Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

What government microblogs do (and don't) mean

Back in May 2010, when Guangdong province had just opened up the first Public Security Bureau [police] microblog in the whole country, I wrote a piece called “Three Recommendations for Government Microblogs” and talked about three principles I thought government offices should abide by to properly make use of microblogs. The first was, “face comments head on” (直面评论), which I meant to deal with the way some prefectural-level police departments were limiting comment functions purely out of fear once their microblogs were up and running. Second, dealing with the way some police microblogs were too thick with official jargon or propaganda, I offered the “please speak human language” (请讲人话) principle. Third, I emphasized that actions speak louder than words, and said that if [the government] made much of this so-called “microblog-based policy discussion” (微博问政), then it was crucial that questions be answered once they were asked — they must implement and follow through on the principle of “results above all else” (结果为上).
The results of a recent online study by The Beijing News on the topic, “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?” suggested that these three principles are of real concern to web users.
For example, to the question “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?”, 46 percent of those surveyed selected the response option saying microblogs could help officials “learn how to speak properly” (学会好好说话) — meaning microblogs could help them discard official-speak and pre-packaged Party jargon and speak like human beings. 45.7 percent of people responded that opening microblogs would mean “mostly putting on shows, with little real influence.” 36.8 percent believed government microblogs generally were “only set-up, but did not allow comments or interaction, so mean little.”
Certainly, what is the purpose of participating in an interactive medium if you don’t want to interact?
62.5 percent of those surveyed said microblogs “could advance interaction and conversation between the government and the people.” This suggests many believe the biggest impact of government microblogs could potentially come in busting through the barriers between the government and the public.
Looking at responses to another survey question, we can get a better grasp of the general environment for microblogs and the hopes people have vested in them. This was the question, “What do believe is the cause of upward trend in official microblogs?” 64.7 percent of those surveyed responded: “With advances in technology, methods for improving governance have come along.” 59 percent responded: “Through microblogs, [officials] can get to know real information about the people.”
These reasons are fair enough, but they don’t go far enough. Even if both the government and the people believe microblogs might enable two-way communication, the internet might ultimately become little more than a stage on which officials can strut their stuff if our understanding of the political role of microblogs stops there.
The use of the internet by officials must be understood on a higher plane of national political culture, and must go beyond the simple “asking after plans and policies” (问计求策) at the local government level.
In fact, the vast majority of officials still see so-called “online discussion of politics” (网络问政) as a new channel and method for obtaining information and exercising social surveillance. Just ahead of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2010, the People’s Daily interviewed 97 NPC delegates under the theme of “How NPC delegates view new media,” and they said there were two principal purposes they saw for using the internet. The first was “using the web as a means of gathering the feelings and opinions of the people, and carrying out research [or observing public opinion].” The second was “thoroughly using e-mail, blogs, microblogs and other new media to strengthen communication and mutual interaction with the masses.” The People’s Daily went so far as to say that “the new media of which the internet is representative have opened up a 24-hour channel for public opinion.”
The problem is that observing public opinion and communicating with the people is not what is meant politically by “democracy.” After all, the gathering up of online public opinion and the exercise of online monitoring [of affairs, by either the public or the government] is not the same thing as having a democratic system.
The online discussion of politics (网络问政) and democratic politics are two separate things. And online discussion of politics will not automatically eliminate the difficulties in communication that we see in our politics today. Many people talk about the discussion of politics as though it’s enough for government officials to hear what people have to say. This is why most of what we have termed “online discussion of politics” has typically been about the “hearing” stage, basically online mailboxes (where you can write in to government officials), online reporting (where you can write in to report abuses), etcetera, which can easily become a one-way street that is more about government officials scoring political points for apparent responsiveness than actually responding to public concerns.
Now that the government, formally speaking, belongs to the taxpayers, it is only right that the government should do its best to understand social conditions and public opinion. This means there is no reason to shower the government with praise for its efforts to use the internet to understand public opinion. Only real solutions to real problems are cause for dishing out praise.
A version of this editorial originally appeared in Chinese at
The Beijing News.

"China's Bold Bloggers": Xu Zhiyong

Reports came late last week that Chinese lawyer and activist Xu Zhiyong (许志永) has been detained in Beijing. Xu is one of several bloggers featured in CMP’s 2009 book China’s Bold Bloggers (中国猛博), to have been sought by authorities in recent months as China’s security police have intensified surveillance and intimidation of writers and activists.
As Xu’s circumstances remain unclear, we release the full chapter on his writings, which readers can download on PDF here. Xu’s original blog, unfortunately, has been closed down for some time.
Xu was detained back in 2009, but later released after an international backlash. The charge leveled against Xu two years ago was back taxes allegedly owed by his legal advocacy group, the Open Constitution Initiative, or “Gongmeng,” which stopped operating in August 2009.
In this July 2009 piece, CMP Director Qian Gang wrote about the pitfalls facing many NGOs and advocacy organizations in China, which often exist in a grey zone where they are vulnerable to charges of “economic crimes” when such charges suit the expedient goals of authorities. This related post also provides good background into this issue.

Former deputy mayor blows whistle on waste

Zhu Shangtong (朱尚同), an 82-year-old retired cadre former deputy mayor of Changsha, issued a rare “letter to higher authorities” yesterday via Xinhua Online and other sites, to complain about the waste and inconvenience caused by a government-funded project for the beautification of Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. It is extremely rare for former or standing Chinese Communist Party officials of such high rank to make such accusations so publicly.
According to Zhu Shangtong’s letter, the local Changsha project is being bankrolled by the government — and ultimately, of course, taxpayers — to the tune of 200 million yuan, or roughly 30.8 million US dollars. Zhu’s letter was posted by Guangzhou-based journalist Zhou Xiaoyun (周筱赟) to at least 10 blog sites and online forums in the early hours of May 19. Some of these posts were still live as late at 2pm yesterday, but all were taken down today.


[ABOVE: Zhu Shangtong, former deputy mayor of Changsha.]
The following is a list of just a few links where information about the Changsha project and Zhu’s complaints was posted yesterday, most all of them still available by early afternoon. They now uniformly return errors, or say content does not exist.
QQ blog post
Tianya Public Forum post
KDnet Forum post
Sina Weibo post
Phoenix Online blog post
Here is our archived file for coverage of the case at the QQ blog of Zhou Xiaoyun. Here is our archived file for coverage of the case at Zhou Xiaoyun’s microblog at Sina Weibo.
With the exception of the Southern Metropolis Daily and the New Express, both major commercial papers in the southern city of Guangzhou, no mainland media covered the allegations made by Zhu Shangtong today. Zhu confirmed to both papers that he was indeed the author of the letter circulating online.
In an interview with the New Express, Zhu Shangtong revealed that local propaganda leaders in Changsha quickly reached him on May 19 to request that he remove the posts circulating on the Internet. When the paper asked whether he had agreed, he responded: “I’m not wrong on this, so why should they be taken down? Actually, the posts online weren’t done by me [but by others], but as to the content I stand behind it.”
Yang Changjiang (杨长江), head of Changsha’s propaganda department, responded to the New Express: “I can say quite responsibly that the facts in the content online differ widely from the truth.” Yang said that the price tag of the pilot project in the Huoxing residential district in question was not 200 million yuan, but rather 80 million yuan.
The following is a quick partial translation of Zhou’s letter, which calls on the State Council and the Central Culture Office to put a stop to “this sort of false and impractical movement.”

“Concerning the City of Changsha’s ‘Improving the City Environment’ (Pilot)”
An Open Letter on the Situation
In recent months, as the city of Changsha has been in the midst of a pilot scheme for “improving the city environment” (优化市区环境) as part of its civilized city building project there has been profligate spending of state funds (the tax revenues of ordinary people), with a heavy emphasis on outward form and a light attitude toward efficiency. It is an absurd phenomenon that harms and harasses the people.
Under the call of gathering strength for the accomplishing of great things, marshaling forces to create a civilized city, the Huoxing Office of [Changsha’s] Furong District has already become a major construction zone, there is a general feeling of insecurity, and those opposed vastly outnumber those in support. I request that the central government think deeply about this!
In the midst of its development, it is a good thing for a city to be improved in good time and order. But this should distinguish between different areas and different buildings, that being fixed which needs fixing, saving what can be saved, and the bill being picked up by the right parties — a balanced process that happens over years. But in a rush to capture civilized city status, with a focus on instant benefits and under pressure from an aggrandized policy [of promoting “civilized” cities], things that should be matters of responsibility individuals and businesses have been financed by the state. It is our view that this pursuit of superficial glory and outer appearance without thought to cost is highly unsatisfactory.
For more than a month now the Huoxing Residential Committee pilot project has comprehensively rolled out this project of “improvement” (优化), rushing into mass action and saying publicly that “this action was dictated by our superiors” (这种作法,是上面定的), refusing to hear different opinions at all. Just as the People’s Daily editorial said on April 28, they “exercise their power to suppress other voices,” and even manufacture fake news, doing whatever pleases their superiors. If they just had the heart to go and visit with residents, with various organs and shops, [they would find that] perhaps everyone is opposed. But mainstream public opinion (for example, Changsha Evening Post has reported saying that the masses uniformly approve of these methods) is sharply at odds with the broader will of the people [ie, real public opinion], as though either side is talking about a different place altogether. Clearly, the subjective assumptions of certain officials have created fallout that contributes to instability and disharmony.
Here are some examples:
Within the scope of the project, all street-side building along major and minor streets, which were originally red-brick or older but still quite sound cement-brick structures, have all been ordered to be made over with tiles. For some streets this is taken even further, and some buildings already laid with decent tiling, but not conforming to the uniform specifications [of the project] (in the vicinity of the Gaoqiao Market, for example), are having paint of a different color applied over the tiling (and what happens after the rains of May and the beating sun have turned this paint grotesque and gaudy?). This has even gone to the point of water holding tanks on top of high-rise apartments being re-painted and decorated. Outer walls along the street, whether major thoroughfares or tiny alleys, some of them in fine condition, have all been newly painted. So from now on, is the government prepared to foot the bill for repairing the outer walls of all private residences?

Below are several photos posted with Zhu Shangtong’s letter, showing the so-called “pilot” project in progress in the Huoxing residential area of Changsha:





People's Daily pushes for greater "reason"

In two pieces posted over the past two days (here and here), we have looked at some of the political and ideological issues at stake in China as the power plays begin A) in the midst of what many see as a very sensitive time for China, with social and political issues mounting (corruption, rising social unrest), and B) we head closer to senior leadership changes in 2012. We have harped on the theme of growing rancor inside the Chinese Communist Party, which is happening behind the curtain of harmony and exuberance.
Growing rancor, both inside the Party and within society, seems to be a theme of broader concern. And we can glimpse this concern again in yesterday’s lead editorial at the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper, “Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?” (追求理性从哪里起步), which has been re-published in a number of major Party and commercial newspapers today, including Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily (which has recently come under pressure for its earthquake commemoration editorial of last week).
This is the fourth editorial from the People’s Daily in the space of a month to deal with so-called “social mentality” or shehui xintai (社会心态). The editorial argues that only by creating effective mechanisms for dealing with underlying problems — such as the deepening gap between rich and poor, the inaccessibility of housing and other crucial social services, the destruction of homes in the face of property development, etcetera — can China move truly and steadily toward the so-called “building of rationality” (理性建设).
Without further ado, or further guesswork as to the significance of this editorial — please post your own comments below — we offer our more-or-less full translation.

Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?
People’s Daily
May 20, 2011
In social life today, “reason” (理性) has become a hot word.
Looking at the question of income disparities with reason, facing unfairness in society with reason, parsing online public opinion with reason, choosing industries and professions with reason . . . The unspoken message behind the frequency of use of this word “reason” is that on a many questions there are some who have moved toward the flip side of reason.
Having experienced the “death of Socrates” in the courts of ancient Greece, and having passed through the whirlwind of the French Revolution whipped up by radicalism, humanity has been been on guard against the turbulence of the irrational. A rational and orderly environment is beneficial to lowering the costs of regulating social relations, and moderate and gradual reform is the most enlightened choice for historical progress — these have already become unshakable convictions of modern society. In a nation with over one billion people, in an explosive era of social transition, fostering a rational and moderate attitude in society is especially crucial.
However, the consideration and discussion of rationality should also unfold on a deeper level. The hope of eliminating any and all irrational remarks is impractical. Being tense and anxious about this is of less avail than resolving their underlying root causes in society and seeking practical channels to dissolve them. Only in this way can we grasp the principal tensions [standing in the way] of a moderate and rational attitude.
. . . Over 30 years of economic reform and opening, our Party’s understanding of rationality has made a giant leap forward. But our rapidly changing China now faces a “time of change such as we have not seen in a thousand years” (千年未有之变局), and in taking our progress on these concepts [of rationality, etc] and action-alizing it in our real practices of social management at every level, gaining an accurate grasp and effectively dealing with social mentalities that grow more complex by the day, we have a long road ahead.
The rational enlightenment of the West faced off principally against the Christian Church. The building of rationality in China today comes with the collision of market rationality and traditional morals and ethics, and also the grinding together of individual rights and the collective spirit. There is also the game being played out between modern public consciousness and the [old, guanxi-based] acquaintance society (熟人社会), and the coexistence of [ideas of] civic participation and old remnants of the [idea of] “serving as master of the people” (为民做主). In such a complex environment, as individual persons, no-one dares say they have a full “grasp of the truth,” and no-one should have an exaggerated sense of their own “superior rationality” (理性优越感), yearning under the mark of “rationality” to shut up once and for all the mouths of “irrationality.”
Even behind the most extreme examples and the most fiercely irrational remarks, there may be some basis in logic. As the final choice, [irrationality] often arises from a sense of poor odds and impending loss. In market competition, the weakest goes to the wall, but must the winner devour all the spoils on his own, and the loser be left with nothing? Violent means of opposition may be irrational, but is violent demolition and removal [of residents from their homes] necessarily reasonable? When going through normal channels makes it difficult to voice legitimate demands, how should they let off these pent up resentments? When there is no space for reason, one hurls abuses. When hurling abuses isn’t enough, one fights. When fighting is of no avail, one runs. We do not encourage this kind of logic of the weak, but we cannot fail to understand it, and we cannot fail to show our concern and offer a way out.
Rationality is the condition on which a society depends for its existence. And the building of rationality is something that requires the united efforts of a whole society. At the present time, the responsibility for this lies chiefly with social administrators (社会管理者) [ie, Party leaders and the government], those who are in positions of strength, and organizations and individuals with an abundance of resources. But every citizen must recognize that any interest demand or value proposition must be made within in an orderly manner within the framework of rule of law. “Reason” will of course not sweep the land, but “lack of reason” will find itself unable to move an inch. The value rational (价值理性), the instrumental rational (工具理性), the procedural rational (程序理性), the objective rational (目的理性) — there are many fronts on which the building of rationality must take place.
But fostering a rational and moderate attitude in society begins with fostering real, equal and earnest communicative rationality (交往理性).
[We need] less, “I don’t have time right now to chit-chat,” and more patient communication. [We need] less lesson giving, “Don’t believe in rumors or transmit them,” and more timely release of information on public affairs. [We need] less insensitive, “If you can’t buy a home why don’t you rent one?” and more acceleration of the building of a social services safety net . . . We must remember at all times that scientific and effective mechanisms for coordinating interests [in society], mechanisms for expressing demands, mechanisms for mediating tensions, and mechanisms for ensuring rights protection, are the only effective antidote for doing away with irrationality.
(This article is the fourth in the People’s Daily series “Observing the Mentality of Our Society”, and was published on May 19.)

Turning back to "new democracy"?

