The following interview with communications scholar, new media expert and CMP fellow Hu Yong (胡泳) was published yesterday by Time Weekly. As the controversy continues in China over the so-called “anti-rumor league,” a group of online rumor busters who have advertised themselves as truth-seeking vigilantes out to identify and neutralize untruths in China’s burgeoning microblog sphere, this interview provides one of the best and most comprehensive looks at the question of what constitutes a “rumor” and how China can best use social media to promote openness, engagement and truth-seeking.
Time Weekly: Recently the problem of “rumors” on microblogs has become something of a concentrated phenomenon and has drawn a lot of controversy. How should we view the relationship between rumor and microblogs?
Hu Yong: Actually, rumors are a very old form of language, with a strong word-of-mouth character to them. In some sense, in the internet age we’ve seen the return you might say of some forms of communication in the past. Microblogs particularly resemble village markets where everyone mills around and the threshold for speaking is quite low. This kind of media form is actually extremely suited to the spread of rumor and hearsay. The transmission chain is short, the speed rapid, and the scope wide. And so, it’s fundamentally impossible to completely get rid of rumor on microblogs.
Time Weekly: Well then, owing to the special characteristics of microblogs, we can’t see all nonfactual information as rumor. We need to separate “inaccurate information” (错误的信息) from “manufactured information” (捏造的信息), in which the former is erroneous (讹) and the latter is rumor (谣). But I’ve noticed that even some journalists don’t always differentiate between what is “erroneous” and what is “rumor,” but simply talk about all nonfactual information as “rumor.”
Hu Yong: That’s right. This certainly happens, and it’s important to recognize the difference. But we need to point out further that if we simply define “rumor” as subjective and deliberate fabrication (观故意的捏造) and then add to this judgement about motives, this is really problematic. Put another way, the reason the “anti-rumor league” has invited so much controversy is because many people believe that they often make conjectures about the motives of those they focus on.
People generally assume that rumor is fabrication, and then suppose that it involves some sort of nefarious purpose. It never occurs to them that rumor is not necessarily in and of itself pure fiction, that there might be a particle of truth. I’m personally very opposed to the idea of ascribing motive in the definition of rumor. We all know that the ascription of motive (动机论) or the attacking of others in argument on the basis of assumed motive (诛心论) have a longstanding and well-established history in China. In the process of verbal exchange, or in the process of discourse and argumentation, we often don’t direct our language toward the conduct or language of the other, but rather directly criticize the other — why did they say what they did, why did they act in that way. We make conjectures about the motives of the other. This kind of motive ascription as a way of thinking is actually the greatest obstacle to reasonable discussion, and in many cases its interest is actually throttling freedom of expression.
Time Weekly: This kind of form of discussion that doesn’t ascribe motive should be a basic principle established in public discussion on microblogs. I know that the French critic [philosopher, sociologist] Raymond Aron placed great importance on this principle and emphasized it again and again. He said that in collective action less attention should be paid to the intention of those taking action and more attention paid to the results of that action.
Hu Yong: We have a tradition of ascribing motive, including during the Cultural Revolution when everyone talked about “literary prostitutes” (文痞) [in accusing certain intellectuals]. What they used was what we often call the billy-club method. This method is in fact one of the most commonly used forms of ascribing motive. If you ascribe motive excessively in your analysis of rumor, it is quite easy to wipe these so-called rumors with your own ethical judgements and then occupy a moral high ground for yourself. When you use this sort of method to carry out a process of demonization on rumor, that actually means that what you’re wiping out is the validity of the public’s questioning of you, or the validity of the public’s resistance. In other words, I think that in the controversy over the “anti-rumor league” there is something that has to be said clearly, and that is that the notion of “dispelling rumor” [piyao] does not have natural validity within the context of contemporary China.
Time Weekly: The “anti-rumor league” and the motive-ascribing form of thought that they represent is something we have to be alert to and critical of. We can also see that if we lump what is said in error with rumor, this kind of thought demands that people have to be all-knowing, and this expects far too much of people.
Hu Yong: In a basic sense, any time something happens information is asymmetrical, and no one is like God, seeing and knowing all. So oftentimes information will emerge incomplete or even in error, and its difficult to dismiss it directly as “rumor.” In a deeper sense, rumor is one way and means by which we come to recognize our society, a form of knowing (认知方式). Because as an individual or community when you meet with uncertainty you will naturally undergo acts of social cognition, or you’ll act in a collective manner, working to eliminate uncertainties in the information process. In the research of rumor, social scientists believe that rumors are in an important sense part of social cognition, a tool with which social communities resolve problems.
