Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Four reasons to take back new microblog regulations

The first reason to withdraw “Beijing Municipal Regulations Concerning the Development and Control of Microblogs” : This regulation states that it is made “according to the Telecommunications Statute of the People’s Republic of China, the Administration of Internet Information Services Measures and other laws, regulations and statutes, but among these none are actually laws. The Telecommunications Statute and Administration of Internet Information Services Measures came about in September 2000, and at the time microblogs did not exist. Nor do these [measures] deal in any way with real-name registration. They cannot be regarded as a legal basis for managing microblogs.
The second reason to withdraw “Beijing Municipal Regulations Concerning the Development and Control of Microblogs” : On June 20, 2008, President Hu Jintao gave a special speech at People’s Daily in which he reaffirmed the people’s right to know (知情权), right to participate (参与权), right to express (表达权) and right to monitor (监督权). He pointed out that the internet “has already become a collection and distribution center for ideas, culture and information and an amplifier for public opinion.” The timing of this speech makes it of more real relevance than the the Telecommunications Statute of the People’s Republic of China and the Administration of Internet Information Services Measures.
The third reason to withdraw “Beijing Municipal Regulations Concerning the Development and Control of Microblogs” : The forefather of socialism, Marx, once incisively pointed out that anonymity of expression in the media is a form of public opinion transmission in society. He said: “”As long as the newspaper press was anonymous, it appeared as the organ of a numberless and nameless public opinion; it was the third power in the state.” The authorities in Beijing should review the radiant ideas of Marx. [On Marx and Engels publishing anonymously].
[NOTE: Thanks to Joshua Rosenzweig for providing the orthodox translation of the above passage from Marx.]
The fourth reason to withdraw “Beijing Municipal Regulations Concerning the Development and Control of Microblogs” : The lesson of previous failures. [The official] China News Service reported on August 11 that a prominent South Korean internet portal site was attacked by hackers who stole the personal information of 35 million users, including un-encripted user names, users real names, phone numbers, passwords and security questions for their e-mail accounts, identification numbers, etcetera. In order to mitigate against the illegal collection of personal information, the South Korean government has decided to abolish the country’s real-name internet registration system in stages.
This article was compiled from a series of posts Professor Zhan Jiang made to his Sina Weibo account on December 17, 2011.

Under construction: new microblog controls

Capping weeks of government grumbling in China over “healthy internet culture,” the need to trumpet “social core values” online and combat “poisonous rumors,” China has today announced new regulations — taking effect immediately — to control the country’s rapidly-growing Twitter-like micro-blogosphere. Among other stipulations, the regulations require all users to register with their real names in order to use microblog services, and those who fail to register within three months will be unable to make posts (if we take these regulations at face value).
While the regulations nominally come from the Beijing municipal government, they will no doubt impact users across the country, as the vast majority of services are based in the city. It is not immediately clear whether QQ Weibo, a leading microblogging platform operated by Shenzhen-based Tencent Holdings, would be subject to these regulations.
There is, in short, a great deal left to clarify about these regulations. We’ll keep our eyes glued to them in coming days and weeks to work out as best we can what exactly they mean for internet companies and users in China.
The following is a video of CCTV coverage today of the new regulations, followed by our translation of some of today’s coverage in Chinese summarizing the regulations.

