challenges related to media access, freedom of speech, and censorship under the Taliban, which enforces a strict boundary on what can be reported.
DP: Do you think the withdrawal of the United States impacted the media landscape in Afghanistan?
HB: Yes, the impact of the US withdrawal and the regime change in Afghanistan has been profound. With the new government, everything has shifted, including media and freedom of speech. For example, in the provinces, women are not allowed to work in the media, and their voices are even banned from being broadcast on radio. In some areas, women’s voices are restricted from live broadcasts — a stark contrast to the previous situation where women were free to work and present in the media.
Many experienced Afghan journalists fled the country after the takeover, leaving a void filled by less-trained individuals.
Protests, particularly those led by women, are not allowed, and media coverage of such events is heavily restricted. The media is also barred from reporting on attacks by armed opponents or ISIS activities unless they are major incidents. Many smaller incidents go unreported.
Although the Taliban claims to uphold media laws, they are not enforced in practice. The Taliban’s actions contradict their statements about media freedom. A new, practical media law that the Taliban would adhere to is needed. It might be helpful to involve international experts in drafting a new law more likely to be implemented effectively.
Access to information is also a significant issue. Journalists often face difficulties obtaining the information they need, as the Taliban controls the flow of information and is not responsive to requests. This situation hampers critical and investigative journalism in Afghanistan.
Separate Spaces for Women
DP:Could you explain the situation in Afghanistan for women in the media?
HB: Gender did not previously impact a journalist’s ability to work freely in Afghanistan. Both men and women could report on various topics without major issues, but traditional customs somehow restricted their work or attire. However, there have been significant restrictions on women in the media since the regime change.
Najiba Ayubi, Afghan jounalist and activist. SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons
Initially, the Taliban mandated that women and men work in separate spaces. Later, they imposed further restrictions, requiring women to wear masks while working. In the provinces, women have been almost entirely removed from the media landscape, with additional bans on women being broadcast.
These restrictions extend to education as well; women are currently barred from studying at universities and receiving media training in Afghanistan. This systematic approach effectively limits women’s participation in media. As a result, once the current female journalists leave the country, Afghanistan may face a severe shortage of women reporters.
Currently, around 60 percent of journalists have lost their jobs, with 80 percent of those being women. This has led to a significant reduction in female journalists. Although there is an increase in female bloggers, their content often avoids criticism of the regime. It may even indirectly support it, giving a misleading impression of the situation in Afghanistan.
Laws and Regulations
DP:With the current laws and regulations that journalists face when reporting, is it still possible to do professional journalism?
HB: Currently, there are no formal laws governing media. Instead, the Taliban has introduced various directives and rules that journalists must follow. Although there is a commission intended to handle complaints and promote access to information, it has not improved media access. If someone refuses to share information, there is no mechanism to address or report this non-compliance.
The Taliban has issued around 11 directives outlining what media can and cannot report. These rules largely restrict reporting on internal Taliban affairs, including corruption within their ranks. Reporting on issues that might negatively impact the Taliban’s image, such as security concerns or internal conflicts, is also prohibited.
The situation is further complicated by the need for more unified regulations nationwide. Media conditions can vary significantly from one province to another. For example, media freedom is generally better in the northern provinces, like Mazar or Kunduz, compared to the southern and eastern regions, where restrictions are stricter. In Kandahar, where the Taliban leadership is based, media restrictions are particularly severe.
In Kabul, the situation may appear relatively better, partly because the presence of foreigners makes it essential to project an image of media freedom. However, this does not reflect the reality in the provinces, where journalists face intense self-censorship due to unclear and inconsistent regulations. The lack of clear guidelines creates fear among journalists, who are uncertain about what content might be considered risky or acceptable. This fear leads to self-censorship, as journalists avoid reporting on topics that might provoke an adverse reaction from the Taliban.
Overall, the regulations are vague and open to interpretation, contributing to a climate of fear and uncertainty among journalists. The Taliban’s approach appears to intentionally create this ambiguity to suppress bold reporting and maintain control over media narratives.
