In the past month, the People’s Daily has run a series of five editorials from the “editorial desk” dealing with so-called “social mentality” or shehui xintai (社会心态) in China. Against the backdrop of tightening controls on the press and a more aggressive attitude toward prominent academics and dissidents — to say nothing of the paper’s typical stiffness — the editorials have puzzled some with their more broad-minded positions. Others have dismissed them as propaganda smoke screens, affecting candor to throw observers for a loop.
Even relative insiders who generally know how to read the signs have scratched their heads. After reading the fifth and final editorial in the series today, the Chinese user “freemoren” wrote on Twitter: “People’s Daily editorial desk: Leaders Must Listen Attentively to Those ‘Sunken Voices’ . . . Doesn’t the People’s Daily seem not to be itself lately? What’s up with Comrade Li Changchun?”
Li Changchun (李长春), of course, is the fifth-ranking member of the politburo standing committee and China’s de facto propaganda chief. He’s the man who steers China’s message, so the implication by “freemoren” is that these unorthodox editorials somehow suggest the propaganda regime itself is in turmoil.
That’s unlikely. But in tomorrow’s post, time permitting, I’ll get into some of the reasons why we see such markedly different voices appearing in a publication generally thought to reflect the broader consensus of the Party leadership.
For now, though, let’s finish out this series at the People’s Daily with the final editorial, “Leaders Must Listen Attentively to Those ‘Sunken Voices'” (执政者要倾听那些“沉没的声音”).

This piece argues that “prolonged social and political stability” can only be established in China if proper mechanisms ensure that all Chinese can make their voices heard. It suggests that China is entering a “golden age” of expression, but that “there are still many voices that have not been heard.”
In keeping with official-speak, the editorial does not invoke the term “freedom of expression” (言论自由), which is slightly more sensitive and has liberal Western associations, but uses instead “right to express,” or biaodaquan (表达权), which hearkens back to Hu Jintao’s 2007 formulation of the so-called “four rights” (四个权利) — the right to know (知情权), right to participate (参与权), right to express (表达权) and right to monitor (监督权).
That’s to be expected. But there are points that genuinely surprise, as when the editorial argues that, from a more enlightened vantage point, “rights defense” (维权), which generally refers to citizen actions to oppose unfair government actions, is “stability preservation” (维稳), a term that generally refers to the mobilization of a huge (and expensive) police and security apparatus to deal with internal unrest arising from social tensions. This view seems much closer to that of liberal Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), a proponent of constitutionalism, than it does to the dominant Party view on social management.
For those of you who haven’t followed it, this series began on April 28 with a piece called “Dealing With ‘Differing Ideas’ With an Attitude of Tolerance” (以包容心对待“异质思维”), which called for a tolerant attitude toward new and different ideas. The editorial called intolerance “a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness” and said “diversity is the secret to prosperity.”
“Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?” (追求理性从哪里起步), published on May 19, argued that only by creating effective mechanisms for dealing with underlying problems — such as the deepening gap between rich and poor, the inaccessibility of housing and other crucial social services, the destruction of homes in the face of property development, etcetera — can China move truly and steadily toward the so-called “building of rationality” (理性建设).
Here is our translation of editorial number five of the People’s Daily series on “social mentality”.

Leaders Must Listen Attentively to Those “Sunken Voices” (执政者要倾听那些“沉没的声音”)
People’s Daily
May 26, 2011
From the Editorial Desk of the People’s Daily (人民日报评论部)
In China today, you can hear all sorts of voices. During sessions of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress [this year], delegates and committee members spoke freely about matters of state. In our newspapers and magazines, different ideas were exchanged and explored. User comments on the news [at websites] often ran into the thousands, and close to 200 million internet users wrote 140-character microblogs as they pleased . . . Track upon track of voices, rising into an ensemble, revealing the complicated picture, and the vigor and vitality, of multiplicity and diversity in this age of ours..
We are ushering in a “golden age” of expression, but there are still many voices that have not been heard. On the one hand, some voices have been submerged in the vastness of the field of voices (声场), so that it is difficult for them to find the surface. On the other hand, there are some voices that only “speak, but in vain” (说也白说), that make their wishes known but find their problems unresolved. These can all be thought of as null expression (无效表达), and some have called them “sunken voices” (沉没的声音).
Null expression is not a lack of expression, nor is it an unwillingness to express. When city leaders in Guangzhou announced that they would meet personally with petitioners, city residents turned out with their bedrolls, waiting in lines for three days, all hoping for an opportunity to “say something” to leaders. When Hu Xiaoyan (胡小燕), the first migrant worker to serve as a delegate to the National People’s Congress, made his private mobile phone number public, he was forced to shut his phone off because he was bombarded with thousands of calls and thousands of text messages. Those hot-button incidents (热点事件) arising from internet attention that become a focus for the media, they are just the “tip of the iceberg.” Beneath the surface of the sea is a much bigger body of ice, and this is the massive foundation that is pushing the crest of ice up out of the water. This is also the “subconscious mind” (潜意识) and “core layer” (核心层) that determines the mentality of our society.
