Last week China was hit by its second charity-related scandal this summer as questions swirled around the China-Africa Project Hope, a charity founded jointly by the China Youth Development Foundation of the Chinese Communist Youth League and the World Eminent Chinese Business Association (WECBA), a group linked to billionaire Lu Junqing (卢俊卿) and registered only as a private company in Hong Kong.
The charity is reportedly run by Lu Junqing’s 24-year-old daughter, Lu Xingyu (卢星宇), whom web users have now snidely called “Lu Meimei” (卢美美), a reference to “Guo Meimei” (郭美美), the young woman who was at the center of the scandal at the Red Cross Society of China in June.
While Lu Junqing and Lu Xingyu have actively spoken with media over the past few days insisting that the activities of the WECBA and China-Africa Project Hope are strictly charitable, there are still many questions.
On August 20, Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily listed out what it called “eight lies” perpetuated by the WECBA and Lu Junqing. A translation of that report follows. Below the report we have pasted a copy of a bilingual brochure for the Future Leaders Club (FLC), an association for the sons and daughters of wealthy Chinese related to the WECBA. Lu Xingyu, who serves as secretary-general of the club, is pictured on the brochure with a number of celebrities. The brochure clearly lists the conditions of membership in the FLC, including a one million yuan membership fee.

“Media Expose Eight Lies of Lu Junqing and the World Eminent Chinese Business Association (WECBA)”
August 20, 2011
Lu Junqing (卢俊卿) and the World Eminent Chinese Business Association that he controls is a very active member of the “group photo industry” (合影经济). This industry is dedicated to creating oppurtunities for people to take pictures with senior officials, both incumbent and retired. Reporters from Southern Metropolis Daily carried out an investigation and discovered much evidence of fraudulent practices in [the association’s] everyday operations.
1. Falsely claiming the United Nations as an event sponsor
Beginning in 2005, the World Eminent Chinese Business Association starting holding an annual event in Beijing called the “World Eminent Chinese Business Conference” (世界杰出华商大会), and to date seven such events have been held. According to the official website of the World Eminent Chinese Business Association, although the seven conferences have had various event sponsors, event partners and media sponsors, every conference had among its sponsors the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the [WECBA] website linked to the official website of UNIDO.
On August 19, Southern Metropolis Daily reached the Beijing office of UNIDO about this matter, and an office employee clearly said that UNIDO has no relationship whatsoever to the World Eminent Chinese Business Association. The employee told the Southern Metropolis Daily reporter that the organization the WECBA cooperated with was a subordinate organization called the “United Nations Industrial Development Organization China Nannan Industrial Cooperation Center” (联合国工业发展组织中国南南工业合作中心), but this organization cannot represent UNIDO. Moreover, if this organization did hold this kind of event in UNIDO’s name, it was required to first obtain approval, but UNIDO never received any such report . . .
According to an “Invitation to the Sixth Annual World Eminent Business Conference 2010” (2010年第六届杰出华商大会邀请函), the sponsoring organization [of the event] was the “China Nannan Industrial Cooperation Center”, and [the invitation] included the name of the center’s director, Tan Weiwen (谭伟文). The invitation claimed that the conference was attended by “high-level United Nations officials.”
According to the reporter’s understanding, the World Eminent Chinese Business Conference was first held in 2005, but the “United Nations Industrial Development Organization China Nannan Industrial Cooperation Center” was not founded until July 23, 2008, so that it would have been impossible for it to have been a sponsoring organization [for the event].
2. Registering only in 2009, but beginning its activities in 2005
Lu Junqing yesterday had a discussion on Sina Microblog and Sohu Microblog with web users. One web user questioned why the full company name [of the WECBA] was not used in promotional materials and operations, but rather the words “company limited” were intentionally removed. Lu Junqing answered: “We already registered with the Hong Kong Police as an association, and also registered commercially with the Commercial Bureau (工商署). The World Eminent Chinese Business Association is an association, it is not a business. That company is only in order to seize intellectual property rights, and doesn’t actually have any operations.”
Yesterday afternoon, the public relations office of the Hong Kong Police confirmed to the Southern Metropolis Daily reporter that the “World Eminent Chinese Business Association” has been registered as an association, but the registration dates to July 1, 2009. But the World Eminent Chinese Business Association Company Limited was registered [as a corporation] on June 10, 2005, four years before the registration as an association. Moreover, Lu Junqing formally began hosting the “World Eminent Chinese Business Conference” through the World Eminent Chinese Business Association in 2005.
3. Fees were clearly wantonly collected, but [Lu Junqing] says they never accepted any money
In an interview with QQ.com on August 18, Lu Junqing said that the World Eminent Chinese Business Association is a non-profit platform for the public benefit, and that in six years of operation they have never accepted any money. First of all, the World Eminent Chinese Business Association was not created as an association until 2009, and the six years of operation can only refer to the World Eminent Chinese Business Association Company Limited registered in 2005. On this question, Southern Metropolis Daily obtained a number of documents that show that the World Eminent Chinese Business Association openly advertised a price tag in order to recruit board members, including three categories, (分理事长单位), (副理事长单位) and (理事单位), with fees of 39,900 yuan, 9,900 yuan and 3,900 yuan per year respectively. The World Eminent Chinese Business Conference organized by this association also accepted high fees, which in 2010 for example were 88,000 yuan for VIPs (with treatment including the organization of meetings with leaders and the taking of photos with small groups of other VIPs), 18,800 yuan for distinguished guests (with treatment including free participation in evaluating and selecting “World Eminent Chinese Business Conference Strong Growth Enterprises”), and 8,800 yuan for regular delegate seats. 
4. Presenting activists as officials from the United Nations
