Today, November 8, is International Journalists Day, and a number of Chinese media have marked the holiday — but none perhaps so forcefully as China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the Communist Youth League of China.
China Youth Daily, which has been known for its strong professional reporting tradition since the 1980s, tells the story in today’s edition of Fujian television journalist Deng Cunyao (邓村尧), who was brutally attacked on October 18, 2010, while leaving his office, in what was apparently a reprisal for critical reporting.
The assailant, riding a red motorbike and covering his face, drove up behind Deng and hacked at his left leg with a large knife. Deng, a producer at Fujian’s Longyan Television Station, recalled to the China Youth Daily reporter: “I wanted to run, but my leg had been broken by the slash, and I fell.”
As Deng screamed for help, the assailant turned and hacked at Deng’s right leg. Unable to stand, Deng watched as the assailant fled on his motorbike.
The China Youth Daily report explores the Deng Cunyao case in detail, including the threats facing his family. We do not translate the report here, but encourage readers of Chinese to take the time.
China Youth Daily apparently timed the release of the report for today. Here is our translation of the editor’s note:

Today is November 8, Journalists Day. We publish this chilling report today in order to pay our respects to those colleagues in journalism who are struggling on the front lines of watchdog journalism, and in order to tell the public: when journalists are beaten, when they suffer knife attacks, this is not only an injustice to the journalists themselves, or to their news units — it is an injustice to the popular will and to the public interest. Journalists represent the will of the public and the conscience of society. When we face difficulty, what we need most of all is your support.

The term “watchdog journalism” here is in Chinese “supervision by public opinion“, or yulun jiandu (舆论监督). The term, first mentioned at a senior leadership level in China in Zhao Ziyang’s political report in 1987, remains one of the officially recognized forms of power monitoring in China. But the term has now also become a rallying cry for professional journalists in China, and in particular for investigative reporters. For a more detailed treatment of this issue please refer to our book Investigative Journalism in China.
In an opinion piece posted online today in response to the case exposed by China Youth Daily, Yu Deqing (于德清) wrote:

Today many journalists have a deep sense of powerlessness. This kind of powerlessness very often comes from repeated obstruction in carrying out supervision by public opinion, comes from the way professional journalism values are constantly under attack in the real world. And in many cases, obstacles in carrying out monitoring pale in comparison to the harm caused by their powerlessness in protecting the safety of their own family members. This places journalists in a moral dilemma — if you can’t even protect your own family members, how can you even begin to talk about the power of monitoring, about protecting social fairness and the interests of the social underclasses?”

Now that the sixth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is history — see our coverage of so-called cultural system reforms announced at the meeting — it’s time to begin looking ahead to next year’s 18th National Party Congress, which will mark a critical transition in China’s top leadership. So much seems bewildering about China’s closed and secretive political system. But we’ll do our best to shed some light on the messy process in a series of posts in coming months.
In a post later this month we’ll discuss the issue of leadership selection and so-called “intra-party democracy” in China, and the (for many) bewildering notion of the “election differential” (选举差额). For now, however, we turn to a recent interview with retired senior cadre Du Daozheng (杜导正), the publisher of the progressive monthly journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋).

[ABOVE: Du Daozheng appears on the cover of the most recent edition of Guangdong’s Southern People Weekly.]
In the interview, published in the most recent issue of Guangdong’s Southern People Weekly magazine, Du discusses Chinese politics and history in light of its present challenges, offering a good overview of some of the issues at stake in the lead up to the 18th Congress.
For more background on Du Daozheng, we encourage readers to turn to this 2007 interview translated by Roland Soong, and this 2009 interview in The New York Times.

