Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Sold out by China's schools

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In news that has shaken the world of higher education in China, 69 students at Guiyang Defense University were found to have been sent to work at a manufacturing facility in the city of Dongguan just six days after they began their studies. In their three-year course of study, factory labor accounted for half their “study” time, and during work periods they worked daily double shifts of more than ten hours. The wage levels earned by these student laborers are so low as to inspire fury — just 1,300 yuan over a period of seven months, or less than 200 yuan on average per month.
The phenomenon of vocational and technical schools (职业技术学校) “selling students” into work positions at factories, clubs and even entertainment venues [such as nightclubs] is already quite widespread. And it has to be said that there are cases even more severe than this one involving Guiyang Defense University. But this is perhaps the first time that dirty dealings on this scale have been openly exposed.
In fact, the abuse of internships and practical experience is something common to both institutions of higher education and vocational and technical schools in China. Students, and particularly students in vocational programs, require hands-on experience, and this isn’t a problem per se.
But for our colleges and universities, the problem of practical education has been put out to pasture. Schools that originally had their own associated factories to provide hands-on training have closed these loss-making facilities down and pushed students out to find their own practical study experiences. In cases where they are unable to find suitable positions, they often manage to get certification anyhow, and schools simply turn a blind eye. What was once a necessary part of the education process has descended into mere formality.
The problem in the case of secondary vocational education in China now is that student labor is effectively being sold off to factories, with students forced to work in regular placements. The schools make money this way and at the same time get to replace teaching with these so-called internships, winning at both ends of the bargain.
Performing arts schools are generally the worst. In recent years they have been known to send students off directly to work in bars and entertainment venues where they are often expected to provide sexual services.
Many people talk about how our universities have gone awry, and that what is really lacking are secondary vocational schools that train skilled workers and craftsmen. And of course skilled workers do require hands-on experience to develop specific skills with their hands. But this sort of training has to be conducted as part of a curriculum.
Part of the education process, internships are not the same thing as regular work placements. Regular work placements in this context essentially amount to using fee-paying students as a source of cheap labor, and many schools are colluding with factories to improperly exploit the sweat of students. These methods are of very little practical benefit to the development of student skills. And long stints of doing work on the assembly line could even be detrimental to their practical abilities.
Schools are places where people are supposed to grow and develop. But many schools have already become seriously displaced from this intended role. They have transmuted into profit-seeking machines that cast aside the dignity of students and trample on disregard their futures.
Our schools have become labor contractors. Worse yet, they are labor contractors who call themselves teachers. They are more rapacious and cruel than true labor contractors. Just imagine, in this age of labor scarcity — what region could possibly attract workers by offering double-shift days for less than 200 yuan a month? But in our teaching schools this is exactly what’s happening.
When schools are unscrupulous to this extreme, is it really right anymore to call them schools?
Most regrettable is that this is the reality facing our schools. This kind of profit-seeking in our schools is something we see everywhere. On the one hand, our schools have a high degree of administrative control. On the other hand, our schools resemble those shady brick kilns [where in the past workers have been found to have been enslaved].
What sorts of deformities will these extraordinary marriages of power and money spawn in the future? They can only be worse and worse, one more monstrous than the next.
This article is a translation adapted from the original editorial published in Guangzhou Daily.

Can social media push change in China?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This time last year, Chinese media were dubbing 2010 the “inaugural year” of the microblog in China. Platforms like Sina Weibo and QQ Weibo, which enabled real-time sharing of text, links, images and video, were already impacting the news agenda in China. In an October 2010 post, CMP Director Ying Chan (陈婉莹) wrote about how she witnessed Chinese editors at a forum in Shanghai busily checking their mobiles for the latest microblog updates on a forced demolition case in Jiangxi province that was grabbing headlines at the time.
But if social media were “inaugural” last year, they have at times seemed unstoppable this year, and that has led to growing speculation that tighter controls are in the offing.
Microblogs have defined many of the top news stories in 2011. From the charity scandal surrounding the socialite Guo Meimei (郭美美) and the Red Cross Society of China to relentless attention to the issue of high-speed rail safety, cost and corruption before and after the July 23 collision in Wenzhou.


