This week Li Yizhong (李毅中), the former director of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), spoke with the Beijing Times newspaper and QQ.com about the development of new media in China and related issues, including real-name registration for social media. Li also had time for a quip about Google’s exit from China.
Li, who is attending the “two meetings” in Beijing this week as a member of the Economics Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), said that real-name registration on China’s social media platforms, a policy formally taking effect on March 16, was meant to ensure “the privacy and secrecy of individuals, corporations and the nation.”

[ABOVE: Today’s edition of the Beijing Times with an interview with Li Yizhong.]
Responding to a question about Google’s “exit” from the China market and rumors that they were working on a re-entry, Li quipped that “if they wish to come back to China again, let them take this up with the relevant [government] departments.”
A partial translation of the internet with Li follows:

Beijing Times: When you were in your position [as director of MIIT], Google made its exit from China. Recently, Google has said it wants to return to China. What do you think about this?
Li Yizhong: Really? They didn’t bother to tell me (big laugh). Any multinational company in China will see a great return so long as they abide by Chinese laws. At that time they had been in China for three years and had 30 percent of the search engine market. They were free to enter or exit, but ultimately they made a trade-off. They partly went to Hong Kong, and partly stayed in mainland China. If they wish to come back to China again, let them take this up with the relevant [government] departments.
Beijing Times: Right now Weibo [microblogs] and other social media [in China] are making a trial run of real-name registration. How do you view this?
Li Yizhong: He he. Each question you ask goes even deeper. According to my own research, real-name registration for the internet is done by many countries around the world. But first it requires a basis in the law. In the mobile phone sector now we’re only at about 58 percent real-name registered, and about 40 percent of the market remains unregistered. This is a process, and it has to be explained. The trials with real-name registration on the Weibo are for the sake of the orderly and healthy development of the internet — in order to protect the privacy and secrecy of individuals, corporations and the nation.
Beijing Times: People within the [internet] industry often remark that the monopoly of [broadband services] by providers has created a situation in which [internet] speeds are low and prices high. Moreover, the National Development and Reform Commission has said it is conducting an investigation into monopoly practices by China Unicom (中国联通) and China Telecom (中国电信).
Li Yizhong: It’s not right to trace every problem back to monopolies. There is competition among the three major providers. I’ve noticed that in this year’s government work report [delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao at the outset of the National People’s Congress this week] already clearly states that private investment will be allowed to enter the telecoms sector. Right now the various [government] agencies are working to formulate concrete plans. The three major providers are all listed companies with about 30 percent social capital (社会资金) investment, so there’s private capital (民间资本) and even foreign investment (外资). In the future it will be opened up even more, allowing private capital (民营资本) to [further] enter the telecoms sector. There’s no question about this. To put it bluntly, the telecoms sector in any country is regarded as core infrastructure (基础设施) and is given great priority. Before we entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), China was not open on the domestic telecoms front, and in the future we will further open it up.

The following re-post by He Bing (何兵), deputy dean of the law school at China University of Political Science and Law, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 8:01am Hong Kong time today, March 9, 2012. He Bing currently has more than 164,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
He Bing’s post includes an image of apparently badly beaten Chinese — presumably rural migrants in the city — leaning against the front of a van that reads “Urban Management Enforcement” (城管执法). Urban management personnel, or chengguan, were established in the 1990s in China, ostensibly to maintain order in China’s cities as they were flooded with migrants from the countryside. All chengguan, which are known nationwide for their brutality, are constituted at the city level.

He Bing’s post with the image reads:

So this is where national administration (国家治理) has brought us. Some people say that we are experiencing glory not seen since time immemorial, others that we are seeing chaos that we have not experienced since time immemorial. We could just say we are seeing wonders (奇迹) such as we have not seen since time immemorial.

The original Chinese-language post from Zheng Wei follows:

国家治理成现在这个样。有人说是旷古未有的盛世，有人说是旷古未有的乱世。总之是旷古未有的奇迹。

Sina Weibo user @dominedeus responded to He Bing’s post by asking: “Have you verified that the photo is accurate?” To which He Bing somewhat snidely answered, in a post also deleted: “What, you think these are false charges trumped up by female spies for the Kuomintang?”

