The following post by Lang Yaoyuan (郎遥远), the Hangzhou-based director of World Merchants Magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:30am Hong Kong time today, March 6, 2012. Lang Yaoyuan currently has just under 70,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Lang Yaoyuan’s simple post contains only an image of former President Jiang Zemin (江泽民) leaning over several Chinese youngsters using computers. The post, a creative caption for the photo, reads:

I’ve come over to see whether you are criticizing me online.

The original Chinese-language post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:

我来看看你们上网骂我没？（设计对白）

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

A Chinese internet user asked me recently how Hong Kong media could so mercilessly criticize the territory’s chief executive and “top administrator”, Donald Tsang (曾荫权), even without clear proof he had done anything wrong. And how could Hong Kong’s Legislative Council order the chief executive to appear for questioning, and unyieldingly face him as he tearfully apologized?
How could the Legislative Council and the media wield such power?
Before I address these questions, let me first bring everyone up to speed. Not long ago, media revealed that while visiting Macau and Thailand for vacation, Donald Tsang made use of a luxury yacht and private jet belonging to businesspeople he was acquainted with.
It was also found that Tsang was leasing an apartment in Shenzhen, just across the border, from Wong Cho-bau (黄楚标), a mainland Chinese businessman who is also a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a major shareholder of the Digital Broadcasting Group in Hong Kong. Rent for the apartment was estimated at US$23,000 per month.
Even as Tsang insisted he was paying market price for the Shenzhen rental property, and that he had paid for the use his friend’s private jet and yacht, Legislative Council members refused to let the matter drop. On February 27, the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption initiated an investigation into Tsang’s conduct.
On March 1, Donald Tsang appeared at a hearing before the Legislative Council on the alleged misconduct. Tsang, a public servant of 45 years, enjoying a relatively clean reputation — and due, moreover, for retirement in just a few month’s time — admitted that his conduct had shaken public confidence in Hong Kong’s system. He expressed his deepest apologies, and said that although his conscience was clear over the Macau and Thailand matters, he would relinquish the Shenzhen rental property.

We cannot rely on conscience for clean politics. Even less can we rely on the personal moral compass of our political figures to maintain their self-discipline.
Hong Kong, fortunately, relies on its institutions, and on rule of law. Throughout the Donald Tsang matter, we have witnessed the relatively high level of freedom enjoyed by Hong Kong media. In mainland China, it would be impossible to see the “top administrator” of any province or city taken publicly to task on television screens.
Plenty of people from the mainland come “freely” to Hong Kong to visit. They often spend liberally while they are here, buying all sorts of things. But I suggest when any mainlander comes to Hong Kong they also pay close attention to local news programs and newspapers. This would allow them to really enjoy greater freedom during these “free” visits (自由行).
But aside from the media’s role, the Tsang incident has given us a glimpse of the Legislative Council as a check on the power of the chief executive. So exactly what kind of body is the Legislative Council?
For the basics, we can turn to Articles 66 through 79 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which outlines the constitution, powers and functions of the Legislative Council. The Basic Law specifies that the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election, and that its role is to enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures; to examine and approve budgets introduced by the government; to approve taxation and public expenditure; to endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court; and to initiative a motion for impeachment of the Chief Executive in cases of “serious breach of law or dereliction of duty,” etcetera.
Seeing Hong Kong’s chief on the television screen tearfully facing steely members of the Legislative Council, internet users in mainland China have felt a mix of admiration and envy. In fact, there’s no cause for them to feel left out. Just about every country in the world has a body like the Legislative Council. They have one in Taiwan. And, yes, there’s even one in mainland China.
In the United States they call it the Congress. In some countries it’s a parliament. In Taiwan it’s called the Legislative Yuan (立法院).
In mainland China? It’s called the National People’s Congress. And — ah, the coincidence! — right now the annual event of the “two meetings” (of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress) is being held in Beijing!
But seriously, how can I possibly say that the National People’s Congress is the same sort of organization as Hong Kong’s Legislative Council?
Turn to China’s Constitution, or to any middle school textbook, and you’ll learn that the National People’s Congress is the highest organ of state power in the People’s Republic of China. Delegates to the National People’s Congress, and the various local congresses, are to be democratically elected. Moreover, the principle functions of the NPC and it’s Standing Committee are as follows:

It exercises the state power of amending the Constitution and supervising the enforcement of the Constitution; enacts basic laws of the state; elects and decides on the choices of the leading personnel of the highest state organs of China, including the President and Vice President, the choice of the Premier of the State Council and other component members of the State Council; elects the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and decide on the choice of other component members of the Central Military Commission; elects the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; examines and approves the plan for national economic and social development and the report on its implementation; examines and approves the state budget and the report on its implementation; and make decisions on other important issues in national life.

