Guangdong’s Nanfang Daily newspaper reported recently that a newly-released research report concluded that Chinese cities, and especially large cities, have entered a period in which crises appear on a frequent basis (危机频发期), are large-scale and cover a range of areas, so that “the basis of urban safety in China is weak” (中国城市安全基础薄弱). The report cited inflation, social inequality and corruption as the primary factors contributing to instability. In this cartoon, posted by Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, red official stamps (symbolizing power) piloted by reckless and devious Party and government officials visit terror on the citizens of a major Chinese city, like a scene out of an alien-invasion film.

That’s right, he’s at it again. Using the opportunity afforded by a speech in a prominent international forum, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) is once again visiting his favorite theme — the urgent need for political reform in China. And once again, his remarks are fodder alike for sanguine optimists, grumbling pessimists and cautious skeptics. Is he serious? Is his making a cynical bid the cement his legacy as a moderate? Is he simply too beleaguered and too powerless to effect his ideas? Or does this prefigure some sort of real change?
It is a debate that has been repeated on each occasion over the past 18 months where Wen has stepped out to toll the bells of political change in the midst of what seems by all other measures a period of great internal political sensitivity for China.
Most notably it was just one year ago, in the period from August 20 and September 30, 2010, that Wen gave no less than seven important utterances on political reform in seven different contexts. For a book-length review of that extended event, discussion of which was mostly suppressed in China’s media, we recommend readers turn to CMP Director Qian Gang’s The Great Game of Political Reform: Wen Jiabao’s Wave of Seven Speeches on Political Reform (Cosmos Books, December 2010).
The full text of Wen Jiabao’s September 14 speech at the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Dalian is available at People’s Daily Online. What follows is our translation of his remarks on political reform, which were made in a closed-door meeting Wednesday afternoon with Chinese CEOs and some Western businesspeople in attendance (thank you to Louisa Lim for that clarification). The Chinese original of our version was taken from the website of Caijing magazine on the evening of September 14.
For now, we’ll avoid parsing Wen’s remarks and leave judgment of their significance to our readers. However, readers of Chinese might want to turn to the comments section of this post at Sina Microblog, in which the Caijing coverage was shared with more than 2,000 users.