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following re-post by Qian Gang (钱钢), the director of the China Media Project, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:24pm Hong Kong time yesterday, March 8, 2012. Qian Gang currently has just under 945,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Qian Gang’s re-post is of an original post (also deleted) by Zheng Wei (郑维), a reporter at the Singapore Straits Times who currently has just over 30,000 followers on Weibo. Zheng Wei’s post includes images of various National People’s Congress delegates appearing in news coverage this week, with blow-up images of the fashion they are wearing (and its prices) off to the right.

Zheng Wei’s post with the image reads:

I saw this a Tencent, so I’ll pass it on. What brands are National People’s Congress delegates representing this year?

The original Chinese-language post from Zheng Wei follows:

在腾讯看到的，转过来。人大代表，代言哪些品牌？

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The annual session of China’s national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), began in China’s Great Hall of the People on March 5, 2012. While the NPC is technically the highest organ of state power in China, its still the Chinese Communist Party that calls the shots, and his highly ritualized event is generally regarded by pundits outside China (and may Chinese) as having little real political significance — and its “delegates” certainly not being representative of the Chinese people. The following cartoon, posted by artist Crazy Crab to his WordPress blog hosted outside China, needs no introduction. It depicts a congress of pigs in a setting very much resembling China’s Great Hall of the People painted as clowns and wearing joker hats. Crazy Crab is a Chinese cartoonist now living overseas who uses the internet and social media to distribute his cartoons inside China.

The following re-post by Qian Gang (钱钢), the director of the China Media Project, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:21am Hong Kong time yesterday, March 7, 2012. Qian Gang currently has just under 945,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Qian Gang’s re-post is a response to another re-post by Chen Youxi (陈有西), a well-known lawyer with more than 92,000 followers on Sina Weibo. Both Qian Gang and Chen Youxi are responding in turn to another (since deleted) post by Yu Guang (俞光), the editor-in-chief of Air Travel (航旅) magazine, in which he posted an image (now unavailable) of police vehicles outside the Great Hall of the People, where the National People’s Congress is now going on. Yu Guang wrote: “The police vehicles parked outside the Great Hall of the People aren’t your ordinary police vehicles. They even have iron spikes sticking out. Just look at how unusual.”
Qian Gang and Chen Youxi responded:

Please give ordinary Chinese freedom from terror!//@ChenYouxi: I can not know the model of the vehicle, but I do know that Tiananmen Square is a public space, not a battlefield or a place under martial law. For this kind of vehicle to be driven onto a public space endangers public safety. This is basic legal knowledge. The Road and Transportation Safety Law (道路交通安全法) and the traffic rules of the Public Security Bureau clearly stipulate that [such vehicles] cannot be driven on [public] roads. Public power doesn’t enjoy special privileges, and must set the example. This should particularly be the case during the two meetings [of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference].

The original Chinese-language post from Qian Gang, with Chen Youxi’s post included, follows:

请给百姓免于恐惧的自由！//@陈有西: 我可以不知道车型号的设计，但是知道天安门广场是公众场所，不是战场和戒严时期场所．这种车开到公共场所，就已经危及公共安全．这是基本法律常识．＜道路交通安全法＞和公安部交通规章有明确规定不得上路．公权无特权，更要模范遵守．特别是两会期间

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

A finance official responding to questions over China’s central government budget, under deliberation at the National People’s Congress (NPC) this week, seems to have created only more confusion over the country’s spending on internal security.
Facing questions from Southern Metropolis Daily, a commercial newspaper based in the southern city of Guangzhou, a representative from the Ministry of Finance rejected reports from international media last year saying spending on domestic security in China had outpaced defense spending, and that these expenditures were being used for “stability preservation” — referring to the policy of maintaining social stability by mobilizing domestic security forces to put down rising incidents of social unrest.
Questioned by the newspaper about public security spending, which in the current draft budget under review at the NPC stands at 701.76 billion yuan against defense spending of 670.27 billion yuan, the Ministry of Finance representative said that “public security” included spending on such things as public transportation and construction safety.
The representative accused foreign media of “intentionally misconstruing” the budget numbers.
During last year’s session of the National People’s Congress, international media reported that China’s spending on internal security had for the first time surpassed military spending. These numbers, however, were never widely reported by Chinese media last year.
Writing on Sina Weibo today, Xie Wen (谢文), an IT expert and former general manager for Yahoo! China, asked how expenditures like public transportation and sanitation could possibly be included in the central government budget for public safety:

I don’t understand. Is public transportation public safety? Is public health not budgeted under health? Is construction safety not included within construction budgets?