If we compare the functions of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council and the National People’s Congress we find that there are no real differences — basically, both enact laws, supervise the work of government organs, appoint and remove ministers and other officials.
Of course, there is one major difference, and that is that the National People’s Congress is controlled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party.
While chief executives in Hong Kong have the power under the Basic Law to dissolve the Legislative Council, they have no power over the council itself. Based on my observations, Hong Kong’s chief executive never appears before the Legislative Council in a leadership capacity but always to be subjected to supervision and criticism.
The limitations and supervision exercised by the Legislative Council do not weaken political power in Hong Kong, or do harm to its political system, but quite the contrary give the Hong Kong people greater confidence in the system.
Just as Hong Kong’s Basic Law technically falls under China’s Constitution, so we might say that Hong Kong’s Legislative Council falls under the National People’s Congress. It is my hope that people’s congresses across China will take cues from Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, that they will fully take up and act on their function under the law as a check on government power.
As a general rule, when a nation’s parliament is rancorous, when its members constantly take the government to task, its society is correspondingly harmonious. If, however, a nation’s parliament is polite, self-congratulatory and flooded with applause, its society is almost certainly without harmony.
The kind of democratic elections we’ve seen recently in Taiwan may be quite some distance off. But we can take heart in knowing that freedom and rule of law are possible right at China’s side, here in Hong Kong — even as it falls under Beijing’s leadership.
Where should we kick off a new round of reforms? We might as well start right here in Hong Kong.
This article was published in Chinese in World Chinese Weekly and is also available at QQ.com.

Urban management authorities (城管) in Liuyuan Subdistrict ((留园街道) in the city of Suzhou in China’s Jiangsu province recently issued an order requiring all small-time peddlers (商贩) of various foodstuffs and wares to purchase “convenience carts” (便民小推车) from which to sell their product. The carts are being sold by the Liuyuan Subdistrict for 3,300 yuan, a costly sum for most small-time peddlers coming into the city, and urban management authorities have said that those not operating with the designated carts will not be permitted to do business. In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to QQ.com, a peddler is chained to his “convenience cart” as he sells candied fruits that presumably bring in precious little revenue.

The once-a-year full parliamentary session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) generally offers more pretense than substance. The real legislative decisions are made behind closed doors by the Chinese Communist Party and by the 150-member standing committee of the NPC, which meets throughout the year.
But the NPC, which kicked off in Beijing today with Premier Wen Jiabao’s annual work report, can still prove interesting — even if, as one Chinese social media user remarked in a post (deleted) last week, it can look like “the world’s grandest cheerleading troupe.”
A Guangdong journalist I spoke to last week as they were setting off to cover the NPC said things could become more interesting this year because the current crop of delegates are on their way out. They might make a bit more fuss about things like China’s seriously outmoded hukou system.
It’s a logic seen quite commonly in China’s political culture. Speak up when your voice matters least, and when you have the least to lose — for this entails less political risk. (The same logic, incidentally, means that the memoirs published by retired Party leaders, the ones who have finally let their hair go grey, tend to be more critical, and more interesting, than anything they dared say while in office.)
Now that the NPC is underway, we’ll have to keep our eyes pealed for points of interest or, dare we hope, significance.
But however the NPC shakes out, of at least equal importance will be how China’s media use the opportunity afforded by the session to discuss critical issues now facing China — in the lead up, remember, to the far-more-significant 18th Party Congress this October.
The broader question we should continue to see in the headlines is about the future of reforms — economic, social and political. Does China need further reform? What kind of reform? And how can it reach a consensus on the future?
Today we turn to an interview with Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, that was run in 21st Century ahead of this week’s NPC and is cropping up on the internet today.
21st Century is a magazine published by the Chinese Communist Youth League, a center of power for current President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛).
The magazine explains that the interview was done “ahead of the current ‘two meetings’ [of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress]” on the crucial issue of “how to promote and create a consensus on reforms, how China can make the transition from economic reform to social reform, and how [it can] further deepen economic system reforms.”
Like many recent articles and discussions on reform in recent weeks, the 21st Century interview with Zheng Yongnian is also pegged to the twentieth anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “southern tour,” in which the paramount leader who began China’s economic reforms in the late 1970s re-affirmed the path of economic development in a series of speeches.
One of the chief points made in the interview with Professor Zheng drawn out by the magazine is that the “deepening” of reforms is not simply about “striking down vested interests.” A number of commentaries and analyses in recent weeks have centered on increasingly entrenched vested interests in China as an obstacle to badly needed reforms.
Back in January, a report from a group of scholars at Tsinghua University, including Sun Liping (孙立平), the former doctoral adviser to now vice-president and successor apparent Xi Jinping (习近平), argued that China was in the midst of a “transition trap” (转型陷阱) in which the energy and impetus to push ahead with necessary reforms was being lost. Sun’s report warned that “powerful vested interests” in China were now “holding reforms hostage.”
A brief portion of the interview with Zheng Yongnian follows:

