Last night Sichuan-based Sina Microblog user Dark Clouds at Midnight (子夜的昙) posted an open letter by three Sichuan journalists alerting top leaders in the city of Mianyang, near the epicenter of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, to alleged construction quality and safety issues at Wanda Plaza, a major commercial project now under construction. In the September 14 open letter, the three journalists allege substandard steel is being illegally used for the project, which is being built by a central-level state-owned enterprise listed on the Fortune Global 500.

[ABOVE: A Sina Microblog post by Dark Clouds at Midnight on September 22 at 10:19 pm shares the full text of an open letter to top leaders in the city of Mianyang.]
The Dark Clouds at Midnight post, which had 3,400 re-posts and close to 700 comments by midday today, was just one of many posts about this open letter shared on Chinese social media. It was based on this September 21 post made to a blog at QQ.com, in which the open letter was shared along with supporting photographs.
These accusations are of particular interest to many Chinese because poor construction quality, and particularly shoddy school construction, was the focus of much attention in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Premier Wen Jiabao pledged in 2008 that the government would look into the issue of shoddy school construction, but no action has so far been taken to deal with those responsible.
A number of Chinese activists, including Tan Zuoren (谭作人) and the artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), attempted to conduct their own independent investigations into shoddy school construction and the death of students in the quake. Tan, whose work we covered here, is now serving a jail sentence for “inciting subversion of state power” for his activism on this issue.
The social media post by Dark Clouds at Midnight (子夜的昙) reads: “For these journalists to make a report of this using their real names is quite extraordinary. [The] May 12 [quake] caused so much hurt for the people of Sichuan. We must not see a return of shoddy construction!”
Our translation of the open letter follows. Photos posted to the blog at QQ.com are pasted below.

“An Open Letter to the City Government of Mianyang and to City Residents”
A Situation Report Concerning the Medium to Large-scale Use of Substandard Steel Reinforcing Bar on the Reconstruction of the Wanda Plaza in Fucheng District
Your Honorable Secretary Wu Jingping (吴靖平) and Mayor Zeng Wanming (曾万明)
We several news journalists (being also web users) have recently received informing reports that for a priority image project (形象工程) of Mianyang city — the Wanda Plaza in Fucheng District — steel materials of inferior quality manufactured by small-scale steel works have been used on a large scale, posing a serious hazard to construction quality and to the life and safety of the people of Mianyang. We hope that we might draw the attention of the honorable city Party committee and the city government to this issue.
We have learned that the developer of the Wanda Plaza project in Mianyang’s Fucheng District is the Dalian Wanda Group, which calls itself a globally-known enterprise; the contractor responsible for the whole project is a central state-owned enterprise, China Construction Second Engineering Bureau Ltd. (中国建筑第二工程局), or “China Construction Second Bureau” (中建二局) for short, one of the world’s top 500 enterprises (世界500强) [NOTE: The company is part of China State Construction Engineering Corp, which is listed on the Fortune 500.] The supplier of steel reinforcements for this project is the 9th Metallurgical Construction Company of China (“9th Metallurgical” for short). It is these three illustrious companies that are illegally shortchanging government construction contracts (偷工减料) and falsely carrying out projects.
According to our investigation over recent months, one-third of the reinforcing steel used in this project so far was purchased by 9th Metallurgical from Jintang (金堂), Guanghan (广汉) and other small steel works, and substandard steel materials such as the “inferior steel” (地调钢) that is expressly forbidden by the state are being used [in the project]. This reinforcing steel product does not carry a steel manufacturing number from the producer, and what’s more it has not product quality certification (产品合格证), and all of it was brought on to the construction site at Wanda Plaza in the middle of the night.
The Mianyang Wanda Plaza project is massive, with a construction area of 450,000 square meters. There are a total of seven processing areas for reinforcing steel, and each of these has massive quantities of poor-quality steel. According to our careful estimates made through undercover work, we found that this steel falls below national quality standards — for example 10mm steel reinforcements, which are nationally limited to no less than 9.6mm, are only 8mm at this project site (please see the photographs following this letter).
Once we had plenty of evidence in our hands, we proceeded on September 8 at 2:30 pm to the Mianyang City Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau, located just 100 meters from the Mianyang Wanda Plaza building site, and explained the situation to Chen Changgu (陈长古), deputy chief of this bureau’s inspection office. Chen then accompanied us along with the chief of the Fourth Enforcement Division, Shao Gang (绍刚), and several enforcement officers to the Wanda Project site, where we had a look around. When we measured the reinforcing steel being installed on the face of the building we found that perhaps all of it was substandard (enforcement officers confirmed this on the scene, and made a record). After we had measures a portion of the steel, a certain Chief Li (李部长) from the contractor side and other started obstructing us from taking photographs (see photos below). After that several workers forcibly and violently grabbed our cameras and took away the memory cards, destroying the evidence. They also threatened to kill us.
As we were being attacked, the enforcement officers that had come along seemed utterly indifferent. Deputy Chief Chen even said: “We can’t control any of this, we only concern ourselves with quality issues. We asked for help in notifying the police, and Chen said: “It’s better for you to notify [them] yourselves!” Deputy Chief Chen even said: “This really should be handled by the Construction Bureau, but it falls under our jurisdiction too.” He said they often came to make selected inspections, but had never found any problems.
After risking our own lives to report the matter to police, we were finally escorted off the construction site by police patrols and some officers from the Huayuan Police Substation. That night, the contractor backed dirt up over the stores of substandard “skinny steel” (瘦身钢筋). Two or three days later, they suddenly brought in 200 tons of proper reinforcing steel in order to cover up [the supplies of substandard material]. Afterward, China Construction Second Bureau and 9th Metallurgical acted as though nothing had happened. The bosses of Wanda Plaze advertised their close relationships with many media and leaders, saying they could easily smooth things out.
Honorable Secretary Wu and Mayor Zeng, Mianyang is in the priority disaster area of the May 12, 2008, earthquake, and many people have not yet emerged from the shadow of that quake. We hope that the honorable city Party committee and government can be responsible to the people of Mianyang, setting up a special investigative team, immediately calling a halt to construction for this project and conducting a thorough investigation of building material channels and construction quality (including parts of the project that have already been poured with cement). [We hope you will] pursue the legal responsibility of government leaders and inspection bureaus whose purview this is and give the people of Mianyang back their right to know.
Chen Changchun (陈长春), Zhao Junshun (赵军顺) and Xiao Leideng (肖磊等)
September 14, 2011

