We noted at CMP yesterday that the rhetoric of online information control has been gearing up in China in recent days, focusing on social media and particularly on microblogging platforms like Sina Weibo. Like the recent action by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television to ban the insertion of advertisements in television dramas in China, the intensified campaign against “unhealthy” information online — microblog rumors are characterized as a “drugs,” for example — takes its cues from the October “Decision” on so-called cultural reforms.
One of the most important in a recent spate of signals in China’s state media is an article in the People’s Daily by Wang Chen (王晨), the director of the State Internet Information Office, the internet control agency created under the State Council Information Office on May 4, 2011.
In the piece, which reflects the Party’s official position on social media, Wang makes the importance of the recent high-level Party meeting on culture clear from the outset. The Party must, he says, “conscientiously implement a number of deployment demands in the ‘Decision’ of the Sixth Plenum of the Party’s 17th Central Committee concerning the ‘development of a healthy and upright online culture,’ the ‘strengthening of public opinion channeling on the internet, singing the ideological and cultural main theme online” and ‘strengthening the channeling and control of social media and real-time communication tools (即时通信工具).'”
Since President Hu Jintao’s address at People’s Daily in June 2008, the concept of “public opinion channeling,” or yulun yindao (舆论引导), has been a central part of the Party’s press control strategy. It implies a more modern, slightly more savvy approach to traditional “public opinion guidance,” the notion (born in June 1989) that the Party must enforce its political line in the media in order to maintain social and political stability and Party rule.
“Public opinion channeling,” which CMP Director Qian Gang has called “Control 2.0,” focuses not just on restricting information but ensuring that the Party’s own authoritative version of the facts predominates. In other words, information can no longer be simply controlled through traditional censorship tactics — it has to be actively spun as well.
The following is a more or less full translation of Wang Chen’s remarks in the People’s Daily.