[ABOVE: This microblog maintained by user “Ji Fashi” (季法师) was the first to break news of last week’s subway collision in Shanghai.]
The changes brought about by platforms like Sina Weibo have tempted some to a cowboy-Western reading of the landscape, in which they imagine social media socking it to those in power. While this oppositional view is somewhat supported by the antagonistic tone of the internet, and the way it can fuel as well as reflect public anger over specific stories and issues, it fails to take into account the way Chinese institutions are adjusting (however ploddingly and reluctantly) to a new era of rapid information sharing.
The push for greater openness over so-called sudden-breaking incidents (突发事件) has been a clear trend in China for almost a decade — broadly speaking ever since the SARS epidemic in 2003. Policy steps on the Party and government side can be seen in China’s law on the handling of sudden-breaking incidents, passed in August 2007, and Hu Jintao’s policy statements in 2008 on the need for more rapid reporting of breaking incidents.
Article 53 of China’s law on the handling of sudden-breaking incidents states: “People’s governments taking on a unified leadership role or organizing the handling of sudden-breaking incidents should according to relevant regulations release information concerning the development of sudden-breaking incidents and response work in a unified, accurate and timely manner.”
On August 2 this year, right on the heels of the railway ministry’s catastrophic handling of the July 23 high-speed train collision in Wenzhou, the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP released a “notice” on the need to deepen openness of government affairs (深化政务公开). This document was apparently in the works for a number of years, but the timing of its release seemed to suggest that those in support saw the public relations bungle of the train collision as a painful reminder of how important it is to stay on top of sudden-breaking incidents and satisfy the public demand for information.
Of course, it is worth bearing in mind the obvious — that the need for greater openness as a tool of social management is balanced at every turn in China against the unflagging priority of controlling information, or “guidance of public opinion.” This is plainly apparent in the text of the August 2 “Notice” itself, which states under item 7 in the only direct reference to sudden-breaking incidents: “[We] must have a firm grasp of openness on major sudden-breaking incidents and hot issues of concern to the masses, objectively releasing the state and process of events, government actions, response measures to be taken by the public, and the findings of official investigations [into incidents], responding in a timely manner to concerns in society, and correctly channeling public opinion (正确引导社会舆论).”
The term (underlined) that concludes this portion, while not exactly signifying media control as blankly as its precursor, “correct guidance of public opinion” (正确舆论导向), was formally ushered into media policy with President Hu Jintao’s June 2008 address at People’s Daily. It is an ambiguous term implying a level of control, but combining it with the idea that the Party should more actively “use” media, including the internet and quasi-independent commercial newspapers, to influence agendas. In the past, we have used the term Control 2.0 to talk about this later development in news and propaganda policy in China.
Given the emphasis on using media more proactively, and on “channeling public opinion,” particularly for sudden-breaking incidents, it’s not surprising to find that microblogs are themselves becoming an increasingly important tool for the government and other institutions in China.
Back in March, the People’s Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Center (人民网舆情监测室) listed the use of microblogs to interact with the public as number five on a list of seven suggestions for dealing with sudden-breaking incidents. The center wrote: “Microblogs have shown most vividly the speed and breadth of information transmission on the internet, and they rapidly transmit information on the internet with a means of high efficiency. In sudden-breaking incidents, microblogs are already gradually becoming the core of public opinion propagation . . . ”
We can see from this passage that microblogs, and social media generally, are already pressuring the government and other institutions to respond more quickly and transparently to sudden-breaking incidents and other issues of public concern. The flip side is that social media are also increasingly providing one of the chief means by which the government and other institutions respond and reach the public.
By the beginning of this year, the opening of “official microblogs” had already become a noticeable and growing trend in China. In a report issued in April this year, the Public Opinion Monitoring Center noted that “microblogs for Party and government institutions and officials already cover many administrative levels, from central to local, and many functional departments.” As of March, the center calculated “more than 400 official microblogs [for Party or administrative offices] and more than 200 microblogs maintained by [individual] officials.” While specific numbers are hard to come by, that number has no doubt grown substantially over the past six months. [Click HERE for a list in Chinese of top-ten “official microblogs” recommended by People’s Daily Online in March this year].
Back in early 2010, the Public Opinion Monitoring Center suggested that the government follow a rule of “four golden hours” (黄金4小时) in dealing with sudden-breaking incidents — meaning that the government should actively share information within that time frame. Chinese new media expert and CMP fellow Hu Yong (胡泳) wrote in response to this idea that “increasing the speed of government [information] response to crises is a basic demand of the new media age.”
But within a short 20 months, the rapid development of social media in China has made these “golden hours” seem an eternity. These days, a story can spread across the country in four golden minutes. Even with real-time tools at their fingertips, sluggish and bureaucratic institutions with a deeply-ingrained culture of holding back on information find themselves playing catch-up.
For a prime example of this, we need look no further than last week’s subway collision in Shanghai, which injured more than 280 people.
By the standard of the Public Opinion Monitoring Center’s “four golden hours,” subway authorities in Shanghai responded with lightning speed.
In this post at 3:33pm, made just over 40 minutes after the subway collision, the official microblog of the Shanghai Metro made the following announcement: “Today at 2:10 pm the Shanghai No. 10 Line experienced equipment failure at the Xintiandi Station, and the entire line from Jiaotong University to Nanjing East Road employed a telephone block system, and trains went under slow restricted speed. During this time, at 2:51 pm, two trains collided between Yu Garden and Old West Gate. At 2:51 pm a section including 9 stations from the Hongqiao Road Station to the Tiantong Road Station was temporarily closed . . . ”
By the time this post was made, however, the first mainstream media report of the crash had been out for almost 15 minutes. That report was filed by a reporter for Shanghai’s commercial Xinmin Evening News who happened to be on one of the subway trains involved in the collision.
But the very first report of the crash had come through social media within seconds of the crash. A Shanghai web user on Sina Microblog with the name “Ji Fashi” (季法师) was the first to make a post with a photograph form the scene. Li Fashi’s post read: “Just now two trains on the Shanghai No. 10 Subway have collided. Everybody bless and protect us!” The post included a now famous photo of a female passenger covered with blood being attended to by another passenger.

[ABOVE: This photo of an injured woman on Shanghai’s No. 10 line was the first to be posted to Chinese social media on September 27, breaking news of the collision of two trains on the line. According to Sina Weibo, the post was made at 2:49 pm. According to the official version of the story, the crash occurred at 2:51 pm.]
So in the 44 minutes between the original Ji Fashi post and the first post from Shanghai subway authorities mentioning the collision, photos and eyewitness accounts were shared across thousands of microblog posts, and reports from the Xinmin Evening News were already being shared across major internet news portals.
During this period, the official microblog of the Shanghai Metro made four separate posts mentioning malfunctions but saying nothing about the collision. In a post at 3:03, almost 15 minutes after the collision, the official microblog said: “Owing to an equipment malfunction on Shanghai Metro Line No. 10, service between the Yili Road Station and Sichuan North Road Station has been suspended, all exchanges to the No. 10 line have been stopped. Will passengers please adjust their travel plans accordingly.”
A full 9 minutes later, another post read: “Owing to an equipment malfunction on Shanghai Metro Line No. 10, service between the Yili Road Station and Sichuan North Road Station has been suspended. The Yu Garden Road station has already been closed. Will passengers please avoid the above-mentioned malfunctioning section . . . ”
Posts at 3:17 pm and 3:23 pm made similar announcements of delays without making any mention of the collision.
Microblogs are not magic bullets. But even as the government tries to reign in their influence, they will likely continue to exert immense pressure on China’s institutions, forcing them to grapple with a public that is more engaged and hungry for information.

