The Party and the government must further improve laws and regulations, carrying out regulation of social organizations according to law. They must accelerate the relaxing of restrictions on social organizations, better cultivating and sustaining them.

We’ve written a great deal lately (here and here, for example) about the ideological struggle that seems to be going on behind the political scenes in China — a struggle, ultimately, over the direction of economic, social and political reforms pitting the so-called “liberal” right against the conservative Maoist left. Obviously, these ideological lines are not always so cut-and-dried. There are centrists no doubt, and both left and right-leaning centrists, and a great mass of the impassive and unsure. For a decent look at the background issues at stake, we recommend a recent piece in The New York Times, “Mao’s Legacy Still Divides China.”
But in what seems like a sharp leftward political turn in China in recent months, it is the liberal right that seems to be taking most of the hard knocks. Quiet chatter on the right in recent days, for example, has turned to the fate of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and well-known “liberal,” who has apparently been silenced quite vigorously by Chinese authorities.
Xin is no stranger to acts of outspokenness. He was party in October 2010 to an open letter calling for free speech and an end to censorship in China. That letter, which CMP translated into English, was signed by a number of senior CCP officials known for their reformist views, including Mao Zedong’s former secretary, Li Rui (李锐).
Not long after that letter was circulated, a lecture by Xin scheduled for a Beijing bookshop on the topic of “The Political Reform Question” was suddenly pulled due to sensitivities. In the lecture, which circulated online despite the best efforts of censors, Xin attacked those who sought to hijack the political reform debate with the outdated “theory of delimitation” — distinguishing between “proletarian” democracy and “bourgeois” democracy — which he calls a “protective amulet . . . for single-party dictatorship” handed down by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin.
Xin is reportedly now under pressure for a speech called “Our Situation and Prospects” that he delivered to a forum of retired Party cadres at the the Ministry of Science and Technology. He has been prohibited from speaking, writing or “being active” for a period of six months as he undergoes scrutiny for “three major errors” he committed in the speech — including the suggestion, apparently, that Wen Jiabao is under rising pressure from Party conservatives for his persistent remarks on political reform.
The following open letter from an elderly CCP member, which has been shared over the past two days among a range of academics, journalists and liberal Party officials, calls on authorities to end the prohibitions against Xin Ziling and argues that the CCP must allow “different voices and different opinions” if it is to maintain its hold on power and accommodate the “standards of modern society.”
The letter also references a supposed remark from a high-level official in the Central Propaganda Department that has surfaced in a number of places recently, that Premier Wen Jiabao — who has insisted repeatedly in recent months that political reform is essential to China’s continued stability and prosperity — has become a “troublemaker.”

“From an Old CCP Member, a Call on the Authorities: Release Restrictions on Xin Ziling”
Ai Feng (艾风)
Recently, I saw an article online by Mr. Fan Ji (范吉) and learned about the forced silencing of Jin Ziling, about how the authorities have demanded he undergo scrutiny owing to three [alleged] major errors. He has been ordered to avoid speaking, writing or being active for a full half year. I read the speech he delivered to a forum of old cadres at the Ministry of Science and Technology and found it to be a sound and well-reasoned work. So I’d like to speak my mind a bit about this.
I too am a retired cadre. Before I had even turned 16, I joined the Chinese Communist Party when it was underground. So I have a history of more than 60 years with the Party. Now, in the capacity of an old CCP member, looking at the three errors that have been foisted on Xin, and then looking at his speech on “Our Situation and Prospects,” I believe the former is based on specious chop logic while the latter [Xin’s own speech] is theoretically sound, backed up by data and convincing. Perhaps it is precisely this strong theoretical basis and persuasiveness, this penetrative power, that has made the authorities fearful, so that they resort to this “ban” on Xin.
