Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Changing China: one vote, one person

Over the past few weeks, one of the hottest issues on China’s Internet — and, more cautiously, in the traditional media — has been the participation of “ordinary citizens” from a range of backgrounds (lawyers, writers, activists, laid-off workers, students) in direct elections for local people’s congresses across China. The issue has continued to build on domestic social media platforms like Sina Weibo, where users are trading information on local candidates and pointing others to key materials, such as manuals on rights and procedures for election candidates.
The story really began back in late April, when a laid-off female worker named Liu Ping (刘萍) announced her candidacy for a district people’s congress in Jiangxi’s Xinyu City (新馀). Liu Ping told the BBC (Chinese) that she had been warned by local police, who said campaigning for office was against the law. Liu’s case drew the attention of a number of influential scholars and journalists, including Chinese Academy of Social Sciences professor and CMP fellow Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), who issued appeals through their own microblogs to draw broader support for Liu and make the public more aware of their political rights. The second wave of interest in local people’s congress elections came when Li Chengpeng (李承鹏), a prominent Chinese author, announced his plans in late May to take part in elections in Chengdu.
This is a fascinating story about growing interest in political participation in China, about real engagement, and about how social media in particular are galvanizing participation to the extent it is possible under the current political system. Unfortunately, this issue has gotten virtually no attention outside China. Why? The notable exception is a piece by Calum McCleod in USA Today, in which he notes that Li Chengpeng’s candidacy has received backing from celebrity blogger Han Han and film director Feng Xiaogang.
No, this is not a political seismic shift, but it is far less ethereal than, for example, the so-called Jasmine protests in China were back in February. And I hope everyone can agree that the story is far more relevant to readers anywhere than the story of a Chinese teen who sold his kidney for an iPad.
What does the election of “independent” candidates mean in a contemporary Chinese context? Well, to begin with, the idea is based in China’s Constitution, which states in Article 34:

All citizens of the People’s Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of nationality, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence, except persons deprived of political rights according to law.

Stand for election where, exactly? Positions for local people’s congresses in villages and city districts are (theoretically, at least) open for direct election, which means anyone meeting these basic requirements can (theoretically) become a candidate.
In practice, people’s congress representatives at the local level are often appointed by Party leaders, and they have little real power to influence local political decisions. Elections are supervised by higher government authorities, so there is ample opportunity for manipulation of the results. Speak to most Chinese about what they know about local elections, and you’ll get incredulous looks. Who gave you the knuckle-brained idea there is such a thing in China? But local citizen candidates have stood successfully in elections before, as this user on Sina Weibo, called “Panama Straw Hat” (巴拿马草帽), noted on June 4th: “I also voted before in university, and selected a teacher from my department. Later, when I went to the government office to handle some stuff, this teacher said, if they have a bad attitude you tell me. People’s Congress representatives can exercise their right of supervision. I’ve kept and treasured my ballot receipt ever since.”
It’s easy to argue that these political rights are worth less than the paper they are written on — not unlike the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression in Article 35, which is up against a massive media control regime.
Still, even granting that this is not a sea change, even granting that there are massive institutional hurdles to real political participation in China, can’t we recognize that this recent outpouring of interest in the idea of “independent” people’s congress candidacy is an interesting and important sign of growing political consciousness among Chinese?
Chinese journalists, academics, lawyers and internet users have hammered home the point over the past couple of weeks that one major problems historically has been that few Chinese are aware of the constitutional rights they ostensibly do have. Fewer still have ever tested them. What we’ve seen over the past week is the determination to do exactly that. And how this will unfold is certainly a story worth watching.
In a post to his blog at Sina.com — pushed, of course, through his microblog — CMP fellow and veteran investigative reporter Wang Keqin (王克勤) last week encouraged rights petitioners across China to become candidates for local people’s congress positions. His post bore the headline: “Calling on the Masses of Petitioners to Participate in Elections for People’s Congresses.” He wrote: Petitioners and rights defenders from all areas of the country should learn from the example of Jiangxi petitioner Liu Ping (刘萍). Going through the bitter process of petitioning isn’t as good as participating in politics yourself, safeguarding your interests as well as those of the public.”
One user responded enthusiastically to Wang Keqin’s call, saying: “This is a great suggestion! A great suggestion!”
Another affirmed the organizational power of the microblog (or “weibo”), saying petitioners and others with rights complaints should get connected: “First, let them get on the Weibo,” they said.
Another user asked a pertinent technical question in a country where millions of workers are on the move: “What if your registration papers are for somewhere else, can you still take part [as a candidate]?”
“This is very constructive,” said one user. “This is not very constructive,” said another.
Still others had a sense of humor about their own ambitions, suggesting their constitutional rights shouldn’t be taken at face value: “So, to become state president what kind of qualifications do you need? How can you get elected to that position? Can all Chinese citizens present themselves as candidates?”
As I suggested above, one of the most interesting aspects of this story has been the wave of interest in the mechanics of local people’s congress elections, on understanding one’s rights and acting on them. There has been a flurried sharing of relevant information.
On May 27, Caixin Media posted a fairly detailed rundown of the relevant rights and issues, explaining for example the concepts of “direct” and “indirect” election, how elections work at various administrative levels, etcetera. The post is still live, despite widespread reports among Chinese journalists on June 2 — again, through domestic microblog platforms — that a ban had already been issued from the Central Propaganda Department prohibiting traditional media from reporting on the participation of ordinary citizens in people’s congress elections.
In another act of media courage — we’ve seen quite a few such acts lately, despite the tightening climate — The Beijing News ran a full page in its June 4 edition on how to take part in people’s congress elections, what citizens’ rights are, etcetera.
Here is an image of the page at The Beijing News:


