Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Reform: for the Party, or for the people?

The following post by Wang Junxiu (王俊秀), one of the founders of the blog platform Bokee.com and a well-known Chinese internet pioneer, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 2:16pm Hong Kong time today, February 27, 2012. Wang Junxiu currently has more than 157,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Wang’s post is a repost of a pair of posts by scholar Li Qingzhen (李清振) and Sina Weibo user “Shenzhen Lawyer” (法律资讯-文史典故).
Both of the posts concern a video recently surfacing on China’s internet in which Hu Dehua (胡德华), the third son of Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), the former General Secretary of the CCP who pioneered reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s — and whose death on April 15, 1989, helped to fuel student protests in China leading up to the Tiananmen massacre that June.
In the video, shown here as having been deleted, Hu Dehua says of his father: “The difference between him, Dad, and Old Deng was that one cared about saving the people and the other cared about saving the Party. After the Cultural Revolution ended, everything was stagnant and saving the people and Party were one and the same thing. Later, after all stomachs were full, people started having other demands, wanting the power to voice [their own demands]. Hu Yaobang believed people should always have a place to speak, that the freedom and power to speak were necessary. But Old Deng only permitted people to say the Party was good. Saying the Party was bad was not OK . . . So the first 10 years of reform were very different from the 20 years that followed.”

//@TeacherLiQingzhen: This sentence by Hu Dehua hits the nail on the head about two different kinds of reform over the past 30 years. //@ShenzhenLawyer: He Dehua talking about reform: [Is it about] saving the Party or saving the people?

The original Chinese-language post from Wang Junxiu follows:

//@李清振老师: 胡德华这段讲话,一语道破过去30多年两种不同的改革观。//@法律资讯-文史典故: 胡德华谈改革:救党还是救民


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Guangzhou official faked her resume?

The following post by Jian Guangzhou (简光洲), a reporter for Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post best known for his work in exposing the 2008 poisoned milk scandal, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:31pm Hong Kong time yesterday, February 22, 2012. Jian Guangzhou currently has just under 50,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Jian Guangzhou’s post is a response to another Weibo post, which we have archived here, alleging that a top Guangdong discipline inspection official, Wang Xiaoling (王晓玲) made false claims on her resume.

Oh powerful microblogs, please help me transmit this [news] to Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang (汪洋): 1. According to our Constitution, I have the right to legally look into to suspected counterfeiting of officials’ resumes; If the Yuexiu branch of the Guangzhou Office of Industry and Commerce continues to indulge and stand behind illegal conduct by . . . businesspeople I will be even crazier than @FangChouzi in biting into any officials connected to the Guangzhou Office of Industry and Commerce, even if it goes up to the provincial governor, even if I’m compelled to go as crazy as Yang Jia (杨佳).

The original Chinese-language post from Jian Guangzhou follows:

围观] //@广州退休一级警督谭树发遗属:万能的微博,请帮我递话给广东省委书记汪洋:1、根据宪法,我有权合法求证官员简历涉嫌造假;2、只要广州工商越秀分局,仍纵容偏袒令先父不瞑目的不法商家,我会比@方舟子 更疯狂咬住与广州工商有关联的任何官员,哪怕是最终关联省长,直至被逼到像杨佳一样疯狂


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Reading between the lines of Xi Jinping's U.S. visit

