Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Fake fans for Party's hero worker?

The following post by Sina-verified user @XiaoShanDoctorate (叶匡政), a researcher at an energy research center in Chengdu, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 10:31pm Hong Kong time yesterday, February 28, 2012. @XiaoShanDoctorate currently has just under 30,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
@XiaoShanDoctorate’s post, a re-post of a post by user @bxtv_XiaoFeng, criticizes the CCP-led cult around Guo Mingyi (郭明义), a manager at Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (鞍山钢铁集团公司). Guo, previously dubbed an “Excellent Chinese Communist Party Member” (优秀共产党员), has been trumpeted as a modern-day Lei Feng (雷锋), an exemplar for all dutiful, obedient and hard-working Chinese. Fans of Guo Mingyi’s Sina Weibo account have topped six million, something Chinese internet users have questioned.

What qualification does someone whose fans are even fake have to be a moral exemplar? @bxtv_XiaoFeng: This thing is really building up! @AnGangGuoMingyi’s Weibo fan base has surpassed six million, but a great number of mummy fans (僵尸粉) are mixed in. I don’t know whether this is a propaganda strategy, but seeing it makes me a bit sick.

The post by @bxtv_XiaoFeng included the following image:


The original Chinese-language post from @XiaoShanDoctorate, with the post from @bxtv_XiaoFeng included, follows:

一个连粉丝都造假的人,有什么资格成为道德楷模? @bxtv_小丰:事情果然闹大了!@鞍钢郭明义 的微博粉丝超过600多万,大量僵尸粉混杂其间,不知是不是宣传策略,反正看着有点恶心。现在一斤被大伙揪住了!


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Criticism of China's National People's Congress

The following post by Ye Kuangzheng (叶匡政), a Chinese poet and scholar, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:45pm Hong Kong time yesterday, February 27, 2012. Ye Kuangzheng currently has just under 125,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Ye Kuangzheng’s post is simply a re-post of a string of separate posts on China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), which will go into full session early next week. The posts, by @LiuZhongshi @LinShaX and @ZhuoShuiQingShenZl, are critical of public security spending in China and the NPC as an empty body merely trumpeting the foregone decisions of the Chinese Communist Party:

//@LiuZhongshi: The people are treated like enemies! //@ZhuoShuiQingShenZl: The government is inactive, so the propaganda leaders are very busy; popular anger runs deep, so they emphasize that society is very harmonious; morals are lacking, so they soak us in great love; public order is great, so they mobilize vast police forces.//@LinShaX: The police forces they’ve mobilized now cost hundreds of thousands more than what America spends on its army, all for the sake of protecting the world’s best-known “great meeting of cheerleaders.”

It is not clear what @LinShaX is referring to in the line about U.S. military spending. China revealed last year, however, that it now spends more on internal security than it does on national defense.
The original Chinese-language post from Ye Kuangzheng, with posts from @LinShaX and @ZhuoShuiQingShenZl included, follows:

//@刘忠世:待民如寇仇!//@浊水清尘zl: 政府无为,所以宣扬领导都很忙;民怨很深,所以强调社会很和谐;道德沦丧,所以渲染我们有大爱;治安很好,所以动用强大的警力。//@林傻X:动用的警力比美国现役陆军的总数还多十几万,只是为了维护世界上最著名的“啦啦队大会”


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Dry Times


Chinese news media reported this week that Yunnan province in the country’s southwest will possibly face its worst drought in a century this year, and three cities in the province are already rationing water supplies. In the following cartoon, posted by artist Cao Yi (曹一) to QQ.com, the member of a Chinese ethnic minority group from Yunnan stands holding out a dish full of cracked, dry earth.
南方周末【云南,渴啊!】 中国水资源最丰富省份之一,云南,2012年春天迎来了又一个干旱开年。过去三年旱情叠加,让气象部门预测,云南可能遭遇“超百年一遇的干旱”。