Beijing Introduces Weibo Development and Control [Management] Regulation
Sina.com (via Qianlong)
December 16, 2011
In recent years, new internet technologies, of which microblog services are the most representative, have developed rapidly [in China]. Microblogs have served a positive role in reflecting public opinion, assembling popular knowledge, disseminating information, serving society and other areas. However, in the process of microblog development, the dissemination of rumors and fake information has also emerged, along with other salient problems such as the sale of “fans” and the use of the web to deceive others, damaging the public interest and harming the people generally. This has met with the objection of websites, users and the public, and various parts of society have called fiercely for the regulation of microblog services.
Beijing is a priority area for the development of microblogs, and in order to further regulate the orderly transmission of microblogs and promote the healthy development of the internet and new media — on the basis of broad investigation and research, listening to opinions from various sides, and according to relevant national laws, regulations and statutes — the municipal office of the people’s city government, the municipal public security bureau, the Beijing Communications Administration and the Beijing Internet Information Office have jointly studied and formulated “Beijing Municipal Regulations Concerning the Development and Control of Microblogs” (《北京市微博客发展管理若干规定》), for release and to formally take effect on December 16, 2011.
The “Regulation,” made under the general principles of “scientific development, positive use, enhanced management [or control] and ensured security,” accords with the “Telecommunications Statute of the People’s Republic of China” and the “Administration of Internet Information Services Measures” and other laws, regulations and statutes. [The “Regulation”] accords with concrete conditions in Beijing, and makes 16 stipulations concerning the set-up, use and management of microblogs, including objectives, scope of application, principles of development, a program for examination and approval, standards for conduct, microblog user account registration, the examination and verification of content, the responsibilities of government agencies, industry self-discipline, social supervision (社会监督), legal obligations and other content. The “Decision” clearly states the need to strengthen the construction and application of microblogs, ensuring that microblogs exert a positive effect in serving society. In providing microblog services, websites must adhere to honesty (诚信办网) and decency (文明办网) in providing web services, actively disseminating the socialist core value system, disseminating advanced socialist culture, and serve the building of a harmonious socialist society.
The “Regulation” makes clear stipulations concerning registration procedures and admittance requirements for websites within the jurisdiction of this municipality carrying out microblog services, establishing that they must, on the basis of raising the need to create an adequate and comprehensive information security management system (信息安全管理制度), clarifying the personnel and supervisory institutions responsible for information security, implementing technical measures for security and control (技术安全防控措施), establishing a system for the securing of user information, and establishing a system for exposing fake information and other requirements, make application and go through examination and approval with municipal internet and information authorities in accordance with the law.

Wukan and the "fourth danger"

Chinese President Hu Jintao’s speech to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1 this year was mostly self-congratulatory, a grocery list of everything the Party professes to have done right. But Hu did pause for a stern moment in which he enumerated what he called the “four dangers”: loss of vitality (精神懈怠), insufficient capacity (能力不足), alienation from the people (脱离群众) and rampant corruption (消极腐败). These internal challenges, said Hu, are now “more strenuous and pressing than at any point in the past.”
The third of these challenges, alienation from the public, can be glimpsed daily on China’s internet, as users fume over myriad injustices and the government’s often cruel and cockeyed way of dealing with them (like burying train cars within 24 hours of a major railway disaster). The credibility of China’s institutions is often questioned so routinely that leaders need only issue a denial of an accusation for internet users to be certain of its truth.
But it’s number four on Hu Jintao’s list, corruption, that arguably presents the most immediate threat to the Party’s standing, and to social and political stability in China. Corruption, particularly at the local level — but surely at every level — is behind most of the social ills and animosities that boil over daily in China into “sudden-breaking incidents” officials do their utmost to crisis-manage.
The emphasis on “channeling public opinion” so prevalent in media policy these last few years — what we have at CMP termed “Control 2.0” — essentially comes down to finding more effective ways of spinning these public opinion crises, managing dangerous stories in the era of real-time interactive information.
But as Zhu Huaxin (祝华新) of the People’s Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Center wrote recently, these public opinion crises are backgrounded by very real “social sicknesses” and “resolving real [underlying] issues is the first order of business, while channeling public opinion on the internet (网上舆论引导) must be secondary.”
In recent weeks, intensifying in recent days, we have another clear example of just how volatile the situation can be in local areas across the country, where citizen’s interests are often threatened by corrupt or unresponsive local leaders not subjected to real checks on their power. And this example also shows us how leaders are trying to grapple with the fallout from this corruption, though not unfortunately the root causes.
The story is about how thousands of residents in Wukan village outside the city of Shanwei in Guangdong province have organized protests against local officials they allege sold off village land in a dirty development deal.
Here is a visual illustration of corruption as the core originating grievance, photos from Wukan shared on social media in which the banner at the top reads: “Does the land belong to corrupt officials?”