The first charge is that Xin Ziling advocates the capitalist road, severely going against the Four Basic Principles (四项基本原则). I won’t talk right now about how the Four Basic Principles was the new four-part formula with which Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) replaced Hua Guofeng’s (华国锋) “Two Whatevers” (两个凡是) after Deng had denounced them. Looking just from the full text of Xin’s speech, it is clear that Xin affirms that opening and reform and the present economic accomplishments have happened under the leadership of the Party, and this accords with the first of these four “whatevers” [the Four Basic Principles, namely: “Upholding the leadership of the CCP.”] As for the second [basic principle], that of remaining on the socialist path, we should admit that Deng on the socialist path and Mao on the socialist path are already quite divergent. Mao upheld public ownership and annihilated private ownership. Deng permitted the development of the private economy, of a mixed economy, and he added protections for private ownership to the Constitution. In terms of economic forms, Mao persisted in the planned economic model, while Deng promoted the market economy. Well then, as for this [basic principle] of remaining on the socialist path, are we to adhere to Mao’s path or to Deng’s? If our Party is carrying on with opening and reform, then of course we are taking Deng’s path.
Xin Ziling’s entire speech is also an affirmation of Deng’s path, and he even says: “The wisdom of Deng Xiaoping comes in these two words, ‘opening up’.” So if Xin praises Deng’s opening and reform, and affirms our present economic accomplishments, how is this a violation of the Four Basic Principles? . . . As an accomplished scholar himself, naturally he cannot simply parrot what others say. According to his profound study of Marxism, and his profound study of democratic socialism (民主社会主义), he raises the same economic theory of the primary stage of socialism that our Party itself has raised recently, which could also be understood as the “new democracy” (新民主主义) that Mao Zedong promoted but then later discarded, or which could be called social democracy (民主社会主义), or again be referred to in terms of the “new capitalism” (新资本主义) that Mao Zedong once spoke of. All of these appellations can be thought of as readings of the current economic situation and social situation in our country, and all offer affirmation and support of the Party’s basic national policy. If these readings and questionings arising from the world of theory are slapped carelessly with labels, and made out to constitute guilt, has this not pulled us back to the “ten thousand horses all muted, and one-hundred birds prevented from singing” (万马齐喑，百鸟禁声) that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution? Are we again to enforce ideological despotism (思想专制) and cultural despotism (文化专制)?
The second charge holds that Xin Ziling set leaders at odds. This is because in his speech Xin said [Premier] Wen Jiabao must not be criticized [or “isolated” or “attacked”], and he strongly advised [President] Hu Jintao against aligning with other influential power cliques to target [and isolate] Wen Jiabao. Because recently one deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department dared say that Wen Jiabao was “a troublemaker” (麻烦制造者), which signaled a shake up. After I read this passage from Xin’s speech, I came away with the feeling that Xin’s motivation was the good of the Party. I didn’t have the merest sense that Xin was attempting to set leaders at odds by making this suggestion. This is because Xin is making this suggestion, first of all, on the basis of the lessons of history, and the way in his later years Mao Zedong targeted Zhou Enlai (了周恩来). And secondly, there are signs that [Xin Ziling’s remarks about the intention of dealing with/isolating/targeting Wen Jiabao] are factual. Even if the Party leadership has no intention whatsoever to deal with Wen Jiabao, and all of this is Xin’s own guesswork, there’s no need at all to go to war over this, leveling accusations against Xin. He could simply be cautioned to be more mindful in future speeches of the factual grounding [of his remarks] and their possible negative impact.
The third charge alleges that Xin used materials he found on the [overseas Chinese] Epoch Times website, criticizing Zeng Wei (曾伟), the son of the former vice-premier Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红), of spending a stupendous sum to purchase a home in Australia. First off, Epoch Times Online is a Falun Gong website, and secondly there are two Zeng Wei’s in Australia. How [they asked] do you have the evidence to say that the Zeng Wei who bought this expensive home is the son of Zeng Qinghong? On these two points, there is not a whole lot I can say, because I don’t know whether Xin used material from the Epoch Times, nor do I know which Zeng Wei bought the house in question. But there is one thing I am certain of in looking at the full text of Xin’s speech, and that is that his criticism of Zeng Wei is meant for the betterment of the Party, because as stage of crony capitalism definitely has already emerged in our society, and if it is allowed to proliferate this spells disaster for our country. And so Xin Ziling reminds us in this speech: “If the Chinese Communist Party wishes to maintain its hold on political power and preserve its leadership status . . . [it must] employ peaceful methods of transition to resolve the issue of crony capitalism.”