Mao Yushi: China's property bubble must burst

Back in April 2011 Chinese economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼) set off a firestorm with a strongly worded criticism of Mao Zedong (毛泽东) posted to Caixin Online. This week Mao Yushi has again raised eyebrows, this time with a darkly frank assessment of China’s property market in an interview with Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily.
In the interview, Mao Yushi argues that one key reason behind rising property prices in China in recent years has been a lack of good investment alternatives for China’s rich, fueling a boom in properties used largely for investment purposes but unaffordable for the vast majority of Chinese.
Citing a high rate of vacancy in Chinese properties (“possibly as high as 50 percent”), Mao suggests China’s property bubble must collapse, with properties losing at lease 50 percent of their value.


[ABOVE: Properties in Guangzhou’s Xian Village are vacated to make way for new property developments. The sign encourages local villagers to reach settlements on compensation for demolished property as early as possible. Photo by David Bandurski]
“Is there no remedy?” the Southern Metropolis Daily reporter asks towards the end of the interview. Mao Yushi answers by suggesting a tax on vacant properties, which he says might encourage a dramatic drop in rental prices and make apartments available to migrant workers. [Readers can click here to follow the conversation about Mao Yushi’s arguments on Sina Weibo.]

No Medicine Can Cure [China’s] Property Market
Southern Metropolis Daily
February 27, 2012
Southern Metropolis Daily: Recently, a number of projects in Lucheng (绿城) in Zhejiang province have been sold, exposing the existential crisis facing privately-run property enterprises. How do you view this phenomenon?
Mao Yushi: How can property enterprises make so much money? The direct reason is that property prices keep going up. Property buyers make money, and property sellers make money too.
Beginning in the second half of last year, you can already see the situation (in the market) changing. But many property developers haven’t yet seen these changes. So now properties are difficult to sell, money can’t be borrowed, and so (they) see the capital chain being broken.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Why is it that this phenomenon is quite common among private enterprises, but the situation at state-run property enterprises is somewhat better?
Mao Yushi: The difference between state-run and privately-run enterprises is in the ability to access money. But the larger climate dictates that the property sector faces huge dangers, whether state-run or privately-run. I said this the year before last. My friends in the property sector don’t like to hear me say it. They say why don’t you help us out. I say, if I help you this does you harm. Unfortunately, very few people understand this.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Many privately-run enterprises have been influenced heavily by macro-adjustments. Where is the development bottleneck here?
Mao Yushi: It’s about financing.
Southern Metropolis Daily: So because they have no cash, these private enterprises face a shrinking space?
Mao Yushi: The major banks don’t service small and medium-sized enterprises. This is the same around the world. The United States has more than 8,000 banks, the vast majority of these small banks. That is why there is no serious financing problem for small and medium-sized businesses in the U.S.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Where is the future space for development for privately-run enterprises in China?
Mao Yushi: If the problem of financing is not resolved there a large space for development doesn’t exist. The biggest source of financing for private enterprises right now is private lending (民间借贷). Now the government plans to chop this [source of financing] off, and the public response has been loud. Because if private lending is not available, this will further strengthen the monopoly of financing by state enterprises.
Southern Metropolis Daily: [Economist] Lang Xianping has said before that once private property developers are out of the picture, property prices will get even higher. What do you think about that view?
Mao Yushi: The problem for small and medium-sized enterprises is about financing, and the problem of financing doesn’t have much to do with property prices.
The Property Bubble Will Burst Sooner or Later
Southern Metropolis Daily: Some people already think that the property market [in China] has already entered an era without a sense of direction, and that the inability to come to a consensus about the property market is the fundamental cause of chaos in the market. Do you support that view?
