This year, China had 17 top scorers, or zhuangyuan (状元), on the national college entrance examination from various provinces who opted for Hong Kong universities over China’s elite institutions, Peking University and Tsinghua University. Traditionally, China’s top universities have aggressively courted these top test scorers, seeing them as an important measure of their elite status. When asked why they had opted for Hong Kong, the students responded that they wanted to experience a different approach to education. In this cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to his QQ.com blog, an old-fashioned Confucian school master, symbolizing the backwardness of China’s higher education system, reaches for top testers depicted as potted plants flying off into the sky on golden wings. For background on standardized testing in Chinese higher education, see CMP fellow Zhang Ming’s article, “Top testers a distraction for China’s schools. ”

In the past, before universities in Hong Kong had entered the competition for top scorers, top scorers from various provinces generally went to Tsinghua University or Peking University. In recent years, as Hong Kong universities have stepped into the game, Chinese institutions sense a real danger that top scorers will be lost, and the media have also jumped on this story about the threat to the excellence of Peking University and Tsinghua University. This is why we’re seeing this situation now . . .
The University of Hong Kong is a mirror on ourselves that is less distant that other elite universities. Because the admissions and enrollment capacity of HKU is limited, there is no way it can run off with all of our top-scoring students. But this mirror brings our own maladies and deformities into sharp relief. If we do not address our shortcomings, and if we do not wipe away the stains that blacken our own face, but rather respond only with more robust efforts [at the same sort of game], then there is really no way to save us.

China’s much-vaunted Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail formally opened on June 30 this year, on the eve of the Chinese Communist Party’s 90th anniversary. Capable of speeds in excess of 300 kilometers per hour, the project is an important showcase for China’s leadership, symbolizing the country’s technological prowess and the Party’s forward-thinking attitude.
On July 7, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Railways (MOR), Wang Yongping (王勇平), took the tone of rivalry over high-speed rail technology up a notch when he scoffed at accusations that China’s trains used Japanese technologies. “The Beijing-Shanghai High-speed Railway and Japan’s Shinkansen can’t even be raised in the same breath, because many of the technologies employed by China’s high-speed rail are far superior to those used in Japan’s Shinkansen,” Wang said. He added: “We Chinese would never claim that technologies owned by others are ours. Nor will we ever relinquish our right to file patent applications for innovations developed through our own knowledge and efforts just because of the irresponsible remarks of others.”

[ABOVE: China’s high-speed rail system gets ready for operation in December 2010. Photo by “triplefivechina” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
But two malfunctions in the space of three days (July 10 and July 12), resulting in late arrivals for scores of high-speed trains, have for many Chinese raised serious questions about the safety, comfort and efficiency of the new high-speed rail line. And so far this week, official state media have noticeably taken a passive, backseat role as social media, notably Sina Microblog, have offered a platform for eyewitness information and a wave of (mostly frustrated and antagonistic) opinion, and as commercial media — the likes of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post, The Beijing News, Caijing magazine and Hu Shuli’s Caixin Media — have jumped on the story.
Posts using terms related to “Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail malfunction” had topped 286,000 on Sina Microblog by yesterday evening (July 12), as the line experienced delays of close to three hours in some cases. In posts aggregated in real time by traditional media outlets such as the Oriental Morning Post, Caijing and Labor Daily, eyewitness social media users shared photos and accounts in real time.
A photo by passenger Tang Yan (唐妍) taken inside a car on the high-speed rail line showed a glass of water on a seat tray with the water clearly leaning in one direction. Tang wrote: “The high-speed rail is creeping along now at a speed of about 5 kilometers per hour, and moreover it’s still going in fits and starts. It’s like a sightseeing car. . . What people find really strange is that the whole car is leaning really severely to the right! I’ve put a glass of water on the seat-back tray, and you can clearly see the incline! . . . I clearly remember it was level when we got on the train.”

A photo in a separate post showed a passenger aboard a stalled Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail train fanning himself in a hot, air-conditionless car as workers outside the train continued with repairs.

A report in today’s edition of The Beijing News quoted one microblog user as saying they saw sparks flying past their window on the train, which was followed by a shriek as the train ground to a stop.
But while Chinese social media, predominately Sina Microblog (Weibo), have been an important source of information, commercial media have also spoken to experts, engineers and railway personnel. One of the first rather comprehensive reports came from the Oriental Morning Post, which reached a range of sources on July 10, the day of the first malfunction causing widespread delays, and on July 11. The paper’s report was published yesterday, and made the rounds on the web and in social media just as chatter was taking off about a second malfunction on the line. We have translated that report below.
In a separate report yesterday, Caijing magazine reported that the deputy secretary of the Communist Youth League in Shanghai’s Luwan District, Huang Tan (黄坦), had posted on his own microblog at 11:33 am that high-speed train G212 had stopped for repairs in Anhui’s prefectural-level city of Bengbu (蚌埠) owing to an electrical malfunction. The Caijing report opened somewhat provocatively with the July 7 statement from Wang Yongping about the superiority of Chinese train technology.
One of the most curious things about this story over the past 72 hours has been the way official state media have been virtually absent. This article from People’s Daily Online, posted at the top of Xinhua Online today, turns to a Japanese expert for his remarks following the July 10 malfunction, suggesting such malfunctions are normal and expected, and cautioning (justifiably) that repairs cannot be rushed in such situations. The expert did note that there seemed to have been serious service related breakdowns that had nothing to do with technology.
In addition to the above report, there is this very brief report from the official China News Service. Curiously, the China News Service story on QQ.com, one of China’s most popular internet portals, has drawn just 3 comments from users — that for a story that has prompted hundreds of thousands of posts and re-posts on social media. When it posted the original, very brief, Xinhua News Agency release about the first high-speed train malfunction on July 10, QQ.com added to the release a number of online reports and accounts from social media that seemed to cast doubt on the Xinhua version itself.
Commercial media and social media seem to have led the charge so far on this story, raising numerous doubts about the safety of the high-speed rail and criticizing railway authorities for their handling of both incidents. The finger-pointing continues today, turning now to the official response from the Ministry of Railways, which came in a brief statement yesterday.
A report from The Beijing Morning Post today bears the headline: “Apology from Ministry of Railways Just One Sentence.” The report, which asks a string of pointed questions, including why the passengers were deprived of air conditioning in closed cars and stifling heat, notes that railway authorities said only yesterday that, “As for the inconvenience caused to passengers by late train arrivals, the railway ministry expresses regret.”
We’ll have to continue to watch this story over the next few days to see how continued coverage plays out. Have commercial media taken advantage of a window of opportunity afforded by a lack of direction from propaganda authorities? If such direction is lacking, why? Or, alternatively, have media disregarded or worked around directives?
There are signs controls may have been asserted today, at the very least on social media. Yesterday, a voting feature on Sina Microblog invited users to cast their votes on their views of the high-speed rail, whether they would opt for it in favor of the airlines, etcetera. That feature, which drew thousands of responses within a few short hours, now seems to have been disabled. In the image below, you can see Sina user chatting about the vote and linking to the now inaccessible page, which I visited with no problems yesterday evening. [UPDATE: Voting feature is now (11:50pm HK time, July 13) available again here.]

