Crooked Crash
Author: David Bandurski
What’s up with the People’s Daily?
What the heck is going on at the People’s Daily? This is what many Chinese readers have been asking since the official Party “mouthpiece” (喉舌) — that’s CCP parlance, not a slur — started running a recent series of editorials calling for “tolerance” and “reason,” and speaking out against the “null expression” of China’s masses who cannot get their legitimate voices heard. From a newspaper that rarely if ever makes for interesting reading, the editorials seem a rare surprise.
As I mentioned yesterday, even relative insiders who generally know how to read the signs have scratched their heads. After reading yesterday’s piece on the need to make all voices in China heard, through grievance resolution as well as expression itself, the Chinese user “freemoren” wrote on Twitter: “Doesn’t the People’s Daily seem not to be itself lately? What’s up with Comrade Li Changchun?” The reference to Li, the fifth-ranking member of the politburo standing committee and China’s de facto propaganda chief, suggests these editorials point to turmoil within the media policy ranks.
Also writing on Twitter, journalist and CMP fellow Chang Ping (长平) and others chattered about this apparently puzzling turn. They noted that just the previous day, the very same People’s Daily had run an editorial by Zhong Jiwen (中纪闻) — in fact, the official pen name of the news office of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (中纪委新闻办公室) — calling for greater “political discipline” (政治纪律) and saying “a small number of Party members and cadres have made irresponsible remarks on matters concerning the basic theories, basic line, basic programs and fundamental experiences of the Party.” That piece had the same stern tone everyone has come to expect from the People’s Daily, hence the remark on Twitter: “This newspaper is suffering from a serious split personality!” (这报纸精神分裂相当严重!)
So, what is going on at the People’s Daily?
It’s no secret, of course, that the People’s Daily isn’t a paper for the people at all. And the surest sign of the paper’s irrelevance to the hoi polloi — much like other Party newspapers at the provincial and municipal level — is its sinking circulation numbers relative to the country’s new brand of commercial newspapers, the likes of The Beijing News, Xiaoxiang Morning Post and Southern Metropolis Daily.But while the Party’s official mouthpiece is not exactly a joy read — and arguably deserves much of the contempt it is shown inside and outside China — there is often more to the People’s Daily than meets the eye. That, mind you, is a statement of fact, not subjective praise. One of the most basic mistakes you can make in reading the People’s Daily — and China’s political terrain generally — is to assume that the Party’s official mouthpiece necessarily reflects a unified, sanitized and tightly managed picture of thought and action at the very top.
There are a couple of basic points to understand. First, even in the proverbial best of times for China’s internal Party politics, pieces in the People’s Daily can reflect agendas or views that are not necessarily unambiguous Party mandate. What I mean to say is that even while it can be completely accurate to say that editorial “X” represents a Party viewpoint, you still must ask the question: whose Party viewpoint?
We know that pieces appear regularly, daily, in the People’s Daily under pen names that stand in for various Party and government offices — which is sometimes also to say interests. The “Zhong Jiwen” editorial this week from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission is a perfect example of this. And let’s not forget the stink bomb that went off at Sohu.com in November last year (though very briefly) over who was behind the pen name “Zheng Qingyuan” (郑青原) put to a series of harder-than-hardline editorials in the People’s Daily, which also outed a number of official pen names. So is it more accurate to see the People’s Daily as an unclouded reflection of Party doctrine and consensus, or as a gumbo pot of subtly competing Party ideas and agendas? . . . No doubt, it falls somewhere along the spectrum between these, and may shift in either direction depending upon the prevailing political winds.
I’ve written at some length here, here, here, here, here and also here about what seem to be deepening divisions within the Party, between left and right, hardliners, liberals and moderates. Upcoming leadership changes in 2012 are of course an issue, but so is the larger question of deep social, economic and political challenges now facing China — and how exactly to tackle those.
An insider at the People’s Daily has emphasized, against suggestions that this series was somehow a cynical propaganda ploy, that these editorials were an “independent” action on the part of the editorial department at the newspaper — meaning that editors at the paper planned and executed the series, but of course had backing from unspecified senior leaders. That doesn’t, of course, mean real and true “independence,” but suggests that these editors (and those supporting them politically) are actively taking advantage of gaps within the Party and the paper.
These editorials should be read as a concerted push by moderate voices within the Party against the (seemingly ascendant) extreme wing (极端派) or “hardline wing” (强硬派) of the Party. These latter elements in the Party, which I’ve heard Chinese journalists refer to also as the “stability preservation clique,” or weiwenpai (维稳派), seem to be running the show right now in terms of “social management” (社会管理). They are the commanders, if you will, of what liberal scholar Yu Jianrong (于建嵘) has called “rigid stability,” essentially the mobilization of a vast police and surveillance apparatus to deal with rising social unrest. And they are the driving force behind the assault on political dissidents, lawyers and activists in recent months.
The actions of this “faction”, a term I use very loosely, are opposed not only by a many ordinary Chinese, but also by many within the Chinese Communist Party and by many Party journalists. The recent editorials in the People’s Daily are crafted in opposition, you might say, to China’s hardline turn. They represent not necessarily “liberals” but rather what you might characterize as “moderates” within the Party.
Despite the People’s Daily‘s status as the “mouthpiece” of the CCP leadership, it is completely possible to have pieces representing “hardline” Party views and “moderate” Party views within the same edition of the newspaper. So there is in fact no need to posit a psychological split here — “This newspaper is suffering from a serious split personality!” — but only a political one, or several.
Which brings us to our second basic point. And that is that rifts have historically played out in the pages of the People’s Daily, particularly at times when divisions are deepened within the Party.
One of the best examples was a front page editorial appearing in the November 14, 1979, edition of the People’s Daily, called “We Can Talk About Political Issues Too” (政治问题也可以讨论). This moderate editorial appeared against the backdrop of internal Party division over the so-called Democracy Wall protests (1978-1979) and the arrest of activist Wei Jingsheng (魏京生). Parallels with the case of artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未) are tempting, but probably best avoided.
Let’s look at what Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟), a well-known reformist and editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily in the 1980s, had to say about this episode in fairly recent political history [Chinese here]. The English version was translated by Andrew Chubb:
After the arrest of Wei Jingsheng at the end of March 1979, Comrade Yaobang indicated his disagreement in a speech to the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in June. Yaobang said: “I support anyone exercising their democratic rights under a socialist system. I hope everyone can enjoy the greatest freedom under the protection of the Constitution. Despite the numerous comrades criticising me by name or otherwise during the Central Work Conference and this People’s Congress, saying I was going behind the central government’s back, supporting a so-called democratisation movement that violated the Four Modernisations, and encouraging anarchy, despite all that I still maintain my views.” Regarding Wei’s arrest he said: “I respectfully suggest that comrades do not arrest people who engage in struggle, still less those who merely show concern. Those who are brave enough to raise these problems, I fear, will not be put off by being thrown in jail. Wei Jingsheng has been held for more than three months, and if he dies he will become a martyr of the masses, a martyr in the hearts of all.