The situation escalated over the weekend as villagers learned that Xue Jinbo (薛锦波), a village representative, had died while in police custody. Police said Xue’s death was due to a heart attack, but family members insist he was badly beaten.
For the fuller story, we refer you to Malcolm Moore’s reporting at The Telegraph [Today’s story is here]. But this photo by Moore gives you a good sense of what’s happening in Wukan.

So we have a case here of alleged official corruption — the “fourth danger,” if you will — that has escalated into a crisis situation over (possibly) another grave issue of injustice as leaders in Guangdong have applied heavy-fisted tactics to deal with it. So far, the government response has been to close Wukan off both in terms of security (“stability preservation”) and propaganda policy (“public opinion channeling”).
Finally late yesterday, just minutes before midnight and after a uniform blackout in Chinese media through the day, we had two news stories on Wukan from China News Service, China’s number-two official newswire. The first reported that Shanwei city authorities revealed at a press conference on the Wukan incident (乌坎事件) yesterday that “preliminary investigations have ruled out external force as the cause of death” in Xue’s case. The news story also said that the city’s medical expert shared photos of Xue’s body during the press conference.
The second China News Service report, also based on the press conference, said that “various village officials” from Wukan had been detained for discipline violations.
Curiously, though, there seems to be no coverage of the press conference from other media. That suggests that these stories can be taken as an illustration of “public opinion channeling” tactics at work. The authorities, in other words, are selectively releasing partial information from an official perspective in an attempt to frame and re-direct public attention. Message 1: Xue Jinbo was not killed by police, an assertion that removes the immediate reason for escalated tensions in Wukan. Message 2: local Wukan leaders have been detained for suspected discipline problems, an action that (leaders undoubtedly hope) will remove the initial underlying cause of tensions, alleged dirty land deals.
A search in Baidu News for “Wukan incident” comes up with a number of other news reports, like this one, making use of the China News Service release. But other suggested links for coverage after December 9 are not available, most notably a report on 21cn.com provocatively headlined “Wukan: The Awakening of a Village” (乌坎:一个村庄的觉醒), which now returns only a “page cannot be found” message:

Stranger still, another link on the Baidu News search results is an article posted yesterday at Phoenix Online with the headline: “Four Villagers from Wukan in Guangdong’s Lufeng City are Locked Up in Three Locations, Allowed to Meet with Relatives” ( 广东陆丰乌坎4村民被分3处关押 获准与亲人见面). The video embedded with the Phoenix Online article says it all, I think, and I encourage readers to look at it carefully. Nanfang Daily, the official mouthpiece of Guangdong Party leaders, is given as the source of the video.