“Actively Carrying Out Public Opinion Channeling Work”
Wang Chen (王晨), Director of the State Internet Information Office
People’s Daily
November 28, 2011
Microblogs, as a new application of the internet, are vested with the qualities of rapid transmission, broad coverage and strong influence, and they are an important platform for the transmission of information. We must, in order to strategically raise the governing capacity of our Party and government, conscientiously implement a number of deployment demands in the “Decision” of the sixth plenum of the Party’s 17th Central Committee concerning the “development of a healthy and upright online culture,” the “strengthening of public opinion channeling on the internet, singing the ideological and cultural main theme online” and “strengthening the channeling and control of social media and real-time communication tools (即时通信工具)”. As suits the new circumstances, [we must] use new platforms, actively carrying out public opinion channeling work through microblogs, working hard to use microblogs to serve the masses and serve society.
[We must] transmit advanced culture (先进文化) and promote and develop healthy social trends through the Weibo. Now many regions have prioritized the strengthening of microblog content building, using microblogs to transmit scientific theories, advocate advanced culture, promote social uprightness and espouse good [social] habits, encouraging a flourishing internet culture and the development of internet civilization (网络文明). [Here, Wang talks about the “great results” this year in using microblogs to bolster propaganda objectives like the celebration of the Party’s 90th anniversary]. [We] hope that various regions and various units will actively put microblogging [technology] to use, maintaining closeness to the truth, closeness to life and closeness to the masses, releasing more healthy and beneficial new content, revealing more fully a positive new [climate of] prevailing practices (积极向上的新风尚) [on social media], reflecting more fully the new gesture of protecting the people’s fundamental interests, further raising the capacity for public opinion channeling and response [to sudden-breaking incidents and news stories], better serving economic reform and opening and modernization.
[We must] provide more rich and various information services through microblogs. Right now, around 50 microblogging sites within our borders have a total of more than 200 million new posts each day, providing a diverse sea of information, adding convenience to the masses of internet users in their study, work and life. [We] must actively encourage relevant parties to provide even more useful information in areas such as commerce, lifestyle, education and entertainment, satisfying internet users’ multi-faceted, diverse and multi-layered spiritual culture demand (精神文化需求) [NOTE: This awkward terms simply refers to demand for information and content, but we leave the more direct term to give a flavor of the official discourse here]. [We] must more fully utilize microblogs to promote economic development and serve the active needs of the social masses, ensuring that microblogs become a channel for transmitting advanced socialist culture (社会主义先进文化), a new platform for public culture services (公共文化服务), and a new space for the healthy cultural lives of the people.
[We must] encourage greater interaction and discussion among internet users through microblogs. Information generated in discussion and exchange among web users constitutes the bulk of microblog content, and the primary demand of web users in utilizing microblogs is that they can be used for the exchange of ideas and emotions and for conversation in life and work. In particular, the use of microblogs by internet users to share their joys and grievances, effectively work out their emotions and balance their mindsets has promoted microblogs in becoming an important social platform through which the public can exchange and converse. [We] hope the celebrity microbloggers (知名博主) can continue to develop their sensitivity to the national circumstances and to the social situation, raising their sense of social responsibility, thoroughly taking on a positive role in channeling online public opinion.
[We must] build internet civilization through microblogs. In recent years, the campaign of “running a civilized Web, and going online in a civilized manner” (文明办网、文明上网) has steadily moved forward, and has effectively purified the online environment, raising the level of internet civilization (提升了网络文明水平). Building internet civilization is an important part of the [project of] building socialist spiritual civilization (社会主义精神文明建设). Many writers, scholars, artists and advanced workers from various quarters have actively taken up use of microblogs to expound scientific theories [i.e., what is rational in the Party’s view], propagate the socialist core value system (社会主义核心价值体系), to share knowledge drawn from their work, to introduce their cultural products, etcetera, resulting in the emergence of internet cultural products that are vested with a Chinese style, show the spirit of the age and are of good taste. [We] hope that websites and our web user friends further establish an internet civilization consciousness (网络文明意识), acting on the “view of honor and shame” (荣辱观) by which “abiding by law and discipline brings honor, and acting against the law and discipline bring shame.” [NOTE: This is a reference to Hu Jintao’s “Eight Honors and Eight Shames,” which were introduced during the internet cleansing campaign in 2007. It was during that year that the idea of a “civilized Web” was drummed home by the leadership. Web portals were pressed to clean up their act along the lines indicated by the Party, and they signed up to public pledges for a “cleaner” internet.] [This is about] advocating civilized expression (倡文明表达), creating a civilized atmosphere (创文明环境), posting civilized blog [and microblog] posts (发文明博文), and being civilized blog [and microblog] account holders (做文明博主) — promoting microblogs in becoming a new platform for the transmission of positive information (积极向上信息) and rational and civilized expression of opinion, in becoming a cultural and public opinion front in actualizing the Socialist View of Honor and Shame (社会主义荣辱观) and promoting the socialist core value system.
