“The New Parable of the Bees” is an essay in the launch issue of the journal Translated Works. In my view, we might say instead that the entire launch issue of Translated Works (译品) is a kind of new parable of the bees — an excellent exercise, in other words, in the practice of honeybee democracy. [NOTE: “Translated Works” is a direct but poor translation of the publication title 译品, which suggests something more tasteful and refined. “Honeybee Democracy” is the title of a 2010 book by Thomas Seeley, reviewed in the launch edition of the journal.]
So what is honeybee democracy? Bees have a highly developed collective intelligence, and this highly developed collective intelligence arises principally from their unique method of decision making. As the article explains, the secret of bees is that they are mutually dependent in the process of agenda setting, but maintain independence during the evaluation and judgement stage. If they were not mutually dependent during the agenda setting process, they could only work for themselves, searching out prospective sites in a random and dispersed manner, and they might find it impossible to reach consensus. For the colony this would lead to disastrous results, and they would be seized with panic. On the other hand, if they did not have independence in the judgement stage, they might be unduly influenced by a cascading effect arising from momentary trends or information, reaching a consensus through a parroting process, and ultimately deciding to build their hives in the most inauspicious places. In order to come to correct decisions as they weigh and balance their options, bees have evolved an excellent mechanism combining consensus building and independence of judgement.
This sort of honeybee democracy is of course already in use — moreover, is already widely in use — in human society. The most classic example can be seen in the open-source age brought about by the advent of open-source software. The open-source method is used not only in the development of software, but translation, subtitling and many other creative endeavors are increasingly utilizing the open-source method. Consensus, openness, sharing and coordination are the basic characteristics of the open-source method — and is this not similar to the consensus and independent judgement we find in honeybee democracy?
This is why I recommend Translated Works. In my view, the translators of the various translated works [in the journal] are like worker bees seeking spiritual sustenance for humanity. I read every word of this launch issue with pleasure. Its fresh subject matter and fresh perspectives, its vibrant new ideas and fluid translations, made me clap my hands. But what most moved me was their honey democracy-like open-source style of working. Not for personal gain, but for public benefit. Not for profit, but for love, in the pursuit of spiritual beauty and enjoyment, they came together — attempting a small little utopia of free collaboration, a union of free individuals.
Against the made backdrop of the whirlwind of profit-seeking [in our society], what elegance, how romantic and poetic.
We can do without neither the market economy nor civil society in China today. But we often emphasize the former while we downplay the latter. Without the coordination of the latter, however, the former is a structure built on shaky sand. If we can say that our market economy has long been well established, we must admit that our building of a civil society falls woefully behind, and now constitutes one of the greatest tasks facing China. How do we build civil society? And how do we foster civic culture and the civic spirit? I believe that the honey democracy-like open-source model, one of free association based on deep love and working for the public good, is the road we must take.
This is the most enlightening aspect of Translated Works. If this sort of model [of collaboration and coordination] could take flower everywhere, I truly believe that would be the day civil society in China is established.
(This essay was written on the occasion of the launch of the online journal Translated Works and was published in the May 25 edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. )
[Access the launch issue of Translated Works here.]

Back in May 2010, when Guangdong province had just opened up the first Public Security Bureau [police] microblog in the whole country, I wrote a piece called “Three Recommendations for Government Microblogs” and talked about three principles I thought government offices should abide by to properly make use of microblogs. The first was, “face comments head on” (直面评论), which I meant to deal with the way some prefectural-level police departments were limiting comment functions purely out of fear once their microblogs were up and running. Second, dealing with the way some police microblogs were too thick with official jargon or propaganda, I offered the “please speak human language” (请讲人话) principle. Third, I emphasized that actions speak louder than words, and said that if [the government] made much of this so-called “microblog-based policy discussion” (微博问政), then it was crucial that questions be answered once they were asked — they must implement and follow through on the principle of “results above all else” (结果为上).
The results of a recent online study by The Beijing News on the topic, “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?” suggested that these three principles are of real concern to web users.
For example, to the question “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?”, 46 percent of those surveyed selected the response option saying microblogs could help officials “learn how to speak properly” (学会好好说话) — meaning microblogs could help them discard official-speak and pre-packaged Party jargon and speak like human beings. 45.7 percent of people responded that opening microblogs would mean “mostly putting on shows, with little real influence.” 36.8 percent believed government microblogs generally were “only set-up, but did not allow comments or interaction, so mean little.”
Certainly, what is the purpose of participating in an interactive medium if you don’t want to interact?
62.5 percent of those surveyed said microblogs “could advance interaction and conversation between the government and the people.” This suggests many believe the biggest impact of government microblogs could potentially come in busting through the barriers between the government and the public.
Looking at responses to another survey question, we can get a better grasp of the general environment for microblogs and the hopes people have vested in them. This was the question, “What do believe is the cause of upward trend in official microblogs?” 64.7 percent of those surveyed responded: “With advances in technology, methods for improving governance have come along.” 59 percent responded: “Through microblogs, [officials] can get to know real information about the people.”
These reasons are fair enough, but they don’t go far enough. Even if both the government and the people believe microblogs might enable two-way communication, the internet might ultimately become little more than a stage on which officials can strut their stuff if our understanding of the political role of microblogs stops there.
The use of the internet by officials must be understood on a higher plane of national political culture, and must go beyond the simple “asking after plans and policies” (问计求策) at the local government level.