In the video, a policeman brings a prisoner (we are to suppose he is one of the Wukan villagers detained) outside to where several three chairs sit. As the prisoner walks in wearing his orange vest, two people (we are to suppose these are two of the prisoner’s relatives) sit in two of the chairs. The time on the video says, “December 13, 2011, 15:00.” There is a brief, awkward embrace of sorts. Then, before anything meaningful whatsoever is spoken, the video cuts to a scene in which two different people (again, we are to suppose these are relatives of the prisoner) walk very casually toward the two empty chairs across from the prisoner, who is already seated. There is a cut once again, and then the two women are already seated. One says, “So, have they beaten you at all?” To which the prisoner responds, “No, they haven’t beaten me.” Then comes the kicker from the prisoner’s relative: “Thanks to the government!”
The time on the video still reads: “December 13, 2011, 15:00.”
As a “channeling” mechanism, of course, this video establishes a third assertion, that the village leaders detained in the Wukan incident have not been mistreated by the authorities.
Images were also posted on Chinese social media yesterday, but control of this story has been very robust. When I posted a Chinese-language summary of Moore’s story and the above photo to Sina Weibo yesterday morning, it was quarantined in under a minute. That is to say, the post was not deleted, but it was hidden from all Sina Weibo users but myself — without any notice for Sina. If I hadn’t been on my toes and ready to watch the post with the help of colleagues I might have assumed simply that no-one was interested in commenting or re-posting the item.
All searches for “Wukan” and “Shanwei” on Sina Weibo yield messages that read: “According to relevant laws and regulations, search results for ‘Wukan’ can not be shown.” Estimates put Shanwei’s population at around 700,000 — so imagine a major internet platform in the United States blocking searches for “Detroit.”
Clearly Wukan is an object lesson in the dangers of runaway corruption at the local level in China. But it is also, unfortunately, shaping up as a test case in how the government is experimenting with new strategies to shape news coverage on sensitive incidents and issues.
Let’s keep watching.
———-
UPDATE:
(For the benefit of commenter Itlee and all, we provide three screenshots of Sina Weibo searches conducted at 5:38pm Hong Kong, December 15, 2011]


Uphill Struggle


Since the 2009 global financial crisis, the outlook for the United States and European economies has not appreciably improved, as Europe continues to struggle with its debt crisis and the U.S. experiences high levels of unemployment. In an October report on the outlook for 2012, Goldman Sachs wrote: “It’s been a disappointing economic recovery since the end of the financial crisis in mid-2009, with US gross domestic product (GDP) growing by only about 2 percent in real terms. The main result of this disappointing growth has been the persistently high number of unemployed in the US. The current rate of GDP growth is insufficient to dent the huge pool of long-term unemployed.” In this cartoon, posted by artist Zhai Haijun (翟海军) to his QQ.com blog, Uncle Sam, riding a bicycle with US$ wheels uphill, looks back at a bicycler representing Europe and points up to the top of the hill, which remains invisible.

He Weifang quote December 2011

The ship of reform has come upon dangerous shoals. The red city to the West [Chongqing] resorts to endless scheming. Utopia [the radical leftist website] is fierce as a starving tiger. And the Nanfang Daily Group [known for its bolder reporting] is as quiet as a cicada in the frost.”

The Hands that Hush Reform


In late 2011 China has been seized by an intensified political chill across the board, continuing what appears to be a general tightening trend since August. He Weifang (贺卫方), one of China’s leading proponents of rule of law and press freedom, posted on his Sina Weibo account on December 11: “The ship of reform has come upon dangerous shoals. The red city to the West [Chongqing] resorts to endless scheming. Utopia [the radical leftist website] is fierce as a starving tiger. And the Nanfang Daily Group [known for its bolder reporting] is as quiet as a cicada in the frost.” This cartoon, which He Weifang appended to the above post on Sina Weibo, is drawn by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚), and depicts a lawyer (holding a book that says “law”) and a journalist, both with their mouths forcibly shut by a dark figure in the background. The anonymity of the figure in the back strikes home the point that China’s political future remains uncertain in the midst of jockeying ahead of next year’s Party Congress.