Yesterday, I wrote about how the battle over ideas — or, more appropriately at times, ideologies — has shown signs of heating up in China in recent months. The hawks of China’s Maoist “left” have stepped out more boldly, and we have seen at the same time that the pro-reform “right” has become exertive, perhaps a reason itself for so much leftist drum-beating. Today, I want to look at another political/intellectual force that has gained some momentum inside the Party, and which I will resist labeling except through the man who stands at its center — the writer and thinker Zhang Musheng (张木生).
Zhang Musheng, whom many fans describe as an intellectual powerhouse, is an expert on rural development. His book A Study of Problems Facing China’s Farmers (中国农民问题学习) was quite influential among educated youth in the 1960s, and ushered him on to the intellectual scene. The book and its core views also influenced the rural economic system reforms that followed from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s.
It so happens that Zhang Musheng is also a former protege of Chen Yizi (陈一咨), the Chinese Communist Party reformer who ran the Research Institute for the Reform of the Economic System in the 1980s, and in this capacity was a key advisor to former Premier Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), and who fled China following the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, eventually founding the Center for Modern China in Princeton, New Jersey.
Zhang is important now because he and his latest book have come to represent a certain political force in China, promoting the idea of “new democracy to save the Chinese Communist Party” (新民主主义救中共). He has said in a provocative affirmation of Chinese Communist Party rule that stresses the demand for change: “Only the Chinese Communist Party can save China; only new democracy can save the Chinese Communist Party.”
More on that in a moment . . .


Zhang is backed politically by a number of important leaders in China’s military, including Liu Yuan (刘源), the son of Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), the former chairman of the People’s Republic of China (1959-1968) who was labeled a “traitor” and finally ousted by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution in 1968 (and was a big fan of new democracy, which Mao was not). It was Liu Yuan who wrote the preface to Zhang’s new book. A serious test of translation powers, the preface is a passionately worded, almost snarling piece that discusses history, culture, national identity and war — and of course new democracy.
Here are two choice quotes from Liu Yuan’s preface:

“If China hopes to roll with the globalization trend of “democracy,” I’m afraid it will be like drawing a tiger and ending up with the likeness of a dog, not getting at all what we expected. Rather than bringing in a stone that might shatter the jade [ie, result in chaos], why don’t we just have confidence and just use our native born new democracy, which Chinese Communist Party member Mao Zedong raised and Liu Shaoqi put into practice?”
“In the path our nation has taken, we have really tossed about. The American, Japanese and Soviet systems, we’ve eaten them raw and skinned them alive, copying them entirely. The Yugoslavian, Singaporean and Hungarian models, we’ve treated them like quick-fix cures. Shock therapy, color revolutions, crumbling and changing flags, these too have been recommended to us like magic turtle soups. [Zhang] Musheng uses the metaphor that we’ve ingested a thousand remedies to the point that we suffer from vomiting and diarrhoeia.”

Here are some quick Cliff Notes from CMP Director Qian Gang on what “new democracy” refers to:

Before the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the banner it held up was that of new democracy (新民主主义). At that time, the Communist Youth League was actually called the Youth League for New Democracy (新民主主义青年团). New democracy is not the same as socialism. It preserves aspects of capitalism, including the protection of individual economic activity in the countryside. Mao Zedong wrote an essay called, “The Doctrine of New Democracy” (新民主主义论). But Mao Zedong hoped to move quickly to socialism, and so he did not favor new democracy. By contrast, Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) was much more in favor of new democracy. In the early stages of the PRC, he encouraged capitalists to develop the economy. In 1956, the CCP completed its so-called “socialist transformation” (社会主义改造) and moved from new democracy to socialism.

As I suggested, Zhang Musheng’s book is creating something of a splash this month. A recent “forum” in Beijing to introduce the book, Changing Our View of Culture and History (改造我们的文化历史观) — published by the Military Affairs and Science Press — was reportedly attended by a powerful constellation of political, military and intellectual stars. Liu Yuan was there. So were five other top People’s Liberation Army generals. So were key figures associated with the left. So were former Freezing Point deputy editor (and CMP fellow) Lu Yuegang (卢跃刚), Caixin Media editor-in-chief (and CMP fellow) Hu Shuli (胡舒立), and Yanhuang Chunqiu editor-in-chief (and CMP fellow) Wu Si (吴思).
“Guests came from the fields of military affairs, history, economics, education and other areas, offering multiple perspectives for interpretation of the book [and its significance],” wrote the Beijing Morning Post.
As I mentioned yesterday, this is a time when internal Party rancor seems to be rising and China’s patina of exuberance is backgrounded by deep sense of insecurity and foreboding. Thirty years of economic development have indeed achieved a “miracle.” But what now? How do we deal with the mountain of crippling problems that stem from that very success? An endemic culture of corruption, a yawning gap between rich and poor, growing social instability. Arguably, that anxiety is felt more keenly on the right, perhaps best encompassed by Wen Jiabao’s portentous words in Shenzhen: “Without the protection afforded by political reforms, we will lose the gains [we have made] through economic reforms, and our goal of modernization cannot be achieved.”
Zhang Musheng and Liu Yuan, too, suggest China is at a political/social/economic crossroads. But their focus — not easily characterized as “left” or “right” — is on returning to the Chinese Communist Party to this root idea of new democracy. Some see Zhang Musheng as a practical thinker and a division healer. As Major General Liu Yuan writes approvingly: “What he calls for is a straightforward building of institutions, not for political slogans and claptrap. His mastery surpasses the ‘new left’ and the ‘old right’, passes the ‘mainstream’ and the ‘non-mainstream.'”
I can’t comment on Zhang straightforwardness, but it is clear that however Liu Yuan may affect a distaste for “political slogans and claptrap,” he is certainly a fan of “new democracy” as the best new slogan for a re-invigorated Chinese Communist Party.
And that may be exactly the point. For Liu Yuan, the “new democracy” his father hoped to put into practice may be the best slogan to take the Party beyond the internal rancor, throw a “democratic” bone to the mob, and preserve the very lucrative status quo of crony capitalism (权贵资本主义).
At any rate, Zhang Musheng is someone to keep an eye on — as are his influential fans. For a bit more background, the following is a translation of Zhang’s recent interview with Netease Books about his latest work and his views on the current situation facing China. Of particular interest is his reading of “great nation” histories as histories of imperial plunder. That is a reading that cannot apply to China, however, which has risen without foreign conquest. So he concludes, talking about the exploitation of farmers as the root of China’s miracle: “We have plundered ourselves.”
Enjoy.

Zhang Musheng Discusses New Democracy and the Future of China’s Reforms
May 9, 2011
Netease Books
Zhang Musheng says, only the Chinese Communist Party can save China; only new democracy can save the Chinese Communist Party. You can choose not to believe him, but you must not be silent, nor do you have cause for concern. You must engage him in debate. The age of “avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed, he says. We have drilled through “chaos”, and an age of “debate” is coming. Tolerance is more important than freedom. Truth (if there is such a thing), will certainly become clearer the more it is debated.
Interviewer: Lei Tian (雷天)
Interviewee: Zhang Musheng (张木生)
Editor’s Notes: A discussion forum on the release of a new book recently drew participation from six People’s Liberation Army generals, and the gathering had all the trappings of a strategic planning session ahead of battle. It was a roomful of people, old, middle-aged and young, concerned about their country and their people. General Liu Yuan (刘源), the son of former PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) “made a great effort” to recommend this new book, Changing Our View of Culture and History (改造我们的文化历史观). The author of this new book, Zhang Musheng (张木生), created a “Zhang Musheng whirlwind” among educated youth in the 1960s with his book A Study of Problems Facing China’s Farmers (中国农民问题学习), in which his core views pointed the way to the rural economic system reforms that would follow more than a decade later. He uses a single phrase to describe the gist of this new book: “By reading the words of Li Ling (李零), we can plan the destiny of our nation.”
Just a few days after this small-scale but high-quality discussion forum, the liberal scholar Xiao Han (萧瀚) sent out a microblog post saying that this book was “a furtive expression of new nationalism (新国家主义),” and that it “would possibly become one source of the next set of state ideological theories.”
Is this new nationalism? And will it become a source for state ideological theory? That’s hard to say.
But “furtive” is something one cannot see — this is clearly a manifesto.
Talking with Mr. Zhang Musheng has three great advantages. The first is that he has quite a temper, but he does not flaunt his seniority, even if you ask him: Why should the Chinese Communist Party stay in power? He’ll discuss this kind of question directly with you. He is about looking for solutions to suit problems, not seeing posts and deleting them [ie, censoring the views of others]. He speaks energetically and bravely. Secondly, he goes right to the heart of questions, whether he is criticizing absolute power or capitalist logic, and he speaks straightforwardly, with courage and character. Third, since the 1980s, he has stayed clear of politics, and has never stopped reading, and when he speaks he can talk boundlessly, with great knowledge and insight.
He says, only the Chinese Communist Party can save China; and only new democracy can rescue the Chinese Communist Party.
You can choose not to believe him, but you must not be silent, and you need not worry [when you’re interviewing him]. You must debate him. The age of avoiding debate, he says, has passed.
We have drilled through “chaos”, and an age of “debate” is coming. Tolerance is more important than freedom. Truth (if there is such a thing), will certainly become clearer the more it is debated.
Recorded remarks of Zhang Musheng:

We have been brought to this point today under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This is a historical fact, something irreversible. Nor can we “suppose,” or ask “what if?” I am confident that environments are always stronger than people, and that coming to this point it [the Party] must reform. And so, to use a proverb, “There will be balance [of power], there will be constitutionalism, there will be different parties within the Party, and opening up and freedom of public opinion, including freedom and independence of thought, can all ultimately be resolved within a single party.”

If we had trade unions and farmer’s associations, even under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and their anti-corruption and balancing mechanisms went further in using the law to check the ruling Party itself, unlike today where everything is bound up together — could it [the Party] not develop in this direction [toward greater democracy]? I believe it is entirely possible. We could surely proceed slowly, step by step. What Hong Kong and Singapore have accomplished, the Chinese Communist Party can surely accomplish.
If the Communist Party does not recover its leadership and control as principally a representative of workers and farmers, then there is no way out for you [the Party] whatsoever, and no legitimacy. So you cannot regard them (the workers and farmers) as [weak and] disadvantaged groups. Today, what kind of farmers are our farmers? On average they have 13.5 years of schooling, and for workers it goes without saying [that this is even higher]. Go back to the past, go back to the era of Mao, and they all belong to what you would call the intellectuals. So these masses aren’t such fools [as you might imagine]. We are talking about 800 million mobile phones sending out short messages, and 460 million notebook computers exchanging ideas. There’s no way of comparing this to your so-called staging demonstrations, airing views and writing big-character posters, or to the great networking — it is so much freer than it was at that time.
I believe there is a group among the next generation of leaders (that have ideals, thinking beyond their own interests). Just think, the 70-80 million members of the Chinese Communist Party largely encompass all of the elite in our society, and the basic question is who should hold the banner [who should lead], who should solve the problems we face. Different environments call for different solutions.
China’s current problem, such a big country, with 1.3 billion people — if you let it take a corrupt path the ordinary people are not going to allow it. The legitimacy of the ruling party will be steadily lost, a problem that is already quite severe. I say this is a burning issue that brooks no delay. There is the problem of heading towards corruption and disintegration, but faced with this danger a group of people rises to face it head on and come up with a solution to the problem . . .
When he was an active Party official, Deng Liqun (邓力群), [a hardline leader of the Central Propaganda Department in the 1980s], pushed the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign [of 1983] and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign [of 1987]. After he stepped down, he himself wanted democracy, wanted discursive power (话语权). Now our Party is so open-minded that it can support an extreme leftist Utopia [online publication] and a rather right internal Party journal like Yanhuang Chunqiu.
The “falsehood, bluster and emptiness” (假大空) of our bureaucrats today stems from a lack of confidence, this lack of confidence is because they have no true beliefs or convictions, and without true beliefs or convictions what are they to China? What does China want? What is China? They aren’t clear about it. So now we talk about our (officials) also becoming disadvantaged groups. Why is that? Because they have power, and power brings corruption, and the outcome of corruption is that they might possibly be found out by the people [through the Internet, by media, etcetera]. So they believe they are weak because even though there are loopholes in internal Party supervision [that they can exploit], they can’t say exactly when they might be dragged out by the public, particularly in this information age, with our Internet society. So they feel that they’re now soft and time — these are their reasons.
Today you don’t just have collusion between bureaucrats and capital, commercial profiteers propping up corrupt officials. You also have the commercializing of leadership, the capitalization of power, and the criminal networking of political power, all very serious.
I’m not saying there’s not crony capitalism, there is. But it’s wrong to use crony capitalism to define the nature of society. Can crony capitalism really become an “ism”? Does it have the capacity to become an “ism”? What banner does crony capitalism hold up? Clearly, it cannot be a doctrine unto itself. It cannot become a kind of independent force. It has to borrow other doctrines to make its bread. What we are playing with now is a form of “chaos”, and this “chaos” must be broken up.
The Dream of a Strong Nation is Actually a Dream of National Plunder (强国梦其实是抢国梦)
[NOTE: This phrase, which Zhang Musheng uses in the interview below, plays on a homonym of the words “strong” and “rob”, which are both pronounced qiang but with different tones and characters.]
Netease Books: Hello, Teacher Zhang. I’m really happy you agreed to do this interview with Netease. I’ve read your book Changing Our View of Culture and History, and I’ve reviewed your speeches and previous essays. In your book, and in various speeches, you’ve said that “if the Communist Party does not represent the majority of people, it is definitely finished.” Last year, the “My Father is Li Gang” case had a major impact, both online and in print media, and it should be seen as a classic case of conflict between the government and the people. Chairman Mao once said, “The world is yours, and it is also ours, but when it comes down to it, it is yours.” But this saying has been changed by web users to say that “when it comes down to it, it is the government’s.” In many cases, including the recent Yao Jiaxin Case (药加鑫案) and others before, we see that web users immediately go and make conjectures about possible government connections. So we can see that officials now have amassed substantial popular grievance. In your book you talk about how the old man Du Runsheng (杜润生), [a former CCP central official who helped frame China’s rural policies in the 1950s-1970s], once mentioned in an essay one grassroots cadre’s views at the time. And you said that when the system was right, they [the cadres] were the ones doing good things; and when the system was wrong, it was very possibly they who were doing bad things. How do you view the current bureaucracy? Do you feel that [political] system reforms are hanging over our heads?
Zhang Musheng: First I just want to say that you pack a whole lot of questions all into one pile. In fact, the core of what you are asking is about these three decades of economic reform. In my own words I would say that [economic reforms] have gained great achievements such as the world could never have imagined, and have also brought major problems such as the world has never before solved. These problems are what in the past the ordinary people quite directly referred to as cadre-mass tensions (干群矛盾). Now we call them government-public tensions (干群矛盾). These tensions have already reached the point where they are irreconcilable and must be resolved.
You ask whether [reforms are] hanging over our heads. I would say they can’t for a moment be delayed. Actually, there is no need for me to answer you. Comrade Wu Bangguo (吴邦国) already said it during this [year’s] “two meetings” [of the NPC and CPPCC], “Reform and opening can wait, the problems of the people (民生问题) must be moved to the front.” Perhaps 80 percent of what Premier Wen Jiabao said in his press conference was on the issues of the people’s livelihood (民生问题). He even said a mass of flattering tongues isn’t work a single man speaking the truth — I’ll listen to whomever can speak the truth [NOTE: This phrase borrows from Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian from the 1st century BC]. All of this had an attitude of urgency, not brooking delay.
A most basic difference here, actually, if we want to resolve tensions between the government and the people, a mainstream view with a strong following holds that, you’ve read [economist] Wu Jinglian’s (吴敬琏) books on 30 years and 60 years, [I suppose, meaning Major Trends in Chinese Reform: the Next 30 Years and 60 Years of China’s Economy]. I’m guessing you’ve definitely read these.
Netease Books: Yes, I’ve read them.
Zhang Musheng: And then there are the suggestions of Qin Xiao (秦晓). As soon as he stepped down [as chief of China Merchants Group] he couldn’t restrain himself, but had to declare himself a firm believer in universal values. The media are not even worth mentioning, probably a landslide [in favor of universal values]. Which is to say that the solutions you guys (the Communist Party) once had are no longer of use. Only universal values will do, it’s only a question of degree. For example, Du Daozheng (杜导正) [of the liberal Party journal Yanhuang Chunqiu] believes that the CCP [can/should] lead, but that the Party must reform, that it must change. Zhu Houze (朱厚泽) has even said, if you guys (the Communist Party) hope you can return to [ideas of] new democracy (新民主主义) you can’t possibly solve the problems [we face]. Li Shenzhi (李慎之), [the prominent public intellectual and former Chinese Academy of Social Sciences deputy director who passed away in 2003], wrote in Fifty Years of Somber Wind and Rain (风雨苍黄50年) that you . . .
Netease Books: . . . You just call it quits.
Zhang Musheng: Call it quits. The other day, [during the forum attended by General Liu Yuan], Wu Si (吴思) said that in the past our belief in Marxism was premised entirely on the idea that capitalism could not resolve its own problems, but in fact experience has shown that capitalism has been able to resolve its problems in every successive crisis it has faced.
Netease Books: Yes, including the recent financial crisis.
Zhang Musheng: Including this recent financial crisis. Everyone says this, whether you’re talking about the mainstream media [ie, Party media] or many thinkers. Meanwhile, those who are on the left, relatively speaking, like Zhang Quanjing (张全景) [of the CCP’s Party Building Directorate] or Li Shenming (李慎明), [vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], talk a lot of things that are our (Communist Party) traditions, our traditional theories. But what notions do they give the ordinary people? They are too old. Like Cheng Enfu (程恩富), setting up a Marxism Research Institute in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and he’s given so much investment. All other sections of [CASS] must step aside for them, but the ordinary people have no interest at all in what they have to say — it’s just too old.
Netease Books: That’s right.
Zhang Musheng: So this brings us to how I see these issues. On the one hand, I think that the most ultimate questions the world faces are ones for which ready answers can’t be given. If I have to say I have an ace in the hole, something I prescribe that I guarantee can cure any problem whatsoever, and I can guarantee too that it won’t have any bad side effects, that’s definitely a fake medicine I’m offering. This is what I think.
But all major questions are resolved little by little, step by step, with the passing of time. The methods of the past, all these methods of rebellion, methods of revolution, methods of betterment, methods of reform. All of these are particular solutions for particular problems [ie, on a case-by-case basis]. Today if you ask me to make a judgement, I would say that while China faces major problems, it has also amassed capital such as it might never have imagined before.
Netease Books: Yes.
Zhang Musheng: Today our state-owned enterprises, if they make real calculations, hold capital of around 100 trillion yuan in capital. In terms of deposits, both domestic and overseas, they hold about 100 trillion. So concerning the problems we face that we must solve, we have the material means, and this is different from the past.
Netease Books: Can you talk about where this money has come from? Should we explore the origins of this money?
Zhang Musheng: About the origins of this money, let me tell you the simplest of truths. Our 250 million farmers have, in the three decades of economic reform and opening, contributed 200,000 square kilometers of land (300 million Chinese mu), and on this 200,000 square kilometers of land, some have made only 1,000 yuan per mu, and at the most others have made 20-30,000 yuan per mu. But they have generated an economic miracle. Last year, land transference fees (土地出让金) in our country amounted to 2.9 trillion yuan (445.7 billion US$), once again having a massive price scissors effect (剪刀差) on our farmers.
This is one [source]. There is another [source], and I’ll just list one example here, looking at our farmers. These 250 million farmers, some people have estimated this, they have created the equivalent of about 60 trillion US dollars in export products, creating for the country foreign exchange reserves of around three trillion [US$]. Of course, while you can’t say this was all their doing, they constitute the chief force of manufacturing, and this is a basic fact. So I think we can say quite clearly where this material base we now have came from.
If you look at our total consumption, our household consumption, it stands at only 35 percent of GDP. In the United States that figure is 70 percent. So how is it that our government in China has managed to become the world’s richest government? It’s not just richer than America in relative terms, but richer in absolute terms. This can all be accounted for.
Netease Books: You say in your book that the primitive accumulation of imperialism, including capitalism, lay principally with the plundering of other nations, using war to plunder the resources and markets of other countries.
Zhang Musheng: The dream of the great nation is the dream of the “take nation” (强国梦是”抢国梦”).
Netease Books: That’s right, the “dream of the take nation.” So what about socialism? Especially in the case of China, [what can we say about] the primitive [capital] accumulation of socialism [?]. That there were no resources to be taken from other countries, so [we have] plundered our own people [?].
Zhang Musheng: We have plundered ourselves. When you plunder yourself you can take quite a bit as well, particularly in a country like ours with such a massive population.
Netease Books: So farmers are the subject [of the plundering]. And the first phase is the plundering of our peasants through industrialization (工业化抢农民). The second phase, the urbanization process of opening and reform [ie, the period roughly since the mid-1990s], also plunders the farmers. So now, having amassed such capital, how do we bring about the next stage of reforms?
Zhang Musheng: This is not where the debate is focused right now. The topic to be debated is how the Chinese Communist Party is unable to solve the problem of corruption, how the Chinese Communist Party is unable itself to solve the problem of checks and balances. [NOTE: Zhang’s point is that first the internal problems facing the Party must be addressed, then the question can be asked about where reforms should head next.]