Time Weekly: Yes. Information, this basic concept, has been defined as something that dispels the cognitive uncertainties of the receiver. For example, the July 23 accident [of the high-speed train in Wenzhou], this sudden-breaking incident, created a great deal of uncertainty. At the same time it also generated a craving for accurate and timely information. But the government was extremely negligent in providing information about the disaster, and even had a desire to cover it up. So then, rumors in the sense that you just described them emerged.
Hu Yong: That’s right. On this issue a lot of people have a very superficial understanding, and perhaps have a lot of warped views. As I just said, we can make a distinction within rumors about truthful content and fictional content. But many people believe that rumors must all naturally be false. What’s more, a great many people believe that rumors are a form of social malady. And so we see even a lot of media saying metaphorically that rumors are spreading like an illness. In fact, some of the actions of the “anti-rumor league” have this sort of problem.
When you understand “rumor” purely as a kind of sickness, you commit an error of presumptuous arrogance, assuming that the public consists of people who easily fall victim to illness, that they easily believe rumors and lightly disseminate them. But in fact as we just discussed, rumors are a normal part of society, a normal condition, and not a sickness. Functional rumors will emerge among communities in our society as they seek answers to events that they cannot explain.
Time Weekly: So once we understand the function that rumors have, how do we understand “rumor busting” organizations like the “anti-rumor league” on microblog platforms? Actually, I’d rather replace the strongly suggestive term “rumor-bust” with “clarify.”
Hu Yong: The “anti-rumor league” says itself that it wants to take on social responsibility in the era of We Media (自媒体), leveraging spontaneous forces to promote self-discipline in speech. This follows the pattern of self-governing organizations in the We Media age, but the problem lies chiefly in the way as everyone has criticized they selectively target rumors, avoiding government rumors and only focusing on rumors from the public. They say themselves that they are bearing a social responsibility, but we can see from the microblog account of the founder of the “anti-rumor league,” Dou Hanzhang (窦含章), that he has labeled himself as someone who “speaks on behalf of the government” (替政府说话的人). This tells us quite clearly that he has a position. In my view, to target popular rumor and avoid official rumor is a failure of intelligence, whether it’s an active attempt at cover up or passive neglect. In sum, they have overlooked a relationship, I call it the relationship between rumors and lies.
[Earlier coverage in Chinese of Dou and his affiliations: http://news.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/20110809/517859.html]
The slogan of the “anti-rumor league” is, “Serving the Truth” (为真相服务). Well then, we then have to ask, under China’s present circumstances what is the biggest obstruction to the truth? Is it lies, or is it rumors? This is a question they must answer.
Time Weekly: In the microblog sphere, the “anti-rumor league” has been subjected to widespread challenge [by users], and you might say it has even become the proverbial rat crossing the road [which everyone hates and abuses]. But objectively speaking, microblogs are in need of a mechanism for clarification, or an information settlement platform (信息澄清平台). What form would you hope this would take, or what kind of people would constitute such a thing?
Hu Yong: As to the mechanisms of clarification, I think we can say as the ancients did that “the art lies outside the poetry” (功夫在诗外). Which is to say we cannot just focus on microblogs and ask what the best mechanism for clearing up [information] is. In fact, the best possible mechanism for clearing up [information] would be for the government to realize openness and transparency of information, would be to resolve the problem of lies that we just touched on. After that, it’s about the media doing fair and comprehensive reporting.
As a form of media, microblogs naturally have their own capacity for self-correction, because many people participate in microblogs and every person has their own strengths, information sources and social network, and sometimes these people may be on the scene [to give eyewitness accounts], etcetera. This is something traditional media often cannot accomplish. This kind of assembling could possibly lead to the emergence of a group intelligence. And this group intelligence is in fact what constitutes the mechanism of self-correction in the microblog sphere. This is one of the great sources of vitality for microblogs.
Time Weekly: Still, some people may be concerned that this sort of self-correcting mechanism is not necessarily complete. Is it possible that it might have systematic flaws, or have collective blind spots?
Hu Yong: This actually boils down to the question of how you regard group thinking (群体思维). There has always been different views about this. One view is the one we’ve already talked about, the view that groups can give rise to intelligence and that this intelligence corrects through exchange. But there has always been another understanding and view that says that if individuals gather into groups the intelligence represented by those groups will not necessarily be superior to individual intelligence, or even will not just not give rise to group intelligence but will instead give rise to crowd foolishness (群体的愚蠢). There are many examples used to support this view, for example Hitler’s Germany, China during the Cultural Revolution, etcetera. The French thinker Gustave Le Bon wrote about this in his book The Crowd.