DP:What barriers do Afghan citizens face in accessing accurate and reliable information?
HB: Access to media and information in Afghanistan is a significant issue. The public is largely exposed to government propaganda, whether through state media or pro-regime bloggers. Critical media is scarce for several reasons. International media faces restrictions, and the available online media is limited by low internet penetration. Less than 18 percent of Afghans have internet access and only about 11-12 percent use social media.
Due to heavy censorship, local media cannot produce accurate or critical information. This lack of diverse perspectives means that people mostly rely on the Taliban’s narrative and what is propagated by supportive bloggers. The public sphere is thus highly controlled, with limited opportunities for critical discourse.
Attempts to provide critical information from outside the country are often met with hostility. Those who challenge the Taliban are frequently labeled as foreign agents or traitors, further stifling dissenting voices. This environment fosters misinformation and disinformation, reinforcing the Taliban’s narrative and suppressing alternative viewpoints.
Additionally, Afghanistan's limited media literacy makes it difficult to differentiate between propaganda and accurate information. This contributes to the Taliban’s ability to control public perception, as people tend to accept at face value what they see and hear.
A journalist reporting in Kunar Province, Afghanistan. Source: Wikimedia Commons
China's Role in the Region
DP: Media engagement has been an essential way for China to influence countries in the region. Are you seeing media engagement by China with the Taliban? What impact, if any, do you think engagement like this is having?
Hazrat Bahar: In the past, the media sector in Afghanistan was heavily influenced by the Western and international communities, with significant investment and involvement, though China also played a role. While Western countries and regional players like India were prominent, China’s involvement was limited and was involved in two main ways.
First, China supported Afghan media networks, such as Shamshad Network and Axon Media Network. Shamshad Network received some support from China, while Axon Media Network, which included outlets like Spogmai Radio, also had ties to Chinese backing. These networks primarily operated in Kabul.
Second, China had its own media presence in Afghanistan. China Radio International (CRI) Pashto contracted with Spogmai Radio, part of the Axon Network, broadcasting CRI’s programs twice daily in Kabul and Kandahar. CRI Pashto’s social media page gained significant traction, with over three million followers, which is notable compared to many popular Afghan media outlets.
Additionally, China Global Television Network (CGTN) produced and is still producing content about Afghanistan, mainly in English. Kabul News Television created a documentary about the Belt and Road Initiative in Afghanistan in 2017. While China’s involvement was less extensive compared to the Western community, it still made notable contributions to Afghan media and provided training for Afghan journalists in China.
DP: Are there any concerns or reservations among Afghani journalists regarding their relationship with Chinese media?
HB: Afghan journalists were cautious about forming close relationships with China. For instance, I spoke with the owner of a prominent Afghan media outlet while researching a chapter on China’s media involvement in Afghanistan. He shared that many journalists avoided visiting the Chinese embassy out of fear that their presence might be noticed by Western diplomats, who might view it unfavorably. This concern was compounded by India's support for Afghan media and the ongoing tensions between India and China, as well as between China and Western countries.
Additionally, China's support for Afghan media was relatively limited and targeted. They mainly supported media outlets ideologically aligned with China or critical of Western involvement in Afghanistan. This selective support may have contributed to the Afghan media's limited interest and involvement in China.
DP: How does Chinese media coverage of the Taliban and its regime in Afghanistan differ from that of Western media, and what impact might this have on the perception of China in Afghanistan?
HB: Even now, Chinese media continues to support the current Afghan regime. They use carefully chosen terms to describe the situation, such as "the acting government of Afghanistan," instead of referring to it as the "Taliban regime" or similar terms. This terminology aligns with the language used by Chinese officials and reflects the close relationship between China and the Taliban. Unlike Western media, which often has a critical stance, Chinese media portrays a more positive image of the Taliban.
Unlike Western media, which often has a critical stance, Chinese media portrays a more positive image of the Taliban.
Chinese media coverage emphasizes security and development, often attributing any negative issues in Afghanistan to international involvement while crediting the Taliban and Chinese investment for improvements. They downplay concerns about human rights and women's rights, framing these issues as internal matters of each country and not areas for external criticism.