21st Century: Opinions are quite divergent about whether to [continue to] reform or not, and how how to reform, and there is no agreement. How do you see the current state of reforms [in China].
Zheng Yongnian: I think there is little divergence over the question of whether or not to reform. Aside from a very few people who talk about how the “China Model” is the best — by “China Model” they mean something very different from how I generally mean it, that it to say I see it as a neutral term — the vast majority of people in society all support reforms. There are even many so-called vested interests people assume would oppose reforms [who in fact support them].
Why do I say that? Because while these vested interests have benefitted substantially from the reform process, they now feel little sense of security under the current state of things. So we’ve seen a large number of rich Chinese moving their wealth overseas.
In terms of the conditions for reform, things right now are far better than they were at the outset of economic reforms. As economic reforms began [in the 1970s and 1980s], there were also vested interests and the obstacles were also great, perhaps greater than they are today. At that time, the opposition came from many sides, including ideology and ideas, organizations and institutions, and financial interests. When we look again at the situation today we see that the conditions are far better.
As for how to reform, there is a lot of division right now. In my view, the ruling Party should seek quickly to move towards a greater consensus on reforms, and a specific blueprint for future reforms, by further pushing to open up and liberate [people’s] ideas (思想大解放).
Looking at a relatively successful example of reforms, the entire [decade of] the 1980s were a time of searching. On the ideological level, there was also no strong consensus within the ruling Party. At that time even the concept of a “market economy” couldn’t be raised [openly] — you could only talk about a “commodity economy” (商品经济). Aside from the very successful initial reforms in the countryside (农村改革), economic reforms in other areas never found a point of breakthrough, even though there were attempts.
Finally, Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” came along to change this situation. The “southern speeches” (南方讲话) Deng Xiaoping made in 1992 became the guiding ideas of the 14th Party Congress held that year. Through all of that padding [i.e., preparation in terms of ideas] the 14th Party Congress was ultimately able to establish the [ideological] superstructure of the “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济), bringing to an end the waffling between a planned economy and a market economy and breaking through the ideological wrangling over whether the market economy was surnamed “Capitalism” or surnamed “Socialism” (姓“资”还是姓“社”). Finally, a consensus on economic reforms was reached.
Looking back, the process of reaching a consensus on economic reform was one full of strategies [by various camps], and these strategies were at once a matter of political experience and political acumen.

Local media in the U.S. city of Seattle reported late last month that a 107-year-old warehouse building that had served as a temporary home for members of the Occupy Seattle movement was finally demolished by its owners. Media reports said Occupy members had fought to save the building since December, when 20 members were arrested for refusing to vacate the premises. In January, one Occupy member and activist, Babylonia Aivaz, said she would seek to marry the building in a last-ditch attempt to save it from demolition. A ceremony was reportedly prepared, but the building was demolished nonetheless. This story of a “forced demolition” in the United States was reported in China’s media and drew interest from readers in China, where forced demolition remains common and widely unpopular despite laws designed to curb the practice. In this cartoon, posted by artist Liu Xudong (刘旭东) to QQ.com, two demolition workers (with blond hair identifying them as “Americans”) stand by with hammers and saws as a voice rises from a warehouse building that says, “Who dares demolish my husband!”

In an article published in the most recent issue of the official Chinese Communist Party journal Seeking Truth (求是), Liu Yunshan (刘云山), the director of China’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD), introduces a new book issued by the CPD and authorized by the Party’s Central Committee outlining the basic policies on cultural development emerging from last October’s Party conference (Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee).
The Central Propaganda Department first issued a formal announcement of the publication of the book, Theorizing Cultural Construction: A Collection of Important Expositions (论文化建设——重要论述摘编), on February 12 this year. That announcement described the book as follows:

The Collection offers a selection on various topics of a series of important expositions from Comrades Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, together reflecting our Party’s important theories and fundamental spirit (基本精神) on cultural construction (文化建设). It is crucial study material for the study and implementation of the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee, further promoting cultural reform and development.

[ABOVE: A screenshot from China Central Television shows coverage on February 15 of the release of a new book from the Central Propaganda Department outlining new cultural policies and their implementation.]
Liu Yunshan’s introduction of the book in the current edition of Seeking Truth outlines six key points for cultural reform and development covered in the Central Propaganda Department volume, as follows:

1. Deeply understanding the important ideas of our Party concerning the status and role of cultural construction, firmly establishing a high-level consciousness and confidence in culture. [Basically, outlines China’s strategic need for not just “material” strength but also “spiritual” strength].
2. Deeply understanding the important ideas of our Party concerning the goals in the struggle for cultural construction, and the objective of firmly building a strong socialist cultural nation.
3. Deeply understanding the important ideas of our Party concerning the guiding principles of cultural construction, constantly expanding the breadth and prospects on the road of cultural development under socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义文化发展)
4. Deeply understanding the important ideas of our Party concerning the fundamental tasks of cultural construction, energetically promoting the building of the socialist core value system (社会主义核心价值体系).
5. Deeply understanding the important ideas of our Party concerning the impetus driving cultural development (文化发展动力), promoting the flourishing development of culture with a spirit of reform and innovation.
6. Deeply understanding the important ideas of our Party concerning the basic [ways of] ensuring cultural construction, promoting cultural reform and development in line with the strengthening and improvement of the Party’s leadership.