The section headers read:
1. Who has the right to stand in elections for [people’s congress] representatives?
2. How do you register to become a candidate?
3. How do those without local household registrations [hukou] take part?
4. How do you handle disputes over eligibility for candidacy?
5. How do you become a candidate for [people’s congress] representative?
6. How do you nominate and promote a candidate?
7. How do elections work and [how are] candidates chosen?
8. How do you impeach representatives not upholding their duty?
I will stop far, far short of saying that this is political awakening, folks. But the next time I see a story about runaway materialism in China, and how the present generation worships Gucci and eschews politics — those always seem to be an easy sell to those editors back in New York and London, eh? — I’ll be digging this story out again.

Kicking Talent to the Curb

A recent editorial in China’s official People’s Daily newspaper criticized the practice among some local officials in China of hiring their family members for important government positions, which it said was detrimental to effective governance of the country. “In governing the state, talent is critical,” the paper wrote (治国经邦,人才为急). The editorial also suggested such local officials were jealous and fearful of persons of talent. In the following cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, four nastily grinning officials, clearly related to one another, wear a single official robe as they menace presumably talented scholars, kicking them away.

People's Daily breaks form with Li Na tribute

The People’s Daily newspaper, the official “mouthpiece” of the Chinese Communist Party, is not known for its inventive news layouts. Playing its narrow political role with tight-lipped seriousness, it lays out the Party news of the day with careful attention to the political pecking order — which usually means, yes, that Hu’s on first.
Over the weekend, however, Chinese tennis player Li Na (李娜) became the first Chinese national (and the first Asian) to win a tennis Grand Slam final, and that news was apparently immense enough as a source of national pride to warrant a break with form at the People’s Daily. Here is the front page of the June 5 edition of the paper, with a prominent report on Li Na’s victory.

Paper slams Google for hacking accusations

In a microblog post yesterday, Hu Xijin (胡锡进), the editor-in-chief of the Global Times newspaper, voiced outrage at the accusations of widespread hacking made by Google against China. He suggested that China too has suffered unconscionable online attacks, and that China’s government, rather than remaining quiet, should speak up about these issues — thereby shutting the mouths of China’s detractors in the West.
Hu Xijin’s microblog post has apparently been transformed into the lead editorial of today’s Global Times. In it, the paper slams Google as a “snotty-nosed” crybaby blaming China for these supposed attacks because it remains bitter about the company’s business failures in China.
But the piece also has strong words for China’s government, urging again that the authorities tackle these and other accusations — including those surrounding artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未) — directly, actively “setting the agenda” and ensuring Western media have less opportunity to “blacken” China’s image. With its talk of “grabbing discursive power” (争夺话语权), the editorial also recalls Chinese President Hu Jintao’s media policy of more active “public opinion channeling” (舆论引导).
After paragraphs bristling with anger, the editorial turns (almost bizarrely, I think) into a call for greater openness of information in China, on the premise that China’s government has nothing whatsoever to hide.
Need I say more?

