Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Offering further indication of the shift away from the politics of Bo Xilai, who was removed as the leader of Chongqing on March 15, a report in today’s Chongqing Daily offers what seems to be a mea culpa by the municipality’s head of propaganda, He Shizhong (何事忠).
According to the report in Chongqing Daily, the official “mouthpiece” of the municipality’s top leadership, He Shizhong told a gathering of propaganda leaders on March 26 that “the cultural and propaganda work of the whole city must firmly and resolutely maintain a high degree of uniformity with the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.”
He Shizhong emphasized that Chongqing propaganda leaders needed to “realistically summarize and analyze propaganda and culture work over the past few years, in which there are a number of areas that require improvement.” Specifically, He said there was a need to “improve activities and methods, reducing as much as possible collective theatrical performances, firmly avoiding movement-style [propaganda] methods.”
Just over a year ago, as Bo Xilai’s campaign of “red songs” was in full swing in the city, He Shizhong defended the Chongqing’s policies on propaganda and culture.
In an interview with Chongqing Daily, He Shizhong sought to dispel fears that the “red China” theme was a celebration of China’s “leftist” past:
What does “China is red” mean? In its makeover, Chongqing Satellite TV upholds the principle of “I love Red China.” When we talk of “red” some people express opposition, saying that we are encouraging “leftist” sympathies, or even taking the old road of the Cultural Revolution. This is entirely wrong. The Chinese people have revered the color red since ancient times . . . The color red represents life, vitality, youth, ardor, brightness, vividness, strength, fullness of life force. In a limited sense, so-called “red culture” (红色文化) points to the way the Chinese Communist Party has, since the last century, led the Chinese masses through an explosive period of revolution and war, how it has built [China up], and about the spirit of the age that has emerged through opening and reform. China under the leadership of the CCP is a “red China.”
Recently, 106-year-old linguist Zhou Youguang (周有光), the “father of pinyin Chinese” was interviewed by the BBC in Beijing and said with seriousness: “”China will have to release itself from communism. The future will be dark if it doesn’t.” He also pointed out that if mainland China cannot peacefully make the transition to freedom and democracy, there will be a violent revolution, and this is just a matter of time. “I have to speak the truth, and what can they do!”
The Weibo post refers to Michael Bristow’s March 22 article on Zhou Youguang, which can be found here. The final sentence in the Weibo post presumably refers to the section in Bristow’s article that reads as follows: “He is critical of the party that governs China – and old enough not to care who is listening to what he has to say. ‘What are they going to do, come and take me away?’ he said in an interview with the BBC in his sparsely furnished Beijing home.
The following image of Zhou Youguang was included with Lang Yaoyuan’s post:
This original Chinese post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
Concerning the suspicious death of in November last year of British national Neil Heywood in Chongqing, Britain’s Foreign Office has said that it was at the request of British nationals in Chongqing who had questions about the circumstances of Neil Heywood’s death that Britain asked China’s government to investigate. Asked yesterday about the death, foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei (洪磊) said he wasn’t familiar with the case.
This original Chinese post from Phoenix News Brief follows:
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
The post is a political cartoon in which a throng of ordinary Chinese waves goodbye to a large red ship called “Titanic.” At the helm of the hulking ship stands Chairman Mao, his hand outstretched, and other top Chinese Communist Party leaders. The obvious implication of the cartoon is that the great red ship of the CCP is doomed — and that the Chinese people are ready to send it off to its sinking doom.
The text in the air to the left of Mao is “Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman” (大海航行靠舵手), the title of a Chinese Communist Party song that was listed No. 1 on a top-ten list of “revolutionary songs” in 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. [Listen to the song at Youtube].
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
It’s a risky proposition to make political forecasts in a totalitarian system. So many things are cloaked and uncertain, and exposure of the slightest hint can bring shock and surprise. It’s this uncertainty, of course, that encourages people to strain their necks and their ears, making endless guesses about what they can neither see nor hear. This is especially true when major things go down, as with the recent leadership change in Chongqing, which has prompted a thousand rumors.
Just over a month ago, a secret visit by “anti-crime hero” Wang Lijun to the US Consulate in Chengdu startled the whole world. For some, this seemed to herald the opening of the political drama in China [ahead of the 18th Party Congress]. In my view, though, what we’re in fact seeing is the curtain closing. This whole affair now means that the 18th Party Congress can go ahead without further drama.
Consensus, stability and unity. In China, these are ideas marshaled by the leadership to brainwash the people. They have become deeply engraved on people’s minds. As a result, any lack of consensus within the Party is perceived as a schism, and external resistance is read as a sign of upheaval.
