Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Critical reporting is also positive news

The editorial department at the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper is once again making waves today with a relatively moderate editorial, this time urging Party and government leaders to take a more tolerant approach toward media and information — not seeing public sentiment as the enemy.
For our comments on editorials appearing since April in the People’s Daily, please see “What’s up with the People’s Daily?“.
Readers may note that today’s editorial mentions Hu Jintao’s so-called “Four Rights” (四个权利), which Hu articulated in his report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, but which have gotten rather cool treatment since. These are: the right to know (知情权), right to participate (参与权), right to express (表达权) and right to monitor (监督权).
In another interesting portion, the editorial twists the CCP propaganda notion of “emphasizing positive news” by quoting Henan Party secretary Lu Zhangong (卢展工), who said back in February, in reference to the Chinese concept that roughly approximates “watchdog journalism,” that “supervision by public opinion is also positive reporting.”
As can only be expected, the editorial does not diverge from the mainstream Party discourse on the press, including Hu’s “Four Rights” and his 2008 policy of “public opinion channeling” (舆论引导). But the final line about the media being “a platform through which the government and the public can have communication and exchange” is sure to raise the hackles of hardliners in the propaganda establishment, who will be quick to remind all that media in China serve the Party, period.

“Media Literacy” Reflects the Quality of Governance (“媒介素养”体现执政水平)
People’s Daily
June 16, 2011
Public sentiment isn’t “the enemy” (敌情). Quite the contrary, the media is a warning mechanism for society. While its attention and reflection on breaking incidents and sensitive issues might cause some momentary embarrassment for local governments, taking a longer-term view this is very beneficial for the protection of rights and interests of the people and the promotion of social progress.
In a definite sense, we are living in an age of media incidents.
We open up our newspapers, send microblogs, [read] news and editorials . . . The public’s interest in society and the government is generally exercised through the platform of the media. The south China tiger affair (华南虎), the “eluding the cat” affair (躲猫猫), the “entrapment” affair (钓鱼执法), the Yihuang self-immolation case (宜黄强拆) — these symbolic events that quickly seized attention across the country on the back of media coverage, remind us that today methods and concepts of governance inevitably emerge, and are even enlarged, through the media. The age of “mediatized governance” (治理媒介化) has already arrived.
As openness and transparency gradually become the consensus in governance, as the right to know, participate, express and monitor become basic rights enjoyed by citizens, we see a steady rise in knowledge about media among governments at various levels. Our press release system is daily improving. Press spokespeople are constantly stepping out. More and more Party and government cadres maintain [online] message boards and do live interviews. More than 1,700 official government microblogs regularly issue authoritative information. Cadres and leaders at various levels are more and more confident under the spotlight. These changes are cause for joy.
Change, of course, is a process. And in the midst of overall progress, some local [governments] still show many deficiencies in dealing with the media. Or they overlook the media, seeing them as so much decoration. Those “deeply sleeping [government] websites” (沉睡网站) whose content is never replenished are a sign of feeble media consciousness [or literacy]. Or [some leaders] avoid the media, . . . exposing the absence of methods for channeling [public opinion to deal with crises]. Or some fear the media, concluding that the media are “on the hunt” (找事) and a source of trouble, and then we see such things as news bans, cover ups, prevention, pressure and hiding the truth (封, 捂, 堵, 压, 瞒). The attitude of “preventing fire, preventing theft, preventing journalists” (防火防盗防记者) is well-known. Or the media are misused, seen as a tool for covering up one’s mistakes, for misleading the public, and for making the case for the improper conduct of various local governments and offices.
If we can say that media have already entered the 2.0 era of two-way communications, then government administration too has entered the 2.0 era — from [the era of] the loudspeaker and preaching from newspapers and magazines, to [the era of] news release, online networking and interactivity. If there is not the necessary media literacy [among government officials], if [they] do not have the capacity to listen and respond, if [they] only suppress and block [media], this will without a doubt take the “inter” out of interconnectivity, leaving just a failed connection.
Public sentiment isn’t “the enemy” (敌情). Quite the contrary, the media is a warning mechanism for society. While its attention and reflection on breaking incidents and sensitive issues might cause some momentary embarrassment for local governments, but accurately and thoroughly observing public sentiment, and keeping a clear head, is greatly beneficial. Taking a longer-term view, this is very beneficial for the protection of rights and interests of the people and the promotion of social progress, just as one provincial Party secretary once said: “Supervision by public opinion is also positive reporting” (舆论监督也是正面报道).
In the face of social transition, institutional transition and transforming ideas, we need the active agenda-setting of the media, and its promotion, building of common ground and cohesion, whether this involves explaining policies, working out hostilities, exchanging ideas or building consensus. It is from this vantage point that the central Party leadership has emphasized that the media is an important resource and method in administering the nation, and that leaders and cadres at various levels must raise their capacity to deal with the media, practically achieving good treatment, good use and good management (善待, 善用, 善管) [of the media].
Leaders and cadres who are surrounded by information and the media, urgently need to make a habit of reading the news sensitivity (新闻敏感) of sudden-breaking events, and the and value judgements involved. Otherwise, if they respond slowly or intervene ineffectively, not only might [such events] “build up if they are small, and explode if they are big” (小事闹大,大事闹炸), but they might dissolve the consensus of reform and development, and erode the “intangible assets” (无形资产) of the government.
For leaders and cadres, media literacy is not just an ability but an attitude. Only with an attitude of equality can the arrogance of “Do you speak for the Party or for the people?” be avoided [NOTE: This refers to a 2009 case in which the vice-mayor of a city in Henan angrily posed this question to a journalist]. Only with an attitude of respect can the arrogance of “I don’t have time to chat with you” be avoided. Only with an attitude of openness can we look problems directly in the face rather than making “journalist blacklists” [NOTE: This is a reference to plans recently announced by China’s Ministry of Health for a blacklist]. Only with an attitude of candor can we greet criticism with self-examination rather than launching back with accusations of slander . . .
Ultimately, the media are a platform through which the government and the public can have communication and exchange. One’s attitude toward the media is also one’s attitude toward the public. This is a basic reflection and test of one’s administrative concepts and abilities.