Yesterday the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper ran an editorial by Yang Jian (杨健) addressing the issue of the so-called “anti-rumor league,” or piyao lianmeng, a group of online rumor busters who have advertised themselves as truth-seeking vigilantes out to identify and neutralize untruths in China’s burgeoning microblog sphere.
The informal group, which of course has its own microblog, has been around for more than two months. But in recent days they have been at the center of an ongoing controversy — playing out online, of course, but also in traditional media — about what counts for truth, and what constitutes rumor, in the messy world of social media.

[ABOVE: The official microblog account of the so-called “anti-rumor league” at Sina Weibo.]
While the group says its goal is to “do our bit to clean up the public opinion ecology of the microblogs,” many Chinese have accused them of official bias — the way, for example, they seem to turn a blind eye to falsehoods perpetuated in Party-run media. Others have voiced a more visceral objection to the term piyao itself, which reminds many of the way local government leaders in particular in China have long tossed out the accusation of “rumor” to cover up their own misdeeds.
The People’s Daily editorial, “In the Microblog Age, How Do We Refute Rumors,” is actually quite even-handed in discussing the rise of social media and its implications. The piece describes the advances in information and public opinion brought about by microblogs with a sense of acceptance and inevitability, noting that while some see them as pandering rumor mills, they “have undeniable characteristics of media” and “have already definitely become an important source for news for other media.”
There are now quite a few news stories and editorials out there in Chinese dealing with this issue from various angles. For example, a piece on the front page of today’s China Youth Daily newspaper (below), which argues that the business of rumor busting must itself be carried out in an “objective” and “neutral” manner.

[ABOVE: An editorial on the front page (below the large photograph) of today’s China Youth Daily newspaper, published by the Communist Youth League of China, argues that rumor-busting must be free of prejudice.]
In a further illustration of the circularity of information sharing and exchange in China today, the China Youth Daily piece itself has been widely shared and commented upon on microblogs today, as have other traditional media takes on the issue.
Not far behind this debate over the truth and over the power of social media is recent furor over the government’s handling of the July 23 high-speed rail collision in Wenzhou. While of course not the only recent story in which microblogs have played a crucial role, the public opinion storm that blew between July 23 and July 30 was a clear illustration — and for leaders, no doubt a concerning one — of just how instrumental social media now are in China.
It remains to be seen how Chinese leaders will balance their clear and uncompromising priority of maintaining controls on information — “guidance of public opinion” — against the emerging maturity of platforms like Sina Microblog. It is a delicate balance, to be sure.
On that note, we turn to an editorial in today’s edition of Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily. The piece is a good look at some of the essential fault lines in this debate over rumor, truth and openness.
Readers should also note the reference at the end to the recently-released “Opinions Concerning the Deepening of Openness of Government Affairs and Strengthening Service in Government Affairs” (关于深化政务公开加强政务服务的意见).

