Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Chongqing hired bloggers to toot its horn

The following post by Zhao Chu (赵楚), a military affairs expert in Shanghai who serves as chief editor of Military Affairs (Point), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 1:31pm Hong Kong time today, February 20, 2012. Zhao Chu currently has just under 119,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

The propaganda office of Chongqing used public funds to invite 32 [so-called] well-known bloggers to evaluate Chongqing, and the resulting news report says that these bloggers believe “Chongqing is a city of ideas and ideals.” I’ve been active online since 1998 and I’ve never heard of any of these well-known bloggers. How strange! Everyone judge for themselves. http://t.cn/SAMo3f

The link provided in the post is for this article posted to an official news website in Chongqing in November 2011, which explains how the city invited 32 “well-known bloggers” from People’s Daily Online, Xinhua News Agency, Sina.com and other sites and “online communities” to take a tour of Chongqing and learn about its policies.
A re-post of the above post, made by user Xiao Dang (小党), a Southern Metropolis Daily journalists with just under 23,000 followers on Sina Weibo, was also deleted by site censors. The Xiao Dang post said simply: “Many of these [bloggers] are actually fifty-centers [hired propagandists] from Chongqing.”
The original Chinese-language post from Zhao Chu follows:

重庆宣传部门花公款请了32位著名博主重庆品鉴,最后新闻报道说,名博主们认为“重庆是一座有思想有理想的城市。”我自98年开始上网,竟然32位名博主一个都不认得,惭愧啊。大家认认。http://t.cn/SAMo3f

Zhou Ruijin: reform and the way forward

As Party leaders position themselves politically ahead of this year’s 18th Party Congress, an unruly process (e.g., Wang Lijun) stirring behind a veneer of national unity, various sides are trying to shore up their ideological positions as well. That is why, in recent weeks, there has been a ratcheting up of rhetoric over the 20th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour,” the 1992 junket — some have called it a “quasi-imperial tour” — in which the architect of China’s reform policy reinvigorated reforms against staunch opposition from conservatives on the left.
Coming between the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen crackdown and the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, Deng’s tour was an important political event shaping China’s dominant political-economic agenda for years after. Essentially, Deng pushed for deeper reform and silenced divisive left-right wrangling over whether reforms were fundamentally “capitalist” (姓资) or “socialist” (姓社) in nature.
Chalking up another important date alongside the “southern tour” anniversary, yesterday, February 19, marked 15 years since Deng Xiaoping’s passing — another occasion inside China to turn the debate over Deng’s legacy into a broader discussion of reform.
Twenty years on from the “southern tour,” and 15 years after Deng Xiaoping’s death, China is an undisputed global economic power, now the world’s second-largest economy, a member of the World Trade Organization, and a crucial partner in dealing with the global financial crisis.
But many, including senior leaders and prominent economists, have warned that reforms in China now face another crucial moment, not unlike that in 1992. Reforms, they say, have come to a standstill as vested interests in the Party have grown stronger and more entrenched, resistant to the changes necessary to deal with rising social problems. [See also Qin Xiao: “Reform must not stop in its tracks“].


[ABOVE: In a photo posted by new media entrepreneur Isaac Mao to Flickr.com on February 17, China-Europe International Business School professor Su Xiaonian delivers a lecture at the school and says there have been no meaningful reforms in China since 1996. The only “reform” on his post-1996 list: China’s WTO entry.]
Speaking out today through an interview pushed on the front page of Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily is Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金), the former editor-in-chief of Liberation Daily who also served as deputy editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.
Zhou, who is often regarded today as the chief voice of the pro-reform faction within the CCP, was also an instrumental voice in China ahead of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.”
In early 1991, one year before the tour, it was a series of commentary pieces written by “Huang Fuping” (皇甫平) in the Liberation Daily that ignited the divisive debate over the direction of reforms. Zhou Ruijin was one of the authors behind the pen name “Huang Fuping” and the essays, which called for an intensification of reforms.
Below is a image of today’s front page at Southern Metropolis Daily, with a large headline at the top, just to the right of a portrait of Deng Xiaoping, that reads: “Reforms have reached another historical moment at which we must forge ahead with all our strength.” The slightly smaller headline just above it reads: “Commemorating the 15th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s passing, Zhou Ruijin, one of the [writers behind] ‘Huang Fuping’, revisits the southern talks.”