[We must] use microblogs as a means for Party organizations and governments to better interact with the masses and serve the masses. For some time now, Party and government organizations at various levels, people’s congresses and political consultative conferences, judicial organs and other state organs as well as people’s groups and public officers, all have used microblogs to better understand the social mood and public opinion, to listen to the voices of the masses, to care about the hardships of the masses — and they have used microblogs as an important channel for connecting with and serving the masses. Up to this point, Party and government organs and public officers have opened up a total of 40,000 microblog accounts. These include the Information Office of the Nanjing City Government in Jiangsu province, the political affairs microblog of Aksu Prefecture in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the microblog group of Mudan District in Heze City in Shandong, and a whole group of other official Party and government microblogs that issue government affairs-related information in a timely manner, showing active concern, realizing good-natured interaction with the masses, promoting work of substance. [Here Wang talks further about the hope that Party and governments organs and leaders will continue to use social media actively as a means to better interact with the public and understand their concerns].
As we actively encourage various aspects [on the government side, intellectuals, member of the public etc.] to actively use microblogs to serve society, we must recognize that there are a number of problems involved in the use of microblogs that must be settled urgently. A small number of people use microblogs to fabricate and disseminate rumors, or to transmit obscene or vulgar information, intentionally violating the rights of others and carrying out illegal online public relations [activities]. These must be investigated and handled according to laws and regulations. When they are online, internet users must obey the law and discipline themselves, not transmitting rumors and not believing rumors. Various microblogging sites must strengthen their management of information posting, not providing a transmission channel to illegal or harmful information.. [We] invite the online masses to actively notify [authorities] of obscene or other harmful information, so that together we can create a creditable, healthy and civilized internet environment.
Strengthening the use and management of microblogs and other new media, promoting the building of internet culture, is a pressing demand in the strengthening of the building of the governing capacity of the Party and the government in the new era. In fact, the question of how to develop and manage microblogs is one many nations in the world together face. . . [Closing is about following President Hu Jintao’s leadership in tackling all of the above-mentioned issues and “promoting social harmony and stability.”]
http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/hlwxx/07/3/201111/t1055267.htm
王晨主任在《人民日报》发表署名文章：积极开展微博客舆论引导工作
国务院新闻办公室门户网站 www.scio.gov.cn | 发布:2011-11-28 | 来源：人民日报 | 作者：
积极开展微博客舆论引导工作
中央外宣办、国家互联网信息办主任
王　晨
微博客作为互联网一种新应用，具有传播快、覆盖广、影响大等特点，是信息传播的一个重要平台。我们要从提高党和政府治国理政能力的战略高度，认真贯彻落实党的十七届六中全会《决定》中有关“发展健康向上的网络文化”、“加强网上舆论引导，唱响网上思想文化主旋律”和“加强对社交网络和即时通信工具等的引导和管理”的部署要求，适应新形势、运用新平台，积极开展微博客舆论引导工作，努力运用微博客服务群众、服务社会。
通过微博客传播先进文化、弘扬社会正气。现在不少地区和单位重视加强微博客内容建设，通过微博客宣传科学理论，传播先进文化，弘扬社会正气，倡导良好风尚，推动了网络文化繁荣和网络文明的发展。特别是今年以来，充分发挥微博客等新技术新应用的作用，成功开展了隆重庆祝中国共产党成立九十周年等一系列重大主题报道，浓墨重彩讴歌了我们党团结带领全国各族人民夺取革命、建设、改革开放伟大胜利的丰功伟绩。希望各地区各单位积极运用微博客，坚持贴近实际、贴近生活、贴近群众，更多发布健康有益的新内容，更多展现积极向上的新风尚，更多反映维护人民群众根本利益的新举措，进一步提高舆论引导和应对能力，更好地为改革开放和现代化建设服务。
通过微博客提供丰富多彩的信息服务。目前，境内50余家微博客网站每天更新帖文达2亿多条，提供了丰富多彩的海量信息，方便了广大网民的学习工作和生活。要积极鼓励有关方面提供更多商务类、生活类、教育类、文娱类等实用信息，满足网民多方面、多样化、多层次的精神文化需求，更好地发挥微博客促进经济发展、服务社会大众的积极作用，使微博客成为传播社会主义先进文化的新途径、公共文化服务的新平台、人们健康精神文化生活的新空间。
通过微博客促进网民沟通交流。网民沟通交流的信息是微博客内容的主体，进行情感思想沟通和工作生活交流是网民使用微博客的主要需求。特别是网民通过微博客分享快乐、分担忧伤，有效疏导了情绪、平衡了心态，推动微博客成为公众沟通交流的重要社交平台。希望知名博主不断增进对国情、社情、网情的了解，增强社会责任感，充分发挥在网上舆论引导中的积极作用。
通过微博客推进网络文明建设。近年来，“文明办网、文明上网”活动不断推进，有效净化了网络环境，提升了网络文明水平。网络文明建设是社会主义精神文明建设的重要内容。许多作家、学者、艺术家和各界先进工作者等积极使用微博客阐释科学理论、宣传社会主义核心价值体系、交流工作心得、推介文化产品等，形成了具有中国气派、体现时代精神、品位高雅的网络文化品牌。希望网站和网民朋友进一步树立网络文明意识，践行“以遵纪守法为荣，以违法乱纪为耻”的荣辱观，倡文明表达、创文明环境,发文明博文、做文明博主，推动微博客成为传播积极向上信息和文明理性表达意见的新平台，成为践行社会主义荣辱观、弘扬社会主义核心价值体系的文化阵地、舆论阵地。
通过微博客推动党政机关和领导干部更好地联系群众、服务群众。一段时间以来，各级党政、人大、政协、司法等国家机关和人民团体及公职人员，通过微博客了解社情民意，倾听群众呼声、了解群众愿望、关心群众疾苦，把微博客作为联系群众、服务群众的重要渠道。目前，党政机关及公职人员已开设的4万多个微博客账户，包括江苏省南京市政府新闻办、新疆维吾尔自治区阿克苏市政务微博群、山东省菏泽市牡丹区政务微博群等一大批党政机关官方微博客，及时发布政务信息，认真回应关切，实现了与公众的良性互动，推动了实际工作。我们希望党政机关和党政领导干部、特别是与民生密切相关的部门和公职人员，通过微博客问政于民、问需于民、问计于民，妥善回应网上热点，努力引导好社会舆论，切实维护人民群众的合法权益。在使用微博客时，希望党政机关和公职人员严格区分职务行为和个人行为，遵守有关政治纪律和组织纪律，认真维护微博客，及时更新信息，提高沟通质量，加强良性互动，扩大社会影响。
在积极鼓励各个方面运用微博客服务社会的同时，也应看到目前微博客使用中还存在着一些亟待解决的问题。少数人利用微博客编造和散布谣言，传播淫秽色情低俗信息，故意侵犯他人权益，进行非法网络公关，必须依法依规予以查处。网民在上网时应守法自律，不传谣、不信谣。微博客网站应加强信息发布管理，不给违法有害信息提供传播渠道。欢迎广大公众积极举报网上淫秽色情等有害信息，共同创建一个诚信健康文明的网络环境。
加强对微博客等新兴媒体的运用和管理，推进网络文化建设，是新时期加强党和政府执政能力建设的迫切要求。实际上，对微博客如何发展和管理也是世界上不少国家面临的共同课题。我们要在以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央坚强领导下，深入贯彻落实中央关于互联网建设管理的一系列重要精神，坚持积极利用、科学发展、依法管理、确保安全的方针，解放思想，与时俱进，积极应对，兴利除弊，努力做好微博客舆论引导工作，充分发挥微博客服务群众服务社会的作用，促进社会和谐稳定，为党和国家工作大局服务，为广大人民群众服务。
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There have been unrelenting signals since August that Chinese leaders plan to act more robustly to control domestic social media platforms, which have been influential on a range of stories this year — from the Guo Meimei scandal to independent local people’s congress candidates. A series of pronouncements in Party publications over the past week, thankfully summarized in one place by Bill Bishop at DigiCha, seem to mark an intensification of the anti-rumor rhetoric that kicked off following the July 23 Wenzhou train collision.
The anti-rumor push, which focusses moralistically on false and misleading information — and, yes, politically uncomfortable information — as a socially dangerous scourge to be rooted out, can be seen as part of a broader attempt to legitimize the intensification of information controls. It is no surprise, therefore, to see that state media fulmination against “rumors” is drumming home the idea of rumors as “drugs” that threaten the well-being of society.
Of course, mobilizing society to accept and legitimize information controls is an increasingly difficult proposition in a country where ordinary people are growing ever more conscious of censorship and its ills. And perhaps one of the best examples of this can be seen in the online controversy brewing this weekend over the past remarks of Hu Zhanfan (胡占凡), the former Guangming Daily editor-in-chief who was appointed last month as the new head of the state-run China Central Television.