What exactly is the World Media Summit?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Two years ago I wrote about the inaugural session of the World Media Summit, a gathering of world media “leaders” conceived, planned and by all accounts funded by China’s official Xinhua News Agency, which falls under China’s State Council and is subject to the public opinion controls of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party. The biennial event, which China’s state media touted in 2009 as “the media Olympics,” kicked off again in Beijing yesterday.
Strangely, for an event that we are told is attended by representatives from hundreds of media from all over the world, there is precious little information out there about the summit. Let’s take a look at the whole universe of information available in English about what we are being told is a global media event attended by the executives at the center of global news creation. Here is an image of a portion of the Google News search results:


As of midday today there were 14 news articles shown for “World Media Summit”. In the order listed on the Google search page, each linking to the relevant article, here is a list of the news organizations responsible for the reports:
1. Xinhua
2. Xinhua
3. China National Radio
4. Xinhua
5. Xinhua
6. Xinhua
7. Xinhua
8. People’s Daily Online
9. Xinhua
10. Xinhua
11. The Voice of Russia
12. Shanghai Daily
13. Shanghai Daily
14. China National Radio
These news stories, all from central state media with the exception of Shanghai Daily and Voice of Russia, offer an interesting picture of China’s state agenda behind the World Media Summit. This September 26 report from Xinhua talks about the need to create a new world order for media. The report reads:

Currently, as the world situation is changing greatly, the reform of world media order is inevitable. Through the impact of the political, economic and technical developments, the world media are calling for the establishment of a fairer, all-win, inclusive and responsible international media order.

So this summit, apparently, is about the global power structure of media in the 21st century. The current “international media order” is unfair, Xinhua suggests, and we must “get all media from different countries and regions involved in news reporting in an equal way.” We need to have “comprehensive, objective and accurate news reporting,” but one goal of such coverage should be “eradicating the chasms between different civilizations and cultures.”


[ABOVE: Global news executives meet in Beijing to decide the future of the “international media order,” according to Xinhua News Agency reports.]
The underlying assumption here is of course that Western coverage of China (and of other countries too) is prejudicial, unfair and unequal — a theme we see again and again in the Party’s official discourse on the need to enhance China’s soft power and grab a greater share of “global public opinion.”
In my 2009 post, I documented the history of the summit’s creation, linking it to a specific central Party directive that became part of Xinhua’s “core work” plan. As Xinhua chief and World Media Summit President Li Congjun (who served for six years as a deputy chief of the propaganda department before taking his Xinhua post) wrote in the Party’s official Seeking Truth journal in February 2009:

[We must] actively seek out new horizons, new mechanisms, new channels and new methods in the area of outside dialogue and cooperation, particularly, as by the demands of central party leaders, successfully organizing the first meeting of the World Media Summit, building a platform for dialogue among first-rate international media (国际一流媒体), further raising the capacity of Xinhua News Agency to make its voice heard in the international news and information sector.

By the Party’s own reckoning, then, this global summit is really all about Xinhua — and more to the point, it is all about the media and propaganda ambitions of the Chinese state.
The bottom line for China is that news should be, well, more diplomatic.
Who, then, are the diplomats at the center of this new “world media order”? They are the news executive-packed “presidium” of the World Media Summit, a group essentially appointed by Xinhua ahead of the Beijing Olympics in 2008. As the governing body of the Summit, these executives are to determine the agendas of the various summits and handle “administrative matters” through “collective consultation.”
The “presidium” is made up of executives from the following news organizations. As a courtesy, I add the nations where they are headquartered:
1. Xinhua (China)
2. The Associated Press (United States)
3. The British Broadcasting Corporation (Britain)
4. The New York Times (United States)
5. Itar-Tass (Russia)
6. Kyodo News (Japan)
7. News Corporation (United States)
8. Thomson-Reuters (United States)
9. Al Jazeera Network (Qatar)
10. Google (United States)
11. Time-Warner’s Turner Broadcasting System (United States)
Al Jazeera and The New York Times were apparently added to the presidium more recently, and Li Congjun told state media this week that with their respective additions in 2010 and 2011 the World Media Summit was now “more representative in terms of cultural backgrounds, media forms and authoritative perspectives.'”
So, people of the world, here are your representatives. Here are the business executives who are tasked (according to Xinhua) with refashioning the “international media order.”


For pictures, names and titles of World Media Summit Presidium Members, see this page on the official website of the World Media Summit. The website also provides an introduction to the Summit and its objectives.
There is of course nothing wrong with global news executives meeting with their Beijing counterparts to discuss business cooperation and exchange.
The problem here is that news executives are being duped into participating in an institutional framework that is ostensibly “non-governmental [and] non-profit” but which is backed and funded by the Chinese state via its official news agency, and which clearly has agendas beyond simple business exchange that overlap with those of the Chinese leadership.
These media executives are representing themselves — or allowing themselves to be represented — as governing members of an organization that states publicly on an official website apparently managed by Xinhua News Agency itself, bearing an all-rights-reserved Xinhua copyright, that it plans to “set a code of conduct binding for all” in order to “tackle challenges and problems confronting all.” Li Congjun, the former deputy propaganda chief who runs Xinhua and is now the Summit’s president apparently proposed “establishing a WMS [World Media Summit] mechanism outlining a common code of conduct.”
Gentlemen, I think everyone understands why you have agreed to sit at the table. But is this really an agenda you have all signed up for? How much do you really understand about this institution? And what right do you have, however powerful your news organizations, to speak for the rest of the world’s media in setting any agendas beyond those of your corporations?
It is possible, of course, that I have entirely misunderstood this institution and your participation. Perhaps, then, your own news organizations can elaborate on the coverage provided by Xinhua. Perhaps they can explain to us what this institution means and why you have agreed to become its “co-chairmen.”
Tell us, please. What exactly is the World Media Summit?