“Wen Jiabao: China’s Future Political Reform Will Face 5 Major Challenges”
September 14
Caijing Online
“This task [of reforming the Party and state leadership system] was raised by [Deng] Xiaoping 30 years ago, and I think that today it is especially pressing.” Chinese State Council Premier Wen Jiabao made the above remarks on the afternoon of September 14 at the meeting [of the World Economic Forum] being held in Dalian.
Wen Jiabao pointed out that in the future there would be 5 difficulties (难点) facing political reform in China:
1. Adhering to the governing of the nation by rule of law. The most important task of a ruling party is to act according to the constitution and the law, and strictly acting within the scope of the constitution and the law requires changing the situation of Party dominance of the government (以党代政), the absolutization of power (权力绝对化) and over-concentration of power. To this end, the Party and state leadership system must be reformed. This task was raised by [Deng] Xiaoping 30 years ago, and I think that today it is especially pressing.
2. We must advance social equity and justice. This requires that we develop the economy through reform, and change the [current] aspect of unequal allocation of income and a yawning [wealth] gap, allowing all people to live lives of dignity and enabling all to enjoy the fruits of reform and development. In a major country with a population of 1.3 billion people, I know only too well that there is still a large population of middle and low-income people, and even of those living in poverty. Social fairness directly concerns whether our political rule truly serves the people or not, and it also concerns sustainable economic development and the harmony and stability of society. To this end, we must prioritize work on two fronts: First, we must employ measures to accelerate the raising of the incomes of medium and low-income people, at the same time adjust the incomes of those in the high-income segment; Secondly, [we must] build and improve our social security system, including unemployment [benefits], pensions, healthcare and other social services, so that this becomes a social security system for the whole of society.
3. Preserving the fairness of the courts. [This means] ensuring that prosecuting organs (检察机关) and judicial organs (司法机关) have the independence they should have, and are not interfered with by any social group (社会团体), social organization (社会组织) or individual. The fairness of the legal system is a reflection of justice and fairness in a society, and we must fully embrace this direction. This is something that was raised 30 long years ago at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C., and we should put it into practice. [NOTE: This refers to the meeting of the Central Committee held from December 18-22, 1978. The session marked the start of China’s opening and reform policy (改革开放). One important theme at the session was the criticism of Mao’s cult of personality and the danger of over-concentration of power.]
4. Guaranteeing the democratic rights of the people. [We must] practically ensure the democratic rights and democratic benefits stipulated in the constitution, of these the most important being the right to vote [and stand] in elections (选举权), the right to know (知情权) [and be informed], the right to monitor [power] (监督权), and the right to participate [in public affairs] (参与权). I would like to talk especially about the right to vote. We must expand the forms of democracy, and we must cement self-rule by villagers. If the people can govern a village well, they can govern a township well, and even govern a county well. Right now some [local] areas are carrying out experiments in elections at the township level on the foundation of accumulated experience [in village-level elections]. I would also like to say that this issue of the expansion of democracy can happen first within the Party, and develop in a step-by-step manner from inside the Party to outside the Party. This is a rather secure and rather practical way [of approaching this issue].
5. [We must] resolutely oppose corruption. Fighting corruption and advocating honest and clean [governance] is a major task facing our governments at various levels. I believe the fight against corruption right now can be undertaken through the following several tasks. First, [we must] oppose the [crime] of duty encroachment [or taking advantage of one’s position for personal gain]. [We must] strictly prevent leaders and cadres from using the convenience of their position to interfere in the bidding and tender process, seeking personal profit. This must become an important task in the [overall] fight against corruption in the economy. Second, [we must] gradually promote a property declaration system (财产申报制) and a public announcement system (公示制) [for making this information about officials public]. In recent years, we have already created a number of systems, including for [reporting of] leaders’ assets, the residency of their family members overseas and their engagement in business and trade. We must continue to improve these, gradually moving from declaration [of this information] to public sharing [of this information]. This is a most important form of supervision of the rights in the hands of cadres. Third is making a public account of the “three public” expenses (“三公”经费) in public financing [NOTE: These include 1. Expenses for overseas trips, ostensibly for government business but often for family vacations; 2. Expenses for food and entertainment; 3. Expenses for public vehicles, usually including luxury sedans, private drivers, gasoline and related expenses, including maintenance.] I have said before that if we take a look at the whole history of public finances, that is a very frightening history indeed, and it reflects the situation with respect to the allocation of the wealth of our society. We have started this year making public outlays for the “three public expenditures” at 98 [govenrment] departments, and this has been welcomed be the masses. But they feel this is still not enough. We must still expand the scope [of making public such figures] according to the need, and the information we release must be specific right down to the item. We must resolutely crack down on corruption, and we must severely punish acts of corruption and those guilt of acts of corruption according to the law, not being soft of hand.

[Frontpage Photo: Wen Jiabao at the World Economic Forum in Germany in 2009, available from the WEF at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