Drama goes hand in hand with totalitarian politics. At critical moments, political drama can determine the course of events. If there hadn’t been the opportunity afforded by Wang Lijun’s “treason”, the leadership would have awaited or invented some other incident to galvanize the Party and put and end to internal destabilizing factors in the interest of peace and unity.
One Chinese internet user quipped that Wang Lijun is indeed the ultimate “anti-crime hero”. Why? Because through his surprise visit to the American consulate in Chengdu he assured in one fell swoop the destruction of China’s strongest criminal element, namely the Maoist faction that remains so enamored of the Cultural Revolution and has been bolstered by the so-called Chongqing model [championed by Bo Xilai].
It certainly seems true that this incident presents the central leadership with the perfect opportunity to eliminate political outliers and stabilize political power. Taking a longer view of things, however, it’s impossible to say with any certainty what impact these events will have.
Some are no doubt tempted to suggest this is a victory for the liberal faction of which Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) is the figurehead. It is a victory against the conservatives and vested interests, and a victory too for the so-called Guangdong model that represents reform and stands in stark contrast to the Chongqing model and its Cultural Revolution revivalism.
I’m not so sure.
While I don’t believe that Bo Xilai ever really took to heart the core ideas of the Cultural Revolution — how could he while his wife ran a large company, his son studied overseas, and Chongqing slurped up investment on his watch? — I do think the failure of his ploy for the political spotlight is a good thing. But how can we be so sure this is really a victory for reform?
The lessons of history caution us that, to quote an old saying, when the danger is past, the gods are forgotten. Reform and opening and the Guangdong model were a banner in the recent political struggle, but as the opponent fades the shine comes off of reform and the Guangdong model too.
At a press conference during the National People’s Congress this month, Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang (汪洋) rejected the idea that the Wukan incident — a village rights defense movement that ended in local elections — bore any new significance. Secretary Wang understands only too well that there is little need [politically] for the Guangdong model once political stability has been secured. There is even less need for democratic reforms, which would only bring new division and hasten the end of the Party’s dictatorship.
Premier Wen Jiabao has said repeatedly that “without reform we are at a dead end.” But who exactly is the “we” here? If, as the official People’s Daily has suggested, this “we” is the Party, then the so-called political reform agenda is really about “saving the Party” and not about real democratic reform.
Many people suppose that once the liberal faction has neutralized the Maoist left and gained a firm hold politically, Premier Wen Jiabao will be in a position to fulfill his political reform promises. The truth is that the impetus for political reform cannot possibly arise from calmness and tranquility. Without sufficient pressure, China’s leadership will not push for reform.
Ratcheting up pressure on Premier Wen Jiabao and affirming his calls for reform are one and the same thing. The role of proponents should be to position democratic reforms within the popular discourse, not to cheer court intrigue from the sidelines.
If this really is an opportunity for political reform, what we need now is concerted action, not passive anticipation amid the calm. This is a translated and abridged version of an article posted to Deutsche Welle Chinese and to Chang Ping’s personal blog on March 25, 2012.
Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), one of China’s most outspoken intellectuals, yesterday posted a ten-year plan for social and political development in China on his Tencent microblog account. The plan called for a three-year initial phase of concerted social and judicial reforms, including the abolishment of the petitioning and household registration systems, followed by a second phase of political reforms moving China toward constitutional democracy.
Yu’s plan gives readers a general idea of many of the concrete changes proposed in China by pro-reformers under the auspices of “political reform”.