(This is one corner of the A section of the Mianyang Wanda Plaza currently under construction.)

(This is a residential building in the B section of Wanda Plaza for which a lot of substandard steel reinforcement has already been used.)

(This is a corner of the A section of Wanda Plaza currently under construction. The roof covering under the tower cranes already hide a great deal of substandard steel reinforcement.)

(This is one of the processing areas for steel reinforcement. Almost all the steel under the journalist’s feet is of poor quality, and this is only 200 meters away from the Mianyang City Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau.)

(The journalist measures the insufficient diameter of the substandard steel. See pictures below.)

(This 12mm steel bar measures only 10.90mm. How far is that from the international [standard] of 11.5mm?)

(on September 8 the journalists notified the Mianyang City Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau. The man at left walking on the steel bar with a red hardhat and satchel and carrying measuring equipment in his right hand is the chief of the Fourth Enforcement Division, Shao Gang. To his right is Chen Changgu, deputy chief of this bureau’s inspection office. The journalists are crouching down and measuring steel reinforcing bar ready to be installed.)

(This steel reinforced waiting to be installed is all substandard. This one, a 10mm steel bar, is only 8.99mm thick, short of the international minimum of 9.6. This photo, which shows a 2007 date, was taken secretly, and their was no time to correct the time on the camera.)

(This 8mm rod, half of which has already been used, shows a diameter of just 6.93, short of the international minimum of 7.7mm.)

(Here Deputy Chief Chen sees for himself that the steel reinforcements do not have quality inspection stamps [合格证] or factory-issued steel numbers. To the right holding the pen is the the chief of the enforcement division, who made a record of the measurements taken by the journalists.)

(Deputy Chief Chen finally discovers the faintest of steel numbers on one bar. The hand on the left pointing at the steel is that of Deputy Chief Chen.)

(The man third from the left in the white t-shirt and white safety hat with his hand on his hip is so-called Chief Li working for the contractor. The man in the red safety hat is enforcement chief Shao.)

(After receiving a couple of phonecalls, Chief Li starts blocking our lens as we try to take photographs. Soon after 7-8 people start dealing more roughly with us, grabbing our cameras.)

(Here are two workers for China Construction Second Engineering Bureau who forcibly took cameras from the reporters.)

(Supplies of substandard steel are already covered over.)

(Here is how China Construction Second Engineering Bureau introduces itself.) [NOTE: Blue banner reads, “China State Construction Engineering Corp: Standing in the World’s Top 500.”]

[NOTE: Blue banner reads, “China State Construction Engineering Corp: Quality is Weightier than Mount Tai.”]

The latest scandal over suspected corruption or favoritism in official government appointments in China erupted earlier this week surrounding 29-year-old Yan Ning (闫宁), who is deputy Party secretary of Hebei’s Guantao County (馆陶县) and expected to formally become its Party chief later this year. According to media reports, Yan’s promotion would make him the youngest county Party chief in history.
But as the Southern Metropolis Daily points out in its lead editorial today, the issue here isn’t so much about age or qualifications as it is about more open government affairs. When Chinese media followed up on the Yan Ning story they were told by government employees that “the chief’s resume is a secret, and it’s not convenient to reveal it to the outside.”
The claim that an official’s work experience is a matter of state secrecy has naturally infuriated many Chinese — and the Guantao government now finds itself at the center of a national scandal, the heart of which is the question, much in the spotlight of late, of open government information and the public’s right to know.
The government of Guantao County (馆陶县) finally released Yan Ning’s resume late yesterday, and it is being widely shared on social media in China today. According to the released information on Yan, he became a village Party leader at the age of just 18.