That year, on November 14, the People’s Daily printed an article by Guo Luoji (郭罗基) called ‘We can talk about political problems too’, examining and elucidating the principles of “don’t shoot the messenger” and “speech is not a crime”. Some people believed these articles spoke on behalf of Wei Jingsheng, and they lined up to criticise the People’s Daily. Hu Qiaomu was greatly incensed by it, complaining to Deng Xiaoping that the paper had flagrantly excused Wei of his crimes. This began a dispute between Hu Qiaomu and I. With no basis at all, he accused us of completely affirming the innocence of counterrevolutionary political opinions, and demanded to know why I had published this kind of important article without sending it to the central government for examination. In fact, the article had been reviewed and edited by Yaobang. Not wanting to pull him into this whirlpool of discord, I replied that the People’s Daily had the right to publish this kind of article without running it past the censors. Afterwards I consulted Yaobang, who specially arranged several legal experts to come and talk it over. They said Guo’s article was not particularly wrong, but that his thesis was not complete enough as it had not explained that freedom of speech was also restricted by the law. Forthwith they wrote an article for the People’s Daily called ‘Discussing the speech and behaviour problem within counterrevolutionary crimes’, reaffirming “don’t shoot the messenger” and explaining Article 102 of the Criminal Code, “the crime of counterrevolutionary incitement”, and the principles behind it.
The face-off between Hu Jiwei and the hardline Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木) is an oft-cited illustration of political divisions within the Party over reform in the 1980s, and the impact this had on press policy in particular. Undoubtedly, the comparison could be taken too far, but it does serve to illustrate the ways in which the newspaper we so often revile as the “mouthpiece” of narrow political accord can illustrate discord as well.
The "sunken voices" of China
In the past month, the People’s Daily has run a series of five editorials from the “editorial desk” dealing with so-called “social mentality” or shehui xintai (社会心态) in China. Against the backdrop of tightening controls on the press and a more aggressive attitude toward prominent academics and dissidents — to say nothing of the paper’s typical stiffness — the editorials have puzzled some with their more broad-minded positions. Others have dismissed them as propaganda smoke screens, affecting candor to throw observers for a loop.
Even relative insiders who generally know how to read the signs have scratched their heads. After reading the fifth and final editorial in the series today, the Chinese user “freemoren” wrote on Twitter: “People’s Daily editorial desk: Leaders Must Listen Attentively to Those ‘Sunken Voices’ . . . Doesn’t the People’s Daily seem not to be itself lately? What’s up with Comrade Li Changchun?”
Li Changchun (李长春), of course, is the fifth-ranking member of the politburo standing committee and China’s de facto propaganda chief. He’s the man who steers China’s message, so the implication by “freemoren” is that these unorthodox editorials somehow suggest the propaganda regime itself is in turmoil.
That’s unlikely. But in tomorrow’s post, time permitting, I’ll get into some of the reasons why we see such markedly different voices appearing in a publication generally thought to reflect the broader consensus of the Party leadership.
For now, though, let’s finish out this series at the People’s Daily with the final editorial, “Leaders Must Listen Attentively to Those ‘Sunken Voices'” (执政者要倾听那些“沉没的声音”).
This piece argues that “prolonged social and political stability” can only be established in China if proper mechanisms ensure that all Chinese can make their voices heard. It suggests that China is entering a “golden age” of expression, but that “there are still many voices that have not been heard.”
In keeping with official-speak, the editorial does not invoke the term “freedom of expression” (言论自由), which is slightly more sensitive and has liberal Western associations, but uses instead “right to express,” or biaodaquan (表达权), which hearkens back to Hu Jintao’s 2007 formulation of the so-called “four rights” (四个权利) — the right to know (知情权), right to participate (参与权), right to express (表达权) and right to monitor (监督权).
That’s to be expected. But there are points that genuinely surprise, as when the editorial argues that, from a more enlightened vantage point, “rights defense” (维权), which generally refers to citizen actions to oppose unfair government actions, is “stability preservation” (维稳), a term that generally refers to the mobilization of a huge (and expensive) police and security apparatus to deal with internal unrest arising from social tensions. This view seems much closer to that of liberal Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), a proponent of constitutionalism, than it does to the dominant Party view on social management.
For those of you who haven’t followed it, this series began on April 28 with a piece called “Dealing With ‘Differing Ideas’ With an Attitude of Tolerance” (以包容心对待“异质思维”), which called for a tolerant attitude toward new and different ideas. The editorial called intolerance “a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness” and said “diversity is the secret to prosperity.”
“Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?” (追求理性从哪里起步), published on May 19, argued that only by creating effective mechanisms for dealing with underlying problems — such as the deepening gap between rich and poor, the inaccessibility of housing and other crucial social services, the destruction of homes in the face of property development, etcetera — can China move truly and steadily toward the so-called “building of rationality” (理性建设).
Here is our translation of editorial number five of the People’s Daily series on “social mentality”.
Leaders Must Listen Attentively to Those “Sunken Voices” (执政者要倾听那些“沉没的声音”)
People’s Daily
May 26, 2011
From the Editorial Desk of the People’s Daily (人民日报评论部)
In China today, you can hear all sorts of voices. During sessions of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress [this year], delegates and committee members spoke freely about matters of state. In our newspapers and magazines, different ideas were exchanged and explored. User comments on the news [at websites] often ran into the thousands, and close to 200 million internet users wrote 140-character microblogs as they pleased . . . Track upon track of voices, rising into an ensemble, revealing the complicated picture, and the vigor and vitality, of multiplicity and diversity in this age of ours..
We are ushering in a “golden age” of expression, but there are still many voices that have not been heard. On the one hand, some voices have been submerged in the vastness of the field of voices (声场), so that it is difficult for them to find the surface. On the other hand, there are some voices that only “speak, but in vain” (说也白说), that make their wishes known but find their problems unresolved. These can all be thought of as null expression (无效表达), and some have called them “sunken voices” (沉没的声音).
Null expression is not a lack of expression, nor is it an unwillingness to express. When city leaders in Guangzhou announced that they would meet personally with petitioners, city residents turned out with their bedrolls, waiting in lines for three days, all hoping for an opportunity to “say something” to leaders. When Hu Xiaoyan (胡小燕), the first migrant worker to serve as a delegate to the National People’s Congress, made his private mobile phone number public, he was forced to shut his phone off because he was bombarded with thousands of calls and thousands of text messages. Those hot-button incidents (热点事件) arising from internet attention that become a focus for the media, they are just the “tip of the iceberg.” Beneath the surface of the sea is a much bigger body of ice, and this is the massive foundation that is pushing the crest of ice up out of the water. This is also the “subconscious mind” (潜意识) and “core layer” (核心层) that determines the mentality of our society.
To a large extent, those who are disadvantaged in terms of expression [ie, those who are voiceless] are also those who are disadvantaged in real terms. In society, they lack the resources to influence public opinion, they seldom have channels to participate in government decision-making, or have no way of obtaining information most directly concerning themselves. Therefore, while their numbers are not small, their voices find it difficult to be heard within society.
To hear and to be heard, this is a fundamental appeal for social persons (社会人). To speak and to hear others speak is even more a basic consensus of modern civilization. When the right to expression (表达权) becomes a basic political right, valuing these voices is the starting off point for coordinating interests and rationalizing social mentalities. In a country with a population of 1.3 billion, now undergoing dramatic social change, it is all the more important that the voices of the broad masses are heard and valued.