[ABOVE: Photo of poll results for high-speed rail as of 11:59pm, July 13. 33% say they will still opt for the high-speed rail, 19% say they will take a plane instead, 26% say they will take some other form of transportation, and the rest are unsure.]
The following is a partial translation of the report yesterday from Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post, which deals with doubts surrounding the first malfunction on July 10.

Three Questions Raised by Mass Delays on the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail
Oriental Morning Post
July 12, 2011
Reporters Shen Liang (沈靓), Chu Jingwei (储静伟), Luan Xiaona (栾晓娜) and Shi Yinsheng (史寅昇)
Three questions raised by mass delays on the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail: Where is the contingency plan?
After 11 days of formal operation, a thunderstorm in Shandong province caused the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail to experience wide-spread delays for the first time. Responding to this accident that caused 19 trains to arrive late, many for as much as two hours, the reason given by railway authorities in Beijing was that “thunderstorms caused the malfunction of the overhead line system” (雷雨导致接触网故障), but no further explanation was given.
Actually, a certain degree of malfunction must be admitted for the high-speed rail, and malfunctions owing to thunderstorms can be understood. But the true measure of the quality of the high-speed rail is shown in how things are handled after malfunctions occur. Train personnel can be taught through repeated training how to have proper postures and smiles to cover up the problems of the high-speed rail service system. But once this system meets with the unexpected, people will be able to see the ineffectiveness behind the smiles.
Judging from the responses of passengers last night, this time around the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail was short of the mark. After trains stopped on the high-speed rail, passengers were shut inside hot and stuff train cars, not knowing what happened, not knowing what they were waiting for, and not knowing how long they would have to wait. Not knowing anything at all, some passengers vented their anger on train personnel, and in this high-pressure situation some personnel were pursued to tears, not knowing what to do.
Train service personnel are just the first point of contact with passengers, and they cannot take responsibility for shutdowns through the entire high-speed rail system. Why did the malfunctions occur? Why did repairs take so long? Why was air-conditioning not working when there was a backup electrical supply? Why were passengers not told specifically what was happening? Why wasn’t more water and food provided after the delays? Why were passengers not compensated? These are all questions that train service personnel are unable to answer.
Media have hotly reported the “battle between air and rail” (空铁之争), and they have at the same time secretly hoped that “Old Man Railway” will show us all in the midst of this struggle that his old way of doing things has changed forever. But the facts this delay incident shows us are cruel.
1. How can thunderstorms caused power outages?
According to related personnel with the Beijing Railway Bureau, “thunderstorms and high winds in the Shandong region were the reason for these train delays, having caused malfunction and power failure along the overhead line system between Qufu (曲阜) and Zaozhuang (枣庄). Moreover, [they said], the power distribution systems for trains on the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail are powered principally through the 25kV high-voltage overhead line system.
Ren Gang (任刚), the chief engineer of CNR Tangshan, has said that the power distribution system for battery chargers on the high-speed rail can enable the provision of power for 120 minutes in the event of that power from the high-voltage overhead line system is lost, ensuring emergency air circulation, lighting and communications. “The trains can still operate as they wait for power suppliers to make rescue repairs,” [he said].
Li Ruiqun (李瑞淳), chief engineer of the CRH380 project, says the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail is a comprehensive project, not just about the trains themselves. These train stoppages had nothing to do with the quality of the trains themselves. Thunderstorms caused the malfunction of the overhead voltage system so that the trains had no source of power to propel them. But the trains themselves had storage batteries [he said] that would allow them to ensure emergency air circulation and electrical power for more than an hour in the event of sudden power outages.
Web users made posts to microblogs saying that after high-speed train number G151 stalled, the entire train experienced loss of power, shutting off the air conditioning and leaving conditions inside suffocating and hot. Well then, if the trains are equipped with storage batteries to provide power, why were the train cars without electricity?
Sun Zhang (孙章), a professor from the City and Rail Transportation Research Center at Tongji University, said that the loss of electrical power in the cars could be due to the failure to put contingency plans into effect. “It’s possible that general contingency training was insufficient, and this can be seen in poor communication with passengers and lack of information transparency,” [Sun said]. As for the suggestion that lightning caused the malfunction of power supply circuits, Sun Zhang says that the trains are equipped with lightning protection systems, and trains and the power supply system should all be equipped with lightning protection systems. “Or perhaps this lightning strike was particularly severe, even disabling the storage batteries.”
2. Why were the train car doors closed tightly? And why did train personnel say nothing?
Mr. Zhang, who was a passenger on train G19 that day said that after the incident occurred nothing was explained over the train’s broadcast system except that the internet signal was weak. Mr. Li, who was a passenger on train G151 also said that after the train experienced a malfunction and stopped in the station in Shandong, it stopped for another half-hour when it reached Xuzhou. Only after we passed the Xuzhou station did the train [personnel] hand out water and crackers, [he said]. But when they asked the train personnel [what had happened], she gave them no response.
In fact, as early as September 2005 the Ministry of Railways sent out a new version of “Methods for Handling Late Passenger Trains” (旅客列车晚点处置办法) to railway authorities throughout the country, and these clearly state: “If trains are later than 30 minutes, the station chief and train conductor should as representatives of the railway authorities issue a sincere apology to passengers; if [trains are] late by more than one hour, [they] must according to rescheduling notices from the railway ministry issue timely statements to passengers to explain the cause of the delay and estimated times of arrival, and work to conciliate the passengers.”
The reporters discovered on microblog platforms that one passenger had stepped out onto the train platform to cool down because it was too hot, and the train eventually departed, leaving him in the station. But [China’s] “Codes Concerning Handling of the Breakdown of Air Conditioning Units on Trains” (动车组列车空调装置故障后应急处置有关要求) stipulate that in order to protect the personal safety of travelers, and according to the staffing situation of trains, 4 to 98 doors should be opened to the platform, safety grids should be set up around the open doors and be staffed by train police, service personnel, meal car personnel and cleaning personnel under the direction of the conductor, strictly prohibiting passengers from exiting the train on their own.
At 8:30pm on July 10, after repairs were carried out, the train temporarily stopped in the Xuzhou East Station and emergency water and bread were provided by the train from the platform, only then resolving the problem of tight supplies of food and beverage.
The Morning Post reporters went to Jinan [Shandong] to cover the issue of food and beverage aboard the train. On train G222, Miss Wang, an employee in charge of sales on the train said that if they ran across the unexpected, the stores of instant noodles and other food and drink on the train could only supply about half of the train’s passengers and, “Generally, the train will resupply itself at stations along the line, but if we run into trouble suddenly and aren’t near a station then there’s nothing we can do.”
Unlike train G151, which experience a malfunction and lost electrical power, more than 10 other trains further down the line on the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail were stopped in various stations, waiting for the line to clear. Although they did not lose electricity, they suffered much unease owing to the lack of a contingency plan.
Shanghai passenger Miss Kuang was on train G21 that day heading from Beijing South Station to Shanghai’s Hongqiao Station. Her train was delayed by close to two hours. Their train was temporarily stopped at Jinan West Station for more than one hour. “In the hour that we waited, the train car doors were closed tight, and if you wanted to get out for some air you couldn’t,” [she said]. What upset the passengers on the train even more was that through all of the stopping and creeping along that personnel on the train never made any notice of the specific reasons for the delays.
Web user “Qing Kou Cai” (青口菜) came across the same situation. He posted on his microblog saying that he was on train G215 and it too was stopped in Jinan for more than one hour. [He said] that train personnel were all hurrying about their business but never made any explanation or attempt to comfort the passengers.
Yesterday, an employee at Jinan West Station told the reporters that on July 10 at least five trains made temporary stops at Jinan West Station. The employee said that because the train station and the trains were under separate controls, even though many trains were stopped at Jinan West Station, there was no way that employees at the station could “interact” with the trains. “As for the difficulties onboard the trains, we knew nothing about it, and we couldn’t be of any help.”
3. Why was there no way of offering compensation for delays?
For passengers, the delays have already become a fact, and what they care about most right now is the issue of compensation. On this issue, the reporter reached the Service Department of the Jinan Railway Ministry posing as a passenger from a delayed train. The employee said that right now there are no relevant laws and regulations on this issue, and therefore there was no way of offering compensation.
An employee from the Division of Passenger Traffic Management of the Transport Bureau of the Ministry of Railways responded that there could be a number of reasons for loss of power resulting in late arrivals, and if investigations showed clearly that errors by railway departments caused loss of power and late arrivals then railway departments would consider offering compensation to passengers. “As the railway ultimately achieved the task of delivering passengers to their destinations, full refunds of tickets are impossible,” [said the employee].