China needs common ground online

Lately, the stink has been rising online and offline.
Traditionally, internet users with differing value orientations in the online space have been quite cut off from one another. For example, KDNET’s Cat’s Eye section and the Utopia website have had their own respective web followings. If anyone from either side incautiously stepped over the line into the other camp, they risk being “pelted with stones”, branded “slaves of the West” or “brain-damaged.” While the two sides could be sharp and mean-spirited in their words, however, they got along fairly well. In fact, the “left” and the “right”, the extreme and the moderate, those advocating “national interests” and those advocating a “grassroots focus,” even as they held tight to their respective positions showed a higher level of tolerance and intellectual vigor than could be seen in the traditional media and in [China’s] rigid institutions.
We’ve seen these sorts of divisions often throughout our history. At the outset of economic reforms [in the late 1970s], after years of isolation and despotism, some young Chinese stepped out in front of the trends, searching for new lifestyles. They were accused by others of being decadent and “dressing weirdly”, and they constant social pressure. The rejection and resistance they faced was a normal expression of social disapproval, but by the beginning of the 1980s this had become a matter for public institutions as well. Work units forced young women to cut their shoulder-length hair and altered the flared trousers popular with many young men. They confiscated literature about love and relationships.
No longer were these just differences of opinion, a tit for tat on more or less equal footing. It was now escalated to a populist call for the state to leverage power to uphold one set of narrow views over the interests of others, a bigoted defense of one’s own discourse power. There was nothing these young people could do at the time to defend themselves against the social and political pressures they faced. In fact, it was a group of older cultural figures, intellectuals and scientists who eventually stepped up to defend their rights and say that the abuse of power must be stopped, figures like Ba Jin (巴金). In the sincerest of tones, Deng Ying (邓颖) said: “Our Party must never again commit ‘blunders steeped in blood.'”
In light of the lessons of history, a number of abnormal trends have lately emerged on the internet that should prompt our concern. For example, dissatisfaction and scorn for those on the opposite side of an issue have in some cases escalated into “human flesh searches” (人肉搜索) of other users, and even the publicizing of their personal telephone numbers or visits to their door to “teach them a lesson”; we have seen the disparaging of other’s characters, personal attacks, attempts to “restrain” them offline, the issuing “death threats”, or posting to police microblogs calling for this or that person to be punished. We have seen users, in the name of “patriotism”, calling on fellow internet users to gather together and set fire to legally published newspapers like Southern Weeked. There was even a case in which a professor from the Chinese department at Peking University bragged on the internet about turning down an interview with a Southern Daily Group weekly publication by spitting three curses at the calling reporter.
Here we see the ordinary process of exchanging information, sharing opinions, acts of exposure and denying of rumors, verification and falsification, support and opposition, all are deeply politicized. For example, those who advocate universal values and encourage reforms are sometimes branded “Western slaves,” something that can still happen within the context of normal scholarly criticism. But when we see people branding others as “traitors” and “sympathizers” — [NOTE: these are very strong and historically sensitive terms, implying criminal treason] — when there is no evidence whatsoever that they have engaged in spying or broken any laws, this [elevates the matter by suggesting these people deserve] “the undying hatred of the people” (全民得而诛之), and the government cannot continue to simply tolerate such opinions. In much the same way, simply attacking any opinion that disagrees with yours as work for the “fifty-centers” (五毛) [i.e., government-hired online commentators], this is another form of arbitrary intolerance.
In China today, it long ago stopped being the age of having “uniformity of public opinion”. Along with the development of the market economy, different interest groups have emerged, each with its own interest demands, value orientations and sensibilities. This is not only normal, it is entirely healthy. There are three key points in ensuring that free competition, mutual respect and peace can be maintained in the midst of this diversity. The first issue is the regularization, transparency and fairness of interactions among various social interests, particularly ensuring that disadvantaged groups can have their rights and needs heard. Secondly, the “public space” of the internet and traditional media should not merely be infatuated with exposes and criticism, but should put their focus on promoting the repair and improvement of current social management systems, and rebuilding of [institutions] where necessary. In facing negative social phenomena, [we must] mend this habit among the people and public opinion of being overly sensitive, [we must] regain and inspire a sense of social consciousness among internet users [i.e., of being part of the fabric of a larger society], and [we must] foster a confident and patient attitude toward the reform and betterment of society.
These three things need to be managed in unison, but the first is without a doubt the principal point of tensions [in society]. The “internet sicknesses” (网络病) we see today are just fallout from “social sicknesses” (社会病), and resolving real [underlying] issues is the first order of business, while channeling public opinion on the internet (网上舆论引导) must be secondary.
The government has an inalienable duty to smooth out competing interests and remedy rights issues in our society. Owing to inaction on social inequality and [the state] setting its own interests against the people, there is a deficit of goodwill in interactions between the government and the people, and this must be urgently compensated for. Earlier this year, a series of “articles from the editorial department” of the People’s Daily expressed deep understanding and tolerance for the agitated mood of the public: “We advocate a calm and rational attitude, but when the lines of defense are lost, with chemical-laced pork, died dumplings [sold past their expiration], poisons in ginger and other such cases coming up again and again, ‘remaining calm’ is easier said than done. We seek an open and tolerant attitude, but we see cases again and again of people falling back on powerful connections (‘拼爹’现象) or taking unfair advantages. [In such circumstances] how can we expect to resolve festering hatred for [government] officials?”