Mao Yushi: No. I think there are a number of reasons why the property sector has become what we see today. One reason is that income distribution in our country is uneven, and the gap between rich and poor is too pronounced. Even if prices go up further, the rich can afford it, and so they don’t care how high prices go. Secondly, the rich have no good channels for investment. If there were good channels for investment, they would no longer go and buy property. Third, there are government controls on land. The government’s regulations concerning a bottom line (红线) for arable land protection at 180,000 mu [or 12,000 hectares] are extremely misguided. Land [availability] is the reason property prices are expensive, and insufficient supply (of land) drives property prices up.
Southern Metropolis Daily: On the one hand, property prices have risen significantly. On the other hand, the rate of empty properties in many areas is quite high.
Mao Yushi: In fact, the (the reason driving property price increases) isn’t because there is so much demand from people. Right now [as you say] many properties are empty, but I think in some cases properties have been empty for more than a decade.
Southern Metropolis Daily: You’ve said before that the greatest risk to China’s economy this year is the property market. Where specifically do you see [this danger] emerging?
Mao Yushi: Many properties standing empty spells a bubble. In my view, the biggest risk for China’s economy this year and next is the bursting of the property bubble. China’s situation, I’m afraid, is unique in the world, because there are so many empty [residential] properties, no one living there. This is the biggest bubble [you can imagine]. A sea of properties, and no one living in them. This is a frightening (thing).
Southern Metropolis Daily: Do you think the property bubble will burst this year?
Mao Yushi: It’s hard to say, but it will burst sooner or later. How could it not burst? You would have to have people living in all of these properties for the [problem of] empty homes to be absorbed. Is that possible. I don’t think it’s possible. Well then, the only road possible is the bursting [of the bubble]. What does bursting mean? It means the steady fall of [residential] property prices.
Southern Metropolis Daily: How far do you think property prices will fall if the bubble bursts?
Mao Yushi: I think 30 percent is too little. Dropping 50 percent is more like it. Actually, 50 percent isn’t really that high. Three years ago, property prices in Beijing went down that much.
Southern Metropolis Daily: According to your thinking, empty properties give rise to a bubble. Well then, in your view, are residential properties by nature supposed to serve a residential function?
Mao Yushi: The ultimate purpose of residential property is that it be lived in.
Southern Metropolis Daily: The only function of homes is to be lived in, so if it’s not this function [they are serving], then we can say something has gone wrong with [the] property [market]?
Mao Yushi: That’s not the way to view this situation. In the property market there should be speculative property (投机房), but the ratio should not very high. Homes can sit empty. But I’ve heard friends in the property market say the rate [of empty properties] should stand around 8-10 percent. Right now, it’s not even 30 percent, but possibly as high as 50 percent. With so many empty properties, can trouble be avoided?
Government Intervention is No Match for the Power of the Market (市场威力)
Southern Metropolis Daily: But looking at the situation this year, it seems that in some regions, owing to restrictions on property purchasing or prices, prices on the property market have gone down?
Mao Yushi: Not necessarily. Right now, the fall in property prices isn’t necessarily due to price or purchasing restrictions. I think its that the whole macroeconomy has met with trouble. I wrote an article before in which I said that now that buying restrictions were over the (government) should rely on the market here on out. Once the bubble bursts, the government should rely on the market. You tell me, what is the use of restricting prices and purchasing?
Southern Metropolis Daily: You’re totally against price and purchasing restrictions?
Mao Yushi: Totally against them.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Ok, what about property taxes (房产税)?
Mao Yushi: I don’t support them either. I’m in support of high taxes on investment gains (投资收益)?
Southern Metropolis Daily: What’s wrong with places like Chongqing and Shanghai charging property taxes?
Mao Yushi: Limits on purchasing and property taxes are limits placed on people buying homes, and I think they’re no good. Property taxes are not a way of dealing with the market [as a whole], but rather should be a normal form of tax, an normal part of the operation of the real-estate market.