On January 28, 1979, Deng Xiaoping visited the United States. That day happened to by the first day of the Lunar New Year according to the Chinese calendar, a time of ringing out the old and ushering in the new. That visit by Deng Xiaoping was a unique and special “diplomacy of heads of state” (首脑外交) between China and the U.S. In 1989, [following the Tiananmen crackdown], China-U.S. relations dramatically worsened, and it was another eight years before a Chinese leader visited the United States.
After the October 26, 1997, Jiang Zemin visit to the U.S. the process of reciprocal visits by heads of state became more systematized, becoming a more formal “pattern” (模式).
For example, in 2002, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both made visits to the United States, with Jiang bringing China-U.S. contacts during his tenure neatly to a close and pointing the way for future [relations], and Hu visiting the United States in order to reaffirm and continue Jiang Zemin-era policy on the relationship.
We see this same pattern playing out as we approach the 18th Party Congress [later this year]. In January last year, Hu Jintao visited the United States in what was billed at home as “a trip to set the tone” of the China-U.S. relationship. This year we have vice-president Xi Jinping (习近平) visiting the United States, the chief task being implementation of the various agreements made by the two heads of state (Hu Jintao and Obama) in January last year — and at the same time opening a new chapter.
According to customary practice and especially according to the principles of Chinese officialdom (官场规则), the significance of this visit by Xi Jinping is huge, but it will not spell any major breakthroughs. If we turn our lens back on Hu Jintao’s first U.S. visit in 2002 and compare it to previous visits by Jiang Zemin we can see quite easily that Hu Jintao was very restrained at the time.
Needless to say, this visit by Xi Jinping also shows some differences from the 2002 Hu Jintao visit. During the time of his visit, Hu Jintao was already president, but Xi Jinping’s succession must wait for the 18th Party Congress. Therefore, a number of politicians and analysts in Washington, D.C., have with little avail cast about in Xi Jinping’s remarks during this visit for signs of the personal style and leadership concepts motivating this future leader.
Tonight I read through Xi Jinping’s speeches, remarks and dialogues during this visit (some as passed along by the media and by members of the U.S. Congress), and I think there are three sentences in particular that are instructive.
First Sentence: “The vast Pacific Ocean has ample space for China and the United States.”
This is something Xi Jinping said in a written interview with the Washington Post ahead of his U.S. trip, and in my view it has lasting charm.
There is another difference between this trip by Xi Jinping and that of Hu Jintao 10 years ago, and that is the fact that back in those days America was in the midst of a fierce war against terrorism, and it really needed China. Now the United States no longer talks about the war on terror. And since the second half of last year, in fact, the strategic center has shifted to the Asia-Pacific, something that has caused an uproar inside China and internationally.
Xi Jinping employs this somewhat poetic sentence to conceal a hard purpose in a softer sentiment, all at one time answering a whole series of questions. First of all, the fact of the U.S. shift to the Asia-Pacific has been wantonly exaggerated by some in the U.S. and China and elevated unnecessarily — particularly by certain dabbling experts in China and by media claptrap. Even the additional posting of a few score members of the U.S. Marine Corps has been read by these people as a “containment of China” (围堵中国) and as a sign of impending war.
This sentence from vice-president Xi Jinping clearly states that if the United States completely respects and makes allowances for the legitimate demands and core interests of various Asia-Pacific nations, and if it works constructively for the peace, stability and prosperity of the region, then China will not oppose the U.S. present in Asia — China welcomes you.
But these words carry a sting as well. On the one hand, they suggest the Asia-Pacific is vast enough to accommodate you, the United States. On the other hand, they imply that the Asia-Pacific can and in fact must accommodate China. The American presence in Asia should not and cannot push out Chinese power.
Finally, this sentence marks the first time a high-level Chinese leader has so conspicuously put China and the United States together, referring to both as “great nations” (大国). This signals a slight departure from the era of excessive modesty (谦虚), or even self-abasement, from the strategy of “hiding one’s capacities and biding one’s time” (韬光养晦). China has stepped onto the stage of major power foreign relations. This sentence was full of suggestion, foreshadowing the fact that the Xi Jinping visit would evince a great nation bearing.
Second Sentence: “There are words in a popular Chinese song that go like this, ‘Dare to ask where the road is; the road is right under your feet.'”
When talking about China-U.S. relations Xi Jinping used a number of interesting expressions, most of which have never before been used by previous leaders. He said, for example, that China-U.S. relations “are without precedent and without the guide of prior experience, so [we] can only ‘cross the river by feeling the stones’ (a reference to Deng Xiaoping’s statement on Chinese economic reforms), or “cut paths across the mountains and build bridges across the rivers” (words used before by Hillary Clinton).
The above remark by Xi Jinping addresses a predominating view, which is that we have never in history has a precedent for a dominant power and a rising power that coexist peacefully and not come to blows. And the view that “China and the U.S. cannot avoid war” (中美必有一战) has it market both ins China and the U.S.
During his visit, Xi Jinping also used a very affirmative statement [for the China-U.S. relationship], saying that, “Eliminating various obstacles to continue as friends and as partners, is the only correct choice in the bilateral China-U.S. relationship.” Words like “the only” (唯一) have seldom been used in the context of [China’s] foreign relations before, particularly with the United States. Because in the China-U.S. relationship, China has always been in a position of relative weakness. How the relationship has developed has been largely determined by the views and actions of American policy-makers, and China has had no choice but to “calmly cope” (沉着应对) with the situation. A leader in a passive position will no use an expression like “the only correct choice.”