Du Daozheng: I’m optimistic about the China’s prospects
— a conversation with Du Daozheng (杜导正)
Southern People Weekly: You compare China’s political situation to a pressure cooker. Would do you think the people inside the pressure cooker should do?
Du Daozheng: Pressure cookers have a valve, and the more you turn this valve the more pressure builds up, until one day the whole thing explodes. Once the explosion happens everyone falls on hard times, and no one has an advantage. And so, I hope we can take the path of reformism (改良主义).
The tension in China rights now can be summed up in 16 words: “Official corruption, a wide income gap, a collapse of ethics and morals, and poor public security.” [NOTE: The 16 “characters” in Chinese here are, 官场腐败，贫富悬殊，道德滑坡，治安不好]. Chinese now have food on the table and roofs over their heads. They are no longer at war, and feel they can get by. But corruption is so severe, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen, and the level of frustration ordinary Chinese feel with the government continues to rise. This is really dangerous.
Southern People Weekly: We’ve just celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution. How do assess these past 100 years?
Du Daozheng: Sun Yat-sen had a profound influence on China, on the [Chinese Communist Party], on generations of intellectuals. The Xinhai Revolution was a banner, and this is something that even the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan doesn’t dare deny. It’s really regrettable that in mainland China we have failed to use the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution as an opportunity to promote the democratic process.
When we look back on Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People” (三民主义), we can see their relevance still. Mao Zedong made many mistakes, but on the issue of national sovereignty, judging historically, what he collectively represents has merit. When I was young we would read the newspapers and be left with the sense that the country was doomed. We lost China’s three northeastern provinces [to the Japanese], and then came Chahar and Rehe [both Mongolian provinces]. National independence, and equal status among nations, this was raised by Sun Yat-sen, it was a concern of Chiang Kai-shek’s, but ultimately the issue was resolved in the era of Mao Zedong.
The leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party has relied upon both “nationalism” and the “people’s welfare,” [two of Sun Yat-sen’s original “three principles”]. But now corruption and the wealth gap has reached such a point that the problem of “people’s power” [or “democracy”] must be resolved. Power must be checked. We cannot rely on morality to provide a check, so this commending of moral principles that we’re seeing right now is of no use. Dealing with internal corruption at the roots is something very difficult for [the Party] to handle itself — it’s like growing a huge boil on one hand and trying to cut it off with a knife in the other. You can’t do it.
There are three things we have to do now. The first is intra-party democracy. The second is reforming the people’s congress system. The third is opening up public opinion [NOTE: in other words, relaxing media policy].
Southern People Weekly: Have the heard the various voices among those now in power [on this issue]?
Du Daozheng: There are good people inside officialdom too right now. A central Party leader stepping down told me that one time he visited a certain province and the situation as introduced to him by the Party secretary [of that province] was one thing, but after the meeting the two of them spoke privately and that provincial secretary said that everything he had just said was said out of obligation only.
If there’s anything I’ve learned through my life of experience it’s that any person, any group, any ruling party, any particular matter, is always very complex, nuanced and changeable. And so when we look at, analyze and handle issues, we must avoid over-simplification and absolutism. I think this applies to all problems.
Southern People Weekly: There are some people who believe that the violent revolution set off by the Xinhai Revolution created a century of unrest for China, that if the self-strengthening movement at the end of the Qing dynasty had been successful, creating a constitutional monarchy, things in China would have gone very differently.
Du Daozheng: The Guangxu Emperor wanted to take the path of Japan’s Meiji Restoration, and if he had been successful this would have been a boon for China. China would not be as it is now, but would be a powerful capitalist nation. But he failed after all. The Empress Dowager Cixi suppressed him. Before her death her own thoughts turned to reform. At the time, forces within the court began to rise [in favor of reform] and many ministers from many parts [of China] had different ideas, that not seeking reform was not an option. She [Cixi] permitted privately-run newspapers, and almost immediately more than 100 publications were launched in Shanghai. But it was too late. The United League had already risen and was calling for revolution. This is the concern in China right now. The lessons of history are rich indeed. All blood and tears.
Southern People Weekly: America is right now experiencing this “occupy Wall Street” movement, and some Chinese have rejoiced in this, saying that the West is in decline and the East is rising.
Du Daozheng: Compared to China the problems facing the West are minor ones. Even if they make a bigger fuss, it won’t come to armed insurrection, because their democratic institutions determine that the people have the right to choose and remove their government. It’s possible under democratic social institutions to constantly reform and correct errors [in society]. There is great vitality, and therefore stability. Internally, they are far more stable that appearances suggest.
Southern People Weekly: Lately, one of the terms that makes governments at all levels of [China’s bureaucracy] nervous is stability preservation. What do you think makes for a stable society?
Southern People Weekly: Lately, one of the terms that makes governments at all levels of [China’s bureaucracy] nervous is stability preservation. What do you think makes for a stable society?
Du Daozheng: Right now large-scale revolution is impossible in China, but small-scale unrest is widespread. In my view, the best thing would be to take a number of quick steps forward while preserving the leadership status of the Chinese Communist Party, preserving current political power, and preserving the present social structure. Recently, a number of sons and daughters of old cadres have talked about how aside from truly advancing intra-party democracy, there is a need to quickly advance the reform of the people’s congress system, including raising the quota of people’s congress delegates for the people by 20 percent. I think this is a good idea.
Southern People Weekly: Recently in Guangdong there was a child who was struck twice by vehicles and then was ignored by 18 passersby who rendered no help at all. How do you see that incident?
Du Daozheng: There is a moral collapse behind this incident, and also weakness in our legal institutions — after I’ve saved you, and you turn and level charges against me, I could face prison time.
Morals are far too weak as a part of our education system. Right now we stop at nothing for scientific and technological development. Just look at how our country places little priority on culture and human affairs, but only awards science and technology. This is not unlike [the situation under] Stalin. Stalin had little regard for the humanities and only cultivated Gorky and a number of intellectuals who would do his bidding. Mostly he supported and cultivate those in the sciences and technology.