Southern Metropolis Daily: So everyone has misunderstood property taxes?
Mao Yushi: We should have property taxes, but they are not a tool to tackle high property prices . . .
Southern Metropolis Daily: On November 10 last year, Zhongshan [in Guangdong province] issued an order on price restriction (限价令) capping property prices at 5,800 yuan/square meter up to December 31, 2011. But after the new year, the cap was raised to 6,590 yuan/square meter.
Mao Yushi: This is completely without reason. Price caps are an even bigger mess than purchasing limits.
Southern Metropolis Daily: But home buyers really benefitted.
Mao Yushi: The most important is balance. This kind of forced price drop will cause unhappiness among developers, and what happens later when no one goes and develops properties?
Southern Metropolis Daily: In fact no clear official document was released for this price standard in Zhongshan. [The government] simply refused to register any property [for sale] that was above this price.
Mao Yushi: Regardless of whether or not there was a document, price limitations are wrong. This just suggests that the government doesn’t want to take responsibility as it carries out a wrong-headed policy. We have a Commodity Price Law by which prices are determined by the market and not interfered with by the government. How do they decide 6,590 yuan/square meter is suitable and not 6,600 yuan/square meter?
Southern Metropolis Daily: The government calculated it on the basis of GDP growth of 13.5 percent last year.
Mao Yushi: Hitching price limits up to GDP makes even less sense.
Southern Metropolis Daily: What if they were connected to average disposable incomes?
Mao Yushi: That makes no sense either. The government needs to have an understanding of economics. They shouldn’t manage so much, but should let the market freely make adjustments.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Do you encourage people to purchase property?
Mao Yushi: In the current market environment I don’t advise people to buy property. Seeing as prices (for property) will drop, what reason would there be in buying something whose price will go down?
Southern Metropolis Daily: But you’ve said before that the government should encourage people to buy property.
Mao Yushi: There’s nothing wrong with the government encouraging people to buy property. But the government needs to open up land supply, expand avenues for investment, etcetera, and not apply limitations on property purchasing to bring prices down.
Charging a Tax on Empty Properties Could Help Dilute the Property Bubble
Southern Metropolis Daily: So what do you think should be done about China’s economy this year? Will there be any loosening of adjustments for the property market?
Mao Yushi: On this, let me just say that government adjustments are of no use. They are negligible compared to market forces. What the government can do is open up investment opportunities, allowing those with money to put that money in investments rather than purchasing property. This is what the government should do first and foremost. But it’s already late. In my view, the bursting of the property bubble is something that cannot be avoided.
Southern Metropolis Daily: It must burst? Is there no remedy?
Mao Yushi: (Things for several seconds) Let me offer one suggestion. Charge a tax on empty properties, and the result will be that rental prices drop dramatically. Then workers from outside the city could afford to rent apartments. If that were done I think it might have some benefit for the property market.
Of course, some people say this would be difficult to do, because it’s difficult to tell whether a property is vacant. But in my view, even if it’s very difficult, even if the costs of doing it are high, it is something that really needs doing, because the income would be very high. . . I think it could be done.
So a property that before could be rented for 2,000 could be rented for 1,000 [a month]. But seen from another angle, (this suggestion) does somewhat interfere with personal freedoms. But I think this is a matter of no alternative, otherwise the losses later will be even larger. When the property bubble bursts down the road, the properties will be worth even less.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Isn’t this suggestion of yours also a form of government regulation of the market?
Mao Yushi: It amounts to interfering with the market, but why is there a need to interfere? Because there is already a bubble. What use is restricting purchases? The purpose of [this] adjustment [I’m suggesting] is allowing people to live in these empty properties.