DP:Generally speaking, how do the public and media audiences view China?
HB: From my analysis of Chinese media coverage over the past two decades, China has been viewed positively in Afghanistan. Even though China’s media presence is not as prominent as that of international outlets like BBC or VOA, the general perception of China remains favorable. Chinese media has been less active in promoting its interests compared to its Western counterparts, but it has still maintained a positive image in Afghan media.
Recently, Chinese media has increased its engagement with high-ranking officials in the Afghan government, as reported by both Afghan and Chinese media. Despite this, the Taliban has restricted international media, including Chinese outlets like China Radio International (CRI), from broadcasting within Afghanistan. For example, CGTN attempted to livestream the International Olympic Games in 2013 but was unsuccessful due to these restrictions.
Overall, while Chinese media continues to have a significant presence and influence, particularly among Pashtun communities in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s restrictions on international media limit their ability to operate freely.
DP: How has China targeted its media outreach in Afghanistan, and is there any notable difference in how it is received by different ethnic groups?
HB: The Chinese media networks I mentioned are primarily owned by Pashtuns, reflecting a strong China-Pashtun connection. I found no evidence of Chinese support extending to non-Pashtun media outlets. For instance, the CRI Pashtu page is quite popular in Afghanistan, whereas the CRI Persian page has much less engagement. This indicates that Chinese media is specifically targeting the Pashtun population, which, in turn, shows a greater interest in Chinese media.
Regarding Chinese language media, I haven’t seen any Chinese-language publications aimed at the Chinese-speaking population in Afghanistan. There is also a Confucius Institute in Kabul that teaches Chinese, but I haven’t seen any media or content published exclusively in Chinese. Before the government's collapse, there were some private Chinese language courses in Kabul, largely driven by economic ties with China.
Many Afghans who travel to China for business or education learn Chinese primarily for practical reasons, but I haven’t observed any significant presence of Chinese language content in Afghanistan. Most Chinese language materials sent by CRI were brochures and promotional items for their regular listeners.
On August 6, the US Democratic Party’s presidential candidate Kamala Harris finally chose her running mate: the 60-year-old governor of Minnesota, Timothy Walz. Subsequently, the media discovered that Walz had lived in China in his younger years. From September 1989 to July 1990, he worked as a foreign teacher at Foshan No. 1 Middle School in Guangdong province.
In the context of recent Sino-US competition, and given the shift in the most recent administrations between the fierce confrontation of Trump and the competitive risk control approach of Biden, the vice-presidential candidate’s China experience has become a focus of attention both inside and outside China.
How does Walz understand China? What is his position on Sino-US relations? In this article, Initium Media looks closely at his teaching career in Guangdong and his engagement with Chinese society before and after 1990, as well as his involvement in related policy and legislative work once in politics.
Walz in Foshan: Learning Cantonese and winning the hearts of students
For more on Walz’s time teaching English in China, our reporter contacted Ms. Pang, a recently retired Chinese language teacher at Foshan No. 1 Middle School. Pang was a colleague of Walz’s, who she says was the school’s first foreign teacher.
At the time, Pang says, Walz was known to teachers and students as simply as “tīm” (添) — a Cantonese transliteration of his first name. Tīm was well-liked, according to Pang: “Everyone treated him like a celebrity,” she says. “He left a good impression on everyone. He was very young and had a bright smile… Even now when I see pictures of him I recognize that same wide, infectious smile pressing his cheeks up.”
After he returned to the US in 1990, Walz told his hometown paper that he got the “royal treatment” in the school’s dormitory — his room came fitted with air conditioning, a color TV, and a radio. He taught four classes a day on the English language and American culture, addressing about 65 students at a time.
Foshan No. 1 Middle School is considered a famous school locally. Founded as Wa Ying College (華英學校) by the Methodist Church of Great Britain in the early 20th century, the school re-established itself in British Hong Kong after the Communist takeover in the mainland. Over the past century, notable Wa Ying alumni — in Foshan or Hong Kong — have included Yellow River Cantata composer Sinn Sing Hoi (冼星海), reformist governor of Guangdong Ye Xuanping (葉選平), and Hong Kong-American economist Steven N. S. Cheung (張五常). Pang says that Walz took part in many activities at the school, and was the mainstay of the faculty basketball team.