[ABOVE: The front page of the February 20, 2012, edition of Southern Metropolis Daily.]
Readers are then directed to page A06, where a half-page article provides an overview of the “Huang Fuping” series of essays and the southern talks and then an interview with Zhou Ruijin, who is pictured at the bottom right.
Zhou’s argument is essentially that China must break through the recalcitrance and “loss of reform energy” represented by the special interests that have come to dominate China’s economy, and the country must reach a new consensus on pushing reforms forward.

[ABOVE: Page A06 of the February 20, 2012, edition of Southern Metropolis Daily.]
There are also references in the Southern Metropolis Daily interview to China’s regime of “stability preservation,” or weiwen (维稳), an expensive mass mobilization of police against Chinese with legitimate grievances stemming from economic and political marginalization.
While some within the CCP regard “stability preservation” as necessary in the context of rising social unrest in China, others see it as fundamentally self-defeating, generating an endless cycle of violence and dis-enfranchisement that fuels further unrest.
In one of his more memorable lines, Zhou Ruijin says: “As the masses face trouble and distress, as they face danger and chaos, Party secretaries [i.e., top leaders in China at all levels] must move ahead of the police, listening attentively to and resolving the demands of the people; they must not hide behind the lines, exacerbating tensions between the government and the people.”
A partial translation of the Zhou Ruijin piece follows, but readers are strongly encouraged to spend time with the Chinese original. This is an important piece in the ongoing tug-of-war over reforms ahead of the 18th Party Congress later this year.
For further background on how the discussion of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” has come into play ahead of leadership changes later this year, readers might turn to this article in The National yesterday, and to this video analysis from Gao Wenqian, which notes other recent Deng coverage in Guangdong newspapers.