Why China's left is up in arms

In recent months we have noted a resurgence of China’s hardline Maoist left. It can be glimpsed symbolically in the red pageantry of Bo Xilai (薄熙來), the former commerce minister and now Chongqing head honcho who has suspended advertising at his official television network and filled the lineup with “red culture” programming — and who has his propaganda chiefs, like so many Pied Pipers, leading the local population in “red songs” to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.
It could be glimpsed earlier this year in the sudden prominence of Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and dean of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an anti- “bourgeois liberalization” attack dog who sat with propaganda czar Li Changchun (李长春) when media control policy for 2011 was drummed home to national propaganda ministers. It could be read in and between the lines of the address to this year’s National People’s Congress by politburo standing committee member Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), in which he said China might “descend into an abyss of internal chaos” if it veered from the current political system.
The examples seem too numerous to admit doubt . . .
The silencing of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and a well-known “liberal,” who has called with great urgency for political reform. The high-profile and very personal slinging match between Wang Wen (王文), the head of the editorial desk at the Chinese-language Global Times, generally known for its nationalistic bent, and the liberal poet and essayist Ye Fu (野夫). The nasty (from the left) and very lopsided exchange between liberal scholar and CMP fellow Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) and a Party official at the University of International Business and Economics.
There is, of course, the detention and subsequent ritualistic attack on artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), known as one of China’s most outspoken proponents of political reform. And the increased visibility of Li Shenming (李慎明), currently a vice-director at CASS and formerly secretary to Wang Zhen (王震), one of the so-called Eight Elders of the Chinese Communist Party, who has argued openly for the continued relevance of the “Stalinist model,” saying the critical reason for the collapse of both the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union was not the failure of Marxism or socialism, but the betrayal of these values and systems by Khrushchev and Gorbachev.
The “deep reds,” with their wistful talk of the glories of Mao Zedong, the “Four Basic Principles” and socialism with Chinese characteristics, seem to have been emboldened.
But how, and why?
While the hawks on the left seem to have greater visibility (and perhaps greater political pull) right now, they are only half the story. It takes two to tango, right?
We have seen interesting, even historic, shows of strength from the liberal right in recent weeks. The first of two recent examples, of course, was the essay from social critic Mao Yushi (茅于轼), which enumerated the various crimes of the CCP’s revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, an act of criticism of historic proportions. The second was an editorial in the Party’s official People’s Daily that urged tolerance for “differing ideas” and seemed to be pointing at the grumbling powers on the left when it said the “hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails” is “fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness.”
It must be noted that the People’s Daily editorial, which according to a well-placed source at People’s Daily Online was an independent effort by moderate journalists with senior-level blessing (not, as some have suggested, a cynical public relations ploy), has drawn fury from the left. During a recent speech on Marxist theory, Chen Kuiyuan, the very same man whose prominent place at the national meeting of propaganda ministers signaled tighter ideological controls on the media, said that “so-called ‘tolerance’ cannot become the ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’,” a clear reference to what he saw as the dangers of the kind of thinking expressed in the People’s Daily editorial. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’, ‘neoliberalism’ or other such bourgeois thought systems,” said Chen, “the nature of our Party and our country will change.”
Last but not least, of course, we have Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), who has stepped out on numerous occasions over the past year and harped on the need for political reform, most recently meeting with student leaders on the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement and on a diplomatic mission to Indonesia. And one of the most interesting (and perhaps revealing) rumors now going around in Party circles is that a deputy propaganda minister recently referred to Premier Wen as a “troublemaker.”
Therefore, as we watch China’s resurgent Maoist left, we have to recognize that the liberal right is acting with greater brazenness as well. This in fact is one important reason why we have seen so much of the left in recent months.
In the following piece, translated from the Chinese side of the China Elections and Governance website, the writer looks at the causes of these “fierce and furious responses” from China’s left. The piece provides excellent background on the current ideological rift playing out behind the scenes, where despite the outward grand narrative of a confident, exuberant and rising China, confidence is flagging.
This is make it or break it time. After three decades of reform, the big questions are now on the table.
As the intellectual Zhang Musheng (张木生) said recently on the launch of a new book that is making ripples inside the Party — more on that tomorrow — “The age of ‘avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed. We have drilled our way through ‘chaos’, and now a new age of ‘debate’ is upon us.”

Troops on Separate Paths Draw Their Swords: Where Does Chinese Society Go From Here?” (各路人马纷纷亮剑,中国社会何去何从)
Wan Jun (万军)
May 10, 2011
1.
Recently, vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and secretary of the Party Leadership Group, Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), delivered a speech during the 2011 Work Meeting on Discipline Construction for the Study of Marxist Theory on the subject of “Having Faith in Marxism, Being a Firm Marxist” (信仰马克思主义,做坚定的马克思主义者). He pointed out in his speech that: “The theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics follows in one continuous line from Marxism, and is built on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is not about the restringing of a musical instrument, or making a fresh start.” “So-called ‘tolerance’ (包容) cannot transform into ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’ (掉包),” [Chen said]. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’ (民主社会主义), ‘neoliberalism’ (新自由主义) or other such bourgeois thought systems, the nature of our Party and our country will change. Therefore, so-called ‘tolerance’ can under no condition become stealthy substitution of one thing for another. We must not allow our very soul to be lost imperceptibly.” Clearly, this speech is like many speeches we have seen in the past two years, with statements like, “[We] resolutely will not allow the usurping of Party and state power under the banner of reform and opening,” or, “[We] resolutely oppose universal values,” etcetera. All of these are aimed at certain social phenomena, and they are quite pointed [in their criticisms].
Naturally, Chen Kuiyuan’s speech represents more than his personal viewpoint. He represents formidable powers. This causes us to recall the remarks of one high-level central Party leader at this year’s two meetings [of the NPC and CPPCC], who said, “In adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the most important thing is to keep to the correct political direction. [We] must not waver on the basic [political] system of our nation and other major matters of principle. If we waver, not only will there be no building of socialist modernization to speak of, but the development gains we have already made will be lost, and the nation might even descend into an abyss of internal chaos.” [NOTE: This statement was made by Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and a senior politburo standing committee member]. He also said with great gravity that, “China will not do multi-party governance in succession, will not do diversity of guiding ideologies, will not do separation of powers or a bicameral system, will not do federalism, and will not do privatization.” With delirious delight, as though he had found a hidden treasure, Zhang Hongliang (张宏良), a Maoist Communist Party member and a professor at China University of Nationalities (Minzu University of China), used the biggest platform of the Maoist left, the Utopia website, to make a report lasting almost three hours, carrying out a comprehensive interpretation of the speech by this high-level leader.
[Zhang Hongliang] then said with utter confidence: “If the Chinese people want to rise without the banner of Mao Zedong, there is no way . . . We must believe that the era of Mao Zedong Thought is coming. We must prepare.” [He added], “Some people say we’re talking about cutting our country off from the world. Then let’s cut our country off from the rest of the world, I say! What’s so bad about that?” This all creates the impression that “a tide of revolution is coming.” When you link the words of these people together, when you line all of these characters up together, the conclusion that you come to us this — that if we want to continue holding high the banner of reform and opening, taking ourselves deeper into the tide of world civilization, the impediments to this are many indeed.
2.
What exactly is it that has stirred all of these people to make such fierce and furious responses? Please see the following materials, from which we can certainly find the answers we need.
February 27, 2010 — Wen Jiabao (温家宝) says during an online discussion with web users: “I’ve referred in the past to remarks made by Chairman Mao Zedong and Mr. Huang Yanpei (黄炎培) before the founding of the republic to resolve the problem of the periodic law (周期律) [of the successive changing of dynasties] and the fact that ‘the nation can fall as quickly as it rises’, [and I said] that the most important thing is democracy, and only with democracy can we ensure the we don’t [have the problem of] a man’s policy measures dying with him (人亡政息).”
June 2010 — Political reforms in Hong Kong come to an impasse, then suddenly there is a reversal, the central leadership accepts the political reform plan of the Democratic Party. Soon after, Adam Michnik, the former advisor to Lech Walesa of Poland’s independent trade union Solidarity paid a visit to China and had a forum with Chinese scholars. At the same time, the senior cadre Qin Xiao (秦晓) meets with People’s Liberation Army General Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲), the son-in-law of Li Xiannian (李先念) [and a well-known proponent of democracy], for talks on universal values.
August 21, 2010Wen Jiabao delivers a speech in Shenzhen called “Only By Adhering to Reform and Opening Does Our Country Have a Bright Future” (只有坚持改革开放,国家才有光明前途), in which he says: “Without the protection afforded by political reforms, we will lose the gains [we have made] through economic reforms, and our goal of modernization cannot be achieved . . . Stopping or moving back will not only spell and end to the fruits of 30 years of reform and opening and a precious development opportunity, sapping the vigor and vitality of socialism with Chinese characteristics, but it will go against the wishes of the people, and is ultimately a dead end.”
September 23, 2010 — Wen Jiabao accepts an interview with CNN anchor Fareed Zakaria, [and says]: “I believe that while moving ahead with economic reforms, we also need to advance political reforms, as our development is comprehensive in nature, our reform should also be comprehensive. I think the core of your question is about the development of democracy in China. I believe when it comes to the development of democracy in China, we talk about progress to be made in three areas: No. 1: We need to gradually improve the democratic election system so that state power will truly belong to the people and state power will be used to serve the people. No. 2: We need to improve the legal system, run the country according to law, and establish the country under the rule of law and we need to view an independent and just judicial system. No. 3: Government should be subject to oversight by the people and that will ask us, call on us to increase transparency in government affairs and particularly it is also necessary for government to accept oversight by the news media and other parties . . . And such a democracy first and foremost should serve to ensure people’s right to democratic elections, oversight and decision making. Such a democracy should also help people to fully develop themselves in an all-around way in an environment featuring freedom and equality. And such a democracy should be based on a full-fledged legal system. Otherwise, there would be chaos. That’s why we need to run the country according to law and ensure that everyone is equal under the law.” [NOTE: Above is not translated from the Chinese version, but taken directly from CNN’s transcript of the interview.]
April 22, 2011 — Prosecutors in the Li Zhuang Case withdraw charges [against the defense lawyer Li Zhuang]. The so-called “Li Zhuang Lawyer’s Perjury Case” (李庄漏罪案) is a symbolic case in the city of Chongqing’s campaign against criminal elements and its turn toward “red culture” and propaganda. The withdrawal of the case has a ripple effect throughout society, doubts open up about [Bo Xilai’s] “anti-crime drive” (打黑) and the “red singing” [campaign] appears desolate and ridiculous.
April 26, 2011 — Caixin Online, a media under the Party newspaper Zhejiang Daily, publishes an essay from the economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼) called “Returning Mao Zedong to Human Form” (把毛泽东还愿成人), which said: “Mao Zedong was not a god, and he must ultimately step down from the stage of godhood and become an ordinary man. Once he has been stripped of his cloak of divinity, and all of the superstitions surrounding him have vanished, he must be subjected to fair judgement.”
April 30, 2011 — The CCP’s newspaper organ the People’s Daily publishes an editorial called “Meeting ‘Diverse Thinking’ With a Tolerant Heart” (以包容心对待社会中“异质思维”) that says: “Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.”
May 4, 2011Southern Metropolis Daily publishes “Wu Kangmin: The Premier Invited Me For ‘a Talk'” (吴康民:总理邀我“一晤”), and points out: when Wen Jiabao spoke about the difficulties facing mainland reforms, he mentioned two principal forces, the first the remnants of feudal society, the second is the evil legacy of the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ [NOTE: Ng Hong Mun is chairman of the Hong Kong delegation to the NPC.]
Look at the above materials and we understand only too clearly that these men have reacted so fiercely because reform elements within the Party have shouted again and again. Yes, China is in the midst of a fierce clash between different ideas, and this state of affairs has directly impacted political trends in China. These political trends concern the direction of economic development. At its most basic, this clash of ideas concerns the major question of what course the Chinese people should take.
3
This fierce clash of ideas exposes the crisis facing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The special characteristics theory was something raised by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s according to the new development demands of society. There were three basic sources. The first was the original doctrine of socialism, and this was evinced clearly in the raising of the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the adherence to single-party rule by the Chinese Communist Party, and a national economic system focusing on the state-run economic sector. The second source was Chinese culture. If the theory of special characteristics was to be rooted in the native country it must be permeated with Chinese cultural elements. In the old parlance, this was about “taking Marxism-Leninism and combining it with the concrete experiences of revolution in China.” Wherein lies the deepest truths about China? Not, I think, in its huge population, or in its clear differences with [countries] around the world. Rather, it lies in those things that manifest the spiritual core of the Chinese people. In understanding the world, the Chinese people have always begun with the yin and the yang — this is true of [understanding] nature, and it is true of [understanding] society. Linguistically, the Chinese people have two systems, the first real [or concrete] (实) and the other void [or fictitious] (虚). Behaviorally, there are also two systems, one yang [“explicit” or “positive”] (meaning clear principles) and the other yin [“implicit” or “negative”] (meaning the unrevealed principles). As these [cultural elements] appear in special characteristics theory, this means that a number of important and well-known wordings and formulations (提法) must be understood in the context of these systems. For example, “First let a few get rich,” but how? The premises are unclear, they are implicit, but the results are explicit, and they must rely on many principles (including many unspoken ones) in order to be achieved. 尽管后来有人匆匆忙忙予以阐述,但已很难改变人们固有的认识. Then there was [Deng Xiaoping’s] so-called “Cat Theory” (猫论), “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (摸着石头过河), and all were perhaps this way — to understand them you must put them in the context and background of Chinese culture. The third [source of special characteristics theory] were various principles from capitalist market economies, but owing to theoretical needs, these principles were always referred to as principles of the “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济). It was this theory that over thirty years resulted in a soaring Chinese economy, with China becoming the world’s second largest economy and causing many people to shout: “China has risen!” At the same time, under the guidance of these theories [borrowed from capitalist market economies] the country has accumulated many thorny problems, such as a growing gap between rich and poor, which has already surpassed that of the world’s most developed capitalist countries. Mechanisms of self-governance and self monitoring [by the Party and government] have turned corruption into a great scourge, so that it has already become one of the countries most salient cultural characteristics. The power of citizens is continuously trampled under foot, and moral dust storms come blowing in one after another . . . All of this has covered the face of the theory of socialism with special characteristics with a layer of grey, and it faces a serious test.
Concerning the whole range of problems existing in society, the normal means would be to treat them surgically, ensuring that the nation operates in health. But the state system under the guidance of special characteristics theory has an extremely small capacity for correcting its errors. Take, for example, the ongoing food safety issues that concern all Chinese. Not only have they not been effectively checked, they’ve grown worse and worse. This shows us that this theory [of socialism with Chinese characteristics] is applicable only to a moment in time, and cannot be applied more broadly. It must exit the stage of history. But there are some who are terrified of this historical necessity, and they will stop at nothing to defend this theory. Their reasons are simple. They are the greatest beneficiaries of this theory. And of course, they represent a powerful force, and they have a foothold in political power, finance, trade, foreign relations, science and technology and other areas.