Why do rumors explode in China?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The Li Gang case of October 2010, in which the son of an influential local police official struck and killed a female college student while driving on campus — and tried to hide behind his father’s authority by shouting, “My father is Li Gang!” — struck a nerve with many Chinese. The case spoke to a generalized fear and resentment over the perception that, in this transitioning society marked by deep social inequality, those with power and wealth can act with impunity.
This month in China we’ve seen a spate of cases reminiscent of the Li Gang case almost one year ago, and the theme of the second-generation rich and powerful — known in Chinese as the fu’erdai (富二代), or the “children of the rich,” and the guan erdai (官二代), the children of officials — has been a recurrent one in China’s media. [View this CMP/Link TV video for a quick review of two recent cases.]
The headlines were dominated this month by the story of Li Tianyi (李天一), the son of famous Chinese vocalist Li Shuangjiang (李双江). The young Li was sentenced to a year in a correctional facility after a September 6 incident in which he and a second teenager attacked a couple in Beijing in a road rage incident. According to eyewitness accounts shared widely in China’s media, as Li Tianyi and his accomplice repeatedly struck the couple they shouted, “Who dares dial 110!” “110” is China’s emergency hotline.
Right on the heels of the Li Shuangjiang case, Ma Wencong, the son of a rich family in the city of Wenzhou — again driving a luxury car — was involved in a dispute over parking in which he struck a shop owner and the woman’s 18-month-old daughter. Huge crowds surrounded Ma Wencong and police responding to the scene, hemming them in for more than five hours. Rumors spread in the crowd — and quickly went nationwide through social media — that Ma Wencong had issued threats by saying, “My father is the mayor.” Meanwhile, crowds destroyed Ma’s Mercedes-Benz.
Chinese media quickly reported that this latest catchphrase for “second-generation” arrogance was a rumor, and that the words “My father is the mayor” were never spoken by Ma Wencong. But as an editorial on People’s Daily Online wrote yesterday, rumor or not, “My father is the mayor” and other such catchphrases speak to a deep anxiety in Chinese society about privilege, inequality and the protection of the rights of ordinary people.
It’s worth noting too that the People’s Daily Online piece is part of the continuing discussion in China in recent weeks about “rumors,” what they signify in Chinese society today, and what if anything should be done about them. And behind this issue, of course, are growing questions about how China’s government will decide to deal with increasingly influential domestic social media such as Sina Weibo (Microblog).
On the topic of the fu’erdai (富二代) and the guan erdai (官二代), readers might also read up on the recent arrest of one member of the so-called “four capital playboys” (京城四少), who will stand trial for numerous counts including illegal weapons possession and destruction of property.
A translation of the People’s Daily Online editorial follows:

People’s Daily Online
September 26, 2011
“My father is the mayor!” A few days ago, on the streets of Wenzhou, as a scuffle and war of words broke out over the parking of a car, it was this sentence spreading among the crowds that resulted in the gathering of thousands in a short space of time. Not only were [the suspect] Ma Wencong (马文聪), the son of a wealthy family, and police officers on the scene surrounded for more than five hours, but many people lost all sense of control, attacking and destroying [Ma Wencong’s] Mercedes-Benz. . . At the same time, via the microblogs the phrase “My father is the mayor” spread quickly. But ultimately the facts showed that these words that had caused such a furor were just rumor.
How is it that a rumor can have such energy? Going back to the scene, we have a troublemaker driving a luxury car, who strikes others and acts crudely, clearly the posture of someone who has “connections.” Then you have the traffic police mishandling the situation, leading to resentment over how they are “partial” to one side. Once you put all of these pieces together, this strikes a nerve with people. Word goes around about the supposed utterance, “My father is the mayor,” and then everything falls into place. Finally, you have the internet allowing it to spread like wildfire.
While the rumor may have been fake, the psychological forces that created the rumor are very real. Crowds massed and surrounded [a suspect] because of a single, “My father is the mayor,” first of all because they were angry at how the suspect relied on his “influence” to do whatever he pleased, and this arrogance filled them with righteous indignation; secondly, they were anxious, wondering whether a troublemaker with such “connections” could really be held to account. Would his father’s influence mean the matter was settled without a satisfactory conclusion? Can the rights of ordinary victims receive protection? A reporter from Wenzhou Evening News who was on the scene reporting at the time also had this feeling, that the real hope people had in passing these words along was that the weak could get assistance so that the matter could be settled better and quicker.
Since last year, when the [phrase], “My father is Li Gang,” emerged from the scene of a car accident on the campus of Hebei University, “My father is so-and-so” has become a news meme. Whether it is a real, “My father is Li Gang,” or “My father is the village chief,” or a fake, “My father is the mayor,” all of these point to the same social problem: a number of members of the privileged class, using their power and wealth as an umbrella of protection, challenge public order and good morals, and harm the public interest. Meanwhile, rigged employment, “relying on Daddy’s connections to get a job,” selectivity in enforcement [of the law] and other such issues of social inequity exist, and these constantly harden people’s prejudice toward the identity of the “father,” on both real and psychological levels, creating a sense of concern about harm to one’s own interests and creating many “indirect stakeholders” (非直接利益相关者). Whether one’s father really is the mayor or not is not important. What is important is whether certain people can use their special status to ride roughshod over others.
In that case, all of those people with no “background” are latent victims, and who can say when they might meet with similar fates. This in fact is a kind of collective anxiety.
A civilized and harmonious society cannot tolerate the unbridled repetition of these “My father is so-and-so’s.” And getting rid of this problem meme can’t be achieved through the spreading of rumors, through the letting off of emotions, or through unwarranted accusations. Even less so can this be achieved through violence. We must return to the path of reason and rule of law . . . Li Qiming (李启铭), the son of Li Gang, was sentenced to six years in jail. Li Shuangjiang’s son, Li Tianyi (李天一), received a year of detention in a correctional facility. Ma Wencong (马文聪), who was rumored to be the son of the mayor, has been arrested for the crime of willfully inflicting harm on another. Wang Shuo (王烁), one of the so-called “four capital playboys” (京城四少), will stand trial for numerous counts [including illegal weapons possession and destruction of property]. All of these results demonstrate the serious attitude of relevant departments [to these cases], and this sends a warning shot to arrogant “second-generationers” (二代) [NOTE: This terms refers to both the “second-generation rich” (富二代), or the sons and daughters of the wealthy, and to the “power progeny” (官二代), the sons and daughters of Party and government officials). At the same time it tells us all that the forces of fairness and justice, and responsible action, are the only resolute means by which we can remove the phenomenon of “My Dad is so-and-so.”