The full Chinese version of Liu Yunshan’s article in Seeking Truth follows:

深入学习党的文化建设理论:推动十七届六中全会精神贯彻落实
时间:2012年03月01日 09时00分 来源:《求是》 作者:刘云山
字号：『 大字体 中字体 小字体 』 我要评论
　　经中央批准，由中央宣传部和中央文献研究室选编出版了《论文化建设——重要论述摘编》（以下简称《摘编》）。这是加强党的文化建设理论学习的重要举措，也是深入贯彻落实党的十七届六中全会精神、进一步推进文化繁荣发展的重要工作。《摘编》收录了毛泽东、邓小平、江泽民、胡锦涛同志关于文化建设的重要论述，凝聚着几代中国共产党人对社会主义文化建设规律的不懈探索，反映了我们党在文化建设领域取得的丰硕理论成果，具有很强的现实指导性。这些重要论述形成于不同时期，都坚持马克思主义立场，贯穿一切为了最广大人民的根本观点，贯穿辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义的基本方法，一脉相承而又与时俱进，紧密联系而又各富创见，成为党的文化建设理论的核心内容，成为党的整个理论体系的重要组成部分，是我们党十分宝贵的精神财富，是推进文化改革发展、繁荣社会主义文化的强大思想武器。这些重要论述充分反映我们党是一个有高度文化自觉、文化自信的马克思主义政党，是一个高扬先进文化旗帜、坚持崇高文化理想的政党，是一个具有深邃文化眼光、宽广文化胸怀的政党，是一个勇于进行文化探索、善于把握文化规律的政党。
　　党的十七届六中全会以来，全党全社会把学习宣传贯彻全会精神作为重要政治任务，思想上高度重视，行动上高度自觉，工作上大力推进。总的看，学习宣传贯彻全会精神态势很好、效果显著，全党全社会的文化自觉文化自信得到提升，广大干部群众关注文化建设、投身文化建设的热情空前高涨，文化改革发展的政策条件不断完善、社会氛围更加浓厚。深入贯彻落实党的十七届六中全会精神，是一个不断深化认识的过程，需要坚持不懈地用党的文化建设理论统一思想、凝聚共识。《摘编》的出版，为学习党的文化建设理论提供了权威教材，为学习贯彻全会精神提供了重要遵循。学习好、宣传好、使用好《摘编》，对于深入落实全会精神有着重要意义。要以《摘编》出版为契机，紧密联系党领导人民进行文化建设的生动实践，紧密联系文化改革发展的具体实际，不断深化对党的文化建设理论的学习理解，更好地用党的理论创新成果武装头脑、指导实践，促进社会主义文化大发展大繁荣。
　　1．深刻理解我们党关于文化建设地位作用的重要思想，牢固树立高度的文化自觉文化自信。文化是民族的血脉，是人民的精神家园，也是政党的旗帜。作为马克思主义政党，我们党始终坚持以思想文化新觉醒、理论创造新成果、文化建设新成就，推动党和人民事业向前发展。在革命战争年代，我们党提出，文化是政治和经济的反映，同时又指导政治和经济斗争实践。在社会主义建设时期，我们党明确提出，“要把我们这个经济落后、文化落后的国家，建设成为富裕的、强盛的、具有高度文化的国家。”进入改革开放新时期，我们党反复强调，“不但要有高度的物质文明，而且要有高度的精神文明。”进入新世纪新阶段，我们党进一步提出，“文化是民族凝聚力和创造力的重要源泉，是综合国力竞争的重要因素，是经济社会发展的重要支撑。”这些重要论述，彰显了几代中国共产党人对发展文化历史责任的主动担当。党的十七届六中全会立足时代和实践的新发展，鲜明提出培养高度的文化自觉和文化自信，进一步深化了我们党对文化地位作用的认识，体现了我们党的战略眼光和远见卓识。
　　文化自觉、文化自信，反映着一个政党的理想追求和精神面貌，是一个政党是否成熟、是否有生命力的重要标志。深入贯彻落实全会精神，首要的就是提高对文化地位作用的认识，保持强烈的文化自信心和自豪感，坚定崇高的文化信念和文化追求。要更加自觉地认识到社会主义先进文化是马克思主义政党思想精神上的旗帜，始终坚持文化发展的正确方向，努力构筑精神文化高地，充分展现先进文化的强大感召力和吸引力。要更加自觉地认识到文化建设是中国特色社会主义事业总体布局的重要组成部分，关系实现全面建设小康社会和中华民族复兴的历史进程，把文化建设放在全局中来认识来把握，让文化真正成为推动经济社会发展的强大力量，成为促进社会文明进步的重要引擎。要更加自觉地认识到文化在综合国力竞争中的独特作用，积极抢占文化发展的制高点，不断增强国家文化软实力，扩大中华文化国际影响力。
　　2．深刻理解我们党关于文化建设奋斗目标的重要思想，进一步坚定建设社会主义文化强国的目标追求。在长期的革命、建设和改革实践中，我们党总是结合自己的历史使命，提出符合时代发展要求的文化发展目标。《摘编》关于文化建设奋斗目标的重要论述，集中体现了几代中国共产党人孜孜追求的文化理想，生动反映了党领导人民推进文化建设的思想轨迹。毛泽东同志早就预言：随着经济建设的高潮到来，不可避免地将要出现一个文化建设的高潮。邓小平同志曾引用毛泽东同志这一论断并指出：我们可以满怀信心地说，这种形势的出现已经为期不远。江泽民同志强调：在当代中国人民的伟大奋斗中，必将迎来社会主义文化建设的新高潮，创造出更加灿烂的先进文化。胡锦涛同志指出：中华民族伟大复兴必然伴随着中华文化繁荣兴盛，要更加自觉、更加主动地推动文化大发展大繁荣。党的十七届六中全会秉持我们党崇高的文化理想，把握文化发展趋势，展望文化发展前景，提出建设社会主义文化强国的奋斗目标，描绘了文化繁荣发展的宏伟蓝图。