[ABOVE: The official government website of Hebei’s Guantao County now shows a photo and brief resume of Yan Ning, the soon-to-be county Party chief whose resume was recently called “secret.”]
The following is our translation of today’s editorial in the Southern Metropolis Daily.

“County Chief’s Resume Kept Secret: Of What Value is Popular Opinion?”
September 22, 2011
A meeting of Party cadres was held recently in Hebei’s Guantao County (馆陶县), and 29-year-old Yan Ning (闫宁) took up his posts as Guantao’s deputy Party secretary and acting county chief. Assuming all goes smoothly, Yan Ning will without a doubt get to drop this qualifier “acting” at the next session of the county people’s congress, becoming the county chief in earnest. When that happens Yan Ning will swipe the historical record books clean. This young man born on November 22, 1981, will stand beside Zhou Senfeng (周森锋), who at the [tender] age of 29 became the chief of a county-level city, Hebei’s Yicheng (宜城), and he will take his place as “the youngest county chief in history.” 
If it weren’t for this newsy detail [about Yan Ning], it’s more than likely that the name Zhou Senfeng would have rapidly faded in the public eye. . . [T]he former riddle of this youth’s rapid advancement, along with the so-called “umbrella-gate” (打伞门), “cigarette-gate” (香烟门) and “thesis-gate” (论文门) — [cases involving officials caught in compromising positions] — all drew attention from the media, but those involved and government organs did their best to withhold everything, and public concerns, which had no proper course, could only build up behind the flood gates. Looking back at things now, the attempts to keep things under wraps were a success, because as Lu Xun once said, “the forgotten savior” will ultimately return and those moments that seemed so hard to endure will yield to times of ease [NOTE: This is a tough passage, but essentially means that people get past a given incident or scandal, move on, and things return to a state of blissful ignorance.] 
Like the earlier case of Zhou Senfeng, Yan Ning’s life experience and his rapid advancement have invited all sorts of thoughts and speculations. News reports says that before the 29-year-old Yan Ning was slated for Guantao’s county chief position, he worked in Yongnian County (永年县) of the [prefectural-level[ city of Handan (邯郸市) for more than five years. For the first three years, this young person won four separate advancements, moving up the ladder faster than is customary. Faced with [public] questions and suppositions, the authorities have perhaps been even more resolute in withholding [information]. In the previous case, one had only to open up the “leadership window” section of the official website of the Guantao county government to view personal information about the deputy county chiefs, including photographs, work experience and a list of responsibilities. But ever since Yan Ning came to work at Guantao, one can only view [on the official website] information about leaders at the standing deputy chief (常务副县长) level or lower. More recently, the “leadership window” section of the site cannot be opened. Media that have gone to the scene to report this story have been given a red light. And now, we have it from government employees in the county that “the chief’s resume is a secret, and it’s not convenient to reveal it to the outside.”
When the resume of a county Party chief became a secret all sorts of whisperings are apt to spread around like wildfire. According to information shared by one web user, Yan Ning’s father previously served as general secretary of the government office in the county, and as [Party] chief of the [local] electrical supply bureau. [The web user said that] there are two department-level officials (厅级) and three county-level officials in Yan’s family. Quite the opposite of what we generally see in such cases, where relevant [government] departments step out to counter the rumors, this time relevant departments in Handan city haven’t issued even the most basic response. One can’t help but be bewildered by this. Is it that they just don’t realize that this will only intensify questions and speculation about Yan Ning? Or is it that they firmly believe these speculations have no teeth? 
Selecting really young county chiefs isn’t a problem. The leap-frog advancement of cadres isn’t a problem. It’s not even important how illustrious the experiences of a cadre are. What is most critical is that you give the public a reason, and that this reason be sufficient to answer doubts. This is a basic requirement of open government information, and a bottom-line requirement of satisfying the public’s right to know (知情权) so that they may supervise their government. Knowing this bottom line but turning a blind and cool eye can only lead one to believe that relevant departments recognize the ineffectuality of public opinion. 
Unlike the local government in Hebei, which [clearly] views the clamor of public opinion was nothing, Hubei’s Yidu City (宜都市) recently dealt with the “25-year-old beauty as township chief” (25岁美女镇长) case in a manner worthy of note. They opened the front door and invited media to report on this story, and the person concerned faced the public directly, thoroughly releasing information about personnel appointments and dismissals, a case of successful crisis management (危机公关). 
But as we designate these varying responses as either “successes” or “failures” [of crisis management], we must recognize that those who “failed,” even as they clearly lost in the court of public opinion, are not facing real pressure, because pressure clearly cannot result in any real consequences for those who “failed.” 
We have talked a great deal in the past about why the level of trust in society is so low. We have voiced distress at how unreasonable the emotions of internet users can be. And we have called energetically on the public to avoid endlessly attributing the most nefarious intentions to the government and officials. All of these thoughts have been positive and significant. But what is regrettable is that every time a particular case [like this one] arises, it seems to expose all of these ideas as pale and feeble.   
Perhaps not long ago, relevant government departments in Hebei were dealing with the issue of how to interact with the public, how to raise the credibility of the government [as an abstract issue]. But as soon as the Yan Ning affair becomes a public issue, they just seem not to care — not to care about the emotional reaction of web users, not to care about the nasty supposition the public might make, and caring even less about how high or low the public’s level of trust in them is. 
The answer to the repeated waves of incidents involving official appointments, and to the hearsay flying to and fro, is naturally first and foremost about open government information, and about transparency of procedure. But most importantly, public opinion must be able to exercise real pressure, becoming something that has to be dealt with. 