The Roots of the Loss of Reform Energy Are Not About Limits in Understanding
Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金), one of the people under the pen name “Huang Fuping” (皇甫平), reviews the southern tour talks and says the limits lie in the entangling of interests and the unwillingness to let go
By Zhou Hucheng (周虎城)
A year before [Deng] Xiaoping’s southern talks, China had a debate over the essays of Huang Fuping. This series of four essays by “Huang Fuping” were organized and published by the Liberation Daily. They conveyed the spirit of the latest directions on reform and opening by Deng Xiaoping, and they were his views and opinions as discussed when he was in Shanghai spending the Spring Festival holiday in 1991. After they were published that year, these essays prompted a massive response in Chinese society.
In recent days, our Nanfang Daily reporter interviewed Zhou Ruijin, one of the [people behind the pen name] “Huang Fuping.” He believes that revisiting [Deng] Xiaoping’s southern talks is about ensuring that reforms become the dominant mainstream value among those in the Chinese Communist Party. He has a strong positive view on Guangdong’s moves to liberate ideas (解放思想) and to re-invent social management, and he urges Guangdong to continue moving at the forefront, paving a “green lane” (绿道) [to future national development] in the hearts of the people.
Following on [initial] reforms [China] did not keep a rein on public power, capital was enlarged on the basis of market mechanisms, and [entrenched] special interests emerged. Deepening economic reforms, and promoting social reforms, administrative reforms and political system reforms, is needed in order to break through “increasingly entrenched” (步步为营) “special interest groups” (特殊利益集团) that have emerged on the back of incomplete market reforms.
Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, today’s leaders and cadres are more informed (知识化) and more professional (专业化水准更高), and they are not divorced from the mainstream sentiments of the people. The loss of momentum in pushing reforms forward comes from the snare of knotty and deeply-rooted difficulties and from the entanglement of interests, making [special interests] reluctant to give a free hand to reforms.
Today reforms suffer from a lack of understanding about how to reform, from an unwillingness to reform, daring not reform, and from empty talk about reform. So we have reform on paper, reform on our lips, but no attempt to assess our situation or take action. Or on the other hand, we have action [that is ill-considered and] that just just rocks the boat.
Today the crux of question of whether leaders can bear the great responsibility of reform is not about their heads, but rather about their backends. It’s not hard to keep a clear head. The difficulty comes in whether to sit [one’s backend down] with the special interests, or to sit with the people, to sit with the central government and with the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
As the masses face trouble and distress, as they face danger and chaos, Party secretaries [i.e., top leaders in China at all levels] must move ahead of the police, listening attentively to and resolving the demands of the people; they must not hide behind the lines, exacerbating tensions between the government and the people.
Reforms have reached another historical moment at which we must forge ahead with all our strength
Reporter: How do you view the historical significance and status of [Deng] Xiaoping’s southern talks?
Zhou Ruijin: Those who experienced it will still recall that the late 1980s and early 1990s were an important historical juncture when China was questioning where reforms should go. There was a fierce debate over whether they should be “market orientated” (市场取向) or “planning orientated” (计划取向), and the latter “planning orientated” camp was gaining the upper hand. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee [in December 1978] had laid down the path of reform and opening, but this was coming under serious challenge. For example, there was at the time a very “leftist” article that said that “the core, focus and crux of the question of reform is what in what [political] orientation to carry out reforms,” that there was one view of reforms that in fact was “capitalist” (资本主义化). Some comrades blotted out all subtleties and divided reform views into one with a “capitalist surname” and another with a “socialist surname” (姓资姓社).
This significance of Deng Xiaoping’s southern talks lay in the astonishing courage and insight of this old man, who while being alert to the “right” essentially guarded against [the ascendance of] the “left.” In economic terms, he argued that development was the overriding concern, that the planned economy did not equal socialism, that the market economy did not equal capitalism. Planned economics and the market, [he said], were both economic strategies. In ideological terms, he raised the concept of the “three benefits” standard (三个有利于) in determining the legitimacy of reform. As he went south, [Deng] Xiaoping spoke on each leg of the trip, from Wuhan all the way to Guangdong. This was a sunny journey to restart reforms and reinvigorate the popular will . . .
As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the southern talks, China has already now become the world’s second-largest economy. It has become an important ballast in dealing with the global financial crisis. But various tensions and interest conflicts within China are also gathering and increasing. Reforms have again reached a historical moment at which we must forge ahead with all our strength.
Looking at the grassroots [of society] and online public opinion, you can see there is a strong base of support for reform. This must be leveraged, bringing the will of the Party and the people together [on reform] and promoting the innovation of social management. Like Guangdong, [we must] give priority to and promote social construction (社会建设), using government and civil society strength in coordination to resolve the complex problems facing our society in transition. Just as [Deng] Xiaoping said that year: “Once certain something must be done, we must dare to experiment, carving open a new path.”

Unbearable Gall


In February 2012 the planned public listing plans of Fujian’s Rui Zhen Tang (归真堂), a supplier of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), drew criticism over the company’s sale of bear bile, a valued Chinese medicinal fluid produced in the livers of Asiatic black bears, which are kept in captivity for “bile milking.” Addressing a backlash over this practice on China’s internet and in the media, the China Association of Traditional Chinese Medicine held a press conference on February 16. The association said that procedures used today for bile milking from live bears were painless and did not harm the health of bears. At the press conference, the head of the association, Fang Shuting (房书亭), said: “The bile milking process is just as simple as turning on the water tap. It’s natural and painless, and after it’s finished the bear can go off and play happily. I don’t feel there’s anything unusual about it. You could even say it’s comfortable!” In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to his blog at QQ.com, a distressed bear looks on as a doctor in white scrubs holds a bowl under a tap protruding from the bear’s middle and bleeding at the point of entry.

I choose Wang Lijun

The following post by Liang Mutian (梁幕天), a magazine editor with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:42am Hong Kong time today, February 17, 2012. Liang Mutian currently has just under 56,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The post is a response to this microblog post from Liang Mutian, not deleted, about how the Ministry of Public Security is launching an event in which the public is encouraged to select people in public security they regard as model figures. Wang Lijun, the former top cop in Chongqing often regarded as the right-hand man of the powerful Bo Xilai (薄熙来), was reportedly taken to Beijing by security police after apparently fleeing Chongqing and taking refuge in the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. The incident, a highly sensitive one for China, has raised many questions about Bo Xilai’s future and about internal wrangling within the CCP ahead of a leadership transition later this year.
Sina Weibo users responding to the original Liang Mutian post all agree in nominating Wang Lijun as an exemplary model.