“Bringing an End to Rumor in the Weibo Age Needs Freedom of Information”
On August 10, the People’s Daily ran an article on the recently hot issue of the “anti-rumor league” and offered its own affirmation of online public opinion’s “fair system of self-cleansing” (良好自净机), expressing the belief that microblogs had led the way in promoting the public’s right to know, right to express, right to participate and right to monitor. The arguments in the article were basically fair, quite different from a number of previous [writings and reports in the media] that cast blame on microblogs on the basis of so-called “rumors.”
Microblogs, and even the whole phenomenon of the internet, are already topics that are unavoidable in understanding and describing contemporary Chinese society. The internet has increasingly become a daily necessity of life for each and every ordinary person. All traditional social issues and discussions have already undergone a simple initial process of inscription whereby they are “reflected to some degree on the internet.” The internet now initiates, guides and promotes change in real society, something getting more and more common and taking on unusual importance. With the introduction and application of each form of new internet technology comes the hope that traditional bounds will be broken, and with the arrival of microblogs, this situation has accelerated in China. The personal media quality of microblogs . . . has allowed them within an exceptionally short period of time to become the principal tool by which Chinese internet users express their thoughts and feelings on current affairs and the world around them.
One topic of discussion that has perhaps never ceased [in the midst of these changes] has been how to judge the veracity of information as people use microblogs to comment, share and draw common attention (围观) to information. And when certain untrue information is broadcast and amplified on the internet, how can we clean up the negative impact of this? In this process, the single-handed “anti-rumor Party” has developed into the collective action of the “anti-rumor league” (辟谣联盟). which “by its own support” (自带干粮) has advertised itself as “serving the truth” (为真相服务). This behavior, which on the surface seems something that the vast majority of internet users might approve of, has been attended all along with controversy and reproach. It has been mocked, despised and doubted. But we must realize that this is not at odds with the desire everyone has for the truth.
In times when the truth is wanting, people will hunger even more for the truth. And at the same time as the internet has afforded people a new tool of expression and transmission [of information], one precondition of the opening up of expression is that mechanisms are found to ensure self-cleansing (自净). The objective of this online self-cleansing is making clear what information is objective, reasonable and neutral. But the path chosen by the “anti-rumor Party” is clearly different. The reason why the “anti-rumor league” has been subjected to so much denunciation is because it is selective in its rumor busting. It targets only “popular rumor” (民谣) and has no interest in “official rumor” (官谣), and in this process it takes official government formulations as the basis and starting point of its rumor busting. This fatal selective blindness has already become, and will possibly continue to be, the Achilles heel of the “anti-rumor league.”
. . .
Recently the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the General Office of the State Council printed and distributed [the notice] “Opinions Concerning the Deepening of Openness of Government Affairs and Strengthening Service in Government Affairs” (关于深化政务公开加强政务服务的意见) emphasizing the importance of open information, and emphasizing especially that event of major sudden-breaking incidents and problems of concern to the people, the circumstances of the event must be released, answering public concerns in a timely, accurate and comprehensive manner. This policy released at a critical moment no doubt has clear guiding importance, and it answers from one angle the people’s demand to be informed of public information resources (公共信息资源), and it fits in its objectives with the consensus among people that they must themselves work in pursuit of the truth. Only in an environment in which information can flow freely can rumor and falsehood be stripped away. When society begins to respect and trust in the fact that everyone is entitled to make their own independent judgements about information, preserving the right to know and express for all, only then will the truth emerge.

Government officials in Lushan, Jiangxi province, went on the defensive in August 2011 after internet users shared the results of local examinations for institutional units linked to the government (事业单位考试), which showed that the top exam results for five separate institutional units were by sons and daughters local Party and government cadres. The Personnel Management Office of Lushan responded by confirming the results, but insisting that they were a “coincidence.” In this cartoon, posted by artist Shang Haichuan (商海春) to his blog at QQ.com, a single official job candidate (presumably the son of the official pictured) stands before an official proffering a job and giving a thumbs-up. The two are surrounded by walls of exclusion, outside of which hordes of colorless job seekers crowd, shut out.

After weeks of back and forth, lawmakers in the United States finally reached a compromise on raising the nation’s debt ceiling in early August 2011. But broader concerns persisted over the state of the U.S. economy and the state of uncertainly over the country’s apparent inability to reach political compromise. In this cartoon, posted by China Daily cartoonist Will Luo (罗杰) to his QQ.com blog, President Obama is pictured at left, in a tight shot, congratulating the Republicans and Democrats for reaching a compromise over the debt ceiling. Obama grins and says: “Congratulations on finally coming to an agreement, guys!” But the shot pulls back at right, where it is clear all three are standing cluelessly atop a sinking ship.
http://luowill.qzone.qq.com/