Continuing our coverage of culture and politics in China in light of the recent “Decision” on “cultural system reforms” released by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the 17th CCP Central Committee — the annual full meeting of China’s topmost Party leaders — we offer a translation of the latest blog essay by race-car driver and cultural critic Han Han (韩寒).
In the essay, Han Han talks about his personal experiences with censorship, which he likens to castration, and offers his own (humorous) reflections on the question of building China as a “cultural strong nation.”
UPDATE: Han Han’s essay had been deleted from his blog by today, November 4, 2011. Left in its place was the headline: “What can you do when your taste is too low.” Readers will understand the headline’s meaning after reading his essay.

[ABOVE: A screenshot of Han Han’s blog today, showing the deleted November 2 post at the top.]

I haven’t written anything since [my July post] “Nation Derailed.” In point of fact, I’m not very diligent about my writing, and each time I do finish writing something and then can’t see it [after I post it, because it has been censored], I get despondent. And there are just so many government departments [to get past]. Even if the propaganda department and the General Administration of Press and Publications are fine with something, any department issued with Passats and above can wipe your essay away with a simple phone call. Of these, the most merciful are in fact certain local public security departments. Back in 2008 I wrote an essay that wasn’t deleted until a after a lapse of a whole year. No wonder people complain about slow police response times. It’s true. There are so many places that delete articles that one doesn’t know how to begin writing.
I’ve been involved in this work [of writing] for around 13 years now, and I now understand just how powerless and of no account cultural workers (文化工作者) really are. Owing to a richness of restrictions, people in this line of work are unable to produce anything truly special. Allow me to share a few stories.
China’s publishing industry actually isn’t so subject to official censorship. People will find that strange, because it goes against the common understanding. But I can tell everyone that there really is no censorship in the book publishing industry. This is because tens of thousands of books are published every year in China, and it’s actually impossible to censor them all. Moreover, I believe that most of those comrades charged with reading books [to censor them] don’t really enjoy reading books, so book censorship has actually been left to the publishing houses themselves.
But this doesn’t amount to the opening of one-hundred flowers. Of course it doesn’t. To put it rather more expertly, this is what they call a system of post-facto censorship (事后审查制). In fact, post-facto censorship is stricter than prior censorship, more lethal and having more adverse reactions. This is something of which those who have used postcoital contraceptives have a rather deeper sense.
Only if you obtain a book license [or “book number”] can you publish, only publishing houses can issue book licenses, only the authorities can operate publishing houses, and so from the very fountainhead publishing freely is impossible. Owing to the fact that the vast majority of state-run publishing houses are of no use, many privately-run cultural enterprises (民营文化公司) have gotten into the book publishing business. The method of publishing is either joint publishing [with a state-run house] or purchasing a number of book licenses from publishing houses. This, however, cannot change the situation facing publishing, because the publishing house still has the ultimate decision.
In the past when a book was not allowed to be published, the reason given was that it was counterrevolutionary. But this term counterrevolutionary later fell out of use because while counterrevolutionary activity was still frowned upon no one wanted exactly to encourage revolution either. In the view of the authorities, the work of the revolution had already been accomplished, and so while counterrevolutionary behavior was a no-no, revolution was equally unwanted. The best thing was for the masses to just live their lives by staying put.