Behind most sunken voices are demands left unmet, and repressed antipathies that await easing. After his son is disabled in an automobile accident, a father from Yunnan province “detonates himself” outside a courthouse, taking the most extreme course of rights defense [NOTE: This seems to be a case that was not reported in China’s media]. A daughter suffers from an incurable disease, and the a mother from Hubei province takes part in an online publicity stunt in which she “crawls on her knees” [across the city of Guangzhou] . . . The incidents that cause a great public clamor all originate with voices that have been neglected. [Voices that] cannot be heard, are not heard, cannot be resolved — if we do not take action to “salvage” (打捞) them, too many voices will be submerged, and we will find it difficult to avoid the choking up of our social mentality, leading to a sharpening of tensions.
Speaking is the foundation of asserting our interests. Only with the expression of interests can there be relative balancing of interests, and only with the relative balancing of interests can there be long-term social stability. The facts tell us that behind many cases of tension and conflict lies the deprivation of mechanisms to express one’s interests. Seen from this perspective, rights defense is stability preservation (维权就是维稳). Listening as much as possible to voices from various circles of society has major benefit for stability preservation (维稳).
In the midst of cacophony, salvaging as much as possible those sunken voices (沉没的声音) is a bounden duty of social administrators (社会管理者). Applying the power of the government toward protecting the right to expression (表达权) of the most vulnerable, so that their interests can be expressed normally through systematized and standardized channels, is inherent to common construction and sharing (共建共享) [of prosperity, etc.], and is crucial to the building of a harmonious society. Only in this way can we ensure that “speaking” (说话) and “making one’s voice heard” (发声) are not only the most basic means of making appeals, but even more become an important link in fostering a healthy social mentality, and become a firm foundation for prolonged social and political stability.
(Thus ends this series of editorials — the editors)
The Great Pile of Shoes
On the afternoon of May 19, Fang Bingxing (方滨兴), the president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications and the man who is often credited as having engineered China’s national internet controls, the so-called Great Firewall, was pummeled with eggs and shoes by a student while giving an address at Wuhan University. The student uploaded images to the web and received widespread support from Chinese internet users, exposing the deep unpopularity of internet censorship in China. According to other versions circulating on China’s internet, the attack was launched by several students, and scores of others attempting to force their way into the building where Fang was giving his talk were held back by security. In this cartoon, posted by the bold Southern Daily Group comic artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to his QQ.com blog, an empty lectern is buried in shoes presumably fired at a detested speaker. One of the microphones is bent over pathetically. What you don’t see says it all.
The value of honeybee democracy
“The New Parable of the Bees” is an essay in the launch issue of the journal Translated Works. In my view, we might say instead that the entire launch issue of Translated Works (译品) is a kind of new parable of the bees — an excellent exercise, in other words, in the practice of honeybee democracy. [NOTE: “Translated Works” is a direct but poor translation of the publication title 译品, which suggests something more tasteful and refined. “Honeybee Democracy” is the title of a 2010 book by Thomas Seeley, reviewed in the launch edition of the journal.]
So what is honeybee democracy? Bees have a highly developed collective intelligence, and this highly developed collective intelligence arises principally from their unique method of decision making. As the article explains, the secret of bees is that they are mutually dependent in the process of agenda setting, but maintain independence during the evaluation and judgement stage. If they were not mutually dependent during the agenda setting process, they could only work for themselves, searching out prospective sites in a random and dispersed manner, and they might find it impossible to reach consensus. For the colony this would lead to disastrous results, and they would be seized with panic. On the other hand, if they did not have independence in the judgement stage, they might be unduly influenced by a cascading effect arising from momentary trends or information, reaching a consensus through a parroting process, and ultimately deciding to build their hives in the most inauspicious places. In order to come to correct decisions as they weigh and balance their options, bees have evolved an excellent mechanism combining consensus building and independence of judgement.
This sort of honeybee democracy is of course already in use — moreover, is already widely in use — in human society. The most classic example can be seen in the open-source age brought about by the advent of open-source software. The open-source method is used not only in the development of software, but translation, subtitling and many other creative endeavors are increasingly utilizing the open-source method. Consensus, openness, sharing and coordination are the basic characteristics of the open-source method — and is this not similar to the consensus and independent judgement we find in honeybee democracy?
This is why I recommend Translated Works. In my view, the translators of the various translated works [in the journal] are like worker bees seeking spiritual sustenance for humanity. I read every word of this launch issue with pleasure. Its fresh subject matter and fresh perspectives, its vibrant new ideas and fluid translations, made me clap my hands. But what most moved me was their honey democracy-like open-source style of working. Not for personal gain, but for public benefit. Not for profit, but for love, in the pursuit of spiritual beauty and enjoyment, they came together — attempting a small little utopia of free collaboration, a union of free individuals.
Against the made backdrop of the whirlwind of profit-seeking [in our society], what elegance, how romantic and poetic.
We can do without neither the market economy nor civil society in China today. But we often emphasize the former while we downplay the latter. Without the coordination of the latter, however, the former is a structure built on shaky sand. If we can say that our market economy has long been well established, we must admit that our building of a civil society falls woefully behind, and now constitutes one of the greatest tasks facing China. How do we build civil society? And how do we foster civic culture and the civic spirit? I believe that the honey democracy-like open-source model, one of free association based on deep love and working for the public good, is the road we must take.
This is the most enlightening aspect of Translated Works. If this sort of model [of collaboration and coordination] could take flower everywhere, I truly believe that would be the day civil society in China is established.
(This essay was written on the occasion of the launch of the online journal Translated Works and was published in the May 25 edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. )
[Access the launch issue of Translated Works here.]
What government microblogs do (and don't) mean
Back in May 2010, when Guangdong province had just opened up the first Public Security Bureau [police] microblog in the whole country, I wrote a piece called “Three Recommendations for Government Microblogs” and talked about three principles I thought government offices should abide by to properly make use of microblogs. The first was, “face comments head on” (直面评论), which I meant to deal with the way some prefectural-level police departments were limiting comment functions purely out of fear once their microblogs were up and running. Second, dealing with the way some police microblogs were too thick with official jargon or propaganda, I offered the “please speak human language” (请讲人话) principle. Third, I emphasized that actions speak louder than words, and said that if [the government] made much of this so-called “microblog-based policy discussion” (微博问政), then it was crucial that questions be answered once they were asked — they must implement and follow through on the principle of “results above all else” (结果为上).
The results of a recent online study by The Beijing News on the topic, “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?” suggested that these three principles are of real concern to web users.
For example, to the question “What change can the trend of official microblogs bring?”, 46 percent of those surveyed selected the response option saying microblogs could help officials “learn how to speak properly” (学会好好说话) — meaning microblogs could help them discard official-speak and pre-packaged Party jargon and speak like human beings. 45.7 percent of people responded that opening microblogs would mean “mostly putting on shows, with little real influence.” 36.8 percent believed government microblogs generally were “only set-up, but did not allow comments or interaction, so mean little.”
Certainly, what is the purpose of participating in an interactive medium if you don’t want to interact?
62.5 percent of those surveyed said microblogs “could advance interaction and conversation between the government and the people.” This suggests many believe the biggest impact of government microblogs could potentially come in busting through the barriers between the government and the public.