FURTHER READING: Southern Metropolis Daily article on Ng Hong Mun
南方都市报
May 3, 2011, A18
吴康民:总理邀我“一晤” 港区原全国人大代表吴康民向南都记者讲述前不久受温总理特邀做客中南海经历
南都记者 杨章怀 实习生 崔义刚 发自北京据媒体报道,香港特区原全国人大代表、培侨教育机构董事长吴康民日前在北京参加完清华大学百年校庆后,来到中南海与国务院总理温家宝畅谈一个半小时,温家宝夫妇宴请吴康民夫妇。在征得温总理同意后,吴康民在返港第二天,给香港媒体发了会见新闻稿和照片。4月28日,吴康民在接受南方都市报记者采访时表示,他就是跟总理拉家常,温总理对他这位香港老者十分尊重。
温总理亲笔信表示“甚思一晤”4月28日,85岁高龄的吴康民在电话里接受南都记者采访时,对5天前在中南海与温家宝见面时的情景历历在目。
吴康民回忆,他第一次见到温家宝总理是在8年前,2003年6月30日,温家宝在香港会见部分香港特区全国人大代表、全国政协委员,曾当选第四届至第十届全国人大代表的吴康民也在其中。
吴康民说,温总理向大家提起,当年两会期间,有香港记者问他“国务院谁分管港澳工作”,总理介绍完后,反问记者“你们还不知道吗”?事后,温总理看到了吴康民在香港媒体发表的一篇短文,大意是“香港地区的全国人大代表都不知道,香港记者怎么会知道?”温家宝说,看了吴康民的文章很有启发,并向大家道歉,还特意介绍时任国务委员的唐家璇给大家认识,“这位就是分管港澳工作的国务院官员”。
“第一次见面,温总理对我有了印象,还跟我握手。但十分短暂。”吴康民说。
吴康民有在报纸上写时政评论的习惯。2009年8月14日,温家宝总理给吴康民写了一封亲笔信,信中称:“香港报刊上有时看到您的一些短文和评论,那些鞭辟入里的分析和见解,给人以启示。”温总理还在信中说,“如来北京,可提前告之,甚思一晤,借聆教益。”几个月后,吴康民受邀到北京参加60年国庆庆典,他提前写信给中央政府驻香港联络办公室(简称“中联办”)负责人,请其转告总理。但温总理国庆期间太忙,国庆后又要出国访问,没能抽空与吴康民见面。
去年10月,吴康民来到北京,当时正在召开中共十七届五中全会,全会结束后,温总理又要出国访问,再次未能见面。
今年新年过后,温总理给吴康民写信称,两次见面落空,希望今年春暖花开时到北京见面。
吴康民接到清华大学百年校庆的邀请函,就将要去北京的消息通过中联办转告总理。一个多星期后,中联办有了回信,总理定于4月24日上午10点与他见面,后又调整为4月23日。
“上下楼时总理一手扶着扶梯,一手搀扶着我”吴康民到北京后,通过中联办在北京的负责人与总理办公室取得联系。见面前一天,吴康民接到总理的口信,说要单独见吴康民,中午请他吃饭,到时可以让吴夫人也来。
4月23日9时15分,中联办的小轿车来到吴康民下榻的宾馆将他接走。吴康民特意穿了身西装,穿着浅蓝色衬衣,系着领带、穿着皮鞋。
进入中南海,汽车直接开到总理的办公室楼下。温总理已经在台阶下迎接。简短的寒暄过后,总理搀扶着吴康民进屋。眼前的总理穿着十分朴素:黑色夹克衫、深蓝色裤子,脚穿布鞋。“我上下楼时,总理一手扶着扶梯,一手搀扶着我。”吴康民回忆当时的情景仍十分感动。
总理先是带吴康民参观,其中一个小会议室只能坐4-8人;稍大一点的会议室可以坐几十个人。总理办公室在二楼,据吴康民目测,只有12平方米左右,一个大办公桌十分显眼。办公室里摆着沙发,还有一些朋友、国际友人的照片。
在吴康民的印象中,温总理办公环境比较朴素,“没有豪华的设备,桌子都是很旧,给人朴素稳重的感觉,没有缤纷艳丽的色彩。”总理书房摆放着观看广州居民下棋照片总理的书房在一楼,靠墙是一排褐色的书柜,书柜中整齐地摆满了书籍。从吴康民提供的与总理的合影可以看到,温总理书柜里有《二十四史》、《辞海》、《现代经济辞典》、《中外历史名人传记》、《中外历史名人之谜》、德国作者卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯的《大哲学家》等书籍。书柜里还摆放着总理的一些照片,其中一幅是身穿白衬衣的温家宝俯身看居民下棋的场景。这张照片拍摄于2005年温总理围绕研究制定“十一五”规划在广东考察期间,当年9月11日下午,温总理来到广州逢源街看望居民、了解居民的生活情况。当总理俯身观看居民下棋时,这个瞬间被定格下来。
交谈气氛十分轻松,没有旁人在场温总理与吴康民交谈的地点就在书房,两人坐在直角型的沙发两旁。“气氛十分轻松,一人一杯茶。交谈没有提前设置议题,没有记录,两人都没有准备书面材料,也没有旁人在场”。吴康民说,开始是聊家庭,温总理介绍说,他父母健在,年纪很大了。温总理还提到年轻时候生活艰难,念大学后,到地方去考察地形,做一些工程技术工作,后调到地质矿产部,1985年任中央办公厅副主任后,就一直在中南海工作。
温总理也看了事先吴康民提交的个人简历,对一直在香港从事教育工作的吴康民比较了解。吴康民随后提到内地造假的情况严重,毒牛奶、假鸡蛋、假文凭、假论文等,认为是对年轻人道德教育不足所致。吴康民说,本准备与总理深入交流道德教育的看法,但“时间太紧了,没有展开”。
吴康民说,温总理提及内地的改革所遇到的困难时说,主要是两股势力,一股是中国封建社会所残余的;另一种则是“文革”遗毒,两股势力影响了人们不敢讲真话,喜欢讲大话,社会风气不好,应该努力纠正。
谈及香港问题时,吴康民主动说,4月11日他在香港媒体发表了一篇《谁能“维稳”,便是“真命天子”》的文章,认为目前香港必须维持社会稳定,反对暴力和暴戾的行为和叫嚣,能维持今后香港稳定的能人,便是下届行政长官的理想人选。温总理点了点头说,“看过这篇文章”。
“我在文章中也没有肯定任何一位热门候选人,温总理更没有和我进一步讨论有关候选人的问题。”吴康民随后邀请温总理再次到香港访问,总理说还需“国务院港澳办安排”。
午餐吃得很简单,总理夫人陪同11时30分,总理起身领着吴康民去离书房不远的小餐厅。当他们来到餐厅时,吴康民夫人、温总理夫人张培莉都准时跟他们会合。没有刻意化妆的总理夫人显得很有气质:齐耳短发,系着橘红色的围巾,穿着粉色花纹的西服外套,黑色裤子。
“餐厅很宽敞,大概有30-40平方米,白色纱窗、一张大圆桌,铺着红色的桌布,四把旧式的椅子,唯一与普通餐馆包间不同的是,窗户底下立着一面国旗。”吴康民说。
温总理靠着窗户坐下,吴康民在总理的右边,总理夫人张培莉在总理的左边,吴夫人则与总理面对而坐。席间,总理夫人说话较少,大部分时间是微笑着听温总理和吴康民两人的交谈。
午饭吃得很简单。每人一杯茶、半杯红酒、烧饼、蔬菜、点心、鸡肉和一碗汤。
午饭开始时,四人先碰杯,喝了口红酒,边吃边聊。主要聊家里的事情,吴康民说虎年添了个孙子,总理也聊了些他孙子的事。
半个多小时的午餐结束后,温总理赠给吴康民一本紫光阁藏画影印画册,并亲笔签名。吴康民则送给总理一张他近期获授香港教育学院荣誉院士的照片和一本政治评论集。
午饭后,温总理带着吴康民参观紫光阁,还向他介绍了周恩来总理生前办公的地方。两人边谈边散步,大约5分钟后,总理夫妇将吴康民夫妇送上汽车,并挥手告别。
以文会友
结识总理
吴康民说,以前经常看到总理对老者十分尊重的新闻,这次亲身经历了总理的亲民,切身感受到平民总理对人亲切的态度。总理举手投足间,都流露出对长者的尊敬,令吴康民印象颇深。
回到香港后,在征得总理同意的情况下,吴康民给香港媒体发了与总理见面的新闻稿和照片,被许多媒体关注。如今,吴康民仍被当地媒体和国外媒体追逐,“他们总想问我和总理聊了哪些秘密。我告诉他们这些后,记者朋友们总不满足,以为我隐瞒了什么。”吴康民说,此次会见并无既定议题,也并无向我征求对内地和香港社会政治情况的意见,偶有触及,都是闲聊,并无深入讨论,“温总理也没有想通过我散播什么信息,总的印象是一种有益的交谈,亲切的慰问,他对60多年在香港从事爱国活动的长者表示敬意。”吴康民说,这一次跟总理接触,缘于他经常在媒体上发表文章,他在香港通过“以文交友”的方式,结识了很多有名望的知识分子。“总理说看到我的文章,令我喜出望外,以文章来结交老朋友,我很感动。”吴康民表示,今后将一如既往地在媒体发表时评文章,“但不敢惊动总理,总理确实太忙了。”

The Wolves of Urban Order


Ever since China’s local urban administrative and law enforcement bureaus were set up in 2001 with the goal of improving city governance as urban areas faced rapid growth, the units have been criticized for their seemingly unrestricted brutality. One notable case of abuse was the beating death in 2008 of Wei Wenhua, which we wrote about at CMP here. In this recent cartoon, artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) again explores the evils of China’s “urban management police”. His cartoon shows a vicious wolf prowling toward the viewer, his red armband bearing the familiar Chinese character for “control” or “manage” worn by so-called urban management police, or cheng guan (城管). The wolf’s leash is loose, suggesting he has been given license for the violence so clear in his eyes.

Magazine busts barriers with report

Chinese authorities have been unrelenting in the control of the media in recent months, and the general consensus among working journalists in China is that things are worse now than they have been in years. But censorship — what the Chinese Communist Party refers to as “guidance of public opinion” — is not a cut-and-dried issue in China’s complex media environment. Even as control is asserted and re-asserted, we continue to see striking examples of Chinese media pushing the limits.
A rare essay last month openly challenged the legacy of Mao Zedong, an act unprecedented in contemporary China. Last week, Southern Metropolis Daily published a courageous editorial commemorating the third anniversary of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and referring obliquely but unmistakably to the artistic works and political activism of detained artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未).
In its May 14 edition, released on May 11, the day before the Southern Metropolis Daily‘s “line ball,” New Century (Caixin Century) magazine, published by Caixin Media, struck hard with a breakthrough investigative report on the systematic abuse of state “family planning” policies — or the so-called “One-Child Policy” — by authorities in Hunan province [English-language report HERE].