　　建设社会主义文化强国的目标，与我国深厚文化底蕴和丰富文化资源相匹配，与建设富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家目标相承接，具有重大的现实意义和长远的战略意义。这是一个催人奋进的目标，顺应了国内外形势发展的新变化，顺应了各族人民精神文化的新期待，展示了我国文化繁荣兴盛的美好前景，要求我们不断用这一目标鼓舞人心，进一步激发全党全社会投身文化建设的热情，凝聚起推动文化改革发展的强大力量，不断开创文化建设的新局面。这是一个全面展现中华文化魅力和实力的目标，要求我们紧跟时代发展步伐，站在世界文明进步前沿，不忘本来、吸收外来、着眼将来，大力发展面向现代化、面向世界、面向未来的，民族的科学的大众的社会主义先进文化，使中华文化具有强大的吸引力影响力、强大的活力创造力、强大的实力竞争力。这是一个需要长期为之奋斗的目标，要求我们立足当前、着眼长远，持之以恒、不懈努力，以只争朝夕的精神开展工作，以强烈的责任感使命感落实好文化改革发展的各项任务，为建设社会主义文化强国奠定坚实基础。
　　3．深刻理解我们党关于文化建设方针原则的重要思想，不断开拓中国特色社会主义文化发展道路的广阔前景。坚持什么样的方针、什么样的原则，直接关系着文化发展的性质和方向。在长期历史实践中，我们党逐步确立了一整套关于文化建设的方针原则：坚持为人民服务、为社会主义服务，实行百花齐放、百家争鸣；坚持两手抓、两手都要硬，面向现代化、面向世界、面向未来；坚持团结稳定鼓劲、正面宣传为主，弘扬主旋律、提倡多样化；坚持以人为本，贴近实际、贴近生活、贴近群众，等等。这些都是对我国文化发展内在规律的深刻揭示，都是实践证明行之有效的方针原则。正是在这些方针原则指导下，我国文化建设取得重大历史性成就，走出了一条中国特色社会主义文化发展道路。党的十七届六中全会在深刻总结历史经验和新的实践的基础上，深刻阐述了这条道路的基本内涵，明确提出丰富拓展这条道路的实践要求。
　　中国特色社会主义文化发展道路是建设社会主义先进文化、实现中华文化繁荣兴盛的唯一正确道路，涵盖了文化建设的根本性质、根本目的、根本动力，规定了我国文化的基本属性和文化工作的基本遵循。要深刻把握中国特色社会主义文化发展道路的基本要求，坚持走先进文化之路，以马克思主义为指导，坚守正确的文化立场、文化取向，清醒认识纷繁复杂的社会文化现象，确保文化建设沿着正确方向发展；坚持走科学发展之路，用科学发展观统领文化建设，以科学发展为主题，把科学发展的理念贯穿到文化工作的各个方面、各个环节；坚持走强基固本之路，把社会主义核心价值体系作为基础工程，坚定理想信念，构筑精神力量，不断巩固全体人民团结奋斗的共同思想道德基础；坚持走以人为本之路，发挥人民在文化建设中的主体作用，坚持文化发展为了人民、文化发展依靠人民、文化发展成果由人民共享；坚持走改革创新之路，激发文化创造活力，解放和发展文化生产力，以与时俱进的精神不断开创社会主义文化建设新局面。
　　4．深刻理解我们党关于文化建设根本任务的重要思想，大力推进社会主义核心价值体系建设。社会主义核心价值体系是兴国之魂，是文化建设之本，决定着中国特色社会主义发展方向。毛泽东同志指出，我们党要有“共同语言”，我们社会主义国家要有“统一意志”。邓小平同志强调，“靠有理想，靠坚强的信念，什么困难都能克服。”江泽民同志强调，“一个民族、一个国家，如果没有自己的精神支柱，就等于没有灵魂，就会失去凝聚力和生命力。”胡锦涛同志指出，“社会主义核心价值体系是社会主义意识形态的本质体现”，“是我国社会主义文化的引领和主导。”重视凝聚共同意志和强大力量，成为我们党不断夺取胜利的一个根本保证。党的十七届六中全会把建设社会主义核心价值体系作为文化建设的根本任务，进行了系统阐述和全面部署，鲜明回答了在新的历史条件下我们党以什么样的思想精神带领人民前进、中华民族以什么样的精神风貌屹立于世界民族之林。
　　面对世界范围各种思想文化交流交融交锋，面对社会思想意识多元多样多变，迫切需要我们探索用社会主义核心价值体系引领社会思潮的有效途径，提高主流思想文化的主导力、整合力，最大限度扩大社会思想认同。要深刻认识推进社会主义核心价值体系建设的重要性紧迫性，铸造兴国之魂，传承文化精髓，坚定目标追求，用社会主义核心价值体系凝魂聚气，努力在多元中立主导、多样中谋共识。要紧密结合思想道德建设的实际，坚持不懈地用马克思主义中国化最新成果武装全党、教育人民，用中国特色社会主义共同理想凝聚力量，用以爱国主义为核心的民族精神和以改革创新为核心的时代精神鼓舞士气，用社会主义荣辱观引领社会风尚。要坚持知行统一、注重实践养成，把社会主义核心价值体系融入国民教育、精神文明建设和党的建设全过程，贯穿改革开放和社会主义现代化建设各领域，体现到精神文化产品创作生产传播的各方面，使之成为全体人民的自觉追求和实际行动。