Looking at responses to another survey question, we can get a better grasp of the general environment for microblogs and the hopes people have vested in them. This was the question, “What do believe is the cause of upward trend in official microblogs?” 64.7 percent of those surveyed responded: “With advances in technology, methods for improving governance have come along.” 59 percent responded: “Through microblogs, [officials] can get to know real information about the people.”
These reasons are fair enough, but they don’t go far enough. Even if both the government and the people believe microblogs might enable two-way communication, the internet might ultimately become little more than a stage on which officials can strut their stuff if our understanding of the political role of microblogs stops there.
The use of the internet by officials must be understood on a higher plane of national political culture, and must go beyond the simple “asking after plans and policies” (问计求策) at the local government level.
In fact, the vast majority of officials still see so-called “online discussion of politics” (网络问政) as a new channel and method for obtaining information and exercising social surveillance. Just ahead of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2010, the People’s Daily interviewed 97 NPC delegates under the theme of “How NPC delegates view new media,” and they said there were two principal purposes they saw for using the internet. The first was “using the web as a means of gathering the feelings and opinions of the people, and carrying out research [or observing public opinion].” The second was “thoroughly using e-mail, blogs, microblogs and other new media to strengthen communication and mutual interaction with the masses.” The People’s Daily went so far as to say that “the new media of which the internet is representative have opened up a 24-hour channel for public opinion.”
The problem is that observing public opinion and communicating with the people is not what is meant politically by “democracy.” After all, the gathering up of online public opinion and the exercise of online monitoring [of affairs, by either the public or the government] is not the same thing as having a democratic system.
The online discussion of politics (网络问政) and democratic politics are two separate things. And online discussion of politics will not automatically eliminate the difficulties in communication that we see in our politics today. Many people talk about the discussion of politics as though it’s enough for government officials to hear what people have to say. This is why most of what we have termed “online discussion of politics” has typically been about the “hearing” stage, basically online mailboxes (where you can write in to government officials), online reporting (where you can write in to report abuses), etcetera, which can easily become a one-way street that is more about government officials scoring political points for apparent responsiveness than actually responding to public concerns.
Now that the government, formally speaking, belongs to the taxpayers, it is only right that the government should do its best to understand social conditions and public opinion. This means there is no reason to shower the government with praise for its efforts to use the internet to understand public opinion. Only real solutions to real problems are cause for dishing out praise.
A version of this editorial originally appeared in Chinese at
The Beijing News.
"China's Bold Bloggers": Xu Zhiyong
Reports came late last week that Chinese lawyer and activist Xu Zhiyong (许志永) has been detained in Beijing. Xu is one of several bloggers featured in CMP’s 2009 book China’s Bold Bloggers (中国猛博), to have been sought by authorities in recent months as China’s security police have intensified surveillance and intimidation of writers and activists.
As Xu’s circumstances remain unclear, we release the full chapter on his writings, which readers can download on PDF here. Xu’s original blog, unfortunately, has been closed down for some time.
Xu was detained back in 2009, but later released after an international backlash. The charge leveled against Xu two years ago was back taxes allegedly owed by his legal advocacy group, the Open Constitution Initiative, or “Gongmeng,” which stopped operating in August 2009.
In this July 2009 piece, CMP Director Qian Gang wrote about the pitfalls facing many NGOs and advocacy organizations in China, which often exist in a grey zone where they are vulnerable to charges of “economic crimes” when such charges suit the expedient goals of authorities. This related post also provides good background into this issue.
Former deputy mayor blows whistle on waste
Zhu Shangtong (朱尚同), an 82-year-old retired cadre former deputy mayor of Changsha, issued a rare “letter to higher authorities” yesterday via Xinhua Online and other sites, to complain about the waste and inconvenience caused by a government-funded project for the beautification of Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. It is extremely rare for former or standing Chinese Communist Party officials of such high rank to make such accusations so publicly.
According to Zhu Shangtong’s letter, the local Changsha project is being bankrolled by the government — and ultimately, of course, taxpayers — to the tune of 200 million yuan, or roughly 30.8 million US dollars. Zhu’s letter was posted by Guangzhou-based journalist Zhou Xiaoyun (周筱赟) to at least 10 blog sites and online forums in the early hours of May 19. Some of these posts were still live as late at 2pm yesterday, but all were taken down today.
[ABOVE: Zhu Shangtong, former deputy mayor of Changsha.]
The following is a list of just a few links where information about the Changsha project and Zhu’s complaints was posted yesterday, most all of them still available by early afternoon. They now uniformly return errors, or say content does not exist.
QQ blog post
Tianya Public Forum post
KDnet Forum post
Sina Weibo post
Phoenix Online blog post
Here is our archived file for coverage of the case at the QQ blog of Zhou Xiaoyun. Here is our archived file for coverage of the case at Zhou Xiaoyun’s microblog at Sina Weibo.
With the exception of the Southern Metropolis Daily and the New Express, both major commercial papers in the southern city of Guangzhou, no mainland media covered the allegations made by Zhu Shangtong today. Zhu confirmed to both papers that he was indeed the author of the letter circulating online.
In an interview with the New Express, Zhu Shangtong revealed that local propaganda leaders in Changsha quickly reached him on May 19 to request that he remove the posts circulating on the Internet. When the paper asked whether he had agreed, he responded: “I’m not wrong on this, so why should they be taken down? Actually, the posts online weren’t done by me [but by others], but as to the content I stand behind it.”
Yang Changjiang (杨长江), head of Changsha’s propaganda department, responded to the New Express: “I can say quite responsibly that the facts in the content online differ widely from the truth.” Yang said that the price tag of the pilot project in the Huoxing residential district in question was not 200 million yuan, but rather 80 million yuan.
The following is a quick partial translation of Zhou’s letter, which calls on the State Council and the Central Culture Office to put a stop to “this sort of false and impractical movement.”
“Concerning the City of Changsha’s ‘Improving the City Environment’ (Pilot)”
An Open Letter on the Situation
In recent months, as the city of Changsha has been in the midst of a pilot scheme for “improving the city environment” (优化市区环境) as part of its civilized city building project there has been profligate spending of state funds (the tax revenues of ordinary people), with a heavy emphasis on outward form and a light attitude toward efficiency. It is an absurd phenomenon that harms and harasses the people.
Under the call of gathering strength for the accomplishing of great things, marshaling forces to create a civilized city, the Huoxing Office of [Changsha’s] Furong District has already become a major construction zone, there is a general feeling of insecurity, and those opposed vastly outnumber those in support. I request that the central government think deeply about this!
In the midst of its development, it is a good thing for a city to be improved in good time and order. But this should distinguish between different areas and different buildings, that being fixed which needs fixing, saving what can be saved, and the bill being picked up by the right parties — a balanced process that happens over years. But in a rush to capture civilized city status, with a focus on instant benefits and under pressure from an aggrandized policy [of promoting “civilized” cities], things that should be matters of responsibility individuals and businesses have been financed by the state. It is our view that this pursuit of superficial glory and outer appearance without thought to cost is highly unsatisfactory.