In summary, I hope the authorities do not make mountains out of molehills and mistake every bush for an enemy. I hope [they] do not take the old path of Mao Zedong, capriciously enforcing a “three bans” policy — limits on speech, writing and action — inside the Party and in larger society by means of organizations or public security means. For the Party to achieve modernization in leading the nation, the Party must first steadily modernize itself, gradually transforming itself from a violent Party of revolution, a Party not allowing different voices and different opinions, to a ruling party suiting the standards of modern society. From leading ideologies to organization structure, to various policies and measures, the ideas and conduct of our leaders must first accord with the demands of modernization. If this is done, our nation with prosper! The people will prosper!
Ai Feng (艾 风)
May 7, 2011

[Frontpage photo from Hong Kong’s Open Magazine.]

On May 5, a post purporting to be the full transcript of an interview by now-detained Chinese artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未) with a so-called “Internet commentator,” or wangluo pinglunyuan (网络评论员), made the rounds on China’s Internet, where it was quickly removed and just as quickly reposted on various blogs and online forums.
Online commentators, known colloquially in China as “50 Centers” or the “50-Cent Party” (五毛党) because they were once rumored to earn 50 Chinese cents for each pro-CCP comment made in online forums or the comment sections of major news stories on Web portals such as QQ.com and Sina.com, are now a generally acknowledged fact in China. But given the secrecy that still surrounds all methods of public opinion control in China, precious little is still known about these hired hands.
For some introductory reading on the topic, please see David Bandurski’s 2008 piece in the Far Eastern Economic Review, which also places the “commentators” in the context of President Hu Jintao’s media policy, which is centered around the relatively new buzzword “public opinion channeling”, or yulun yindao (舆论引导). Another popular term for these “commentators” in recent months has been “public opinion channeler” (舆论引导员), which is used often in this purported Ai Weiwei interview.
[UPDATE: We have confirmed the authenticity of the interview with a volunteer at Ai Weiwei’s studio, who writes: “The source is reliable. We first provided him with an interview outline, with close to one-hundred questions. After he had answered them, Ai Weiwei conducted a telephone interview with him on the basis of the written responses, adding the material from the telephone interview to the written responses.”] While we cannot confirm the authenticity of the interview, said to have taken place on March 22 this year, some have suggested it was compiled and posted by one of Ai Weiwei’s assistants. Posted in full form at the blog of Xin Liyang, among other places, the transcript was also posted at “Ai Ai Weiwei,” a site a site set up in support of the artist.
When and if we have further information on the origin of the posted transcript, we will make note of it here. Until then, we offer a translated portion of the purported Ai Weiwei interview, which offers and interesting glimpse into the world of the “public opinion channeler.”

Interviewee: W, Male, 26 years old. Public opinion channeler.
Interviewer: Ai Weiwei
Date of Interview: March 22, 2011
Method of Interview: E-mail and over the phone [NOTE: The Chinese suggests that perhaps questions were sent to the interviewee by e-e-mail and then a followed up with a phone call.]
Question: Could you tell me your name, your age, what city you’re in. And your Web alias as well (though you could choose to neglect that).
Answer: I definitely can’t make my name known in any form to the outside world. For this interview you can just call me “W.” I’m 26 years old. You can say I’m in Shanghai. As for my Web aliases and such, there are too many. Generally, I register and use new ones all the time. I won’t give examples here.
Question: How about your level of education, and your work experience?
Answer: I graduated from university, in the area of journalism studies. As for my work experience, I previously worked at a television station, then I started working for online media. Basically, I’ve been working all along in the news media industry, for about four to five years now.
Question: So when and under what situation was it that you began conducting channeling of public opinion work?
Answer: It was a little over a year ago, I guess. There wasn’t any special circumstances to speak of. I had a friend who said he was doing this, and I was online a lot every day, so he asked me whether I would be interested in doing it. I needed a bit of extra income at the time, so I said I’d give it a try. Once I started doing it, I realized just how easy it is, and it all started from there.
Question: How do you describe yourself the work you’re now doing?
Answer: My basic job is working for Internet media, but I don’t do journalism per se. Mostly I handle entertainment events, and from time to time I’ll go out and conduct interviews and things like that. Because I spend a lot of time on the Internet, I can do this online commentary work (网评的工作) as a part-time gig. Whatever you want to call it is fine — Internet commentator (网络评论员), public opinion channeler (舆论导向员), or even the “50-cent Party” (五毛党) everyone is so familiar with.