So now the reason for not being able to publish things is that they are deficient in taste (格调不高). My first book, The Three Doors (三重门), was dragged about in coming out precisely because it was deficient in taste. If something’s deficient in taste this can be fatal. After all, if the writing isn’t strong enough, it can be improved. If the logic isn’t there, it can be worked out. But deficiency of taste is a real headache, and you just don’t know how you can lift up your taste. If you ask them what they mean by taste, they don’t know either. Only now have I come to understand that taste actually means to cut out (割掉), so deficiency of taste actually means that not enough has been cut [NOTE: This is a play on words, as the words “taste”, gediao, and “to cut out” are homophones in Chinese]. So you think that just by symbolically smoothing out the calluses on your feet you can make it in the creative industries [in China], eh? No, you have to make sure you cut high enough. If you spare that part just below the waist, you might still be too manly for the creative industries.
I’ve long been subjected to the bitterness of censorship. But since I managed to raise my taste somewhat, I have fortunately been able to publish books. And because some books have enjoyed substantial sales, I’ve sometimes been able to get the publisher to push the taste down just a bit. Each time before I write I have to go through a process of self-censorship. Perhaps some who have never worked in this industry might feel that doing this makes us somehow cowardly, not MAN enough. For example, before my book Solo Troupe (独唱团) was published I went through all sorts of difficulties. Some of my friends couldn’t stand it. They said I was selling out, and if it were them they would say forget the book number, take it right to the printers, print tens of thousands of copies and start selling them. While I admire these friends for their deficiency of taste, they don’t understand that the printers can only run their machines once they’ve received a printing authorization from the publishing house. Otherwise you can’t print a single copy without someone informing the police. If your own grandfather opens up his own printing house and you manage to print tens of thousands of copies, without a book number no bookstore or newsstand is going to carry your product. Even those people who sell pirated copies won’t help you sell it.
These friends might say, well then, I would just put it up on the internet and sell it on Taobao. Let me tell you then that if you want to sell books on Taobao you first have to have the credentials, you can’t just tack a book cover right up there. You have to enter the book number, and once the system has verified the book number and the book title, only then can your book go up.
And so up to this very day, everyone and anyone involved in culture is engaged in a painful process of self-censorship. So can we look forward to publishing houses lowering their taste a bit? This is of course impossible. As soon as a publishing house shows any sign of notching down its taste — remembering that these are state-run units — the authorities will just send over a new publishing chief. The nasty thing about post-facto censorship is how it exacts penalties. It says, look, I’m not going to look over your shoulder, but if you publish something improper I’ll have your head for it. If it’s something less serious I’ll fire you from your post or disband the publishing house; if it’s serious I’ll lock you up. So, you decide how you want to do it.
As for myself, while every single essay I write goes through a process of self-censorship and castration, sometimes unavoidably the fashion of my castration is still insufficient to pass muster. This has to do with the level of sensitivity at various publishing houses. For example, my most recent novel has been killed outright, because the protagonist in the novel is surnamed Hu [like China’s president]. So even though I have only written 5,000 characters so far, the publisher assumes there must be political allegory somewhere. By the time I realized I had to avoid this name and changed the character’s surname it was too late.
I don’t know how a country where a writer trembles when he takes up his pen can build itself into a cultural great nation (文化强国), or how a country where you have to avoid using the names of [politburo] standing committee members and therefore can’t find the [Tang dynasty poet] Li Bai in a Google search can build itself into a cultural great nation. I have no idea how these cultural system reforms are supposed to work. I just have one wish, and that is that Mr. Han Zheng (韩正), [currently the mayor of Shanghai], is not promoted again. Otherwise, I won’t even be able to come up with myself in a search.