For more than a month now the Huoxing Residential Committee pilot project has comprehensively rolled out this project of “improvement” (优化), rushing into mass action and saying publicly that “this action was dictated by our superiors” (这种作法，是上面定的), refusing to hear different opinions at all. Just as the People’s Daily editorial said on April 28, they “exercise their power to suppress other voices,” and even manufacture fake news, doing whatever pleases their superiors. If they just had the heart to go and visit with residents, with various organs and shops, [they would find that] perhaps everyone is opposed. But mainstream public opinion (for example, Changsha Evening Post has reported saying that the masses uniformly approve of these methods) is sharply at odds with the broader will of the people [ie, real public opinion], as though either side is talking about a different place altogether. Clearly, the subjective assumptions of certain officials have created fallout that contributes to instability and disharmony.
Here are some examples:
Within the scope of the project, all street-side building along major and minor streets, which were originally red-brick or older but still quite sound cement-brick structures, have all been ordered to be made over with tiles. For some streets this is taken even further, and some buildings already laid with decent tiling, but not conforming to the uniform specifications [of the project] (in the vicinity of the Gaoqiao Market, for example), are having paint of a different color applied over the tiling (and what happens after the rains of May and the beating sun have turned this paint grotesque and gaudy?). This has even gone to the point of water holding tanks on top of high-rise apartments being re-painted and decorated. Outer walls along the street, whether major thoroughfares or tiny alleys, some of them in fine condition, have all been newly painted. So from now on, is the government prepared to foot the bill for repairing the outer walls of all private residences?
Below are several photos posted with Zhu Shangtong’s letter, showing the so-called “pilot” project in progress in the Huoxing residential area of Changsha:
People's Daily pushes for greater "reason"
In two pieces posted over the past two days (here and here), we have looked at some of the political and ideological issues at stake in China as the power plays begin A) in the midst of what many see as a very sensitive time for China, with social and political issues mounting (corruption, rising social unrest), and B) we head closer to senior leadership changes in 2012. We have harped on the theme of growing rancor inside the Chinese Communist Party, which is happening behind the curtain of harmony and exuberance.
Growing rancor, both inside the Party and within society, seems to be a theme of broader concern. And we can glimpse this concern again in yesterday’s lead editorial at the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper, “Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?” (追求理性从哪里起步), which has been re-published in a number of major Party and commercial newspapers today, including Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily (which has recently come under pressure for its earthquake commemoration editorial of last week).
This is the fourth editorial from the People’s Daily in the space of a month to deal with so-called “social mentality” or shehui xintai (社会心态). The editorial argues that only by creating effective mechanisms for dealing with underlying problems — such as the deepening gap between rich and poor, the inaccessibility of housing and other crucial social services, the destruction of homes in the face of property development, etcetera — can China move truly and steadily toward the so-called “building of rationality” (理性建设).
Without further ado, or further guesswork as to the significance of this editorial — please post your own comments below — we offer our more-or-less full translation.
“Where Do We Begin in Our Pursuit of Reason?”
People’s Daily
May 20, 2011
In social life today, “reason” (理性) has become a hot word.
Looking at the question of income disparities with reason, facing unfairness in society with reason, parsing online public opinion with reason, choosing industries and professions with reason . . . The unspoken message behind the frequency of use of this word “reason” is that on a many questions there are some who have moved toward the flip side of reason.
Having experienced the “death of Socrates” in the courts of ancient Greece, and having passed through the whirlwind of the French Revolution whipped up by radicalism, humanity has been been on guard against the turbulence of the irrational. A rational and orderly environment is beneficial to lowering the costs of regulating social relations, and moderate and gradual reform is the most enlightened choice for historical progress — these have already become unshakable convictions of modern society. In a nation with over one billion people, in an explosive era of social transition, fostering a rational and moderate attitude in society is especially crucial.
However, the consideration and discussion of rationality should also unfold on a deeper level. The hope of eliminating any and all irrational remarks is impractical. Being tense and anxious about this is of less avail than resolving their underlying root causes in society and seeking practical channels to dissolve them. Only in this way can we grasp the principal tensions [standing in the way] of a moderate and rational attitude.
. . . Over 30 years of economic reform and opening, our Party’s understanding of rationality has made a giant leap forward. But our rapidly changing China now faces a “time of change such as we have not seen in a thousand years” (千年未有之变局), and in taking our progress on these concepts [of rationality, etc] and action-alizing it in our real practices of social management at every level, gaining an accurate grasp and effectively dealing with social mentalities that grow more complex by the day, we have a long road ahead.
The rational enlightenment of the West faced off principally against the Christian Church. The building of rationality in China today comes with the collision of market rationality and traditional morals and ethics, and also the grinding together of individual rights and the collective spirit. There is also the game being played out between modern public consciousness and the [old, guanxi-based] acquaintance society (熟人社会), and the coexistence of [ideas of] civic participation and old remnants of the [idea of] “serving as master of the people” (为民做主). In such a complex environment, as individual persons, no-one dares say they have a full “grasp of the truth,” and no-one should have an exaggerated sense of their own “superior rationality” (理性优越感), yearning under the mark of “rationality” to shut up once and for all the mouths of “irrationality.”
Even behind the most extreme examples and the most fiercely irrational remarks, there may be some basis in logic. As the final choice, [irrationality] often arises from a sense of poor odds and impending loss. In market competition, the weakest goes to the wall, but must the winner devour all the spoils on his own, and the loser be left with nothing? Violent means of opposition may be irrational, but is violent demolition and removal [of residents from their homes] necessarily reasonable? When going through normal channels makes it difficult to voice legitimate demands, how should they let off these pent up resentments? When there is no space for reason, one hurls abuses. When hurling abuses isn’t enough, one fights. When fighting is of no avail, one runs. We do not encourage this kind of logic of the weak, but we cannot fail to understand it, and we cannot fail to show our concern and offer a way out.
Rationality is the condition on which a society depends for its existence. And the building of rationality is something that requires the united efforts of a whole society. At the present time, the responsibility for this lies chiefly with social administrators (社会管理者) [ie, Party leaders and the government], those who are in positions of strength, and organizations and individuals with an abundance of resources. But every citizen must recognize that any interest demand or value proposition must be made within in an orderly manner within the framework of rule of law. “Reason” will of course not sweep the land, but “lack of reason” will find itself unable to move an inch. The value rational (价值理性), the instrumental rational (工具理性), the procedural rational (程序理性), the objective rational (目的理性) — there are many fronts on which the building of rationality must take place.
But fostering a rational and moderate attitude in society begins with fostering real, equal and earnest communicative rationality (交往理性).
[We need] less, “I don’t have time right now to chit-chat,” and more patient communication. [We need] less lesson giving, “Don’t believe in rumors or transmit them,” and more timely release of information on public affairs. [We need] less insensitive, “If you can’t buy a home why don’t you rent one?” and more acceleration of the building of a social services safety net . . . We must remember at all times that scientific and effective mechanisms for coordinating interests [in society], mechanisms for expressing demands, mechanisms for mediating tensions, and mechanisms for ensuring rights protection, are the only effective antidote for doing away with irrationality.
(This article is the fourth in the People’s Daily series “Observing the Mentality of Our Society”, and was published on May 19.)
Turning back to "new democracy"?