　　5．深刻理解我们党关于文化发展动力的重要思想，以改革创新精神推动文化繁荣发展。改革创新是一个民族文化生生不息的活力源泉，是推动文化繁荣发展的关键所在。在领导文化建设过程中，我们党就文化发展的动力问题提出了一系列重要思想，始终强调要古为今用、洋为中用，推陈出新；强调要把握时代要求、着眼新的实践，积极进行文化创新，实现文化的与时俱进；强调文化是最需要创新的领域，改革是文化发展的必由之路，必须坚持解放思想、大胆创新，以改革促发展促繁荣。党的十七届六中全会贯穿改革创新的精神，从文化发展的更高起点出发，从建设社会主义文化强国的更高目标出发，对深化文化体制改革、推进文化创新、解放和发展文化生产力，提出新的更高要求，为增强文化发展的动力活力指明了方向。
　　现在，我国文化体制改革已进入全面深化的新阶段，文化发展已进入加速推进的新时期，巩固良好态势、破解前进中的问题，根本的途径还是靠改革创新。要坚持把转变观念作为总开关，把深化改革作为强大动力，把锐意创新作为不懈追求，坚持解放思想、实事求是、与时俱进，把改革创新精神贯穿文化建设全过程。要大力推进文化体制机制改革创新，深化文化管理体制改革，创新文化走出去模式，破除制约文化发展的体制机制障碍，着力构建充满活力、富有效率、更加开放、有利于文化科学发展的体制机制。要坚持导向为魂、内容为王、创意制胜，大力推进文化内容形式和方法手段创新，推进文化与高新科技的融合，不断提升文化的原创能力，增强文化的时代感和吸引力。要推动改革在重点领域和关键环节取得新进展，加大力度、加快进度、巩固提高、重点突破、全面推进，深化国有经营性文化单位转企改制，深化公益性文化单位改革，如期完成中央确定的阶段性改革任务，更好促进文化事业文化产业繁荣发展。
　　6．深刻理解我们党关于文化建设根本保证的重要思想，在加强和改进党的领导中推动文化改革发展。党管意识形态，党管宣传文化，是我们党在长期实践中形成的重要原则。我们党历来高度重视对文化工作的领导，在事业发展的不同阶段，都提出自己的文化纲领、文化目标、文化政策，有力推动了文化向前发展。改革开放的不断扩大，社会主义市场经济的深入发展，对党领导文化建设的能力水平提出了更高要求。在这样的形势下，如何牢牢把握意识形态工作主导权，瘴握文化改革发展领导权，是一项重大而紧迫的课题。党的十七届六中全会明谭指出，价强和改进党对文化工作的领导，吻推进文化改革发展的根本保证，也是加强党的执政能力建设和先进性建设的内在要求，必须从战略全局出发，把握文化发展规律，健全领导机制，改硷工作方式方法，增强领导文化建设的本领。
　　掌握领导权，才有主动权。各级党委政府要切?把文化建设摆在全局工作重要位置，纳入经济社会发展总体规划，纳入科学发展考核评价体系，与经济社会发展一同研究部署、一同组织实施、一同督促检查，确保文化改革发展的目标任务和政策举措落到实处。要把文化繁荣发展作为贯彻落实科学发展观的基本要求，作为坚持发展是硬道理、发展是党执政兴国第一要务的重要内容，像抓经济建设一样抓文化建设，像抓经济体制改革一样抓文化体制改革，像抓经济领域重点工程一样抓重点文化项目。要提高领导文化改革发展的科学化水平，坚持以科学制度作保障、以科学方法来推进，更好地用符合文化发展规律的思路和办法领导文化工作。要自觉贯彻党的群众路线，解决好“为了谁、依靠谁、我是谁”的基本问题，发挥好人民群众的首创精神和主体作用，更好调动文化工作者和全社会推动文化建设的积极性、创造性。要牢固树立人才是第一资源的思想，坚持尊重劳动、尊重知识、尊重人才、尊重创造，加大政策扶持，创造良好环境，形成人尽其才、才尽其用的生动局面，努力造就一批有影响的文化名家、文化大师和各领域领军人物，建设一支适应文化繁荣发展、建设社会主义文化强国需要的宏大文化人才队伍。
　　我们党关于文化建设的思想系统丰富，做好《摘编》的学习宣传使用工作十分重要。要把学习《摘编》作为推进学习型党组织建设的重要内容，纳入中心组学习计划，作为高校党校进行思想理论教育的重要材料，作为向基层干部群众进行宣讲的重要内容。要围绕我们党关于文化建设的重要论述，组织专家学者深入研究文化领域的重大理论和现实问题，研究关系文化发展的全局性、战略性、前瞻性问题，及时把实践经验升华为理论成果，不断丰富和发展中国特色社会主义文化理论，为推进文化建设提供学理支撑。要结合《摘编》的学习使用，切实加强对党的文化建设理论的宣传阐释，加强对中央关于文化建设决策部署的宣传阐释，加强对文化改革发展进展成效的宣传阐释，以良好的舆论环境，推动党的十七届六中全会精神深入落实，推动兴起社会主义文化建设的新高潮。
　　（本文系中共中央政治局委员、中央书记处书记、中宣部部长刘云山同志2012年2月15日在《论文化建设——重要论述摘编》出版座谈会上的讲话，发表时有删节。）