Public participation for effective monitoring of the CCP

The following post by Xie Wen (谢文), an IT expert and former general manager for Yahoo! China, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 8:16am Hong Kong time today, February 28, 2012. He Bing currently has just under 124,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Xie Wen’s post was made in response to a post from Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin (胡锡进) that was also deleted from Sina Weibo and is included in the Xie Wen re-post. Hu Xijin currently has 1.78 million followers on Weibo, according to numbers by Sina.

They can begin by not deleting [Weibo] posts. //@HuXijin: It’s because the leadership status of the Chinese Communist Party is not like that of political parties in the West that when it makes errors the impact on the country is also greater. Therefore, aside from scientific and democratic decision-making, oversight mechanisms for the CCP must be strong and effective, and should move steadily to widespread and substantive participation by the public. This sort of oversight can only be a process of innovating Chinese politics. It’s very tiring, yes. But exhaustion is the price of the development and prosperity of China.

The original Chinese-language post from Xie Wen, with the Hu Xijin post included, follows:

可以从不删贴开始。//@胡锡进: 正因为中共非同西方政党的领导地位,它犯错比西方政党犯错对国家的影响同样更大。因此除了决策的科学民主化,对中共的监督机制必须是强有力的,应逐渐加入民间广泛、实质的参与。这种监督只能是一次中国政治的创新过程。很累吧。累是诺大中国发展、繁荣而且不乱的代价。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Cutting down the National People's Congress

The following post by He Bing (何兵), deputy director of the School of Law at China University of Politics and Law, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 2:16pm Hong Kong time today, February 27, 2012. He Bing currently has more than 156,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
He Bing’s post dealt with the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s legislature and nominal highest state body, which meets in full session just once a year. The Standing Committee of the NPC went into session in Beijing today. The full session of the annual NPC will begin on March 5.

3,000 National People’s Congress (NPC) delegates meet, something unlike anything seen anywhere else in the world. Great forces are mustered, wasting the wealth of the people. How is it that what is clearly a big mistake isn’t reformed? I suggest collapsing the whole NPC into the standing committee [of the NPC), shrinking it down to about 300-500 people. This is a basic precondition of the normal operation of the National People’s Congress.

The original Chinese-language post from He Bing follows:

三千名人大代表开会,全世界绝无仅有。兴师动众,徒耗民财。这样明显的错误,为何不改?建议将人大与常委会合一,压缩至三百到五百人。这是人大机构能够正常运转的基本前提。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Reform: for the Party, or for the people?

The following post by Wang Junxiu (王俊秀), one of the founders of the blog platform Bokee.com and a well-known Chinese internet pioneer, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 2:16pm Hong Kong time today, February 27, 2012. Wang Junxiu currently has more than 157,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Wang’s post is a repost of a pair of posts by scholar Li Qingzhen (李清振) and Sina Weibo user “Shenzhen Lawyer” (法律资讯-文史典故).
Both of the posts concern a video recently surfacing on China’s internet in which Hu Dehua (胡德华), the third son of Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), the former General Secretary of the CCP who pioneered reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s — and whose death on April 15, 1989, helped to fuel student protests in China leading up to the Tiananmen massacre that June.
In the video, shown here as having been deleted, Hu Dehua says of his father: “The difference between him, Dad, and Old Deng was that one cared about saving the people and the other cared about saving the Party. After the Cultural Revolution ended, everything was stagnant and saving the people and Party were one and the same thing. Later, after all stomachs were full, people started having other demands, wanting the power to voice [their own demands]. Hu Yaobang believed people should always have a place to speak, that the freedom and power to speak were necessary. But Old Deng only permitted people to say the Party was good. Saying the Party was bad was not OK . . . So the first 10 years of reform were very different from the 20 years that followed.”

//@TeacherLiQingzhen: This sentence by Hu Dehua hits the nail on the head about two different kinds of reform over the past 30 years. //@ShenzhenLawyer: He Dehua talking about reform: [Is it about] saving the Party or saving the people?

The original Chinese-language post from Wang Junxiu follows:

//@李清振老师: 胡德华这段讲话,一语道破过去30多年两种不同的改革观。//@法律资讯-文史典故: 胡德华谈改革:救党还是救民


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Guangzhou official faked her resume?

The following post by Jian Guangzhou (简光洲), a reporter for Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post best known for his work in exposing the 2008 poisoned milk scandal, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:31pm Hong Kong time yesterday, February 22, 2012. Jian Guangzhou currently has just under 50,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Jian Guangzhou’s post is a response to another Weibo post, which we have archived here, alleging that a top Guangdong discipline inspection official, Wang Xiaoling (王晓玲) made false claims on her resume.