Clearly, a great nation wants to move from a “passive” posture to an “active” one, and this sentence amounts to Chinese leaders saying they will move from a passive to an active position in China-U.S. relations, that they have the confidence and the capacity to develop the bilateral relationship.
The phrase “dar[ing] to ask where the road is” shows Xi Jinping’s sense of confidence. When he says that there are no precedents to set the tone in the China-U.S. relationship for the future, this implies that the future path will rely on future leaders, and it also suggests that he will take a new road as new circumstances merit.
Third Sentence: “On the question of human rights, there is no best, only better.”
While the Taiwan issue is still the biggest one in the China-U.S. relationship, Beijing has adjusted its policies since Ma Ying-jeou came to office, and the situation has already changed. I’m confident that Chinese on both sides of the straits have the capacity to resolve their own issues. Moreover, if extreme events can be avoided, the possibility of the United States turning back and entangling itself deeper in the Taiwan issue is increasingly unlikely.
As for other issues in the China-U.S. relationship, such as trade issues, border disputes in the South China Sea, piracy issues, energy and climate issues, environmental protection, etcetera — none of these are major issues, and all perhaps are within the realm of the “controllable”. Certainly, they will not really impact the larger China-U.S. relationship.
The biggest issue between the U.S. and China remains ideological in nature, about political systems and values. These issues emerge in bilateral talks over the question of human rights. Human rights issues have been entangled with China-U.S. relations for a very long time, and these are not easy to resolve.
During Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Senator John McCain criticized China’s human rights record. Their criticisms, moreover, were voiced in severe and seemingly unfriendly tones. But astonishingly, Xi Jinping’s response showed great capability and offered food for thought.
I call his response “astonishing” first of all because it differs from the attitude other national Party leaders have had on this issue, and secondly because Xi Jinping’s response this time was calmer, more reasonable, and even elegant in comparison to this attitude when he visited Mexico three years ago.
After Biden criticized China’s human rights record, Xi Jinping emphasized: “On the question of human rights, there is no best, only better.” Some commentators inside China have read this as a jab by Xi Jinping against a U.S. human rights situation that isn’t ideal, and this certainly makes sense when you consider that other leaders have said as much in the past. But I think the remark from Xi Jinping shouldn’t be understood in this way, particularly if you consider the official Chinese translation: “Of course there is always room for improvement when it comes to human rights.”
One commentator on Phoenix TV suggested this translation was off, but I would suggest that while we often have seen inaccurate translations from the foreign ministry in the past, this is not such as case. Once translated into English, this sort of neutral remark, that “there is no best, only better,” leaves America wondering exactly what you mean to say — which is to say, it’s as though it wasn’t said at all.
Later, when Xi Jinping responded to McCain’s criticisms over the issue of human rights in Tibet, he spoke more directly. According to McCain’s own statement on the exchange, Xi Jinping’s response was: “McCain, your bluntness is well known in China.” He then continued: “We have a long road ahead of us. And as you know, America also had many problems in the past.” McCain said that while Xi Jinping did not directly answer his questions on human rights, he views the exchange as “open and frank.” The meeting happened behind closed doors.
In fact, McCain has an insufficient understanding of Chinese political culture. Not only did Xi Jinping answer him, but in fact, in my view, the answer was ingenious. When Xi pointed out that “America also had many problems in the past,” he was affirming America’s progress; and when he said that, “We have a long road ahead of us,” he had two meanings, not just admitting that China had its shortcomings (that the country is where America was in the past) but also pointed to China objective (becoming a developed nation). Generally speaking, countries around the world share a basic standard in thinking on human rights. But owing to differences in economic development, cultural background and other factors, the human rights situations in various countries differ markedly. The crux is not whether there are gaps, but how these gaps are seen and understood.
While Xi Jinping did talk about China’s national circumstances and culture, this is the first time, to my recollection, that a Chinese leader has not raised the issue of human rights “standards” (标准) when facing questions from Americans on human rights. In the past, our national leaders have routinely said that there are differences in the way our two countries understand and assess human rights. What you Americans see as good, we see as bad. It’s this way of thinking that has China coming out with its own “White Paper on Human Rights in the United States” (美国人权状况白皮书) whenever the U.S. issues its own white paper on China’s human rights situation. This spirals into a war of words over whose human rights situation is the best.
But these people should study Xi Jinping’s remarks: there is no best, only better. There is always room for improvement when it comes to human rights.
Given its level of development, China’s human rights situation cannot be compared to that of the United States and other Western countries, which are far more prosperous. There is no shame in this. But if for the sake of face you wield the power and privilege in your hands to twist the facts and defy generally recognized human value standards, setting up your own human rights “standards” for your exclusive benefit, this is shameful.
This article, written on February 16, 2012, was published in Chinese in World Chinese Weekly and also posted to Yang Hengjun’s weblog.