China's media czars dial up the pomp

The 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party is just a little over two weeks away, and the time has come for pomp and circumstance. That is the message China’s propaganda czar, Li Changchun (李长春), conveys to the domestic media today in a speech being energetically promoted — presumably because no one has any real choice — across major internet news portals and in daily newspapers.
In the speech, given yesterday while on an official inspection tour of the north-central autonomous region of Ningxia, Li urges media to “carry out education in the love of the Party, love of the nation and love of socialism extensively throughout society.” Media are to create “a dense atmosphere of solemnity and ardor, joy and peace, unity and advancement, and scientific development.” Li also talks about the need to advance “cultural sector reforms,” so that enterprises, in the cultural sector that is, continue to raise the competitiveness of their brands. For good measure, he talks about actively “extolling [our] outstanding national cultural traditions.”
What does all this Party claptrap mean? . . . What, you didn’t understand the memo?
It means, of course, tighter controls on the media. It sends the message, loud and clear to all journalists, editors and website operators, that now is crunch time. The party is just around the corner, and anyone who spoils the mood does so at great peril.


[ABOVE: Today’s news page at QQ.com, with Li Changchun coverage highlighted.]
For all the complicated mechanics of press control in China, the fundamental agent is fear. And this is what Li Changchun’s message conveys, behind the leader’s support for cultural traditions — sit back, sing along and enjoy the party, and you’ll have nothing to fear.
Just to give you a taste of Li Changchun’s soaring rhetoric, here is a portion of the Xinhua release.

“Li Changchun: Creating a Favorable [Public Opinion] Environment for the 90th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party”
Li Changchun emphasizes during an inspection tour in Ningxia: [We must] extensively carry out education in love for the Party, love for the nation and love for society
June 14, 2011
Xinhua News Agency
Reporter, Zhang Qin (张钦)
Creating a Favorable Environment for the 90th Anniversary of the CCP
CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun (李长春) emphasized during an inspection tour in Ningxia that in celebration of the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, [we must] carry out education in the love of the Party, love of the nation and love of socialism extensively throughout society, undertaking education in the socialist core value system (社会主义核心价值体系), undertaking education in the great experience [and success] of economic reform and opening, undertaking education in the furthering of unity among our national peoples, singing the main theme (主旋律) of the goodness of the CCP, the goodness of socialism, the goodness of economic reform and opening, the goodness of our Great Mother Country and the goodness of people of all nationalities, working hard to create a dense atmosphere of solemnity and ardor, joy and peace, unity and advancement, and scientific development. [We must] encourage cadres and the masses to struggle hard for the realization of the struggle objective of the “12th Five-year Plan,” for the seizing of the full building of the new victory of a moderately prosperous society, and the creation of a new dimension of the project of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
. . .
He [Li Changchun] emphasized that [we, or media] must thoroughly make use of sites of patriotic education, energetically propagating the great achievements and abundant merits of the Chinese Communist Party in leading the people in revolution, the building [of a nation] and economic reform and opening, must energetically promote the great spirit of the Long March and other precious spiritual riches created in the various historical eras of our Party, and invest these with new currency . . .

And while Li Changchun is drumming home the message out West, Liu Yunshan (刘云山), the head of China’s Central Propaganda Department, is in Zhejiang province with the same message.
The other big headline on news sites today is, “Liu Yunshan: Do Propaganda for the 90th Anniversary Well — Use the Achievements of the Party to Stimulate the People.”
Liu talks about the need to fully exploit “red resources” (红色资源), carrying out education on the “history, knowledge and nature of the Party.”


[ABOVE: Today’s news page at Sohu.com, with Li Changchun and Liu Yunshan coverage highlighted.]