NOTE: This post had been deleted from Han Han’s blog by Friday, November 4. We post the Chinese here for the convenience of our readers:
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4701280b0102dwvy.html
格调不高怎么办 (2011-11-02 18:42:22)转载
标签： 杂谈
自从《脱节的国度》不见了以后，一直都未写东西。因为我着实是一个写的不勤奋的人，每次写完，隔日不见，真的扫兴，而且国家部门繁多，就算宣传部门和新闻出版部门觉得没问题，所有配备了帕萨特以上公务车的部门也都可以一个电话把你文章删了。其中最仁慈的反而是某地方的公安部门，08年有一天我写了一篇文章，事隔一年多，他们删除了这篇文章。难怪大家都说公安出警慢。没错。删文章的地方太多了，就不知道该怎么下笔了。
从事了这个工作大概十三年，我发现文化工作者在地位上真是一个特别下三滥特别窝囊废的工种。这个工种所出产的作品由于受到诸多的限制，所以肯定没有那么奇特的经历更加精彩。我来说一些小故事。
在中国的出版行业，其实是没有官方的审查的。大家都应该觉得很奇怪，因为这违背了常识。但是可以告诉大家，出版行业的确没有审查。这是因为中国每年要出几十万本书，实在审查不过来。而且我相信管那些读书人的同志大部分都不爱读书，所以图书审查其实一直由出版社独立完成。
但是这样一来岂不是百花齐放了。当然不是。比较专业的说，这叫事后审查制。事后审查制其实要比事前审查制更加紧，杀伤力和副作用更大。这点用过事后避孕药的朋友肯定深有感触。
只有拥有书号才能出版，只有出版社才能发书号，只有官方才能有出版社，所以从源头上，自由的出版其实是不可能的。而由于大量的国有出版社能力不济，很多民营文化公司开始运营图书出版。出版的方式就是合作出版或者从出版社那里购买一些书号。但这依然不能改变出版现状，因为出版社依然是终审方。而一本书如果不让出版，在以往理由是反革命，后来反革命这个词不太出现了，因为反革命既然是不好的，那岂不成了鼓励革命。而官方认为，革命工作已经完成，所以既不能反革命，也不能革命，群众最好的生活方式就是呆着。于是现在不能出版的理由就是格调不高。我第一本书《三重门》就是因为格调不高，迟迟不能出版。格调不高是致命的，因为文笔太差可以改，逻辑不清可 以理，唯 独格调不高让人头疼，你也不知道怎么能让自己的格调提高一点。你问他什么是格调，他也不知道。一直到现在，我才明白了，格调其实就是割掉的意思，格调不高就是割掉的不够高，你以为象征性的把脚底板的老茧磨磨平就能从事文化行业了么，你要割掉的够高。凡是保留腰以下部分的，从事文化行业明显还是会显得雄性气息太浓厚。
我是一直饱受审查之苦的。但在格调稍微高了一点以后，我还是侥幸可以出版图书，并且因为图书的畅销，有的时候还稍微可以在小问题和出版方争取格调稍微降低一点。每次写作前，我都要进行一次自我审查。也许很多没有从事过这个行业的朋友会觉得我们这样做特别怂，不够MAN。比如当年《独唱团》出版前遇到很多的困难，一些朋友看不下去了，说你太娘们了，这要是我，不要书号了，直接拿到印刷厂去，印个几十万本，这就开卖了。我欣赏这位朋友的没有格调，但他们不知道印刷厂只有收到了出版社开具的委托印刷单以后才能开机印刷，否则你非但印不了一本，人家就报警了。其次就算你爹开了一个印刷厂，你印刷出了几十万本，你没有书号，就没有一家书店和报刊亭是会进你的 货的。连 卖盗版的都不敢帮你卖。也许这位朋友会说，那我就放到网上去，在淘宝卖。那我告诉你，在淘宝销售图书，首先你得拥有资质，其次你不能随手拍一个封面就上架了，你必须输入书号，当系统把你输入的书号和书名对应起来，你才能上架。
所以一直到今天，所有的文化人都在进行着痛苦的自我审查。那我们能否指望出版社突然格调降低呢，这当然也不可能，一旦出版社有格调降低的迹象，由于都是国有单位，官方再指派一个社长过去就是。而那些格调降低的同志就可以去妇联残联养养老。事后审查制最恐怖一环在于惩罚，就是我不管你，但你要是出版了什么幺蛾子，我罚死你。轻则撤职撤社，重则投进大牢，所以你看着办吧。
至于我本人，虽然每一篇文章都经过了自我审查和阉割，但有的时候难免也会出现阉割的形状不符合认证的情况。这个和每个出版社的紧张程度有关系。比如我最新的小说就被枪毙了，因为新小说里的主人公姓胡，虽然我才写了五千字，但是出版社认为这必然是有政治隐喻的。当我明白了要避讳的时候再改姓已经晚了。但避讳要记住勿忘前朝，我还有一篇小说中，因为出现了“江河湖海”四个字，被更直接的枪毙了。如果说之前我犯了错误的话，那这一个就是两倍的错误。连我都不能原谅我自己，明知道惹不起，怎么连躲都没躲利索呢。
我不知道一个文化人提笔就哆嗦的国家怎么能建设成文化强国，一个因为要避讳常委所以在谷歌上搜索不到李白的国家怎么能建设成文化强国。我不知道该怎么一个文化体制改革法，反正我只有一个愿望，就是韩正老师别再升官了，要不然我就搜不到我了。
谨以此文纪念一期被停的《独唱团》以及两期被停的《大方》。

This cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to his blog at QQ.com, is a nuanced criticism of China’s current politics. The red carpet represents the red road of China’s current politics, essentially market economics welded to political autocracy, encompassed by the political buzzword “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The name of Kuang’s cartoon is “The Special Road” (特色之路). Marching along in front along this road is an official wearing a long gown, a symbol of China’s old feudal society, and a suggestion by Kuang that China’s leaders still behave in a feudal manner in an essentially feudal system. Servants walking behind the official hold up empty symbols that bolster legitimacy and create unity. The first holds up an airily empty umbrella torso of Mao Zedong (representing Maoist ideology) as a shelter for the official — protecting the official from ideological challenges. This is also a reference to China’s imperial past as emperors walked under massive umbrellas while on outside tours. The official (and his servants — other officials too?) are headless, suggesting the lack of real political acumen behind the show and triumphalism. The red flag might represent Chinese nationalism, a unifying force. The portrait held at the back of the procession is presumably that of former president Jiang Zemin (江泽民), whose own political formula, the “Three Represents”, has been written formally into the Party Constitution.

On October 8, 1980, an editorial by famous Chinese actor Zhao Dan (赵丹), a central figure in the heyday of Chinese cinema in the 1930s and 40s, appeared in the Party’s official People’s Daily. Zhao expressed concern over political intervention in culture, which he said made it “impossible to have a flourishing of the arts.”
The editorial, which Zhao composed from his sickbed in September 1980, as economic reforms were just getting underway and the memories of the Cultural Revolution were still fresh, is a perennial favorite of Chinese artists and intellectuals on the issue of politics and creativity. It’s no surprise, then, that the editorial has been dragged out again in the weeks — and actively shared on social media — following the Chinese Communist Party’s “Decision” on cultural development.

[ABOVE: Zhao Dan’s editorial on literature and the arts appears in the October 8, 1980, edition of People’s Daily.]
Zhao’s cautions on the political control of culture are unfortunately as current today as they were three decades ago. A partial translation of the editorial follows.

“If Management is too Specific, There is No Hope for the Arts”
The People’s Daily is carrying out a discussion on “improving the Party’s leadership of the arts and culture, doing the task of arts and culture effectively.” When I saw words like “improving” and “effectively” in the headlines, I was encouraged; when I saw in the “editor’s note” this phrase about how “the Party’s work in leading literature and the arts must be improved, achieving strengthening through improvement, on this issue we are steadfast,” I was heavyhearted all over again. I don’t know how broad the scope of this “we” in the “editor’s note” is supposed to be. I only know that there are some artists — artists who have been loyal and faithful to the work of the Party, and who have persevered — who will be struck with fear as a conditioned reflex when they hear about this need to “strengthen the Party’s leadership.” Because in their gathered experiences of such movements, every time there is a strengthening, this means more interference, more intrusion, and even “outright dictatorship” [over the arts]. This is still fresh in their memories, and prompts especially sensitive feelings. We must not, hereafter, “strengthen” things in such a way. . .
As for concrete artistic creation, does the Party really need to take the lead at all? How should the Party lead?
The Party takes the lead in setting national economic plans, the Party leads in the carrying out of agricultural and industrial policies; but it is totally unnecessary for the Party to lead as to how to plant a field, or how to construct a bench, or how to cook, and it is totally unnecessary for it to lead writers in how to write essays, or actors in how to act. Literature and art are matters for writers and artists themselves. If the Party is too specific in its management of literature and the arts there will be no hope for them, they will be finished. The Gang of Four were the most concrete in their management of the arts, to the point where they managed every belt and patch on the bodies of actors, to the point that only eight plays were left for 800 million people. Will these negative examples not make us more alert?
What writer ever became a writer because he answered the call of the Party? Did Lu Xun or Mao Dun ever heed the words of the Party before the set their pens to writing? Did they ever write what the Party bade them to write?! And, well, who was it that told Marx himself to write? Life, struggle and the process of history give rise to culture, and make generations of artists and theorists “who guide the arts for generation following.” As for the character and philosophy of the arts, these are not things that any one Party, or any faction, or any organization, or any branch can manage. If you insist on managing it so concretely, you will only cause trouble for yourself, becoming a fool for one’s pains, and court disaster for the arts.
The leaders at every level who oversee the arts all say that they are “cleaving to the Party’s principles on the arts, cleaving to revolutionary thought on the arts.” With the possible exception of arts experts, they are all simpletons who are deaf and blind. It’s been 30 years now since the founding of the nation, and 60 years since the May Fourth Movement, and we now say that the proletarian army of the arts numbers in the millions. Why then is it that from the center right on down to the provinces, districts, counties, communes, factories and mines, we must always invite outsiders [to the arts] who do not understand or barely understand the arts to come of lead and guide them before we can set our minds at ease? It’s a logic that defies all understanding! . . . Should the various associations for literature and the arts, and various arts and literature troupes, make rigid and inflexible rules as to what ideology constitutes the one leading guideline? Should a single written work be established as [defining] the aim and purpose? In my view, we should think very carefully and debate this. I think it would be better not to. In the history of the arts from ancient times down to the present day, when one form is allowed to wash out all the hundreds of others, it is impossible to have a flourishing of the arts.
At the third meeting of the Fifth National People’s Congress the delegates debated fiercely about the issue of [political] systems. This term [political] “system” is something we artists were not so familiar with before. But we gradually discovered that if we were lazy in dealing with “systems” then “systems” can squeeze the life out of us; so we learned that we must seriously tackle this issue. . . .
Artistic creation is the most personal of all. Artistic creation cannot be dictated by a show of hands. It can be discussed, criticized, encouraged or praised. In terms of historical eras, the arts are not inhibited and cannot be inhibited.
September 1980, from his sickbed.