Our rulers should be more keen to resolve those problems that are ‘material’ (有形), achieving a fairer and more just society and providing real “chicken soup for the soul” (心灵鸡汤). So long as the government works to resolve real “material” issues of injustice and unfairness, whether it means “enlarging the cake” (做大蛋糕) or “dividing it better” (分好蛋糕), whether it means strengthening government responsibility or expanding social participation, all should be applauded. At the same time, I hope that responsible organs of public power can accept checks [on their conduct] and scrutiny [of their actions], respecting the process of rule of law.
Another aspect of this issue is the question of what sort of “public space” we really need today? Within this “public space,” what is the role of those “public intellectuals” who have tens of thousands or even millions of fans on social media, or tens of thousands to millions of hits on their weblogs? In an age of diverse competing interests, the “public space” constituted by the internet comes down to the formation of real views and opinions in society, allowing various opinions and proposals to be tested in experience to see whether they pan out. For China’s 485 million internet users, the bottom line that must be conscientiously respected is to embrace and defend the internet as an “opinion community” where information can freely circulate, just as in daily life the framework of our laws and constitution are maintained as the bottom line for China’s 1.3 billion-strong “interest community.”
This “opinion community” is not about the left versus right, radicals versus moderates, the halls of power versus the common folk. It means acknowledging the legitimacy of different opinions and different interest demands, and the equality of all under the protection of the law in expressing their views online and participating in society. The field of public opinion on the internet requires opinions from different value orientations to check one another and hedge against one another. It needs a mechanism of “self-purification” (自净) of information through a process of dynamic updating of posts and criticism and counter-criticism by internet users. This means we must protect not just our own right to expression (表达权) but must protect the right of others to speak, and not seek to monopolize discursive power (垄断话语权).
We cannot unilaterally arbitrate a matter through the media against another when they are given no right of reply (答辩权). We must deal with the matters at hand, and avoid at all cost hanging ideological signboards on those to whose views we object, subjecting them to moral trial. More importantly still, we must not seek to aid organs of public power in stripping them of their discursive power. I am confident that the mediation of interests goes hand in hand with social progress . . . Sometimes, compromise is progress (让步就是进步).
Within this “opinion community,” no matter how fierce the debate becomes, no matter how strong the conviction of social justice, moral purity or intellectual superiority on any one side, ultimately, as a matter of conscience, we must do our utmost to live under the same roof and work to find our “greatest common denominator”. My hope is that this sort of “public space” can become the filter through which helter-skelter information passes, the ballast that steadies the anger and emotion of internet users. I hope it can clear away anxieties rather than amplify them, that it can build political consensus rather than deepen social division.
As we seek the “greatest common denominator,” every individual and every rank or class must be alert to and carefully consider the reason why so often we become “coprime numbers” (互质数), we must be alert to and carefully consider how it is that that pernicious zero-sum idea we [should have] left behind three decades ago still lingers with us today, namely that, “If it’s not the east wind pushing down the west wind, then it’s the west wind pushing down the east wind.” [NOTE: These words, originally from the Qing classic The Dream of the Red Chambers, were used by Mao Zedong to talk about ideological struggles.]
At a full committee meeting of the All-China Writers Association that concluded recently, CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun (李长春) proposed respect for differences and tolerance for diversity, uniting all forces that can be united, stimulating social, intellectual and cultural vitality, working to uphold neutrality amid diversity, seeking consensus in dialogue and exchange. This spirit applies not just to the cultural field but provides inspiration in the realm of public expression.
When the stink rises on the internet, it is extremely important that [Party and government] authority respond carefully and sensibly. Shanghai’s Party secretary, Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), recently mentioned the word “tolerance” in his speech to the Ninth Plenary Session of the 16th Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CCP. He quoted the famous line from the “Communist Manifesto”, that “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all,” elevating tolerance from the question of the cultural character of Shanghai . . . to the plane of the law and civil rights. This kind of fresh political thinking within the Party is heartening and worth considering.
We can also be cheered by the way non-governmental figures like economist Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏) and media professional Xiao Shu (笑蜀) have repeatedly encouraged taking a rational view of social transition [in China], using a calm attitude to bring political participation into practice, ensuring that society is not swept up and torn apart by extreme influences and that a sluice gate is opened for social conflict and political unrest.
There were two “micro-charity” drives fueled by the internet this year that received a positive response from the government. In the so-called “take a picture to save an abducted child” movement [on microblogs], internet users assisted police in their efforts to help families who had lost their children make breakthroughs in their cases; and Deng Fei (邓飞) and some 500 other journalists launched their “free lunch” movement [on the internet], raising money to buy food for migrant school children. These were successful experiments in leveraging the “self-organization” of [emerging] civil society working hand-in-hand with the government, and they could not work without the leverage provided by institutions.
The current dysphoria on China’s internet, and the decline in the level of tolerance and acceptance there, reflects a worsening of tensions and conflict in actual society, and also reveals a progressive loss of patience among the public for the improvement of our institutions. The suicide bombing on May 26 this year of Qian Mingqi (钱明奇), a resident in Jiangxi’s Wuzhou city who faced the demolition of his home, was a warning shot. The destruction of good and bad alike (玉石俱焚) is something neither the government nor the people wish to see. At this turning point in history, “public intellectuals” and the “gate-keepers” in the media have a definite level of responsibility, to “add moisture” and “bring the temperature down” on the dry and hot internet, ensuring that rational and middle-of-the-line voices become the public opinion mainstream. After all, the peaceful transition of our society is for the good of all the people.