Question: What sort of conditions and qualifications are required of public opinion channelers?
Answer: I’m not sure what qualifications and such are required for other Internet commentators. When I started doing this, it was all just through the help and connections of this friend. All I did was provide proof of identity, and there weren’t any special or rigorous qualifications or conditions. Personally, I think to do this you need a definite degree of competency with language, because you have to write constantly.
Question: Did you go through any special work training? And if so, what specifically did it involve?
Answer: No, my friend just introduced the basics of the work process.
Question: What are the standards or criteria that govern the work?
Answer: I’m not sure how to answer that. Actually, there are no standards. If there are, I would have to say it’s understanding clearly what the guiding ideology of your superiors is (上级的指导思想). You first get a clear sense of what the public opinion orientation is up top, then you start your own work.
Question: Could you introduce the work process?
Answer: This question is pretty hard to answer. Actually, the work process is really simple [on the surface], but in terms of concrete practice it’s a lot of trouble, or it might vary according to certain incidents, particularly various sudden-breaking incidents. I’ll just give a general outline first, and the rest I can talk about through specific examples, and that should make it clear to you.
Generally, it works with one of us, or a small group of us, being responsible for certain major websites. I principally deal with a number of our BBS (bulletin-board) sites and major news portals, and I’ll often spend time in the news section at QQ.com. The work flow is generally in three major steps like this — receive a task, then begin searching for topics, and after that begin making posts to channel public opinion (引导舆论). So next I’ll get in to the specifics of what each step entails.
So receiving a task basically means making sure you check your e-mail every day, often checking your messages, or we set up a QQ Group. But generally we don’t talk about this content in the Group. We generally just say there’s work to be done, and remind everyone to check their e-mails. Generally, after something happens, and sometimes before new stories even break, we’ll receive an e-mail. It will tell you first about the incident, about the news, and then tell you what orientation to take (什么方向). So it tells you a general ideological orientation, and you go and channel the ideas of web users toward that orientation, or you go and blur the focus of web users, or you might go and stir the emotions of web users [over some issue] . . . Once you understand these instructions, you begin to select your subjects [or objectives], finding relevant news or articles on websites and then writing one’s own articles, making posts [in the response section, and responding to other responses, all along the lines of the general orientation given above. This requires a lot of skill. You must hide your own identity. And you can’t write in too official a way. You have to write articles of many different styles. Sometimes this means talking, fighting and disputing with yourself. Essentially, it’s about creating a facade and then channeling web users over to you. The art of doing this is actually quite profound.
In fact, in a single forum you have to play three different roles. One is the leader. Another is the follower. The third is the observer, which is to say the masses ignorant of the facts (不明真相的群众). So first off is the leader. This is a speaker with relative authority. The leader generally steps into the debate later on, drawing out strong evidence with which to speak. The language from this character is relatively authoritative. Generally, the public will view this sort of person as credible. As to the second, the follower, there are basically two types, two types in opposition. These two characters are constantly debating and arguing, and even name calling, in opposition in the forum. This serves to draw the attention of observers. Then, in the end, the leader steps out, drawing on strong evidence. And ultimately, public opinion is drawn over to this third side [of the leader]. You could say we are like directors, and we write, direct and act all on our own, and in this way influence our audience. So there are times when I feel my personality is quite split.
Question: When do you receive your instructions or requirements from whomever?
Answer: Basically, around 9am every day you receive an e-mail, which basically tells you the principle news stories you’ll be commenting on for that day. Sometimes it will also tell you which principally which website to comment on. But in most cases the websites aren’t specified, and you go yourself and find relevant news. And then start commenting.
Question: In carrying out this specific work, are you able to see related [government] documents? Or is it just e-mails?
Answer: There aren’t any documents at all. It’s just an e-mail sent over, a command and their general intentions. For example, these past couple of days oil prices have been set to go up, or there might be a certain news story, and certain hearsay circulates. Before any clear news comes out, [we] need to do our best to channel this information elsewhere, doing our utmost to push it down. That’s basically it.
Question: Could you list out the content of some of the e-mail “tasks” you’ve received?