Oh powerful microblogs, please help me transmit this [news] to Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang (汪洋): 1. According to our Constitution, I have the right to legally look into to suspected counterfeiting of officials’ resumes; If the Yuexiu branch of the Guangzhou Office of Industry and Commerce continues to indulge and stand behind illegal conduct by . . . businesspeople I will be even crazier than @FangChouzi in biting into any officials connected to the Guangzhou Office of Industry and Commerce, even if it goes up to the provincial governor, even if I’m compelled to go as crazy as Yang Jia (杨佳).

The original Chinese-language post from Jian Guangzhou follows:

围观] //@广州退休一级警督谭树发遗属:万能的微博,请帮我递话给广东省委书记汪洋:1、根据宪法,我有权合法求证官员简历涉嫌造假;2、只要广州工商越秀分局,仍纵容偏袒令先父不瞑目的不法商家,我会比@方舟子 更疯狂咬住与广州工商有关联的任何官员,哪怕是最终关联省长,直至被逼到像杨佳一样疯狂


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Reading between the lines of Xi Jinping's U.S. visit

On January 28, 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited the United States. That day happened to by the first day of the Lunar New Year according to the Chinese calendar, a time of ringing out the old and ushering in the new. That visit by Deng Xiaoping was a unique and special “diplomacy of heads of state” (首脑外交) between China and the U.S. In 1989, [following the Tiananmen crackdown], China-U.S. relations dramatically worsened, and it was another eight years before a Chinese leader visited the United States.
After the October 26, 1997, Jiang Zemin visit to the U.S. the process of reciprocal visits by heads of state became more systematized, becoming a more formal “pattern” (模式).
For example, in 2002, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both made visits to the United States, with Jiang bringing China-U.S. contacts during his tenure neatly to a close and pointing the way for future [relations], and Hu visiting the United States in order to reaffirm and continue Jiang Zemin-era policy on the relationship.
We see this same pattern playing out as we approach the 18th Party Congress [later this year]. In January last year, Hu Jintao visited the United States in what was billed at home as “a trip to set the tone” of the China-U.S. relationship. This year we have vice-president Xi Jinping (习近平) visiting the United States, the chief task being implementation of the various agreements made by the two heads of state (Hu Jintao and Obama) in January last year — and at the same time opening a new chapter.
According to customary practice and especially according to the principles of Chinese officialdom (官场规则), the significance of this visit by Xi Jinping is huge, but it will not spell any major breakthroughs. If we turn our lens back on Hu Jintao’s first U.S. visit in 2002 and compare it to previous visits by Jiang Zemin we can see quite easily that Hu Jintao was very restrained at the time.
Needless to say, this visit by Xi Jinping also shows some differences from the 2002 Hu Jintao visit. During the time of his visit, Hu Jintao was already president, but Xi Jinping’s succession must wait for the 18th Party Congress. Therefore, a number of politicians and analysts in Washington, D.C., have with little avail cast about in Xi Jinping’s remarks during this visit for signs of the personal style and leadership concepts motivating this future leader.
Tonight I read through Xi Jinping’s speeches, remarks and dialogues during this visit (some as passed along by the media and by members of the U.S. Congress), and I think there are three sentences in particular that are instructive.
First Sentence: “The vast Pacific Ocean has ample space for China and the United States.”
This is something Xi Jinping said in a written interview with the Washington Post ahead of his U.S. trip, and in my view it has lasting charm.
There is another difference between this trip by Xi Jinping and that of Hu Jintao 10 years ago, and that is the fact that back in those days America was in the midst of a fierce war against terrorism, and it really needed China. Now the United States no longer talks about the war on terror. And since the second half of last year, in fact, the strategic center has shifted to the Asia-Pacific, something that has caused an uproar inside China and internationally.
Xi Jinping employs this somewhat poetic sentence to conceal a hard purpose in a softer sentiment, all at one time answering a whole series of questions. First of all, the fact of the U.S. shift to the Asia-Pacific has been wantonly exaggerated by some in the U.S. and China and elevated unnecessarily — particularly by certain dabbling experts in China and by media claptrap. Even the additional posting of a few score members of the U.S. Marine Corps has been read by these people as a “containment of China” (围堵中国) and as a sign of impending war.