In his July 1 speech commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) paused only briefly from his message of glory and progress to warn that the Party now faces internal challenges that are “more strenuous and pressing than at any point in the past.” Hu said that the Party faces “four dangers” — lost vitality (精神懈怠), insufficient capacity (能力不足), alienation from the people (脱离群众) and rampant corruption (消极腐败).
In one way or another, the last of these, corruption, has been in China’s headlines ever since. Even as celebrations for the anniversary were going on, a scandal was brewing online surrounding the China Red Cross Society, a state-run charity organization. This scandal was set off with callow social media posts by Guo Meimei (郭美美), 20, who flaunted photos of herself and her wealthy lifestyle and claimed to be the “general manager” of a company affiliated with the Red Cross. [3-minute rundown of the scandal at Link TV].
The “Guo Meimei affair,” the facts of which remain frustratingly unclear, has sizzled deep under the surface through July as another story of corruption and incompetence has come to the fore. That story, of course, is all about China’s embattled Ministry of Railways and the country’s monumentally expensive (and apparently rash) push to develop high-speed rail. China’s former railway minister, Liu Zhijun (刘志军), was arrested for corruption in February along with other key figures, including former deputy chief engineer Zhang Shuguang (张曙光), who is reported to have stashed billions of dollars overseas (where his wife and daughter, some say, are now living in comfort). [Here is my latest Link TV 3-minute rundown, of crash coverage in China.]
Thieving state assets and stashing them overseas is clearly a major, major problem for the CCP. But no one seems to know just how big it is — and no one stands by their statistics for very long. However strong the apparent resolve to deal with the issue, it’s just too sensitive to talk about too openly.
Yesterday the overseas edition of China’s official People’s Daily newspaper issued a public apology to “readers at home and overseas”, saying government statistics on corrupt officials absconding with state assets included in a July 26 report were “false.” The original language in the report was as follows:

According to estimates made in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report “China Research Report on Countermeasures for the Punishment and Prevention of Corruption” (中国惩治和预防腐败重大对策研究), China presently has more than 4,000 officials who have fled overseas. The Commission for Discipline Inspection says that in the recent 30 years, officials fleeing overseas have run away with more than 50 billion US dollars in assets (about 320 billion yuan), for an average of 100 million yuan in stolen assets per person.

So, were these numbers wrong? Or was the overseas edition of the People’s Daily in the wrong to release them? It is hard to tell whether this apology was actually meant for “readers at home and overseas,” or for Chinese leaders who forced the paper to back-peddle.
This isn’t the first time staggering numbers like this have been revealed. Back in June, Beijing Youth Daily reporter Cheng Jie (程婕) reported that figures released by an enforcement division of China’s central bank showed that since the mid-1990s an estimated 16-18,000 Party, government, police and state-owned enterprise officials from China had absconded overseas with approximately 800 billion yuan in assets, or roughly 123.6 billion US dollars.
The same figures made the front page of the June 15 edition of New Express newspaper, a spin-off of Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News.
The basis for these reports was a document released on the internet by the Anti-Money Laundering Bureau (Security Bureau) of the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank. The report was called, “Research on the Channels and Detection Methods for the Transfer Overseas of Asset by Corrupt Elements in Our Country” (我国腐败分子向境外转移资产的途径及监测方法研究).
These figures were shared widely on China’s web back in June — just have a look at this Baidu search — and were hotly discussed in social media, as well as becoming fodder for comic artists.