Transparency of Information is China’s Constant Direction” (信息透明是中国的不二方向)
June 3, 2011
Google has once again announced that its Gmail service has suffered an attack originating in Jinan [the capital of China’s Jilin province], and in this accusation, which professionals immediately find tiresome, Google has shown itself as an Internet giant to be incredibly naive. On its list of victims, Google has placed in particular — aside from high-level American government officials, Asian diplomats and military personnel — “Chinese political activists.” This [addition] suits the outside world’s image of China’s government as a government that would “do anything to ensure stability preservation.” And [the accusation] might easily gain the support of a few in China who understand little about the internet and are accustomed to reading politics into everything.
We don’t know exactly how many attacks “originating in China” Google might have suffered, but in the unordered world of the web, it is perhaps unavoidable that Google should suffer a large number of attacks. This is the real price for “standing at the summit” of the internet. Moreover, an attack from an IP address in China does not necessarily mean the attacker must really be in China. And if it turns out they are in China, the operation is not necessarily being directed by Chinese people or the Chinese government. These principles are as simple as ABC for internet experts, but Google is always weeping snotty-nosed, pulling the wool over the eyes of everyone in the world who doesn’t understand how IP addresses work.
In the internet world there is a saying: that those hackers who are really and truly good at what they do are uncatchable, and those who are caught are all small-time offenders. But it’s not just Google. Western politicians have persistently declared that they have suffered online attacks “originating in China,” and in broader public opinion this suggestion [that attacks have] “originated in China” has borne a serious implication, which is clearly that these attacks are being perpetrated by Chinese people, and moreover under the direction of China’s government.
All of this is perhaps not worth getting all incensed about, because the Western media have always been this way. What we must ask, though, is this: Where have China’s relevant [government] departments run off to in all of this? Every day, China receives so many online attacks from outside the country, and some government officials have had their computers manipulated, resulting in serious breaches of secrecy. Some officials have for this reason been punished [for breach of secrecy]. But why is it that China has never made its own experiences public, but just sits there quietly enduring rebuke from foreign countries. A person who has constantly suffered theft at the hands of others is made out to be an infamous pirate!
Perhaps out of pent up fury with its lack of business success in China, Google wants to do battle with the Chinese government. In accusing China of online spying, Western politicians hope to make known their refusal to give in to China. For them, blackening the face of China is something they do willy-nilly, like spending loose pocket change.
But China’s caution in rebuking others is as though we live in the ideal “Republic” described by Plato.
We can rebuke others, but even more we should reflect on ourselves. Lack of transparency of information has become a habit with us, and knuckling under (低调) [or keeping a low profile] has perhaps become our strategy for dealing with anything of a sensitive nature. Everyone knows this is an age for grabbing discursive power (争夺话语权) and [drawing] eyes and ears, and silence often means acquiescence. If you do not take the initiative in setting the agenda, you will be afflicted by the agenda others set. China, whose miracles have surprised the world and who has acted justly and moderately toward the outside world, is again and again spoken of as a country “both big and bad” (又大又坏).
In April this year police in China detained Ai Weiwei, a matter falling entirely within the scope of China’s judicial sovereignty. But why could relevant Chinese departments not quickly make an announcement of this? Why did they have to give Western media hours and hours of time in which to blacken China? They described the detained Ai Weiwei as “missing” (失踪), and this word has been burned deep into Western public opinion, to this day still being used. Who knows how much energy it will cost us to erase the influence of this word.
China is an aboveboard nation. We have our problems, we have made mistakes, but a few flaws cannot obscure the splendor of the jade. It is entirely within our ability to broadly open up the affairs of our nation, because our national objectives can withstand criticism. There is no shame in showing the process of our advancement before others. There is no need for us to hide anything. Many of our documents can become open reports.
We know achieving openness of information is a process. But we must step firmly into the future. This is the overarching trend of the information age, and it is also the constant direction of enlightened politics in China.