In recent weeks, China has been engulfed in a wave of state propaganda centered around Lei Feng (雷锋), a familiar Party exemplar from the country’s past. A self-sacrificing People’s Liberation Army soldier, Lei Feng ostensibly dedicated himself, heart and soul, to the Chinese Communist Party and its vision.
The new Lei Feng wave comes as China celebrates both the 50th anniversary of Lei Feng’s death in 1962 and the 49th anniversary of his formal status as a Party exemplar — March 5 each year is “Study Lei Feng Day.”
For Party leaders, re-visiting the spirit of Lei Feng is apropos in 2012 not just because of the above-mentioned anniversaries, but because there has been increasing concern, and also discussion, inside China about what many see as a progressive moral slide. Chinese — or so the argument goes — have become too selfish as rapid economic change has thrust the country forward, ahead of its own core values.

What are those core values? In the Party’s view, they must be “socialist core values” (社会主义核心价值), distinct from the universal values trumpeted in the West, as best suited (they say) to China’s unique culture and national circumstances (国情).
An important part of the program of broadly-touted “cultural system reforms” coming out of the sixth plenum of the 17th Central Committee last October was the promotion of these “socialist core values.” And so — (I’m still channeling one rather dominant Party discourse here) — in the same way that institutions like Hollywood and the Western press expound and project a set of Western “universal values”, Chinese culture in the broadest sense must transmit a unique set of Chinese values, an amalgam of (often twisted) ancient traditions and Party traditions.
Enter Lei Feng.
In an announcement earlier this week, China’s Ministry of Education said it was launching a movement of Lei Feng studies through the country’s education system, in order to “deeply implement the overall demands of . . . the Sixth Plenum of the Party’s 17th Central Committee.”
Said the announcement:

Lei Feng is a paragon for the practice of socialist and communist thought and morals, a model to be studied by the whole nation. The Lei Feng spirit is an important part of the spirit of the Chinese people, evincing the traditional virtue of the Chinese people, and in tune with our era of social progress. [It] manifests the inherent advancedness of our Party, and is a vivid embodiment of the socialist core value system.

As noted on the front page of the overseas edition of the People’s Daily today, the opening day of the National People’s Congress (NPC), March 5, also marks the 49th anniversary of the study of the “spirit of Lei Feng.” According to his official diary, Lei Feng died in 1962, but it was in 1963, 49 years ago, that Lei Feng was introduced to the Chinese public through a concerted propaganda campaign.
The Lei Feng wave fits nicely with the upcoming NPC not just because the session is the first since “cultural reforms” were trumpeted last October, but because public morals and broader social governance issues are likely to take a front seat at the session.
For example, there is talk that one agenda to be discussed is the creation of what has been called a “Good Samaritan law” — in other words, legislation encouraging citizens to assist those in need by lowering the risk associated with doing so. Talk of such legislation was ignited late last year after video surfaced of a toddler in the city of Foshan run over twice in succession by passing vehicles and then ignored by passersby.
What has the Lei Feng wave actually looked like in mainland Chinese newspaper coverage? Here is a graph showing the results day by day in more than 200 Chinese newspapers since February 1.

In an article published in at least 12 Party-run newspapers today, “The Eternal Summons: Century Symphony for the Lei Feng Spirit” (永恒的召唤: 雷锋精神世纪交响曲), China’s official Xinhua News Agency likens China to a grand symphony, in which of course everyone has their part to play.
The allegorical structure, in which Lei Feng serves as “first violin” (第一小提琴手), accords well with Hu Jintao’s notion of “harmony” and the “harmonious society”, or hexie shehui (和谐社会). All Chinese must play their part, subordinating their own tunes to the greater music of national peace and purpose.
Lei Feng, the tireless hero sacrificing personal interests for the greater good of the Party and the people, is the exemplar for all players — the virtuoso, if you will, of self-effacing struggle.
Much of the Xinhua piece is structured as a call and answer, again extending the musical theme. Like this portion, which introduces the idea that each member of Chinese society should serve as a brick in the great edifice that is China:

We ask: Lei Feng, how can we follow you today in moving forward?
Lei Feng once said: tall buildings are built up one brick and one stone at a time, and we must be the bricks and the stone, doing our piecemeal bit.
In the process of building our spiritual edifice (精神大厦), if only you are willing, we can all, like Lei Feng, be a single brick, a single tile, or even a single grain of sand . . . In Nanjing, after the Sichuan earthquake, an old man named Xu Chao (徐超) who made his way by begging, even after donating 5 yuan searched for all the cash on his person and finally went to the bank to change [the smalls] into a 100-yuan bill to put in the donation box. For this old man, this was a “bare donation” sparing nothing.
True goodness cares not who you are, or what your status is, and it cannot be measured by how much money you pay out. So long as it arises from love deep in your soul, every single person can be Lei Feng.