The official website of the World Eminent Chinese Business Association says that on August 18, 2009, the secretary of the “United Nations Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations”, Hamad (哈马德), visited Beijing, and that the association’s chairman, Lu Junqing, held a welcome banquet at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. On November 12, 2009, Hamad once again in the same capacity visited the association and said: “I welcome the World Eminent Chinese Business Association to participate in the commercial activities of the United Nations.” According to a copy of World Eminent Chinese Business Association materials obtained by Southern Metropolis Daily, between October 16 and October 26, 2009, Lu Junqing once again received a meeting with “United Nations Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations” secretary Hamad while visiting the United States as a Chinese business representative. 
The Southern Metropolis Daily has learned that there is no such organization as the “United Nations Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations” at the United Nations. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs has a branch called the Committee on NGOs, and this committee confirmed that they have no such person as Hamad. 
Openly available information shows that the secretary general of the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) is one Tajeldin Hamad, but this organization is not associated with the United Nations. According to WANGO’s official website, the organization was formed in July 2000 in New York. The English materials on the website make special mention that the organization’s secretary general was invited in the second half of 2010 to attend an annual meeting in Beijing hosted by the World Eminent Chinese Business Association. 
5. Former high-level United Nations officials are presented as current high-level United Nations officials
In World Eminent Chinese Business Association materials, Ibrahim Gambari has also been a guest of the association, attending along with “United Nations Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations Secretary General Hamad” numerous events related to the association in the capacity of “deputy secretary-general of the United Nations.” But in fact Gambari relinquished his office as deputy secretary-general of the United Nations in March 2007. According to the United Nations website, on March 2, 2007, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appointed Gambari to the position of special adviser on the International Compact for Iraq . . . 
6. Passing off personalities as associates
The official website of China-Africa Project Hope lists out many chairmen, co-chairmen and presiding chairmen, and the famous [television] host Yang Lan (杨澜) is listed as a chairman — after Yang Lan repeatedly denied these rumors [listed on the site] the site deleted Yang Lan’s name, title and headshot. 
In the “General Introduction” on their official website, the World Eminent Chinese Business Association has a “leaders and advisors” section that lists out many leaders and advisors of the association, most well-known people from various walks of society. But of the three economic advisors listed, Beijing Normal University Finance Center Director Zhong Wei (钟伟) and Ba Shusong (巴曙松), head of the Finance Research Institute of the State Council’s Development Research Center, told Southern Metropolis Daily they had no idea they were listed as advisors of the association. 
After Southern Metropolis Daily revealed this,  the World Eminent Chinese Business Association deleted the entire “leaders and advisors” section from its website. 
7. Falsely creating publishing organizations that don’t exist
Listed among the subordinate bodies of the World Eminent Chinese Business Association are the Buyers and Sellers magazine publishing house, the World Eminent Chinese Business Press, and the Zhongxin Press, but no records of any of these publishing organizations could be found in the public database of the General Administration of Press and Publications. 
According to Internet searches, the “Zhongxin Press” previously posted an online job advertisement looking for a typist and identifying the employer as a “large-scale commercial enterprise,” leaving as addresses 167 People’s Road Central in Kunming and No. 33 People’s Avenue on Haidiandao, Haikou . . . 
An insider at the World Eminent Chinese Business Association provided Southern Metropolis Daily with a December 28, 2009, edition of the World Eminent Business Herald and the first 2010 edition of World Eminent Business magazine. Publishing license numbers were shown on neither of the above publications. An advertisement about board membership in the association says that Buyer and Seller is actually an online magazine [of the association]. 
8. Exaggeration of the amount donated for the China-Africa Project Hope
As of August 17, 2011, the China-Africa Project Hope charity administered by the World Eminent Chinese Business Association had accepted 31.02 million yuan in donations. But this association declared on April 21 that people had donated 247.9 million yuan, and on June 19 it again said people had donated 176 million yuan. Lu Xingyu (卢星宇) [Lu Junqing’s daughter] said in the overseas edition of People’s Daily that initial donations totaled 400 million yuan. But in November 2009 the World Eminent Chinese Business Association said that the association’s deputy chairman Li Jianhua (李建华), had donated 30 million yuan to a project that at the time was called the “Hope Africa Project” (希望非洲工程). 

[ABOVE: A brochure for the Future Leaders Club, posted to Sina Microblog today by well-known journalists and op-ed writer Zhou Xiaoyun (周筱赟). The brochure clearly lists the conditions of membership in the FLC, including a one million yuan membership fee.]

In August 2011, Chinese media reported that the city of Beijing had decided to close 20 schools for the children of migrant workers. The news sparked outrage from many Chinese, and drew more attention to the difficulties facing migrant workers and their children in China’s growing cities, where they labor for years without being accepted as city residents and receiving public benefits like access to education and healthcare. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, housed birds (city residents with rights) huddle inside their houses in the branches. Meanwhile, homeless and exposed chicks (the sons and daughters of migrants) weep.

Guangdong’s Nanfang Daily newspaper reported in August 2011 that Zhou Donghua (唐剑威), the head of the Luogang (萝岗) District branch of Agricultural Bank of China in the city of Guangzhou, and Tang Jianwei (唐剑威), the branch client services manager, were arrested and charged with corruption for allegedly stealing 59.5 million yuan in land requisition compensation funds for agricultural land — funds that ordinarily would be given to farmers losing their land to make room for development. The charges said the men had used the funds for gambling and other illegal activities. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, two officials with bags reading “land requisition compensation fund” slung over their shoulders, roll the dice at a casino table. The cup they hold bears the logo of the Agricultural Bank of China.