This sentence from vice-president Xi Jinping clearly states that if the United States completely respects and makes allowances for the legitimate demands and core interests of various Asia-Pacific nations, and if it works constructively for the peace, stability and prosperity of the region, then China will not oppose the U.S. present in Asia — China welcomes you.
But these words carry a sting as well. On the one hand, they suggest the Asia-Pacific is vast enough to accommodate you, the United States. On the other hand, they imply that the Asia-Pacific can and in fact must accommodate China. The American presence in Asia should not and cannot push out Chinese power.
Finally, this sentence marks the first time a high-level Chinese leader has so conspicuously put China and the United States together, referring to both as “great nations” (大国). This signals a slight departure from the era of excessive modesty (谦虚), or even self-abasement, from the strategy of “hiding one’s capacities and biding one’s time” (韬光养晦). China has stepped onto the stage of major power foreign relations. This sentence was full of suggestion, foreshadowing the fact that the Xi Jinping visit would evince a great nation bearing.
Second Sentence: “There are words in a popular Chinese song that go like this, ‘Dare to ask where the road is; the road is right under your feet.'”
When talking about China-U.S. relations Xi Jinping used a number of interesting expressions, most of which have never before been used by previous leaders. He said, for example, that China-U.S. relations “are without precedent and without the guide of prior experience, so [we] can only ‘cross the river by feeling the stones’ (a reference to Deng Xiaoping’s statement on Chinese economic reforms), or “cut paths across the mountains and build bridges across the rivers” (words used before by Hillary Clinton).
The above remark by Xi Jinping addresses a predominating view, which is that we have never in history has a precedent for a dominant power and a rising power that coexist peacefully and not come to blows. And the view that “China and the U.S. cannot avoid war” (中美必有一战) has it market both ins China and the U.S.
During his visit, Xi Jinping also used a very affirmative statement [for the China-U.S. relationship], saying that, “Eliminating various obstacles to continue as friends and as partners, is the only correct choice in the bilateral China-U.S. relationship.” Words like “the only” (唯一) have seldom been used in the context of [China’s] foreign relations before, particularly with the United States. Because in the China-U.S. relationship, China has always been in a position of relative weakness. How the relationship has developed has been largely determined by the views and actions of American policy-makers, and China has had no choice but to “calmly cope” (沉着应对) with the situation. A leader in a passive position will no use an expression like “the only correct choice.”
Clearly, a great nation wants to move from a “passive” posture to an “active” one, and this sentence amounts to Chinese leaders saying they will move from a passive to an active position in China-U.S. relations, that they have the confidence and the capacity to develop the bilateral relationship.
The phrase “dar[ing] to ask where the road is” shows Xi Jinping’s sense of confidence. When he says that there are no precedents to set the tone in the China-U.S. relationship for the future, this implies that the future path will rely on future leaders, and it also suggests that he will take a new road as new circumstances merit.
Third Sentence: “On the question of human rights, there is no best, only better.”
While the Taiwan issue is still the biggest one in the China-U.S. relationship, Beijing has adjusted its policies since Ma Ying-jeou came to office, and the situation has already changed. I’m confident that Chinese on both sides of the straits have the capacity to resolve their own issues. Moreover, if extreme events can be avoided, the possibility of the United States turning back and entangling itself deeper in the Taiwan issue is increasingly unlikely.
As for other issues in the China-U.S. relationship, such as trade issues, border disputes in the South China Sea, piracy issues, energy and climate issues, environmental protection, etcetera — none of these are major issues, and all perhaps are within the realm of the “controllable”. Certainly, they will not really impact the larger China-U.S. relationship.
The biggest issue between the U.S. and China remains ideological in nature, about political systems and values. These issues emerge in bilateral talks over the question of human rights. Human rights issues have been entangled with China-U.S. relations for a very long time, and these are not easy to resolve.
During Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Senator John McCain criticized China’s human rights record. Their criticisms, moreover, were voiced in severe and seemingly unfriendly tones. But astonishingly, Xi Jinping’s response showed great capability and offered food for thought.