In fact, the vast majority of officials still see so-called “online discussion of politics” (网络问政) as a new channel and method for obtaining information and exercising social surveillance. Just ahead of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2010, the People’s Daily interviewed 97 NPC delegates under the theme of “How NPC delegates view new media,” and they said there were two principal purposes they saw for using the internet. The first was “using the web as a means of gathering the feelings and opinions of the people, and carrying out research [or observing public opinion].” The second was “thoroughly using e-mail, blogs, microblogs and other new media to strengthen communication and mutual interaction with the masses.” The People’s Daily went so far as to say that “the new media of which the internet is representative have opened up a 24-hour channel for public opinion.”
The problem is that observing public opinion and communicating with the people is not what is meant politically by “democracy.” After all, the gathering up of online public opinion and the exercise of online monitoring [of affairs, by either the public or the government] is not the same thing as having a democratic system.
The online discussion of politics (网络问政) and democratic politics are two separate things. And online discussion of politics will not automatically eliminate the difficulties in communication that we see in our politics today. Many people talk about the discussion of politics as though it’s enough for government officials to hear what people have to say. This is why most of what we have termed “online discussion of politics” has typically been about the “hearing” stage, basically online mailboxes (where you can write in to government officials), online reporting (where you can write in to report abuses), etcetera, which can easily become a one-way street that is more about government officials scoring political points for apparent responsiveness than actually responding to public concerns.
Now that the government, formally speaking, belongs to the taxpayers, it is only right that the government should do its best to understand social conditions and public opinion. This means there is no reason to shower the government with praise for its efforts to use the internet to understand public opinion. Only real solutions to real problems are cause for dishing out praise.
A version of this editorial originally appeared in Chinese at
The Beijing News.

Reports came late last week that Chinese lawyer and activist Xu Zhiyong (许志永) has been detained in Beijing. Xu is one of several bloggers featured in CMP’s 2009 book China’s Bold Bloggers (中国猛博), to have been sought by authorities in recent months as China’s security police have intensified surveillance and intimidation of writers and activists.
As Xu’s circumstances remain unclear, we release the full chapter on his writings, which readers can download on PDF here. Xu’s original blog, unfortunately, has been closed down for some time.
Xu was detained back in 2009, but later released after an international backlash. The charge leveled against Xu two years ago was back taxes allegedly owed by his legal advocacy group, the Open Constitution Initiative, or “Gongmeng,” which stopped operating in August 2009.
In this July 2009 piece, CMP Director Qian Gang wrote about the pitfalls facing many NGOs and advocacy organizations in China, which often exist in a grey zone where they are vulnerable to charges of “economic crimes” when such charges suit the expedient goals of authorities. This related post also provides good background into this issue.

Zhu Shangtong (朱尚同), an 82-year-old retired cadre former deputy mayor of Changsha, issued a rare “letter to higher authorities” yesterday via Xinhua Online and other sites, to complain about the waste and inconvenience caused by a government-funded project for the beautification of Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. It is extremely rare for former or standing Chinese Communist Party officials of such high rank to make such accusations so publicly.
According to Zhu Shangtong’s letter, the local Changsha project is being bankrolled by the government — and ultimately, of course, taxpayers — to the tune of 200 million yuan, or roughly 30.8 million US dollars. Zhu’s letter was posted by Guangzhou-based journalist Zhou Xiaoyun (周筱赟) to at least 10 blog sites and online forums in the early hours of May 19. Some of these posts were still live as late at 2pm yesterday, but all were taken down today.

[ABOVE: Zhu Shangtong, former deputy mayor of Changsha.]
The following is a list of just a few links where information about the Changsha project and Zhu’s complaints was posted yesterday, most all of them still available by early afternoon. They now uniformly return errors, or say content does not exist.
QQ blog post
Tianya Public Forum post
KDnet Forum post
Sina Weibo post
Phoenix Online blog post
Here is our archived file for coverage of the case at the QQ blog of Zhou Xiaoyun. Here is our archived file for coverage of the case at Zhou Xiaoyun’s microblog at Sina Weibo.
With the exception of the Southern Metropolis Daily and the New Express, both major commercial papers in the southern city of Guangzhou, no mainland media covered the allegations made by Zhu Shangtong today. Zhu confirmed to both papers that he was indeed the author of the letter circulating online.
In an interview with the New Express, Zhu Shangtong revealed that local propaganda leaders in Changsha quickly reached him on May 19 to request that he remove the posts circulating on the Internet. When the paper asked whether he had agreed, he responded: “I’m not wrong on this, so why should they be taken down? Actually, the posts online weren’t done by me [but by others], but as to the content I stand behind it.”
Yang Changjiang (杨长江), head of Changsha’s propaganda department, responded to the New Express: “I can say quite responsibly that the facts in the content online differ widely from the truth.” Yang said that the price tag of the pilot project in the Huoxing residential district in question was not 200 million yuan, but rather 80 million yuan.
The following is a quick partial translation of Zhou’s letter, which calls on the State Council and the Central Culture Office to put a stop to “this sort of false and impractical movement.”

“Concerning the City of Changsha’s ‘Improving the City Environment’ (Pilot)”
An Open Letter on the Situation
In recent months, as the city of Changsha has been in the midst of a pilot scheme for “improving the city environment” (优化市区环境) as part of its civilized city building project there has been profligate spending of state funds (the tax revenues of ordinary people), with a heavy emphasis on outward form and a light attitude toward efficiency. It is an absurd phenomenon that harms and harasses the people.