Shortly after 1 a.m. on September 18, Li Xiang (李翔), a journalist for the local television network in Luoyang, Henan province, was killed in a brutal knife attack not far from his home. While the motive for the attack was not immediately clear, suspicion turned immediately to Li’s work on various social issues, and to reporting he was doing more recently on the re-sale of dangerous waste oil, an issue that has become national news over the past week.
The General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), the government office that deals with licensing and registration and journalists and media — and sometimes speaks publicly on behalf of journalists — said yesterday in an interview with the the Legal Mirror newspaper that it “severely condemned” any harm done to journalists. A GAPP spokesperson said: “We are already paying attention [to this case], and we hope the police, which are investigating the case, quickly have a breakthrough and bring the perpetrators to justice.” GAPP added that it would “take necessary measures” according to developments in the case.

[ABOVE: Journalists Li Xiang is pictured at work in this still from a television report on his killing.]
People’s Daily Online reports today that police in Luoyang now have two suspects in custody. Luoyang police said they would hold a news conference on the case “shortly” and let media know the specifics of the case.

In September 2011 police in China said they had broken up a national ring of illegal suppliers recycling dangerous “waste oil,” or “hogwash oil” (地沟油) — oil re-processed from waste animal parts, recycled from fryers, etcetera — and reselling it to restaurants and other customers for use in food production. The announcement was a disturbing confirmation of rumors long circulating in China. “Waste oil” is known to have serious health risks, and experts say some forms are cancer-causing. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his blog at QQ.com, a bottle of waste oil is poured over a fresh fish laid out on a dinner plate. The surface of the oil tells the story of its origins in the rat and roach-infested sewers..

Guangdong’s Nanfang Daily newspaper reported recently that a newly-released research report concluded that Chinese cities, and especially large cities, have entered a period in which crises appear on a frequent basis (危机频发期), are large-scale and cover a range of areas, so that “the basis of urban safety in China is weak” (中国城市安全基础薄弱). The report cited inflation, social inequality and corruption as the primary factors contributing to instability. In this cartoon, posted by Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, red official stamps (symbolizing power) piloted by reckless and devious Party and government officials visit terror on the citizens of a major Chinese city, like a scene out of an alien-invasion film.

That’s right, he’s at it again. Using the opportunity afforded by a speech in a prominent international forum, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) is once again visiting his favorite theme — the urgent need for political reform in China. And once again, his remarks are fodder alike for sanguine optimists, grumbling pessimists and cautious skeptics. Is he serious? Is his making a cynical bid the cement his legacy as a moderate? Is he simply too beleaguered and too powerless to effect his ideas? Or does this prefigure some sort of real change?
It is a debate that has been repeated on each occasion over the past 18 months where Wen has stepped out to toll the bells of political change in the midst of what seems by all other measures a period of great internal political sensitivity for China.
Most notably it was just one year ago, in the period from August 20 and September 30, 2010, that Wen gave no less than seven important utterances on political reform in seven different contexts. For a book-length review of that extended event, discussion of which was mostly suppressed in China’s media, we recommend readers turn to CMP Director Qian Gang’s The Great Game of Political Reform: Wen Jiabao’s Wave of Seven Speeches on Political Reform (Cosmos Books, December 2010).
The full text of Wen Jiabao’s September 14 speech at the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Dalian is available at People’s Daily Online. What follows is our translation of his remarks on political reform, which were made in a closed-door meeting Wednesday afternoon with Chinese CEOs and some Western businesspeople in attendance (thank you to Louisa Lim for that clarification). The Chinese original of our version was taken from the website of Caijing magazine on the evening of September 14.
For now, we’ll avoid parsing Wen’s remarks and leave judgment of their significance to our readers. However, readers of Chinese might want to turn to the comments section of this post at Sina Microblog, in which the Caijing coverage was shared with more than 2,000 users.