The death of American technology entrepreneur and innovator Steve Jobs on October 5, 2011, drew a flood of interest in China’s media, and for days tributes to Jobs were prominent across Chinese social media platforms such as Sina Weibo and QQ Weibo. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his QQ.com blog, Steve Jobs is picture in heaven with God, enthusiastically walking the Almighty through its features.

In a meeting of the governing council of the All-China Journalists Association last Friday (ACJA), Li Changchun (李长春) — the politburo standing committee member in charge of ideology, and China’s media control czar — conveyed the “spirit” (or significance) of China’s recent pronouncements on culture as they apply to the news media.
Li Changchun’s speech can be read as important in the sense that it reiterates the Party’s policy on press control and press development. Essentially, it 1) establishes the Party’s CONTROL over the media, emphasizing the duty of media to the Party and the need to “tightly embrace the main line and main theme”; 2. restates commercial development of the media as a priority, including raising the “closeness, attractiveness and infectiveness (亲和力、吸引力、感染力) of news and propaganda; and emphasizes the (relatively) new priority of strengthening China’s voice (as a function of the Party’s will) outside China, in order to create “an objective and amicable international public opinion environment conducive to our own interests.”
Li Changchun’s speech signals again that despite all of the language this month about cultural innovation, advancement and refulgence, the Party’s fundamental attitudes and policies toward culture — and toward news media in particular — have not changed.
The media must “guide public opinion” domestically, and to the extent possible also internationally, while they continue to operate as profit-making enterprises creating products attractive to the masses, thereby contributing to overall GDP growth.
A partial translation of the excerpting of Li’s speech by official state media follows:

Li Changchun stressed that the sixth plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP that just closed was an extremely important meeting taking place in the midst of a critical period in the comprehensive building of a moderately wealthy society and a key phase in the reform and development of culture. Study, propagation and implementation of the spirit of the meeting must be the foremost task of the journalistic front (新闻战线) at present, using deep and sound propaganda to unify the ideas of the Party, the nation and various peoples over the spirit of the meeting, cohering their intelligence and strength around implementing the [policy] programs of the meeting.”
Li Changchun pointed out in his speech that ever since the 17th Party Congress [in 2007] the Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary has given a high degree of priority to news and propaganda work, placing the raising of public opinion channeling capacity in an especially conspicuous position of importance, making specific demands regarding news and propaganda work under the new circumstances [of modern communications], pointing a clear path forward, and promoting the achievement of positive evolution in many areas of news and propaganda work, opening up a new situation. According to the demands of the Central Committee, the journalistic front have steadily deepened “Three Studies and Education” activities (三项学习教育), adhered to the [“Three Closenesses”] of closeness to reality, life and the masses, widely undertaken the movement of “moving at the grass-roots, transitioning work styles and reforming writing styles” (走基层、转作风、改文风), giving greater priority to doing propaganda on major topics properly, to the propagation of model personalities, doing a proper job of news reports on sudden-breaking incidents, strengthening channeling [of public opinion] over major hot topics in society, strengthening and improving supervision by public opinion (舆论监督), leveraging the important role of emerging media, strengthening the building of international communication capacity (国际传播能力), strengthening the building of [media] capacity, and the political and ideological character of our masses of news workers has been raised noticeably, showing an enterprising spirit and bringing forth a great number of model news workers loved by the people, who have distinguished themselves in achieving the tasks set to them by the Party and the people. Experience has shown that our ranks of news workers are ranks of the highest character, showing political acumen, shrewdness, strict discipline and uprightness of manner. . .
Li Changchun stressed that news media are an important battle front in the building of culture, news and propaganda are important channels for the propagation of culture, having an important position and serving an important role in the development of culture. The journalistic front must have a high sense of political responsibility and historical mission, deeply studying, propagating and implementing the spirit of the sixth plenum of the 17th Central Committee, in order to promote the great advancement and flourishing of socialist culture, providing strong ideological and public opinion support for opening up fresh progress in socialism with Chinese characteristics. [The journalistic front] must rapidly raise up a wave of study, propagation and implementation of the spirit of the sixth plenum of the 17th Central Committee, guiding and boosting up the cadres and masses in working and struggling for the building of a strong nation of socialist culture; [they] must energetically promote the socialist core value system, constantly strengthening the common moral and ideological foundation of united struggle by the whole Party, the whole and its various peoples; [they] must tightly embrace the main line and main theme, working to create and promote scientific development, and a public opinion environment [conducive to] accelerating the transition of economic development methods; [they] must conduct energetic propaganda on new developments and new results in cultural system reforms, further stirring up the zeal, initiative and creativity of the entire society in promoting cultural reform; [they] must persist in putting the people as the base (以人为本), serving the people, cleaving close to actuality, life and the masses [the so-called “Three Closenesses”], steadily raising the closeness, attractiveness and infectiveness (亲和力、吸引力、感染力) of news and propaganda; [they] must further raise the level and capacity of overseas (对外) transmission [of China’s messages], working to build an objective and amicable international public opinion environment conducive to our own interests.