//@jacky-wl: Wang Lijun //@白桦林Rainy:Wang Lijun //@家有烈犬不逗儿:Wang Lijun //@枝枝710:Wang Lijun //@小祁5810:Wang Lijun //@王国富9: Wang Lijun //@钧杰侯: //@Haliluja: Wang Lijun //@likuer33: Wang Lijun //@胡杨树: Wang Lijun //@赵大鹏: Wang Lijun //@风竹欲: Wang Lijun //@稳步如飞: Wang Lijun//@好摄子良: I would choose Wang Lijun!

The original Chinese-language post follows:

//@jacky-wl: 王立军 //@白桦林Rainy:王立军 //@家有烈犬不逗儿:王立军 //@枝枝710:王立军 //@小祁5810:王立军 //@王国富9: 王立军 //@钧杰侯: //@Haliluja: 王立军 //@likuer33: 王立军 //@胡杨树: 王立军 //@赵大鹏: 王立军 //@风竹欲: 王立军 //@稳步如飞: 王立军//@好摄子良: 我评选王立军吧哈哈


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

In war of words, Hong Kong and China need cool heads

The war of words between Hong Kong and mainland China, which intensified earlier this month with an ad in Hong Kong’s Apple Daily likening mainlanders coming to the SAR to “invading locusts,” continues to boil on the internet. For an overview of the row, readers can turn to our story last week, or to this video summary by Link TV.
For another perspective on this story, we turn today to veteran Chinese television journalist Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇), executive news editor for Hong Kong-based Phoenix Television.
In the piece, published recently by China Newsweekly, Luqiu Luwei argues that of course neither side can do without the other, and that there is a general need for cooler heads to prioritize facts over personal attacks.