“Wen Jiabao: China’s Future Political Reform Will Face 5 Major Challenges”
September 14
Caijing Online
“This task [of reforming the Party and state leadership system] was raised by [Deng] Xiaoping 30 years ago, and I think that today it is especially pressing.” Chinese State Council Premier Wen Jiabao made the above remarks on the afternoon of September 14 at the meeting [of the World Economic Forum] being held in Dalian.
Wen Jiabao pointed out that in the future there would be 5 difficulties (难点) facing political reform in China:
1. Adhering to the governing of the nation by rule of law. The most important task of a ruling party is to act according to the constitution and the law, and strictly acting within the scope of the constitution and the law requires changing the situation of Party dominance of the government (以党代政), the absolutization of power (权力绝对化) and over-concentration of power. To this end, the Party and state leadership system must be reformed. This task was raised by [Deng] Xiaoping 30 years ago, and I think that today it is especially pressing.
2. We must advance social equity and justice. This requires that we develop the economy through reform, and change the [current] aspect of unequal allocation of income and a yawning [wealth] gap, allowing all people to live lives of dignity and enabling all to enjoy the fruits of reform and development. In a major country with a population of 1.3 billion people, I know only too well that there is still a large population of middle and low-income people, and even of those living in poverty. Social fairness directly concerns whether our political rule truly serves the people or not, and it also concerns sustainable economic development and the harmony and stability of society. To this end, we must prioritize work on two fronts: First, we must employ measures to accelerate the raising of the incomes of medium and low-income people, at the same time adjust the incomes of those in the high-income segment; Secondly, [we must] build and improve our social security system, including unemployment [benefits], pensions, healthcare and other social services, so that this becomes a social security system for the whole of society.
3. Preserving the fairness of the courts. [This means] ensuring that prosecuting organs (检察机关) and judicial organs (司法机关) have the independence they should have, and are not interfered with by any social group (社会团体), social organization (社会组织) or individual. The fairness of the legal system is a reflection of justice and fairness in a society, and we must fully embrace this direction. This is something that was raised 30 long years ago at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the C.P.C., and we should put it into practice. [NOTE: This refers to the meeting of the Central Committee held from December 18-22, 1978. The session marked the start of China’s opening and reform policy (改革开放). One important theme at the session was the criticism of Mao’s cult of personality and the danger of over-concentration of power.]
4. Guaranteeing the democratic rights of the people. [We must] practically ensure the democratic rights and democratic benefits stipulated in the constitution, of these the most important being the right to vote [and stand] in elections (选举权), the right to know (知情权) [and be informed], the right to monitor [power] (监督权), and the right to participate [in public affairs] (参与权). I would like to talk especially about the right to vote. We must expand the forms of democracy, and we must cement self-rule by villagers. If the people can govern a village well, they can govern a township well, and even govern a county well. Right now some [local] areas are carrying out experiments in elections at the township level on the foundation of accumulated experience [in village-level elections]. I would also like to say that this issue of the expansion of democracy can happen first within the Party, and develop in a step-by-step manner from inside the Party to outside the Party. This is a rather secure and rather practical way [of approaching this issue].
5. [We must] resolutely oppose corruption. Fighting corruption and advocating honest and clean [governance] is a major task facing our governments at various levels. I believe the fight against corruption right now can be undertaken through the following several tasks. First, [we must] oppose the [crime] of duty encroachment [or taking advantage of one’s position for personal gain]. [We must] strictly prevent leaders and cadres from using the convenience of their position to interfere in the bidding and tender process, seeking personal profit. This must become an important task in the [overall] fight against corruption in the economy. Second, [we must] gradually promote a property declaration system (财产申报制) and a public announcement system (公示制) [for making this information about officials public]. In recent years, we have already created a number of systems, including for [reporting of] leaders’ assets, the residency of their family members overseas and their engagement in business and trade. We must continue to improve these, gradually moving from declaration [of this information] to public sharing [of this information]. This is a most important form of supervision of the rights in the hands of cadres. Third is making a public account of the “three public” expenses (“三公”经费) in public financing [NOTE: These include 1. Expenses for overseas trips, ostensibly for government business but often for family vacations; 2. Expenses for food and entertainment; 3. Expenses for public vehicles, usually including luxury sedans, private drivers, gasoline and related expenses, including maintenance.] I have said before that if we take a look at the whole history of public finances, that is a very frightening history indeed, and it reflects the situation with respect to the allocation of the wealth of our society. We have started this year making public outlays for the “three public expenditures” at 98 [govenrment] departments, and this has been welcomed be the masses. But they feel this is still not enough. We must still expand the scope [of making public such figures] according to the need, and the information we release must be specific right down to the item. We must resolutely crack down on corruption, and we must severely punish acts of corruption and those guilt of acts of corruption according to the law, not being soft of hand.