In an interview at the time, Walz bemoaned the “unbearably hot” Guangdong weather but praised his students’ curiosity about all things American. At Christmas time, he said that students and friends decorated a pine tree and brought it to his room.
“His colleagues would often laugh at him because as soon as he got his pay he went to the school store to buy ice cream,” Pang recalls. Walz didn’t understand Cantonese or Mandarin when he first arrived, Pang says, but he gradually began to learn. Another old teacher at the school remembered how Walz bought a bag of lychees and invited him in Mandarin to share.
“Every time he spoke Cantonese everyone would applaud him,” a report from 1990 said, “but he said that learning Mandarin was very difficult.”
Initium Media also contacted Walz’s former students, but they said they couldn’t remember details of his classes after over 30 years. One former student said she only remembered that Walz gave all of his students English names — though she couldn’t remember what hers was.
After Waltz was announced as the Democratic vice presidential candidate, a retired Foshan No. 1 Middle School teacher shared a photo in a chat group of Walz traveling with his colleagues when he was a teacher in Foshan.
Friendly to Chinese, and long engaged in Sino-US civil exchanges
The start of large-scale American exchanges with the People’s Republic of China can be traced back to the end of the Cultural Revolution. After Deng Xiaoping took power, he promoted reform and opening. He sent a large number of Chinese students to the United States to study, and he welcomed American scholars and teachers to bring professional knowledge to China.
In 1978, Zhou Peiyuan (周培源), the then president of Peking University, led a delegation to Washington to discuss educational exchanges between China and the US. In October that year, the two countries signed an Understanding on the Exchange of Students and Scholars Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, opening the period of academic exchanges that has been called the “China-US Honeymoon.” The following year, after the normalization of US-China relations, teachers from American universities officially entered Chinese classrooms.
There were about 180 American teachers and 50 researchers living and teaching in China in 1981, according to a later study of memoirs written by American teachers in the country, and the number rose steadily from that point on.
In 1989, after serving in the Army National Guard and graduating with a bachelor’s in social science education from Chadron State College, Walz arranged to teach in China through Harvard University’s WorldTeach program. In his Congressional biography, Walz describes himself as “one of the first US educators to receive government approval to teach in China.”
According to a report by The Hill, Walz has said that he went to China because “China was coming.” After teaching for a year at Foshan No. 1 Middle School, Walz spent three months traveling across China, including at least six trips to the then-Portuguese colony of Macau, where he said he would eat McDonald’s and watch English-language movies. According to a 2007 financial disclosure statement for the US House of Representatives, Walz was a visiting fellow in international relations at Macao Polytechnic University.
In addition to visiting Macau, Walz traveled by train to Beijing, of which he once said: “It [Beijing] always brings back a lot of bitter memories.” Walz has said, however, that he never felt his safety threatened. Wherever he went, he could always ask students for assistance.
After his time in China, Walz returned to Nebraska and founded Educational Travel Adventures, a company that organizes annual summer educational trips for US students and provides scholarships for travel and study in China.
These activities are also remembered at Foshan No. 1 Middle School. “Four years later, he brought some people back with him, and I met him on campus again,” Mr. Pang said, referring to the 50 American students that Walz brought to China in 1994. “He was very attached to Foshan No. 1 Middle School, and he came back from such a faraway place and brought his girlfriend with him.” Mr. Pang was in fact referring to Gwen Whipple, also a school teacher, who had married Walz before the trip, on June 4, 1994. The trip to China with American students that summer was also a two-week honeymoon, including sightseeing, cultural study, and a bit of tai chi.