[Frontpage photo by “triplefivechina” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

According to a recent news report in Gansu’s Lanzhou Morning Post a local producer of “Japanese tofu” has been treating its products with Libai brand detergent and harmful coloring agents in order to improve stickiness and color. The report says commercial investigators began investigating the case on July 7. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, a pair of gloved hands pour detergents and dies over a bowl of coughing and gagging tofu.

Hu Jintao’s report delivered on July 1, 2011, to the conference commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party can be seen as one of the most important political declarations from the Party’s senior leadership ahead of the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Conducting an analysis of the full text of Hu’s report, I found a number of signs that are worth noting.
Historically speaking, CCP anniversary commemorations have had a close relationship to major Party congresses. Each successive Party congress since the 12th Party Congress in 1982 has fallen after major CCP anniversary celebrations held at five or ten-year intervals. For this reason, leadership speeches for major Party anniversaries often define the “orientation” (定向) for Party congresses, which are held every five years. If that orientation differs or undergoes substantial change, this generally means the political situation in China has been a complex one in the intervening year between the anniversary and the congress, or even that a political shift has occurred.
In China, the struggle over discursive power reflects the Party’s internal political struggles. In the current political lexicon of the Chinese Communist Party, “Mao Zedong Thought” (毛泽东思想), “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论), the “Three Represents” (三个代表) and the “Scientific Outlook on Development” (科学发展观) are the trademarks representing the discursive power of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao respectively. They point to the theoretical systems created by these four political leaders. “Mao Zedong Thought” is a political buzzword already belonging to the past. Meanwhile, another phrase, “With the important theories of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the ‘Three Represents’ as the guide, thoroughly applying the Scientific Outlook on Development,” is one whose use by the Chinese Communist Party has become standard practice ever since Hu Jintao took over the reins from Jiang Zemin (symbolized formally when Jiang gave up his post as head of the Central Military Commission in 2004). The latter phrase also appeared in Hu Jintao’s July 1 speech.
These political trademarks have ebbed and flowed in successive speeches to commemorate major Party anniversaries, from Jiang Zemin’s reports on the 70th and 80th anniversaries in 1991 and 2001, to Hu Jintao’s report on the 85th anniversary in 2006 and the 90th anniversary this month.