Answer: I’ve thought over and over this point, and think it’s best for me not to get into these e-mails, the links on which I’ve commented or the content, these aspects. If I do that, it would be very easy for them to search out who I am, for them to know who it was that opened their mouth up about these things. I can only offer a few cases. For example, the recent panic buying of salt [after the Japanese earthquake and nuclear crisis]. The content of the e-mails I received was basically telling everyone: don’t spread rumors, don’t believe rumors. Or, “Influence the public’s understanding of XXXX incident, promote the correct guidance of public opinion of XXXX.” As for thwarting rumors, they said: “Strengthen explanation and clarification of the XXXX incident, avoiding the emergence of inaccurate or illegal speech.” Then some were relatively directed, like: “Directed at the unfavorable social impact of the recent XXXX incident, the stress must be on channeling the thoughts of web users toward XXXX correct orientation.”
Question: In the midst of your “guidance of public opinion” work, how much do you think is directed from above, and how much is based on your own understanding [of what’s expected]?
Answer: In all of it I listen to the instructions from above, but your superiors don’t indicate how you should do it. Your superiors will only tell you the overall orientation of your public opinion channeling. They’ll tell you that this incident requires channeling the people toward this or that orientation, that the public can’t be allowed to think this or that, or that we can’t tolerate this or that kind of speech. But [in this work] you basically have to understand the meaning and intention of your superiors. You can’t add on your own subjective ideas.

In China today, the [political] divisions between right and left are severe. But if we can say at all that there is some point on which there is consensus on both sides, this would have to be that both sides believe our universities are in trouble. The doubts raised by [CCP elder] Qian Xuesen (钱学森) — [who asked rhetorically some years before he passed away in 2009, “Why can’t our schools produce outstanding talent?” — are in fact the same doubts that many people have about education in our country. And yet, as questions and doubts pile up, our universities have continued to degenerate, and the downward slide is rapid indeed.
If I’ve said in the past that our universities are like the old imperial institution of the yamen, [in which serving bureaucrats were primarily concerned with enriching themselves], our universities today are more yamen than yamens ever were. Time and again, journalists have asked me which I am more hopeful about, Chinese football [notorious for its weakness and corruption] or Chinese universities? I always say Chinese soccer.
Of course, there’s an element of resentment to this response. China’s universities, having come to their present-day plight, are actually quite similar to Chinese football, for the reason that they are both bureaucratic bodies that have trended toward commercialization [or industrialization]. The result has been the formation of massive interest groups. Our universities have in fact become shrines at which various education-related interest groups can personally profit. Only by perpetuating bureaucracy can they ensure that their own interest groups profit as handsomely as possible. And only with their continued monopolization of the education sector can they ensure that their highly bureaucratic institutions survive. So regardless of what the rest of us have to say about it, laughing and scorning, they remain impervious, determined to guard their own turf.
The only possible road out for China’s universities is reform. The most critical reason universities in the Republican Era were run so well by comparison was that there was a three-tiered system in place. National, private and church-run universities coexisted. The national Peking University and Tsinghua University were both pretty strong. The privately-run Nankai University and Xiamen University were also strong. As for the church-run schools, while their names may not now come readily to us, they were perhaps all decent schools. Names like Yenching University in north China, Fu Jen Catholic University, Peking Union Medical College, Ginling College, Saint John’s University, Hangchow Christian University, Central China University, and Canton Christian College (later Lingnan University). In the history of higher education in China, which of these are not distinguished? And while the church-run universities had strong religious overtones to start with, this was substantially toned down after the May Fourth Movement, and they were later largely secularized, indistinguishable from national and private universities.
Everyone knows that our universities are not some quintessence of Chinese culture, but rather are imported products. Even if the Imperial Capital University, founded in 1898 to later become Peking University, was the earliest to be founded, the first people to advance higher education curricula in China were foreigners. For Chinese, the founding of universities was a learning process, involving study outside China as well as study on our own doorstep.
The competition afforded by church-run schools was critical. The principles of university autonomy, academic freedom and faculty governance of universities are the result of accumulated experiences of the academic world outside China, and they are established practices that must be followed by any university that wants to excel. In the Republican Era there were also government authorities that sought to meddle with the universities, and there were privately-run universities driven by greed. But in a dominating atmosphere of competition, these instances did not infect the overarching climate of higher education.