Doubts and questions about China-Africa Project Hope (中非希望工程), a charity run by a private Hong Kong-registered company and the China Youth Development Fund of the Chinese Communist Youth League, are mounting in China’s media today, and at the center of this latest charity-related storm is Lu Xingyu (卢星宇), 24, the executive chairman and secretary-general of the project and the daughter of Chinese billionaire Lu Junqing (卢俊卿). [You can find our recap yesterday here].
Unlike Guo Meimei (郭美美), the young woman who was at the center of the scandal rocking the China Red Cross Society back in June, Lu Xingyu — who has been given the nickname Lu Meimei (卢美美) by web users — has shown much more mettle. She has accepted a number of interviews with media to explain the charity and drum home her point that everything is above board.
Many serious questions remain, despite Lu’s reassurances. But right now we’d like to share an interview with Lu that appears in today’s edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post:

[ABOVE: Lu Xingyu (left) is pictured at a forum of the Chinese Eminent Business Leaders Association.]

Oriental Morning Post: When you saw what web users were saying about you, what was your reaction?
Lu Xingyu: My first reaction was to turn red, seeing that I had turned into an overnight celebrity.
Oriental Morning Post: At the time, did you think of Guo Meimei [the woman at the center of the China Red Cross Society scandal in June]?
Lu Xingyu: I didn’t think of Guo Meimei, but I’ve already seen of course the way web users are pouring on the abuse.
Oriental Morning Post: You don’t worry about becoming another Guo Meimei?
Lu Xingyu: That’s not possible. I’m completely serious, unlike Guo Meimei.
Oriental Morning Post: Why did you later delete your microblog account?
Lu Xingyu: I am a second-generation rich. I enjoy great food. And there are lots of pictures of that kind on my microblog . . .
Oriental Morning Post: You were afraid others would see you as “flaunting your wealth”?
Lu Xingyu: I decided to delete [my account] because others didn’t want to see that side of me. Besides this, I had lots of photos of myself and my friends, and I didn’t want to impact them in any way. I wanted to protect others, and also to express my respect to those web users who like me.
Oriental Morning Post: Why are people attacking you?
Lu Xingyu: There are a number of reasons. The first is the Guo Meimei incident, and everyone has this attitude of despising the rich (仇富心态). I am a post-80 girl [born after 1980], and I am a second-generation rich girl [whose father is a billionaire]. The second reason is that Beijing closed 30 schools for migrant workers. The third reason is because there has been a lot of bad news lately about the China Red Cross Society and other charities, and people have a feeling of mistrust toward the charity sector.
Oriental Morning Post: And right now the public doesn’t trust you.
Lu Xingyu: That’s right. But our charity work is real charity work, 101 percent charity. Actually, we are anti-corrupt.
Oriental Morning Post: Anti-corrupt?
Lu Xingyu: That’s right. I was the first to give one million yuan [to the charity], all my own pocket money, my allowance money. All of the money in our company goes to charity work, not a cent is reimbursed [or expensed] (报销).
Oriental Morning Post: Who put up the money for you to go on a mission to Africa?
Lu Xingyu: My dad. And I have some money too.
Oriental Morning Post: Can you be sure that your father has never expensed [ie, taken money earmarked for charity]?
Lu Xingyu: No, I’m sure of that.
Oriental Morning Post: At the age of 24 you are already the executive chairman of China-Africa Project Hope. Is this a reflection of your own abilities or has you father helped you along?
Lu Xingyu: This is a platform provided by my father, but you can’t deny my ability. The collection of donations and dealings with leaders in foreign countries is all handled by me. I have the ability to serve as executive chairman.
Oriental Morning Post: Do you have such a huge social network yourself?
Lu Xingyu: Of course I have used many of my father’s resources, I don’t deny that.
Oriental Morning Post: Was it your father’s idea for you to go into charity, or was that something you wanted? Lu Xingyu: It was all me. I really admire my father. He has always taught me to be responsible.
Oriental Morning Post: If it weren’t for your father, if you weren’t a second-generation rich, would you still do charity work?
Lu Xingyu: But the fact is that this is my father, and I have the capacity to go and do charity work.
Oriental Morning Post: Why do you do charity work?
Lu Xingyu: I think it’s my responsibility. Right now there are so many misunderstandings about second-generation rich. I want to take this cap, ‘second-generation rich’, and transform it into the hat ‘second-generation benevolent’ (仁二代).
Oriental Morning Post: So getting to China-Africa Project Hope, what is your mode of operation?
Lu Xingyu: We rely on private donations, only collecting donations from the World Eminent Chinese Business Association (WECBA). It’s not like they’re spitting out online, us taking money from here and there. Entrepreneurs donate of their own free will, so we are justified, open and above board. We have nothing at all to hide.
Oriental Morning Post: With the outside world casting so much doubt on you, do you regret doing charity work?
Lu Xingyu: I don’t regret it. Doing charity is about one’s conscience.
Oriental Morning Post: Is that enough, relying on conscience?
Lu Xingyu: I have a clear conscience. This is about responsibility.