Under the call of gathering strength for the accomplishing of great things, marshaling forces to create a civilized city, the Huoxing Office of [Changsha’s] Furong District has already become a major construction zone, there is a general feeling of insecurity, and those opposed vastly outnumber those in support. I request that the central government think deeply about this!
In the midst of its development, it is a good thing for a city to be improved in good time and order. But this should distinguish between different areas and different buildings, that being fixed which needs fixing, saving what can be saved, and the bill being picked up by the right parties — a balanced process that happens over years. But in a rush to capture civilized city status, with a focus on instant benefits and under pressure from an aggrandized policy [of promoting “civilized” cities], things that should be matters of responsibility individuals and businesses have been financed by the state. It is our view that this pursuit of superficial glory and outer appearance without thought to cost is highly unsatisfactory.
For more than a month now the Huoxing Residential Committee pilot project has comprehensively rolled out this project of “improvement” (优化), rushing into mass action and saying publicly that “this action was dictated by our superiors” (这种作法，是上面定的), refusing to hear different opinions at all. Just as the People’s Daily editorial said on April 28, they “exercise their power to suppress other voices,” and even manufacture fake news, doing whatever pleases their superiors. If they just had the heart to go and visit with residents, with various organs and shops, [they would find that] perhaps everyone is opposed. But mainstream public opinion (for example, Changsha Evening Post has reported saying that the masses uniformly approve of these methods) is sharply at odds with the broader will of the people [ie, real public opinion], as though either side is talking about a different place altogether. Clearly, the subjective assumptions of certain officials have created fallout that contributes to instability and disharmony.
Here are some examples:
Within the scope of the project, all street-side building along major and minor streets, which were originally red-brick or older but still quite sound cement-brick structures, have all been ordered to be made over with tiles. For some streets this is taken even further, and some buildings already laid with decent tiling, but not conforming to the uniform specifications [of the project] (in the vicinity of the Gaoqiao Market, for example), are having paint of a different color applied over the tiling (and what happens after the rains of May and the beating sun have turned this paint grotesque and gaudy?). This has even gone to the point of water holding tanks on top of high-rise apartments being re-painted and decorated. Outer walls along the street, whether major thoroughfares or tiny alleys, some of them in fine condition, have all been newly painted. So from now on, is the government prepared to foot the bill for repairing the outer walls of all private residences?

Below are several photos posted with Zhu Shangtong’s letter, showing the so-called “pilot” project in progress in the Huoxing residential area of Changsha:

In two pieces posted over the past two days (here and here), we have looked at some of the political and ideological issues at stake in China as the power plays begin A) in the midst of what many see as a very sensitive time for China, with social and political issues mounting (corruption, rising social unrest), and B) we head closer to senior leadership changes in 2012. We have harped on the theme of growing rancor inside the Chinese Communist Party, which is happening behind the curtain of harmony and exuberance.
Growing rancor, both inside the Party and within society, seems to be a theme of broader concern. And we can glimpse this concern again in yesterday’s lead editorial at the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper, “Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?” (追求理性从哪里起步), which has been re-published in a number of major Party and commercial newspapers today, including Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily (which has recently come under pressure for its earthquake commemoration editorial of last week).
This is the fourth editorial from the People’s Daily in the space of a month to deal with so-called “social mentality” or shehui xintai (社会心态). The editorial argues that only by creating effective mechanisms for dealing with underlying problems — such as the deepening gap between rich and poor, the inaccessibility of housing and other crucial social services, the destruction of homes in the face of property development, etcetera — can China move truly and steadily toward the so-called “building of rationality” (理性建设).
Without further ado, or further guesswork as to the significance of this editorial — please post your own comments below — we offer our more-or-less full translation.

“Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?”
People’s Daily
May 20, 2011
In social life today, “reason” (理性) has become a hot word.
Looking at the question of income disparities with reason, facing unfairness in society with reason, parsing online public opinion with reason, choosing industries and professions with reason . . . The unspoken message behind the frequency of use of this word “reason” is that on a many questions there are some who have moved toward the flip side of reason.
Having experienced the “death of Socrates” in the courts of ancient Greece, and having passed through the whirlwind of the French Revolution whipped up by radicalism, humanity has been been on guard against the turbulence of the irrational. A rational and orderly environment is beneficial to lowering the costs of regulating social relations, and moderate and gradual reform is the most enlightened choice for historical progress — these have already become unshakable convictions of modern society. In a nation with over one billion people, in an explosive era of social transition, fostering a rational and moderate attitude in society is especially crucial.
However, the consideration and discussion of rationality should also unfold on a deeper level. The hope of eliminating any and all irrational remarks is impractical. Being tense and anxious about this is of less avail than resolving their underlying root causes in society and seeking practical channels to dissolve them. Only in this way can we grasp the principal tensions [standing in the way] of a moderate and rational attitude.
. . . Over 30 years of economic reform and opening, our Party’s understanding of rationality has made a giant leap forward. But our rapidly changing China now faces a “time of change such as we have not seen in a thousand years” (千年未有之变局), and in taking our progress on these concepts [of rationality, etc] and action-alizing it in our real practices of social management at every level, gaining an accurate grasp and effectively dealing with social mentalities that grow more complex by the day, we have a long road ahead.
The rational enlightenment of the West faced off principally against the Christian Church. The building of rationality in China today comes with the collision of market rationality and traditional morals and ethics, and also the grinding together of individual rights and the collective spirit. There is also the game being played out between modern public consciousness and the [old, guanxi-based] acquaintance society (熟人社会), and the coexistence of [ideas of] civic participation and old remnants of the [idea of] “serving as master of the people” (为民做主). In such a complex environment, as individual persons, no-one dares say they have a full “grasp of the truth,” and no-one should have an exaggerated sense of their own “superior rationality” (理性优越感), yearning under the mark of “rationality” to shut up once and for all the mouths of “irrationality.”