The New Century report, written by journalist Shangguan Jiaoming (上官皎明), is the first in China’s domestic media to deal openly with the uglier side of China’s national family planning policies, and is arguably one of the most important investigative reports to appear in China in recent years (in which challenges to investigative reporting have been numerous). The report shows not only that children were forcibly taken from farmers in Hunan and placed in welfare homes, but also that they were sold for profit by authorities to families in Western countries, including the United States.
On the eve of the publishing of this important work, Shangguan Jiaoming circulated a letter among friends and colleagues, asking them to give the report attention and share it with others, noting the likelihood that action would swiftly be taken against it. The journalist also shared a fuller version of the report, which we have pasted below our translation of the letter.

Hello Everyone!
Respected teachers and friends, I present to you a recent investigative piece of mine, the recent cover story in Caixin’s New Century weekly magazine, “Lost Babies” (邵氏婴儿). This report is divided into three parts, the first “Babies Snatched Away” (抢婴), the second “The Moneymaking Proposition” (生意经), and the third “Come Home, Child” (宝贝回家), together coming to 15,000 words.
Completing this group of reports was the work of four years. My first investigations were carried out in the first half of 2007, but I was later forced to give up the topic owing to its sensitivity. In the years that followed, I carried out many investigations, but ultimately I had no way of publishing these as they made ugly revelations about national “family planning” policies. This year, with the support of Caixin Media, I carried out deeper investigation of this matter in April.
This year, as both China and the United States were issuing their respective reports on human rights [concerning one another], I carried out deep in the mountain region of Longhui County (隆回) in Hunan province investigative reporting that was most intimately connected with questions of “human rights.” And this matter had to do as well with US-China relations — for many years, family planning departments in Hunan have treated the sons and daughters of farmers [in Hunan] as “illegal babies” to be confiscated and snatched away. When money was paid, they were released [back to their families]. When money was not paid, they were sent off to welfare homes — and these welfare homes then “sold” these babies off through foreign adoption channels to America and other [countries] overseas.
This human tragedy sound almost too wicked to believe, and yet it is a fact. The parents of sons and daughters snatched away have fought relentlessly for years, and their stories are so absurdly fantastic that they shocked this investigator. When I investigated this story during the first half of 2007, my grasp of the facts was limited to the confiscation of these children of farmers and their consignment to welfare homes, and stopped there. But my investigations this year development to such a point that I was able to confirm that children had been sent off to America, Holland and other countries. I also reached knowledgeable people on the U.S. side, who were able to provide even more information.
While the news never stops, this is perhaps the most important “human rights report” I will achieve this year, so I hope everyone will give it their attention. Attached is my first draft of the report (with some differences from the version finally published). On Monday, we will formally publish the story, video interviews, photos and other materials on the Caixin Media website (http://www.caing.com/)
It is very possible the report will be quickly “harmonized”. I humbly request that you teachers and friends pass the report along, and offer your comments.
Additionally, in the process of doing my on-the-spot reporting [for this piece], I took 3-4 hours of video and numerous photos as well as conducted audio interviews. In good time, I intend to edit these into a documentary called “Snatched Away” (抢婴) of around 30 minutes or so, so I hope everyone will stay tuned.
Thank you!
Respectfully,
Shangguan Jiaoming (上官皎明)
May 10, 2011