Naked Claims of "State Secrecy"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.


In late September 2011, police in Luoyang, Henan province, arrested Li Hao (李浩), a former firefighter who held other government positions, for allegedly kidnapping and holding six women in a basement apartment and using them as sex slaves. The case was not reported publicly until September 22, when Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily broke the story, which quickly drew national attention. On the day the report ran in Southern Metropolis Daily, the reporter responsible for the story, Ji Xuguang (纪许光), says he was questioned by local police in a hotel in Luoyang. Officers wanted to know who had leaked the story to Ji, and said this act was “a violation of state secrecy.” This story broke just as another case, in which a local government claimed the resume of a young official was a “secret,” was drawing attention to the claim of secrecy as a means of covering up potentially damaging news. In this cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to his blog at QQ.com, an official (presumably) stands naked an covers his private parts with a placard that reads: “State secrets.”

Reading behind Wen's remarks on reform

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Dalian — At the World Economic Forum’s Summer Davos in Dalian earlier this month, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) called again for political reform in China. The context and the way Wen’s words were handled by China’s party media suggested that he might have won greater support among top party echelons in his effort to keep alive the push for political reform.
Unlike last year, when Wen’s repeated promises on political reform received low-key treatment from party media, the official Xinhua News Agency this time dispatched the full text of Wen’s speech across the country.
Party insiders at the Dalian forum said Wen’s high profile statements on political reform showed that the liberal wing of the Chinese Communist Party was flexing its muscles. Another observer said that Xinhua must have gotten the go-ahead from the Central Propaganda Department to release Wen’s speech.
In Dalian, Wen Jiabao gave two speeches, the first at the opening ceremony of the forum on the morning of September 14th, and the second at a meeting with CEO’s later in the day. His morning address focused on economic issues and devoted only one short paragraph to political reform. He mentioned the importance of governing by law, and the need for institutional changes that would protect citizens’ rights.
Wen’s real moment came in the afternoon when he met with about 100 CEO’s. The meeting was designed as a closed-door discussion conducted according to the Chatham House Rule, under which participants can cite the content of the meeting but must not disclose the identities and affiliations of the speakers. In spite of the stipulation, Wen Jiabao permitted Xinhua News Agency to stream live the text of the meeting online. The first question came from Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of WEF, who asked Wen to elaborate his morning statement on political reform.
Wen was responded: “Our meeting this afternoon . . . is not just about me interacting with all of you here. In fact, I am thinking of having interactions with all the people of this country. ” He had come prepared to use the forum as a platform to speak to the whole nation.
Wen cited five points of political reform, which went much further than what he had said in the past.
Wen went on to offer his “five points of political reform” (政改五点), which have since been widely publicized. They are: 1. ruling the country by law, and ensuring separation of the party and government; 2. promoting social justice, addressing unfair distribution of wages and closing the gap between the rich and the poor; 3. ensuring an impartial and independent judiciary; 4. protecting the democratic rights of the people and expanding grassroots elections; 5. opposing corruption, requiring government officials to make public their financial affairs .
Of the five points, the first was most provocative as it called for reforming the leadership system (领导制度) of the Chinese Communist Party and the government. “The ruling Party must conduct itself according to the constitution and the law, said Wen, He also said in no uncertain terms that there must be changes in the Party’s dominance of government affairs (以党代政), its absolute power, and the over-concentration of power. Evoking the authority of Deng Xiaoping, he said, “These are tasks that Deng Xiaoping spoke of 30 years ago, and I think they are even more urgent today.”
Just 12 minutes after the meeting concluded, Caijing Online had posted the full text of Wen’s remarks on political reform. Soon after, the official China News Service posted a report with the headline “Wen Jiabao Talks About Five Points on Political Reform,” which was quickly reposted by other online sites. A national discussion on the topic has been launched, as citizens around the country posted their comments online..
Breaking through its customary silence, Xinhua News Agency reports the full text of Wen’s speech
As for Xinhua News Agency, while it has already posted a transcript of the speech on its official website, it did not send a wire story until the early hours of September 15 . Most notably, Xinhua, in its online release, switched the orders of the questions and answers. It put an exchange on “economic challenges” as the first question, while “burying” Wen’s remarks on political reform under the second question.
More alert journalists found the early morning release highly unusual. One minute after Xinhua sent its wire, Jin Yi (金毅), a deputy editor at Hangzhou’s Youth Times, noted Xinhua’s breakthrough dispatch and started bantering online with other microblog writers.

“My god, they sent a release so late. The papers have already gone to press.//@LittleChenTwo: Xinhua News Agency has sent a release! Tonight is a breakthrough!//@LittleChenTwo: They are still sending the story over. There might be more. //@IAmLiHongwen: Mm, (Let me) make a visual record.」

The day after Wen’s speech, Southern Metropolis Daily ran Wen’s five points on page four under the headline, “Changing Party dominance of the government and over-concentration of power/Wen Jiabao Offers Five Views to Explain Political Reform in Detail.” The official People’s Daily printed the entire Xinhua dispatch, including the five points, on page three but did not highlight Wen’s key message in the headline.
Hoping the next leadership group will take on political reform
While Wen’s “five points” has sparked a discussion online, many web users said they had little expectation of real changes. Some ridiculed his words, saying that he has talked about political reform time and again but has taken no action. One web user wrote: “I guess before next year’s 19th Party Congress there’s little chance for of Premier Wen to make any progress in political reform.”
It is true that Wen’s “five points” harks back to the 1980’s. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech called, “Concerning Reform to the Party and Government Leadership System,” in which he criticized the “over-concentration of power, the patriarchal system (家长制), the system of lifelong tenure for leaders and all sorts of other privileges.” Deng also called for other reform measures such as the separation of the Party and government, and the banning of the lifelong tenure system for government officials.
For Wen Jiabao, talking about political reform is indeed not new. But talking about the issue is better than not talking all. And the unprecedented robust treatment of Wen’s remarks by the party media has at least opened up the issue for a national conversation. By offering a five-point programme, Wen is also challenging expected successors of the top party leadership, Xi Jinping (习近平) and Li Keqiang (李克强), to place political reform squarely on their agenda.
An earlier Chinese version of this article was published in the Sept 19th edition of the Hong Kong Economic Times.