[ABOVE: Hu Zhanfan, appointed last month as the new head of CCTV, addresses a forum in January 2011 in his capacity as editor-in-chief of Guangming Daily, a paper published by the Central Propaganda Department.]
AFP had a good run down of the story yesterday, citing how internet users had seized on a July speech given by Hu Zhanfan in which he said that “[t]he first social responsibility and professional ethic of media staff should be understanding their role clearly and be a good mouthpiece.”
In fact, Hu Zhanfan made the controversial remarks back in January this year at a special forum dealing with the issue of “fake news.” The event was hosted by Guangming Daily, a newspaper published by the Party’s Central Propaganda Department.
Hu’s speech drew little attention at the time, and his appointment last month to head up CCTV received little comment. But posts on social media over the weekend likening Hu Zhanfan to the infamous Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, known in Chinese as gepei’er (戈培尔), put Hu at the center of an online firestorm.
Posts like this one juxtaposed CCTV’s official nightly newscast, Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播), and photos of Chinese crowds waving red flags with black-and-white images from Nazi-era Germany. In clear reference to the Party’s anti-rumor campaign, posts like this one offered the apocryphal Goebbels quote about repeating lies: “If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth.”
In yet another Sina Weibo post, a Chinese internet user asked: “When will Goebbels-style news controls end [in China]?” The post was a response to another post by writer Murong Xuecun (慕容雪村), who has frequently spoken out against censorship in China. Murong Xuecun’s post, which referred to the recent death of toddler Xiao Yueyue in southern China (after she was callously ignored by passersby after being struck twice by vehicles), read:

Experience teaches us that people gain much more from negative news. If you’ve watched Xinwen Lianbo, [the Party’s official nightly newscast], over the past 30 years, you’ve learned nothing useful . . . But a single Xiao Yueyue incident caused many to understand the responsibilities parents have and how passersby should conduct themselves . . . “Criticism” implies moral choice. Speak the truth and the sky won’t fall — it will just wake people up.

The official anti-rumor campaign and the anti-censorship firestorm on social media (which of course are the primary target of the anti-rumor campaign) together provide an interesting snapshot of tensions over information and censorship in China.
Further, it is interesting to note that opinion within China’s media does not hold that Hu Zhanfan takes a particularly hardline stance on press controls. In fact, some journalists consider him to be a rather liberal figure, and would suggest that his conservative remarks on the role of the press in China reflect nothing more than the fact that he was the Party boss of a major Party-run newspaper.
So can we regard these inflammatory statements on social media about “China’s Goebbel” as just more rumor?
The following is a partial translation of official media coverage of Hu Zhanfan’s remarks on the role of the press last January:

“Guangming Daily Holds Special Education and Training Session on ‘Avoiding Fake News’”
Editor-in-chief Hu Zhanfan’s talk dealt principally with five points: The first was about what is fake news; the second about the reasons for fake news; the third about the harm done by fake news; the fourth about social responsibility and professional ethics; the fifth about putting an end to falsehood and upholding responsibility and morals.
Concerning the nature of fake news, editor-in-chief Hu Zhanfan said, fake news refers to reports that do not truly reflect the original appearance (本来面貌) of things, which fabricate, twist or invent news facts. These common traits go against the objective facts upon which news relies, and wantonly rely on the will of individuals, seeking or relying on will of others to manufacture “news.” He used a rich variety of examples to talk about different forms of fake news, including embellishing stories . . .
Editor-in-chief Hu Zhanfan believes that in recent years fake news has shown a number of new characteristics. First, [fake news] has spread from commercialized, metro media to traditional authoritative [Party] media. Second, it has spread from entertainment and social news to economic and political news. Third, as traditional and internet-based media have had a more interactive relationship, fake news has been transmitted much more rapidly and widely. Fourth, there has been a trend from simple concocting of fake news to making idle reports, reporting gossip, exaggerating, going against common knowledge and other such issues, which have steadily spread.
Concerning the reasons for the spread of fake news, editor-in-chief Hu Zhanfan said that the principle reason was the drive for [personal] benefit (利益的驱动). Specifically, the impulse for economic gain had resulted in the emergence of a commercial trend in news; for the sake of finishing their task or making a name for themselves, individual reporters though nothing of fabricating news; some media, in order to attract eyeballs (吸引眼球), directly engaged in fake news. The second reason, [Hu said], was an incorrect style of work (作风不实) that caused [journalists] to chase after wind and shadows (捕风捉影). The chief reason for the emergence of fake reports, [he said], was that front-line reporters placed insufficiently strict demands on themselves and had an incorrect style of work. Some reporters showed insufficient cultivation, had low-quality behavior, had a flippant approach to work, and this had opened the door to fake news. The third and underlying root reason for fake news was the question of the Marxist View of Journalism (马克思主义新闻观). A number of news workers have not defined their own role in terms of the propaganda work of the Party, but rather have defined themselves as journalism professionals, and this is a fundamentally erroneous role definition. Strengthening education in the Marxist View of Journalism and raising the quality and character of news teams is not just very necessary, it is a matter of extreme urgency.
Concerning the damage done by fake news, editor-in-chief Hu Zhanfan pointed out that fake news and false reports (失实报道) not only damage the reputation of news journalists and the credibility of the media, but they also hamper, interfere with and destroy guidance of public opinion, damaging social order and economic order and seriously and even directly impacting social stability. For the media, winning the trust of the people is a project that will take years and years, built up through report after report. But the emergence of a single false report can extinguish everything that has been gained . . .
Concerning social responsibility and professional ethics, editor-in-chief Hu Zhanfan believes that the first and foremost social responsibility [of journalists] is to serve well as a mouthpiece tool (当好喉舌工具). This is the most core content of the Marxist View of Journalism, and it is the most fundamental of principles.

Following chatter by Chinese internet users in late November, Chinese media reported that a 26-year-old woman who has been dubbed “the most county leader in history” is now serving as the top Party leader in Hubei’s Jiangling County (江陵县). The young cadre, born in 1985 and graduating from college in 2008, reportedly stepped right into a Party leadership position in Jiangling upon graduation and was promoted four time within four years. The story has raised suspicions about the young Party secretary’s political connections and possible corruption. In this cartoon, posted by Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, the young female Party leader, juggling several official caps, rids a unicycle across a high-wire as perplexed ordinary Chinese look on.

Unpacking China’s latest policies on cultural reform, which emerged from October’s sixth plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP, will be a process of many months. The October “Notice” on cultural reform is not so much a coherent program of cultural development as a mess of politics, ideology and commercial interests. And the Party’s own attempts to explain what these changes mean lead only to more befuddlement.
Take, for example, today’s edition of the Party’s official People’s Daily. While articles on cultural reform are scattered throughout the paper, page seven offers a series of pieces with the stated goal of “exploring methods of transition and development for the cultural industries.” 

The first piece in the series, “Breaking Through Deep Issues in the Development of Culture Industries,” comes from the Hebei Province Research Center for the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Here is the center’s introduction:

In a modern society, culture and the economy grow together into one with each passing day. Owing to various regional, industry and administrative lines, our country’s cultural industries have not only suffered the limitation of their own development, but the support of and drive for economic and social development in a larger sense has not been fully brought into play [as a result]. Therefore, various regions and industries should, in the forming and implementation of cultural reform and development planning, set their eyes on cooperative development, united development, breaking through . . . [the situation] of the backwardness of cultural development relative to the economic development.

Readers hoping for specifics are rewarded instead with more generalities. The article says that achieving cross-regional and cross-industry cultural industry development requires “the strengthening of top-level design, innovating the systems and mechanisms for cultural construction.”
The objectives broadly defined in this article seem valid enough. China must move toward greater innovation. Indeed. China must transition from a “made in China” model to a “created in China” model. Sure.

While there are many reasons for the emergence of “shanzai culture” [in China], on one level it can illustrate the loss of impetus for innovation and creation in the cultural industries. At the moment, our culture industries lag behind the overall economy and society in terms of innovation and creativity, and this has restrained the development of the culture industries as well as economic and social development. Fostering the impulse for creativity and innovation has become . . . a strategic focus and urgent task in the cultural and also social and economic development. Realizing the leap from “made in China” and “assembled in China” to “created in China” and “brand China” requires a salient emphasis on innovation consciousness (创新意识) and creative thinking (创造思维), making innovation and creativity the leading and driving forces of cultural industry development. [This means] strengthening the protection of intellectual property and creating a social environment that respects knowledge, respects talent, respect work and respects innovation. [This means] strengthening the position of creativity and innovation in the cultural service value chain, raising the quality and effectiveness of acts of innovation and creativity.