Even behind the most extreme examples and the most fiercely irrational remarks, there may be some basis in logic. As the final choice, [irrationality] often arises from a sense of poor odds and impending loss. In market competition, the weakest goes to the wall, but must the winner devour all the spoils on his own, and the loser be left with nothing? Violent means of opposition may be irrational, but is violent demolition and removal [of residents from their homes] necessarily reasonable? When going through normal channels makes it difficult to voice legitimate demands, how should they let off these pent up resentments? When there is no space for reason, one hurls abuses. When hurling abuses isn’t enough, one fights. When fighting is of no avail, one runs. We do not encourage this kind of logic of the weak, but we cannot fail to understand it, and we cannot fail to show our concern and offer a way out.
Rationality is the condition on which a society depends for its existence. And the building of rationality is something that requires the united efforts of a whole society. At the present time, the responsibility for this lies chiefly with social administrators (社会管理者) [ie, Party leaders and the government], those who are in positions of strength, and organizations and individuals with an abundance of resources. But every citizen must recognize that any interest demand or value proposition must be made within in an orderly manner within the framework of rule of law. “Reason” will of course not sweep the land, but “lack of reason” will find itself unable to move an inch. The value rational (价值理性), the instrumental rational (工具理性), the procedural rational (程序理性), the objective rational (目的理性) — there are many fronts on which the building of rationality must take place.
But fostering a rational and moderate attitude in society begins with fostering real, equal and earnest communicative rationality (交往理性).
[We need] less, “I don’t have time right now to chit-chat,” and more patient communication. [We need] less lesson giving, “Don’t believe in rumors or transmit them,” and more timely release of information on public affairs. [We need] less insensitive, “If you can’t buy a home why don’t you rent one?” and more acceleration of the building of a social services safety net . . . We must remember at all times that scientific and effective mechanisms for coordinating interests [in society], mechanisms for expressing demands, mechanisms for mediating tensions, and mechanisms for ensuring rights protection, are the only effective antidote for doing away with irrationality.
(This article is the fourth in the People’s Daily series “Observing the Mentality of Our Society”, and was published on May 19.)

The remolding of red culture is actually a form of mobilization, a form of public opinion, a kind of rousing, a method and tactic of rescuing us from our crisis of belief and crisis of morality.

In recent months we have noted a resurgence of China’s hardline Maoist left. It can be glimpsed symbolically in the red pageantry of Bo Xilai (薄熙來), the former commerce minister and now Chongqing head honcho who has suspended advertising at his official television network and filled the lineup with “red culture” programming — and who has his propaganda chiefs, like so many Pied Pipers, leading the local population in “red songs” to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.
It could be glimpsed earlier this year in the sudden prominence of Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and dean of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an anti- “bourgeois liberalization” attack dog who sat with propaganda czar Li Changchun (李长春) when media control policy for 2011 was drummed home to national propaganda ministers. It could be read in and between the lines of the address to this year’s National People’s Congress by politburo standing committee member Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), in which he said China might “descend into an abyss of internal chaos” if it veered from the current political system.
The examples seem too numerous to admit doubt . . .
The silencing of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and a well-known “liberal,” who has called with great urgency for political reform. The high-profile and very personal slinging match between Wang Wen (王文), the head of the editorial desk at the Chinese-language Global Times, generally known for its nationalistic bent, and the liberal poet and essayist Ye Fu (野夫). The nasty (from the left) and very lopsided exchange between liberal scholar and CMP fellow Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) and a Party official at the University of International Business and Economics.
There is, of course, the detention and subsequent ritualistic attack on artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), known as one of China’s most outspoken proponents of political reform. And the increased visibility of Li Shenming (李慎明), currently a vice-director at CASS and formerly secretary to Wang Zhen (王震), one of the so-called Eight Elders of the Chinese Communist Party, who has argued openly for the continued relevance of the “Stalinist model,” saying the critical reason for the collapse of both the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union was not the failure of Marxism or socialism, but the betrayal of these values and systems by Khrushchev and Gorbachev.
The “deep reds,” with their wistful talk of the glories of Mao Zedong, the “Four Basic Principles” and socialism with Chinese characteristics, seem to have been emboldened.
But how, and why?
While the hawks on the left seem to have greater visibility (and perhaps greater political pull) right now, they are only half the story. It takes two to tango, right?
We have seen interesting, even historic, shows of strength from the liberal right in recent weeks. The first of two recent examples, of course, was the essay from social critic Mao Yushi (茅于轼), which enumerated the various crimes of the CCP’s revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, an act of criticism of historic proportions. The second was an editorial in the Party’s official People’s Daily that urged tolerance for “differing ideas” and seemed to be pointing at the grumbling powers on the left when it said the “hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails” is “fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness.”
It must be noted that the People’s Daily editorial, which according to a well-placed source at People’s Daily Online was an independent effort by moderate journalists with senior-level blessing (not, as some have suggested, a cynical public relations ploy), has drawn fury from the left. During a recent speech on Marxist theory, Chen Kuiyuan, the very same man whose prominent place at the national meeting of propaganda ministers signaled tighter ideological controls on the media, said that “so-called ‘tolerance’ cannot become the ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’,” a clear reference to what he saw as the dangers of the kind of thinking expressed in the People’s Daily editorial. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’, ‘neoliberalism’ or other such bourgeois thought systems,” said Chen, “the nature of our Party and our country will change.”