Planned journalist blacklist angers media

During a June 13 forum on food safety in China, Mao Qun’an (毛群安), head of the news and publicity office of China’s Ministry of Health, said the ministry would build a “blacklist system,” maintaining records of “media journalists at various levels” responsible for false reports on food safety and other health problems. Mao said the journalist blacklist was meant to “combat or prevent media at various levels from polluting the broadcast [or news] environment (传播环境), and offering misleading information.”
News of the planned blacklist has understandably rattled Chinese journalists and many internet users, who have attacked the blacklist as unnecessary, ineffective, irresponsible and an overstepping of the ministry’s authority.
Certainly, the Ministry of Health has been under a great deal of pressure in recent months, as health and food safety scandals have cropped up one after the other, calling into question a dizzying array of food products, everything from pork to chrysanthemums. These successive scandals have exposed the ineffectiveness of government safety inspectors and created a widespread sense of desperation among Chinese consumers.
Frustration with the Ministry of Health, and the remarks from Mao Qun’an, is clear in today’s newspapers.
The Information Times, a commercial spin-off of Guangzhou Daily, admitted that there had been problems in many news reports, due largely to insufficient expertise and training on the health and food safety beat. But the paper suggested the ministry’s response was an overreaction:

There certainly are such problems as dissemination of inaccurate information, and just as spokesman [Mao] said, “Many media have in their reports equated the use of additives and the illegal use of additives.” . . . But to suggest that media have ‘intentionally misled the people’ is a bit hard for anyone to stomach . . . Clearly, in creating its own blacklist of journalist, the Ministry of Health is overstepping its authority. Therefore, to say this blacklist is an attempt by the ministry to shield itself from supervision by public opinion [or Chinese watchdog journalism] is not as on the mark as saying it is a fig leaf, disguising the [ministry’s] own ineffectiveness is conducting its work. It even turns [the blame for] the chaotic situation in food safety on to “journalists at various levels.”

Jinan Times, a commercial spin-off of the official Jinan Daily, said it was only natural that the announcement of a planned blacklist angered people, given the tough climate already facing Chinese media:

As the news media’s right to report (报道权) and right to interview (采访权) have not yet received sufficient protection, and as the general environment for watchdog journalism (舆论监督) remains poor, it naturally angers society to hear that Ministry of Health officials are talking about creating a ‘journalist blacklist’. We should know that while news media bear a duty to conduct watchdog journalism, and news reporters have been dubbed the ‘uncrowned kings’, in exercising this function media and journalists suffer more limitations than they enjoy protections. Most urgent right now is protecting under the law the interview rights of journalists and the media’s right to watchdog journalism. What we don’t need is to rack our brains to further limit or cancel these rights . . .

And the newspaper further implied that by introducing such measures, the Ministry of Health — and China’s government more generally — risked setting itself in further opposition to the interests of an already frustrated public:

Of course, if the Ministry of Health or other government offices want to create these ‘journalist blacklists’, they face a great deal of risk themselves. Because functional departments, the news media and the public have very different standards for determining what it means to ‘disseminate inaccurate information’ or ‘willfully mislead the public.” And these ideas might diverge to the point that functional departments ‘blacklist’ reporters who have the courage to expose food safety problems and are regarded as ‘heroes’ by the media and the public. Look for example at how the reporters who exposed the melamine milk scandal and the pork scandal have earned the respect of the public.

The Daily Times, a commercial spin-off of the official Liaoning Daily, wrote today that the idea to create of a journalist blacklist is “laughable” and “without any legal basis.”

No measures from organs of public power can be undertaken with such liberty, but must be authorized by law before they are done. What law is there that authorizes the Ministry of Health to deprive a journalist of his right to engage in supervision by public opinion [or watchdog journalism]?

Zhou Ruijin May 2011 Quote

These [tensions between the government and the people] are institutional in nature, and what we need is a deepening of political reform, firmly planting the idea of democracy in the minds of officials at all levels . . .

Can China's anti-corruption sites last?

Late last week, The Beijing News ran a report on an anti-corruption website launched in India by a Bangalore-based non-profit organization that aims to fight corruption in Indian society. The site, “I Paid a Bribe” (http://ipaidabribe.com/) seeks to improve understanding and openness about corrupt practices in India by crowd-sourcing the experiences of web users across the country (more here from The Hindu).
The Beijing News story, which was re-run by China Central Television’s online news site and more than 300 other sites and blogs in China, quickly captivated Chinese web users. And just as quickly, the story spawned three copycat sites inside China.