But how do you drive home a “salient emphasis on innovation consciousness and creative thinking” and nurture “the impulse for creativity and innovation” without relaxing the political and ideological environment in which people create in the first place? This, as I’ve stressed before, is the fundamental blind-spot of China’s cultural reforms.
How do you create “a social environment that respects knowledge” and innovation when the fundamental law on culture is the Party’s, the demand that culture “follow the correct political orientation” as spelled out in the October “Decision” on cultural reforms?
The paragraph above also talks about the “quality and effectiveness” of innovation and creativity. But what are the metrics for quality and effectiveness? Who decides what is quality and what is effective? Who gets to allocate resources on that basis?
The second article in the series begins with an assessment of the need for more cultural production on the basis of broader trends in economic growth:

In step with our country’s economic development and rising household incomes, the spiritual [or “non-material” = “cultural”] consumer demand of the people has steadily expanded, and this has promoted the emergence of cultural and creative industries. In the past few years, the cultural and creative industries in our country have developed rapidly, and the scope of development has expanded from several large cities like Beijing and Shanghai to principal cities throughout the country.

How will China now meet this rising demand? The article states confidently that “many major cities have placed great priority on cultural innovation and industry development, and have gained clear results.” 

The city of Shanghai has raised the concept of ‘innovation industrialized and industry innovated’; the city of Nanjing has raised [the idea of] ‘making it such that every person’s creativity is encouraged, that every good creation has the opportunity to be marketed (市场化) and industrialized (产业化), and that every creator receives effective institutional support and favorable policy support’; the city of Guangzhou has raised [the concept of] ‘grabbing hold of the animation industry just [as it has] the automotive industry’; the city of Shenzhen has talked about building ‘the capital of innovative design; etcetera.  

So the Party everywhere is talking about innovation. That’s no surprise, of course. They have little choice given that innovation has become the preeminent Party buzzword. And what about action? The article goes on to mention other specific measures, such as a pilot project offering tax reductions for cultural enterprises in Beijing, investment in the building of “cultural industry accumulation areas” (产业聚集区) — culture industry parks, that is — and working with banks to encourage loans to “cultural innovation enterprises” (文化创意企业). 
I may seem to some to be belaboring this point, but there is an ongoing tension here between the “material” of hoped-for culture and the “spirit” of innovation. “Cultural industry accumulation areas” and loans for “cultural innovation enterprises” are all well and good. But the assumption seems to be that people will be innovating simply because these loans and parks exist. And there is that nagging question about the “social environment” for innovation alluded to in the first article in the People’s Daily series. Can you talk about innovation without talking about freedom? Whether you can or not, China is doing just that.
Nor can the discussion of cultural development escape the ideological conditioned response of defining Chinese cultural creation in opposition to the West — and thereby unnecessarily restricting its meaning and twisting its purpose. Who is going to decide whether innovations are sufficiently “Chinese”?
A third article on page 7 of the People’s Daily urges that policy making on cultural development take into account the uniqueness of the Chinese condition:  

The writer believes that every country’s cultural industries have their own soil on which they live and their own conditions that give them full scope. Departing from definite historical conditions and social environments, the development modes of cultural industries must change. Therefore, in setting down policies for the cultural industries, while the advanced experiences of developed Western nations should be adopted, we cannot apply or mechanically copy development modes . . .

So innovation is great, but China has to make sure that whatever innovation it gets is Chinese enough.
This prerogative of “Chineseness” leads us to another of the bewildering contradictions in this push for cultural reform. As I said at the outset, this policy is a mess. So perhaps it shouldn’t surprise us that the top-down push to create innovative culture that is quintessentially Chinese also maintains as its “guiding principle” the political tenets of a 19th century German philosopher.
An article in the People’s Daily series addressing the “need to thoroughly leverage the capacity of [China’s] excellent traditional culture” offers the following proviso for cultural industry development:

“[We must] adhere to the correct development direction. In bringing traditional culture into [overall] cultural industry development, we must adhere to Marxism as the guiding principle, keeping to the tenets of serving the people and serving socialism . . . ”

Currently secretary at People’s Daily Online’s Public Opinion Monitoring Center and editor of the journal Online Public Opinion, Zhu Huaxin (祝华新) served as a reporter for the CCP’s official People’s Daily from 1986 to 2000. He is the author of numerous articles and reports on public opinion, agenda-setting, the internet and social media in China.

The Beijing News reported on November 30 that a woman from the city of Suzhou named only as “Ms. Wang” recently filed a lawsuit against China’s Ministry of Land and Resources after her request for access to information on a highway construction project under China’s 2008 National Ordinance on Open Government Information (政府信息公开条例) was denied. The case shows the immense difficulties facing citizens in China who attempt to use the open government information (OGI) legislation to monitor the government. The 2008 ordinance specifies that government agencies much keep logs of all available records, defines a range of areas where citizens are ostensibly allowed access to information, and defines the procedures by which citizens can apply for access to government information. In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichun (商海春) to his blog at QQ.com, an ordinary citizen hopelessly tries to raise a huge bottle-opener labeled “open information” to the sealed mouth of a larger-than-life government official.