Last but not least, of course, we have Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), who has stepped out on numerous occasions over the past year and harped on the need for political reform, most recently meeting with student leaders on the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement and on a diplomatic mission to Indonesia. And one of the most interesting (and perhaps revealing) rumors now going around in Party circles is that a deputy propaganda minister recently referred to Premier Wen as a “troublemaker.”
Therefore, as we watch China’s resurgent Maoist left, we have to recognize that the liberal right is acting with greater brazenness as well. This in fact is one important reason why we have seen so much of the left in recent months.
In the following piece, translated from the Chinese side of the China Elections and Governance website, the writer looks at the causes of these “fierce and furious responses” from China’s left. The piece provides excellent background on the current ideological rift playing out behind the scenes, where despite the outward grand narrative of a confident, exuberant and rising China, confidence is flagging.
This is make it or break it time. After three decades of reform, the big questions are now on the table.
As the intellectual Zhang Musheng (张木生) said recently on the launch of a new book that is making ripples inside the Party — more on that tomorrow — “The age of ‘avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed. We have drilled our way through ‘chaos’, and now a new age of ‘debate’ is upon us.”

“Troops on Separate Paths Draw Their Swords: Where Does Chinese Society Go From Here?” (各路人马纷纷亮剑，中国社会何去何从)
Wan Jun (万军)
May 10, 2011
1.
Recently, vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and secretary of the Party Leadership Group, Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), delivered a speech during the 2011 Work Meeting on Discipline Construction for the Study of Marxist Theory on the subject of “Having Faith in Marxism, Being a Firm Marxist” (信仰马克思主义，做坚定的马克思主义者). He pointed out in his speech that: “The theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics follows in one continuous line from Marxism, and is built on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is not about the restringing of a musical instrument, or making a fresh start.” “So-called ‘tolerance’ (包容) cannot transform into ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’ (掉包),” [Chen said]. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’ (民主社会主义), ‘neoliberalism’ (新自由主义) or other such bourgeois thought systems, the nature of our Party and our country will change. Therefore, so-called ‘tolerance’ can under no condition become stealthy substitution of one thing for another. We must not allow our very soul to be lost imperceptibly.” Clearly, this speech is like many speeches we have seen in the past two years, with statements like, “[We] resolutely will not allow the usurping of Party and state power under the banner of reform and opening,” or, “[We] resolutely oppose universal values,” etcetera. All of these are aimed at certain social phenomena, and they are quite pointed [in their criticisms].
Naturally, Chen Kuiyuan’s speech represents more than his personal viewpoint. He represents formidable powers. This causes us to recall the remarks of one high-level central Party leader at this year’s two meetings [of the NPC and CPPCC], who said, “In adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the most important thing is to keep to the correct political direction. [We] must not waver on the basic [political] system of our nation and other major matters of principle. If we waver, not only will there be no building of socialist modernization to speak of, but the development gains we have already made will be lost, and the nation might even descend into an abyss of internal chaos.” [NOTE: This statement was made by Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and a senior politburo standing committee member]. He also said with great gravity that, “China will not do multi-party governance in succession, will not do diversity of guiding ideologies, will not do separation of powers or a bicameral system, will not do federalism, and will not do privatization.” With delirious delight, as though he had found a hidden treasure, Zhang Hongliang (张宏良), a Maoist Communist Party member and a professor at China University of Nationalities (Minzu University of China), used the biggest platform of the Maoist left, the Utopia website, to make a report lasting almost three hours, carrying out a comprehensive interpretation of the speech by this high-level leader.
[Zhang Hongliang] then said with utter confidence: “If the Chinese people want to rise without the banner of Mao Zedong, there is no way . . . We must believe that the era of Mao Zedong Thought is coming. We must prepare.” [He added], “Some people say we’re talking about cutting our country off from the world. Then let’s cut our country off from the rest of the world, I say! What’s so bad about that?” This all creates the impression that “a tide of revolution is coming.” When you link the words of these people together, when you line all of these characters up together, the conclusion that you come to us this — that if we want to continue holding high the banner of reform and opening, taking ourselves deeper into the tide of world civilization, the impediments to this are many indeed.
2.
What exactly is it that has stirred all of these people to make such fierce and furious responses? Please see the following materials, from which we can certainly find the answers we need.
February 27, 2010 — Wen Jiabao (温家宝) says during an online discussion with web users: “I’ve referred in the past to remarks made by Chairman Mao Zedong and Mr. Huang Yanpei (黄炎培) before the founding of the republic to resolve the problem of the periodic law (周期律) [of the successive changing of dynasties] and the fact that ‘the nation can fall as quickly as it rises’, [and I said] that the most important thing is democracy, and only with democracy can we ensure the we don’t [have the problem of] a man’s policy measures dying with him (人亡政息).”
June 2010 — Political reforms in Hong Kong come to an impasse, then suddenly there is a reversal, the central leadership accepts the political reform plan of the Democratic Party. Soon after, Adam Michnik, the former advisor to Lech Walesa of Poland’s independent trade union Solidarity paid a visit to China and had a forum with Chinese scholars. At the same time, the senior cadre Qin Xiao (秦晓) meets with People’s Liberation Army General Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲), the son-in-law of Li Xiannian (李先念) [and a well-known proponent of democracy], for talks on universal values.