Another great big mess is brewing in the world of Chinese charity. Just weeks after the cooling off of the Guo Meimei (郭美美) case, in which a young woman’s extravagant lifestyle touched off a firestorm over alleged corruption at the China Red Cross Society, web users have singled out another young woman for infamy.
Lu Xingyu (卢星宇), 24, is reportedly the executive chairman and secretary-general of the China-Africa Project Hope, a charity whose goal is to build 1,000 primary schools in Africa over the next 10 years. But web users and now traditional media journalists, have been probing into the project, asking the same sorts of questions we saw in the Guo Meimei case? What kind of charity is this? Is the money being used properly? Is proper oversight being exercised?
It seems that the Lu Xingyu story was first broken by CMP fellow and Xinmin Weekly journalist Yang Jiang (杨江), who made the first post on Sina Microblog at 10:06pm on August 16. That post, which was widely shared, was deleted by Sina, and prompted Lu to change the name of her microblog account (“Lu Xingyu — Vampire Mermaid”).

[ABOVE: This photo of Lu Xingyu has circulated widely on social media in China today.]
As with the earlier Guo Meimei case, this one is a hornet’s nest of questions and accusations. The question now is how many threads the media will pull before the axe falls. With the recent furor over the government mishandling of the July 23 high-speed train collision in Wenzhou, following on the heels of the Red Cross Society of China fiasco, leaders are probably anxious to prevent another bomb from going off this summer.

[ABOVE: In this video also shared widely on social media today, the young Lu Xingyu talks about her charity work and talks about the “second-generation rich”, or the sons and daughters of China’s wealthy, becoming the “second-generation Benevolent” (仁二代).]
We’ll move quickly to one of today’s news stories to give readers a taste of what this story is all about. But here are a couple of threads explored today.
Web users revealed, and the Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper apparently confirmed, that the World Eminent Chinese Business Association (WECBA) of which Lu Xinyu is a member, and which is an organizational founder of China-Africa Project Hope, is not registered, as required of all organizations in China, with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The association is actually a private business registered in Hong Kong, the paper said. The China Youth Development Fund, which is operated by the Chinese Communist Youth League, confirmed to Chinese media yesterday that China-Africa Project Hope was jointly created by the Fund and the (unregistered) WECBA.
This is not of course the first time the China Youth Development Fund’s charity actions have been under the spotlight. Prior to the recent scandal involving the China Red Cross Society, one of the biggest charity scandals on record in China was corruption at Project Hope, a project administered by the CYDF to support individual school fees for poor Chinese children. A report by CMP fellow Zhai Minglei in 2001 exposed fraudulent practices at Project Hope for Southern Weekend newspaper, and a subsequent report by Southern Weekend, killed under government pressure but eventually posted to the internet, implicated top Project Hope officials on the basis of testimony from a senior whistleblower.
Web users and media are also making much of the fact that China-Africa Project Hope skims off 10 percent of all donations as a “management fee” for administrative purposes, but views differ over just how improper (or not) that is. In this series of videos, Lu Xingyu directly answers the doubts of web users and asks: “What are you doing? Are you actually going out there to help others, or are you just chattering online?”
The following is a portion of a news story appearing today in the Zhejiang Evening News and on QQ.com.

After Guo Meimei, another celebrity has emerged on the microblogs.
Born in 1987, a graduate of California State University, the executive chairman and secretary-general of the China-Africa Project Hope, secretary-general of the Global Chinese Business Future Leaders (全球华商未来领袖俱乐部), and a member of the second-generation rich (富二代) . . . Add these all together and you get Lu Xingyu (卢星宇), the latest hot person on the internet.
On August 16, the “China-Africa Project Hope Primary School” (中非希望小学) became a hot word on microblogs, and this low-profile project and its “second-generation rich” manager Lu Xingyu became the focus of widespread attention by web users. Web users called Lu Xingyu “Guo Meimei 2” (郭美美二代), [in reference to the you woman at the center of the Red Cross Society of China scandal in June], and said she would “usurp Guo Meimei to become the latest red-hot person on the Web.” The point of interest in paying attention to Lu Xingyu is attention to a topic that has lately been a focus in society — corruption in the charity sector.
Yesterday, this reporter interviews Lu Xingyu by personal correspondence via microblog, and at 5pm that day Lu Xingyu openly answered several major questions of concern to journalists and web users.
The “China-Africa Hope Primary School” Suddenly Goes Hot
On August 16, some media reported that many schools for the children of migrant workers in Beijing were being demolished, news that affected around 30,000 students in Daxing, Chaoyang and Haiding [districts]. This news drew a lot of attention and was a point of sore disappointment. As their attention was drawn to news related to “hope schools” [operated by the government-run charity Project Hope], some web users discovered the “China-Africa Hope Primary School” project, and they posted this information online. This was how the project came into the view of web users — and the convoluted family relationships of the project’s presidium [of top managers] also stunned people.
According to a June 13 report from Xinhua News Agency, “China-Africa Project Hope” plans to fund the construction of 1,000 Hope primary schools in Africa in the next 10 years, spending around two billion yuan [US$310 million].
Web users discovered quite quickly that China-Africa Project Hope executive chairman and secretary-general Lu Xingyu had set up a microblog in her real name, her ID “Lu Xingyu — Vampire Mermaid” (卢星宇-吸血鬼美人鱼), and her verified information: executive chairman and secretary-general of the China-Africa Hope Project, and secretary-general of the Global Chinese Business Future Leaders.
One web user wrote on their microblog: “Lu Xingyu has become famous overnight, covering right over Guo Meimei! So it turns out that this little sister born in 1987 is responsible for this project in which China is spending 1.5 billion to build 1,000 Hope primary schools in Africa. The charity organization she runs, just like the China Red Cross Society, take 10 percent of total donations as a management fee, so that’s 150 million yuan. No wonder she’s so keen on going and making sure African kids can go to school, while children in her own country can’t go to school.”
Lu Xingyu’s Background is Uncommon
After this was exposed, Lu Xingyu’s information, photos and other material became the focus of much attention, and they drew gusts of discussion from web users. Related information shows that Lu Xingyu is just 24 years old, and is the daughter of billionaire Lu Junqing (卢俊卿), the chairman of the China Merchants Association (华商500强俱乐部主席), chairman of the board of directors of Tianjiu Confucian Business Investment Group (天九儒商投资集团), acting chairman of the World Eminent Chinese Business Association (WECBA/世界杰出华商协会), and a recipient of a gold medal from the Global Charity Federation (全球公益慈善联盟). Lu Xingyu is a graduate in media studies from the California State University.
Yesterday afternoon, this reporter dialed the three separate number provided on the official website of “China-Africa Project Hope” [apparently not now available]. Two of these were never answered, the third was answered but the person on the other end said it was not the China-Africa Hope Project and hung up the phone saying “you dialed the wrong number.”
The reporter saw on the official website of China-Africa Project Hope that this fund is a special charity foundation set up by and enterprise legal person (企业法人), a social organization legal person (社会团体法人) and a natural person (自然人) with contributions from the Youth Development Fund [of the Chinese Communist Youth League, which administers the charity Project Hope in China]. [The project] has already up to now built primary schools in Tanzania, Kenya and other countries, supporting poor students. The project’s income is derived from donations from the organizers, donations from members of Global Chinese Business Future Leaders, and donations from the World Eminent Chinese Business Association and donations from other enterprises. And 10 percent of donations are applied as administrative costs of the the project’s services and management.
This project’s executive board consists of 9 members, it’s executive chairman being Lu Xingyu. Additionally, people have suspected that this fund is essentially a family enterprise, and two young members of the executive board are the son and daughter respectively of the president and co-president.