Reporters allege shady building practices

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Last night Sichuan-based Sina Microblog user Dark Clouds at Midnight (子夜的昙) posted an open letter by three Sichuan journalists alerting top leaders in the city of Mianyang, near the epicenter of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, to alleged construction quality and safety issues at Wanda Plaza, a major commercial project now under construction. In the September 14 open letter, the three journalists allege substandard steel is being illegally used for the project, which is being built by a central-level state-owned enterprise listed on the Fortune Global 500.


[ABOVE: A Sina Microblog post by Dark Clouds at Midnight on September 22 at 10:19 pm shares the full text of an open letter to top leaders in the city of Mianyang.]
The Dark Clouds at Midnight post, which had 3,400 re-posts and close to 700 comments by midday today, was just one of many posts about this open letter shared on Chinese social media. It was based on this September 21 post made to a blog at QQ.com, in which the open letter was shared along with supporting photographs.
These accusations are of particular interest to many Chinese because poor construction quality, and particularly shoddy school construction, was the focus of much attention in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Premier Wen Jiabao pledged in 2008 that the government would look into the issue of shoddy school construction, but no action has so far been taken to deal with those responsible.
A number of Chinese activists, including Tan Zuoren (谭作人) and the artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), attempted to conduct their own independent investigations into shoddy school construction and the death of students in the quake. Tan, whose work we covered here, is now serving a jail sentence for “inciting subversion of state power” for his activism on this issue.
The social media post by Dark Clouds at Midnight (子夜的昙) reads: “For these journalists to make a report of this using their real names is quite extraordinary. [The] May 12 [quake] caused so much hurt for the people of Sichuan. We must not see a return of shoddy construction!”
Our translation of the open letter follows. Photos posted to the blog at QQ.com are pasted below.

“An Open Letter to the City Government of Mianyang and to City Residents”
A Situation Report Concerning the Medium to Large-scale Use of Substandard Steel Reinforcing Bar on the Reconstruction of the Wanda Plaza in Fucheng District
Your Honorable Secretary Wu Jingping (吴靖平) and Mayor Zeng Wanming (曾万明)
We several news journalists (being also web users) have recently received informing reports that for a priority image project (形象工程) of Mianyang city — the Wanda Plaza in Fucheng District — steel materials of inferior quality manufactured by small-scale steel works have been used on a large scale, posing a serious hazard to construction quality and to the life and safety of the people of Mianyang. We hope that we might draw the attention of the honorable city Party committee and the city government to this issue.
We have learned that the developer of the Wanda Plaza project in Mianyang’s Fucheng District is the Dalian Wanda Group, which calls itself a globally-known enterprise; the contractor responsible for the whole project is a central state-owned enterprise, China Construction Second Engineering Bureau Ltd. (中国建筑第二工程局), or “China Construction Second Bureau” (中建二局) for short, one of the world’s top 500 enterprises (世界500强) [NOTE: The company is part of China State Construction Engineering Corp, which is listed on the Fortune 500.] The supplier of steel reinforcements for this project is the 9th Metallurgical Construction Company of China (“9th Metallurgical” for short). It is these three illustrious companies that are illegally shortchanging government construction contracts (偷工减料) and falsely carrying out projects.
According to our investigation over recent months, one-third of the reinforcing steel used in this project so far was purchased by 9th Metallurgical from Jintang (金堂), Guanghan (广汉) and other small steel works, and substandard steel materials such as the “inferior steel” (地调钢) that is expressly forbidden by the state are being used [in the project]. This reinforcing steel product does not carry a steel manufacturing number from the producer, and what’s more it has not product quality certification (产品合格证), and all of it was brought on to the construction site at Wanda Plaza in the middle of the night.
The Mianyang Wanda Plaza project is massive, with a construction area of 450,000 square meters. There are a total of seven processing areas for reinforcing steel, and each of these has massive quantities of poor-quality steel. According to our careful estimates made through undercover work, we found that this steel falls below national quality standards — for example 10mm steel reinforcements, which are nationally limited to no less than 9.6mm, are only 8mm at this project site (please see the photographs following this letter).
Once we had plenty of evidence in our hands, we proceeded on September 8 at 2:30 pm to the Mianyang City Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau, located just 100 meters from the Mianyang Wanda Plaza building site, and explained the situation to Chen Changgu (陈长古), deputy chief of this bureau’s inspection office. Chen then accompanied us along with the chief of the Fourth Enforcement Division, Shao Gang (绍刚), and several enforcement officers to the Wanda Project site, where we had a look around. When we measured the reinforcing steel being installed on the face of the building we found that perhaps all of it was substandard (enforcement officers confirmed this on the scene, and made a record). After we had measures a portion of the steel, a certain Chief Li (李部长) from the contractor side and other started obstructing us from taking photographs (see photos below). After that several workers forcibly and violently grabbed our cameras and took away the memory cards, destroying the evidence. They also threatened to kill us.
As we were being attacked, the enforcement officers that had come along seemed utterly indifferent. Deputy Chief Chen even said: “We can’t control any of this, we only concern ourselves with quality issues. We asked for help in notifying the police, and Chen said: “It’s better for you to notify [them] yourselves!” Deputy Chief Chen even said: “This really should be handled by the Construction Bureau, but it falls under our jurisdiction too.” He said they often came to make selected inspections, but had never found any problems.
After risking our own lives to report the matter to police, we were finally escorted off the construction site by police patrols and some officers from the Huayuan Police Substation. That night, the contractor backed dirt up over the stores of substandard “skinny steel” (瘦身钢筋). Two or three days later, they suddenly brought in 200 tons of proper reinforcing steel in order to cover up [the supplies of substandard material]. Afterward, China Construction Second Bureau and 9th Metallurgical acted as though nothing had happened. The bosses of Wanda Plaze advertised their close relationships with many media and leaders, saying they could easily smooth things out.
Honorable Secretary Wu and Mayor Zeng, Mianyang is in the priority disaster area of the May 12, 2008, earthquake, and many people have not yet emerged from the shadow of that quake. We hope that the honorable city Party committee and government can be responsible to the people of Mianyang, setting up a special investigative team, immediately calling a halt to construction for this project and conducting a thorough investigation of building material channels and construction quality (including parts of the project that have already been poured with cement). [We hope you will] pursue the legal responsibility of government leaders and inspection bureaus whose purview this is and give the people of Mianyang back their right to know.
Chen Changchun (陈长春), Zhao Junshun (赵军顺) and Xiao Leideng (肖磊等)
September 14, 2011