In the Republican Era, China also had many so-called “wild chicken universities” (野鸡大学), fake universities or diploma mills that catered especially to those who required instant diplomas. But these universities were largely ignored, as though they didn’t even exist. Those who founded universities, regardless of who they were, had to follow established practices if they were serious about creating competitive institutions. In those days, universities founded by warlords, such as Zhang Xueliang’s (张学良) Northeastern University, Tang Jiyao’s (唐继尧) Dong Lu University (which later become Yunnan University) and Cao Kun’s Hebei University managed to barely make par because they generally kept to established practices, and the wills of these men were never uniformly imposed.
While the Republican tradition of higher education no longer exists, universities in China today must on a most basic level follow the principles of other advanced countries. If we insist against this trend, and harp on about our unique characteristics, we would be better off just establishing old-style imperial academies and forgetting about universities altogether. All of our disciplines can just follow along ancient lines — Confucian classics, history, philosophy and literature. We have no need then for such things as natural science, engineering and law. Our college students can avoid studying foreign languages. And of course there’s no need to fuss about the Science Citation Index (SCI).
The situation we now have, where we’ve only halfway accommodated established international practices, which can be violated left and right, is actually even more frightening. We talk about scholarship, but belittle academic freedoms. We pursue the Science Citation Index [as a measure of the influence of academic research] but we don’t put any stress on where influence is rooted. We found universities, and our universities look exactly like government agencies. With universities like this it makes no difference how many we build, or how much equipment we stuff into them, they will ultimately avail us little. Our so-called vocational universities can’t even provide us with the kind of talent we need to carry out basic industrial upgrades and raise efficiency.
And so, if we hope to have universities with an impact, our only option is to join up with established [international] practices — like [the newly formed and not yet approved] Nanfang University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen, which is taking its cues from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Right now, however, encouraging universities to do as Nanfang University of Science and Technology has done is unrealistic. Owing to monopolistic control of the education sector, no matter how big a mess any given university [which manages to get licensed from the Ministry of Education] is, so long as there are Chinese capable of sending their children, the market will be there. So long as they can preserve the honeypot their monopoly affords, universities will have no impetus to reform themselves.
The only way out of this morass is opening up. We need more than just a few more anomalies like Nanfang University of Science and Technology. What we need is a government green light for private capital to establish universities, not just the small-scale, low-level academies now permitted to private capital. A much bigger door needs to be opened, allowing foreign investment in universities as well as church-run universities. The religious-affiliated universities we once had in China should return. If the concern on this count is loss of political control, this matter is easily solved with policies and regulations to govern such institutions.
As everyone knows, China has made major accomplishments on the economic front in recent years, and this owes to the Open Door Policy. But in fact, it is opening that creates the conditions for reform to happen. If no opening comes, there can be no reform. If we do not step out, if we do not adopt [outside practices and knowledge], there will be no market reforms in China to speak of, nor will there be any basis to talk about the building of a modern enterprise system.
Marketization and industrialization hold nothing to fear. What we must fear is marketization and industrialization utterly devoid of rules. The present problems in China’s economy result from monopoly control of a whole range of sectors, and from the actions of the visible hand of the state throughout the market. Getting a handle on state power is the primary goal of the next stage of reforms. For our universities, the most serious problem is bureaucratism and monopoly control, and this kind of industrialization is the true arch-criminal we face. This is also why many people feel that our universities today are not as good as they were in the era of the planned economy.
Relative to average incomes in our country, university tuition is already incredibly high. This means that whether or not education authorities are willing to admit it, the degree of industrialization in higher education is already quite high. The reason the education services provided to consumers are so poor is that they are forced to be compatible with a stepped monopoly system based on imperial-style government-run national examinations. There is just one store, with no branches. People have no choice but to compare bad apples, choosing from the substandard barrel those that are least rotten.
There is nothing to fear about industrialization [of education services]. What is frightening is being unable to get the service you deserve even after you’ve paid for it. In terms of education, this means students fail to gain the knowledge, training and abilities that prepare them for the job market.
If, as some have suggested, our universities were still fortresses of the planned economy, then reform would be a simple matter. Administrative leverage alone might prize the sector open. But our universities today have already been transformed into a vast monopoly enterprise fortified by official power. There is no other way except to encourage opening up, drawing on external factors.