Two days ago, rumors began circulating on social media that there were troubles at Window on the South (南风窗), a Guangzhou-based news and current affairs magazine with a distinguished 26-year history and a reputation as one of the leading lights of professional journalism in China. It is now confirmed that Zhao Lingmin (赵灵敏), one of the publication’s top editors, has been suspended from her duties (停职).
The action is the latest in a number of disciplinary actions against journalists in the past year. Most recently, China Central Television producer Wang Qinglei (王青雷) was suspended after his program was outspoken in its criticism of the government’s handling of the July 23 high-speed train collision in Wenzhou.
It seems that the chief reason for Zhao’s suspension is an article called “China Has Risen, We Must Say Goodbye to the Foreign Policy of Revolution” (中国要崛起，必须告别革命外交), which she wrote for a recent edition of the magazine [more from the SCMP]. This article is still available on a number of blogs and chatrooms, but has been deleted from most other sites. The original link at the Window on the South website now results in an error message:

The following is a translation of Zhao Lingmin’s letter to colleagues concerning her suspension from Window on the South:

Dear Colleagues:
After a meeting yesterday I had already accepted a notice from the board [informing me] a termination was to be carried out and that [I was to] undergo self-examination. Beginning from today, I have already been released from all editorial work on this publication. The second half of the year is a crucial time for circulation and advertising for next year, and I already had many ideas and plans in place for the next few months, but none of these can now be done. Window on the South no longer requires my thoughts and consideration.
As to the “errors of political guidance” (政治导向错误) represented in the article “China Has Risen, We Must Say Goodbye to the Foreign Policy of Revolution” (中国要崛起，必须告别革命外交), I naturally see this in a different way [from authorities], but clearly right now there is not an atmosphere or opportunity for the discussion of issues on the basis of facts and principles. As the writer of this piece and as the editorial head (采编中心主任), I feel deeply sorry for the negative impact this piece has had on this publication, but magazine publishing has its own process and I can only take on the responsibility I am meant to take on. They way things are now being handled, heaping all of the burdens on the writer and on the publisher who has no direct connection to the article, magnifying the problem as a question of principle, targeting people rather than issues and selectively and brashy handling this matter — clearly, this is something I cannot countenance.
I have passed seven full happy years at Window on the South. Having made the journey from a point where I was a new hand too timid even to pick up the phone to interview someone up to this point today, I offer my heartfelt thanks to Window on the South for giving me this opportunity and nurturing. I am also thankful for the support I have received from all of you. At the same time, I feel I have given my utmost in my work, and there is nothing on my conscience. Particularly in the recent three years, as demanded by my position and my sense of responsibility, I have put perhaps all of the time and energy I could into work, to the point where it has been difficult to have a full personal life. If it had not been for this incident, I might not perhaps [anyway] have continued this way of life for too many more years. But now, in this accident, I have at last been disengaged, and I have an opportunity to live a normal and relaxed life. This morning, I discovered for the first time upon crawling out of bed that I no longer have to think about things for the sake of work. While this feeling is unfamiliar, it seems not so bad.
Over the past few months what has most gratified me is the way that most members of our editorial team have found their own independent characters and judgement, that they don’t fawn and slavishly accept things. In my view, it is on the basis of this spirit that Window on the South has stood tall these 26 years, and it is also the reason why so many colleagues have been able to press on year after year even as they are full of complaints about the situation of hte magazine. The inertial force of this spiritual community is something that no material bounty or connection could ever replace. While it may be buffeted by a larger climate and local environment that grow narrower by the day, I really hope everyone [at the publication] will continue to push on with this independent character and judgement [NOTE: By “environment large and small” Zhao is referring to larger national trends, such as tightening ahead of next year’s Party Congress, and the specific environment facing the publication, including management and local leaders]. I also hope that our department in charge (主管部门) [which administers the publication] and those in charge will respect the time-honored legacy, culture, atmosphere and values of Window on the South, having an attitude of caution and responsibility toward history in operating and managing this magazine with such a brilliant past.