[ABOVE: Urban management personnel, charged with maintaining “public safety” in China’s cities, hustle a balloon seller in a video posted to China’s web.
A translation of the report from Southern Metropolis Daily follows:

“Stability Preservation Surpasses 700 Billion Yuan? Ministry of Finance: This is a Misrepresentation”
Southern Metropolis Daily
March 7, 2012
Wang Haiyan (王海艳)
Beijing — Foreign media have reported that today China’s budget for stability preservation has already surpassed 700 billion yuan, more than its defense budget (军费预算). Yesterday, someone from the Ministry of Finance refuted this, saying that these expenditures were for public safety (公共安全), and that foreign media had misrepresented [the figures].
Yesterday, reporters from Southern Metropolis Daily consulted the “Report on the Situation of Central and Local Budget Implementation in 2011, and Draft Central and Local Budget for 2012” (关于2011年中央和地方预算执行情况与2012年中央和地方预算草案的报告), to be discussed at the National People’s Congress, and discovered that the section “Situation in Preparation of National Public Financing Expenditures for 2012” (2012年全国公共财政支出预算安排情况) states that this year the national defense budget will stand at 670.27 billion yuan, and the budget for public safety (公共安全) will stand at 701.76 billion yuan.
A relevant person with the Ministry of Finance explained that public safety includes the categories of public health (公共卫生), public transportation (公共交通), construction safety (建筑安全) and many others, and this cannot all be construed as stability preservation spending. For example, expenditures for strengthening the food safety inspection and detection capacity of grassroots regulators, and for promoting food safety protections, are also included in the budget. Foreign media, [they said], had deliberately misrepresented [the figures], intentionally building up [the story].
This [ministry] person said that with the exception of the United States and France, expenditures on public safety by most countries in the world surpass military spending. Therefore, [they said], it is normal for spending on public safety in China to surpass military spending.

The following post by Tian Weihua (田炜华), the director of Chief Financial Officer magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 12:16am Hong Kong time today, March 7, 2012. Tian Weihua currently has just under 140,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Tian Weihua’s post includes an image of a one-yuan bill. But the bill has apparently been altered to include phrases about the practice of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement branded as an “evil cult” by the Chinese Communist Party in 1999, and still very sensitive today. The date on the bill is 1999, and the characters at the top, just to the left of “People’s Bank of China”, read: “Falun Dafa is Great!”
The tongue-in-cheek post by Tian Weihua reads:

Just now I was searching for change to pay my parking fee when out of nowhere I found this bill . . .

The original Chinese-language post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:

刚才找零钱付停车费，居然找到一张这样的。。。

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following post by Lang Yaoyuan (郎遥远), the Hangzhou-based director of World Merchants Magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:30am Hong Kong time today, March 6, 2012. Lang Yaoyuan currently has just under 70,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Lang Yaoyuan’s simple post contains only an image of former President Jiang Zemin (江泽民) leaning over several Chinese youngsters using computers. The post, a creative caption for the photo, reads:

I’ve come over to see whether you are criticizing me online.

The original Chinese-language post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:

我来看看你们上网骂我没？（设计对白）

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

A Chinese internet user asked me recently how Hong Kong media could so mercilessly criticize the territory’s chief executive and “top administrator”, Donald Tsang (曾荫权), even without clear proof he had done anything wrong. And how could Hong Kong’s Legislative Council order the chief executive to appear for questioning, and unyieldingly face him as he tearfully apologized?
How could the Legislative Council and the media wield such power?
Before I address these questions, let me first bring everyone up to speed. Not long ago, media revealed that while visiting Macau and Thailand for vacation, Donald Tsang made use of a luxury yacht and private jet belonging to businesspeople he was acquainted with.
It was also found that Tsang was leasing an apartment in Shenzhen, just across the border, from Wong Cho-bau (黄楚标), a mainland Chinese businessman who is also a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a major shareholder of the Digital Broadcasting Group in Hong Kong. Rent for the apartment was estimated at US$23,000 per month.
Even as Tsang insisted he was paying market price for the Shenzhen rental property, and that he had paid for the use his friend’s private jet and yacht, Legislative Council members refused to let the matter drop. On February 27, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption initiated an investigation into Tsang’s conduct.
On March 1, Donald Tsang appeared at a hearing before the Legislative Council on the alleged misconduct. Tsang, a public servant of 45 years, enjoying a relatively clean reputation — and due, moreover, for retirement in just a few month’s time — admitted that his conduct had shaken public confidence in Hong Kong’s system. He expressed his deepest apologies, and said that although his conscience was clear over the Macau and Thailand matters, he would relinquish the Shenzhen rental property.