On August 6, 2024, Democratic presidential candidate Gloria Hershey and her vice presidential running mate, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, appeared together on stage during a campaign event in Pennsylvania. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Walz on China: an emphasis on human rights and security, but support for dialogue
Walz, who taught in China and speaks some Chinese, is seen by many as having a more moderate China policy. Some Chinese netizens on Weibo hope that if he wins, he might give a boost to US-China relations. Critics such as former Richard Grenell, however, who served as Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the Trump administration, have criticized Walz for his record on China. “There is no one more pro-China than the Marxist Walz,” Grinnel wrote on X on August 6.
In terms of his political record, Waltz is far from a “dove” in his approach to China. He is a long-time supporter and advocate of political freedoms in China, and has criticized Beijing on issues ranging from Hong Kong to Tibet.
Both the 1989 student movement and the June 4 incident had a profound impact on Walz.
In a 1994 interview with Nebraska’s Star-Herald newspaper, Walz recalled that he, like all teachers in the WorldTeach program, had first received language training in Hong Kong in 1989. As he and other volunteers watched the news from Hong Kong on June 4, many decided to back out of the program. He had other ideas. “I felt it was more important than ever to go to China,” he said. He felt it was important, he recalled, for him to tell this story “so that the people of China knew that we stood with them.”
When he returned to the US in 1990, he remarked in an interview that the Chinese people he met were “all so kind, generous, and capable,” and that they simply lacked “the leadership they deserved.”
After entering politics, Volz served from 2007 to 2018 while in the US Congress as a member of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), which monitors human rights and the rule of law in China.
During that time, Walz sponsored a series of resolutions advocating political freedoms in China, including a resolution in 2009 commemorating the 20th anniversary of the crackdown, as well as measures supporting human rights activists including Huang Qi (黄琦), Tan Zuoren (譚作人), and Chen Guangcheng (陳光誠). Walz also called persistently on the Chinese government to release Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波).
Walz also touched on other issues sensitive to China, such as Tibet and Hong Kong. He voiced support for Tibetan autonomy and met with the Dalai Lama, the exiled leader of Tibet. He joined a visit by US lawmakers to Tibet in November 2015 led by Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi. During that trip, the delegation met with then-Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), as well as Zhang Ping (張平), the vice chairman of the National People’s Congress, and Chen Quanguo (陳全國), secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region. In a press release following the visit, the delegation “reiterated the imperative of respect for religious freedom and expression in Tibet; autonomy and democracy in Hong Kong; and respect for human and women’s rights across China. The delegation also expressed specific concerns related to the recent arrest and detention of human rights lawyers and activists.”
On the issue of Hong Kong, he was an advocate early on in 2017 for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, and in August of that year met with now-jailed Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong (黃之鋒), calling him “a true defender of democracy in China.” Pro-democracy activist Jeffrey Ngo Cheuk Hin (敖卓軒), a former member of Hong Kong’s Demosisto party, pointed out earlier this month that at the time of the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong, Walz was an important advocate for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.
Walz meets with Joshua Wong in 2017. Source: Tim Walz on X.
A report in Time magazine has pointed out that Walz has not expressed a clear policy position on Taiwan, but that he has taken a rather firm stance on the South China Sea issue, arguing that the US should oppose China’s actions in the region. He has also co-sponsored a bill opposing any reduction of US military personnel in the region, urging that US troop levels be maintained in order to curb the challenges of “Islamic extremism” and “Chinese expansion in the South China Sea.”
The same report also said Walz is concerned about the gap in trade between the US and China, and wants to improve their trade deficit by demanding that China abide by environmental standards, fair trade, and human rights. At the same time, he has publicly criticized Trump’s trade war footing with China, pointing out that Minnesota’s agricultural sector has been hit hard by slumping exports of commodities like soybeans and pork to China.
During an interview in 2016, Walz said that US-China relations are extremely complicated. On certain issues, the US must take a firm stance with China, he said. But relations between the two countries do not need to be adversarial and the two sides should continue to seek out areas where they can cooperate.
Hopes are high for AI in China. Not only, according to prevailing narratives, will the country’s advanced artificial intelligence enable it to rival the United States in a critical field of emerging tech, but this act of one-upmanship will also help to cement China’s role as a great power and ensure that it avoids another “Century of Humiliation” — the roughly 100-year period from the First Opium War to the end of WWII, when foreign powers dominated China and carved off chunks of its territory.