Yesterday, I wrote about how the battle over ideas — or, more appropriately at times, ideologies — has shown signs of heating up in China in recent months. The hawks of China’s Maoist “left” have stepped out more boldly, and we have seen at the same time that the pro-reform “right” has become exertive, perhaps a reason itself for so much leftist drum-beating. Today, I want to look at another political/intellectual force that has gained some momentum inside the Party, and which I will resist labeling except through the man who stands at its center — the writer and thinker Zhang Musheng (张木生).
Zhang Musheng, whom many fans describe as an intellectual powerhouse, is an expert on rural development. His book A Study of Problems Facing China’s Farmers (中国农民问题学习) was quite influential among educated youth in the 1960s, and ushered him on to the intellectual scene. The book and its core views also influenced the rural economic system reforms that followed from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s.
It so happens that Zhang Musheng is also a former protege of Chen Yizi (陈一咨), the Chinese Communist Party reformer who ran the Research Institute for the Reform of the Economic System in the 1980s, and in this capacity was a key advisor to former Premier Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), and who fled China following the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, eventually founding the Center for Modern China in Princeton, New Jersey.
Zhang is important now because he and his latest book have come to represent a certain political force in China, promoting the idea of “new democracy to save the Chinese Communist Party” (新民主主义救中共). He has said in a provocative affirmation of Chinese Communist Party rule that stresses the demand for change: “Only the Chinese Communist Party can save China; only new democracy can save the Chinese Communist Party.”
More on that in a moment . . .
Zhang is backed politically by a number of important leaders in China’s military, including Liu Yuan (刘源), the son of Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), the former chairman of the People’s Republic of China (1959-1968) who was labeled a “traitor” and finally ousted by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution in 1968 (and was a big fan of new democracy, which Mao was not). It was Liu Yuan who wrote the preface to Zhang’s new book. A serious test of translation powers, the preface is a passionately worded, almost snarling piece that discusses history, culture, national identity and war — and of course new democracy.
Here are two choice quotes from Liu Yuan’s preface:
“If China hopes to roll with the globalization trend of “democracy,” I’m afraid it will be like drawing a tiger and ending up with the likeness of a dog, not getting at all what we expected. Rather than bringing in a stone that might shatter the jade [ie, result in chaos], why don’t we just have confidence and just use our native born new democracy, which Chinese Communist Party member Mao Zedong raised and Liu Shaoqi put into practice?”
“In the path our nation has taken, we have really tossed about. The American, Japanese and Soviet systems, we’ve eaten them raw and skinned them alive, copying them entirely. The Yugoslavian, Singaporean and Hungarian models, we’ve treated them like quick-fix cures. Shock therapy, color revolutions, crumbling and changing flags, these too have been recommended to us like magic turtle soups. [Zhang] Musheng uses the metaphor that we’ve ingested a thousand remedies to the point that we suffer from vomiting and diarrhoeia.”
Here are some quick Cliff Notes from CMP Director Qian Gang on what “new democracy” refers to:
Before the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the banner it held up was that of new democracy (新民主主义). At that time, the Communist Youth League was actually called the Youth League for New Democracy (新民主主义青年团). New democracy is not the same as socialism. It preserves aspects of capitalism, including the protection of individual economic activity in the countryside. Mao Zedong wrote an essay called, “The Doctrine of New Democracy” (新民主主义论). But Mao Zedong hoped to move quickly to socialism, and so he did not favor new democracy. By contrast, Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) was much more in favor of new democracy. In the early stages of the PRC, he encouraged capitalists to develop the economy. In 1956, the CCP completed its so-called “socialist transformation” (社会主义改造) and moved from new democracy to socialism.
As I suggested, Zhang Musheng’s book is creating something of a splash this month. A recent “forum” in Beijing to introduce the book, Changing Our View of Culture and History (改造我们的文化历史观) — published by the Military Affairs and Science Press — was reportedly attended by a powerful constellation of political, military and intellectual stars. Liu Yuan was there. So were five other top People’s Liberation Army generals. So were key figures associated with the left. So were former Freezing Point deputy editor (and CMP fellow) Lu Yuegang (卢跃刚), Caixin Media editor-in-chief (and CMP fellow) Hu Shuli (胡舒立), and Yanhuang Chunqiu editor-in-chief (and CMP fellow) Wu Si (吴思).
“Guests came from the fields of military affairs, history, economics, education and other areas, offering multiple perspectives for interpretation of the book [and its significance],” wrote the Beijing Morning Post.
As I mentioned yesterday, this is a time when internal Party rancor seems to be rising and China’s patina of exuberance is backgrounded by deep sense of insecurity and foreboding. Thirty years of economic development have indeed achieved a “miracle.” But what now? How do we deal with the mountain of crippling problems that stem from that very success? An endemic culture of corruption, a yawning gap between rich and poor, growing social instability. Arguably, that anxiety is felt more keenly on the right, perhaps best encompassed by Wen Jiabao’s portentous words in Shenzhen: “Without the protection afforded by political reforms, we will lose the gains [we have made] through economic reforms, and our goal of modernization cannot be achieved.”
Zhang Musheng and Liu Yuan, too, suggest China is at a political/social/economic crossroads. But their focus — not easily characterized as “left” or “right” — is on returning to the Chinese Communist Party to this root idea of new democracy. Some see Zhang Musheng as a practical thinker and a division healer. As Major General Liu Yuan writes approvingly: “What he calls for is a straightforward building of institutions, not for political slogans and claptrap. His mastery surpasses the ‘new left’ and the ‘old right’, passes the ‘mainstream’ and the ‘non-mainstream.'”
I can’t comment on Zhang straightforwardness, but it is clear that however Liu Yuan may affect a distaste for “political slogans and claptrap,” he is certainly a fan of “new democracy” as the best new slogan for a re-invigorated Chinese Communist Party.
And that may be exactly the point. For Liu Yuan, the “new democracy” his father hoped to put into practice may be the best slogan to take the Party beyond the internal rancor, throw a “democratic” bone to the mob, and preserve the very lucrative status quo of crony capitalism (权贵资本主义).
At any rate, Zhang Musheng is someone to keep an eye on — as are his influential fans. For a bit more background, the following is a translation of Zhang’s recent interview with Netease Books about his latest work and his views on the current situation facing China. Of particular interest is his reading of “great nation” histories as histories of imperial plunder. That is a reading that cannot apply to China, however, which has risen without foreign conquest. So he concludes, talking about the exploitation of farmers as the root of China’s miracle: “We have plundered ourselves.”
Enjoy.
“Zhang Musheng Discusses New Democracy and the Future of China’s Reforms”
May 9, 2011
Netease Books
Zhang Musheng says, only the Chinese Communist Party can save China; only new democracy can save the Chinese Communist Party. You can choose not to believe him, but you must not be silent, nor do you have cause for concern. You must engage him in debate. The age of “avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed, he says. We have drilled through “chaos”, and an age of “debate” is coming. Tolerance is more important than freedom. Truth (if there is such a thing), will certainly become clearer the more it is debated.