Potty Politics


On February 19, 2012, a group of female college students from several universities in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou staged an “occupy male toilets” protest Chinese media referred to with the more sanitized term “performance art.” Bristling over the problem of extremely long lines outside public toilets for females — by contrast, of course, to short waits for males — the young women demanded in an open letter a new law calling for more and better toilet facilities for women. Meanwhile, they occupied male toilets and appropriated them for use by women, preventing men from entering. In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to QQ.com, a female student stands victoriously atop a porcelain toilet, brandishing the red flag of revolution.

Chongqing hired bloggers to toot its horn

The following post by Zhao Chu (赵楚), a military affairs expert in Shanghai who serves as chief editor of Military Affairs (Point), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 1:31pm Hong Kong time today, February 20, 2012. Zhao Chu currently has just under 119,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

The propaganda office of Chongqing used public funds to invite 32 [so-called] well-known bloggers to evaluate Chongqing, and the resulting news report says that these bloggers believe “Chongqing is a city of ideas and ideals.” I’ve been active online since 1998 and I’ve never heard of any of these well-known bloggers. How strange! Everyone judge for themselves. http://t.cn/SAMo3f

The link provided in the post is for this article posted to an official news website in Chongqing in November 2011, which explains how the city invited 32 “well-known bloggers” from People’s Daily Online, Xinhua News Agency, Sina.com and other sites and “online communities” to take a tour of Chongqing and learn about its policies.
A re-post of the above post, made by user Xiao Dang (小党), a Southern Metropolis Daily journalists with just under 23,000 followers on Sina Weibo, was also deleted by site censors. The Xiao Dang post said simply: “Many of these [bloggers] are actually fifty-centers [hired propagandists] from Chongqing.”
The original Chinese-language post from Zhao Chu follows:

重庆宣传部门花公款请了32位著名博主重庆品鉴,最后新闻报道说,名博主们认为“重庆是一座有思想有理想的城市。”我自98年开始上网,竟然32位名博主一个都不认得,惭愧啊。大家认认。http://t.cn/SAMo3f

Zhou Ruijin: reform and the way forward

As Party leaders position themselves politically ahead of this year’s 18th Party Congress, an unruly process (e.g., Wang Lijun) stirring behind a veneer of national unity, various sides are trying to shore up their ideological positions as well. That is why, in recent weeks, there has been a ratcheting up of rhetoric over the 20th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour,” the 1992 junket — some have called it a “quasi-imperial tour” — in which the architect of China’s reform policy reinvigorated reforms against staunch opposition from conservatives on the left.
Coming between the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen crackdown and the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, Deng’s tour was an important political event shaping China’s dominant political-economic agenda for years after. Essentially, Deng pushed for deeper reform and silenced divisive left-right wrangling over whether reforms were fundamentally “capitalist” (姓资) or “socialist” (姓社) in nature.
Chalking up another important date alongside the “southern tour” anniversary, yesterday, February 19, marked 15 years since Deng Xiaoping’s passing — another occasion inside China to turn the debate over Deng’s legacy into a broader discussion of reform.
Twenty years on from the “southern tour,” and 15 years after Deng Xiaoping’s death, China is an undisputed global economic power, now the world’s second-largest economy, a member of the World Trade Organization, and a crucial partner in dealing with the global financial crisis.
But many, including senior leaders and prominent economists, have warned that reforms in China now face another crucial moment, not unlike that in 1992. Reforms, they say, have come to a standstill as vested interests in the Party have grown stronger and more entrenched, resistant to the changes necessary to deal with rising social problems. [See also Qin Xiao: “Reform must not stop in its tracks“].