The biggest media story in China so far this September is the takeover of The Beijing News and the Beijing Times, two of the country’s leading commercial newspapers, by Beijing’s municipal propaganda department. The story, which deals with the highly sensitive issue of press control, cannot be openly addressed in domestic Chinese media. English-language coverage of the story, meanwhile, has been a knot of confusion.
Everyone knows, or senses, that the move is fundamentally about press control, and not, as the Beijing city leadership has said, about addressing things like resource scattering (资源分散) and homogenized competition (同质化竞争) in the Beijing newspaper market — whatever those are. But beyond this intuition there are few specifics to put the story into context.
An AFP report said in its lead that both newspapers were “under new management,” not bothering to explain what that meant. Further down it quoted an Internet user as saying both papers had “been downgraded.” Huh?
In one of the better reports, The Guardian cited suspicion among some Chinese journalists that the reshuffle had something to do with bold coverage of the July 23 Wenzhou train collision, which had sparked “official anger.” But the idea of a generalized “official anger” failed to address why a story more directly implicating national-level railway officials and local officials in Wenzhou and Shanghai would have generated such focused concern among city officials in Beijing.
So, “official anger,” sure. But which level of “official anger” is most relevant here — national or municipal? In fact, the idea that the Wenzhou train crash was an important factor behind this management change doesn’t accord well with how press politics work in China.
The Diplomat, clearly also confused by the move, even noted that the two newspapers had “now been taken over by CCP media authorities.” Like all media, of course, both newspapers have been under the control of “CCP media authorities” since birth. The difference now is that these papers are under the control of municipal authorities in Beijing rather than central authorities. Their new managing institution representing CCP media authority, in other words, is a notch down on the Party totem pole.
Breaking through the confusion and understanding what has happened to The Beijing News and the Beijing Times means revisiting how media are controlled institutionally in China, and specifically the crucial role approval and registration of media plays in securing Party control over them.
So here are the basics.
1. How Publications are Approved and Controlled
For starters, one of the most critical of management functions in the process of press control is the government’s enactment of a system of approval (批准) and registration (登记) for news media. The right of approval, or shenpiquan (审批权), is exercised by the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), or the relevant press and publications authority at the provincial or municipal level.
According to regulations on the publishing of newspapers and periodicals, all publications must have “a definite managing institution capable of conscientiously taking on leadership responsibility.” Basically, that means they must have an official sponsor that says, “Look, we will manage this publication politically, ensuring that it abides by propaganda discipline and doesn’t cause trouble — and the buck will stop with us if things go wrong.”
So, here’s a key term to remember: managing institution (or “supervising institution”).
Think of the managing institution (主管单位 ) as the node where any given publication connects to the Party press bureaucracy. If you’d like to take a look in practice at which publications are controlled by which managing institutions, try using our China Media Map. In the search bar at the right enter the name of a publication like Nanfang Daily (南方日报) and hit “Go.” When the publication appears underneath, click on it. You’ll see a box of information including its “supervising institution.” In this case, it’s the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP, the Party’s top leadership ranks in Guangdong. That means, folks, that the newspaper and its leadership have to answer ultimately to top Party leaders in Guangdong, who exercise their authority through provincial propaganda leaders.
You can also use the China Media Map search function to see how publications are connected to one another, and how the chain of command and control works. If you search Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报) you’ll notice that its managing institution (or “supervising institution”) is the Nanfang Daily Press Group, so it is a spin-off of the Nanfang Daily, whose own managing institution is the top leadership in Guangdong.
Moving on, once the agreement of a managing institution is obtained, the publishing institution (主办单位) — think of it as a publishing house or group — can seek approval from the General Administration of Press and Publications for the launch of a publication, or “publishing unit”. And once the proper approvals and registration are complete, the publication can legally publish.
The managing institution and publishing institution systems (主办单位与主管单位制度) are a crucial part of the Party’s control of the media. According to regulations, a managing institution must be a “Party, government, Federation of Labor, Youth League, or Women’s Federation” organization. The “Provisional Regulations Concerning the Responsibilities of Publishing Institutions and Managing Institutions of Publishing Units” (关于出版单位的主办单位和主管单位职责的暂行规定), issued by GAPP in 1997, clearly stipulated a line of command in which managing institutions are responsible for exercising control over publishing institutions, which then in turn are responsible for exercising control and generally managing their “publishing units” (出版单位), the publications themselves.
These regulations make it impossible for private publications to be launched in China.
Some of you might be thinking: “Well, what about the internet?” You should keep in mind that internet sites are technically barred from doing their own news reporting and limited to aggregation of news content — so the licensing and approval system for “print” publications essentially ensures that the information pipeline is in the hands of “publishing units” controlled and managed by Party-sanctioned “managing institutions.”
2. The “Abnormal” Phenomenon of Cross-Regional Reporting
The next bit of background to understand about the recent change affecting The Beijing News and the Beijing Times is that the priority and legacy of information control as a means of protecting the interests of the Party and government, and the mapping of the press structure on the Party-state bureaucracy itself, has created a unique phenomenon in China called “cross-regional reporting,” or yidi jiandu (异地监督).
Basically, yidi jiandu is when a publishing unit in one region, let’s say Guangdong, conducts critical reporting — what is often known as “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), which you can think of as a uniquely Chinese form of “watchdog journalism” — on another city or region. They can do this because negative stories from another region do not directly impact the leaders responsible for managing their publication. Remember, for example, that propaganda officials in Guangdong (who effectively control Nanfang Daily) are tasked with maintaining “discipline” on stories affecting the province. If Nanfang Daily editors send reporters off to Guangxi province to report on a local case of corruption, this does not compromise this primary task, and in fact may draw feisty media away from more sensitive local stories.
In August 2007, Li Kaisheng (李开盛) explained the principle of cross-regional reporting and its importance this way:

“Cross-regional reporting is an important phenomenon in China’s media. Speaking from reason, extra-territorial reporting is an abnormal phenomenon. If [media] are all mouthpieces of the Party, and are the inner voice of the people, then why should local events rely on the support of media from outside the area to be reported, for monitoring to happen? When local media are already on the ground, and can operate more conveniently, when their understanding of the background of [local] news events is stronger than that of outside media, why wouldn’t their reports be of better quality than those of outside media? But the reality is quite the opposite. In today’s society, cross-regional reporting plays an extremely important role, and many sudden-breaking incidents are reported first by media from outside the area, and only in this way can draw the attention of the higher levels of leadership and therefore ultimately be quickly resolved, limiting harm to the greatest possible extent. On the other side, we see that when something happens in one area, the media of that area maintain complete silence, or present one unified picture of positivity. Regardless of how lively these [local] media might be in their reporting of sudden-breaking events elsewhere, they are silent on issues concerning their own areas.”

As an example, Li cited the August 2007 collapse of a bridge in Xiangxi, a prefecture in Hunan province. Searching Rednet.cn, a major news portal in Hunan, he found that the story of the collapse, a story obviously of great local relevance, was nowhere to be seen in the featured news of the day. Only deep in the site was some coverage found by means of a targeted keyword search.
But Li noted also that among the coverage available there was nothing in the way of critical reporting, and no attempt to explore the causes of the collapse or the question of responsibility.
By contrast, media outside of Hunan did report on the story, and online news portals outside the region, like Sina.com, actively aggregated related content, including in-depth reports and critical opinions.
So even when cross-regional reporting was not about the conduct of labor-intensive investigative reporting, it was still critical in offering more comprehensive coverage of local news stories.
Li Kaisheng concluded what should be obvious to anyone who observes Chinese media coverage on a regular basis — that media from outside a given region are generally far more effective in covering local stories from that region than are local journalists, regardless of how professionally-inclined these local journalists are. He said: “We must emphasize that in a situation in which local media are deficient [in covering local issues], cross-regional reporting is indispensable. The prominence of cross-regional reporting shows us clearly the deficient state of local monitoring by media.”
In an article for Deutsche Welle in October 2008, veteran journalist and CMP fellow Li Datong (李大同) declared in reference to the poisoned milk scandal that broke on the heels of the Beijing Olympic Games and first implicated a major milk company and Party officials in Hebei province: “If it hadn’t been for the [Shanghai-based] Oriental Morning Post violating propaganda discipline and conducting ‘cross-regional reporting,’ children in China today would probably still be drinking poisonous milk powder!”
(Read on for an explanation of why Li Datong would refer to cross-regional reporting as “violating propaganda discipline.”)
3. Cross-Level Reporting and the Top-Down Monitoring
The unique nature of “supervision” by the press in China — specifically, its regional and bureaucratic character — also means that media whose managing institutions are higher up the ladder of the Party bureaucracy can more easily conduct critical reporting of issues involving lower-level governments or organizations. While this is generally also included under the term “cross-regional reporting,” we can think of this as “cross-level reporting” or “top-down monitoring.”
Imagine, for example, that there is a major corruption story involving city leaders in Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang province. It would be difficult and dangerous for a local Hangzhou newspaper like Hangzhou Daily or any of its commercial spinoffs to pursue such a story. But it might be possible for a newspaper like the City Express (都市快报), a spin-off of the provincial Party mouthpiece of Zhejiang province, Zhejiang Daily (浙江日报), to attempt such a story because its managing institution once removed is the top leadership in Zhejiang, not the city leadership in Hangzhou (which directly controls Hangzhou Daily and its spin-offs by extension).
Of course, we can’t forget that a major corruption story involving Hangzhou city leaders might be a major priority for provincial Party leaders as well, and provincial propaganda leaders might for this reason prevent the City Express from covering it.
How The Beijing News Was Knocked Down to Size
The above overview should begin to make it clearer exactly what happened to The Beijing News and the Beijing Times and why. A paper like The Beijing News, located in the city of Beijing but with the administrative and cross-regional clout, if you will, afforded by having the central-ranking Guangming Daily Newspaper Group (top-down clout) and the Guangdong provincial-ranking Nanfang Daily Group (cross-regional clout) as its joint managing institutions, is understandably a thorn in the side of the Beijing city leadership. This is particularly true when you consider that the The Beijing News has also benefitted from the professional tradition afforded by the Nanfang Daily Group connection — a tradition of strong “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督).
Having now been knocked down a notch administratively, it will now be much harder for both The Beijing News and the Beijing Times to cover more sensitive stories concerning the interests of Beijing leaders.
The registration information in the General Administration of Press and Publications database — on which our China Media Map is based — has not yet been changed. So readers can still enter The Beijing News (新京报) and see the the managing and publishing institutions prior to the change.
And who is the managing institution for the Guangming Daily Newspaper Group, the former partner managing institution for The Beijing News? It is the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a high as you can go up the ladder of power. In fact, the Guangming Daily is directly administered by the Central Propaganda Department (of the CCP Central Committee).
That may seem mind-blowingly improbable to those not privy to the inner workings of China’s media. How could a publication known for its hard-hitting coverage and outspoken opinions have been administered directly by the Party agency at the very pinnacle of press controls? And how can we possibly be concerned about the possible loss of “space” for coverage when a publication is just shifting from one control-minded boss to another?
Welcome to the fog and complexity of China’s media.
In fact, cross-regional reporting generally has come under much greater pressure in recent years, as regional officials have complained about pesky journalists snooping around in their own backyards. On September 18, 2004, the Central Party Office bowed to demands for action and issued a policy banning the practice of cross-regional reporting. This has not stopped the practice outright, but it has served as a pretext for many officials to push back against critical reporting.
The recent action against The Beijing News and the Beijing Times was a play by city leader in Beijing to remove the longstanding threat that both newspapers posed to their propaganda objectives — as professionally-minded, competing newspapers based in the city with the administrative clout to tackle bigger stories.
In an online post, the now Hong Kong-based mainland blogger and media professional Bei Feng (北风) hit the nail on the head when he wrote: “By assigning The Beijing News and the Beijing Times to the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, the Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department can directly issue bans and missives [to them] and does not have to go through the Central Propaganda Department anymore. This move will without a doubt have a major impact in decreasing the number of their negative reports about Beijing; Aside from this, if they again report on negative news outside Beijing, this belongs to the realm of strictly prohibited extra-territorial reporting, so negative reports [in general] will see a major decrease. I’m confident that the former reason is relatively speaking the bigger one.” 
There you have it. . . And the real lingering mystery behind this change is how leaders in Beijing managed to make it happen. What were the specific lines of power and influence?
As to the reasons given by Beijing leaders for the change. They are, well, just so much posturing and drivel. But we should certainly have them on record. So here’s our translation of the news release published in the city’s mouthpiece Beijing Daily announcing the change:

Beijing Daily
September 3, 2011
Page 2
Beijing Times and The Beijing News Changed to Beijing City as Managing Institution and Publishing Institution
This reporter learned from the Beijing Municipal Administration of Press and Publications (北京市新闻出版局) that given the approval of the General Administration of Press and Publications, that the Beijing Times, whose managing and publishing institutions are the People’s Daily, and The Beijing News, whose managing institution is the Guangming Daily Publishing Group, and whose publishing institutions are [jointly] the Guangming Daily Publishing Group and the Nanfang Daily Publishing Group, will from today forward be changed to management and publishing by the City of Beijing.
The Beijing Times and The Beijing News were launched in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Since their launches, both publications have seen a steady increase in influence and market competitiveness, and have already become well-known metropolitan newspaper brands.
A representative from the Beijing Municipal Administration of Press and Publications said that the change in the managing and publishing institutions for the two publications is an important action of the central Party leadership’s demand to deepen cultural sector reforms, benefitting the acceleration of the promotion of resource integration in the publications sector of the Beijing region, benefitting change in the serious state of resource scattering (资源分散) and homogenized competition (同质化竞争) among metropolitan newspapers in Beijing, benefitting the city of Beijing in increasing the strength of its support for the two newspaper in terms of policy, resources, science and technology and personnel, further promoting media strengthening (做强做大) at the two papers.
Responsible persons at the two papers said that these changes in the managing and publishing institutions will enable the two papers to win greater space for development and infuse them with strength and vitality, further raising the influence and competitiveness of the two papers, and having great long-term significance for both papers.
The two papers will certainly grab this rare opportunity to adhere to correct guidance of public opinion, focusing on central tasks and serving the overall interests, promoting the rapid and healthy development of the newspaper industry in the capital.