We cannot rely on conscience for clean politics. Even less can we rely on the personal moral compass of our political figures to maintain their self-discipline.
Hong Kong, fortunately, relies on its institutions, and on rule of law. Throughout the Donald Tsang matter, we have witnessed the relatively high level of freedom enjoyed by Hong Kong media. In mainland China, it would be impossible to see the “top administrator” of any province or city taken publicly to task on television screens.
Plenty of people from the mainland come “freely” to Hong Kong to visit. They often spend liberally while they are here, buying all sorts of things. But I suggest when any mainlander comes to Hong Kong they also pay close attention to local news programs and newspapers. This would allow them to really enjoy greater freedom during these “free” visits (自由行).
But aside from the media’s role, the Tsang incident has given us a glimpse of the Legislative Council as a check on the power of the chief executive. So exactly what kind of body is the Legislative Council?
For the basics, we can turn to Articles 66 through 79 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which outlines the constitution, powers and functions of the Legislative Council. The Basic Law specifies that the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election, and that its role is to enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures; to examine and approve budgets introduced by the government; to approve taxation and public expenditure; to endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court; and to initiative a motion for impeachment of the Chief Executive in cases of “serious breach of law or dereliction of duty,” etcetera.
Seeing Hong Kong’s chief on the television screen tearfully facing steely members of the Legislative Council, internet users in mainland China have felt a mix of admiration and envy. In fact, there’s no cause for them to feel left out. Just about every country in the world has a body like the Legislative Council. They have one in Taiwan. And, yes, there’s even one in mainland China.
In the United States they call it the Congress. In some countries it’s a parliament. In Taiwan it’s called the Legislative Yuan (立法院).
In mainland China? It’s called the National People’s Congress. And — ah, the coincidence! — right now the annual event of the “two meetings” (of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress) is being held in Beijing!
But seriously, how can I possibly say that the National People’s Congress is the same sort of organization as Hong Kong’s Legislative Council?
Turn to China’s Constitution, or to any middle school textbook, and you’ll learn that the National People’s Congress is the highest organ of state power in the People’s Republic of China. Delegates to the National People’s Congress, and the various local congresses, are to be democratically elected. Moreover, the principle functions of the NPC and it’s Standing Committee are as follows:

It exercises the state power of amending the Constitution and supervising the enforcement of the Constitution; enacts basic laws of the state; elects and decides on the choices of the leading personnel of the highest state organs of China, including the President and Vice President, the choice of the Premier of the State Council and other component members of the State Council; elects the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and decide on the choice of other component members of the Central Military Commission; elects the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; examines and approves the plan for national economic and social development and the report on its implementation; examines and approves the state budget and the report on its implementation; and make decisions on other important issues in national life.

If we compare the functions of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council and the National People’s Congress we find that there are no real differences — basically, both enact laws, supervise the work of government organs, appoint and remove ministers and other officials.
Of course, there is one major difference, and that is that the National People’s Congress is controlled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party.
While chief executives in Hong Kong have the power under the Basic Law to dissolve the Legislative Council, they have no power over the council itself. Based on my observations, Hong Kong’s chief executive never appears before the Legislative Council in a leadership capacity but always to be subjected to supervision and criticism.
The limitations and supervision exercised by the Legislative Council do not weaken political power in Hong Kong, or do harm to its political system, but quite the contrary give the Hong Kong people greater confidence in the system.
Just as Hong Kong’s Basic Law technically falls under China’s Constitution, so we might say that Hong Kong’s Legislative Council falls under the National People’s Congress. It is my hope that people’s congresses across China will take cues from Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, that they will fully take up and act on their function under the law as a check on government power.
As a general rule, when a nation’s parliament is rancorous, when its members constantly take the government to task, its society is correspondingly harmonious. If, however, a nation’s parliament is polite, self-congratulatory and flooded with applause, its society is almost certainly without harmony.
The kind of democratic elections we’ve seen recently in Taiwan may be quite some distance off. But we can take heart in knowing that freedom and rule of law are possible right at China’s side, here in Hong Kong — even as it falls under Beijing’s leadership.
Where should we kick off a new round of reforms? We might as well start right here in Hong Kong.
This article was published in Chinese in World Chinese Weekly and is also available at QQ.com.