[ABOVE: In a photo posted by new media entrepreneur Isaac Mao to Flickr.com on February 17, China-Europe International Business School professor Su Xiaonian delivers a lecture at the school and says there have been no meaningful reforms in China since 1996. The only “reform” on his post-1996 list: China’s WTO entry.]
Speaking out today through an interview pushed on the front page of Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily is Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金), the former editor-in-chief of Liberation Daily who also served as deputy editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.
Zhou, who is often regarded today as the chief voice of the pro-reform faction within the CCP, was also an instrumental voice in China ahead of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.”
In early 1991, one year before the tour, it was a series of commentary pieces written by “Huang Fuping” (皇甫平) in the Liberation Daily that ignited the divisive debate over the direction of reforms. Zhou Ruijin was one of the authors behind the pen name “Huang Fuping” and the essays, which called for an intensification of reforms.
Below is a image of today’s front page at Southern Metropolis Daily, with a large headline at the top, just to the right of a portrait of Deng Xiaoping, that reads: “Reforms have reached another historical moment at which we must forge ahead with all our strength.” The slightly smaller headline just above it reads: “Commemorating the 15th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s passing, Zhou Ruijin, one of the [writers behind] ‘Huang Fuping’, revisits the southern talks.”

[ABOVE: The front page of the February 20, 2012, edition of Southern Metropolis Daily.]
Readers are then directed to page A06, where a half-page article provides an overview of the “Huang Fuping” series of essays and the southern talks and then an interview with Zhou Ruijin, who is pictured at the bottom right.
Zhou’s argument is essentially that China must break through the recalcitrance and “loss of reform energy” represented by the special interests that have come to dominate China’s economy, and the country must reach a new consensus on pushing reforms forward.

[ABOVE: Page A06 of the February 20, 2012, edition of Southern Metropolis Daily.]
There are also references in the Southern Metropolis Daily interview to China’s regime of “stability preservation,” or weiwen (维稳), an expensive mass mobilization of police against Chinese with legitimate grievances stemming from economic and political marginalization.
While some within the CCP regard “stability preservation” as necessary in the context of rising social unrest in China, others see it as fundamentally self-defeating, generating an endless cycle of violence and dis-enfranchisement that fuels further unrest.
In one of his more memorable lines, Zhou Ruijin says: “As the masses face trouble and distress, as they face danger and chaos, Party secretaries [i.e., top leaders in China at all levels] must move ahead of the police, listening attentively to and resolving the demands of the people; they must not hide behind the lines, exacerbating tensions between the government and the people.”
A partial translation of the Zhou Ruijin piece follows, but readers are strongly encouraged to spend time with the Chinese original. This is an important piece in the ongoing tug-of-war over reforms ahead of the 18th Party Congress later this year.
For further background on how the discussion of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” has come into play ahead of leadership changes later this year, readers might turn to this article in The National yesterday, and to this video analysis from Gao Wenqian, which notes other recent Deng coverage in Guangdong newspapers.