Finally, a break!


Schools are a high-pressure environment for Chinese children, demanding hours and hours of extra study sessions in subjects from mathematics to English. The system is still focused largely on rote learning, requiring students to retain vast amounts of information with little concern for developing their creative skills. In this cartoon, posted by artist Yan Peng ( 延鹏) to his QQ.com blog, a young boy is bedridden in the hospital, hooked up to an IV, but his spirits soar at the resulting respite from his grueling school work. A thought bubble over his head reads: “Now I don’t have to attend cram class after cram class. I don’t have to stay up doing my homework until midnight.” On the table beside his bed sits a backpack stuffed full of textbooks.

Inside Chongqing's red TV revolution

Earlier this week, Guangdong’s Southern People Weekly ran a report taking an inside look at how Chongqing Satellite TV has made a shift toward the “red” under top leader Bo Xilai’s (薄熙来) broad revival of classic Chinese Communist Party culture, with all of its political undertones.
The report is interesting for a number reasons. First of all, of course, it offers — or purports to offer — an inside perspective on changes in Chongqing, which have either joyed or disgusted Chinese in recent months, depending on who you’re listening to. It provides a picture of news journalists struggling with dwindling budgets as advertising revenues become a thing of the past (dropped by the station itself), and forced to work closely with Party and government authorities on all stories they take on.
Secondly, I think this story, which is from one of China’s most respected professional magazines, should turn attention to basic issues of professionalism. We often provide examples at this site of the courage and professionalism shown by Chinese journalists in a very difficult press climate. But it’s important to remember how far Chinese media still have to go in building up their own professional cultures, which does not necessarily have to be dictated by the political climate.
Specifically, this report relies exclusively on anonymous sources. This is often, many argue, an unavoidable choice in China’s media environment, where sources face a very real risk of reprisal. But this is often used also as a rationale for sloppy reporting.
Tt may make sense, in the case of this report, to withhold the identities of employees still working at Chongqing Satellite TV. But the reporter, Chen Lei (陈磊), even withholds the identity of a journalist source in circumstances that do not seem at all warranted: “There are also those who believe that the programs [at Chongqing Satellite TV] are not bad. Chongqing Daily reporter Zhang Hua (name changed), who has a background in archaeology, confessed that he really enjoys programs on Chongqing Satellite TV and often watches them.”
Is “Zhang Hua” afraid of reprisals from those who might think he’s a Party bootlicker?
The following partial translation picks up partway through the Southern People Weekly report.