So which side really can’t do without the other, Hong Kong or the mainland?
China Newsweekly
February 15, 2012
Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇)
When I saw the last line in the advertisement purchased by Hong Kong internet users in Apple Daily on February 1, which said, “If there was no Hong Kong, you would all be done for,” I thought immediately of something you hear all the time from mainlanders: “If it wasn’t for the mainland, the ‘fragrant harbor’ of Hong Kong would have stunk long ago.”
Showing that this side or that would be in trouble without the other is actually a really simple thing to do. Either side can come up with countless examples to support an argument they are determined not to let go of.
Some people in mainland China are particularly fond of one example, which is that if it weren’t for the mainland providing water and foodstuffs Hong Kongers wouldn’t be able to survive.
During the Hong Kong drought of 1963, the British Hong Kong Government introduced water restriction policies. The government proposed the idea of purchasing water from the mainland, and if this hadn’t been approved by Zhou Enlai, beginning the Dongjiang Water Supply Project (东江水供水工程), then the people of Hong Kong would have suffered a much longer period of water shortage, because at the time the desalinization of sea water was costly and the technology not yet mature. But this of course this is a mutually beneficial exchange, and the purchase of water from Guangdong by the SAR is expected to bring in 3.54, 3.74 and 3.96 billion yuan respectively in the coming three years alone, an annual increase of 5.8 percent. That’s a great boon for enterprises in Guangdong supplying water.
As for food, while mainland supplies of vegetables account for more than 90 percent of the market in Hong Kong, consumers in fact do have a choice between mainland products and products imported at zero tariff from other regions.
Most of the vegetables imported from the mainland directly impact Hong Kong’s own agricultural sector. Add to this the fact that Hong Kong does not support local agriculture from a policy standpoint, and this spells the gradual disappearance of Hong Kong agriculture. Moreover, because of the Dongjiang Water Supply Project, Hong Kong’s government has slowed development of desalinization technology. There are some voices in Hong Kong who say this is a strategic move on the part of the central CCP leadership, which seeks to enhance the SAR’s dependency on the mainland.
Some Hong Kongers are fond of making the point that if the colony of Hong Kong had not been a factor from the Qing dynasty up to the present day,and particularly during the time of the Xinhai Revolution, there would have been no base for revolution and no source of funding for revolution. And as for the 1978 opening and reform policy, if it hadn’t been for Hong Kong money flowing into the mainland there would have been no development of Shenzhen, and there would have been no hope for the smooth progress of economic reforms. But while this certainly does show the importance of Hong Kong in the process of economic growth and democratization for China, it does not support the idea that without Hong Kong there would be no present-day China as we know it.
As for those Hong Kongers who ridicule mainlanders as locusts, they only see those tourists flowing into Hong Kong and those mothers coming to Hong Kong to give birth as enjoying the benefits the SAR has to offer. What they don’t see are the benefits for Hong Kong’s economy resulting from these visitors — how these private medical clinics are constantly growing, and how as the retail sector benefits this creates more jobs for the territory. In various ways all Hong Kongers benefit from the income that derives from mainland tourism. As for inflationary pressures on housing and commodities, and public resource shortages, its the government in Hong Kong that bears the responsibility.
Naturally, if mainland travelers go to Hong Kong or other places around the world harboring a sense that they are saviors, there is one thing they should bear in mind, and that is that much of their purchasing is fueled by the fact that they cannot buy inexpensive or safe products inside China, so this is just about taking what they need.
So far as this attitude among mainland travelers is concerned, Hong Kongers also need to examine their own attitudes. Since Hong Kong’s handover in 1997 Hong Kong media have been able to accompany Chinese leaders on overseas tours. And every time they have an opportunity to raise questions, my Hong Kong colleagues can’t avoid asking about what preferential policies the central leadership will afford Hong Kong, or about what the attitude of the central leadership is toward the selection of Hong Kong’s chief executive. For quite some time I’ve felt with a sense of sadness that the one country two systems arrangement and Hong Kong self-governance is something Hong Kongers have forfeited themselves, always gazing north to the divine land, speculating about what “father” is thinking. This attitude has spread from the SAR government right on down through its political parties, the business community, the media and general society.
If some Hong Kongers want to look at mainlanders as invading locusts, perhaps Hong Kongers themselves should ask whether this description might apply to their own migrations in 1989 and 1997, when a sense of insecurity drove many to emigrate to other countries. Look at Vancouver, Canada, for example. If it hadn’t been for the sense, after 1997, that Hong Kong had remained stable — and that opportunities in Canada were lacking — there wouldn’t have been the drifting back of Hong Kongers that we have seen.
Taking advantage and avoiding damage is only human. When so many Hong Kongers were similarly motivated back in those days, why do they have such a problem with mainlanders doing the same thing? Twenty years ago it was Taiwanese mothers filling maternity wards in California. They traveled across the ocean with their stuck-out bellies so that their children could be American citizens and have futures their parents thought of as more hopeful. Now it’s mainland mothers filling up the maternity wards. Even if they sneak over, it’s still for the sake of their children, because they lack a sense of security.
There is no way either side of this bickering could bring the other around. What we need to turn our attention to are the facts, talking about the issues rather than attacking people. Of course, it may be hard to hear [complaints like those in the Apple Daily ad], but speaking openly about such concerns is still better than bottling them up inside.
Antagonism is rooted in prejudice. We need to think about where these feelings come from. Isolated cases of contact between Hong Kongers and mainlanders have made the concept of China and what it means concrete for many Hong Kong people. But how can we ensure that individuals are not made out to represent the whole? Is it right to transfer feelings of concern and dissatisfaction with Hong Kong’s future prospects away from the Hong Kong government and on to the shoulders of mainland tourists? And how can some mainland tourists who come to Hong Kong throw off their colored glasses, like the idea of China’s century of shame (百年耻辱) [i.e., the colonial experience], and accept that there are many things about Hong Kong as a population and a society that they don’t yet understand?
If it’s true that information is incomplete inside mainland China, and that this impacts the views and judgements of mainlanders, it’s perhaps equally true that in Hong Kong, where information flows freely, many people choose to turn a blind eye to issues, their facts fogged over with indignation.
In the words of the English philosopher Bertrand Russell: “Love is wise, hatred is foolish.”