In fact, hopes might even be too high. State media have recently begun cautioning AI’s cheerleaders that they need to tone it down.
An article last month in the China News Publishing & Broadcasting Journal (中国新闻出版广电报) — a periodical aimed at media specialists and printed by a media group directly under the Central Propaganda Department — reminded readers that AI-generated content (AIGC) is still “in its infancy” and can’t be expected to perform miracles just yet. Some outlets know too little about AI’s current capabilities and limits, the piece says, yet they have launched full-blown AI projects that have, predictably, stagnated. It urges Chinese media to “avoid blindly following trends” and buying into “excessive hype.”
For some newsrooms, AI in its “infancy” is behaving more like a problem child than a wunderkind.
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For years, the CCP has made it clear that AI development is both a strategic priority and a point of national pride. It is “a new focus of international competition,” as per a State Council document from 2017. Key communiqués in 2024 from both the government and the Party indicate pushing AI is a priority.
The powerful Cyberspace Administration of China made the stakes clear in an article in People’s Daily earlier this year, when it said AI could do for China in the 21st century what the Industrial Revolution did for the UK in the 19th century: transform it from a marginal set of islands to the world’s greatest empire. China’s weakness at the time, the CAC editorial says, was the consequence of turning away from the latest technology. Since then, media nationwide have been pushing AI-generated content hard. Eleven outlets opened their own specialized AIGC studios (AIGC工作室) by the end of June this year, or have collaborated to create their own AIGC content and Large Language Models (LLMs), the computational models that are now powering generative AI.
Jiangxi’s propaganda department used AI to create an audiobook version of “Old Auntie” Gong Quanzhen (龚全珍) a communist party “moral exemplar” who passed away last year.
Some of these ventures have been successful. Chengdu Radio and Television collaborated with over ten other provincial stations to create AI videos promoting the distinct features of each locality. The humble Weifang Bohai International Communication Center has a remarkably life-like AI anchor courtesy of China Daily that’s been delivering weekly bulletins since the start of July. But others have promised more than they can deliver. An online platform supervised by Jiangxi’s propaganda department announced that “after more than a year of exploration and practice,” it was opening its own AIGC studio with a laundry list of AI-based content — almost none of which has materialized.
Embracing new tech is no guarantee it will be easy to implement, even for those with access to the best resources. Some of the biggest outlets in the country have already had LLMs of their own for some time now, but despite boasting of how they shorten production times from weeks to a few days, they have produced little with these tools. CCTV used a new LLM of its own to create a series of AI-generated videos in February, promising 26 episodes but stopping after just six. The official broadcaster has published many more AI videos since then, but no longer lists the LLM used to generate them. Shanghai Radio and Television’s AIGC studio, meanwhile, has only produced five videos in as many months — not exactly an appreciable gain in efficiency.
Perhaps they have been countering the same problems as Bona Film Group with their new AI-generated series on Douyin. Technicians at the state-owned production company told reporters they were struggling to keep the algorithm from hallucinating and to get it to ensure continuity between shots and realistically depict the human body in motion. This has also troubled Kling (可灵AI) from Douyin rival Kuaishou, which despite opening a recent New York Times report on Chinese AI “closing the gap”, still has significant drawbacks. A Kling video shared online shows a gymnast whose limbs morph and merge like one possessed. We asked it to animate a photo of swimmers diving into a pool and the results defied gravity.
Nevertheless, Kuaishou says they’ll be using Kling to make a micro-drama series.
Some AI-generation software is better than others, but many of the precedents so far are less than promising. Take, for example, Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚报), a paper under Guangdong’s provincial propaganda department. The paper recently used Tencent’s “Cloudy” (混云) LLM to create several videos announcing the establishment of their AI lab — mostly psychedelic, four-second clips spliced together with mismatched artistic styles. The novelty and prestige of the tech may excuse the patchiness of these teasers, but any full-length news bulletin or documentary created with this tool would be unwatchable.