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封面报道
2002 至 2005 年,在湖南省隆回县,以收取社会抚养费为名,诸多“非法”婴幼儿被计生部门抢走,而后以弃婴的名义送入福利院,多数被领养。近年来,部分孩子被找到下落, 有些已经远在美国、荷兰等国。那些被抢走的孩子的家长们,至今还在寻亲路上
邵氏婴儿
□本刊记者 上官敫铭 | 文
漫漫寻亲路上,湖南人杨理兵随身携带着一张压了层薄膜的照片。照片上的女孩叫杨玲, 是他的第一胎孩子,算起来今年应该七岁了。
2005 年,杨玲尚在襁褓中,就离别了亲人。她不是被人贩子拐跑,而是被镇里的计生 干部以未交“社会抚养费”为名抢走了。
四年后,杨理兵终于得知女儿的下落——已是远在美国。
2009 年的一天,杨理兵和妻子曹志美在湖南常德一家酒店里,从一位素不相识的人手 中,得到女孩的两张照片,“我一眼就能肯定,她就是我的女儿。”杨理兵说。杨家的遭遇并非孤例。如今,隆回县有数十名婴儿曾被计划生育部门抢走,与父母人各 天涯。当地计生部门的解释是:这些婴幼儿多是被农民“非法收养”的弃婴。但实际上,有相当一部分婴幼儿是亲生的;更甚者,有的并非超生儿. 2002 年至 2005 年间,以违反计划生育政策为由、强行抱走婴幼儿的行为,在隆回县高平镇达到高潮。多年后,因部分家长锲而不舍的寻亲,类似事件浮出水面,甚至波及美国、 荷兰等国。
上篇
抢婴
锁定目标后,计生工作人员少则四五人,多则十余人,在村干部的带领下,迅速包围目标家 庭,将婴幼儿强行抱走。赎回小孩的惟一条件,就是交钱湖南邵阳隆回县,是一个国家级贫困县。从县城北行 70 多公里,到达高平镇。这是一 个位于大山群中的乡镇,人口 7 万多人。
看似人口不多,长年来,高平镇却面临着计划生育的压力。
上个世纪 70 年代初,中国开始推行以“一胎化”为主要标志的计划生育政策。1982 年, 计划生育政策被确定为基本国策。当时,和全国很多地方一样,湖南省也对计划生育工作实行“一票否决”制。违反《人口与计划生育法》和《湖南省人口与计划生育条例》禁止性规 定的,地方政府的主要负责人、人口和计划生育工作分管负责人及责任人和单位,一年内不 得评先评奖、晋职晋级、提拔重用、调动。
隆回县连续十余年,保持湖南省“计划生育工作先进县”的称号。因此其制定的处罚和 考核细则更为严苛。层层考核压力下,基层政府甚至不惜使用各种暴力手段。在那时的高平镇乡村,常常可以看到诸如“通不通,三分钟;再不通,龙卷风”等标语——乡民们解释称,
1其意思是计生干部给违反政策的家庭做思想工作,大约只需三分钟时间,之后再没做通,家 里值钱的家当就将像被龙卷风过境一样被一扫而空。此外,“儿子走了找老子,老子跑了拆房子”的标语,也让人惊悚。因“超生”问题而 被处罚过的西山村农民袁朝仁向财新《新世纪》记者介绍,在 1997年以前,对违反计划生 育政策的处罚是“打烂房子”、“抓大人”。他就曾因超生问题,被拆了房子.“2000 年以后,不砸房子了,‘没收’小孩。”袁朝仁说。
袁朝仁所说的“没收小孩”,是高平镇计生部门独特的处理违反计划生育政策的方式之 一。其方式是,计生办人员进村入户,将涉嫌违法生育、抚养的婴幼儿抢抱走。因此,每当计生干部下乡入户核查,乡民们便如遇匪寇而四处逃避。在 2002 年至 2005 年间,高平镇出现坊间所称的“抢婴潮”
“没收”杨玲(小标题)
杨理兵清楚地记得,2004 年 7 月 29 日下午,女儿在自己家中呱呱坠地。
那天下午,湖南省邵阳市隆回县高平镇凤形村,杨理兵妻子曹志美有了生产迹象。父亲 叫来了村里的接生婆袁长娥。袁长娥对财新《新世纪》记者回忆说,当她赶到杨理兵家时, 杨的母亲正陪在儿媳身旁。“那是下午四五点钟,生产很顺利。”
女儿降生后,杨家为其取名“杨玲”。哺育女儿到半岁后,杨理兵夫妇便离开老家,南 下深圳打工谋生,“孩子就交给爷爷奶奶哺养了。” 2005 年 5 月的一天,杨理兵照例给家里打电话,得到惊人消息,“女儿被人抢走了!” 他匆忙从深圳赶回家。但一切已晚。
对于头胎女儿为什么会被抢走,杨理兵百思不得其解。后来他猜到了原因:因为他们夫 妻双双外出打工,女儿由爷爷奶奶抚养,结果计生干部误以为两个老人收养了一个小孩, 因此也在征收“社会抚养费”之列。
杨理兵的父亲对财新《新世纪》记者回忆称,2004 年 4 月 29 日,高平镇计划生育办公室(以下简称“计生办”)刘唐山等一行近十人来到杨家。“他们很凶,她奶奶在屋里看到后 就抱着孩子躲,后来躲到了猪圈里。”
计生干部最终发现了被奶奶抱着躲在猪圈里的杨玲,理由是杨家未交“社会抚养费”, 要带走这个“非法婴儿”。
当天下午,杨理兵的父亲跟到了高平镇。“他们说,必须交 6000 块钱才可以把人抱回来。” 但四处筹借,只借到 4000
元,“我第二天再去,计生办的人说,就算交一万块,人也要不回 来了。”
那时,计生办人员已将杨玲送到了邵阳市社会福利院。由于通讯不畅,时隔多日,杨理 兵才赶回高平镇。他赶到镇里去要人,小孩已经被送走,争执中还发生了冲突。杨理兵回忆说,镇里主管计生工作的干部承诺,只要他不再继续追究此事,以后允许他 生两个小孩,还不用交罚款,“他们答应给我办理两个‘准生证’。”
“准生证”后来又被改名称做“计划生育服务证”,是中国新生婴儿赖以证明合法身份 的主要凭证。为了控制人口需要,育龄夫妇在生育前,必须到当地计生部门办理这一证件, 这是合法生育的法定程序。杨理兵并不理会这些。他赶到邵阳市社会福利院时,“根本就不知道女儿在哪里。”杨说: “他们‘没收’了我的女儿?!”
拆散双胞胎(小标题)
2
计生办“没收”的孩子,不仅杨玲一个。早在 2002 年,同是高平镇的计生干部,就抢 走了曾又东夫妇的一名女儿。
曾又东是高平镇高凤村人,与上黄村的袁赞华结为夫妻。1995 年和 1997 年,袁赞华先后生下两个女儿。二女儿降生后,由于交不起罚款,他们家的房子被计生办人员拆掉了屋顶。 夫妇俩由此跑到外地营生,发誓要为曾家生个儿子。
第三胎怀孕后,曾又东、袁赞华夫妇躲到了岳父家。“为了躲计生办的人,我们在竹林 里搭了个棚子居住。”曾又东对财新《新世纪》记者说。2000 年 9 月 15 日(农历八月初九),在岳父家的小竹林里,曾又东的双胞胎女儿降临人世。给袁赞华接生的,是上黄村的接生婆李桂华。在接受财新《新世纪》记者采访时,李 桂华对当年的情形历历在目,“是一对双胞胎,一个先出头,第二个先出脚。”
很难说曾家此时是欢喜还是烦恼。袁赞华发誓——“再生一个,无论是不是男孩,都不 再生了。” 2001 年 2 月,曾又东夫妇决定到重庆打工。对四个小孩,“我们决定带 3 个在身边,留 一个在妻子哥哥家代养。”曾又东说。
于是,袁赞华的兄嫂袁国雄、周秀华夫妇,为曾又东夫妇抚养了双胞胎姐妹中的大女儿。
厄运于次年发生。2002 年 5 月 30 日,高平镇计生办陈孝宇、王易等十余人闯进上黄村 袁国雄家,将 1岁半的小孩带走。一同被带走的,还有袁国雄的妻子周秀华。
“刚开始他们叫交 3000,后来就涨到 5000,再后来就要 1 万了。”袁国雄夫妇曾据理力争,向计生办人员坦陈,这是代妹妹家抚养的。但计生部门原则性很强,一口咬定交钱才 能赎人。因交不起罚款,双胞胎姐姐被送到了邵阳市社会福利院。
因通讯不畅,曾又东夫妇当时对此一无所知。那年 3 月,在重庆朝天门批发市场做小生 意的曾又东夫妇,还沉浸在幸福中,袁赞华生下了他们期盼的儿子。
2003 年,因母亲过世回家奔丧的曾又东,才知道女儿被计生办带走的消息。 如今,曾又东对这对双胞胎女儿中的姐姐已经印象模糊,“右耳朵好像有一点小赘肉?” 被抢夺的四类婴儿杨理兵和曾又东的遭遇并非孤例。高平镇被计生办以“超生”或“非法收养”等名由“抢 走”的婴幼儿,不在少数。而领回小孩的条件,无一例外都是交钱。数额多少没有定数,全凭计生干部们的说法。
高平镇西山洞村 5 组农民袁朝容对财新《新世纪》记者称,2004 年 8 月,他在广东省东莞市一家家具厂打工时,逛街过程中看到一个包裹,打开一看,里面是一个奄奄一息的女 婴。“这是一条生命啊。”袁朝容将女婴救起。在工友建议下,时年 42
岁无妻无子的袁朝容, 喂养了这名婴儿,并取名“袁庆龄”。
2004 年 12 月,袁朝容将孩子带回老家,向村长汇报此事,又交了些钱,希望村长帮忙 办理领养手续。第二年,袁朝容每月支付 350 元生活费,委托姨妈代养孩子,自己再次离家南下打工。然而,2005 年 7 月 28 日,高平镇李子健、陈孝宇等四五名计生干部闯入袁朝容姨妈家, 称此女婴为“非法收养”,将袁庆铃被抱走,并称必须交8000元才能将人领回。
袁朝容胞兄袁朝福对财新《新世纪》记者介绍,当时弟弟在广东,自己多次到镇计生办 请求放人,得到的答复是“必须先缴纳社会抚养费”。四个月后,当袁朝福回到老家要人时, 得到的答复是,小孩已被送到邵阳市社会福利院。
大石村 10 组农民袁名友夫妇,生育了两名男孩之后,妻子进行了结扎手术。1999 年, 他们在湖北省洪湖市沙口镇做生意时,捡到一名被遗弃的女婴收养下来。年底,回乡过年的3袁名友将此事向村干部汇报,并委托办理收养手续。 袁名友说,2002 年 5 月 10 日,在缴纳了 2000 元社会抚养费后,该名女婴在高平镇派出所进行了人口登记。在初次户口登记上,女婴取名“袁红”,与户主袁名友的关系是“养 女”。
虽然已缴纳社会抚养费,且上了户口,但是,2002 年 7 月 29 日,高平镇计生办干部刘唐山等四人还是来到袁家,将袁红抱走。彼时,袁名友夫妇在田地里劳作,看到来“抢人” 的刘唐山等人驾车离去,飞奔尾追。“他们把我女儿抓到了镇计生办。”袁名友向财新《新世纪》记者回忆说,“他们说我非 法收养,叫我按手模。说要拿 4 万块钱赎人,否则就不放人。最后说至少要交 3万。”
然而,第二天袁名友凑足钱带到计生办时,女儿已经不见了。“她的脖子底下,左边有 颗黑痣,豆子一样大的。”回忆起养女的模样,袁名友眼圈红了起来。吊诡的是,袁红被计生办抢走三年后,2005 年 12 月 30 日,当袁名友家更换新户口本时,袁红仍是袁家的一员。户口本上,袁红与户主的关系是“女儿”。但是,袁红至今下落 不明。
与袁名友的遭遇类似,高平镇合兴村 2 组农民李谟华收养的女儿,也于 2002 年被计生 干部抱走。
早在1998年,李家就为收养的女儿李艳上了户口。彼时施行的《收养法》,尚无“收养 应当向县级以上人民政府民政部门登记”的规定(1998 年 11月法律修正后才增加此规定)。 女儿被抱走后,李家无力缴纳罚款,李艳由此不知所踪。
在黄信村,2002 年上半年,村民周英河与女友唐海梅结婚,当年 12 月底,夫妻俩为周家生了第一个女孩,取名周娟。与中国农村很多地方一样,周英河和唐海梅当时按传统习俗 办过酒席即宣布结婚,暂未到民政部门注册登记。3个半月后,周英河夫妇南下广州打工,周的母亲刘素珍(音)承担了哺育孙女的任务。 然而,周娟最终还是被高平镇计生办的工作人员“抢走”了。
据刘素珍向财新《新世纪》记者回忆,那是 2003 年 3 月 15 日,“有八九个干部又来抢 小孩,我抱着孙女就跑了,躲在附近的邻居家。”
计生干部最终找到了被放在床上睡觉的周娟。“他们说,你老人家不会带小孩,我们带 比你带好些。”刘素珍跟着他们来到计生办后,按要求照相压手印,“他们就叫我走了。说要交 1 万 5 千块才能把孩子抱回来。”刘素珍没有能力筹款,孙女被计生办送到了福利院。
毛坪村 4 组的袁新权,头胎女儿也是被高平镇计生办工作人员抢走。2005 年 11 月 2 日, 袁新权的女儿降生。当年11月 25日,家人抱着女儿在路上行走时,被计生办人员强行将女 儿抱走。
不独隆回县,在邵阳市洞口县,也有类似情况。2008 年 12 月 2 日,该县城关镇的厚永 军、肖绚丽夫妇,因超生未及时上交社会抚养费,他们诞生才40 天的一名男婴,被当地计 生干部抱走,后因找人说情才被还回。
据袁朝仁等人初步统计,从 2000 年至 2005 年间,湖南隆回县高平镇至少有 16 名婴幼 儿,被镇计生办以违反计划生育政策的名义强行抱走。
“被抱走的小孩有四种情况,第一种是‘未婚先育’(一般已按传统习俗摆喜酒,但尚 未办理结婚登记)的,第二种是超生。”袁朝仁称,前两种情况,被抱走的婴幼儿都是其父母亲生骨肉。“第三种,就是抱养的,有的可能不符合收养规定;第四种,应该说是合法收 养的,因为他们已经上户口了呀!”
这四类婴幼儿,都是当地计生干部锁定的目标。散落在大山深处的高平镇各地乡村,乡 民们谈计生色变。一些乡民称,每当计生干部下乡入户时,家有属于上述四种情况婴幼儿的农户,便如遇匪寇而四处逃避。
4依据多位家长描述,计生干部抢走婴幼儿的过程几乎大同小异。锁定目标后,计生工作 人员少则四五人多则十余人,在村干部的带领下,迅速包围计划对象家庭,将婴幼儿强行抱走。赎回小孩的惟一条件,就是交钱。
经财新《新世纪》记者采访调查核实,截至 2005 年,被高平镇计生工作人员强行抱走 的婴幼儿近 20 名。■
中篇
生意经
基层在执行计划生育国策的过程中,不乏高压和严苛的措施。除了政绩考量,自由裁量的罚款也充盈了地方财政。在政绩和利益的双重驱动下,交不起罚款家庭的婴幼儿被送往福利院, “弃婴”利益链由此产生隆回县对计划生育国策的执行,经历了一个不断从紧的过程。
2001 年 11 月,因违反计划生育问题突出,隆回县开始对高平镇进行集中整治。全县抽 调 230 多名干部进驻高平镇,入驻各个乡村督导工作。在此期间,原先对违反计划生育人员收取的“计划外生育费”,统一更名为“社会抚养 费”。扭曲的“社会抚养费”(小标题)按政府给出的定义,社会抚养费是指“为调节自然资源的利用和保护环境,适当补偿政 府的社会事业公共投入的经费,对不符合法定条件生育子女的公民征收的费用”。属于行政性收费,具有补偿性和强制性的特点。
2002 年 8 月 2 日,国务院经国务院令第 357 号公布了《社会抚养费征收管理办法》,征收的对象主要是“超生”家庭,即“不符合人口与计划生育法第十八条的规定生育子女的公 民”。
而依据《湖南省人口与计划生育条例》规定,未婚生育、超生、非法收养的家庭,都要 缴纳社会抚养费。
隆回县在对高平镇计划生育问题进行整治的运动中,为了顺利收取社会抚养费,县法院 “计生行政审判合议庭”抽调了七名法官进驻高平镇,派出所抽调四名干警协同,负责强制执行。1999年,隆回县“大胆探索”,成立了计划生育行政审判合议庭,由审判员和来自县计生委公务员(由法院任命为助理审判员)组成,日常工作由计生委管理。这个法庭的主要任务,就是负责对计生行政案件的强制执行——其中主要就是罚款或收费的执行。这一“成功 经验”,后来被全省推介。
通过整治,高平镇的超生势头得到一定遏制。然而,在经济凋敝的大山深处,乡民们“养 儿防老”、“男尊女卑”、“多子多福”等传统观念并没有因此改变。2005 年 3 月 22 日,隆回县提出了以“县乡村三级联包”的形式加强计划生育管理。除
“一票否决”外,再以职务升迁和经济奖励的方式,刺激计生干部的工作积极性。
在此背景之下,县、镇、村三级的相关干部的升迁、工资待遇等,均被与计生绩效“捆5绑”在一起。分管及负责计划生育的干部们,决定“破釜沉舟,背水一战”(当地计生标语——编者注),高平镇的大街小巷再次贴满与计划生育有关的标语,例如“谁敢超生就让他 倾家荡产”。
计生部门为何如此热衷“没收”婴幼儿并送往福利院?除了政绩考量,以收取“社会抚 养费”为目的的创收,也是主要动力之一。据高平镇官方人士介绍,农业税取消后,该镇维持干部队伍的工资都时常捉襟见肘。收 取社会抚养费,不仅仅是在落实计生国策,更是为充盈地方财政收入。社会抚养费未按规定支出,在湖南省是普遍现象。依据湖南省人口和计划生育委员会的 初步统计,仅 2004 年和 2005 年,社会抚养费非规定支出的比例分别高达88.04%和 87.11%。 其中,绝大部分用乡镇机关支出。对于乡镇政府将社会抚养费直接“坐收坐支”的现象,湖 南省财政厅曾给予批评。
在2006年5月17日,隆回县发布当年上半年计划生育督察通报。通报称,“有些乡镇将社会抚养费作为乡镇财政的主要来源,财政所无能开发财源,只能绞尽脑汁管死这笔钱”。
上述督查通报进而称,“有的乡镇按月定计生办上交社会抚养费指标,否则扣发计生办 人员工资。”乡镇计生办“重点工作(孕检、节育措施落实)没人做,难点工作不愿做,有钱的工作(社会抚养费征收)抢着做。”
2010 年,隆回县县长钟义凡在该县人口和计划生育工作春季集中整治活动动员大会上发表讲话时说,在“一票否决”等压力下,“乡镇党委、政府与计生队伍存在较深的利害关 系,不敢得罪,导致计生队伍绑架党委和政府”。2002年4月,高平镇计生办主任由周小方担任。彼时,主管该镇计生工作的是镇党委副书记刘述德。为了摘掉因计生问题而被“黄牌警告”的帽子,高平镇进行了专项集中整治 ——主要的一项工作就是征收社会抚养费。
当时,计生办成为高平镇政府第一大部门。镇政府 120 多名工作人员的建制,计生办就 占到 30 人。据周小方介绍,全镇每年补报生育和超生的婴幼儿在100人左右。
计生办的工作人员则开始搜寻并锁定超生、“非婚生育”和“非法收养”子女家庭。据 当地官员介绍,在高平镇刚开始收取社会抚养费时,每人约在3000到4000元。但是,以 强行抱走小孩相“要挟”时,价格就涨到 1 万元甚至几万元。
“弃婴”收养黑幕(小标题)
那些被计生办工作人员抢走的婴幼儿,不仅仅是征收社会抚养费的筹码。有知情者称, 每送一名婴幼儿到福利院,计生干部可得到 1000 元甚至更多回报。
但邵阳市福利院院长蒋德伟在接受财新《新世纪》记者采访时,没有正面回应这一说法。邵阳市福利院能够证实的是,在 2002 年至 2005 年间,隆回县高平镇民政办、计生办共 送来了13名婴儿,其中,一名男婴被领回。其他未被领回的婴幼儿,经民政公示程序被宣 布为“弃婴”后,进入社会收养程序——尤其是涉外收养渠道。
“收养人要捐助一笔收养金。”蒋德伟说,正常的行情是,每收养一位中国孤儿(弃婴), 外国收养家庭通常需支付3000美元。在湖南省,民政厅收养中心接收到收养人捐助的收养 金后,绝大部分(约 90%)将回拨给福利院。
在此利诱下,曾有人专事贩婴生意。2005 年 11 月,湖南省本地媒体曾披露衡阳祁东县一起团伙贩婴案,幕后指使就是衡阳市多家福利院。福利院与人贩子互相勾结,收买婴幼儿, 并将其变为“弃婴”后,送入涉外收养渠道,以从中牟利。自2003年以来,衡南县福利院“买进”婴儿 169 名,衡山县福利院“买进”232名, 衡阳县福利院“买进”的婴儿最多,为409名。
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经湖南省祁东县法院的判决证实,为了多向境外输送可供收养的婴儿,衡阳县各福利院 不但给职工下达搜寻婴儿的任务,甚至主动通过人贩等各种中间人“收购”婴儿。福利院至多支付两三千元人民币“买入”婴幼儿,送养国外后即可获得 3000 美元。
前述案件,撕开了“弃婴”收养的黑幕一角,福利院成为“洗白”人口贩卖的合法中介。 2006年2月22日,湖南省祁东县法院公开审理这一福利院贩婴案时,引起海内外舆论哗然。
巧合的是,前述衡阳县多家福利院疯狂“买进”婴幼儿的时间段,正是隆回县各乡村爆 发“抢婴潮”的时期. 2009年7月,中国媒体再次披露了计生部门将超生婴儿抢送到福利院,并在涉外领养过程中牟利的事件。在贵州镇远县,计生部门将交不出罚款的超生婴儿强行抱走,送入福利院后再通过“寻亲公告”等程序将其变为“弃婴”,多名婴儿被送养到美国、荷兰及西班牙 等国。与多年前衡阳县的多家福利院一样,镇远县福利院每送养一名婴儿,亦可获3000美元“赞助费”。
“弃婴”制造链
为了将这些抢抱走的婴幼儿,变成合法“弃婴”,高平镇计生办的工作人员,伪造或编 造了相关文件材料。财新《新世纪》根据这些资料,就 2005 年计生办抱走杨理兵女儿的案卷,进行了采访 核实。
当年,该案案由系杨理兵“非法代养一个孩子”。立案负责人为时任主管计生工作的高 平镇党委副书记刘述德,经办人包括计生办的刘唐山、李红旺、罗伟等三人。在案卷中,包括了结案报告、立案呈批报告、综合材料、分别对杨理兵父子的两份讯问笔录、杨理兵本人 的申请书、民政办证明、村委会证明、派出所证明、村干部证明等 10 份材料。