In Jiang Zemin’s report on the 70th anniversary in 1991, he mentioned “Mao Zedong Thought” 12 times. That speech came not long after the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989, at a time when reforms had been completely held back. Jiang Zemin’s speech also emphasized the importance of opposing “peaceful evolution,” upholding the “Four Basic Principles” (leadership of the CCP, the socialist path, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and dictatorship by the proletariat), and maintaining the system of “public ownership.” According to this discursive arrangement, the Party congress set for the following year might have anticipated an appreciable “leftward shift” (向左转). However, Deng Xiaoping’s so-called “southern tour” in the spring of 1992 reinvigorated economic reforms and established the reform objective of the “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济) as the chief objective of the 14th Party Congress in 1992. At the same time, Deng’s “southern tour” set the course for the political trademark “Hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory” (高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜), which had a prominent part in the 15th Party Congress five years later.
During the 14th Party Congress in 1992, “market economy” was written into the party constitution. During the 15th Party Congress, “Deng Xiaoping Theory” was written into the party constitution. Against this backdrop, “Mao Zedong Thought” — which is, of course, associated with the political left — saw successive declines in the reports to commemorate the 80th and 85th anniversaries of the CCP in 2001 and 2006. In the former, the dominant terms were the “Three Represents” and “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” The “Three Represents” was Jiang Zemin’s trademark theory, taking the stage in the run-up to the fall of 2002 and the passing of the torch to his successor, Hu Jintao. This emphasis on the “Three Represents” established the orientation for the 16th Party Congress, during which Jiang’s trademark theory was written into the party constitution.
But in 2006, both “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents” were in decline, the position of strength yielded to Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development.” In his speech commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Party that year, Hu Jintao went through great pains to enunciate his “Scientific Outlook on Development,” which he had raised back in 2004, and this slogan appeared with a frequency outstripping that of both “Mao Zedong Thought” in the 70th anniversary report (in 1991) and the “Three Represents” in the 80th anniversary report (in 2001). The “Scientific Outlook on Development,” its core the notion of “people foremost” (以人为本), became the principal theme of the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and the term was written that year into the party constitution. That constitution now reads: “The Scientific Outlook on Development, as a scientific theory completely in line with the important theories of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the ‘Three Represents,’ and in keeping with the times, is an important guideline for the social and economic development of our country, and a major strategic theory that must be adhered to and carried out for the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
From the 15th Party Congress to the 17th Party Congress, “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” and the “Scientific Outlook on Development” each became in succession the dominant, trademark political terms of the respective meetings.
In Hu Jintao’s July 1 speech to commemorate the Party’s 90th anniversary, however, we see some rather unusual shifts. Now, even before Hu has stepped aside for his successor, there is a noticeable decline in his discursive profile as the “Scientific Outlook on Development” shows a drop in frequency. “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents” likewise show declines, but we find by contrast that “Mao Zedong Thought” has experienced a moderate rise. Even if we factor in instances where Hu Jintao uses “scientific development” in his speech rather than the full-blown term “Scientific Outlook on Development” (stressing that this abridged form cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as an equivalent), we count only 9 instances altogether, far below the 17 full uses of the term Hu logged in his speech to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the Party in 2006. We can guess, therefore, that Hu’s trademark political term will see a dramatic fall in the upcoming political report to the 18th Party Congress.
When I searched archives of the CCP’s official People’s Daily from 1997 to 2010, it was clear the both “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents” had both reached peaks of frequency and then fallen out of use in a relative sense. Similarly, the “Scientific Outlook on Development” has steadily declined since reaching a peak around the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

Looking at the indications given in the 90th anniversary report, it seems that none of these above-mentioned theories will be important banner terms during the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Meanwhile the term “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义) has experienced a dramatic rise when anniversary reports are compared (22 times for the 70th, 17 times for the 80th and 37 times for the 90th). This term can be seen today as the Chinese Communist Party’s “greatest common denominator” (最大公约数), a term not associated with any one political figure (though it was raised by Deng Xiaoping) or political faction, and one that is not generally contested.
In his political report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao did not employ the phrase “raising high the glorious banner of Deng Xiaoing Theory” (高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜), replacing the phrase instead with “raising high the glorious banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜). In his July 1 speech, he offered a new formulation of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and its role relative to other theories. He said that the Party had made two great theoretical achievements, the first being “Mao Zedong Thought” and the second being “the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which, he said, includes “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” and the “Scientific Outlook on Development.” This formulation essentially packaged all three of these theories — of Deng, Jiang and Hu respectively — under one banner, representing the continued decline of the status of Deng and Jiang in the discursive mix. So we see the rapid fading of the terms “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents.” But more startling is the way Hu has de-emphasized his own political trademark, seemingly abandoning the hope that it will symbolize his own political personality and establish the orientation for the 18th Party Congress.
At the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Hu Jintao will pass the torch to another general secretary. But according to convention it will still be Hu Jintao that prepares the political report for the congress. Analyzing his 90th anniversary report, it would seem that “the glorious banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics” will set the orientation for the 18th Party Congress. But I believe the likelihood of that is slim. That would mean that the 18th Party Congress had little fresh significance in terms of the articulation of the CCP’s political goals. The general conclusion to be drawn from Hu Jintao’s 19th anniversary report is that he is hesitating and taking a wait and see attitude.