I call his response “astonishing” first of all because it differs from the attitude other national Party leaders have had on this issue, and secondly because Xi Jinping’s response this time was calmer, more reasonable, and even elegant in comparison to this attitude when he visited Mexico three years ago.
After Biden criticized China’s human rights record, Xi Jinping emphasized: “On the question of human rights, there is no best, only better.” Some commentators inside China have read this as a jab by Xi Jinping against a U.S. human rights situation that isn’t ideal, and this certainly makes sense when you consider that other leaders have said as much in the past. But I think the remark from Xi Jinping shouldn’t be understood in this way, particularly if you consider the official Chinese translation: “Of course there is always room for improvement when it comes to human rights.”
One commentator on Phoenix TV suggested this translation was off, but I would suggest that while we often have seen inaccurate translations from the foreign ministry in the past, this is not such as case. Once translated into English, this sort of neutral remark, that “there is no best, only better,” leaves America wondering exactly what you mean to say — which is to say, it’s as though it wasn’t said at all.
Later, when Xi Jinping responded to McCain’s criticisms over the issue of human rights in Tibet, he spoke more directly. According to McCain’s own statement on the exchange, Xi Jinping’s response was: “McCain, your bluntness is well known in China.” He then continued: “We have a long road ahead of us. And as you know, America also had many problems in the past.” McCain said that while Xi Jinping did not directly answer his questions on human rights, he views the exchange as “open and frank.” The meeting happened behind closed doors.
In fact, McCain has an insufficient understanding of Chinese political culture. Not only did Xi Jinping answer him, but in fact, in my view, the answer was ingenious. When Xi pointed out that “America also had many problems in the past,” he was affirming America’s progress; and when he said that, “We have a long road ahead of us,” he had two meanings, not just admitting that China had its shortcomings (that the country is where America was in the past) but also pointed to China objective (becoming a developed nation). Generally speaking, countries around the world share a basic standard in thinking on human rights. But owing to differences in economic development, cultural background and other factors, the human rights situations in various countries differ markedly. The crux is not whether there are gaps, but how these gaps are seen and understood.
While Xi Jinping did talk about China’s national circumstances and culture, this is the first time, to my recollection, that a Chinese leader has not raised the issue of human rights “standards” (标准) when facing questions from Americans on human rights. In the past, our national leaders have routinely said that there are differences in the way our two countries understand and assess human rights. What you Americans see as good, we see as bad. It’s this way of thinking that has China coming out with its own “White Paper on Human Rights in the United States” (美国人权状况白皮书) whenever the U.S. issues its own white paper on China’s human rights situation. This spirals into a war of words over whose human rights situation is the best.
But these people should study Xi Jinping’s remarks: there is no best, only better. There is always room for improvement when it comes to human rights.
Given its level of development, China’s human rights situation cannot be compared to that of the United States and other Western countries, which are far more prosperous. There is no shame in this. But if for the sake of face you wield the power and privilege in your hands to twist the facts and defy generally recognized human value standards, setting up your own human rights “standards” for your exclusive benefit, this is shameful.
This article, written on February 16, 2012, was published in Chinese in World Chinese Weekly and also posted to Yang Hengjun’s weblog.

Potty Politics


On February 19, 2012, a group of female college students from several universities in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou staged an “occupy male toilets” protest Chinese media referred to with the more sanitized term “performance art.” Bristling over the problem of extremely long lines outside public toilets for females — by contrast, of course, to short waits for males — the young women demanded in an open letter a new law calling for more and better toilet facilities for women. Meanwhile, they occupied male toilets and appropriated them for use by women, preventing men from entering. In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to QQ.com, a female student stands victoriously atop a porcelain toilet, brandishing the red flag of revolution.