财新《新世纪》记者通过对相关当事人的采访证实,除了高平镇派出所出具的杨理兵为 登记结婚的证明为真实材料,其他九份材料均系编造或伪造。在对“杨清正”的讯问笔录中,文字资料显示,“杨清正”承认抚养的女婴为“儿子杨 理兵从外面捡回来的”,并表示“听人民政府处理”。在笔录上,在多处签字“杨清正”处, 印上了鲜红的指模。
但是,杨家人称,高平镇计生办人员从未对杨父做过笔录,而杨理兵的父亲,正确的姓 名应该系“杨亲政”而非“杨清正”。在对杨理兵的笔录及其“申请”中,于 2005 年 4 月 30 日签字且按指模的“杨理兵”称, “我自愿申请将捡回的小孩送邵阳市社会福利院抚养,绝不后悔”。但事实是,儿女被抱走 一个月后,身在深圳的杨理兵才得知这一消息。“这全都是伪造的。”杨理兵对财新《新世纪》记者说。
“村干部证明”文件,是凤形村支部书记“汪先姣”出具的。证明书称,杨理兵在外打 工时“捡到一个女孩,未取名,一直放在家里由他的父亲带养。我村杨理兵还不符合收养条件,他父亲又年事已高,无力抚养小孩”。
事实上,凤形村支部书记汪先蛟的家,与杨理兵家隔着一座山。“我是给镇里的计生干 部说过,杨理兵家养着一个女孩,当时听说好像是捡来的。” 汪先蛟对财新《新世纪》记者说:“我当时是不太确定情况。但这份证明肯定不是我写的。”
看到记者提供的“证明材料”的复印件后,汪先蛟确认,“我的字不能写那么好的。这 个签名、手印也都不是我的。我的名字是蛟龙的‘蛟’。”——而“证明书”的落款是“汪先
姣”。
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在高平镇向上级部门汇报的“计划生育违法案件”中,与杨理兵的案卷一样,相关材料 中,当事人无一例外,均“承认”婴幼儿是捡来的来历不明的“弃婴”。对此,曾任高平镇党委书记的陈勇称,被抱走的婴幼儿是有亲生的,但当时村民害怕缴 纳社会抚养费,同时又希望继续生育男孩,因此都自称是收养的。
而时任高平镇计生办主任周小方说,生下女婴的家庭,多将婴儿放在亲戚家抚养,以逃 避违反计划生育政策的处罚。计生干部在执法时,村民不承认抚养的婴幼儿系亲生的。但财新《新世纪》记者对案卷涉及的相关当事人进行采访核实时,无一人自称这些婴儿 是弃婴。
“他们抢走的是我孙女啊!”为儿子周英河抚养孙女的刘素珍,回忆起孙女被抢走时的 情形时失声痛哭。她说,当时自己与孙女周娟被关押在计生办二楼,计生干部让她在一份材料上按了手印,不识字的刘素珍不清楚上面写的是什么内容。
对于伪造“弃婴”文件一事,当年负责高平镇计生工作的刘述德对财新《新世纪》记者 称,“不可能造假的。”时任计生办主任周小方则对财新《新世纪》周刊记者说,对于抱走计生对象婴幼儿一事,“当时已有结论,没有他们(指寻找子女的家长——编者注)说的那些 事。”
一夜出炉的“调查报告”
经邵阳市社会福利院证实,隆回县高平镇被计生部门带走的 13 名婴儿中,至少有 7 名 是抚养家庭的亲生骨肉。之后,家长们一直抗争不止。
在抢婴潮中失去孩子的家长们相互打听,找到了遭遇相同的家庭。他们组成维权团体, 向当地政府讨要公道。
2006 年 3 月 10 晚,隆回县政府得知,多位被抢婴幼儿的家长打算到北京上访维权。时任邵阳市委书记盛茂林,邵阳市委常委、市委秘书长向才昂等人做出批示,要求隆回县调查处理。当晚,隆回县县委书记杨建新、县长钟义凡等人分别做出批示,要求成立调查组。次日 上午,隆回县从县委办、纪检委、计生局、宣传部等四部门抽调11名人员组成联合调查组, 由县委办副主任兼督查室主任陈云鹤带队,赴高平镇展开调查。
时隔仅仅一天,2006 年 3 月 12 日,联合调查组的报告即出炉。调查组确认确有 12 名 婴幼儿被计生办工作人员抱走。被调查的12户村民分别为:合兴村魏太喜、大石村袁明友 夫妇、白地村王义娥夫妇、黄信村周乐平刘素贞夫妇、金凤山村罗如冰、杏升村聂仙银夫妇、金凤山村周英喜夫妇、回小村袁家石、大田村周英明夫妇、凤形村杨清正、上黄村袁国雄夫 妇和毛坪村袁新权。
前述调查报告称,被计生办抱走的 12 名小孩中,11 名是不符合收养条件,又未办理任何收养关系手续,属于非法收养。“在非法收养人主动提出送社会福利院的情况下,全部移 送邵阳市社会福利院抚养”。
调查组承认,只有袁新权与孙歌的女儿为“未婚先育”,“袁新权父子请求计生办工作人 员协助„„将该女婴送到邵阳市社会福利院。”
但是,经财新《新世纪》记者采访核实,调查报告中所涉及的 12 户村民中,并非报告所称“婴儿或幼儿的来源情况说不清楚”。包括黄信村周乐平夫妇、凤形村杨清正、上黄村 袁国雄夫妇等家庭,其抚养的婴幼儿均与自己有血缘关系。
其中,周乐平夫妇抚养的,是其儿子周英河夫妇所生的第一胎孩子;凤形村的“杨清正”, 抚养的是前述其子杨理兵的第一胎女儿杨玲;而上黄村袁国雄夫妇抚养的,是前述曾又东、 袁赞华双胞胎女儿中的姐姐。
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在调查组所涉名单之外,财新《新世纪》记者通过对家长及当时婴儿接生婆的调查核实, 至少有七名被计生办抱走的婴幼儿与抚养家庭有血缘关系。■
下篇
宝贝回家
婴幼儿被“没收”的家长们,走上了漫漫寻亲路。多年后他们发现,自己的骨肉已由福利院变 成“弃婴,” 而被外国家庭收养。如今,多位家长已确认了孩子在国外生活的信息魏海龙回家在“抢婴潮”中,合兴村 5 组农民魏太喜的养子,是被计生部门强行带走的小孩之一。
2005 年 10 月 16 日上午,高平镇五六名计生干部闯入魏太喜家,将时年 5 岁的魏海龙 带走。计生干部留下话,“交钱(社会抚养费)赎人”——魏家要缴纳6500 元罚款,才能领 回孩子。
魏海龙是魏太喜收养的弃婴。2000 年,魏太喜与妻子龙蕊(当时尚未办理结婚登记手续)在贵州天柱县凤城镇打工时,捡到了一名出生约十余天的男婴。据魏太喜称,因夫妻俩没有生育能力,便将男婴抱养,取名魏海龙。当年春节,回家过年的魏太喜向一名村干部交 了100元钱,希望办理收养申请和登记事宜。
六年后,当魏海龙已届入小学念书的年龄时,计生办干部李子健、陈孝宇等六人,突然 登门,将其从家中抢走。根据中国《收养法》的规定,收养人欲收养子女,应当同时具备以下条件:无子女、有 抚养教育被收养人的能力、未患有在医学上认为不应当收养子女的疾病、年满30周岁。据 此,2000 年时,魏太喜未满 30 岁,应该不符合收养人条件,且未到民政部门办理收养手续, 应属于非法收养。
不过,针对民间大量存在的非法收养情况,目前中国尚未出台如何处理的法律法规。按 理,即使要对这样的情况进行纠正,也应该由主管收养工作的民政部门采取行动,而非由计生部门越俎代庖,更不应该以此为由索要社会抚养费。
魏太喜家穷极,拿不出钱,他绕了几个弯之后,找到了时任邵阳市人大代表袁忠福。
袁忠福是高平镇江魏村种粮专业户,曾培育了杂交水稻新品“五彩稻”,在隆回县乃至 邵阳市均颇有声誉。因带领村民致富,袁当选为邵阳市第十三届、第十四届人大代表。
接到魏家的求助后,一场营救魏海龙的行动由此展开。袁忠福找到了时任高平镇党委副 书记、分管计划生育工作的刘述德。刘对袁的答复是,小孩已送福利院,要交1万元社会抚 养费方可领回。
对此,袁忠福利用人大代表的身份,分别向隆回县人大、县政府等部门反映此事。针对袁忠福的诉求,高平镇计生办于 2005 年 11 月 2 日向相关上级部门领导专函汇报称: 魏太喜未年满30周岁(魏 1975年12月生), 不符合《收养法》第四款关于收养人须年满 30 岁的规定;此外,收养人未遵守关于“收养应向县级以上人民政府民政部门登记”的规定;而魏海龙是否为弃婴,也无相关证明。
高平镇计生办还在前述汇报材料称,因收养关系不成立,魏太喜“主动提出家庭困难, 无法抚养小孩,请求镇计生办将小孩送社会福利机构抚养”。实际上,经财新《新世纪》记者采访核实,计生办出具的魏太喜的“申请书”,如前述
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提到的杨理兵申请书一样,同系伪造。 在魏家向计生办讨要魏海龙期间,高平镇计生办却向相关上级部门汇报称,魏太喜听闻公安机关将调查其非法领养一事畏罪潜逃。而事实上,魏太喜及其家人,为了从计生部门手 中要回养子而一直抗争。
得知魏海龙被计生办抓去的消息后,魏就读的雪界小学曾专门致函高平镇计生办,希望 计生办领导“以孩子学业为重,让他赶快重返校园”。对此,计生办不予理会。魏海龙是“弃婴”,还是如计生办称系魏太喜“买回”?为了查明真相,袁忠福奔赴贵 州等地调查了解情况。据魏太喜当年打工的店主陆跃珍证实, 2000年6月的一天晚上,陆 跃珍的商店门口出来了婴儿的啼哭声。陆等人出门查看时,发现裙包里放在一个出生未满一月的男婴。“可能是想送给我养的。”陆跃珍说,“但我不想要。我想到魏太喜爱人无生育能 力,我劝他俩捡着带养成人,这也是积德。”
确证了魏海龙的弃婴身份后,在袁忠福的督促下,2005 年 11 月底,高平镇计生办和派 出所将魏海龙从邵阳市社会福利院接回。被带走29天之后,魏海龙终于回到家中。
寻亲之路
魏海龙回家的消息,激起了更多家长的寻亲热情。
女儿被抢走后,曾又东不止一次到高坪镇计生办讨要说法,但总是无功而返。“他们说 我女儿是捡来的。之后不管怎么说就是不理我了。我去县公安局报了几次警,警察每次都说会给我一个满意的答复,但后来就不管了。”曾又东对财新《新世纪》记者说。
2006 年 3 月 25 日,为了防止新生的儿子又被抢走,曾又东主动去计生办缴纳了 14400 元社会抚养费,为儿子办理了落户手续。
袁庆龄被抢走后,袁朝容曾从广州赶回老家讨要说法。“他们说我这是非法领养,还把 我打了一顿。”袁朝容对财新《新世纪》记者说,“这女儿是我救起的,当时不救她就死了。 如果她还在人间,希望她能好好活着。”
袁朝容的哥哥袁朝福却誓为兄弟讨个公道。袁庆龄被计生办人员抱走四个月后,有一天, 原高平镇党委书记田昌金对袁称,袁朝容符合收养条件,但收养需要申请。袁朝福转述了当天田昌金对他的话,“他说,我给你们联系,出点钱另找一个孩子来养吧。原来那个女孩不 行了,已经不见了。”
为此,袁朝福找到了主管计生工作的时任高平镇党委副书记刘述德。刘并没有给袁朝福 任何答复。讨要孩子的代价是,袁朝福被拘留了五天。依据隆回县公安局认定,袁朝福打了刘述德,因此将其行政拘留。
但袁朝福说,“那是陷害!我们是吵了起来,他就叫派出所警察抓我。”为了力证自己被 诬陷, 2006年3月,袁朝福曾向隆回县公安局提起行政复议申请,要求撤销拘留他的“隆 公(行)决字[2006]101 号”文件。而袁红被计生办抢走后,袁名友曾据理力争,但计生干部们不予理会。能证实袁名友夫 妇合法收养袁红的材料,包括当时捡拾时现场目击者的证明、缴纳的社会抚养费收据、袁红已合法进行户口登记等材料。
“这些他们都不认,就是叫我交钱。”袁名友对财新《新世纪》记者称。由于经济条件 有限,袁名友夫妇追寻女儿的脚步,止步于镇计生办。
让袁更加愤怒的是,袁红不知所踪九年后,2010 年 11 月,袁名友家上缴的农村合作医 疗费中,仍要缴纳女儿的份额。
“你们还我女儿!还我女儿!”确认杨玲被送到邵阳市社会福利院后,杨理兵多次来到 福利院,但每次都吃闭门羹。“我就差给他们下跪了。”杨对财新《新世纪》记者说。
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“邵氏”婴儿
“非法”婴幼儿被抱走后,其中家长未能及时缴纳或根本交不起高额社会抚养费的,就 被送到了福利院。
“高坪镇民政办现送来女弃婴一名。请接收。”2002 年至 2005 年间,邵阳市社会福利 院每年都会收到来自高平镇民政办、计生办送来的接收弃婴申请书。对于这些送来的“弃婴”,福利院照单将其收下。“他们也是政府部门,我们不能怀疑吧。”
邵阳市社会福利院院长蒋德伟对财新《新世纪》记者解释说。依照惯例,这些婴幼儿入院的 时间成为了他们的生日,姓氏则都统一改成了“邵”——邵阳的邵。
依照《收养法》、《外国人在中华人民共和国收养子女登记办法》的相关规定,福利院的 婴儿、儿童可进入本国及涉外将婴儿涉外送养渠道。2003年,《民政部关于社会福利机构涉 外送养工作的若干规定》中明确,“社会福利机构送养弃婴、儿童,省级人民政府民政部门应当在当地省级报纸上刊登查找弃婴、儿童生父母的公告。自公告刊登之日起满 60 日,弃 婴、儿童的生父母或其他监护人未认领的,视为查找不到生父母的弃婴、儿童。”
财新《新世纪》记者查阅了部分 2002 年至 2005 年的《湖南日报》,确有湖南省民政厅发布的单独或包括来自邵阳社会福利院的《寻亲公告》。然而,对于生活在大山深处,或者 常年在外乡打工的高坪镇乡民而言,这些公告对他们没有任何用处。
这即意味着,公告 60 天后,早已取名的“杨玲”、“周娟”、“袁庆龄”、“袁红”、“李艳” 等的婴幼儿,将统一变成“邵”姓。由此,当地民政部门和福利院,“将确定其为弃婴,依 法予以安置”。
多年来,家长们向外界寻求帮助,追寻亲生骨肉下落的努力从未停息。湖南邵阳、省会 长沙、首都北京等多个地方的相关政府部门,都留下了他们信访的脚印。2006年3月10日,高平镇部分婴幼儿被计生办抢走后下落不明的家长,决定集体到北 京上访。消息被当地政府获悉,家长们的维权行为被阻止。当年3月21日,香港《南华早 报》率先披露消息,高平镇计生办工作抢走农民婴幼儿的消息第一次被英文读者所知。
2007年上半年,家长们找到内地记者反映相关事宜。
2008年,中国儿童第二大收养国的荷兰,其 EO 电视台在相关中国孤儿问题的电视专题片中,除了检讨荷兰从中国(邵阳)收养婴幼儿可能存在的疏漏,也指责了邵阳市社会福利院涉嫌将高平镇计生办送来的婴幼儿变为“弃婴”的行为。杨理兵的亲生女儿杨玲,在未被 计生办人员抢走前的照片,出现在该专题片中。
2009年9月20日,美国《洛杉矶时报》在关于中国弃婴及收养等相关问题的报道中, 再次披露了隆回县高平镇多名农民婴幼儿被抢抱送到福利院的消息。美国是收养中国婴幼儿 数量最多的国家,该报道引发了美国读者的热议。
中国收养中心成立于 1996 年 6 月,中国涉外收养工作当年正式启动。至今,与中国建 立收养合作关系的国家有 17 个。2011年1月18日,经中央机构编制委员会办公室批准, 中国收养中心更名为中国儿童福利和收养中心.
据该中心披露的最新统计数据,至今共有 10 万多名中国孤残儿童被外国家庭收养。可 以确认的是,被高平镇计生部门送到福利院的“邵氏”婴儿,部分就名列其中。“我们都是按着政策规定来的。”邵阳市社会福利院院长蒋德伟对财新《新世纪》记者 称,福利院涉外的收养程序符合规定。对于那些被伪造为“弃婴”的婴幼儿的下落,蒋称, 依据《收养法》规定,不便透露任何信息。现行《收养法》第 21 条规定,“收养人、送养人 要求保守收养秘密的,其他人应当尊重其意愿,不得泄露”。
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人伦悲剧
然而,部分婴幼儿的下落还是有了眉目。2009 年底,有热心的美国读者依据此前媒体报道,找到了三名情况较为吻合的被收养 女孩资料——包括刚到达美国的信息和照片、生活了几年后的近照等。
这三人的照片传真到了邵阳。“这就是我的女儿!”曾又东看到其中一张照片时脱口而出。 照片中的女孩,与双胞胎妹妹曾双洁长得近乎一模一样。“她会讲中文吗?会回来认我们吗?”曾又东像在呓语,“不是我们抛弃她,她是被抢走的!”
经财新《新世纪》记者从多方渠道得知,收养双胞胎姐姐的是一对年龄偏高的美国夫妇, 丈夫于2010年病故。养女的信息在网上被泄露后,这户家庭原有的联系方式均已失效.
第二个获悉女儿去向的是杨理兵。他已记不清是 2008 年还是 2009 年的某一天,一位自 称“小叶”(化名)的人,自称找到了与杨玲信息较为吻合的两个女孩。杨理兵和妻子曹志美从打工地湖南郴州赶到常德。当见到小叶提供的两位女孩照片中的 一张时,曹志美痛哭不已。“没错!这就是我们的女儿。”杨理兵指着其中一张相片说.
远在美国的小叶,时常为美国收养家庭做翻译。依据收养地点、时间等相关资料,小叶 提供了与杨理兵儿女较为吻合的信息。但或是出于尊重收养伦理的考虑,除了确认杨玲被美国家庭收养,小叶再未提供更多相关情况。
“小孩在她的美国收养家庭生活得很好,她的收养父母都非常爱她。”小叶对财新《新 世纪》记者说。在没有进行DNA鉴定前,收养家庭也不能百分之百确定女孩是杨理兵的女 儿。“但我相信,将来会有她与亲生父母相认的一天。”小叶说。相关知情人士向财新《新世纪》记者透露,邵阳市福利院确认接收的十余名婴儿中,“都 已送养到国外”。更多信息较为吻合的照片传真回来,然而,那些丢失孩子的父母,除非进行 DNA 鉴定,都不敢确认谁是自己的骨肉。
曾又东夫妇认女儿的依据,是双胞胎姐妹中的妹妹,她们就像一个模子所刻。而杨理兵, 则是因为在小孩被抢走之前,曾给女儿拍下过照片。给杨理兵拍全家福的照相馆,在高平墟的一条街上。杨理兵每次经过,老板娘总会关心 的问,“你女儿找回来了吗?”
寻女多年,杨理兵夫妇已无心营生,家境日渐窘迫。确认女儿仍存活于世、身在美国的 消息后,曹志美要求丈夫尽快找回杨玲。2009 年底,曹志美不辞而别,离家出走。
“她留下话说,连女儿被人抢去都找不回来,跟我过还有什么意思?”言及此事,泪水 在杨理兵眼眶打转,“只要还活着,我一定要找回自己的女儿。”■
被计生办抢走的孩子(制表)
魏海龙,合兴村魏太喜养子。弃婴。2000 年 6 月,抱养于贵州省天柱县。2005 年 10 月 16 日被计生办人员带走,送入邵阳市社会福利院,后被领回。袁红,太石村袁名友养女。弃婴。1999 年 8 月,在湖北省洪湖市沙口镇被袁名友夫妇 抱养。2002 年 5 月已办理户口登记手续。2002年7月29日被计生办人员带走。
资料:
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袁庆龄,弃婴。2004 年 8 月,西山洞村袁朝荣自称从广州东莞捡到后带养,未办理收 养手续。2005 年 7 月 28
日,计生办人员从白地村袁姨妈王义娥家带走。
婴儿X(未取名,下同),毛坪村袁新权与孙歌“未婚先育(”暂未登记结婚)之女。生 于 2005 年农历 10 月初一,2005 年 11 月 25
日被计生人员带走,这是隆回县官方惟一承认 送到福利院的农民亲生子女。
婴儿 X,毛坪村袁明三之女,第一胎亲生。于 2001 年 6 月出生,2002 年 6 月被“抢
走。”
杨玲,2004 年 7 月出生,杨理兵、曹志美夫妇头胎女婴。依农村风俗办过酒席,生育 时尚未领取结婚证件。2005 年 4 月 29
日被计生办人员强行抱走。2009 年确认,被美国家 庭收养。
婴儿 X,凤形村袁精南之女,第三胎。于大田村外公家抚养,2004 年 9 月被带走。
婴儿 X,2004 年上半年,回小村袁家石自称在广东捡拾来的弃婴,未办理收养手续。 2004 年下半年,该名女婴被带走。
婴儿 X,金凤山村周英喜收养女婴,2002 年 9 月份收养,未办理收养手续。2003 年 5 月 23 日被计生办人员抱走。
李艳,合兴村李谟华养女,1998 年 11 月抱养,已办理户口登记手续。2002 年,女 婴被计生办人员抱走。
婴儿 X,高凤村曾又东夫妇双胞胎女儿之姐姐,亲生,第三胎,生于 2000 年 9 月。 上黄村袁国雄夫妇帮忙抚养。2002 年 5 月 30
日被计生办人员抢走。2009 年确认,被一户 美国家庭收养。
婴儿 X,茶山村袁朝辉夫妇亲生女儿,第二胎,生于 2003 年 3 月。2003 年 6 月,该 名女婴在聂姓外公家被计生干部抱走。
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周娟,黄新村周乐平与唐海梅之女,当时尚未办理结婚手续,生于 2002 年 12 月。2003 年 3 月 15
日,周娟被计生办人员从为儿子带养孙女的周乐平夫妇手中强行带走。
……
资料来源:经财新《新世纪》记者在高平镇采访核实,为不完全统计
14