Ahead of this year’s Mid-Autumn Festival, the traditional lunar harvest festival in China, the traffic situation in many Chinese cities reportedly worsened, with authorities saying more people than ever were on the roads to deliver mooncakes to friends and family as dictated by tradition. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his blog at QQ.com, the roads of a bustling metropolis are backed up with vehicles shaped like traditional Chinese mooncakes () for the Mid-Autumn Festival.

The following is a translation of a portion of an interview by the Chinese-language Global Times newspaper with veteran diplomat and former Ambassador to France Wu Jianmin (吴建民). In the interview, which the paper is publishing in installments, Wu addresses a range of issues, from tensions in the South China Sea to twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union.
In this portion, Wu discusses the importance of basic communication skills — which he says many Chinese youth and diplomats alike have in short supply — and urges a cool-headed approach to international affairs.

Global Times Editor’s Note: Since he withdrew from the front lines of diplomacy, veteran diplomat and former Ambassador to France Wu Jianmin (吴建民) has been as energetic as ever, and he is still a prominent figure in foreign diplomacy circles . . . On August 12, our Global Times journalist interviewed Wu Jianmin on the South China Sea issue, questions of Chinese foreign policy, current Chinese social problems, the U.S. and European debt crises, the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other issues. Wu Jianmin offered open and detailed responses to these issues. Recently, we have been continuously offering content from this interview, today being a selection of latter portions. We invite you to stay tuned!
Global Times: In the various political contexts of different countries, foreign diplomats generally have their own individual characters. You are very well know both inside and outside China, but many Chinese diplomats are quite unknown. Well, is this you think because, as they say, “There is no such thing as a minor matter in foreign affairs,” or because they don’t dare to speak out or don’t wish to, or is it some other reason?
Wu Jianmin: This problem does exist. Today, many of our leaders and cadres who go on visits to foreign countries don’t wish to see reporters and think that the more they talk the more they stand to lose. But the world really has a hunger to understand China. I believe the problem is that Chinese elites really lack the ability to engage in communication and dialogue, and there is a need for improvement. And so, I went to the Foreign Affairs University and started a communication studies class (交流学), which I teach myself. Now Zhao Qizheng (赵启正) and I are writing a book called Communication Makes Life Richer (交流使人生更美好). It is written for young people, many of whom don’t understand [the art of] communication. If you don’t understand communication many opportunities will be lost to you. So we need to grasp this [problem] from the roots, nurturing [these skills] in our universities. . . .
Global Times: Is this a situation that has to change?
Wu Jianmin: Actually, this situation is already changing. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already raised its requirements for foreign diplomats. Every year now you must make a report home about how many journalists you met with, how many public addresses you gave. There is an expectation that they make more public appearances and interact more with the media.
Global Times: You once said that if you had a second life you would still choose a life in foreign diplomacy, and media have said before that the stage of foreign relations is richer and more active because of the influence of Wu Jianmin. Ever since you withdrew from the front lines you’ve been involved with foreign relations activities. So, how do you explain your feelings to your friends in foreign diplomacy?
Wu Jianmin: After I graduated from university in 1959 I was engaged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the time I retired in 2009 it had been 50 years [in this line of work]. I really hope that our youth, and Internet users, have the capacity to think for themselves. The world is changing, and there are all sorts of different agitations and incitations (煽动). Those driving these incitations would like to push our youth along in one direction [of their choosing] in order to achieve their own objectives. And so our young people need to be very mindful of this sort of inflammatory language (煽动的言论).
What is the standard on which determinations should be made? Experience. For example, you say we should go to war (你说打好). Well, in your view what would the result be if we went to war with America? Is this the result China really wants? When calamity comes to the country and its people, who will bear responsibility for that? Of course those who whipped things up in the first place also bear responsibility. Experience is the best teacher.