It’s been a busy year for China’s broadcast authority, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), which has made it its mission to shake up the already messy world of Chinese television. The body’s latest action, formally announced yesterday, is to ban the insertion of advertising in popular television dramas.
Back in July this year, SARFT held a “discussion forum” to address the issue of “entertainment excessiveness” in Chinese television programming, giving bosses from various provincial television networks an ostensible opportunity to offer their views on new restrictions that already seemed a foregone conclusion. The entertainment programming ban, known in China by the shorthand xian yu ling (限娱令), finally came in September and took effect in October. It forced television stations to broadcast “entertainment programs” (娱乐节目) no more than three times a week during prime time (5-10pm).
The latest SARFT ban on advertising in television dramas expressly prohibits the interruption of dramas with ads, but does not prevent broadcasters from airing advertisements before and after dramas, or from placing paid-for plugs directly into the dramas themselves. There are some ambiguities here that could lead to interesting cheats or workarounds from television broadcasters, something we’ll come to later.

[ABOVE: Today’s frontpage at the commercial Dongguan Times makes the latest SARFT ban the leading story. Strips of film labeled “advertising” are crossed into an X with a pair of scissors. The headline: “Ban on [ad] insertion. SARFT: Beginning next year TV dramas can’t insert ads.” The paper reports estimated losses to the TV sector by the move at 20 billion yuan, or 3.1 billion US dollars.]
But behind a swarm of questions like, “Will the rule kill off advertising revenues in the television sector?” and “Will broadcasters find a way to sneak around the rule?”, there looms a far more basic question: Why?
Why, indeed.
The ready answer seems to be that SARFT is putting its regulatory muscle where the Party’s mouth is on the broader issue of “cultural reforms.” To recap, the main theme at the recent plenary session of the Party’s 17th Central Committee was the building of a new cultural vibrancy in China through what was billed as a concerted process of cultural reform. In the Party’s formulation, this policy would bring a windfall of global “soft power” for China and give China the non-material confidence to stand strong “in the forest of nations.”
The talk of “cultural renewal” at the meeting came with a whole set of political and ideological imperatives. And superficially at least, it seems that SARFT is now muscling in on the television sector with some of these imperatives under its arm.
First of all, the “Notice” coming out of the October plenum said culture had to “uphold the main theme” and adhere to “correct guidance of public opinion,” both code for towing the Party’s political line. Further, the “Notice” stressed that “Marxism must be upheld as the guiding principle” of cultural reforms carried out “with the ideological armor of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This would ensure cultural reforms “moved in the correct [political] direction.”
More directly relevant to this ad-related ban, however, the “Notice” defined “the building of a public culture service system” (公共文化服务体系) as one of the chief goals of cultural reforms. In yesterday’s official notice from SARFT, “actively developing cultural work in the public welfare” as prioritized at the recent sixth plenum is given as justification for the ban on advertising. The idea, basically, is that advertisements pollute the public welfare value of the television space, and removing them from television dramas is a service to the Chinese public.
Some members of the public have understood the ban in exactly this way. Internet user Yan Ni (燕妮) wrote on her weblog today:

The public opinion power of ordinary people is pretty substantial. The new SARFT regulations have surfaced, and beginning January 2012 advertisements can’t be inserted into television dramas. This gives the audience back a harmonious and efficient television environment. The hopes of ordinary people have been answered. This is a good thing, a very good thing.”

This of course is a fair initial reaction from the sofa. But there are important institutional, economic, practical and, yes, political questions that are left hanging by this SARFT action and its public service justification.
The section of October’s “Notice” that deals with “building a public culture service system” states that “public welfare cultural units” will form the “backbone” of this project, “supported by public financing.” The same section also talks about “employing government procurement, project subsidies, direct subsidies, interest subsidies, tax reduction and other policy measures” to “encourage various cultural firms to participate in public culture service.” Clearly, providing state funding for public welfare programming is one thing, and forcing public welfare programming standards on commercially operating enterprises is another.
This begs the question of the exact institutional nature of the television networks that will be impacted by the SARFT policy. Since the 1990s, media in China have been weaned off government support and encouraged to commercialize. In a competitive national market, they have been forced to fight for ad dollars, a fight for their survival. But the Party of course maintains the Party nature of all media in China, which is to say that there are no truly “independent” media even if the vast majority of Chinese media today have become financially independent.
So are these television networks “public welfare institutions”? Or are they for-profit entities? The answer is that they are neither and both, a question that Wei Yingjie (魏英杰) addressed yesterday at the Economic Observer:

. . . [T]he rationality and feasibility of the ‘advertising ban’ policy remain in question. In terms of the policy itself, SARFT can of course issue this or that regulation given that it is the department that overseas broadcast television nationwide. But the question of whether or not the policy is rational is a matter of whether or not it accommodates the industry’s own laws of development. So we have to make clear: are mainland television stations ultimately public welfare institutions or are they for-profit institutions? The answer is that mainland television stations are not purely public welfare institutions, nor are they entirely marketized institutions. Rather, they are compounds of both.