[ABOVE: The June 6 edition of The Beijing News, with a full page of coverage on India’s anti-corruption website.]
Called respectively, “I Took a Bribe” (我行贿了), “Yeah, I Took a Bribe” (我行贿啦) and “I Bribed” (我贿赂了), these sites are inspired, say the creators, by India’s “I Paid a Bribe” site. They say what they’re doing should receive the support of Chinese government leaders, seeing as fighting corruption is, as they told The Beijing News, a matter of necessity for the Party and the people and essential to China’s betterment.
As you open “I Took a Bribe” (http://www.woxinghuile.info/) the site’s motto is displayed at the top of your browser: “Stopping bribery begins with me!” A tagline below explains the site’s operating principles, similar to those of the original Indian website: “Anonymously sharing instances of bribery, revealing the harm of corruption.”
The sites have drawn enthusiastic attention from web users, who have scrambled to share their personal experiences of corrupt conduct touching on their lives, cobbling together a broader picture of corruption in China.
One post made to the site just before 3pm on June 13 read:

Last month my wife and I went to our county people’s government (Henan’s Shangcheng County) to pick up our marriage license. When she picked it up, the employee asked whether she had brought a black ink pen. I said no, we hadn’t. She asked us to go to a small store right nextdoor. When we got to the store, the boss lady got together several bags of wedding candy, Zhonghua brand cigarettes and other stuff together in quite an experienced manner, totaling up to more than 100 yuan. The boss lady smiled and said it worked the same way for all of the people who came to the store. We were moody about the whole thing but figured it was an auspicious thing so whatever. We took the stuff back over, and the employee [at the government office] said with a huge smile that she would register an auspicious day and license number for us . . . While it was a small thing, a colleague of mine from Hunan said it works the same everywhere. I hope these public servants get a hold of themselves.

A user claiming to be an employee at a foreign company in the city of Yantai, in Shandong province, wrote:

Every time some holiday or festival rolls around, its ordinary [for us] to go out and give gifts [to government officials], and these must be given out. Our company gives all shopping vouchers, the smallest being 500 yuan a piece. As arranged by our company boss, the list of people [receiving gifts] directly by my hands are: Yantai Entry-Exit Quarantine Bureau, 14th floor, [surname] Ding* (post, clerk), Spring Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival each year, two vouchers each time and a stack of gifts . . . Yantai Foreign Affairs Office, 3rd Floor, [surname] Xiao** (post, I won’t write it, I think everyone will know), Spring Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival and New Year’s every year, two vouchers . . .

In yesterday’s edition of Southern Metropolis Daily, columnist Deng Weizhi (邓伟志) underscored the dangers of corruption that becomes so much a fabric of society that is goes unregarded and is tacitly accepted: “Is there anything more dangerous than corruption? Yes, there is not seeing corruption as corruption. Am I right? So many people in China don’t admit that this or that is corruption, even after they’re in prison . . . What is clearly black income [from corruption], they call ‘grey income’. What is clearly a violation of principles, they call the ‘latent principles’ (潜规则).”
But while these sites could prove effective in bringing more instances of corruption to the surface, they may be rendering more assistance than government leaders care to receive. By afternoon on June 13, the official Sina Microblog page for at least one of the sites, “I Took a Bribe” (我行贿了), had been disabled, though the much less trafficked microblog on the QQ platform was still available.


[ABOVE: The official microblog page for China’s “I Took a Bribe” site on the QQ microblog platform.]
When the official Sina Microblog account of “I Paid a Bribe” was disabled, users at the anti-corruption site posted about that too, and noted that searches for the site on Baidu.com did not seem turn up the site:

Sina has harmonized the official microblog of this website! Just now when I searched for “I Paid a Bribe” [on Baidu] I already couldn’t find it . . . The most disgusting thing is how our internet has problems! Sina.com has gone wrong in the head, don’t you think! The website is doing really well, so Sina jumps up as always ready to be at the vanguard [in listening to the leadership]! I look down [on them]! I have nothing but contempt for them! I question Sina’s motives.

While the microblog page for “I Took a Bribe” may be too hot for Sina to handle, all three sites remain the focus of intense attention on Sina, with many users speculating that it is only a matter of time before the sites run afoul of the authorities: “I expect this site will be ‘harmonized’ at any time,” wrote one user, “It damages the favorable image of the Party and the government.”
But some Chinese have expressed legitimate concerns about the sites as well.
When one user made an incendiary post alleging that a certain deputy mayor in Anhui province (who is named in the post) had promised political advancement to women in exchange for sexual relations, another user expressed concern for the posting of such claims without solid facts from accredited Chinese media. This was angrily shot down by another user:

ajddcw: Sources must come through proper domestic news media, otherwise the ‘political’ risk is rather great; I suggest the creation of a list of credible sources, and links to sources can be given after posts. This is more proper.
rt2222: Will the web manager please delete the person with this id ‘ajddcw’, blocking their IP address out for good. This person isn’t helping. They are tricky and stupid. If things were done as they said, would there be any sense in having this website at all? What a thoughtless idiot thing to say.

Simply posting anti-corruption stories from approved “mainstream” media, if that is what user “ajddcw” is suggesting, would certainly seem to undermine the value of these crowd-sourcing sites. Nevertheless, the user does have a legitimate point about credibility. The point was echoed in yesterday’s edition of Southern Metropolis Daily, in which an editorial on these three anti–corruption sites emphasized three key points they would all need to contend with:
1. How can the sites avoid stepping over legal boundaries? If they become platforms through which attacks are deliberately launched against others in personal vendettas, etc, their value will be seriously diminished.
2. How can the websites maintain themselves financially? How can they avoid such influences as payment for removal of posts or accepting payments from informants, an issue that directly concerns the sites’ credibility?
3. How can the sites interact effectively with the government? At present, the sites do not have direct or implied support from the government, so whether or not they can be sustained remains a question.
For now, point three is the most immediate key point to watch. The fact that the Sina Microblog for “I Took a Bribe” is now inactive suggests that Sina is already under pressure to minimize the impact of China’s latest online rage.