August 21, 2010 — Wen Jiabao delivers a speech in Shenzhen called “Only By Adhering to Reform and Opening Does Our Country Have a Bright Future” (只有坚持改革开放，国家才有光明前途), in which he says: “Without the protection afforded by political reforms, we will lose the gains [we have made] through economic reforms, and our goal of modernization cannot be achieved . . . Stopping or moving back will not only spell and end to the fruits of 30 years of reform and opening and a precious development opportunity, sapping the vigor and vitality of socialism with Chinese characteristics, but it will go against the wishes of the people, and is ultimately a dead end.”
September 23, 2010 — Wen Jiabao accepts an interview with CNN anchor Fareed Zakaria, [and says]: “I believe that while moving ahead with economic reforms, we also need to advance political reforms, as our development is comprehensive in nature, our reform should also be comprehensive. I think the core of your question is about the development of democracy in China. I believe when it comes to the development of democracy in China, we talk about progress to be made in three areas: No. 1: We need to gradually improve the democratic election system so that state power will truly belong to the people and state power will be used to serve the people. No. 2: We need to improve the legal system, run the country according to law, and establish the country under the rule of law and we need to view an independent and just judicial system. No. 3: Government should be subject to oversight by the people and that will ask us, call on us to increase transparency in government affairs and particularly it is also necessary for government to accept oversight by the news media and other parties . . . And such a democracy first and foremost should serve to ensure people’s right to democratic elections, oversight and decision making. Such a democracy should also help people to fully develop themselves in an all-around way in an environment featuring freedom and equality. And such a democracy should be based on a full-fledged legal system. Otherwise, there would be chaos. That’s why we need to run the country according to law and ensure that everyone is equal under the law.” [NOTE: Above is not translated from the Chinese version, but taken directly from CNN’s transcript of the interview.]
April 22, 2011 — Prosecutors in the Li Zhuang Case withdraw charges [against the defense lawyer Li Zhuang]. The so-called “Li Zhuang Lawyer’s Perjury Case” (李庄漏罪案) is a symbolic case in the city of Chongqing’s campaign against criminal elements and its turn toward “red culture” and propaganda. The withdrawal of the case has a ripple effect throughout society, doubts open up about [Bo Xilai’s] “anti-crime drive” (打黑) and the “red singing” [campaign] appears desolate and ridiculous.
April 26, 2011 — Caixin Online, a media under the Party newspaper Zhejiang Daily, publishes an essay from the economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼) called “Returning Mao Zedong to Human Form” (把毛泽东还愿成人), which said: “Mao Zedong was not a god, and he must ultimately step down from the stage of godhood and become an ordinary man. Once he has been stripped of his cloak of divinity, and all of the superstitions surrounding him have vanished, he must be subjected to fair judgement.”
April 30, 2011 — The CCP’s newspaper organ the People’s Daily publishes an editorial called “Meeting ‘Diverse Thinking’ With a Tolerant Heart” (以包容心对待社会中“异质思维”) that says: “Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.”
May 4, 2011 — Southern Metropolis Daily publishes “Wu Kangmin: The Premier Invited Me For ‘a Talk'” (吴康民：总理邀我“一晤”), and points out: when Wen Jiabao spoke about the difficulties facing mainland reforms, he mentioned two principal forces, the first the remnants of feudal society, the second is the evil legacy of the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ [NOTE: Ng Hong Mun is chairman of the Hong Kong delegation to the NPC.]
Look at the above materials and we understand only too clearly that these men have reacted so fiercely because reform elements within the Party have shouted again and again. Yes, China is in the midst of a fierce clash between different ideas, and this state of affairs has directly impacted political trends in China. These political trends concern the direction of economic development. At its most basic, this clash of ideas concerns the major question of what course the Chinese people should take.
3
This fierce clash of ideas exposes the crisis facing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The special characteristics theory was something raised by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s according to the new development demands of society. There were three basic sources. The first was the original doctrine of socialism, and this was evinced clearly in the raising of the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the adherence to single-party rule by the Chinese Communist Party, and a national economic system focusing on the state-run economic sector. The second source was Chinese culture. If the theory of special characteristics was to be rooted in the native country it must be permeated with Chinese cultural elements. In the old parlance, this was about “taking Marxism-Leninism and combining it with the concrete experiences of revolution in China.” Wherein lies the deepest truths about China? Not, I think, in its huge population, or in its clear differences with [countries] around the world. Rather, it lies in those things that manifest the spiritual core of the Chinese people. In understanding the world, the Chinese people have always begun with the yin and the yang — this is true of [understanding] nature, and it is true of [understanding] society. Linguistically, the Chinese people have two systems, the first real [or concrete] (实) and the other void [or fictitious] (虚). Behaviorally, there are also two systems, one yang [“explicit” or “positive”] (meaning clear principles) and the other yin [“implicit” or “negative”] (meaning the unrevealed principles). As these [cultural elements] appear in special characteristics theory, this means that a number of important and well-known wordings and formulations (提法) must be understood in the context of these systems. For example, “First let a few get rich,” but how? The premises are unclear, they are implicit, but the results are explicit, and they must rely on many principles (including many unspoken ones) in order to be achieved. 尽管后来有人匆匆忙忙予以阐述，但已很难改变人们固有的认识. Then there was [Deng Xiaoping’s] so-called “Cat Theory” (猫论), “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (摸着石头过河), and all were perhaps this way — to understand them you must put them in the context and background of Chinese culture. The third [source of special characteristics theory] were various principles from capitalist market economies, but owing to theoretical needs, these principles were always referred to as principles of the “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济). It was this theory that over thirty years resulted in a soaring Chinese economy, with China becoming the world’s second largest economy and causing many people to shout: “China has risen!” At the same time, under the guidance of these theories [borrowed from capitalist market economies] the country has accumulated many thorny problems, such as a growing gap between rich and poor, which has already surpassed that of the world’s most developed capitalist countries. Mechanisms of self-governance and self monitoring [by the Party and government] have turned corruption into a great scourge, so that it has already become one of the countries most salient cultural characteristics. The power of citizens is continuously trampled under foot, and moral dust storms come blowing in one after another . . . All of this has covered the face of the theory of socialism with special characteristics with a layer of grey, and it faces a serious test.