Clearly, in the past one or two years, Hu Jintao has lacked sufficient political drive. His July 1 speech answered none of the problems Chinese care about with rising intensity: rights defense, anti-corruption and political reform. Hu’s recent report, in fact, represents a clear backwards turn from the report to the 17th Party Congress. When Hu Jintao spoke about democracy, it was to roundly praise the achievements of the democratic politics of the Chinese Communist Party. But as for the future, there was no vision or promise. Phrases that were rare bright points in the 2007 report, such as “protecting the people’s right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to monitor,” and “letting power be exercised under the sunlight” (transparently, that is), were absent altogether from the 90th anniversary report. He spoke about fighting corruption, but said nothing at all about the crucial issue of declaration of assets by government officials. Nor did he make any mention of the importance of press and public opinion supervision.
Against these absences, the July 1 speech placed a heavy emphasis on “stability.” The term “stability” was used five times in the report for the 70th anniversary in 1991, four times in the report for the 80th anniversary in 2001, and six times in the report for the 85th anniversary in 2006. The term appears 10 times in Hu Jintao’s latest report, surpassing the 70th anniversary report that came in the tense climate that followed the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The language of stability, moreover, is more hard-line than in Hu’s report to the 17th Party Congress, in which he said, “Social stability is the common wish of the people, and an important condition of reform and development.” In his July 1 speech, Hu Jintao emphasized for the first time that: “Development is the fundamental principle, stability is the fundamental task.” This is a slogan we heard from hard-line leaders during unrest in Tibet in 2008, and again during unrest in Xinjiang the following year. The use of this term in Hu Jintao’s 90th anniversary speech conveys the voice of hardliners within the Chinese Communist Party. Hu even included his catchphrase “to not rock the boat,” or bu zheteng (不折腾), in the closing remarks of his report.
As a matter of course, the drafts for reports on important Party anniversaries and of course political reports to Party congresses go through an internal process of repeated discussion and revision, and they are the product of various political influences and power plays. Unlike the anniversary speeches we saw in the run-up to the 16th and 17th Party congresses, Hu Jintao’s July 1 speech not only makes no introduction of a political concept to set the orientation of the 18th Party Congress in 2012, but it in fact weakens the political trademarks of Hu and his predecessors. Hu Jintao glances warily to the left and right in the speech, not daring to draw his sword, if you will. Defining stability as the primary task is perhaps the only consensus to be had at the most senior levels at present.
Does the weakening of the political trademarks of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao mean that various factions and interests at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party are holding each other back ahead of the 18th Party Congress, and that we are in the midst of a political stalemate? Does the relative rise of “Mao Zedong Thought” in Hu Jintao’s July 1 report suggest that the Party might make a leftward turn? Does Jiang Zemin’s absence from the July 1 celebrations, as well as the prominent positioning of former standing committee member Song Ping (宋平), sometimes called the “king of China’s left” (左王), signify that larger shifts in Chinese politics are still possible? And as we saw in the interval between the report commemorating the Party’s 70th anniversary in 1991 and the 14th Party Congress in 1992, when Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” radically reset China’s political course, can we expect some sort of dramatic shift over the next year? These are things we will have to continue to watch very closely.

China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported late last night, in both Chinese and English releases, that the G151 train on the country’s brand-new Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway suffered a malfunction yesterday that resulted in a delay of “more than an hour.” On the basis of reports in social media, however, news websites (including Shanghai’s Xinmin Online), reported that the delay was two hours. Xinhua reported that “this malfunction was principally caused by thunderstorms.” Principally?
News of the malfunction on the high-speed rail spread quickly on social media, where Chinese were reading a different account of what happened on the line. Xinmin Online, the official news website of Shanghai’s Xinmin Evening News, quoted user “shirley_wang1018” writing on a microblog account that the train stopped for more than an hour, slowly started up again and had a second malfunction just 20 minutes later. Another web user wrote that there was no air circulation in the train cars, that the cars were leaning slightly, and that passengers were very nervous. Rail employees apparently explained to passengers that thunderstorms had caused an interruption of power to the overhead line system.

[ABOVE: A photo posted to Sina Weibo by a user aboard the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail shows passengers waiting in a dark car.]
A single Sina Weibo post by “Female Finance Reporter Bu Luo” (财经女记者部落) with a photo and short news brief on the rail malfunction had been shared more than 19,000 times by 2:30am on July 11. The post had more than 3,700 user comments.
The vast majority of users responded by voicing their anger and frustration, many voicing again concerns and criticisms that have followed the high-speed rail project through its history, particularly cost, corruption and safety. The rail, which officially opened to great fanfare on June 30, was an important sign of prestige and legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party on the eve of its 90th anniversary on July 1. But many have bristled at the line’s price tag of 32.5 billion U.S. dollars. Rumors of corruption involving the project became news in February this year, when Liu Zhijun (刘志军), the head of the railway ministry, was arrested on charges of corruption.
“Sure the reason was ‘weather’,” Sina Weibo user “tata_Beijing” (塔塔_北京) said sarcastically.
“And they call it the safest rail in the world,” said user “turan kongjian” (突然空闲).
“The facts clearly show that the talk of being the safest is just hot air,” said user “yinbao xiaoxiong” (尹抱小熊), responding to another user who wrote: “Strange! This should be investigated! We should hold those responsible to account according to the law!”
“I’m sure this is just the beginning,” said user “jackie51”.
“How tragic is fast-food-style China!” bemoaned “yiguogudu_ye.”
“Taking an airplane is a lot safer. I’d rather wait in the airport, at least it’s safe,” said user “cha’ersicao” (查尔斯曹).

[ABOVE: A photo of passengers waiting outside train G151 as “emergency repairs” are made.]

In his July 1 speech to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) paused briefly from the self-congratulation to warn that the Party faces “four dangers,” including corruption and alienation from the people. We noted after the celebrations that Hu’s speech pointed to a tense environment within the Party, and suggested that the only real consensus right now seems to be the need for stability.
Of course, how to achieve that stability is a question that raises once again all of those essential but divisive issues Hu Jintao did not actively address in his speech — namely, rights defense, anti-corruption and political reform.