Interviewer: Lei Tian (雷天)
Interviewee: Zhang Musheng (张木生)
Editor’s Notes: A discussion forum on the release of a new book recently drew participation from six People’s Liberation Army generals, and the gathering had all the trappings of a strategic planning session ahead of battle. It was a roomful of people, old, middle-aged and young, concerned about their country and their people. General Liu Yuan (刘源), the son of former PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) “made a great effort” to recommend this new book, Changing Our View of Culture and History (改造我们的文化历史观). The author of this new book, Zhang Musheng (张木生), created a “Zhang Musheng whirlwind” among educated youth in the 1960s with his book A Study of Problems Facing China’s Farmers (中国农民问题学习), in which his core views pointed the way to the rural economic system reforms that would follow more than a decade later. He uses a single phrase to describe the gist of this new book: “By reading the words of Li Ling (李零), we can plan the destiny of our nation.”
Just a few days after this small-scale but high-quality discussion forum, the liberal scholar Xiao Han (萧瀚) sent out a microblog post saying that this book was “a furtive expression of new nationalism (新国家主义),” and that it “would possibly become one source of the next set of state ideological theories.”
Is this new nationalism? And will it become a source for state ideological theory? That’s hard to say.
But “furtive” is something one cannot see — this is clearly a manifesto.
Talking with Mr. Zhang Musheng has three great advantages. The first is that he has quite a temper, but he does not flaunt his seniority, even if you ask him: Why should the Chinese Communist Party stay in power? He’ll discuss this kind of question directly with you. He is about looking for solutions to suit problems, not seeing posts and deleting them [ie, censoring the views of others]. He speaks energetically and bravely. Secondly, he goes right to the heart of questions, whether he is criticizing absolute power or capitalist logic, and he speaks straightforwardly, with courage and character. Third, since the 1980s, he has stayed clear of politics, and has never stopped reading, and when he speaks he can talk boundlessly, with great knowledge and insight.
He says, only the Chinese Communist Party can save China; and only new democracy can rescue the Chinese Communist Party.
You can choose not to believe him, but you must not be silent, and you need not worry [when you’re interviewing him]. You must debate him. The age of avoiding debate, he says, has passed.
We have drilled through “chaos”, and an age of “debate” is coming. Tolerance is more important than freedom. Truth (if there is such a thing), will certainly become clearer the more it is debated.
Recorded remarks of Zhang Musheng:
We have been brought to this point today under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This is a historical fact, something irreversible. Nor can we “suppose,” or ask “what if?” I am confident that environments are always stronger than people, and that coming to this point it [the Party] must reform. And so, to use a proverb, “There will be balance [of power], there will be constitutionalism, there will be different parties within the Party, and opening up and freedom of public opinion, including freedom and independence of thought, can all ultimately be resolved within a single party.”
If we had trade unions and farmer’s associations, even under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and their anti-corruption and balancing mechanisms went further in using the law to check the ruling Party itself, unlike today where everything is bound up together — could it [the Party] not develop in this direction [toward greater democracy]? I believe it is entirely possible. We could surely proceed slowly, step by step. What Hong Kong and Singapore have accomplished, the Chinese Communist Party can surely accomplish.
If the Communist Party does not recover its leadership and control as principally a representative of workers and farmers, then there is no way out for you [the Party] whatsoever, and no legitimacy. So you cannot regard them (the workers and farmers) as [weak and] disadvantaged groups. Today, what kind of farmers are our farmers? On average they have 13.5 years of schooling, and for workers it goes without saying [that this is even higher]. Go back to the past, go back to the era of Mao, and they all belong to what you would call the intellectuals. So these masses aren’t such fools [as you might imagine]. We are talking about 800 million mobile phones sending out short messages, and 460 million notebook computers exchanging ideas. There’s no way of comparing this to your so-called staging demonstrations, airing views and writing big-character posters, or to the great networking — it is so much freer than it was at that time.
I believe there is a group among the next generation of leaders (that have ideals, thinking beyond their own interests). Just think, the 70-80 million members of the Chinese Communist Party largely encompass all of the elite in our society, and the basic question is who should hold the banner [who should lead], who should solve the problems we face. Different environments call for different solutions.
China’s current problem, such a big country, with 1.3 billion people — if you let it take a corrupt path the ordinary people are not going to allow it. The legitimacy of the ruling party will be steadily lost, a problem that is already quite severe. I say this is a burning issue that brooks no delay. There is the problem of heading towards corruption and disintegration, but faced with this danger a group of people rises to face it head on and come up with a solution to the problem . . .
When he was an active Party official, Deng Liqun (邓力群), [a hardline leader of the Central Propaganda Department in the 1980s], pushed the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign [of 1983] and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign [of 1987]. After he stepped down, he himself wanted democracy, wanted discursive power (话语权). Now our Party is so open-minded that it can support an extreme leftist Utopia [online publication] and a rather right internal Party journal like Yanhuang Chunqiu.
The “falsehood, bluster and emptiness” (假大空) of our bureaucrats today stems from a lack of confidence, this lack of confidence is because they have no true beliefs or convictions, and without true beliefs or convictions what are they to China? What does China want? What is China? They aren’t clear about it. So now we talk about our (officials) also becoming disadvantaged groups. Why is that? Because they have power, and power brings corruption, and the outcome of corruption is that they might possibly be found out by the people [through the Internet, by media, etcetera]. So they believe they are weak because even though there are loopholes in internal Party supervision [that they can exploit], they can’t say exactly when they might be dragged out by the public, particularly in this information age, with our Internet society. So they feel that they’re now soft and time — these are their reasons.
Today you don’t just have collusion between bureaucrats and capital, commercial profiteers propping up corrupt officials. You also have the commercializing of leadership, the capitalization of power, and the criminal networking of political power, all very serious.
I’m not saying there’s not crony capitalism, there is. But it’s wrong to use crony capitalism to define the nature of society. Can crony capitalism really become an “ism”? Does it have the capacity to become an “ism”? What banner does crony capitalism hold up? Clearly, it cannot be a doctrine unto itself. It cannot become a kind of independent force. It has to borrow other doctrines to make its bread. What we are playing with now is a form of “chaos”, and this “chaos” must be broken up.
The Dream of a Strong Nation is Actually a Dream of National Plunder (强国梦其实是抢国梦)
[NOTE: This phrase, which Zhang Musheng uses in the interview below, plays on a homonym of the words “strong” and “rob”, which are both pronounced qiang but with different tones and characters.]
Netease Books: Hello, Teacher Zhang. I’m really happy you agreed to do this interview with Netease. I’ve read your book Changing Our View of Culture and History, and I’ve reviewed your speeches and previous essays. In your book, and in various speeches, you’ve said that “if the Communist Party does not represent the majority of people, it is definitely finished.” Last year, the “My Father is Li Gang” case had a major impact, both online and in print media, and it should be seen as a classic case of conflict between the government and the people. Chairman Mao once said, “The world is yours, and it is also ours, but when it comes down to it, it is yours.” But this saying has been changed by web users to say that “when it comes down to it, it is the government’s.” In many cases, including the recent Yao Jiaxin Case (药加鑫案) and others before, we see that web users immediately go and make conjectures about possible government connections. So we can see that officials now have amassed substantial popular grievance. In your book you talk about how the old man Du Runsheng (杜润生), [a former CCP central official who helped frame China’s rural policies in the 1950s-1970s], once mentioned in an essay one grassroots cadre’s views at the time. And you said that when the system was right, they [the cadres] were the ones doing good things; and when the system was wrong, it was very possibly they who were doing bad things. How do you view the current bureaucracy? Do you feel that [political] system reforms are hanging over our heads?