Flowers of Evil

A number of Chinese media, including Guangzhou’s New Express and the official China National Radio reported in June 2011 that about 10 percent, or 200 tons, of the annual chrysanthemum flower tea supply produced in Yangma Township (洋马镇) of Sheyang County (射阳县) in Jiangsu province — a region known as the home of traditional Chinese medicine and the “land of chrysanthemums” (菊花之乡) — were suspected of sulphur contamination during processing, making it dangerous for human consumption. This cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, shows a bed a nastily-grinning chrysanthemums. Media reports on food safety issues have followed one after the other this year in China, exposing poor government oversight of food production across the country.

A brief history of the "red song"

We’re heading down the final red stretch to the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. In light of this important anniversary — if you don’t think its important, just look at the way it has affected everything and everyone from film to new media — we’ll be posting a series of pieces in the coming three weeks on the politics and culture of “red.”
One of the big events of the anniversary, in addition to the unctuous propaganda blockbuster film “The Founding of the Party,” will be the airing over ten days on China Central Television of “90 Years of Red Songs” (红歌90年), a special official feature documentary, or zhuantipian (专题片), featuring more than 170 “red classics.” These will be sung by a dizzying parade of Chinese stars, including Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛), the wife of vice president Xi Jinping (习近平), who is widely presumed to be China’s next president.
To prepare you for this heady mix of politics and performing arts, we begin with a partial translation from the latest edition of Southern Weekend, which deals with the relatively recent concept of the “red song” and walks through the history of Party performing arts in China.