Of course, many Chinese would argue, and have, that the country’s present woes — including rising social unrest, and what might best be characterized as a general social malaise — are not the product of a moral deficit or an insufficiency of “spirit.” Rather, they are the product of political, social and economic marginalization.
Xinhua’s romantic story about the beggar Xu Chao exposes an appalling blindness to underlying social issues. Unpack the host of questions surrounding the poor Xu and you might have an illuminating case study on social and political gaps, on institutional negligence. But here, the hot tears of ideological fervor blind the reporters to the obvious.
As incidents like that in Guangdong’s Wukan village have sufficiently shown, Chinese are not lacking in political spirit or pluck. They certainly don’t need a moral pep-a-rally or a Lei Feng love fest.
What Chinese arguably do need, and what many increasingly demand, are institutions that, rather than exacting romantic self-sacrifice, enable participation and afford protection, so that every citizen can be clear where they stand — and can do good without fear.

The following post by Consensus Net (共识网), the official Weibo account of China’s Leaders (领导者) magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:46pm Hong Kong time, February 28, 2012. Lang Yaoyuan currently has just over 102,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The post came against the backdrop of renewed use in official Party media of the image and story of Lei Feng (雷锋), a People’s Liberation Army soldier held up in official Party propaganda in the 1960s as an exemplar of duty and devotion to the Party and the socialist cause. The dusting off of Lei Feng seems to have come amidst an invigorated official campaign in China to improve public morals.

Lei Feng, such a youthful screw [in the machine] http://t.cn/zOG5GhH Through his extended use in the propaganda of the national machine, spirit of Lei Feng has already become to tool advocating the individual’s sacrifice of private interests. The greater the sacrifice, the loftier the image, the greater the spirit. This kind of neglect of private interests, which from its very origin sets moral standards against private interests as a value orientation, must necessarily go against human nature. And so it is very difficult [for such a standard] to serve in raising the level of social morals.

The post by Consensus Net included the following image of Lei Feng:

The original Chinese-language post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:

雷锋，如此年轻的螺丝钉http://t.cn/zOG5GhH在国家机器长期宣传下，雷锋精神已经演变成国家提倡个人牺牲私利的工具：牺牲越巨大，形象越高大，精神越伟大。这样一种忽视个人利益、从一开始就将道德标准与私人利益对立起来的价值导向，必然是违背人性的，也就难以起到提高社会道德水平的作用.

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following post by Lang Yaoyuan (郎遥远), the Hangzhou-based director of World Merchants Magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 6:00pm Hong Kong time yesterday, February 29, 2012. Lang Yaoyuan currently has just under 70,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Lang Yaoyuan’s post deals with the as-yet-unexplained unblocking on February 21 of an entry about former premier Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) on the Baidu website’s encyclopedia service, Baidu Baike (百度百科). According to some Chinese-language reports outside China, the Baidu page for Zhao Ziyang, a pro-reform figure who was ousted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, received more than two million visits within one day. The page has since been disabled.

That General Secretary who shed tears for our college students on the square was suddenly unblocked a few days back, and there were 2,16 million views that day. This old man, about whom for so long we could hear nothing, suddenly overnight appears again on the horizon of our awareness. Several million searches can be seen as several million tributes, so late but still not absent. At such a moment I feel how awesome (“NB”) it is to be Chinese. Chinese forget nothing.

The post by Lang Yaoyuan included the following image of Zhao Ziyang:

The original Chinese-language post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:

那位曾在广场对大学生流泪的总书记，前几天突然解禁，当天网络浏览216万次。“一个走得如此荒凉的老人，在这样一个偶然的夜里，又一次静静地出现在你我可以感知的边界。数百万条的搜索，就权当数百万次的注目礼吧，迟到了，却并不缺席。这一刻，感到身为一个中国人的NB。中国人，什么都没有忘记。”

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

State media report today that Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), the head of China’s General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) — the agency that licenses journalists and print publications in the country and oversees ideological training campaigns for media — will serve as dean of the Tsinghua School of Journalism and Communication effective March 1.
Liu Binjie’s appointment to head up the journalism school at Tsinghua, generally recognized as one of China’s top universities, is explained in media reports as a routine replacement of Fan Jingyi (范敬宜), the previous dean (and the school’s first), who passed away on November 13 last year.
However, the fact that journalism schools at three of China’s top universities are now being run by former ministerial-level (正部级) officials has led to speculation on social media that Liu’s choice might be politically significant.
Liu Binjie served previously as minister of propaganda for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, and as the top Party propaganda official in China’s western Sichuan province.
The current dean at Peking University’s school of journalism is Shao Huaze (邵华泽), a former top official at the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper. The dean of the journalism school at People’s University of China is Zhao Qizheng (赵启正), the former director of China’s State Council Information Office, where controls on China’s internet are centered.
It was not immediately clear from Chinese news coverage whether Liu Binjie’s appointment would mean his replacement as head of GAPP, or whether he would hold the positions concurrently.