I thank everyone for their concern over the past two days. I am fine, and I hope all of you take care as well.
Zhao Lingmin (赵灵敏)
August 16, 2011
各位同事：
昨天早上会议之后，我已接获社委会通知，进行停职反省。自今天开始，我已退出本刊所有采编业务和工作。下半年是明年广告、发行的关键时期，我本已对未来几个月的内容有了很多的设想和筹划，但现在都做不了了，《南风窗》已不需要我再为它设想考虑了。
关于《中国要崛起，必须告别革命外交》一文的所谓“政治导向错误”，我自然有不同的看法，但目前显然并没有一个从事实和道理上讨论问题的氛围和契机。作为本文的作者和采编中心主任，我对此文给本刊造成的负面影响深感抱歉，但杂志出版是有流程的，我只能承担自己应该承担的责任，像目前这样把所有板子打在作者和与此文无直接关联的社长身上，进行上纲上线、对人不对事的选择性和扩大化处理，显然 并不能服众。
在《南风窗》，我度过了非常快乐和充实的7年。从一个给采访对象打电话都战战兢兢的新手起步走到今天，我由衷感谢《南风窗》给予我的机会和培养，也感谢各位的支持和帮助。与此同时，我在工作上也尽了最大努力，自认问心无愧。特别是最近3年来，出于工作岗位的需要和责任感，我将几乎所有能拿出来的时间和精力都投入到了工作中，以至于很难有完整的个人生活。如果不是此次的事件，我大概还会将这样的生活方式继续很多年，但现在，以这样一个始料不及的方式，我终于解脱了，有机会过更为正常和轻松的生活了。今天早上，我7年来第一次在起床后发现不需要再为工作想东想西了，这样的感觉虽然陌生，但似乎很不错。
过去几个月，最让我感到欣慰的，是采编部门的大部分同事所表现 出来的独立人格和判断力，遇事不阿附，不盲从。在我看来，这种精神力量是《南风窗》能够屹立26年的根本，也是很多同事即便对杂志的现状啧有烦言、但仍一年年坚守下来的根本原因。这一精神共同体的向心力，是任何物质上的恩惠和拉拢所不能替代的。虽然这种独立人格和判断力，在今天日益逼仄的大环境和小环境面前简直弱不禁风，但我还是期望大家能勉力坚守。也盼望我们的主管部门和新的主事者，能够尊重《南风窗》长期形成的历史、文化、氛围和价值观，以审慎和对历史负责任的态度经营和管理这本有光辉过去的杂志。
感谢大家这两天来对我的关心，我很好，大家也保重。
赵灵敏
2011年8月16日

On August 13, China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported on a document ostensibly from the State Administration of Taxation that explained new personal income tax rules in China. Gearing up to parse the document — “State Council State Administration of Taxation, Notice 47, 2011” (国家税务总局公告2011年第47号公告) — Xinhua asked: “So how are the old tax rules and the new tax rules connected? On [August 13], the State Administration of Taxation accepted an interview with our reporter. . . ”
The same day, Guangzhou Daily, the official party-run newspaper in the southern city of Guangzhou, was the first major print publication to run a report on the “new rules,” offering a detailed explanation.
Well, that official document, it turns out, was fake.
That’s right. An official government policy release, and it was apparently completely fabricated, though no one bothered to check. The State Administration of Taxation stepped out yesterday and officially said so, leaving many state media red-faced with embarrassment.
So where did Document No. 47 come from? That is now under investigation, authorities say. But in a report on the front page of today’s The Beijing News newspaper, Yue Shumin (岳树民), a professor of finance at People’s University of China, remarked the expertise with which the counterfeit official notice was made. “Looking at the text of the fabricated notice, it’s clear it is done with a definite level of expertise. If the fabricator didn’t have a good command of finance and taxation it would have been difficult to mislead the media and the public in this way,” said Yue.
Government authorities — yes, real ones — have stated their determination to hold those responsible to account. But beyond the question of who, there lingers the great big question of HOW.
Exposing its own mouthpiece reflex, the official Xinhua News Agency didn’t just report the fake notice as news — it claimed to have interviewed the “relevant responsible person” in the notice. This is typical of the way state media routinely take hand-off official releases from Party and government organs and repack them as reported news.
Here is the official China Central Television reporting the “news” of Notice 47 on August 14, complete with graphics calculating how the new policies will impact the average Joe. They even go out on into the city to interview the Man-on-the-Street about the new rules. So at least they did their footwork, right?

The timing of these revelations could hardly be more interesting. Over the past two weeks a debate has simmered in China over the issue of “rumors” on social media and the question of the truth and credibility of information.
Much of the chatter has centered on the so-called “anti-rumor league,” or piyao lianmeng, a group of online rumor busters who have advertised themselves as truth-seeking vigilantes out to identify and neutralize untruths in China’s burgeoning microblog sphere. The group’s crusade was trumpeted by state media. On August 3, China Central Television’s “Morning News” program reported under the title “Where is the ethical bottom line on microblogs?” the story of how one user on QQ Microblog called “Guo Yao” (郭瑶) had impersonated the relative of a July 23 crash victim.
But critics pointed out justifiably that the “anti-rumor league” focused excessively on popular rumor, turning a blind eye to misinformation by the government. Many harbored a suspicion that the League and the whole attack on microblog rumors was an attempt black-wash social media as a problem, particularly in the wake of the furor over the handling of the July 23 Wenzhou train collision, in which microblogs played a crucial role. Others pointed out that the real root of rumor and misinformation is the government’s own policies of news and information control.
Look, then, at the way commercial media today have pounced on the story of Notice 47, drawing it into the larger debate over rumor and truth. Here is today’s Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper. The large bold headline across the top, above the image of Hu Jintao visiting Guangzhou, reads: “Premium Allocation Tax Assessment? It’s Fake! The State Administration of Taxation Document Was Fabricated.”