Red songs are “red” once again
Red songs are “red” [popular] once again. As for existing red songs, a program called “90 Years of Red Songs” will be aired on China Central Television Channel One before and around the 90th anniversary of the Party; as for newly-created red songs, 36 “Singing China” songs gathered, selected and produced over the past year or more have been rolled out on major television and radio stations across the country since May.
Beginning on June 2, 2011, the days-long process of recording “90 Years of Red Songs” began in Studio 9 of China Central Television. Up to this day, this is the largest-scale program of its kind, under the principle direction of the Central Propaganda Department, which put together the team two months earlier.
Zhu Hai (朱海), who is responsible for selecting material for “90 Years of Red Songs,” took on the job two months ago. This performing arts special documentary film (文艺专题片) to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the Party is made up of 10 episodes, and will be run over 10 days before and after July 1. “90 Years of Red Songs” will have two principal parts, interviews and performances. The scale of the performance lineup is clear at a glance. [It includes such] mainland singers as Wang Kun (王昆), Guo Lanying (郭兰英), Li Guangxi (李光曦), Yu Shuzhen (于淑珍), Yin Xiumei (殷秀梅), Yan Weiwen (阎维文), Mao Amin (毛阿敏), plus Song Zuying (宋祖英) and Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛). Additionally, Zhang Mingmin and Andy Lau (刘德华) will represent the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in singing red songs.
Interviews [and special appearances, retrospectives] will include Nie Er (聂耳), the composer of the “National Anthem,” Cao Huoxing (曹火星) (“Without the CCP There is No New China”), the ancestors of first-generation New China musician Jie Fu (劫夫) (“We Travel on the Great Road”), various classic figures from different historical generations, for example the Sister Heroes of the Grassland, and former comrades of Lei Feng (雷锋) and his group leader, the son of “Iron Man” Wang Jinxi (王进喜), the daughter of Kong Fanshen (孔繁森), little heroes in the fight against the [2008 Sichuan] earthquake, etcetera.
Altogether, 170 songs were chosen for the film, showing the 90-year journey of the Chinese Communist Party. “All of the songs are red classics passed down to us,” says Zhu Hai.
The vast majority of the songs chosen are emotive in character, chosen for their eulogizing quality. For example, “My Mother Country” (我的祖国), “Let us Row Our Oars” (让我们荡起双桨) . . . etcetera. And, “Those slogan-like songs were so quickly forgotten,” says Zhu Hai. “Red songs are the voice of the mainstream,” said Zhu Hai, explaining the principle in selecting songs.
[In several paragraphs, the report explains the process and criteria for selection of 36 new red songs]
As early as July 2008, Chongqing kicked off red singing for the first time, the Party committee and government [of Chongqing] sending down [a document called] “Opinion on Widely Carrying Out Programs to Sing and Disseminate Red Classic Songs” (关于广泛开展红色经典歌曲传唱活动的意见), which stipulated that the whole city should take part in mass [red singing] cultural events, with the red singing theme of: “Singing of the goodness of the Party, the goodness of socialism, the goodness of economic reform and opening, the goodness of the People’s Army, the goodness of the masses, and the goodness of the Great Motherland.”
This is seen as the point from which the idea of red songs swiftly spread. Song Xiaoming (宋小明), deputy director of the Chinese Music Literature Association, said that the saying ‘red song’ was only introduced in recent years. In previous decades they were always called the ‘main theme’ (主旋律). In recent years, red song clubs (红歌会) in Jiangxi and other areas gradually has some influence [but] focused on classic historical red songs. Later, the Party secretary of Chongqing, Bo Xilai (薄熙来) raised the idea of not just singing red songs, but also creating red songs. So by the time the 90th anniversary of the Party rolled around, the term “red song” was established. Red songs encompass six aspects — the goodness of the CCP, the goodness of the Motherland, the goodness of socialism, the goodness of economic reform and opening, and the goodness of the People’s Army — essentially embracing the entire political life of the Chinese people.
There are now more and more street performances of red songs. Promoted from a number of quarters, red songs are again redding up [becoming very popular] (红起来了).
What are “red songs”?
Music critic Jin Zhaojun (金兆钧) believes that the term “red songs” very possibly comes from a series of “red classic” performances he helped to curate. When a performance of the ballet version of “White Haired Girl” was being prepared for Beijing in 1995, the sponsors invited Jin Zhaojun as an advisor. Jin Zhaojun’s suggestion was that they might as well bring back “Red Detachment of Women” and “The Long March Chorus” too, that since the political climate was right a performance would be easier to put on [packaged all together under this “red” theme].
When they promoted [the performance] the concept of “red classics” came up, and the warmth of the reception was beyond their expectations.
Jin Zhaojun tends to believe that “red songs” should point specifically to “red classic” songs and dramas created with Mao Zedong’s “Speech to the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” (在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话) as the guiding ideology. Which is to say that only those “red songs” emerging after May 1942 are truly “red songs.”
“It’s not only songs that praise the Party, praise socialism and praise leaders that belong to the ‘red songs’ [genre]. [Songs] praising the People’s Army, praising workers, praising the Motherland and one’s home actually also should be considered ‘red songs’,” Jin Zhaojun said.
Jin Zhaojun is the same age as [the famous writer] Wang Shuo (王朔). Owing to his complicated family background, it was only in 1982, at the age of 24, that he managed to enter a performance troupe. Even this being the case, when he hears “red songs” from those times, “it whips up recollections more of my youth, not a certain ideology from a specific period.” As a professional music critic, he is very clear in advocating a clear recognition of the artistic value of “red songs.”
“When social tensions are fierce, and opposing forces are dug in, songs are always able to whip up people’s emotions. And it’s precisely at such moments [of tension] that people come together in song. It’s the same all over the world,” Jin Zhaojun said. “La Marseillaise,” which emerged from the French Revolution has been passed down to the present day, and has already become a symbol of France. When America opposed occupation by the British and fought their war of independence, the patriotic song “Yankee Doodle” passed across the whole country.
Talking about “red songs,” Song Xiaoming of the Chinese Music Literature Association says frankly: “Insofar as it is sanctified by usage, this term ‘red songs’ is admissible. But speaking more strictly, this term is not too scientific, and its hard to expand. For example, what should we call a song that praises environmental protectionism?”
Song Xiaoming consciously created his own song called “Red and Green.” The song goes: “You endowed me with the color red, and gave me a healthy start . . . You endowed me with the color green, and let me wing off freely.”
Many music critics believe that the revolutionary songs that emerged during the October Revolution in the former Soviet Union, during the Great War [of the Soviet Union against the forces of fascism], and in the era of the building of socialism can be regarded as Soviet “red songs.” But Song Xiaoming emphasizes that “red songs” are without a doubt a cultural phenomenon unique to China (中国特色的文艺现象): “Taking for example the songs of the time of the Great War, the content is always related to love, does not flinch from the cruelty and mercilessness of war, does not flinch from the fact that soldiers are marching off to battle with heavy hearts. As the guns fire days after day, the soldiers sing of their own loved ones. With love there is hope.”
Song Xiaoming believes that the truly Chinese character in Chinese “red songs” lies principally in their clearly political tonality. This of course is because China’s historical circumstances are so desperate, and soldiers must overcome many more difficulties.