According to a news report in Guangming Daily in September 2011, China has now said goodbye to the era of severe research and development funding shortages. But a new problem is rearing it’s head: research corruption. The article said, citing a report from the Ministry of Science and Technology, that while research and development funding has been increasing at a rate of around 20 percent a year, only about 40 percent of total funding is actually applied to research and development. That means about 60 percent of funding is wasted, embezzlement and misappropriation being the main forms of abuse. In this cartoon, posted by Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, lazy white-coated lab rats (representing research scientists, of course), drink wantonly from a flask labeled “research and development funding.”

Responding directly to a report by China’s official Xinhua News Agency on the charity scandal surrounding billionaire Lu Junqing (卢俊卿), the special legal team for Lu’s World Eminent Chinese Business Association issued another “notice” this afternoon insisting no laws or regulations have been violated by Lu or any of his charity organizations.
A full translation of the notice, the 13th issued by the WECBA’s legal team since the scandal broke last month, follows:

World Eminent Chinese Business Association
China-Africa Project Hope Incident Special Legal Team
Notice
(2011, No. 13)
1. Up to this point, no office of authority has determined that the World Eminent Chinese Business Association is an “illegal organization,” and public opinion cannot replace the law.
2. The World Eminent Chinese Business Association is a legal organization registered in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and it has violated no prohibitive regulations in carrying out activities in mainland China.
3. The illegal organizations according to the Ministry of Civil Affair’s “Provisional Measures on Stamping Out Illegal Non-government Organizations” referred to by the Xinhua News Agency reporters [in the report dated September 8, 2011] is about mainland Chinese organizations that have not gone through registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs but make bold to carry out activities in the name of associations. Concerning organizations legally registered in Hong Kong carrying out activities in mainland China, there are no prohibitive regulations.
4. Concerning legal issues involving the World Eminent Chinese Business Association, this legal team has already made a clear declaration in Notice No. 3. This legal team clearly stated in that notice that: “The World Eminent Chinese Business Association is acting within the law in carrying out public charity and other related activities in mainland China.” We advise everyone to refer to [that notice].
5. For all large-scale activities carried out by the World Eminent Chinese Business Association jointly with relevant organizations in mainland China, relevant mainland organizations are responsible for seeking the approval of relevant departments and for obtaining permits.
6. Will media and the public please not misread the report today from the Xinhua News Agency reporters, and we ask that various major media as they re-run the Xinhua release they respect the original and do not play with the headline. We hope that everyone objectively interpret the important information conveyed by the report: 1. Lu Junqing and Lu Xingyu have already truly donated 11 million yuan to China-Africa Project Hope (agreeing to donate 100 million), and the World Eminent Chinese Business Association, the Tianjiu Confucian Business Investment Group, Lu Junqing, Lu Xingyu, none have withdrawn management fees, Lu Junqing having even paid more than 5 million yuan to maintain an unprofitable enterprise. They have not sought personal gain in the name of charity; 2. China-Africa Project Hope has not in its entire operating process violated any relevant regulation of the country.
World Eminent Chinese Business Association “China-Africa Project Hope Incident Special Legal Team”
Chairman of Legal Team: Gao Zicheng (高子程)
Vice-chairman of Legal Team: Zhang Yong (张勇)
Legal Team Members: Gao Zicheng (高子程), Zhang Yong (张勇), Sun Hongli (孙宏礼), Ji Aiping (戢爱平), (兴英杰), Qi Xiaohong (戚晓红), Zhou Shifeng (周世峰), Ren Feifan (任飞帆).
September 9, 2011

Following initial reports on social media, Chinese media reported widely yesterday that a couple in Beijing were attacked on September 6 by the 15-year-old son of famous Chinese singer Li Shuangjiang (李双江) after a simple traffic accident. According to eyewitnesses, Li’s son, who was driving a BMW without a driver’s license, attacked the couple with another man within minutes allegedly rear-ending their car, beating them and shouting, “Who dares dial 110!”
For many Chinese, this incident bore eerie echoes of the “Li Gang case” of October 2010, in which the son of an influential police official in Hebei Province struck two university students with his car, killing one, while driving on campus. When finally stopped, the young man threatened others saying, “My father is Li Gang!” These words became a slogan in China summing up the problem of corruption, abuse of power and disproportionate privilege among government leaders and other elites and their family members.
The broader issue of privilege among China’s second-generation political and business elites is encompassed in two terms now widely used, the “power progeny” or “second-generation [of] officials” (官二代) and the “second-generation rich” (富二代). Li Shuangjiang’s son would be considered a prime example of the latter, as would Lu Xingyu (卢星宇), the daughter of billionaire Lu Junqing (卢俊卿) who is now embroiled, along with her father, in a scandal of her own.
In the lead editorial in today’s edition of The Beijing News, the term “second-generation rich” is not used explicitly. But the editorial deals generally with the issue of privilege and inequality of opportunity in China and what they mean for society.
These are issues that will no doubt be played out in many more cases to come.
A translation of the lead editorial in The Beijing News follows:

“Why Does a 15-year-old Dare to ‘Pick Fights and Make Trouble’?”
September 9, 2011
According to a report in The Beijing News, the son of vocalist Li Shuangjiang (李双江), who is suspected of driving without a license and attacking others, has already been arrested according to the law. There is nothing greatly suspenseful about the case, which in due time will be investigated and handled according to the law. But the repercussions of this suspected case of “troublemaking” certainly do not end here.
In all fairness, this dispute itself was quite plain and ordinary, and was not something awful. The direct damage resulting from it was also minimal. But the social impact is ugly. Not only the parents of those involved, but all society is perhaps asking: Why did a 15-year-old youth not even capable of bearing full legal responsibility for his actions act in such an aggressive manner? And how did the ideas and problem-solving impulses behind these actions take shape?
In the media and public appearances, Li Shuangjiang and his wife have often praised their son’s talents and abilities, and have allowed him to appear onstage in numerous public forums. At the age of 5, he became the “youngest ambassador for [China’s] Olympic big”, appearing onstage numerous times with his father to sing . . .
It’s not difficult to see that many of these opportunities and much of this limelight were not so much about the child’s talent, effort or professional skill so much as his being steeped in the light of being “Li Shuangjiang’s son.” And as for these undeserved opportunities for limelight, all sides gave them and received them in without the least unease, the famous Li Shuangjiang and his wife not only making them possible but clearly having no qualms whatsoever about it.
Everyone loves their children, but it is precisely this teaching by precept and example that might exercise a subtle influence, allowing the child to heap up the sense of relying on, trusting in and even reveling in the halo bestowed by their parents — believing that all of the conveniences and privileges enjoyed by “Li Shuangjiang’s son” are normal, and that just by raising the “great flag” of his parents he can live without restrictions and have whatever he pleases. Each time father and son took the stage, each instance of vaunting before the public, imperceptibly strengthened the son’s sense that he enjoyed special privileges.
Perhaps as a father Li Shuangjiang would not have hoped to instill in his son this sense [of superiority], but objectively speaking the possession of privilege and convenience itself is the best breeding ground for this sense of special rights and privileges.
Media have reported that Li Shuangjiang noticed from his sons keen interest and aptitude for cars from a young age, that when his son was young he would teach him hand-on-hand [how to drive] in the open space of their courtyard, and that he would compare driving cars to melodies and symphonies. The BMW without tags [involved in the recent incident] had previously been worked on, and the refitting was quite expensive, clearly not the kind of work that can be done by a youth on his own. A 15-year-old is unable to apply for a driver’s license under the law, and Li Shuangjiang and his wife must know this. They should also know that giving a motor vehicle to someone who does not possess a driver’s license is a violation of traffic laws. What is regrettable, though, is that they gave tacit consent, or even encouraged this symphony their son should not have played [ie, this recent incident]. . .
Parents are the first teachers of their own children, and while they may be proud of their kids they must not allow their kids to be puffed with pride. They must not allow their sons to wield special privileges that are not rightfully theirs, and act with [reckless] “courage,” because of [the parent’s] own status and name.
This incident has drawn a wave of public attention most of all because this is not an isolated case, and that to varying degrees [in different cases] these examples of youth misusing the resources of their parents and see public order and the public good as something to be spurned.
After this incident, Li Shuangjiang and his wife went to the hospital to visit the the woman who was beaten [by their son], and they apologized on behalf of their son saying that, “I didn’t teach my son properly,” that he would willingly submit to the victim “using a club to give me a good beating” and that he “would not indulge the errors committed by his own child.” This is proper behavior, and it might to some degree restore [Li Shuangjiang’s] image. But should we not as a society think deeply about why we had to wait for this kind of thing to happen before we confessed in this way?