To a large extent, those who are disadvantaged in terms of expression [ie, those who are voiceless] are also those who are disadvantaged in real terms. In society, they lack the resources to influence public opinion, they seldom have channels to participate in government decision-making, or have no way of obtaining information most directly concerning themselves. Therefore, while their numbers are not small, their voices find it difficult to be heard within society.
To hear and to be heard, this is a fundamental appeal for social persons (社会人). To speak and to hear others speak is even more a basic consensus of modern civilization. When the right to expression (表达权) becomes a basic political right, valuing these voices is the starting off point for coordinating interests and rationalizing social mentalities. In a country with a population of 1.3 billion, now undergoing dramatic social change, it is all the more important that the voices of the broad masses are heard and valued.
Behind most sunken voices are demands left unmet, and repressed antipathies that await easing. After his son is disabled in an automobile accident, a father from Yunnan province “detonates himself” outside a courthouse, taking the most extreme course of rights defense [NOTE: This seems to be a case that was not reported in China’s media]. A daughter suffers from an incurable disease, and the a mother from Hubei province takes part in an online publicity stunt in which she “crawls on her knees” [across the city of Guangzhou] . . . The incidents that cause a great public clamor all originate with voices that have been neglected. [Voices that] cannot be heard, are not heard, cannot be resolved — if we do not take action to “salvage” (打捞) them, too many voices will be submerged, and we will find it difficult to avoid the choking up of our social mentality, leading to a sharpening of tensions.
Speaking is the foundation of asserting our interests. Only with the expression of interests can there be relative balancing of interests, and only with the relative balancing of interests can there be long-term social stability. The facts tell us that behind many cases of tension and conflict lies the deprivation of mechanisms to express one’s interests. Seen from this perspective, rights defense is stability preservation (维权就是维稳). Listening as much as possible to voices from various circles of society has major benefit for stability preservation (维稳).
In the midst of cacophony, salvaging as much as possible those sunken voices (沉没的声音) is a bounden duty of social administrators (社会管理者). Applying the power of the government toward protecting the right to expression (表达权) of the most vulnerable, so that their interests can be expressed normally through systematized and standardized channels, is inherent to common construction and sharing (共建共享) [of prosperity, etc.], and is crucial to the building of a harmonious society. Only in this way can we ensure that “speaking” (说话) and “making one’s voice heard” (发声) are not only the most basic means of making appeals, but even more become an important link in fostering a healthy social mentality, and become a firm foundation for prolonged social and political stability.
(Thus ends this series of editorials — the editors)

“The New Parable of the Bees” is an essay in the launch issue of the journal Translated Works. In my view, we might say instead that the entire launch issue of Translated Works (译品) is a kind of new parable of the bees — an excellent exercise, in other words, in the practice of honeybee democracy. [NOTE: “Translated Works” is a direct but poor translation of the publication title 译品, which suggests something more tasteful and refined. “Honeybee Democracy” is the title of a 2010 book by Thomas Seeley, reviewed in the launch edition of the journal.]
So what is honeybee democracy? Bees have a highly developed collective intelligence, and this highly developed collective intelligence arises principally from their unique method of decision making. As the article explains, the secret of bees is that they are mutually dependent in the process of agenda setting, but maintain independence during the evaluation and judgement stage. If they were not mutually dependent during the agenda setting process, they could only work for themselves, searching out prospective sites in a random and dispersed manner, and they might find it impossible to reach consensus. For the colony this would lead to disastrous results, and they would be seized with panic. On the other hand, if they did not have independence in the judgement stage, they might be unduly influenced by a cascading effect arising from momentary trends or information, reaching a consensus through a parroting process, and ultimately deciding to build their hives in the most inauspicious places. In order to come to correct decisions as they weigh and balance their options, bees have evolved an excellent mechanism combining consensus building and independence of judgement.
This sort of honeybee democracy is of course already in use — moreover, is already widely in use — in human society. The most classic example can be seen in the open-source age brought about by the advent of open-source software. The open-source method is used not only in the development of software, but translation, subtitling and many other creative endeavors are increasingly utilizing the open-source method. Consensus, openness, sharing and coordination are the basic characteristics of the open-source method — and is this not similar to the consensus and independent judgement we find in honeybee democracy?
This is why I recommend Translated Works. In my view, the translators of the various translated works [in the journal] are like worker bees seeking spiritual sustenance for humanity. I read every word of this launch issue with pleasure. Its fresh subject matter and fresh perspectives, its vibrant new ideas and fluid translations, made me clap my hands. But what most moved me was their honey democracy-like open-source style of working. Not for personal gain, but for public benefit. Not for profit, but for love, in the pursuit of spiritual beauty and enjoyment, they came together — attempting a small little utopia of free collaboration, a union of free individuals.