The Concerns of Employees
Watching the programs at Chongqing Satellite TV, Dou Dou (name changed) has her own take on the whole thing. Two months ago, she was still an employee there. Almost overnight, she was notified by the unit of her dismissal after a “two-way selection” involving both a written examination and an interview [to determine her suitability for the station, and vice versa]. She had worked for the unit for three years, since 2008.
Also dismissed along with Dou Dou were scores of colleagues from the advertising department — 10 of these were dismissed and more than 20 others uneasily awaited transfers within the organization.
What Dou Dou cares about is when her severance package will come through. “We are young, so if they let us go, that’s that. But what we don’t know is how much severance we’ll receive. They said, you can get the equivalent of a month of salary multiplied by the number of years we worked at the station. But many of us have received only the basic wage since the second half of last year, so this is unfair [if severance is calculated on this basis].” [NOTE: Chinese journalists are generally paid a basic wage with performance-based pay and some subsidies.]
As to the reasons for letting this group of people go, Dou Dou says that the explanation within the station was “an objective economic entity facing major economic changes” — “Actually,” [said Dou Dou], “it was that they would no longer broadcast advertisements.” Before Spring Festival this year, Dou Dou and her colleagues had already heard the winds of change. “Only, we didn’t think changes would happen so fast, and that they would be so intense.”
These aren’t Dou Dou’s concerns alone.
When Ting Ting (name changed), who is on the front lines of news gathering [for Chongqing Satellite TV], saw this reporter, she had just returned from reporting a story. Speaking about the changes since [the station] stopped broadcasting ads, this capable and efficient female journalist clearly felt helpless — “There’s no money. The funds available for program production are so short it’s pitiful!”
Ting Ting’s program is Chongqing Satellite TV’s trump card [one of its key programs], broadcast 20 minutes each day since March 7. But they only have more than 10 people working on the [news] program. Aside from going and recording the program content with the propaganda offices of various city districts, they must “first make contact with the opposite side” (事先和对方联系) when reporting news across provinces (跨省采访).
[Ting Ting explained:] “Only when [the government authorities in the area where we are reporting] agree to help us arrange and pay for the reporting trip, and don’t bring up costs [ie, expect payment] do we dare to go [and report the story]. When we do go, our leaders [in Chongqing] have to remind us that if the other side says they want us to settle accounts, resulting in fees [for the station], we need to explain to them that this is a [reporting] task arranged by the Propaganda Department of Chongqing Municipality, and we have to coordinate with the department on our return.”
[Ting Ting said:] “There’s nothing we can do. The propaganda department doesn’t have any money [to provide for these stories] and the station no longer broadcasts advertisements.” Ting Ting said that according to her understanding, news staff would see generally wage cuts of around 10 percent after the Spring Festival. “That means hundreds of yuan less per month, and cuts are even deeper for logistical staff.”
Many employees at Chongqing Satellite TV said that after former [station] president Li Xiaofeng (李晓枫) was “official detained and interrogated [for disciplinary issues]” (双规) in October 2010, the awkward predicament of the financial situation at Chongqing Satellite TV daily became clearer to staff members. [Unattributed quote:] “Before the Spring Festival, [the station’s] Party secretary Liu Wanli (刘万利) held a general meeting of employees and said that the station had come upon a time of great difficulties, and everyone should ready themselves for leaner times. No one ever thought that after the Spring Festival advertisements would be stopped . . . ”
[Unattributed quote:] “Actually, before Spring Festival when principal leaders from the municipal Party committee came to our station and visited with news personnel, praising the good work we had done in producing a red TV channel (红色频道), they raised the issue of stopping the broadcasting of advertisements, saying we should hold on, and that more understanding and support would follow. They also said that when mountain flowers blossom full, [the plum flower] will mingle smiling in their midst. [NOTE: This is from Mao Zedong’s poem “Ode to the Plum Blossom.” The use of the line here suggests that top Chongqing leaders are confident that more and more people, and more and more Party leaders, will begin to see the wisdom of the change to “red” programming at Chongqing Satellite TV and will follow its example in time.]
Ting Ting sighed: “Not long ago, I heard that the station had stopped giving traffic allowances (车贴) to mid-level Party cadres [at the station], and a number of mid-level cadres started having station vehicles take them to and from work. Aye! They make the rest of us drive ourselves to work, and how unfair to us is that! One time they went out for an interview and a dish [they ordered for a meal] was really tasty, so they wanted to order one more. Their colleague in the finance department warned them: order more and there won’t be enough money!
The Emergence of the “Red Channel”
In the memories of many employees, Chongqing Satellite TV’s transformation into a “red channel” began back in 2008.
That year, Chongqing Satellite TV introduced a new channel branding under the slogan “China stories, world humanity” (故事中国,人文天下) [NOTE: This is an awful translation, suggestions welcome]. They clearly defined a kind of “heroic character” as the external face of the station to be promoted — “The biggest characteristic was to broadcast all sorts of television dramas that could draw larger audiences, and to broadcast these over and over. For example, “Drawing Sword” (亮剑), which was aired scores of times. [NOTE: “Drawing Sword” is a patriotic drama set during the war of resistance against Japan and centering on the Eighth Route Army of the Chinese Communist Party.]
In further programming changes in May 2009, Chongqing Satellite TV moved from a focus on ratings to [a focus on] value orientation: “There was a determination to spend about a year to break loose from the ugly competitive environment [of television] nationally, and seek a sustainable development path promoting advanced mainstream [CCP] culture.”
The focus of these changes was on establishing a movement with Chongqing characteristics of “singing red, reading the [Party] classics, telling [Party] stories and passing along [Party] maxims” . . .
In a publicity document, Chongqing Satellite TV said, “Chongqing will become a cultural high plain, and Chongqing Satellite TV is a critical resource [toward this end]. Chongqing Satellite TV must stand out and stand up.” This speaks the hopes for Chongqing Satellite TV held by principal leaders in the municipal Party committee, and is the goal toward which Chongqing’s broadcast industry is struggling generally.
At the annual China Media Congress in 2009, Chongqing Satellite TV was designated as one of China’s top ten satellite television stations. But by this time, audience ratings were seldom raised at all. At the “two meetings” [of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congess] in 2010, then president Li Xiaofeng said: “Audience ratings are the root of all evil in our country’s television sector. It is a statistical technique that entirely excludes the [cultural] elite from the investigative sample.”
Li said that Chongqing Satellite TV had cut out selection shows [resembling, for example, the American Idol-like Super Girl program on Hunan TV] and replaced them with a big lineup of heroically themed and revolutionary history themed programs, which had been well-received by various quarters. What people could not understand [subsequently], however, was how Chongqing Satellite TV’s ratings had slipped from fourth position in 2008 to tenth position in 2009, and to twentieth position by March 2010.
“I propose the creation of an audience rating system more suited to the unique situation of our country,” Li Xiaofeng said [in 2009].
That year, Chongqing Satellite TV made great efforts to build [its] “China Red” (中国红) [branding]. This was evidenced not just in its Spring Festival Gala, its cultural variety shows and its [Party] classic dramas, but also in programs like “Sing/Read/Speak/Convey” (唱读讲传), [a shortening of “singing red, reading the [Party] classics, telling [Party] stories and passing along [Party] maxims”] . . .
. . .