The Roots of the Loss of Reform Energy Are Not About Limits in Understanding
Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金), one of the people under the pen name “Huang Fuping” (皇甫平), reviews the southern tour talks and says the limits lie in the entangling of interests and the unwillingness to let go
By Zhou Hucheng (周虎城)
A year before [Deng] Xiaoping’s southern talks, China had a debate over the essays of Huang Fuping. This series of four essays by “Huang Fuping” were organized and published by the Liberation Daily. They conveyed the spirit of the latest directions on reform and opening by Deng Xiaoping, and they were his views and opinions as discussed when he was in Shanghai spending the Spring Festival holiday in 1991. After they were published that year, these essays prompted a massive response in Chinese society.
In recent days, our Nanfang Daily reporter interviewed Zhou Ruijin, one of the [people behind the pen name] “Huang Fuping.” He believes that revisiting [Deng] Xiaoping’s southern talks is about ensuring that reforms become the dominant mainstream value among those in the Chinese Communist Party. He has a strong positive view on Guangdong’s moves to liberate ideas (解放思想) and to re-invent social management, and he urges Guangdong to continue moving at the forefront, paving a “green lane” (绿道) [to future national development] in the hearts of the people.
Following on [initial] reforms [China] did not keep a rein on public power, capital was enlarged on the basis of market mechanisms, and [entrenched] special interests emerged. Deepening economic reforms, and promoting social reforms, administrative reforms and political system reforms, is needed in order to break through “increasingly entrenched” (步步为营) “special interest groups” (特殊利益集团) that have emerged on the back of incomplete market reforms.
Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, today’s leaders and cadres are more informed (知识化) and more professional (专业化水准更高), and they are not divorced from the mainstream sentiments of the people. The loss of momentum in pushing reforms forward comes from the snare of knotty and deeply-rooted difficulties and from the entanglement of interests, making [special interests] reluctant to give a free hand to reforms.
Today reforms suffer from a lack of understanding about how to reform, from an unwillingness to reform, daring not reform, and from empty talk about reform. So we have reform on paper, reform on our lips, but no attempt to assess our situation or take action. Or on the other hand, we have action [that is ill-considered and] that just just rocks the boat.
Today the crux of question of whether leaders can bear the great responsibility of reform is not about their heads, but rather about their backends. It’s not hard to keep a clear head. The difficulty comes in whether to sit [one’s backend down] with the special interests, or to sit with the people, to sit with the central government and with the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
As the masses face trouble and distress, as they face danger and chaos, Party secretaries [i.e., top leaders in China at all levels] must move ahead of the police, listening attentively to and resolving the demands of the people; they must not hide behind the lines, exacerbating tensions between the government and the people.
Reforms have reached another historical moment at which we must forge ahead with all our strength
Reporter: How do you view the historical significance and status of [Deng] Xiaoping’s southern talks?
Zhou Ruijin: Those who experienced it will still recall that the late 1980s and early 1990s were an important historical juncture when China was questioning where reforms should go. There was a fierce debate over whether they should be “market orientated” (市场取向) or “planning orientated” (计划取向), and the latter “planning orientated” camp was gaining the upper hand. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee [in December 1978] had laid down the path of reform and opening, but this was coming under serious challenge. For example, there was at the time a very “leftist” article that said that “the core, focus and crux of the question of reform is what in what [political] orientation to carry out reforms,” that there was one view of reforms that in fact was “capitalist” (资本主义化). Some comrades blotted out all subtleties and divided reform views into one with a “capitalist surname” and another with a “socialist surname” (姓资姓社).
This significance of Deng Xiaoping’s southern talks lay in the astonishing courage and insight of this old man, who while being alert to the “right” essentially guarded against [the ascendance of] the “left.” In economic terms, he argued that development was the overriding concern, that the planned economy did not equal socialism, that the market economy did not equal capitalism. Planned economics and the market, [he said], were both economic strategies. In ideological terms, he raised the concept of the “three benefits” standard (三个有利于) in determining the legitimacy of reform. As he went south, [Deng] Xiaoping spoke on each leg of the trip, from Wuhan all the way to Guangdong. This was a sunny journey to restart reforms and reinvigorate the popular will . . .
As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the southern talks, China has already now become the world’s second-largest economy. It has become an important ballast in dealing with the global financial crisis. But various tensions and interest conflicts within China are also gathering and increasing. Reforms have again reached a historical moment at which we must forge ahead with all our strength.
Looking at the grassroots [of society] and online public opinion, you can see there is a strong base of support for reform. This must be leveraged, bringing the will of the Party and the people together [on reform] and promoting the innovation of social management. Like Guangdong, [we must] give priority to and promote social construction (社会建设), using government and civil society strength in coordination to resolve the complex problems facing our society in transition. Just as [Deng] Xiaoping said that year: “Once certain something must be done, we must dare to experiment, carving open a new path.”

Unbearable Gall


In February 2012 the planned public listing plans of Fujian’s Rui Zhen Tang (归真堂), a supplier of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), drew criticism over the company’s sale of bear bile, a valued Chinese medicinal fluid produced in the livers of Asiatic black bears, which are kept in captivity for “bile milking.” Addressing a backlash over this practice on China’s internet and in the media, the China Association of Traditional Chinese Medicine held a press conference on February 16. The association said that procedures used today for bile milking from live bears were painless and did not harm the health of bears. At the press conference, the head of the association, Fang Shuting (房书亭), said: “The bile milking process is just as simple as turning on the water tap. It’s natural and painless, and after it’s finished the bear can go off and play happily. I don’t feel there’s anything unusual about it. You could even say it’s comfortable!” In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to his blog at QQ.com, a distressed bear looks on as a doctor in white scrubs holds a bowl under a tap protruding from the bear’s middle and bleeding at the point of entry.