[ABOVE: In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, corrupt government officials (identifiable by their imperial-era official hats) hurry through a series of underground tunnels, grinning and making off with bags full of riches.]
For China’s leadership, of course, this issue isn’t at all funny. As Hu stressed in his July 1 speech, corruption is one of the chief dangers facing the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and one that taps into deep resentment over the way government officials and their family members have — in the eyes of many — benefitted disproportionately from China’s economic development.
And as the scandals involving the railway ministry and the Red Cross Society of China have shown only too clearly, resolving the issue of corruption is fundamental in dealing with Hu Jintao’s danger number three: alienation from the people.
But I would suggest that all of these recent scandals illustrate a fifth danger, one that in various ways is now being debated with deep ambivalence within the Party — and that is lack of openness and transparency.
The need for openness was of course a critical issue in the recent wave of public anger surrounding the July 23 train collision in Wenzhou. But the Party’s hesitancy was illustrated in chiaroscuro on July 28 and 29.
Visiting the site of the crash, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to get to the bottom of the collision and its causes, holding those responsible to account. But Chinese media had scarcely begun to exploit the opportunity for openness afforded by Wen’s visit before the Central Propaganda Department came down hard.
On the question of openness, contradictions abound.
On August 3, just as Chinese media were reeling from the tightening over the weekend, the official Xinhua News Agency sent out a release called “Central Party Demands Progress of Major Sudden-breaking Incidents Be Announced.” The release dealt with “Opinions Concerning the Deepening of Openness of Government Affairs and Strengthening Service in Government Affairs” (关于深化政务公开加强政务服务的意见), a notice issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the General Office of the State Council.
This “Notice” — I thank Jamie Horsley of Yale’s China Law Center for clarifying this point — has been in the drafting process since 2009 and was worked through various drafts last year before being finalized. But its release on the heels of last week’s public opinion tsunami over the July 23 crash is almost certainly no coincidence.
It’s fair to say that the “Notice” — along with other related moves such as the 2008 legislation on open government information — reflects one school of thinking within the Chinese Communist Party, the idea that openness and accountability are crucial to maintaining legitimacy.
This idea is plainly contradicted by the actions of propaganda authorities, a tug-of-war of priorities not missed by Chinese journalists. He Yanguang (贺延光), a widely respected veteran photojournalist with China Youth Daily, wrote on his Sina Weibo account Wednesday:

I don’t understand! Xinhua News Agency says in an official notice today that there was a need to grasp openness [in the handling] of major sudden-breaking incidents and problems of key concern to the people . . . to thoroughly bring the supervisory role of the media into play, and to strengthen the monitoring [of government] by society . . . Well then, why in recent days have directives prevented media from asking questions and commenting, and made them pull countless pages overnight, so that resentment bristles in the media? Do they up there want to act like whores and build monuments to their chastity? Or is the propaganda department beyond the central Party’s control?

Plenty of Party leaders have argued in recent years that openness of information is a key part of good governance and instrumental to stemming public opinion crises. In 2008, Wang Yang (汪洋), Guangdong’s party secretary, called for greater openness as he likened stifled public opinion to the dangerous “barrier lakes” forming along rivers near the epicenter of the Sichuan earthquake. He said leaders must listen to the words of the people, and not build up “language barrier lakes” (言塞湖) that might threaten to burst (arguably exactly what happened after the July 23 train collision).
But the more farsighted priority of pushing openness to tackle key issues and build legitimacy is most often frustrated in the shortsighted present by the need to maintain social and political stability by enforcing media controls, or “correct guidance of public opinion” (a lesson from June 4, 1989, that the CCP has never forgotten).
In a piece on page 23 of yesterday’s edition of the People’s Daily, we see the tug-of-war at work once again. The editorial, ” Rampant Corruption is a Fatal Wound to the Party” (“消极腐败”是政党致命伤), is the latest piece from the opinion desk of the People’s Daily that penned another group of moderate essays calling for “tolerance” earlier this year.
The editorial is firm in describing corruption as a scourge that must be pulled out by its roots. It is clear that the consequences of not doing so are dire:

Corrupt politics also resulted in mutiny in the Philippines, unrest in Thailand, political change in Tunisia. People firmly believe that corruption is the great enemy of rulers. We are reminded profoundly by the political death of the Soviet Union, and by dramatic transformation overnight and political change in Eastern Europe, that in just the same way black corruption might corrode the red organism [of the CCP].

[ABOVE: Page 23 of yesterday’s People’s Daily, with the editorial on corruption at top.]
But again, this resolve on the issue of corruption is not supported by an equal resolve to be open about corruption, or to be open about the core question of political reform.
Couched in terms of the People’s Daily editorial, this latter question would be: How can the mighty “red organism” transform its own nature?
Not without scrutiny, certainly. Which is why openness — of the press and eventually the political system — is so critical.
The failure to allow open information and debate on key issues like corruption and political reform is therefore a fifth danger facing the Party. In the face of continued controls on China’s press, calls for greater openness like the “Notice” announced by Xinhua, and Wen Jiabao’s pledge to get to the bottom of the July 23 crash, look very much like “openness” behind closed doors.
And that’s unlikely to appease the clawing crowd outside.