Against the made backdrop of the whirlwind of profit-seeking [in our society], what elegance, how romantic and poetic.
We can do without neither the market economy nor civil society in China today. But we often emphasize the former while we downplay the latter. Without the coordination of the latter, however, the former is a structure built on shaky sand. If we can say that our market economy has long been well established, we must admit that our building of a civil society falls woefully behind, and now constitutes one of the greatest tasks facing China. How do we build civil society? And how do we foster civic culture and the civic spirit? I believe that the honey democracy-like open-source model, one of free association based on deep love and working for the public good, is the road we must take.
This is the most enlightening aspect of Translated Works. If this sort of model [of collaboration and coordination] could take flower everywhere, I truly believe that would be the day civil society in China is established.
(This essay was written on the occasion of the launch of the online journal Translated Works and was published in the May 25 edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. )
[Access the launch issue of Translated Works here.]

Back in May 2010, when Guangdong province had just opened up the first Public Security Bureau [police] microblog in the whole country, I wrote a piece called “Three Recommendations for Government Microblogs” and talked about three principles I thought government offices should abide by to properly make use of microblogs. The first was, “face comments head on” (直面评论), which I meant to deal with the way some prefectural-level police departments were limiting comment functions purely out of fear once their microblogs were up and running. Second, dealing with the way some police microblogs were too thick with official jargon or propaganda, I offered the “please speak human language” (请讲人话) principle. Third, I emphasized that actions speak louder than words, and said that if [the government] made much of this so-called “microblog-based policy discussion” (微博问政), then it was crucial that questions be answered once they were asked — they must implement and follow through on the principle of “results above all else” (结果为上).
The results of a recent online study by The Beijing News on the topic, “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?” suggested that these three principles are of real concern to web users.
For example, to the question “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?”, 46 percent of those surveyed selected the response option saying microblogs could help officials “learn how to speak properly” (学会好好说话) — meaning microblogs could help them discard official-speak and pre-packaged Party jargon and speak like human beings. 45.7 percent of people responded that opening microblogs would mean “mostly putting on shows, with little real influence.” 36.8 percent believed government microblogs generally were “only set-up, but did not allow comments or interaction, so mean little.”
Certainly, what is the purpose of participating in an interactive medium if you don’t want to interact?
62.5 percent of those surveyed said microblogs “could advance interaction and conversation between the government and the people.” This suggests many believe the biggest impact of government microblogs could potentially come in busting through the barriers between the government and the public.
Looking at responses to another survey question, we can get a better grasp of the general environment for microblogs and the hopes people have vested in them. This was the question, “What do believe is the cause of upward trend in official microblogs?” 64.7 percent of those surveyed responded: “With advances in technology, methods for improving governance have come along.” 59 percent responded: “Through microblogs, [officials] can get to know real information about the people.”
These reasons are fair enough, but they don’t go far enough. Even if both the government and the people believe microblogs might enable two-way communication, the internet might ultimately become little more than a stage on which officials can strut their stuff if our understanding of the political role of microblogs stops there.
The use of the internet by officials must be understood on a higher plane of national political culture, and must go beyond the simple “asking after plans and policies” (问计求策) at the local government level.
In fact, the vast majority of officials still see so-called “online discussion of politics” (网络问政) as a new channel and method for obtaining information and exercising social surveillance. Just ahead of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2010, the People’s Daily interviewed 97 NPC delegates under the theme of “How NPC delegates view new media,” and they said there were two principal purposes they saw for using the internet. The first was “using the web as a means of gathering the feelings and opinions of the people, and carrying out research [or observing public opinion].” The second was “thoroughly using e-mail, blogs, microblogs and other new media to strengthen communication and mutual interaction with the masses.” The People’s Daily went so far as to say that “the new media of which the internet is representative have opened up a 24-hour channel for public opinion.”
The problem is that observing public opinion and communicating with the people is not what is meant politically by “democracy.” After all, the gathering up of online public opinion and the exercise of online monitoring [of affairs, by either the public or the government] is not the same thing as having a democratic system.
The online discussion of politics (网络问政) and democratic politics are two separate things. And online discussion of politics will not automatically eliminate the difficulties in communication that we see in our politics today. Many people talk about the discussion of politics as though it’s enough for government officials to hear what people have to say. This is why most of what we have termed “online discussion of politics” has typically been about the “hearing” stage, basically online mailboxes (where you can write in to government officials), online reporting (where you can write in to report abuses), etcetera, which can easily become a one-way street that is more about government officials scoring political points for apparent responsiveness than actually responding to public concerns.
Now that the government, formally speaking, belongs to the taxpayers, it is only right that the government should do its best to understand social conditions and public opinion. This means there is no reason to shower the government with praise for its efforts to use the internet to understand public opinion. Only real solutions to real problems are cause for dishing out praise.
A version of this editorial originally appeared in Chinese at
The Beijing News.