Overhyped Output
AI has generated hype all around the world, but the nature of China’s political system makes that hype harder to call out, at least in public. Chinese state media and tech companies have been trumpeting the big promises and potential of AI while turning a blind eye to the teething problems outlets are facing right now to implement this technology. The media’s job, authorities have made clear, is to push positive messaging about China’s technological development, and AI-generated videos are very effective public displays of that. At the same time, tech firms are locked in cut-throat competition to convince the media of their successes.
Humanoid Robots on display at the WAIC. Photo: VCG
This dynamic played out at the World AI Conference in Shanghai earlier this month. State media ran a series of pieces (also here and here) showcasing the million-dollar deals made, with Xinhua pointing to it as evidence of the “innovative vitality” of Chinese AI. But privately-owned, Nasdaq-listed 36Kr was less impressed. Their reviewer noted the event’s popularity and the photogenic wall of robots at the entrance for visitors to take selfies in front of, but that nothing inside was actually new. Most of the big companies were all doing the same thing. “They all play with general large models, and then make AI-generated pictures and videos,” they wrote.
AI is still an evolving technology, full of uncertainties about how the technology can and cannot be used. There have even been rumblings in the West that LLMs may be a dead end altogether, unable to improve further or to do so without extreme difficulty. For its part, China’s leadership is dead-set that this is the way forward, and state media like the Economic Daily (经济日报) have urged readers to ignore fluctuating sentiment on Wall Street about AI investments. Bullishness is the order of the day. Now it’s up to the country’s media outlets to find a way to make the promise of AI real.
When Italy officially withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) late last year, following weeks of confidential negotiations and a few diplomatic missteps, the complete silence about the reversal in China’s state media was a telling measure of the prevailing mood. The visible exit of a G7 economy from Xi Jinping’s massive, multi-billion dollar signature program was a humiliating about-face.
As Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Beijing this week, China seemed keen to shift the narrative, underscoring the benefits of the economic relationship. Those benefits, many Italians would say, were scarcely visible during Italy’s four-year involvement in the project, which yielded few tangible economic benefits for Italy despite initial enthusiasm about the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). But Meloni’s government has also wanted to maintain a heightened relationship with Beijing, proving that Italy does not necessarily need to be in the BRI to become a stable economic partner of China.
Before Meloni arrived in the Chinese capital on July 26th, media coverage in China of her trip was relatively low-key. Most notable was an article from the state-run Global Times, published by the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily, that took a critical stance – hinting again at China’s understanding of Italy’s December 2023 decision as a scorn.
The article suggested Italy was arriving in China, hat in hand, to apologize for its withdrawal from the BRI. It cited Zhao Junjie, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, as saying the visit was “likely aimed at making up for the regret of withdrawal and personally clarifying some misunderstandings.” The article also undermined the notion of Italian agency, implying the country had only backed out of its MoU with China because it had been pressured to do so by the United States. “[Meloni] also needs more cooperation and support from China, especially after her previous visit to the US clearly did not bring her any real benefits,” said Zhao.
A Fresh Start
During the course of Meloni’s three-day visit to China, there was a clear sense in China’s state media that a new chapter was unfolding. The visit was covered prominently, with Meloni standing beside Xi Jinping on the front page of the People’s Daily the day after her arrival. The meeting did not quite get prime position, below or to the right of the newspaper’s masthead. That went, perhaps tellingly, to the visiting president of the small Southeast Asian nation of Timor Leste, whose GDP – and China cares about such things – is .06 percent that of Italy’s.
The People's Daily front page on July 30, 2024, shows Meloni (at right) shaking hands with Xi.
This looked visually very much like a demotion of Italy’s stature, a tiny but significant act of revenge. But the prevailing sentiment, treated with an attitude of Chinese acceptance, was that Italy had come seeking forgiveness, and hoping for a fresh start in its diplomatic relations with China.