Responding to the growing problem of long lines for healthcare at Chinese hospitals, China’s Ministry of Health declared this week that hospitals must ensure that waits are no longer than 10 minutes. Media and web users immediately criticized the announcement as a non-solution to a huge problem. The root issue, they said, was overwhelming demand in the face of a shortage of doctors, something that orders from on high simply cannot solve. Other reports across the country revealed that the instructions from the Ministry of Health had resulted in “10-minute rules” at many hospitals that impacted the quality of service — for example, an order that doctors cannot spend more than 10 minutes talking with a patient about their condition. In this cartoon, posted by artist Cao Yi (曹一) to his blog at QQ.com and originally published in Changjiang Daily (长江日报), Chinese line up for service at a hospital as one frustrated patient says: “Wait, they just made us line up somewhere else!”

One of today’s major official news announcements in China, pinned to the top of most major web portals through the day, was a notice from top Party leaders urging governments at all levels to be more conscientious in advancing the goal of a more open government, particularly around “sudden-breaking events and problems of key concern to the people.”
It can be said that this document (an “Opinion”) is of little fresh importance from a policy standpoint. It is, in other words, purely a regurgitation of principles iterated in President Hu Jintao’s 2008 policy of “public opinion channeling,” or yulun yindao (舆论引导) — the idea that Chinese state media and governments should be proactive in reporting news, largely with the goal of directing stories in the government’s interest — and in the May 2008 National Ordinance on Open Government Information, or zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli (政府信息公开条例), which places various open government information requirements on local governments and ministries of the State Council.
Well then, why mention the announcement at all? Because the timing is important.

[ABOVE: Today’s news section at QQ.com, one of China’s leading internet portal sites. The large headline at top is the Xinhua News Agency story on the notice on open government.]
This official notice (from Xinhua, mind you, not the “Opinion” itself) can be read as a direct response to the recent week of (from the leadership’s standpoint) chaos in China’s media over reporting on the July 23 train collision in Wenzhou, which claimed at least 40 lives and brought an outpouring of public anger toward the government. And in fact, the sustained media attack on China’s Ministry of Railways this month, which has happened since at least July 10, when the first malfunction was reported on the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail, might be read as the chief factor behind releasing the “Opinion” at this time, though it has been in the works for years.
The bottom line: the railway ministry, and local governments, did a horrific job of handling this public opinion crisis. And the answer to avoiding similar things happening in the future is to be more upfront about the decisions the government makes, the findings of its investigations, etcetera.
Of course, critics are right on the money in pointing out that this is just more official-speak on top of official-speak, and the critical question is how to implement these principles. The National Ordinance on Open Government Information has been in effect for more than three years, but clearly it did nothing to create real openness or accountability within the railway ministry — where the push to develop high-speed rail has been in high gear since around 2007, and a truly open look at the books would certainly have set off warning bells.
A web user in Anhui’s Chaohu City (巢湖市) wrote: “The Central Committee has already deployed so may like demands! The key is implementation. They have to truly go and manage things, and dare to go manage things.”
From Xiamen, another user wrote: “Every time it’s all this approximate stuff. What does it mean to correctly channel public opinion in society? What is correct and what is incorrect? Relevant [government] departments and local governments all believe that their way of doing things is correct. So, does this document from the Central Committee have any real use in offering guidance?”

“Central Party Demands Progress of Major Sudden-breaking Incidents Be Announced” (“中央要求公布重大突发事件进展 回应社会关切”)
Xinhua News Agency
August 3, 2011
In recent days, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the General Office of the State Council printed and distributed [the notice] “Opinions Concerning the Deepening of Openness of Government Affairs and Strengthening Service in Government Affairs” (关于深化政务公开加强政务服务的意见), which raised the need to gain a strong grasp of openness [in the handling] of major sudden-breaking incidents and problems of key concern to the people, objectively announcing [publishing/releasing] the course of events, the measures taken by the government, public preventive measures (公众防范措施) and the results of investigation.
Quickly Responding to Social Concerns
The “Opinion” raised the need to renew the modes and methods of openness in government affairs, upholding [an atmosphere] conveniencing public knowledge of affairs and conducive to the principle of public monitoring [of policy and the government], expanding the scope of work, deepening content [subject to] openness [i.e., being open about a wider field of government information], enriching the forms of openness, promoting the improvement of the government itself and innovation of management . . .
Administrative organs at all levels must strictly follow the National Ordinance on Open Government Information (政府信息公开条例) [put into effect in May 2008], making available accurate government information actively and on a timely basis concerning prospective budgets and final accounts, the approval and implementation of major construction projects, social welfare projects and other such areas.
[We must] effectively grasp openness on sudden-breaking incidents and problems of key concern to the people, objectively announcing the course of events, the measures taken by the government, public preventive measures and the results of investigation.[We must] respond to social concerns in a timely manner, correctly channeling public opinion in society.