[ABOVE: “This is us [China] today!” wrote Dong Chongfei (董崇飞), a social media editor in Shandong province, on his Sina Weibo account on July 9. The cartoon depicts an unstable Jenga tower being built by a towering crane.]
In the most recent edition of the liberal Party journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金), the former editor-in-chief of the official People’s Daily and an influential pro-reform Party elder, commemorated the CCP’s 90th anniversary with a stark warning: if tensions between the people and the government continue to rise due to unaddressed grievances and popular disgust at corruption and other injustices, the outcome could be catastrophic.
A full translation of Zhou’s essay follows.

Lately I’ve had a deep sense of anxiety as I’ve watched one occurrence after another of tensions between governments and people at the local level, which have become more an more acute. A number of officials at the local government level have abused their powers, again and again trampling the human rights, right to life and rights of property of ordinary people. Those affected turn to petitioning, make contact with the media, or go online to report their stories. If they turn to legal proceedings and other like methods in an attempt to protect the legitimate rights granted them in the constitution, they find that these channels for voicing their interests are blocked. What’s more, local governments will level such charges as “slander” (诽谤) or “extortion of the government” (敲诈政府) to go after them, “arresting them across provincial borders” (跨省抓捕) or simply locking them away in mental hospitals claiming that they are “psychological unsound.” Not long ago, Wuhan petitioner Xu Wu (徐武) was lucky enough to escape from a “mental hospital” after being locked up for four years, but then was openly dragged away by Wuhan police from the courtyard of Guangdong’s Southern Television (TVS) and again committed to a mental hospital. There was a buzz of public opinion around the country, but authorities in Hubei simply responded by suppressing media reporting.
These arrogant and unreasonable methods scraped the very bottom of the ethics of governance, seriously going against our Party’s political aim that says that “the Party works for the public, and exercises power for the people” (立党为公、执政为民). Lately the problem of petitioners “being [forcibly committed to] mental hospitals” (被精神病) has become, like the problem of forced property demolition (暴力拆迁), a painful new concern of the people. The first concern of many leaders now is to maintain the semblance of stability while they are in their posts. If nothing goes wrong they earn their political points (不出事, 出政绩).
In order to preserve the face and awe of the local government, and even of the various interest groups with which they have creeping connections, they will not stop at harming the interests of the people, and they even cloak themselves in the tiger skins of “stability preservation,” deceiving their superiors with claims [that they are battling] “hostile forces” and masses who “don’t understand the truth,” excusing their own incompetence in public administration and their ruthless offenses. They care not whether the price is loss of government credibility or the disintegration of popular support.
On the surface, these local [governments] can rely on public power and force to successfully suppress the discontentment and opposition of the people. For the moment, they can shield themselves from “static noise” in the media and on the Internet. But they cannot eliminate the hatred toward the government in the hearts of the people. When new hot topics [in the news and on the Internet] crop up, public anger will burst free, demanding payment with interest. The problem is, who will pay the debt of this anger pent up among the people? Local officials do not think about this issue. But they will cause our Party and our socialist system to have to answer for these combustible social tensions. In some areas, the “water level” of the people’s anger has already risen above the “plane,” and its only through a high-pressure campaign of stability preservation that the levee holds and temporary peace is ensured. But no one can say when the dam will be breached or collapse altogether. These methods spell disaster not just for the people, but spell disaster for the Party and the nation. As early as 2009, during the Deng Yujiao (邓玉娇) case that infuriated the public, web users warned: “Any instance of injustice must result in the further loss of the hearts of the people, and each popular resentment gathered up must ultimately breed great disaster.”
Ninety long years ago, our Chinese Communist Party rose among the peasants and the workers. Without weapons and without printing presses, but relying only on deep sympathies at the grassroots, its democratic politics and its longing for social fairness, it won the heartfelt support of the people. When Peng Pai (彭湃), the son of a major landlord in Haifeng County (海丰县), returned from his studies in Japan, his took off his long robe and wore a short trousers in its place and gave up his family’s rich lifestyle, in which “on average each [family] member had 50 slaves,” set fire to his own land deed and divided the land up among the poor, creating the Hailufeng Revolutionary Base (海陆丰革命根据地). The two sons of Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), [a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party], when one was 17 and the other 14, went themselves to Shanghai for studies. They generally ate only flat bread and drank only water, not wearing cotton jackets in the winter, wearing rags in the summer. They were at one with the workers and ordinary city residents. They often helped the old and sick cart drivers pull their carts. And they became early heroes of the worker’s movement.
The attitude of the older generation of revolutionaries in receiving petitioners is something we should urgently think about. According to media reports, in March 1960, during the three years of the Great Famine that followed the “Great Leap Forward,” Red Army hero and Sichuan Daxian farmer He Mingyuan (何明渊) went to the capital [Beijing] to voice his grievances. Using the rather extreme method of lighting a lamp during the daytime in front of the Monument to the Martyrs on Tiananmen Square, he reminded the central government to pay attention to ordinary Chinese who were dying of hunger. In that time when “class struggle” was sweeping the land, the Party secretary of the Beijing Party Committee, Peng Zhen (彭真), did not toss him into prison, but actually prevented him from returning to his hometown, where he might have faced recrimination, and allowed him to go to [the city of] Wuhan in Hubei to live. When Chairman Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) heard a report of this, he was so moved that he couldn’t speak for a time. The central leadership resolutely took measures in accordance with the actual situation in various regions, correcting the errors of the “Great Leap Forward.” While the old generation of CCP leaders did make this and that sort of error in administering state affairs, the care they showed when they faced the sufferings of the people remains moving.
Love of the people, closeness to the people and respect for the people are the precious assets that enabled our Party to earn the support of the people and be victorious over every trial. Against the glowing examples of the older generation of leaders, just how many thousands and tens of thousands of miles short are these local officials today who treat the people facing demolition and removal [of their property] as crickets and ants and petitioners as enemies?
Some people at the grassroots, because they’ve been driven into a corner, and have no remedies or recourse, will spare no pains [to make their grievances known] even if it means destroying their own bodies . . . [so we see] people facing demolition [of their properties] setting fire to themselves. Are members of our Chinese Communist Party not jarred by this. The rights and freedom of our citizens must be protected. The power vested by the people must be limited and checked by the system. Our Party leaders at all levels must expend the greatest energies possible to unblock the channels by which various social interests can be voiced and played out, and improve general administration, Party discipline, and judicial and public opinion mechanisms, all of this in order to carefully attend to the will of the people, dissolve popular anger, care for the sufferings of the people, and resolve the real interest issues of the people. Only by properly attending to the above, can we eliminate various factors of disharmony and truly preserve social and political stability.
Recently, the Ministry of Land and Resources send down an urgent notice demanding that local governments “desist from forcibly carrying out land appropriation and demolition and removal” in order to prevent the crude suppression of the people as a source of mass incidents of a grave nature. In contrast to Hubei province, when it came out in Hunan that lower-level family planning officials in Shaoyang City (邵阳市) were accused of selling children born in violation of the One-Child Policy, the Party secretary of Hunan, Zhou Qiang (周强), ordered a “thorough investigation”; a discipline inspection official set up shop in the township government office [in Shaoyang] and publicly listened to ordinary citizens as they told their stories, and he said to the victims: “Rest assured, we’ll handle this.”
I sincerely hope that in this era of transition in which social tensions are acute, our Party cadres at various levels are able to set straight their relationship with the people, staying vigilant day and night, truly acting in accord with Hu Jintao’s words, “Use power for the people, show concern for the people and seek benefit for the people,” truly acting in accord with Comrade Xi Jinping’s words, “Power is bestowed by the people,” acting in accord with Hu Jintao’s words, so all people can hear those warm and sincere words: “Rest assured, we’ll handle this.”