He Weifang: handle Wang Lijun case by rule of law

The following post by Chinese legal scholar He Weifang (贺卫方) about the recent Wang Lijun case was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 5am Hong Kong time today, February 16, 2012. He Weifang currently has just under 389,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
He Weifang’s post was made in response to another post, so far not deleted, suggesting that Wang Lijun’s wife, Xiao Shuli (肖淑丽), and his younger brother Wang Lihui (王立辉) had approached Chongqing authorities for information on Wang Lijun but had only been told that the investigation was ongoing and information could not be shared. When they tried to meet with Bo Xilai, the post said, their request was denied.
To this, He Weifang responded:

Why can’t the platform of rule of law be used, fairly and transparently handling cases of this kind? What danger is there in family members visiting? When will we be able to part ways with this cycle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? I call on the authorities to move in the direction of rule of law!

The original Chinese-language post from He Weifang follows:

为什么不能用法治的平台,透明公正地处理这类事项?家属探望一下,又有什么危险?我们何时能够走出这种冤冤相报的循环?呼吁当局走向法治!//@怎么验2012: 回复@Khemma:恩,于建嵘老师那里应该还有大家冬天捐的棉衣 //@Khemma:绝大讽刺~北京桥洞下的访民可以考虑挤一挤给这两位腾点住处。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Business leaders accompanying Xi Jinping on U.S. visit

The following post by Wall Street Journal Chinese (华尔街日报中文网) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 4:30am Hong Kong time today, February 16, 2012. Wall Street Journal Chinese currently has just under 751,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

[Chinese business leaders accompanying Xi Jinping on U.S. visit] Among those accompanying Chinese vice-president Xi Jinping (习近平) on his visit to the U.S. this week there are many of the most influential Chinese business leaders, including state-owned enterprise bosses and also private enterprise bosses. This article introduces a number of these people. http://t.cn/zO2Z0mD


The original Chinese-language post follows:

【陪同习近平访美的中国商界领袖】- 本周陪同中国国家副主席习近平访美的随行人员中﹐有不少中国最有实力的商界领袖﹐既有国企老总﹐也有民营企业负责人。本文对其中一部分人进行了介绍。http://t.cn/zO2Z0mD


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Sucking the Private Economy Dry


According to a February 2012 report in Guangdong’s Southern Weekend newspaper, China’s four largest commercial banks each raked in profits of more than 300 million yuan a day in 2011. Meanwhile, the paper said, profits in China’s real economy (实体经济) had been “paper thin.” Financing has tightened for private enterprises, which does not bode well, it said, for the national economy. In the following cartoon, run by Guangdong’s Southern Weekend newspaper and posted by artist Cao Yi (曹一) to QQ.com, a banker sits comfortably in the clouds on the left, sucking all moisture up with a straw. Meanwhile, back down on the ground (to the right), the boss of a private enterprise looks longingly up toward the clouds, hoping for rain, as he holds a withering plant labeled “company profits.”

Purple Prose Prisoner


In February 2012, Chinese media reported on the official statement of repentance (悔过书) written by Yin Chunyan (尹春燕), the former head of the assets division of the property office in Hunan province’s Zhuzhou city (株洲), who had recently been sentenced to eight years in jail for corruption. Yin’s statement, quite literary in style, reportedly ran over 3,300 characters — roughly six to seven thousand words in English — and even quoted from the philosopher Immanuel Kant: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: The starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.” An official with China’s Commission for Discipline Inspection was quoted in the media as saying that “Yi Chunyan’s statement of repentance had the best styled Chinese of any letter we have seen before from a [Party] cadre.” In this cartoon, posted by artist Chen Chunming (陈春鸣) to his blog at QQ.com, a prisoner sits dejectedly in his cell as the sign over his head reads: “PRIZE: ‘Detention Cup’, for the best styled letter of repentance.” A rat in the cell looks on and remarks with admiration, “Ah, rapeseed flowers!” (a term of praise meaning that someone is gifted).