Concerning the whole range of problems existing in society, the normal means would be to treat them surgically, ensuring that the nation operates in health. But the state system under the guidance of special characteristics theory has an extremely small capacity for correcting its errors. Take, for example, the ongoing food safety issues that concern all Chinese. Not only have they not been effectively checked, they’ve grown worse and worse. This shows us that this theory [of socialism with Chinese characteristics] is applicable only to a moment in time, and cannot be applied more broadly. It must exit the stage of history. But there are some who are terrified of this historical necessity, and they will stop at nothing to defend this theory. Their reasons are simple. They are the greatest beneficiaries of this theory. And of course, they represent a powerful force, and they have a foothold in political power, finance, trade, foreign relations, science and technology and other areas.

FURTHER READING: Southern Metropolis Daily article on Ng Hong Mun
南方都市报
May 3, 2011, A18
吴康民：总理邀我“一晤” 港区原全国人大代表吴康民向南都记者讲述前不久受温总理特邀做客中南海经历
南都记者 杨章怀 实习生 崔义刚 发自北京据媒体报道，香港特区原全国人大代表、培侨教育机构董事长吴康民日前在北京参加完清华大学百年校庆后，来到中南海与国务院总理温家宝畅谈一个半小时，温家宝夫妇宴请吴康民夫妇。在征得温总理同意后，吴康民在返港第二天，给香港媒体发了会见新闻稿和照片。4月28日，吴康民在接受南方都市报记者采访时表示，他就是跟总理拉家常，温总理对他这位香港老者十分尊重。
温总理亲笔信表示“甚思一晤”4月28日，85岁高龄的吴康民在电话里接受南都记者采访时，对5天前在中南海与温家宝见面时的情景历历在目。
吴康民回忆，他第一次见到温家宝总理是在8年前，2003年6月30日，温家宝在香港会见部分香港特区全国人大代表、全国政协委员，曾当选第四届至第十届全国人大代表的吴康民也在其中。
吴康民说，温总理向大家提起，当年两会期间，有香港记者问他“国务院谁分管港澳工作”，总理介绍完后，反问记者“你们还不知道吗”？事后，温总理看到了吴康民在香港媒体发表的一篇短文，大意是“香港地区的全国人大代表都不知道，香港记者怎么会知道？”温家宝说，看了吴康民的文章很有启发，并向大家道歉，还特意介绍时任国务委员的唐家璇给大家认识，“这位就是分管港澳工作的国务院官员”。
“第一次见面，温总理对我有了印象，还跟我握手。但十分短暂。”吴康民说。
吴康民有在报纸上写时政评论的习惯。2009年8月14日，温家宝总理给吴康民写了一封亲笔信，信中称：“香港报刊上有时看到您的一些短文和评论，那些鞭辟入里的分析和见解，给人以启示。”温总理还在信中说，“如来北京，可提前告之，甚思一晤，借聆教益。”几个月后，吴康民受邀到北京参加60年国庆庆典，他提前写信给中央政府驻香港联络办公室(简称“中联办”)负责人，请其转告总理。但温总理国庆期间太忙，国庆后又要出国访问，没能抽空与吴康民见面。
去年10月，吴康民来到北京，当时正在召开中共十七届五中全会，全会结束后，温总理又要出国访问，再次未能见面。
今年新年过后，温总理给吴康民写信称，两次见面落空，希望今年春暖花开时到北京见面。
吴康民接到清华大学百年校庆的邀请函，就将要去北京的消息通过中联办转告总理。一个多星期后，中联办有了回信，总理定于4月24日上午10点与他见面，后又调整为4月23日。
“上下楼时总理一手扶着扶梯，一手搀扶着我”吴康民到北京后，通过中联办在北京的负责人与总理办公室取得联系。见面前一天，吴康民接到总理的口信，说要单独见吴康民，中午请他吃饭，到时可以让吴夫人也来。
4月23日9时15分，中联办的小轿车来到吴康民下榻的宾馆将他接走。吴康民特意穿了身西装，穿着浅蓝色衬衣，系着领带、穿着皮鞋。