Bold editorial on 2008 quake blacked out

One of the lead editorials in today’s edition of Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper, a bold but indirect call on all Chinese to remember those who perished in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, has been removed from the paper’s website. It seems plausible that the editorial fell afoul of censors due to its oblique reference to the efforts of activists such as Tan Zuoren (谭作人) and Ai Weiwei (艾未未) to independently investigate the collapse of shoddy school buildings in the quake.
The section in question, which also contains three apparent references to works of art by Ai Weiwei, reads: “In our hearts, we lowered our flags to half-mast for them. On the day of mourning we called them home and wished them peace. We gathered together all the human evidence of them we could. We read their names together. We promised that we would bear them constantly in mind, never forgetting, over and over again. We did so much, and yet we did too little. Those of you who were lost and did not return, where are you? Can the light we kindle shine across your path? We cannot do more.”
The image layout of the lead editorial page is still available at the Southern Metropolis Daily website.


However, try clicking on the space for the Sichuan quake commemoration editorial at lower left and you get a notice that reads: “No such content today.”

Follow search links on Baidu for the editorial and you’ll find that most if not all of them are now unavailable. Interestingly, a video version of the editorial has now surfaced (so quickly!) on 56.com, in which the piece is read out loud by CMP fellow and Chinese scholar Ai Xiaoming (艾晓明) as the text appears in subtitles below and facts about students who died in the quake scroll up on a black background. The video has also been posted to YouTube.

Chinese Twitter users have already shared a link to a Google Docs version of the editorial, which is available by clicking the headline on our full translation below. Please forgive any errors and mistranslations, and offer up your friendly suggestions. This is a tough piece, in prose-poem style, and much is up to the eye and mind of the reader.

Remembering Them As We Are Borne By the River of Time” (躺在时间的河流上怀念他们)
Lead Editorial (社论)
Southern Metropolis Daily
May 12, 2011
Today is the third anniversary of the Wenchuan earthquake, and you readers are certainly aware of our grief and its causes. That earthquake laid waste to mountains and rivers. It resulted in the loss of some 80,000 lives. So the tapestry of our grief stretches on to the present day. Our grief is for those brethren who are lost and will never return. And May has become, therefore, a month of sorrow. We feel sorrow too because we found ourselves so powerless as they were snatched from us. Again, another year of sacrifices and offerings [to the dead]. Time passes like a river unyielding, and there are so many questions we must face. Who were they? What happened to them? Where are they? What actions do they demand of us?
A few burning joss sticks, and the scent of the smoke curls upwards, rising into the void. They are not cold numbers. They existed, buoyant with life, with real names. They walked into the ruins with the entirety of their lives. They lived happily on this earth for seven years, or for longer or shorter periods of time. They were parents, they were children, they were sisters, they were brothers. They were people of yellow skin. They were residents or passing travelers in these homes. They stalked these mountains and rivers, watching the clouds rise and fall. They all had human emotions. They are human beings you have met or not seen, spirits abiding across the expanse of earth.
Life happens by chance, but death comes of necessity. Three years ago today, at this same time, afternoon, dusk and night fell like stands of rotten trees, choking the river of time [NOTE: This means people were dying steadily after the 3pm quake]. Red the blood, grey the dust, white the vertigo, black the raiments of death. They fell in a current of color, like the standing grain of misfortune cut down by the sharpest of scythes. They lost everything. Their old age, or middle age, youth or childhood, all were ended too early and too quickly. They became a jumble of fragments. As though by a sharp edge, their families were cloven, tears left in the wake. They said farewell to their hometowns.
They came from four directions, and departed in eight directions. We feel regret mingled with self-reproach. They should have had better deaths, with calm and unhurried remembrances, tears permitted to fly like the rain. In such haste, such haste, they departed forever from villages and cities left in sick-heartedness. Now, across mountain slopes where new green rises over the stones, they remain in the schools, on the roads, underground, in the nameless places. They are together with each other, the way wheat grows together. In the summer, in the midst of their final twilight, they went to a place we cannot see. They are the only anguish and the only comfort left to the survivors [NOTE: comfort by virtue of their continued presence in spirit].
In our hearts, we lowered our flags to half-mast for them. On the day of mourning we called them home and wished them peace. We gathered together all the human evidence of them we could. We read their names together [NOTE: This seems to be a reference to Ai Weiwei’s piece “Missing,” in which volunteers read the names of students who died in the Sichuan earthquake]. We promised that we would bear them constantly in mind, never forgetting, over and over again. We did so much, and yet we did too little. Those of you who were lost and did not return, where are you? Can the light we kindle shine across your path? We cannot do more. We can but present steel zodiacs, and offer up porcelain sunflower seeds [NOTE: This is a presumable reference to Ai Weiwei’s exhibit at the Tate Modern, which incorporates sunflowers seeds and the Chinese zodiac heads now on display at London’s Somerset House], symbolic memorials to your lives once so tangible. What else would you wish us to do? [NOTE: Many would read the above passage as a reference to the collapse of school buildings and the work done by Ai Weiwei (艾未未), Tan Zuoren (谭作人) and others to remember the children who died in the quake and understand the underlying causes.]
We know these deaths have already happened, but to forget is to heartlessly hope they endure a second death. If we do not cherish their memory, oblivion [or forgetting] will only grow in strength. The sacrifices of this day are done to spurn forgetting, to avoid losing them all over again. Our future memorials are proof again and again before them: we will never be far from you, we will always be together, even though we meet with death and fear. This is a promise that we must bear firmly in mind. People are eternal, and they are always with us. As citizens of conscience, this is our duty to these [destroyed] villages and cities.
Rising from dust and to dust returning, there is one responsibility we cannot forsake. This is to commemorate them. It is about the schools commemorating their students, about the hills commemorating the farmers, about clay sculptures [commemorating] the witnesses [NOTE: This is a reference, apparently, to a set of sculptures erected at Buwa Village in Weizhou, the seat of Wenchuan County at the epicenter], about families commemorating those who were lost, about fresh flowers commemorating the graves, about life commemorating life. We will never forget. We will ever gaze off to the distance in their direction. They are a part of our lives. We do not live for ourselves alone. The river of time brings us together here, so let us reunite, just as though we never suffered this loss.
Let our amusements cease, and today at that time, let us be borne by the river of time, putting ourselves in their place and searching for understanding, feeling their presence and their requests, being conscious of our exchanges and our promises. Since they departed, no night has permitted us peaceful rest. But these three years, we have remembered and been watchful of our principles. May is a time of sorrow, and a time of clarity. Our attitude towards them is a measure of our distance from the rest of humanity. In bearing our wishes to the spirits, we bless and protect them, just as they watch over us. We offer our prayers to the land on the other side. May you partake of this sacrifice.

The following are the comments on the above editorial left at QQ.com as of 10:46pm, May 12.
QQ Web User in Changde — 8 hours ago
Porcelain sunflower seeds!
We all get it.
QQ Web User WXZ — 2 hours ago
We grieve.
QQ Web User in Beijing SH/WAN — 2 hours ago
Was that steel zodiac, and those porcelain sunflower sees for the sake of remembrance or for making himself rich?
QQ Web User in Shanghai 洛迦王子 — 2 hours ago
It seems the Nanfang [media] group wants a bit of face.
QQ Web User jkrv — 2 hours ago
Thanks to the Nanfang [media] group, China’s media of conscience.
QQ Web User 宝马 — 3 hours ago
This essay really makes one’s balls ache. The writer suffers from more than just the usual brain damage.
QQ Web User 水上飘 — 3 hours ago
[comment on] “Porcelain sunflower seeds!
We all get it.”
Aye, we don’t know where the future is. [NOTE: This is a play on Ai Weiwei’s name (哎,未来不知道在哪里啊)].
QQ Web User in Dongguan 小草 — 3 hours ago
Southern Metropolis Daily has played the hero this time. This article is being deleted all over the internet. If everyone wants to read it they’d better be fast about it. I guarantee that tomorrow you won’t be able to see it!!!
QQ Web User in Inner Mongolia kL#3]jx`<.Vu -- 3 hours ago
We cannot do more. We can but present steel zodiacs, and offer up porcelain sunflower seeds, symbolic memorials to your lives once so tangible. What else would you wish us to do?
QQ Web User 地铁中的我 — 6 hours ago
Southern Metropolis Daily is selling its own goods.
QQ Web User in Chengdu 娃娃脸づ — 6 hours ago
Our conscience calls to us!
QQ Web User in Shijiazhuang 至柔 — 7 hours ago
We give our thanks for the living, and remember the dead.
QQ Web User in Shenzhen Crepusculo — 7 hours ago
The sacrifices of this day are done to spurn forgetting, to avoid losing them all over again.
QQ Web User 老虎 — 8 hours ago
Way to go, Southern Metropolis Daily.
QQ Web User Lefty — 8 hours ago
Natural disaster is difficult to predict, but human disaster we should be able to avoid!
QQ Web User in Xuzhou 高山流水 — 8 hours ago
Thank you, Southern Metropolis Daily.
[Frontpage photo by treasurethouhast available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
CHINESE VERSION:
[南都社论]躺在时间的河流上怀念他们
[社论]躺在时间的河流上怀念他们
稿源:南方都市报 2011-05-12
作者:南都社论
摘要:哀伤是为同胞一去不还,五月就此成为悲哀的月份;哀伤也因为念及自身无力,不能抵挡决绝的离逝。又一年祭祀重来,躺在时间的河流上怀念他们,实有必要确认诸多问题:他们是谁?他们遇到了什么?他们在哪里?他们想要我们做什么?
今天是汶川地震三周年纪念日,读者诸君一定知道我们的哀悼所在。那场大地震令山河破碎,八万多人罹难失踪,连绵不绝的哀伤延续至今。哀伤是为同胞一去不还,五月就此成为悲哀的月份;哀伤也因为念及自身无力,不能抵挡决绝的离逝。又一年祭祀重来,躺在时间的河流上怀念他们,实有必要确认诸多问题:他们是谁?他们遇到了什么?他们在哪里?他们想要我们做什么?
馨香几枝,烟气袅袅,升腾至虚空。他们不是冰冷的数字,他们也曾顶着百家姓活泼泼地存在过。他们用整整一生,走进五月的废墟。他们开心地在世上生活过七年,抑或更长更短的岁月。他们是父母,是子女,是姐妹,是兄弟,是黄皮肤的人。他们是寨子里的居民和过客,是跋涉山川河流的人,看云起云落,他们是一切真情。他们是你遇见或未见的人类,是住在大地上的灵魂。
生是偶然的,死亡是必然。三年前的今天,同个时刻,下午黄昏黑夜如朽木,纷纷落下,壅塞时间的河流。红色是血,灰色是扬尘,白色是眩晕,黑色是死神的衣袂,他们在颜色横流中倒下,像是不幸的庄稼,被锐利的刀锋杀害。他们失去了所有,他们的老年中年青年或童年时代结束得太早太快。他们成了各种各样碎片,使用尖锐的边缘,把日子割出眼泪,将故乡抛弃。
他们从四方而来,往八方而去。我们悔恨,他们本该有更好的死亡方式,譬如从容悼念,并且允许泪飞成雨。匆匆复匆匆,他们永远离开伤感的村庄和城市,他们现在石头长有新绿的山坡上,他们仍在学校,在路上,在地下,在无名之处。他们和他们在一起,就像麦子与麦子长在一起。在夏天,在他们最后的黄昏去了我们看不见的地方,他们是生者唯一的痛楚,唯一的安慰。
我们在心里为他们降过半旗,我们在哀悼日为他们招魂请安,我们搜集过他们一世为人的证据,我们一起念出过他们的名字。我们答应过要念念不忘,要生生不息。我们做了很多,又做得太少。迷途不返的人,你们在哪里?我们点燃的光能否照亮你们的路?我们无法做得更多,只好摆上铁做的十二生肖,敬上瓷做的瓜子,象征且祭奠你们凝固了的生命。你们还想要我们做什么?
我们知道,死亡已经发生,而遗忘等候一旁,觊觎他们的再一次死亡。如果不怀念,遗忘就会越来越强大。今天的祭祀就是为了拒绝遗忘,拒绝再次失去他们。以后的纪念,目的无他,也是一遍遍证明给他们看:我们从未远离,我们一直在一起,哪怕是遇到死亡和恐惧。这是一种要被记取的承诺,人千古,人又永远在。这是我们对整座村落、整座城市、良知国民的交代。
起于尘土而又归于尘土,可有一种责任无法推卸。这就是我们对他们的纪念,是校园对学生的纪念,山野对农夫的纪念,黄泥雕群对凝视者的纪念,是家庭对逝者的纪念,是鲜花对坟墓的纪念,是生命对生命的纪念。我们始终不忘,始终向着他们的方向眺望。我们的生活里有他们,我们不只是为自己过活。时间的河流联系彼此,让我们重聚在一起,就像是真的没有失去过。
止歇欢娱,今天此时,让我们躺在时间的河流上,采用他们惯常的姿势,感知他们的所在和请求,察觉我们的对话与诺言。在他们走后,没有一个夜晚能让我们安睡。可三年来,我们谨记并警醒我们的原则。五月是悲哀的,又是清醒的。通过对他们的取态,丈量我们与人类的距离。祝愿大地上的神祇同样能保佑他们,就像他们保佑我们一样。祈祷彼岸乐土。伏食尚飨。