I choose Wang Lijun

The following post by Liang Mutian (梁幕天), a magazine editor with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:42am Hong Kong time today, February 17, 2012. Liang Mutian currently has just under 56,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The post is a response to this microblog post from Liang Mutian, not deleted, about how the Ministry of Public Security is launching an event in which the public is encouraged to select people in public security they regard as model figures. Wang Lijun, the former top cop in Chongqing often regarded as the right-hand man of the powerful Bo Xilai (薄熙来), was reportedly taken to Beijing by security police after apparently fleeing Chongqing and taking refuge in the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. The incident, a highly sensitive one for China, has raised many questions about Bo Xilai’s future and about internal wrangling within the CCP ahead of a leadership transition later this year.
Sina Weibo users responding to the original Liang Mutian post all agree in nominating Wang Lijun as an exemplary model.

//@jacky-wl: Wang Lijun //@白桦林Rainy:Wang Lijun //@家有烈犬不逗儿:Wang Lijun //@枝枝710:Wang Lijun //@小祁5810:Wang Lijun //@王国富9: Wang Lijun //@钧杰侯: //@Haliluja: Wang Lijun //@likuer33: Wang Lijun //@胡杨树: Wang Lijun //@赵大鹏: Wang Lijun //@风竹欲: Wang Lijun //@稳步如飞: Wang Lijun//@好摄子良: I would choose Wang Lijun!

The original Chinese-language post follows:

//@jacky-wl: 王立军 //@白桦林Rainy:王立军 //@家有烈犬不逗儿:王立军 //@枝枝710:王立军 //@小祁5810:王立军 //@王国富9: 王立军 //@钧杰侯: //@Haliluja: 王立军 //@likuer33: 王立军 //@胡杨树: 王立军 //@赵大鹏: 王立军 //@风竹欲: 王立军 //@稳步如飞: 王立军//@好摄子良: 我评选王立军吧哈哈


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

In war of words, Hong Kong and China need cool heads

The war of words between Hong Kong and mainland China, which intensified earlier this month with an ad in Hong Kong’s Apple Daily likening mainlanders coming to the SAR to “invading locusts,” continues to boil on the internet. For an overview of the row, readers can turn to our story last week, or to this video summary by Link TV.
For another perspective on this story, we turn today to veteran Chinese television journalist Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇), executive news editor for Hong Kong-based Phoenix Television.
In the piece, published recently by China Newsweekly, Luqiu Luwei argues that of course neither side can do without the other, and that there is a general need for cooler heads to prioritize facts over personal attacks.