And here is the front page of Morning News, a commercial spin-off of the official Sichuan Daily, which reads across the top, “Anti-Rumor Announcement,” or piyao shengming (辟谣声明). The big black characters read, “This is fake,” referring of course to the widely disseminated Notice 47. But for any reader savvy enough to have followed the recent debate over “rumor,” the words piyao (or “rumor-busting”) in the headline will almost surely recall the ethical attack on social media.

Clearly, rumor and fabrication are not issues confined to social media. And this particular revelation of rumor is probably something the “anti-rumor league” never saw coming.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: After a second round of propaganda directives on July 29 effectively brought an end to a week of feverish discussion of government negligence in the handling of the July 23 train collision in Wenzhou, much attention in China turned to the issue of how the ensure the quality and reliability of information on China’s social media. This debate seemed to cap a summer in which platforms like Sina Microblog and QQ Microblog have had a dramatic impact on such stories as the Red Cross Society of China (“Guo Meimei”) scandal and problems facing China’s high-speed rail network. But much of the doubting about the ethics of social media angered Chinese internet users, who saw attempts to broad-brush platforms like Sina Microblog as rumor mills as just the latest action to control information. Some of the most intelligent writing on the issue of “rumor,” “truth” and social media has been that of CMP fellow and Peking University professor Hu Yong (胡泳), who has drawn a clear line between official press control policies, the crisis of credibility facing official news, and the general appeal of hearsay. The following is a partial translation of an essay by Hu Yong that appeared in the August 12 edition of the Economic Observer. The points Hu makes are of particular relevance to the prevailing silence now over protests yesterday in the city of Dalian. As controls were strictly in force over this story, social media provided the only source of information.

This is an age pervaded by rumor. On July 28, People’s Daily Online summed up eight big rumors surrounding the Wenzhou train collision. On August 3, China Central Television’s Morning News program reported under the title “Where is the ethical bottom line on microblogs?” the story of how one user on QQ Microblog called “Guo Yao” (郭瑶) had impersonated the relative of a crash victim.

In the CCTV report, a member of the so-called Anti-Rumor League, [identified as] “a group of self-organizing enthusiastic web users working as rumor busting volunteers,” endorsed the idea of a “moral bankruptcy” (沦丧) in the ethics of microblogs. This group, formed on May 18 [this year], says that it has thus far been involved in the busting of more than one-hundred [online] rumors. But it was in the midst of the incident of the [Wenzhou] train collision [on July 23] that the group was cast into some doubt, accused of “selectively busting rumors” (选择性辟谣) and “only busting popular rumors, not busting official rumors” [or falsehoods] (只辟民谣，不辟官谣). Some even suggested in the fiercest of words that the Anti-Rumor League was “a platform carrying out directed attacks from a predefined political position as it hoists the signboard of rumor busting.”

Li Mu (李牧), a core figure in the League, also admits that it was wrong of the Anti-Rumor League to trust overly in the Ministry of Railways during the “7.23” incident. Excessive trust in the declarations of the government, and the use of official government news releases in countering many rumors is a major defect of the Anti-Rumor League.

The publicity slogan of the Anti-Rumor League is “serving the truth” (为真相服务), but there’s a little something about the operation of current politics that everyone is clear about, and that is that the government is not just a natural provider of the truth. Very often, it is the government that is guilty of the “original sin,” and harboring skepticism towards it is very reasonable.

As for the charge of “selectively busting rumors,” the principal founder of the Anti-Rumor League, Wu Fatian (吴法天), has responded: “The orientation of the Anti-Rumor League is about being a spontaneous organization of self-discipline among web users in the We Media age, and what it mainly does is issue accurate information about microblog rumors, so it works through microblog posting by the public.” At first glance, it seems this starting off point would yield few misgivings.

Microblogs are certainly not a clean and blameless territory, and spontaneous popular action to exercise self-discipline over speech on microblogs accords with the basic character of self organization in the We Media era. But if we look more carefully, the act of chiefly targeting “popular rumors” in rumor busting actually suggests a major deficiency of wisdom: it perhaps actively covers up or passively overlooks a hard fact of contemporary society, which is that official lies (官方的谎言) outpace popular rumors, constituting the greatest interference and obstruction with the truth.

When the goal of busting rumors is to get at the truth this is a good thing. But if rumor busters stand solely on the side of the government to blacken and attack popular public opinion, this isn’t in the interest of discovering the facts and the truth but in fact serves the goal of so-called channeling of public opinion (舆论引导), thereby serving as a tool aiding and abetting those people and organizations that endeavor to twist the truth.

In many online incidents, “strengthening channeling of public opinion” and “handling rumor according to the law” have appeared in the same directives [from press control authorities], and this is a tactic we have seen from the government for a long time. We can say that in fact it is the conduct of “strengthening channeling of public opinion” that has caused official information to be so wanting in credibility, which has in turn nurtured a rich soil for the transmission of “rumors.” On the one hand, the government has provided an environment conducive to the spread of rumors, and on the other it sternly lashes out against rumors, placing itself in the midst of an insoluble contradiction.