Stake it on Daddy

Two decades of economic growth have certainly made China richer. But uneven growth and lagging political reforms have also contributed to a sharp widening of the gap between rich and poor in the country. As social gaps grow more distinct, some Chinese say there is a growing consciousness among young Chinese of gaps in opportunity between those who have access the power, money and connections and those who do not. The term “stake it on daddy,” or pin die (拼爹) — a shortened form of bipin laodie (比拼老爹) — is a popular modern slang in China for the practice among young people (and many not so young) of comparing one’s own parents and connections with those of others in terms of economic wealth and social or political status. Behind this term is the idea (how broadly it is held is difficult to say) that in China having ability is not as important in the real world as having a father who is connected and/or wealthy. The Li Gang Case of 2010 could be regarded as a classic manifestation of the ping die social mentality. In this case, the son of an influential police official struck and killed a female college student with his luxury sedan and dared witnesses to turn him in, shouting “My father is Li Gang.”

Smogscape


During the first week of December 2012, Chinese media turned their attention to the serious problem of pollution in Beijing and other cities. Poor visibility due to smog in the capital of Beijing caused the cancellation or delay of hundreds of flights.
In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to his QQ.com blog, a city resident wearing a mask to protect himself from pollution gazes up, where just the tips of nearby skyscrapers are visible. All the city features around him are invisible in the smog. The cartoon is drawn in a narrow vertical manner, mirroring traditional Chinese landscape paintings.