So which side really can’t do without the other, Hong Kong or the mainland?
China Newsweekly
February 15, 2012
Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇)
When I saw the last line in the advertisement purchased by Hong Kong internet users in Apple Daily on February 1, which said, “If there was no Hong Kong, you would all be done for,” I thought immediately of something you hear all the time from mainlanders: “If it wasn’t for the mainland, the ‘fragrant harbor’ of Hong Kong would have stunk long ago.”
Showing that this side or that would be in trouble without the other is actually a really simple thing to do. Either side can come up with countless examples to support an argument they are determined not to let go of.
Some people in mainland China are particularly fond of one example, which is that if it weren’t for the mainland providing water and foodstuffs Hong Kongers wouldn’t be able to survive.
During the Hong Kong drought of 1963, the British Hong Kong Government introduced water restriction policies. The government proposed the idea of purchasing water from the mainland, and if this hadn’t been approved by Zhou Enlai, beginning the Dongjiang Water Supply Project (东江水供水工程), then the people of Hong Kong would have suffered a much longer period of water shortage, because at the time the desalinization of sea water was costly and the technology not yet mature. But this of course this is a mutually beneficial exchange, and the purchase of water from Guangdong by the SAR is expected to bring in 3.54, 3.74 and 3.96 billion yuan respectively in the coming three years alone, an annual increase of 5.8 percent. That’s a great boon for enterprises in Guangdong supplying water.
As for food, while mainland supplies of vegetables account for more than 90 percent of the market in Hong Kong, consumers in fact do have a choice between mainland products and products imported at zero tariff from other regions.
Most of the vegetables imported from the mainland directly impact Hong Kong’s own agricultural sector. Add to this the fact that Hong Kong does not support local agriculture from a policy standpoint, and this spells the gradual disappearance of Hong Kong agriculture. Moreover, because of the Dongjiang Water Supply Project, Hong Kong’s government has slowed development of desalinization technology. There are some voices in Hong Kong who say this is a strategic move on the part of the central CCP leadership, which seeks to enhance the SAR’s dependency on the mainland.
Some Hong Kongers are fond of making the point that if the colony of Hong Kong had not been a factor from the Qing dynasty up to the present day,and particularly during the time of the Xinhai Revolution, there would have been no base for revolution and no source of funding for revolution. And as for the 1978 opening and reform policy, if it hadn’t been for Hong Kong money flowing into the mainland there would have been no development of Shenzhen, and there would have been no hope for the smooth progress of economic reforms. But while this certainly does show the importance of Hong Kong in the process of economic growth and democratization for China, it does not support the idea that without Hong Kong there would be no present-day China as we know it.
As for those Hong Kongers who ridicule mainlanders as locusts, they only see those tourists flowing into Hong Kong and those mothers coming to Hong Kong to give birth as enjoying the benefits the SAR has to offer. What they don’t see are the benefits for Hong Kong’s economy resulting from these visitors — how these private medical clinics are constantly growing, and how as the retail sector benefits this creates more jobs for the territory. In various ways all Hong Kongers benefit from the income that derives from mainland tourism. As for inflationary pressures on housing and commodities, and public resource shortages, its the government in Hong Kong that bears the responsibility.
Naturally, if mainland travelers go to Hong Kong or other places around the world harboring a sense that they are saviors, there is one thing they should bear in mind, and that is that much of their purchasing is fueled by the fact that they cannot buy inexpensive or safe products inside China, so this is just about taking what they need.
So far as this attitude among mainland travelers is concerned, Hong Kongers also need to examine their own attitudes. Since Hong Kong’s handover in 1997 Hong Kong media have been able to accompany Chinese leaders on overseas tours. And every time they have an opportunity to raise questions, my Hong Kong colleagues can’t avoid asking about what preferential policies the central leadership will afford Hong Kong, or about what the attitude of the central leadership is toward the selection of Hong Kong’s chief executive. For quite some time I’ve felt with a sense of sadness that the one country two systems arrangement and Hong Kong self-governance is something Hong Kongers have forfeited themselves, always gazing north to the divine land, speculating about what “father” is thinking. This attitude has spread from the SAR government right on down through its political parties, the business community, the media and general society.
If some Hong Kongers want to look at mainlanders as invading locusts, perhaps Hong Kongers themselves should ask whether this description might apply to their own migrations in 1989 and 1997, when a sense of insecurity drove many to emigrate to other countries. Look at Vancouver, Canada, for example. If it hadn’t been for the sense, after 1997, that Hong Kong had remained stable — and that opportunities in Canada were lacking — there wouldn’t have been the drifting back of Hong Kongers that we have seen.
Taking advantage and avoiding damage is only human. When so many Hong Kongers were similarly motivated back in those days, why do they have such a problem with mainlanders doing the same thing? Twenty years ago it was Taiwanese mothers filling maternity wards in California. They traveled across the ocean with their stuck-out bellies so that their children could be American citizens and have futures their parents thought of as more hopeful. Now it’s mainland mothers filling up the maternity wards. Even if they sneak over, it’s still for the sake of their children, because they lack a sense of security.
There is no way either side of this bickering could bring the other around. What we need to turn our attention to are the facts, talking about the issues rather than attacking people. Of course, it may be hard to hear [complaints like those in the Apple Daily ad], but speaking openly about such concerns is still better than bottling them up inside.
Antagonism is rooted in prejudice. We need to think about where these feelings come from. Isolated cases of contact between Hong Kongers and mainlanders have made the concept of China and what it means concrete for many Hong Kong people. But how can we ensure that individuals are not made out to represent the whole? Is it right to transfer feelings of concern and dissatisfaction with Hong Kong’s future prospects away from the Hong Kong government and on to the shoulders of mainland tourists? And how can some mainland tourists who come to Hong Kong throw off their colored glasses, like the idea of China’s century of shame (百年耻辱) [i.e., the colonial experience], and accept that there are many things about Hong Kong as a population and a society that they don’t yet understand?
If it’s true that information is incomplete inside mainland China, and that this impacts the views and judgements of mainlanders, it’s perhaps equally true that in Hong Kong, where information flows freely, many people choose to turn a blind eye to issues, their facts fogged over with indignation.
In the words of the English philosopher Bertrand Russell: “Love is wise, hatred is foolish.”