The People’s Daily forefronted Xi Jinping’s remarks about the long-standing amicable relations between China and Italy, framing their historical ties as an unshakable foundation for future collaboration. The reference to the ancient Silk Road was particularly notable, as it evoked the Party's favored narrative of shared economic and cultural, even civilizational, exchange. “China and Italy should uphold and carry forward the Silk Road spirit,” the article read, noting that both China and Italy are “ancient civilizational states” (文明古国).
State media coverage portrayed the factors impacting the relationship as being primarily about geopolitical forces rather than about real determinations of mutual interest. The relationship remained constant in the midst of change, according to the People’s Daily article: “Despite the profound evolution of the current international situation, China's will to emphasize and develop China-Italy relations remains unchanged, the win-win nature of China-Italy relations remains unchanged, and the friendship between the two peoples remains unchanged,” the newspaper said, relating Xi Jinping’s sentiments.
This language of stability and continuity was meant to convey the image of a patient and benevolent China willing to forgive Italy’s mistakes.
Whatever the realities of China-Italy trade, the relationship was, according to China, “win-win” – a term China’s leaders frequently use to convey the idea that arrangements are good for everyone involved, but that often implies glossing over differences that are only too real. In this respect, it is certainly true that Italy seeks a strengthening of its economic ties with China. But the partnership faces significant hurdles. As Meloni made a point of highlighting during the Italy-China Business Forum, held in the midst of her visit, and as she sat next to Chinese Premier Li Qiang, investments from China in Italy are currently only a third of those made by Italian businesses in China. “It’s a gap that I’d like to see narrowed in the right way,” she told the audience of officials and business leaders.
Meloni appears beside Premier Li Qiang during the recent Italy-China Business Forum. Source: Palazzo Chigi.
Indispensable China
Typical of much external propaganda by official state outlets on foreign affairs, China Radio International (中国国际广播电台) cherry-picked quotes from a range of Italian commentators, many with long-standing proxy relationships with China. The overarching message of the coverage was that China is absolutely essential to Italy’s continued development.
One quote came, for example, from Mario Bosselli, the president of the China Italy Foundation, which promotes economic, commercial, and cultural relations between Italy and China. The Foundation also maintains a close relationship with the Chinese embassy in Italy, with the latter being a counselor in its Council of Administration. Bosselli emphasized the importance of investment in China for Italian companies: “Investing in China is of great significance to Italian companies and will help high-quality Italian products enter the Chinese market,” he was quoted as saying. Ahead of Meloni’s visit, Bosselli was also quoted by the Global Times as saying that Italy was the perfect “gateway” for Chinese products heading for third-country markets. It is worth noting that the “gateway to Europe” argument has been made, with encouragement from Chinese state media and economists, for almost all countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.
The overarching message of the coverage was that China is absolutely essential to Italy’s continued development.
Another quote in the CRI story came from Adolfo Urso, Italy’s Minister of Economic Development. Urso again urged the importance of the Chinese market, which he called indispensable. “China is an indispensable market and a key partner for Italian companies.” he was quoted as saying. “Cooperation between Italy and China in areas such as green technology and electric vehicles is becoming increasingly important.”
As the official Xinhua News Agency reported on Meloni’s visit, Bosselli of the China Italy Foundation was again the source. The outlet ran an “exclusive” interview with the association president. In the way typical with interviews in Chinese state media, this was delivered as a series of paraphrased statements as opposed to direct quotes, beginning with “Bosselli expressed.” Bosselli’s talk of “respect and trust,” “dialogue and cooperation,” and his appeal to history over substantive trade seemed to echo China’s official line: “Next year will mark the 20th anniversary of the Italy-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and we look forward to both sides upholding respect and trust, maintaining dialogue and cooperation, and capitalizing on this opportunity to add new meaning to the Italy-China relationship,” read the paraphrasal.
Chinese state media coverage of Giorgia Meloni’s visit has tried to strike a fine balance between admonishing past disappointments and welcoming a fresh diplomatic reset. At the same time, Meloni and her government came to the country to strike a different kind of balance: one that will let Italy become a critical economic partner for China — like the other G7 economies — without having to rejoin the Belt and Road Initiative, and, in so doing, fall back into its political orbit.