[Frontpage photo by espensorvik available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

Chinese media push on Three Gorges

There is so much going on right now in China’s media, society and politics right now that no single person or project could possibly keep up. We’re barely halfway through this week, and there are already a few notable stories that deserve more attention than we can possibly pay them as we slog through Hu Jintao’s remarks on “innovating social management” (创新社会管理). The following is just one.
Revisiting the Three Gorges Dam. Even as noted critics of the Three Gorges Dam — including economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼), who has recently come under fire for openly questioning the legacy of Mao Zedong — note that its link to environmental problems, such as this year’s severe drought, has not been established clearly by climate experts, the project is being subjected to a level of public criticism not seen in China since construction of the project began in 1992.
One important reason for this, of course, is that the State Council is debating the passage of a “Three Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan” (三峡后续工作规划) and a “Yangtze Middle and Lower Reaches Water Contamination Prevention Plan” (长江中下游流域水污染防治规划), exposing a number of serious issues with the Three Gorges Dam Project. Media have seized on this as an opportunity to probe deeper into the project and its impact (including the history of its approval).
In a recent interview with Southern People Weekly, Mao Yushi criticized the way the assessment of the project by experts in the 1980s was subordinated to political will. And in the boldest move yet, Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post ran a series of reports and opinions running to 12 pages under the topic of “Re-investigating the Three Gorges” (三侠再调查). The front page of the newspaper featured a large photo of scientist Huang Wanli (黄万里), the Chinese engineer and hydrologist who in 1957 openly opposed the idea of a dam at the Three Gorges and was labeled a “rightist” that same year.


[ABOVE: Front page of May 31, 2011, edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post, with a large photo at center of engineer Huang Wanli, who opposed the Three Gorges Dam in 1957 and throughout his life.]
In a 1993 interview with writer and CMP fellow Dai Qing (戴晴), the author of Yangtze! Yangtze!, Huang said: “Damming the Three Gorges might well have been Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s grand view of the future, and it might well have fit Mao Zedong’s poetic fantasy, but we engineers must treat the issue with a sense of responsibility. I have never been given a chance to speak out.”

Masked and Mum


Chinese media reported on May 30, 2011
, that an official in charge of land requisition in the city of Foshan in Guangdong province wore a medical mask during an interview with television media and said that he “had a right to not be filmed.” Media reported that this official has a long track record of avoiding media interviews. In this cartoon, posted by artist Chen Chunming (陈春鸣) to his QQ.com blog, a fat official sits at a table draped with a red cloth wearing his imperial-era official cap, a symbol of government authority. A white mask covers his face, but the contempt in his eyes is visible. The characters on the table read: “Media press conference.” A gaggle of journalists presses forward, sweating with tension as they wait for the words that never come.