(This is one corner of the A section of the Mianyang Wanda Plaza currently under construction.)

(This is a residential building in the B section of Wanda Plaza for which a lot of substandard steel reinforcement has already been used.)

(This is a corner of the A section of Wanda Plaza currently under construction. The roof covering under the tower cranes already hide a great deal of substandard steel reinforcement.)

(This is one of the processing areas for steel reinforcement. Almost all the steel under the journalist’s feet is of poor quality, and this is only 200 meters away from the Mianyang City Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau.)

(The journalist measures the insufficient diameter of the substandard steel. See pictures below.)

(This 12mm steel bar measures only 10.90mm. How far is that from the international [standard] of 11.5mm?)

(on September 8 the journalists notified the Mianyang City Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau. The man at left walking on the steel bar with a red hardhat and satchel and carrying measuring equipment in his right hand is the chief of the Fourth Enforcement Division, Shao Gang. To his right is Chen Changgu, deputy chief of this bureau’s inspection office. The journalists are crouching down and measuring steel reinforcing bar ready to be installed.)

(This steel reinforced waiting to be installed is all substandard. This one, a 10mm steel bar, is only 8.99mm thick, short of the international minimum of 9.6. This photo, which shows a 2007 date, was taken secretly, and their was no time to correct the time on the camera.)

(This 8mm rod, half of which has already been used, shows a diameter of just 6.93, short of the international minimum of 7.7mm.)

(Here Deputy Chief Chen sees for himself that the steel reinforcements do not have quality inspection stamps [合格证] or factory-issued steel numbers. To the right holding the pen is the the chief of the enforcement division, who made a record of the measurements taken by the journalists.)

(Deputy Chief Chen finally discovers the faintest of steel numbers on one bar. The hand on the left pointing at the steel is that of Deputy Chief Chen.)

(The man third from the left in the white t-shirt and white safety hat with his hand on his hip is so-called Chief Li working for the contractor. The man in the red safety hat is enforcement chief Shao.)

(After receiving a couple of phonecalls, Chief Li starts blocking our lens as we try to take photographs. Soon after 7-8 people start dealing more roughly with us, grabbing our cameras.)

(Here are two workers for China Construction Second Engineering Bureau who forcibly took cameras from the reporters.)

(Supplies of substandard steel are already covered over.)

(Here is how China Construction Second Engineering Bureau introduces itself.) [NOTE: Blue banner reads, “China State Construction Engineering Corp: Standing in the World’s Top 500.”]

[NOTE: Blue banner reads, “China State Construction Engineering Corp: Quality is Weightier than Mount Tai.”]

A "secret" official resume sparks anger

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The latest scandal over suspected corruption or favoritism in official government appointments in China erupted earlier this week surrounding 29-year-old Yan Ning (闫宁), who is deputy Party secretary of Hebei’s Guantao County (馆陶县) and expected to formally become its Party chief later this year. According to media reports, Yan’s promotion would make him the youngest county Party chief in history.
But as the Southern Metropolis Daily points out in its lead editorial today, the issue here isn’t so much about age or qualifications as it is about more open government affairs. When Chinese media followed up on the Yan Ning story they were told by government employees that “the chief’s resume is a secret, and it’s not convenient to reveal it to the outside.”
The claim that an official’s work experience is a matter of state secrecy has naturally infuriated many Chinese — and the Guantao government now finds itself at the center of a national scandal, the heart of which is the question, much in the spotlight of late, of open government information and the public’s right to know.
The government of Guantao County (馆陶县) finally released Yan Ning’s resume late yesterday, and it is being widely shared on social media in China today. According to the released information on Yan, he became a village Party leader at the age of just 18.


[ABOVE: The official government website of Hebei’s Guantao County now shows a photo and brief resume of Yan Ning, the soon-to-be county Party chief whose resume was recently called “secret.”]
The following is our translation of today’s editorial in the Southern Metropolis Daily.