While the stench of death is thick on the surface of our education sector, we should recognize that it has like other sectors experienced a great deal of change over the past 30 years of reform. Further reform means dealing with a massive wall of vested interests. The only force that can bring down that wall is opening up.
This editorial originally appeared in Chinese at Southern Metropolis Daily.

Every night from seven o’clock to seven-thirty I have to watch China Central Television, just to see what kind of nonsense it’s saying.

In a fresh reminder that one can always expect the unexpected from China’s media, the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily ran an editorial yesterday calling on a tolerant attitude toward new and different ideas. In apparent reference to the recent suppression of dissident voices, such as that of Ai Weiwei (though the circumstances of the editorial are at this point speculative), the editorial called intolerance “a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness” and said “diversity is the secret to prosperity.”
The full Chinese text of the editorial can be found at QQ.com here, at China Elections and Governance here and in traditional characters at Sina.com HK here.
Our nearly full translation of the editorial follows:

Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.
. . . China’s society today stands in an age in which ideas and culture are pluralistic, diversified and always changing. As we move into the deep zone and a crucial stage of reforms, the modulations and game playing of different interests will naturally give rise to the expression of different demands. As our opening expands and we move deeper into globalization, it is inevitable that various values and ideas, traditional and modern, foreign and homegrown, will collide and clash.
Without a doubt, this is a historic change. From one voice to a hundred flowers in bloom, from a thousand uniform faces to richness and diversity. This expresses a great liberation of ideas, and it shows that China is advancing.
When you have diverse expression, it is difficult to avoid having “contrary ideas,” so that it seems chickens are talking to the ducks [and neither side understands the other]. In this process, we must appreciate calm and rational discussion, being ready to admit our own errors. But it is with some regret that we note that some cannot countenance differing views in discussion, but resort to mutual insult, dragging up old misdeeds, and leaping to slap the other side with ugly labels, so that personal emotion trumps the pursuit of truth. In dealing with criticism and differing opinion, some not only fail to keep an open mind, but even raise charges of “slander” and exercise their power to suppress different voices.
Mr. Lu Xun once said that threats and execrations are a far cry from combat. Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.
In this sense, it is only through having a merciful attitude toward “contrary ideas,” adjusting our opinions through dialogue and dissolving tensions through discussion that we can we reach consensus to the greatest degree possible, promoting the progress of ideas. In dealing with ordinary people, those rulers who hold power especially require this “tolerance.” While the narrow-mindedness of the former might amount to verbal violence, the narrow-mindedness of the latter can lead to real harm, as we saw in the “Pengshui poetry case” (彭水诗案) and the “Lingbao text case” (灵宝帖案). If the tolerance of the former shows strength of character, the tolerance of the latter shows not only a kind of “magnanimity” (雅量), but further meets the needs of rule for the people, and the demands of a society rule by law.
“Because we serve the people, if we have faults, we do not fear the people criticizing them and pointing them out.” Criticism can perhaps be right or wrong, and some may even go to extremes. But so long as they are well-meant, do not violate laws and regulations, and do not harm public order and morals, they should be met with an attitude of tolerance. They cannot be subjectively dismissed as something being “done in opposition.” Quite the contrary, we should recognize that in a diverse society respecting different voices and opinions is a necessary part of respecting citizen’s right to express, and moderating anxieties within society.
. . . Actually, differing voices and even opinions of opposition, are important resources in raising the bar on leadership. So called “not making decisions without hearing different opinions” can only happen if different voices are allowed to exist. This is the only way different situations can be understood, rational assessments be made and accurate decisions rendered. This is why Mao Zedong said that the sky wouldn’t fall if people were allowed to speak. This is why Deng Xiaoping said that “seven mouths and eight tongues are not frightening, but most frightening is when not a crow or sparrow can be heard.” This is why central Party leaders have continuously emphasized that “we must create the conditions for people to criticize and monitor the government.”
Diversity is the secret to prosperity. The further a society develops, the more need it has for the expression of diverse personalities, and the more capacity it needs to draw on different opinions to create unity of will. If we treat different voices with tolerance, seeking “unity” in “diversity”, we will not become like “a sack of potatoes with no continuity,” but we will through the discussion and collision of ideas continue to coalesce and rise.