[Frontpage Photo: Wen Jiabao at the World Economic Forum in Germany in 2009, available from the WEF at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

The biggest media story in China so far this September is the takeover of The Beijing News and the Beijing Times, two of the country’s leading commercial newspapers, by Beijing’s municipal propaganda department. The story, which deals with the highly sensitive issue of press control, cannot be openly addressed in domestic Chinese media. English-language coverage of the story, meanwhile, has been a knot of confusion.
Everyone knows, or senses, that the move is fundamentally about press control, and not, as the Beijing city leadership has said, about addressing things like resource scattering (资源分散) and homogenized competition (同质化竞争) in the Beijing newspaper market — whatever those are. But beyond this intuition there are few specifics to put the story into context.
An AFP report said in its lead that both newspapers were “under new management,” not bothering to explain what that meant. Further down it quoted an Internet user as saying both papers had “been downgraded.” Huh?
In one of the better reports, The Guardian cited suspicion among some Chinese journalists that the reshuffle had something to do with bold coverage of the July 23 Wenzhou train collision, which had sparked “official anger.” But the idea of a generalized “official anger” failed to address why a story more directly implicating national-level railway officials and local officials in Wenzhou and Shanghai would have generated such focused concern among city officials in Beijing.
So, “official anger,” sure. But which level of “official anger” is most relevant here — national or municipal? In fact, the idea that the Wenzhou train crash was an important factor behind this management change doesn’t accord well with how press politics work in China.
The Diplomat, clearly also confused by the move, even noted that the two newspapers had “now been taken over by CCP media authorities.” Like all media, of course, both newspapers have been under the control of “CCP media authorities” since birth. The difference now is that these papers are under the control of municipal authorities in Beijing rather than central authorities. Their new managing institution representing CCP media authority, in other words, is a notch down on the Party totem pole.
Breaking through the confusion and understanding what has happened to The Beijing News and the Beijing Times means revisiting how media are controlled institutionally in China, and specifically the crucial role approval and registration of media plays in securing Party control over them.
So here are the basics.
1. How Publications are Approved and Controlled
For starters, one of the most critical of management functions in the process of press control is the government’s enactment of a system of approval (批准) and registration (登记) for news media. The right of approval, or shenpiquan (审批权), is exercised by the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), or the relevant press and publications authority at the provincial or municipal level.
According to regulations on the publishing of newspapers and periodicals, all publications must have “a definite managing institution capable of conscientiously taking on leadership responsibility.” Basically, that means they must have an official sponsor that says, “Look, we will manage this publication politically, ensuring that it abides by propaganda discipline and doesn’t cause trouble — and the buck will stop with us if things go wrong.”
So, here’s a key term to remember: managing institution (or “supervising institution”).
Think of the managing institution (主管单位 ) as the node where any given publication connects to the Party press bureaucracy. If you’d like to take a look in practice at which publications are controlled by which managing institutions, try using our China Media Map. In the search bar at the right enter the name of a publication like Nanfang Daily (南方日报) and hit “Go.” When the publication appears underneath, click on it. You’ll see a box of information including its “supervising institution.” In this case, it’s the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP, the Party’s top leadership ranks in Guangdong. That means, folks, that the newspaper and its leadership have to answer ultimately to top Party leaders in Guangdong, who exercise their authority through provincial propaganda leaders.
You can also use the China Media Map search function to see how publications are connected to one another, and how the chain of command and control works. If you search Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报) you’ll notice that its managing institution (or “supervising institution”) is the Nanfang Daily Press Group, so it is a spin-off of the Nanfang Daily, whose own managing institution is the top leadership in Guangdong.
Moving on, once the agreement of a managing institution is obtained, the publishing institution (主办单位) — think of it as a publishing house or group — can seek approval from the General Administration of Press and Publications for the launch of a publication, or “publishing unit”. And once the proper approvals and registration are complete, the publication can legally publish.
The managing institution and publishing institution systems (主办单位与主管单位制度) are a crucial part of the Party’s control of the media. According to regulations, a managing institution must be a “Party, government, Federation of Labor, Youth League, or Women’s Federation” organization. The “Provisional Regulations Concerning the Responsibilities of Publishing Institutions and Managing Institutions of Publishing Units” (关于出版单位的主办单位和主管单位职责的暂行规定), issued by GAPP in 1997, clearly stipulated a line of command in which managing institutions are responsible for exercising control over publishing institutions, which then in turn are responsible for exercising control and generally managing their “publishing units” (出版单位), the publications themselves.
These regulations make it impossible for private publications to be launched in China.
Some of you might be thinking: “Well, what about the internet?” You should keep in mind that internet sites are technically barred from doing their own news reporting and limited to aggregation of news content — so the licensing and approval system for “print” publications essentially ensures that the information pipeline is in the hands of “publishing units” controlled and managed by Party-sanctioned “managing institutions.”
2. The “Abnormal” Phenomenon of Cross-Regional Reporting
The next bit of background to understand about the recent change affecting The Beijing News and the Beijing Times is that the priority and legacy of information control as a means of protecting the interests of the Party and government, and the mapping of the press structure on the Party-state bureaucracy itself, has created a unique phenomenon in China called “cross-regional reporting,” or yidi jiandu (异地监督).
Basically, yidi jiandu is when a publishing unit in one region, let’s say Guangdong, conducts critical reporting — what is often known as “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), which you can think of as a uniquely Chinese form of “watchdog journalism” — on another city or region. They can do this because negative stories from another region do not directly impact the leaders responsible for managing their publication. Remember, for example, that propaganda officials in Guangdong (who effectively control Nanfang Daily) are tasked with maintaining “discipline” on stories affecting the province. If Nanfang Daily editors send reporters off to Guangxi province to report on a local case of corruption, this does not compromise this primary task, and in fact may draw feisty media away from more sensitive local stories.
In August 2007, Li Kaisheng (李开盛) explained the principle of cross-regional reporting and its importance this way:

“Cross-regional reporting is an important phenomenon in China’s media. Speaking from reason, extra-territorial reporting is an abnormal phenomenon. If [media] are all mouthpieces of the Party, and are the inner voice of the people, then why should local events rely on the support of media from outside the area to be reported, for monitoring to happen? When local media are already on the ground, and can operate more conveniently, when their understanding of the background of [local] news events is stronger than that of outside media, why wouldn’t their reports be of better quality than those of outside media? But the reality is quite the opposite. In today’s society, cross-regional reporting plays an extremely important role, and many sudden-breaking incidents are reported first by media from outside the area, and only in this way can draw the attention of the higher levels of leadership and therefore ultimately be quickly resolved, limiting harm to the greatest possible extent. On the other side, we see that when something happens in one area, the media of that area maintain complete silence, or present one unified picture of positivity. Regardless of how lively these [local] media might be in their reporting of sudden-breaking events elsewhere, they are silent on issues concerning their own areas.”

As an example, Li cited the August 2007 collapse of a bridge in Xiangxi, a prefecture in Hunan province. Searching Rednet.cn, a major news portal in Hunan, he found that the story of the collapse, a story obviously of great local relevance, was nowhere to be seen in the featured news of the day. Only deep in the site was some coverage found by means of a targeted keyword search.
But Li noted also that among the coverage available there was nothing in the way of critical reporting, and no attempt to explore the causes of the collapse or the question of responsibility.
By contrast, media outside of Hunan did report on the story, and online news portals outside the region, like Sina.com, actively aggregated related content, including in-depth reports and critical opinions.
So even when cross-regional reporting was not about the conduct of labor-intensive investigative reporting, it was still critical in offering more comprehensive coverage of local news stories.
Li Kaisheng concluded what should be obvious to anyone who observes Chinese media coverage on a regular basis — that media from outside a given region are generally far more effective in covering local stories from that region than are local journalists, regardless of how professionally-inclined these local journalists are. He said: “We must emphasize that in a situation in which local media are deficient [in covering local issues], cross-regional reporting is indispensable. The prominence of cross-regional reporting shows us clearly the deficient state of local monitoring by media.”
In an article for Deutsche Welle in October 2008, veteran journalist and CMP fellow Li Datong (李大同) declared in reference to the poisoned milk scandal that broke on the heels of the Beijing Olympic Games and first implicated a major milk company and Party officials in Hebei province: “If it hadn’t been for the [Shanghai-based] Oriental Morning Post violating propaganda discipline and conducting ‘cross-regional reporting,’ children in China today would probably still be drinking poisonous milk powder!”
(Read on for an explanation of why Li Datong would refer to cross-regional reporting as “violating propaganda discipline.”)
3. Cross-Level Reporting and the Top-Down Monitoring
The unique nature of “supervision” by the press in China — specifically, its regional and bureaucratic character — also means that media whose managing institutions are higher up the ladder of the Party bureaucracy can more easily conduct critical reporting of issues involving lower-level governments or organizations. While this is generally also included under the term “cross-regional reporting,” we can think of this as “cross-level reporting” or “top-down monitoring.”
Imagine, for example, that there is a major corruption story involving city leaders in Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang province. It would be difficult and dangerous for a local Hangzhou newspaper like Hangzhou Daily or any of its commercial spinoffs to pursue such a story. But it might be possible for a newspaper like the City Express (都市快报), a spin-off of the provincial Party mouthpiece of Zhejiang province, Zhejiang Daily (浙江日报), to attempt such a story because its managing institution once removed is the top leadership in Zhejiang, not the city leadership in Hangzhou (which directly controls Hangzhou Daily and its spin-offs by extension).
Of course, we can’t forget that a major corruption story involving Hangzhou city leaders might be a major priority for provincial Party leaders as well, and provincial propaganda leaders might for this reason prevent the City Express from covering it.
How The Beijing News Was Knocked Down to Size
The above overview should begin to make it clearer exactly what happened to The Beijing News and the Beijing Times and why. A paper like The Beijing News, located in the city of Beijing but with the administrative and cross-regional clout, if you will, afforded by having the central-ranking Guangming Daily Newspaper Group (top-down clout) and the Guangdong provincial-ranking Nanfang Daily Group (cross-regional clout) as its joint managing institutions, is understandably a thorn in the side of the Beijing city leadership. This is particularly true when you consider that the The Beijing News has also benefitted from the professional tradition afforded by the Nanfang Daily Group connection — a tradition of strong “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督).
Having now been knocked down a notch administratively, it will now be much harder for both The Beijing News and the Beijing Times to cover more sensitive stories concerning the interests of Beijing leaders.
The registration information in the General Administration of Press and Publications database — on which our China Media Map is based — has not yet been changed. So readers can still enter The Beijing News (新京报) and see the the managing and publishing institutions prior to the change.
And who is the managing institution for the Guangming Daily Newspaper Group, the former partner managing institution for The Beijing News? It is the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a high as you can go up the ladder of power. In fact, the Guangming Daily is directly administered by the Central Propaganda Department (of the CCP Central Committee).
That may seem mind-blowingly improbable to those not privy to the inner workings of China’s media. How could a publication known for its hard-hitting coverage and outspoken opinions have been administered directly by the Party agency at the very pinnacle of press controls? And how can we possibly be concerned about the possible loss of “space” for coverage when a publication is just shifting from one control-minded boss to another?
Welcome to the fog and complexity of China’s media.
In fact, cross-regional reporting generally has come under much greater pressure in recent years, as regional officials have complained about pesky journalists snooping around in their own backyards. On September 18, 2004, the Central Party Office bowed to demands for action and issued a policy banning the practice of cross-regional reporting. This has not stopped the practice outright, but it has served as a pretext for many officials to push back against critical reporting.
The recent action against The Beijing News and the Beijing Times was a play by city leader in Beijing to remove the longstanding threat that both newspapers posed to their propaganda objectives — as professionally-minded, competing newspapers based in the city with the administrative clout to tackle bigger stories.
In an online post, the now Hong Kong-based mainland blogger and media professional Bei Feng (北风) hit the nail on the head when he wrote: “By assigning The Beijing News and the Beijing Times to the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, the Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department can directly issue bans and missives [to them] and does not have to go through the Central Propaganda Department anymore. This move will without a doubt have a major impact in decreasing the number of their negative reports about Beijing; Aside from this, if they again report on negative news outside Beijing, this belongs to the realm of strictly prohibited extra-territorial reporting, so negative reports [in general] will see a major decrease. I’m confident that the former reason is relatively speaking the bigger one.” 
There you have it. . . And the real lingering mystery behind this change is how leaders in Beijing managed to make it happen. What were the specific lines of power and influence?
As to the reasons given by Beijing leaders for the change. They are, well, just so much posturing and drivel. But we should certainly have them on record. So here’s our translation of the news release published in the city’s mouthpiece Beijing Daily announcing the change:

Beijing Daily
September 3, 2011
Page 2
Beijing Times and The Beijing News Changed to Beijing City as Managing Institution and Publishing Institution
This reporter learned from the Beijing Municipal Administration of Press and Publications (北京市新闻出版局) that given the approval of the General Administration of Press and Publications, that the Beijing Times, whose managing and publishing institutions are the People’s Daily, and The Beijing News, whose managing institution is the Guangming Daily Publishing Group, and whose publishing institutions are [jointly] the Guangming Daily Publishing Group and the Nanfang Daily Publishing Group, will from today forward be changed to management and publishing by the City of Beijing.
The Beijing Times and The Beijing News were launched in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Since their launches, both publications have seen a steady increase in influence and market competitiveness, and have already become well-known metropolitan newspaper brands.
A representative from the Beijing Municipal Administration of Press and Publications said that the change in the managing and publishing institutions for the two publications is an important action of the central Party leadership’s demand to deepen cultural sector reforms, benefitting the acceleration of the promotion of resource integration in the publications sector of the Beijing region, benefitting change in the serious state of resource scattering (资源分散) and homogenized competition (同质化竞争) among metropolitan newspapers in Beijing, benefitting the city of Beijing in increasing the strength of its support for the two newspaper in terms of policy, resources, science and technology and personnel, further promoting media strengthening (做强做大) at the two papers.
Responsible persons at the two papers said that these changes in the managing and publishing institutions will enable the two papers to win greater space for development and infuse them with strength and vitality, further raising the influence and competitiveness of the two papers, and having great long-term significance for both papers.
The two papers will certainly grab this rare opportunity to adhere to correct guidance of public opinion, focusing on central tasks and serving the overall interests, promoting the rapid and healthy development of the newspaper industry in the capital.

Ahead of this year’s Mid-Autumn Festival, the traditional lunar harvest festival in China, the traffic situation in many Chinese cities reportedly worsened, with authorities saying more people than ever were on the roads to deliver mooncakes to friends and family as dictated by tradition. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his blog at QQ.com, the roads of a bustling metropolis are backed up with vehicles shaped like traditional Chinese mooncakes () for the Mid-Autumn Festival.