Over the past week, as Chinese media and internet users alike pressed for the truth behind the tragic high-speed rail collision in Wenzhou on July 23, social media platforms like Sina Microblog (Weibo) and QQ Microblog played a crucial role.
While microblogs are providing a rich means for ordinary Chinese to access, share and comment on information, they are also influencing the discourse of government officials in important but less perceptible ways.
The following piece, published on page four of today’s official People’s Daily (vertical at upper-right), briefly addresses the way microblogs — and the internet more generally — are changing the way officials interact with the public, and of course public expectations.

“How to Speak in the Microblog Age”
People’s Daily
August 2, 2011
Tang Weihong (唐维红)
In sudden-breaking events, the information tends to come from microblogs [or “Weibo”], and most of the public commentary arises from microblogs . . . Ever since they stepped onto the stage, their convenience, independence, interactivity and other advantages have shown the characteristics of Web 2.0 beyond any doubt.
With a low threshold of 140 characters, every “tiny ego” has a platform through which to express their own voice, ushering in a era in the world in which every person can speak, and every person can be noticed.
In 2010, microblogs in China were just in the midst of their “inaugural year.” In that year, various major websites were competing to launch their own microblog platforms, and user numbers were constantly growing. Sending information at any time and at any place, choosing oneself who to follow, offering exponential [information] sharing . . . Faced the Weibo wave, more and more people are no longer looking on but are deciding to participate.
This does not exclude government offices and leaders from various levels. According to incomplete statistics from the Public Opinion Monitoring Center [of People’s Daily Online], weibo accounts run by government agencies and leaders cover many functional and administrative departments, from the central level down to the local level. These microblogs are opening up a channel of communication between the people and the government, and they are having visible results in creating an impression of closeness to the people.
Some leaders and cadres opened up microblogs in their real names during [this year’s] two meetings [of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference], speaking candidly and confidently, not fearing sensitive issues. Some leaders are even weibo celebrities, constantly updating their accounts by computer or mobile, and having large audiences. By the end of January this year, more than 800 police departments across the country had set up microblog accounts, not just releasing information, including policing alerts and safety information, but having a strong showing in the midst of sudden-breaking incidents.
“You must not utter official-speak and bluster, but must speak ordinary language for the people to understand you. Otherwise, who will listen?” On microblogs, not speaking official-speak and empty speech has become the first criterion. The 140-character limit means that you must speak concisely; only by spurning official-speak and pre-packaged formulas can you explain the facts and speak with meaning. In the context of multi-dimensional communication and direct communication with the public, the consequences of speaking falsehoods and saying the wrong thing are “very serious.”
It has been said that microblogs “place the public and Shakespeare on the same level.” The discourse environment of the grassroots, with its special characteristics, is very different from the pattern of discourse Party and government officials have grown accustomed to. And this means that many officials have had to “learn how to talk all over again.”
Equal and earnest dialogue is the basic principle by which microblogs operate. Equality and sharing is the fundamental spirit of the internet, and its charm. There is no rostrum on the internet. Everyone has a microphone. “So long as everyone interacts heart to heart, in a spirit of frankness, ultimately we can all earn trust.” [NOTE: This is a quote by a senior Zhejiang official, Cai Qi (蔡奇).]
Timely and accurate information release is the strength of microblogs maintained by leaders and [government] organs. Whether or not we admit it, microblogs maintained by Party and government leaders and organs have their own special character. They have hold of more authoritative information, and have a deeper understanding of the Party and the nation’s principles and policies, and this is why web users pay attention to them. Only by answering the concerns of web users in a timely and accurate manner through the platform of the microblog can the ultimate objective of opening these microblogs be reached — understanding public feeling, and alleviating public concerns.
. . .
Mastering the use of the internet shows a leader’s quality and ability. We hope that more and more leaders show their capacity for speech on the internet and on microblogs, and find popularity. We hope even more than more and more leaders address the conditions of the people in the real world, through real actions.