ABOVE: On July 23, 1975, 50,000 farmers gather in Acheng County, Heilongjiang province, to watch a dance drama of the revolutionary classic White Haired Girl. Photo by Li Zhensheng (李振盛).
Where do red songs come from?
If you trace back across the veins of Chinese revolutionary history, then songs of the May Fourth Movement such as the “Patriotic Anthem Commemorating May Fourth” (五四纪念爱国歌) and “National Humiliation” (国耻), and songs like “Three Disciplines and Eight Attentions” (三大纪律八项注意) and “Striking Down the [Western] Powers” (打倒列强) coming out of the period of the first domestic revolutionary war (1924-1927), which appropriated foreign melodies and substituted [Chinese] lyrics, should also be regarded as “red songs.”
The chief reason why Jin Zhaojun stresses the importance of the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art as a nodal point is because it was from that point on that artistic creation, including music, fell entirely under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
In the first phase [after Yan’an], folk songs were used as material and red content was added. For example, The East is Red took the original lyrics, “Riding a white horse, wielding a foreign gun,” and replaced them with, “The east is red, the sun is rising.”
In the second phase, nutrients were drawn from folk songs to fuel original creations. “For example, Jie Fu on the one hand gathered together local folk songs, to the point where his stomach swelled with folk songs,” said Jin Zhaojun. Jie Fu’s songs sound so familiar upon hearing, but you can’t say they are plagiarized, nor can you say they are adaptations. That [says Jin Zhaojun] is the product of his rich experiences and his closeness to the masses.
After 1949, that group of musicians of which Jie Fu and others were representative entered a period of further creation, some going off to study in the Soviet Union or returning to colleges and universities to further their study. Western musical methods were widely adopted [during this time]. In the 17 years before the Cultural Revolution, the creation of “red songs” reached a new peak. At that time, “red songs” were in fact “popular songs” sung spontaneously by the people, and were of three principal types — those emerging during the Korean War against America, simply marches; lyrics in a domestic folk song style; then there were the songs in frontier ethnic minority style, from a group of artists of which Lei Zhenbang (雷振邦) and Luo Nian (罗念) were representative.
In fact, as early as the Anti-Japanese War, Xian Xinghai’s (冼星海) “Yellow River Cantata” employed artistic methods outside of the grand chorus style traditional to Chinese music. The facts showed that ordinary Chinese could easily understand and accept [these new forms]. But the further development of professionalism [in music] would wait until after 1949.
These developments could be seen clearly in the creation of musical dramas. The musical drama “White Haired Girl” (白毛女), created in 1945, clearly borrowed its form and style from Western musical dramas, but the hints of Chinese operatic tradition were strong . . .
[Article talks about how these styles developed up to the Cultural Revolution]
In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, the arts languished. Jin Zhaojun is in the habit of making the half joke that “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is Just Good” [a Cultural Revolution-era chorus song] is China’s last march. “It’s just good, it’s just good, it’s just good . . . That’s just madness, totally beyond reason.”
Jin Zhaojun makes it a point to emphasize that so long as the creator’s feelings are sincere, political [objectives] will not harm artistic ones. “Particularly for my generation, we cannot, no matter what, forget Li Shuangjiang’s (李双江) songs such as ‘The Red Star Leads Me to Struggle‘ (红星照我去战斗), ‘Hymn to Beijing’ (颂歌) or ‘I Love the Wu Zhi Mountain, I Love the Wan Quan River’ (我爱五指山,我爱万泉河) and the pleasure they brought us.”

Changing China: one vote, one person

Over the past few weeks, one of the hottest issues on China’s Internet — and, more cautiously, in the traditional media — has been the participation of “ordinary citizens” from a range of backgrounds (lawyers, writers, activists, laid-off workers, students) in direct elections for local people’s congresses across China. The issue has continued to build on domestic social media platforms like Sina Weibo, where users are trading information on local candidates and pointing others to key materials, such as manuals on rights and procedures for election candidates.
The story really began back in late April, when a laid-off female worker named Liu Ping (刘萍) announced her candidacy for a district people’s congress in Jiangxi’s Xinyu City (新馀). Liu Ping told the BBC (Chinese) that she had been warned by local police, who said campaigning for office was against the law. Liu’s case drew the attention of a number of influential scholars and journalists, including Chinese Academy of Social Sciences professor and CMP fellow Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), who issued appeals through their own microblogs to draw broader support for Liu and make the public more aware of their political rights. The second wave of interest in local people’s congress elections came when Li Chengpeng (李承鹏), a prominent Chinese author, announced his plans in late May to take part in elections in Chengdu.
This is a fascinating story about growing interest in political participation in China, about real engagement, and about how social media in particular are galvanizing participation to the extent it is possible under the current political system. Unfortunately, this issue has gotten virtually no attention outside China. Why? The notable exception is a piece by Calum McCleod in USA Today, in which he notes that Li Chengpeng’s candidacy has received backing from celebrity blogger Han Han and film director Feng Xiaogang.
No, this is not a political seismic shift, but it is far less ethereal than, for example, the so-called Jasmine protests in China were back in February. And I hope everyone can agree that the story is far more relevant to readers anywhere than the story of a Chinese teen who sold his kidney for an iPad.
What does the election of “independent” candidates mean in a contemporary Chinese context? Well, to begin with, the idea is based in China’s Constitution, which states in Article 34:

All citizens of the People’s Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of nationality, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence, except persons deprived of political rights according to law.