The core question, then, is this. Who is paying for the “public welfare” mandate? And for that matter, who is paying for the cultural reforms trumpeted so loudly at October’s meeting?
Wei sums it up like this: “The issue is really simple. Mainland television stations do not rely on fiscal appropriations to survive, and so they must be permitted to go and find sustenance in the marketplace.” It’s entirely unreasonable, he suggests, to expect profit-driven television stations to take a hit for “public welfare” without the government stepping up with its pocketbook — and arguably goes against the “spirit” of the Party’s October “Notice”, which indicates that public financing will support the so-called “public culture service system” that is the core justification of the SARFT action.
Here is Wei Yingjie again:

This means that while administrative departments [like SARFT] can demand that television stations at various levels have a great public welfare quality about them, the government must finance these stations, otherwise there is no reason to inhibit the television stations in carrying out commercial activities.

“Who’s paying for this?” seems a most basic question that neither SARFT nor the Party leaders who presumably back this decision have cared to think about. On page nine of the CCP’s official People’s Daily today, Zhang He (张贺) praises the SARFT action, saying that television viewers have been “held ransom” by advertisements. He concludes with staggering blindness: “I hope television stations won’t focus too much on the short-term impact of the ban on inserting advertisements and will take a longer view, putting their energies into raising their own core competitiveness, constantly creating various unique and excellent content resources.” Pray tell, Zhang, how will these television stations pay for the “unique” and “excellent” programs you imagine populating this idealistic future?
There also seems to be a serious disconnect in the SARFT action between problem assessment and policy prescription. This can be glimpsed again in Zhang He’s editorial, where he argues that while people do not object to “reasonable advertising,” “the values of some television broadcast units have gone seriously awry, and they care more about economic benefit than the public welfare.” Admitting that “some” stations might have behaved excessively, where is the rationale then for banning all ads at all stations?
Further, the inconsistent and apparently unfair application of this public welfare standard calls into question the motives at the very core. Zhang He writes in People’s Daily about advertisements on television dramas “harming the normal viewing rights of the masses.” But what about advertisements inserted into news programming in China? Isn’t that serious too?
A report on the SARFT action at China Enterprise Online today quoted Beijing Huayuan Group CEO Ren Zhiqiang (任志强) as saying: “Why aren’t they limiting the insertion of advertisements in news programming? It seems that a lot of advertisements are still being inserted into a lot of [news] programs like Diyi Shijian [on CCTV 2]. We should treat all equally without discrimination. Every one is equal under the law, you know.”
It is of course a further hypocrisy to righteously defend the right of the Chinese public to be free from advertising during television dramas when there is, too put it gingerly, an insufficient respect for the public’s right to know. Shouldn’t public welfare programming begin by safeguarding the accuracy of news and information in the public interest? This point was made in a backhand fashion by Wang Ran (王冉), the CEO of China eCapital Corporation, again at China Enterprise Online. In reference to China’s official nightly newscast, which is stacked with propaganda about top Party leaders, Wang remarked: “I hope that some day Xinwen Lianbo too will stop its 30-minute advertising insertion.” Wang was of course referring to the news program itself, one big advertisement for top Party leaders.
Beyond the issue of whether these new measures are reasonable or even at their core really about the public welfare, there is the question of whether they will have the intended effect at all. Internet users and commentators are already speculating about how television stations will get around the rules. Many people have suggested, for example, that the rules will result in a flood of product placements in television dramas themselves — arguably more insidiously damaging to the public welfare. Another countermeasure to the rules might be to divide dramas into segments, allowing stations to justify placing ads before and after and argue that they were not actually “inserted.”
Finally, what other unintended effects will these rules — which, of course, deal only with television — have in a changing information terrain, where the Internet and social media are increasingly encroaching on the television space anyhow? One answer comes from ChinaEquity International Holding Co. Ltd. CEO Wang Chaoyong (汪潮涌): “All these various bans from the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television are just marginalizing the whole television sector and actively promoting the development of the internet and mobile media.”

In October and November 2011, an online campaign gathered pace in China around the case of blind lawyer and human rights activist Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚), who has been kept under house arrest at his home in Linyi, Shandong province, since his release from prison in late 2010. Chinese internet users and activists who attempted to visit Chen Guangcheng in response to online calls for action were harassed by local police and thugs. In late October, US Representative Chris Smith, chairman of the Congressional Executive Commission on China, said a congressional trip to Linyi to visit Chen was being planned. The AFP quoted Smith as saying that US lawmakers “desperately hope” Chen is still alive. Smith was subsequently denied a visa to visit China. In this cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to his blog at QQ.com, chains of oppression dripping with blood knot around a pair of dark sunglasses, symbolic of the blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng. The cartoon was drawn for the occasion of Chen Guangcheng’s 40th birthday on November 12.