Since the SARS epidemic in 2003, the massive losses and risks that come with the suppression of media coverage of sudden-breaking incidents by relevant government departments have been illustrated again and again. As the media say nothing, or become representatives of the discourse of those in power, this inevitably becomes the principal reason for the spread of rumor and social panic.

Under [the policy of] “correct guidance of public opinion” the traditional media only selectively report major social and political events, and the standards are entirely within their hands. Whatever is regarded as negative (反面), destructive (消极), disturbing (添乱), discrediting (抹黑) is not permitted, and everything that is regarded as positive (正面), constructive (积极), encouraging (鼓劲) and praising (添彩) is openly proclaimed. Their basic criterion for deciding [what is positive or negative] is whether or not something poses a danger to social stability, and they care nothing for whether or not damage is done to the public’s right to know, or whether their actions might pose a grave danger to the life and property of the people.

When normal social communication mechanisms are crippled, abnormal communication mechanisms will be enlivened. Hearsay about sudden-breaking incidents is mostly transmitted by word of mouth, through instant messaging, online forums (and later added to microblogs), and communication much earlier than for formal releases in newspapers, television, radio and other traditional forms of media. People are much more inclined to believe rumors of uncertain provenance than they are to believe official news reports by newspapers, television and other mass media, which creates a situation in which “news looks like rumor and rumor looks like news.” Under the control of the government, transmission methods that are twisted by administrative power have exactly the opposite of their intended effect in an environment in which rumors are widely disseminated.

Posts began appearing earlier today on Chinese social media sites, most notably Sina Microblog (Weibo), saying that a mass demonstration was happening in the northern city of Dalian to oppose a chemical plant that has been placed near residential areas. Posts were quickly controlled, however, and now all related material is being scrubbed from the internet. While censorship of overt references and images of the protests themselves is plainly dampening the social media impact, however, anger over the chemical project is still quite visible, with many users posting “Get out Fujia PX!” messages.
Here’s more on the story from Jonathan Watts at The Guardian.
The following is a screenshot of my own Sina Weibo account showing recent posts. At the top is a post I re-posted earlier to my own followers that showed a picture of streets in Dalian filled with marching protesters. My comments and those of other to the original post with the photograph are still visible, but the original post has been replaced with a notice that says: “This microblog post has already been deleted by the user.”

Was this actually deleted by the user, or by the service? That’s a question to follow up later. This same user posted numerous times, first identifying Dalian as the place pictured, then removing mention of Dalian because keyword blocks were preventing the post. It’s hard to imagine this user then deciding on their own to delete successfully posted content. But this is of course just speculation.
The following are two photographs posted by the above-mentioned user that are apparently — but we can’t confirm this — of protests going on in Dalian. Readers should also look at the series posted by Chinese blogger Bei Feng to Google +, which suggest this is a very well organized demonstration, which pre-planned posters, t-shirts and some very savvy slogans (the symbol of the collective “middle-finger” may be the image of China in 2011).

Users on Sina Microblog have also been sharing an English news release on the protests that has been released by the official Xinhua News Agency. A Chinese release does not currently come up through a news search on Baidu, nor had anything been posted on Xinhua Online as of 4:16pm Sunday.
Other related terms on social media are being blocked. Here, for example, is a search I attempted using the word “stroll,” or sanbu (散步), which has become euphemism in Chinese for demonstration. Again, the notice says this content cannot be shown under relevant laws and policies.

Here is another image appearing on Sina Weibo on Sunday afternoon, again without any direct identification owing to keyword blocks.

Here is a recent re-posting of an August 8 post in which a user on Sina Weibo shared a screenshot of China Central Television coverage of the local opposition in Dalian to the PX project.

Some social media users, like this one in Shanghai, have replaced their profile photos with black signs that say, “Fujia PX, get out of Dalian!”

Signs like these are apparently being use in the Dalian protests, if we can assume, that is, that the following images shared on social media are authentic. The black square at the center of the four photographs reads: “Today let the whole country do its part for the residents of Dalian!”

The following image was also posted to Sina Weibo on Sunday evening around 5pm.

And another post shared Sunday evening included an image of what appears to be a message on someone’s iPhone that reads:

Just now a broadcast on the square shouted out that the governement will relocated the PX project as soon as possible, but to remove it scientifically will require some time, so an urgent notice will first be given to the enterprise to cease production. There was applause on the square, and this demonstrates that the public will has won out. People have gradually begun to leave the square, but 20 popular representatives are still posted outside the doors of the government.

If that announcement was made, perhaps these leaders, pictured standing atop an emergency vehicle in Dalian, were the ones to make it.

The following is a strip of photos from Dalian posted to a Sina Weibo account on Sunday evening.

The following set of photos was posted to Sina Weibo just after midnight, August 15, 2011.

The following image was posted by the “Newspaper Observer” microblog to Sina Weibo on August 15. It clearly shows a photograph of the actual morning edition of Dalian’s Peninsula Morning Post newspaper, with a large front-page article bearing the headline, “Fujian PX Project to Immediately Stop Production and be Relocated.” The underlined portion under the headline refers to city leaders “meeting with city masses yesterday.” But the paper’s online digital edition has apparently been cleansed, and shows instead an article about an upcoming vehicle expo.

The following photo of the August 15 edition of Dalian Evening Post also shows that coverage of the decision to relocated the PX project made the front page. Underlined portion is again reference to leaders meeting with the masses, which suggests the decision is in response to demonstrations, a highly sensitive issue.