A translation of the general outline for Yu Jianrong’s plan follows. The original text-as-image file posted to Tencent Weibo follows the translation:
Ten-Year Outline for Social and Political Development in China (October 2012 to September 2022)
Author: Yu Jianrong First Phase (October 2012 to December 2015)
Achieving basic social equality and justice, with the adjustment of public welfare policies as the premise and the protection of people’s rights as the foundation. 1. Adjustment of public welfare policies i. Clarifying rights to rural land, implementing the Property Law; ii. Adjusting basic social welfare policies (社会福利政策), extending pensions, unemployment, health insurance and such to low-income members of society; iii. Thoroughly reform the household registration system, instituting compulsory education (义务教育) and equality of higher-education testing across all regions without discrimination. 2. Build a judicial system of checks and balances, establishing legal authority i. Detach the personnel, finances and property of inferior courts and intermediate courts from cities and counties, instituting a system of direct jurisdiction by the provinces; ii. Institute a system of lifetime tenure for judges with strict [stipulations on] mobility; iii. Institute a system of high salaries for judges, strictly following up on mishandled cases; iv. Abolish politics and law committees below the provincial level; v. Abolish the petitioning system, resolve long-standing cases through the judicial system; vi. Abolish the re-education through labor system, ensuring the personal rights of citizens 3. Ensure freedom of speech and freedom of expression i. Achieve openness of government affairs ii. Make public the assets of officials and other information iii. Strictly prohibit incrimination through speech (因言获罪) 4. Strengthen the building of social organizations, foster civil society development i. Regulate community management organizations; ii. Energetically develop social welfare organizations, using welfare to re-mold the humanistic spirit; iii. Protect social and religious organizations Second Phase (January 2016 to September 2022)
Promoting the transition of the country to constitutional democracy, with political reform as the premise and civil rights as the foundation. 1. Carry out reform of political power at the county level i. Open up elections for county-level people’s congresses, instituting a system in which people’s congresses are not administrative or professionalized ii. Reform the cross-regional system for county-level officials; [NOTE: This system, used in the Ming and Qing dynasties, means placing outsiders in local positions to prevent entrenched resistance to the center and promote the centralization of power.] iii. Institute differential elections for county-level positions; [NOTE: This means that the number of candidates surpasses the number of posts available.] iv. Transform township governments into branch organs. 2. Open up society i. Establish a press law, open up the media; ii. Establish a Political Parties Law, open up social and political organizations.
The China Times (华夏时报) reported today that Chongqing Satellite TV, which suspended commercial advertising one year ago as part of Bo Xilai’s populist campaign of red culture, will re-introduce advertising on April 2. [Read our coverage of this issue last year here and here].
On March 15, the same day Bo Xilai’s removal as Chongqing’s top leader was announced, a brief advertisement for a liquor brand was broadcast following the 30-minute official local newscast, “Chongqing Central News Daily” (重庆新闻联播). This commercial, the first appearing on Chongqing Satellite TV since the station’s “red” makeover a year ago, drove speculation that a change was in the offing. But an official about turn on advertising or “red” programming was never confirmed by the station.
Today the China Times cited a representative from the chief editor’s office at Chongqing Satellite TV as saying employees at the network had been under strict instructions not to talk about the pending makeover.
Despite these supposed restrictions, however, the China Times noted that employees seemed quite willing to talk about the changes.
“Although Chongqing Satellite TV has officially been very secretive about the re-design, many current and former employees confirmed the guesses being made outside to the reporter from this paper.”
The “complete re-design” of Chongqing Satellite TV will reportedly take place on April 2, with the re-introduction of commercial advertising and a whole new line-up of entertainment programming.
China is now possibly, apparently, invisibly in the midst of political turmoil at the highest levels. In the wake of the public removal of Bo Xilai (薄熙来) last week as top leader in the municipality of Chongqing, there have been mounting rumors and hints, vague sketches of intrigue. Gunshots heard, say some, at the very heart of power. A mysterious black Ferrari, driven by an unknown man of possible consequence, crashing and burning on the capital’s outskirts (then the story swept under the rug of “harmony”). Finally, suggestions even of a thwarted coup attempt by China’s number nine, security chief Zhou Yongkang (周永康).
Of course, as several foreign correspondents have rightly remarked today, it’s impossible to say anything with certainty about what’s happening — and difficult, in fact, to say much of anything at all.
In other ways, though, the lingering uncertainty speaks for itself.
It’s simple enough, sure, to suggest that the more extreme plot lines are pure fabrication. But even if they are, the abiding sense of uncertainly and insecurity about what is happening at the top nonetheless exposes the volatility of Chinese politics.
Politics at the top in China, and in fact at every level, is still beyond scrutiny, three decades after Deng Xiaoping urged the need for political reform to avoid the kind of destabilizing fractures that could erupt into events like the Cultural Revolution.
The very fact that the rumors and curiosities this week have been “harmonized” rather than contradicted with facts will naturally lead many people to believe them, or believe at the very least that they are half-truths pointing to the same fundamental conclusion: that all is not well in Zhongnanhai.
The rumors might be easy enough to clear away. Who exactly was the man in the black Ferrari? And where is Zhou Yongkang, who appears to have been absent from the news for the past 48 hours?
Instead, there is a total information vacuum surrounding these apparent curiosities. They are left behind like spooky chalk outlines.
Continued traces of apparent political friction can be seen on Chinese social media, thanks to our colleagues here at the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, who have created an archive of select deleted (“permission denied”) posts.