Earlier this week the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), China’s television authority, announced a clean-up of entertainment programming on the country’s 34 provincial satellite television channels, citing what it characterized as a worrying slide into lowbrow programs of questionable morality.
Beginning January 1, 2012, SARFT said it would limit the number of entertainment programs that could be aired by satellite channels, and that they would be required to offer no less than two hours of news content between 6pm and midnight.

[ABOVE: A live audience crowds in to watch “If You Are the One,” a popular dating program on Jiangsu Satellite TV that has come under fire for being too “low-brow.”]
Media scholar and CMP fellow Zhan Jiang (展江) has been one of the most outspoken critics of SARFT’s intrusion into entertainment programming. The following is an interview Zhan did last July with Phoenix Online, which the site re-ran this week in the midst of the debate about “low-brow” entertainment.

Phoenix Online Entertainment: Have you seen “If You Are the One?” or other programs like it? These kinds of programs have been accused of fabrication, of whipping up negative issues, of creating characters like gold-digging women and men who flaunt their wealth. How do you see this whole thing? [NOTE: “If You Are the One” (非诚勿扰) is a television dating program launched in January 2010 by Jiangsu Satellite Television.]
Zhan Jiang: I’ve watched a few episodes. As for concerns about fabrication, of puffing up certain topics and the like, I think this should be tolerated. This type of program is a necessary outcome of market economics, and so long as they do no great harm they should be tolerated.
As for questions of morality, talking about whether they are good or bad is fundamentally pointless. And what should be the moral standard here? Responsibility has an active dimension and a passive dimension. If doctors, police and lawyers and people in other professions maintain passive responsibility that already pretty good.
Phoenix Online Entertainment: If you’ve seen any recent episodes of “If You Are the One” you have the sense that it has become more restrained, and I understand this is because the State Administration of Radio Film and Television sent down an order for the clean-up [of such programs]. Do you think there’s a need to strengthen control of entertainment programs like this?
Zhan Jiang: To be perfectly honest, I don’t pay a great deal of attention to entertainment programming. But there is a place for them. I’m opposed to public authorities cracking down on the media. On the matter of public authorities cracking down on the media, I stand on the side of the media. And if, in turn, media do harm to the public, I stand on the side of the public. Whoever is in a position of weakness, that’s where I stand.
Phoenix Online Entertainment: But being in a position of weakness doesn’t necessarily mean one is in the right.
Zhan Jiang: Why must we be so intolerant about the so-called “three vulgarities”? Why should entertainment be so conservative? It’s like expecting those who are born slaves to consider the tastes of their masters. Why should underclasses [in our society] think about what elites think? On the surface the critics are all about goodness and morality, but in fact they are first and foremost intolerant.
Phoenix Online Entertainment: When phrases like, “I would rather weep in a BMW than smile from the back of a bicycle,” [emerge from entertainment programming], is this leading the audience to erroneous ideas in your view?
Zhan Jiang: Ma Nuo (马诺), [the contestant on “If You Are the One” who said these words], is guilty only of not being noble. If you launch accusations against her, does that ennoble you? In the entertainment industry, there are so many things that are far more “three-vulgar” than that. Entertainment programs have simply made us of various aspects of people’s natures.
When it comes down to it, ratings are a good thing! If you say they are bad, is that going to change anything? It changes nothing. Ratings are impossible to ignore for programming. This is the way its always been: few join the chorus of high-brow songs, while cheap ballads are sung by all. When the weaknesses and natural inclinations of human nature come out of the shadows, there are always those who make great pretensions to elegance and sigh about how things are getting worse.