On June 30, officials in the city of Qingdao formally opened the Qingdao Jiaozhou Bay Bridge (青岛胶州湾大桥), the world’s longest sea bridge, for traffic. But many drivers noted to their dismay that some of the safety railings lining the side of the bridge had not been installed, or screws had not been tightened properly. In this animated cartoon, posted by artist Cao Yi (曹一) to his QQ blog, a grinning official holds a commemorative plaque and ribbon to celebrate the grand opening of a bridge project, not-so-discretely tapping in a few remaining safety rails on the clearly unfinished project.

Over the weekend, mine authorities in the Bouyei-Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Qianna, in China’s Guizhou province, reported that 21 miners were trapped in a flooded mine, and that rescue efforts were in progress. Also over the weekend, 19 miners were trapped after a mine collapsed in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. China has the world’s worst record on mine safety, with 2,500 miners killed last year alone. People’s Daily Online reported late last month, on the heals of two more deadly mining incidents, that the problem of illegal mines remains rife. The report revealed that there were more than 2,000 illegal mines in Fujian province’s Longyan prefecture (龙岩) alone, and that these were heavily invested by local Party and government officials. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, an official smiles, his hand and pocket full of money, as he watches miners emerge with carts of coal from a mine shaped like a human skull.

In his speech commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party yesterday, President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) spoke for a tensely scripted 72 minutes about the glories of the CCP [English here], its “historic” accomplishments and its “advanced” theoretical frameworks. Avoiding altogether the more sensitive episodes of the Party’s history, Hu’s speech traced China’s coming of age as a modern nation, from the humiliation of the Opium Wars to the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, and on through to the the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the onset of economic reforms.
Not surprisingly, there was plenty of talk of the advanced culture of socialism, but no mention of the Cultural Revolution. There was praise for the “building of the socialist market economy,” but no mention of the economic and political tragedies of the Maoist era, such as the Great Leap Forward, the Anti-rightist Movement and the Great Famine.
The Party’s legacy was described as an unqualified success, a faultless saga of national progress. “All of the accomplishments we have made over the past 90 years are the result of the tenacity and continued struggle of the Chinese Communist Party along with the people. The first generation of central Party leaders of which Mao Zedong was the core led the whole Party, the whole people and the various nationalities of the entire nation in achieving the great victory of the new-democratic revolution, building the basic system of socialism, and setting down the basic political conditions and institutional foundations for all development and progress in China today.”
While emphasizing that Hu Jintao’s speech yesterday can be seen as one of “his most important political declarations ahead of the 18th Party Congress [in 2012],” China Media Project Director Qian Gang (钱钢) said the speech was “completely stable and safe, even lethargic,” and gave every indication that Hu Jintao and China’s current crop of leaders have no intention of taking bolder action, particularly on political reform, to deal with problems currently facing China. Overall, Qian Gang said, the speech suggests that Hu Jintao is “in a situation where he doesn’t dare move forward but doesn’t dare move backward either.”
There is every suggestion in yesterday’s speech that Hu Jintao will maintain the status quo through the remainder of his term in office, and will have a hard time making any concerted move.
Perhaps the most notable thing about Hu’s speech is its overriding emphasis on stability, with stability-related terms buzzwords and phrases appearing with greater frequency than seen in the past three Party anniversary reports delivered by Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao. Here are the four major anniversary reports we have had in the last two decades:
1991: Jiang Zemin’s report to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the CCP
2001: Jiang Zemin’s report to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the CCP
2006: Hu Jintao’s report to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the CCP
2011: Hu Jintao’s report to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the CCP
While the term “stability” appeared 5 times in the 70th anniversary report, 4 in the 80th, and 6 in the 85th, it appeared at least 10 times in yesterday’s speech. The language of stability, moreover, is more hardline than in Hu’s report to the 17th Party Congress, in which he said, “Social stability is the common wish of the people, and an important condition of reform and development.” In yesterday’s speech, Hu Jintao emphasized for the first time that: “Development is the fundamental principle, stability is the fundamental task; Without stability, nothing can be accomplished, and the gains we have already made will also be lost. This principle is something not only comrades throughout the Party must bear firmly in mind, but that the whole people must be induced to bear firmly in mind.” Hu Jintao even included his catchphrase “to not rock the boat,” or bu zheteng (不折腾), in the closing remarks of yesterday’s speech.
Also at issue here is the tug-of-war we have seen happening within the CCP over the past few years, which speaks to deep unease about where the country needs to go. China’s hardline left has clearly enjoyed greater prominence, and almost certainly has wielded greater influence, in recent months.
Keyword frequencies in Hu Jintao’s speech yesterday do seem to indicate something of a leftward shift.