Stand for election where, exactly? Positions for local people’s congresses in villages and city districts are (theoretically, at least) open for direct election, which means anyone meeting these basic requirements can (theoretically) become a candidate.
In practice, people’s congress representatives at the local level are often appointed by Party leaders, and they have little real power to influence local political decisions. Elections are supervised by higher government authorities, so there is ample opportunity for manipulation of the results. Speak to most Chinese about what they know about local elections, and you’ll get incredulous looks. Who gave you the knuckle-brained idea there is such a thing in China? But local citizen candidates have stood successfully in elections before, as this user on Sina Weibo, called “Panama Straw Hat” (巴拿马草帽), noted on June 4th: “I also voted before in university, and selected a teacher from my department. Later, when I went to the government office to handle some stuff, this teacher said, if they have a bad attitude you tell me. People’s Congress representatives can exercise their right of supervision. I’ve kept and treasured my ballot receipt ever since.”
It’s easy to argue that these political rights are worth less than the paper they are written on — not unlike the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression in Article 35, which is up against a massive media control regime.
Still, even granting that this is not a sea change, even granting that there are massive institutional hurdles to real political participation in China, can’t we recognize that this recent outpouring of interest in the idea of “independent” people’s congress candidacy is an interesting and important sign of growing political consciousness among Chinese?
Chinese journalists, academics, lawyers and internet users have hammered home the point over the past couple of weeks that one major problems historically has been that few Chinese are aware of the constitutional rights they ostensibly do have. Fewer still have ever tested them. What we’ve seen over the past week is the determination to do exactly that. And how this will unfold is certainly a story worth watching.
In a post to his blog at Sina.com — pushed, of course, through his microblog — CMP fellow and veteran investigative reporter Wang Keqin (王克勤) last week encouraged rights petitioners across China to become candidates for local people’s congress positions. His post bore the headline: “Calling on the Masses of Petitioners to Participate in Elections for People’s Congresses.” He wrote: Petitioners and rights defenders from all areas of the country should learn from the example of Jiangxi petitioner Liu Ping (刘萍). Going through the bitter process of petitioning isn’t as good as participating in politics yourself, safeguarding your interests as well as those of the public.”
One user responded enthusiastically to Wang Keqin’s call, saying: “This is a great suggestion! A great suggestion!”
Another affirmed the organizational power of the microblog (or “weibo”), saying petitioners and others with rights complaints should get connected: “First, let them get on the Weibo,” they said.
Another user asked a pertinent technical question in a country where millions of workers are on the move: “What if your registration papers are for somewhere else, can you still take part [as a candidate]?”
“This is very constructive,” said one user. “This is not very constructive,” said another.
Still others had a sense of humor about their own ambitions, suggesting their constitutional rights shouldn’t be taken at face value: “So, to become state president what kind of qualifications do you need? How can you get elected to that position? Can all Chinese citizens present themselves as candidates?”
As I suggested above, one of the most interesting aspects of this story has been the wave of interest in the mechanics of local people’s congress elections, on understanding one’s rights and acting on them. There has been a flurried sharing of relevant information.
On May 27, Caixin Media posted a fairly detailed rundown of the relevant rights and issues, explaining for example the concepts of “direct” and “indirect” election, how elections work at various administrative levels, etcetera. The post is still live, despite widespread reports among Chinese journalists on June 2 — again, through domestic microblog platforms — that a ban had already been issued from the Central Propaganda Department prohibiting traditional media from reporting on the participation of ordinary citizens in people’s congress elections.
In another act of media courage — we’ve seen quite a few such acts lately, despite the tightening climate — The Beijing News ran a full page in its June 4 edition on how to take part in people’s congress elections, what citizens’ rights are, etcetera.
Here is an image of the page at The Beijing News:


The section headers read:
1. Who has the right to stand in elections for [people’s congress] representatives?
2. How do you register to become a candidate?
3. How do those without local household registrations [hukou] take part?
4. How do you handle disputes over eligibility for candidacy?
5. How do you become a candidate for [people’s congress] representative?
6. How do you nominate and promote a candidate?
7. How do elections work and [how are] candidates chosen?
8. How do you impeach representatives not upholding their duty?
I will stop far, far short of saying that this is political awakening, folks. But the next time I see a story about runaway materialism in China, and how the present generation worships Gucci and eschews politics — those always seem to be an easy sell to those editors back in New York and London, eh? — I’ll be digging this story out again.

Kicking Talent to the Curb

A recent editorial in China’s official People’s Daily newspaper criticized the practice among some local officials in China of hiring their family members for important government positions, which it said was detrimental to effective governance of the country. “In governing the state, talent is critical,” the paper wrote (治国经邦,人才为急). The editorial also suggested such local officials were jealous and fearful of persons of talent. In the following cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, four nastily grinning officials, clearly related to one another, wear a single official robe as they menace presumably talented scholars, kicking them away.

People's Daily breaks form with Li Na tribute

The People’s Daily newspaper, the official “mouthpiece” of the Chinese Communist Party, is not known for its inventive news layouts. Playing its narrow political role with tight-lipped seriousness, it lays out the Party news of the day with careful attention to the political pecking order — which usually means, yes, that Hu’s on first.
Over the weekend, however, Chinese tennis player Li Na (李娜) became the first Chinese national (and the first Asian) to win a tennis Grand Slam final, and that news was apparently immense enough as a source of national pride to warrant a break with form at the People’s Daily. Here is the front page of the June 5 edition of the paper, with a prominent report on Li Na’s victory.