Forum denounces economist Mao Yushi

Last month we posted our translation of an essay by economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼) questioning the legacy of the revolutionary leader Mao Zedong (毛泽东). We pointed out that such a direct challenge to Mao Zedong’s legacy had never been made inside China. In its latest edition, the Economist reports on the threats now being made against Mao Yushi by extreme leftists infuriated by his “attack” on Mao as a hero of the Party and the people.
As we have noted at some length, tensions between China’s Maoist left and its liberal right seem to have deepened in recent months. Today, the leftist website Utopia has posted coverage of a forum yesterday in Shanxi province, in which scores gathered to denounce a number of liberal intellectuals, including Mao Yushi and Xin Ziling (辛子陵), calling them “traitors, running dogs and collaborators.”
A partial translation of the Utopia piece including the statement from the forum is below, followed by photos of the event.

On May 29, 2011, a meeting of people from various quarters in Shanxi to denounce and lay a public charge against the traitors and collaborators Mao Yushi (茅于轼) and Xin Ziling (辛子陵) was smoothly held and passed off successfully in the city of Taiyuan. This was a gathering of patriotism. This was a gathering in which the people voiced their cry for justice. This was a meeting opposing all forms of imperialist intrusion and all traitors, running dogs and collaborators.
Comrades participating in the forum unanimously believe that:
Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽东) is the leader of the Party and the people, the creator of the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Liberation Army, and as such we cannot condone the wanton distortion and slander of his magnificent image [as a leader who] devoted his life to leading the toiling masses in rising in revolution. As for the actions of the likes of Mao Yushi (茅于轼), Xin Ziling (辛子陵) and Yuan Tengfei (袁腾飞) in attacking leaders of the Party and the people in the interests of traitors and collaborators, this is not permitted by the Party. It is not permitted by the people. Even less is it permitted by human history (人类历史).
. . .
Below are pictures from the meeting furiously denouncing the traitors and collaborators Mao Yushi and Xin Ziling:


[ABOVE: A blue banner hanging at the head of the anti-Mao Yushi/Xin Ziling forum in Shanxi reads: “The people of Shanxi denounce the traitors and collaborators Mao Yushi and Xin Ziling.”]




[ABOVE: The red banner hanging over the heads of the forum participants reads: “Anyone who opposes the CCP and Chairman Mao Zedong is our enemy.”]

Bombs and Ballots


On Wednesday, May 25, 2011, three separate explosions rocked government complexes in the city of Fuzhou, Jiangxi province. China’s Global Times newspaper called the incident a “suicide bombing,” and police authorities in Jiangxi later identified the suspect in the bombings as unemployed resident Qian Mingqi, saying he had carried out the attacks out of frustration with the handling of the case of the demolition of his home. The day after the bombing, brief news of the incident appeared in the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper, and the final editorial in a rare People’s Daily series calling for greater sensitivity toward issues facing ordinary Chinese said: “Behind most sunken voices [those ignored in the judicial and petitioning process, for example] are demands left unmet, and repressed antipathies that await easing. After his son is disabled in an automobile accident, a father from Yunnan province “detonates himself” outside a courthouse, taking the most extreme course of rights defense . . . ” This cartoon by online cartoonist Aberrant Hot Pepper (变态辣椒) was posted by Nanfang Daily Group cartoonist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to his own QQ.com blog with slight alteration to make it less “offensive” to readers. Kuang gave his blog entry the headline: “A good cartoon serving as a caution to China — here’s to our citizenry!” Below the cartoon Kuang wrote: “Seeing this, you need not say a thing . . . A good political cartoon is like an incisive commentary, better than a thousand words!” In the cartoon the artist presents two unmistakable alternatives. On the left, crossed out with an “X” (the option no-one wants), is an act of explosive violence, presumably a desperate act on the part of an ordinary citizen whose legitimate demands have gone unheard. On the right, the more acceptable option, is a hand casting a vote.