In the political lexicon of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong Thought (毛泽东思想), Deng Xiaoping Theory (邓小平理论), the Three Represents (三个代表) and the Scientific View of Development (科学发展观) are terms representing the political ideas and gravitas of four generations of leaders — Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The relative strength or weakness of these terms is closely tied to shifts in political power. And we can see significant changes in the use of these terms in the four major anniversary reports we have seen in the last two decades, based on Qian Gang’s analysis.
Jiang Zemin’s 1991 report followed on the heels of the Tiananmen Massacre, and economic reforms were stalled at the time, almost a year before Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” (南巡). Jiang’s speech that year mentioned “Mao Zedong Thought” 12 times, a clear nod to conservative leaders on the left. But the term declined in each of the successive reports in 2001 and 2006. The reigning terms during the 80th anniversary in 2001 were the “Three Represents,” Jiang Zemin’s signature theory, and “Deng Xiaoping Theory”. But in 2006, both of these terms took a backseat to Hu Jintao’s new buzzword, the “Scientific View of Development.”
In yesterday’s speech, however, we see a startling reshuffle of terms and their relative power. Hu Jintao’s “Scientific View of Development” has plunged, and Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin terminologies similarly show decline. By contrast, “Mao Zedong Thought” is resurgent. So the order of precedence has been flipped: Mao, Jiang-Deng, Hu.
Hu Jintao also mentioned “Scientific Development” (without the full term) several times in the speech, but even when all related instances are factored together they emerge only nine times in the speech, compared to 17 times for the full term in Hu’s 2006 speech to commemorate the Party’s 85th anniversary.
“Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents” have in the past been terms of political strength. But Hu Jintao spoke yesterday of just two “great theoretical achievements” of the Party. The first, he said, was “Mao Zedong Thought”, and the second was the “theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义理论体系) — which included “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” and the “Scientific View of Development.” This packing together of “theoretical achievements” after Mao in fact suggests a weakening of status of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. And, says Qian Gang: “Hu Jintao seems to have given up the ambition of [establishing] the ‘Scientific View of Development’ as his personal political trademark. This is a rather peculiar circumstance.”
Could this signal the fact that China’s top leaders have seen their power eroded ahead of next year’s 18th Party Congress, and that a tug-of-war is underway among the Party’s elite? Is there a new dominant political “theory” waiting in the wings? To what extent can we see the ascendance of “Mao Zedong Thought” in Hu’s speech as a sign of a further leftward shift in Chinese politics?
One of the most notable things about yesterday’s celebration was not just, as Hong Kong media quickly noted, the conspicuous absence of Jiang Zemin, who is rumored to be seriously ill, but the surprising presence of the 94-year-old Song Ping (宋平), a formidable figure who has been called the “king of the left” (左王). Song, long rumored himself to be seriously ill, was out yesterday with an air of return — and seated, it must be noted, at the center of the rostrum along with the former premier Zhu Rongji (朱镕基). Does this mean we can expect a shake-up in Chinese politics ahead of the 18th Party Congress?
These are all things we will have to watch closely.

[ABOVE: Song Ping (bottom left), sometimes called the “king” of China’s left, stands next to former premier Zhu Rongji in a position of prominence during yesterday’s celebrations.]
While yesterday’s speech does not differ greatly from Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, there are a number of points that clearly mark a step back.
Qian Gang says: “He is unable to answer those questions which have received ever more urgent attention in China in recent years: rights defense, the fight against corruption and political reform. He has great praise for the Party’s achievements in the area of democratic politics, but as for the future there is no vision or promise.”
Qian Gang also notes that the formula of the “four rights,” which Hu spoke of in 2007 — namely, the right to know (知情权), right to participate (参与权), right to express (表达权) and right to monitor (监督权) — are completely absent in yesterday’s speech. Nor was there any mention of “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), a term routinely appearing in political reports and past anniversary speeches and denoting the importance of the press and public opinion in monitoring power.
The only portion of Hu Jintao’s speech that was not self-congratulatory came in the 24th minute. Following his litany of praise for the historic victories of the Chinese Communist Party and the people of China, Hu said the Party now faces internal challenges that are “more strenuous and pressing than at any point in the past.” He stressed that the Party faces “four dangers” — lost vitality (精神懈怠), insufficient capacity (能力不足), alienation from the people (脱离群众) and rampant corruption (消极腐败).
But while Hu gave a nod to the problem of official corruption, which is now a source of broad public anger, no substantive action was mentioned. He did not, for example, raise the issue of declaration of assets by officials (官员财产申报).
In sum, Hu Jintao’s speech yesterday was cautious in the extreme, a further sign that the mood of glorious celebration in China is backgrounded by a deep unease.
Those professional Chinese media scrambling to take something positive away from the speech, or to use it to advance more liberal agendas, could only seize on that portion dealing with the “four dangers.” This was exactly what news editors at QQ.com did yesterday, playing down the atmosphere of celebration and self-congratulation. The bright red headline at the top reads: “Four dangers now urgently face us.”