“County Chief’s Resume Kept Secret: Of What Value is Popular Opinion?”
September 22, 2011
A meeting of Party cadres was held recently in Hebei’s Guantao County (馆陶县), and 29-year-old Yan Ning (闫宁) took up his posts as Guantao’s deputy Party secretary and acting county chief. Assuming all goes smoothly, Yan Ning will without a doubt get to drop this qualifier “acting” at the next session of the county people’s congress, becoming the county chief in earnest. When that happens Yan Ning will swipe the historical record books clean. This young man born on November 22, 1981, will stand beside Zhou Senfeng (周森锋), who at the [tender] age of 29 became the chief of a county-level city, Hebei’s Yicheng (宜城), and he will take his place as “the youngest county chief in history.” 
If it weren’t for this newsy detail [about Yan Ning], it’s more than likely that the name Zhou Senfeng would have rapidly faded in the public eye. . . [T]he former riddle of this youth’s rapid advancement, along with the so-called “umbrella-gate” (打伞门), “cigarette-gate” (香烟门) and “thesis-gate” (论文门) — [cases involving officials caught in compromising positions] — all drew attention from the media, but those involved and government organs did their best to withhold everything, and public concerns, which had no proper course, could only build up behind the flood gates. Looking back at things now, the attempts to keep things under wraps were a success, because as Lu Xun once said, “the forgotten savior” will ultimately return and those moments that seemed so hard to endure will yield to times of ease [NOTE: This is a tough passage, but essentially means that people get past a given incident or scandal, move on, and things return to a state of blissful ignorance.] 
Like the earlier case of Zhou Senfeng, Yan Ning’s life experience and his rapid advancement have invited all sorts of thoughts and speculations. News reports says that before the 29-year-old Yan Ning was slated for Guantao’s county chief position, he worked in Yongnian County (永年县) of the [prefectural-level[ city of Handan (邯郸市) for more than five years. For the first three years, this young person won four separate advancements, moving up the ladder faster than is customary. Faced with [public] questions and suppositions, the authorities have perhaps been even more resolute in withholding [information]. In the previous case, one had only to open up the “leadership window” section of the official website of the Guantao county government to view personal information about the deputy county chiefs, including photographs, work experience and a list of responsibilities. But ever since Yan Ning came to work at Guantao, one can only view [on the official website] information about leaders at the standing deputy chief (常务副县长) level or lower. More recently, the “leadership window” section of the site cannot be opened. Media that have gone to the scene to report this story have been given a red light. And now, we have it from government employees in the county that “the chief’s resume is a secret, and it’s not convenient to reveal it to the outside.”
When the resume of a county Party chief became a secret all sorts of whisperings are apt to spread around like wildfire. According to information shared by one web user, Yan Ning’s father previously served as general secretary of the government office in the county, and as [Party] chief of the [local] electrical supply bureau. [The web user said that] there are two department-level officials (厅级) and three county-level officials in Yan’s family. Quite the opposite of what we generally see in such cases, where relevant [government] departments step out to counter the rumors, this time relevant departments in Handan city haven’t issued even the most basic response. One can’t help but be bewildered by this. Is it that they just don’t realize that this will only intensify questions and speculation about Yan Ning? Or is it that they firmly believe these speculations have no teeth? 
Selecting really young county chiefs isn’t a problem. The leap-frog advancement of cadres isn’t a problem. It’s not even important how illustrious the experiences of a cadre are. What is most critical is that you give the public a reason, and that this reason be sufficient to answer doubts. This is a basic requirement of open government information, and a bottom-line requirement of satisfying the public’s right to know (知情权) so that they may supervise their government. Knowing this bottom line but turning a blind and cool eye can only lead one to believe that relevant departments recognize the ineffectuality of public opinion. 
Unlike the local government in Hebei, which [clearly] views the clamor of public opinion was nothing, Hubei’s Yidu City (宜都市) recently dealt with the “25-year-old beauty as township chief” (25岁美女镇长) case in a manner worthy of note. They opened the front door and invited media to report on this story, and the person concerned faced the public directly, thoroughly releasing information about personnel appointments and dismissals, a case of successful crisis management (危机公关). 
But as we designate these varying responses as either “successes” or “failures” [of crisis management], we must recognize that those who “failed,” even as they clearly lost in the court of public opinion, are not facing real pressure, because pressure clearly cannot result in any real consequences for those who “failed.” 
We have talked a great deal in the past about why the level of trust in society is so low. We have voiced distress at how unreasonable the emotions of internet users can be. And we have called energetically on the public to avoid endlessly attributing the most nefarious intentions to the government and officials. All of these thoughts have been positive and significant. But what is regrettable is that every time a particular case [like this one] arises, it seems to expose all of these ideas as pale and feeble.   
Perhaps not long ago, relevant government departments in Hebei were dealing with the issue of how to interact with the public, how to raise the credibility of the government [as an abstract issue]. But as soon as the Yan Ning affair becomes a public issue, they just seem not to care — not to care about the emotional reaction of web users, not to care about the nasty supposition the public might make, and caring even less about how high or low the public’s level of trust in them is. 
The answer to the repeated waves of incidents involving official appointments, and to the hearsay flying to and fro, is naturally first and foremost about open government information, and about transparency of procedure. But most importantly, public opinion must be able to exercise real pressure, becoming something that has to be dealt with. 

Suspects arrested in killing of Henan journalist

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Shortly after 1 a.m. on September 18, Li Xiang (李翔), a journalist for the local television network in Luoyang, Henan province, was killed in a brutal knife attack not far from his home. While the motive for the attack was not immediately clear, suspicion turned immediately to Li’s work on various social issues, and to reporting he was doing more recently on the re-sale of dangerous waste oil, an issue that has become national news over the past week.
The General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), the government office that deals with licensing and registration and journalists and media — and sometimes speaks publicly on behalf of journalists — said yesterday in an interview with the the Legal Mirror newspaper that it “severely condemned” any harm done to journalists. A GAPP spokesperson said: “We are already paying attention [to this case], and we hope the police, which are investigating the case, quickly have a breakthrough and bring the perpetrators to justice.” GAPP added that it would “take necessary measures” according to developments in the case.


[ABOVE: Journalists Li Xiang is pictured at work in this still from a television report on his killing.]
People’s Daily Online reports today that police in Luoyang now have two suspects in custody. Luoyang police said they would hold a news conference on the case “shortly” and let media know the specifics of the case.

ABOUT US

CONTACT US

FOLLOW US (X)

COOKIE & PRIVACY POLICY

LINGUA SINICA NEWSLETTER