进入中南海，汽车直接开到总理的办公室楼下。温总理已经在台阶下迎接。简短的寒暄过后，总理搀扶着吴康民进屋。眼前的总理穿着十分朴素：黑色夹克衫、深蓝色裤子，脚穿布鞋。“我上下楼时，总理一手扶着扶梯，一手搀扶着我。”吴康民回忆当时的情景仍十分感动。
总理先是带吴康民参观，其中一个小会议室只能坐4-8人；稍大一点的会议室可以坐几十个人。总理办公室在二楼，据吴康民目测，只有12平方米左右，一个大办公桌十分显眼。办公室里摆着沙发，还有一些朋友、国际友人的照片。
在吴康民的印象中，温总理办公环境比较朴素，“没有豪华的设备，桌子都是很旧，给人朴素稳重的感觉，没有缤纷艳丽的色彩。”总理书房摆放着观看广州居民下棋照片总理的书房在一楼，靠墙是一排褐色的书柜，书柜中整齐地摆满了书籍。从吴康民提供的与总理的合影可以看到，温总理书柜里有《二十四史》、《辞海》、《现代经济辞典》、《中外历史名人传记》、《中外历史名人之谜》、德国作者卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯的《大哲学家》等书籍。书柜里还摆放着总理的一些照片，其中一幅是身穿白衬衣的温家宝俯身看居民下棋的场景。这张照片拍摄于2005年温总理围绕研究制定“十一五”规划在广东考察期间，当年9月11日下午，温总理来到广州逢源街看望居民、了解居民的生活情况。当总理俯身观看居民下棋时，这个瞬间被定格下来。
交谈气氛十分轻松，没有旁人在场温总理与吴康民交谈的地点就在书房，两人坐在直角型的沙发两旁。“气氛十分轻松，一人一杯茶。交谈没有提前设置议题，没有记录，两人都没有准备书面材料，也没有旁人在场”。吴康民说，开始是聊家庭，温总理介绍说，他父母健在，年纪很大了。温总理还提到年轻时候生活艰难，念大学后，到地方去考察地形，做一些工程技术工作，后调到地质矿产部，1985年任中央办公厅副主任后，就一直在中南海工作。
温总理也看了事先吴康民提交的个人简历，对一直在香港从事教育工作的吴康民比较了解。吴康民随后提到内地造假的情况严重，毒牛奶、假鸡蛋、假文凭、假论文等，认为是对年轻人道德教育不足所致。吴康民说，本准备与总理深入交流道德教育的看法，但“时间太紧了，没有展开”。
吴康民说，温总理提及内地的改革所遇到的困难时说，主要是两股势力，一股是中国封建社会所残余的；另一种则是“文革”遗毒，两股势力影响了人们不敢讲真话，喜欢讲大话，社会风气不好，应该努力纠正。
谈及香港问题时，吴康民主动说，4月11日他在香港媒体发表了一篇《谁能“维稳”，便是“真命天子”》的文章，认为目前香港必须维持社会稳定，反对暴力和暴戾的行为和叫嚣，能维持今后香港稳定的能人，便是下届行政长官的理想人选。温总理点了点头说，“看过这篇文章”。
“我在文章中也没有肯定任何一位热门候选人，温总理更没有和我进一步讨论有关候选人的问题。”吴康民随后邀请温总理再次到香港访问，总理说还需“国务院港澳办安排”。
午餐吃得很简单，总理夫人陪同11时30分，总理起身领着吴康民去离书房不远的小餐厅。当他们来到餐厅时，吴康民夫人、温总理夫人张培莉都准时跟他们会合。没有刻意化妆的总理夫人显得很有气质：齐耳短发，系着橘红色的围巾，穿着粉色花纹的西服外套，黑色裤子。
“餐厅很宽敞，大概有30-40平方米，白色纱窗、一张大圆桌，铺着红色的桌布，四把旧式的椅子，唯一与普通餐馆包间不同的是，窗户底下立着一面国旗。”吴康民说。
温总理靠着窗户坐下，吴康民在总理的右边，总理夫人张培莉在总理的左边，吴夫人则与总理面对而坐。席间，总理夫人说话较少，大部分时间是微笑着听温总理和吴康民两人的交谈。
午饭吃得很简单。每人一杯茶、半杯红酒、烧饼、蔬菜、点心、鸡肉和一碗汤。
午饭开始时，四人先碰杯，喝了口红酒，边吃边聊。主要聊家里的事情，吴康民说虎年添了个孙子，总理也聊了些他孙子的事。
半个多小时的午餐结束后，温总理赠给吴康民一本紫光阁藏画影印画册，并亲笔签名。吴康民则送给总理一张他近期获授香港教育学院荣誉院士的照片和一本政治评论集。
午饭后，温总理带着吴康民参观紫光阁，还向他介绍了周恩来总理生前办公的地方。两人边谈边散步，大约5分钟后，总理夫妇将吴康民夫妇送上汽车，并挥手告别。
以文会友
结识总理
吴康民说，以前经常看到总理对老者十分尊重的新闻，这次亲身经历了总理的亲民，切身感受到平民总理对人亲切的态度。总理举手投足间，都流露出对长者的尊敬，令吴康民印象颇深。
回到香港后，在征得总理同意的情况下，吴康民给香港媒体发了与总理见面的新闻稿和照片，被许多媒体关注。如今，吴康民仍被当地媒体和国外媒体追逐，“他们总想问我和总理聊了哪些秘密。我告诉他们这些后，记者朋友们总不满足，以为我隐瞒了什么。”吴康民说，此次会见并无既定议题，也并无向我征求对内地和香港社会政治情况的意见，偶有触及，都是闲聊，并无深入讨论，“温总理也没有想通过我散播什么信息，总的印象是一种有益的交谈，亲切的慰问，他对60多年在香港从事爱国活动的长者表示敬意。”吴康民说，这一次跟总理接触，缘于他经常在媒体上发表文章，他在香港通过“以文交友”的方式，结识了很多有名望的知识分子。“总理说看到我的文章，令我喜出望外，以文章来结交老朋友，我很感动。”吴康民表示，今后将一如既往地在媒体发表时评文章，“但不敢惊动总理，总理确实太忙了。”