Here, for example, is a deleted March 20 post from Lu Yong (卢勇), a public relations specialist for a company in Chengdu with more than 100,000 Weibo followers. Lu writes: “This is Chongqing right now, where people are still putting up banners like this one, and continuing to sing red songs.” The accompanying picture shows Chinese holding up a red banner with yellow characters that read, “The people of Chongqing love you, Secretary Bo [Xilai]!”
Other deleted posts, like this one from March 20 (removed yesterday), deal with the question of the mysterious black Ferrari that crashed on March 18.
Finally, this deleted post from prominent Chinese scholar Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥) may provide the most suitably crepuscular image for what we’ve seen in China over the past few days:
Hegel once said that wisdom was like an owl, and that it took flight only at dusk. But his was a nation of philosophy. Here in our country, we have no owls, only bats. Those bats are rumors, and they take flight after midnight from the microblogs that are their caves. These past few days the bats have been plentiful. Like talk of a “new Gang of Four” . . . The people playing these political tricks, they seem just like children trying to hoist 200-kilogram barbells over their heads. I worry for them.
[Frontpage Image: “Millions of Bats, Khao Yai“, posted by stijnbokhove to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
As we’ve pointed out again and again at the China Media Project, one of the most interesting contrasts that can readily be seen in China’s media is between news treatment by Party-run newspapers and market-oriented newspapers.
In the vast majority of cases, these mass-circulation market-oriented city newspapers (都市类报纸) — let’s call them the C‘s — are spin-offs of Party newspapers (the P‘s) run by the top Party leadership at various levels of the bureaucracy. While the former rely entirely on advertising, the latter continue to receive Party support. Though financially self-reliant, however, these commercial papers are still tied in politically to the Party-run press bureaucracy — a legacy of the Mao Zedong-era principle of “politicians running the newspapers.”
Over the past decade in China it’s been at these market-oriented newspapers (and similar magazines) that we have seen the most interesting coverage — from relevant consumer content to hard-hitting investigative reporting. And the differences can be seen at a glance.
For example, consider this composite of four top Party newspapers today created by Old Media Wang (传媒老王), a Weibo user who regularly posts content and observations from China’s media. The paper’s are: People’s Daily, Economic Daily, Guangming Daily and Liberation Army Daily.
All of the papers have identical designs, the same top stories about official Party goings-on, the same image (of Party leaders, of course), etcetera. The top story is about China’s 13th National Civil Affairs Conference (第十三次全国民政会议), a meeting of China’s civil affairs-related departments attended yesterday by President Hu Jintao and other top leaders.
At commercial newspapers, the big story today is about rising fuel costs and related inflation concerns. Here is a composite of a number of major commercial papers, again created by Old Media Wang.
Here the top story is not the 13th National Civil Affairs Conference. Goodness, who wants to read about that?
The top story is oil. All of the front pages in the composite, from Southern Metropolis Daily at the upper-left to Jiangnan Times at the bottom-right, scream out with headlines about rising oil prices and their impact on consumers (hence the relevance). At top-center is Shandong Commercial News with the big black circle of a fuel (price) indicator at center and a headline that reads: “There is no high, only higher.” So we can visualize the differences between these types of newspapers. But how can we visualize their relationships?
The critical fact to understand is that all publications in China need to have an institutional sponsor, if you will, a Party or government organ that vouches for it politically and can be held accountable if things go wrong. This is called the “supervising institution”, or zhuguan danwei (主管单位).
In the case of commercial newspapers, their “supervising institutions” are the Party papers, which in turn are “supervised” by the top Party leadership at that corresponding level.
To visualize the relationships, readers can try using our CMP Media Map to search the following groups of publications:
1. People’s Daily (人民日报) and Jinghua Times (京华时报)
2. Nanfang Daily (南方日报), Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报) and Southern Metropolis Weekly
Go to our CMP Media Map and paste the Chinese characters for People’s Daily into the search field at the upper-right. Click GO. (This may take a minute to load). The edition that shows up at the top is the one you want. Click on it and you’ll see the registration information at the bottom of the page.
Notice that the supervising institution is given as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中共中央). That means this is a central-level Party publication overseen by the top Party leadership.
Now try plugging in Jinghua Times, a commercial publication. You’ll notice, when the registration information comes up, that the supervising institution is People’s Daily. This is what we mean when we refer to these publications as spin-offs.
You can think of these as the political family trees of China’s newspaper and magazine publishing industry. In fact, Party papers are also referred to in Chinese as “mother papers”, or mubao (母报), and their spin-offs are called “child papers,” or zibao (子报).
And there you have it. Arcane? Perhaps. But absolutely critical for anyone who wants to understand the basics of how Chinese newspapers and other publications actually fit into the political landscape.