Zhang Musheng: First I just want to say that you pack a whole lot of questions all into one pile. In fact, the core of what you are asking is about these three decades of economic reform. In my own words I would say that [economic reforms] have gained great achievements such as the world could never have imagined, and have also brought major problems such as the world has never before solved. These problems are what in the past the ordinary people quite directly referred to as cadre-mass tensions (干群矛盾). Now we call them government-public tensions (干群矛盾). These tensions have already reached the point where they are irreconcilable and must be resolved.
You ask whether [reforms are] hanging over our heads. I would say they can’t for a moment be delayed. Actually, there is no need for me to answer you. Comrade Wu Bangguo (吴邦国) already said it during this [year’s] “two meetings” [of the NPC and CPPCC], “Reform and opening can wait, the problems of the people (民生问题) must be moved to the front.” Perhaps 80 percent of what Premier Wen Jiabao said in his press conference was on the issues of the people’s livelihood (民生问题). He even said a mass of flattering tongues isn’t work a single man speaking the truth — I’ll listen to whomever can speak the truth [NOTE: This phrase borrows from Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian from the 1st century BC]. All of this had an attitude of urgency, not brooking delay.
A most basic difference here, actually, if we want to resolve tensions between the government and the people, a mainstream view with a strong following holds that, you’ve read [economist] Wu Jinglian’s (吴敬琏) books on 30 years and 60 years, [I suppose, meaning Major Trends in Chinese Reform: the Next 30 Years and 60 Years of China’s Economy]. I’m guessing you’ve definitely read these.
Netease Books: Yes, I’ve read them.
Zhang Musheng: And then there are the suggestions of Qin Xiao (秦晓). As soon as he stepped down [as chief of China Merchants Group] he couldn’t restrain himself, but had to declare himself a firm believer in universal values. The media are not even worth mentioning, probably a landslide [in favor of universal values]. Which is to say that the solutions you guys (the Communist Party) once had are no longer of use. Only universal values will do, it’s only a question of degree. For example, Du Daozheng (杜导正) [of the liberal Party journal Yanhuang Chunqiu] believes that the CCP [can/should] lead, but that the Party must reform, that it must change. Zhu Houze (朱厚泽) has even said, if you guys (the Communist Party) hope you can return to [ideas of] new democracy (新民主主义) you can’t possibly solve the problems [we face]. Li Shenzhi (李慎之), [the prominent public intellectual and former Chinese Academy of Social Sciences deputy director who passed away in 2003], wrote in Fifty Years of Somber Wind and Rain (风雨苍黄50年) that you . . .
Netease Books: . . . You just call it quits.
Zhang Musheng: Call it quits. The other day, [during the forum attended by General Liu Yuan], Wu Si (吴思) said that in the past our belief in Marxism was premised entirely on the idea that capitalism could not resolve its own problems, but in fact experience has shown that capitalism has been able to resolve its problems in every successive crisis it has faced.
Netease Books: Yes, including the recent financial crisis.
Zhang Musheng: Including this recent financial crisis. Everyone says this, whether you’re talking about the mainstream media [ie, Party media] or many thinkers. Meanwhile, those who are on the left, relatively speaking, like Zhang Quanjing (张全景) [of the CCP’s Party Building Directorate] or Li Shenming (李慎明), [vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], talk a lot of things that are our (Communist Party) traditions, our traditional theories. But what notions do they give the ordinary people? They are too old. Like Cheng Enfu (程恩富), setting up a Marxism Research Institute in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and he’s given so much investment. All other sections of [CASS] must step aside for them, but the ordinary people have no interest at all in what they have to say — it’s just too old.
Netease Books: That’s right.
Zhang Musheng: So this brings us to how I see these issues. On the one hand, I think that the most ultimate questions the world faces are ones for which ready answers can’t be given. If I have to say I have an ace in the hole, something I prescribe that I guarantee can cure any problem whatsoever, and I can guarantee too that it won’t have any bad side effects, that’s definitely a fake medicine I’m offering. This is what I think.
But all major questions are resolved little by little, step by step, with the passing of time. The methods of the past, all these methods of rebellion, methods of revolution, methods of betterment, methods of reform. All of these are particular solutions for particular problems [ie, on a case-by-case basis]. Today if you ask me to make a judgement, I would say that while China faces major problems, it has also amassed capital such as it might never have imagined before.
Netease Books: Yes.
Zhang Musheng: Today our state-owned enterprises, if they make real calculations, hold capital of around 100 trillion yuan in capital. In terms of deposits, both domestic and overseas, they hold about 100 trillion. So concerning the problems we face that we must solve, we have the material means, and this is different from the past.
Netease Books: Can you talk about where this money has come from? Should we explore the origins of this money?
Zhang Musheng: About the origins of this money, let me tell you the simplest of truths. Our 250 million farmers have, in the three decades of economic reform and opening, contributed 200,000 square kilometers of land (300 million Chinese mu), and on this 200,000 square kilometers of land, some have made only 1,000 yuan per mu, and at the most others have made 20-30,000 yuan per mu. But they have generated an economic miracle. Last year, land transference fees (土地出让金) in our country amounted to 2.9 trillion yuan (445.7 billion US$), once again having a massive price scissors effect (剪刀差) on our farmers.
This is one [source]. There is another [source], and I’ll just list one example here, looking at our farmers. These 250 million farmers, some people have estimated this, they have created the equivalent of about 60 trillion US dollars in export products, creating for the country foreign exchange reserves of around three trillion [US$]. Of course, while you can’t say this was all their doing, they constitute the chief force of manufacturing, and this is a basic fact. So I think we can say quite clearly where this material base we now have came from.
If you look at our total consumption, our household consumption, it stands at only 35 percent of GDP. In the United States that figure is 70 percent. So how is it that our government in China has managed to become the world’s richest government? It’s not just richer than America in relative terms, but richer in absolute terms. This can all be accounted for.
Netease Books: You say in your book that the primitive accumulation of imperialism, including capitalism, lay principally with the plundering of other nations, using war to plunder the resources and markets of other countries.
Zhang Musheng: The dream of the great nation is the dream of the “take nation” (强国梦是”抢国梦”).
Netease Books: That’s right, the “dream of the take nation.” So what about socialism? Especially in the case of China, [what can we say about] the primitive [capital] accumulation of socialism [?]. That there were no resources to be taken from other countries, so [we have] plundered our own people [?].
Zhang Musheng: We have plundered ourselves. When you plunder yourself you can take quite a bit as well, particularly in a country like ours with such a massive population.
Netease Books: So farmers are the subject [of the plundering]. And the first phase is the plundering of our peasants through industrialization (工业化抢农民). The second phase, the urbanization process of opening and reform [ie, the period roughly since the mid-1990s], also plunders the farmers. So now, having amassed such capital, how do we bring about the next stage of reforms?
Zhang Musheng: This is not where the debate is focused right now. The topic to be debated is how the Chinese Communist Party is unable to solve the problem of corruption, how the Chinese Communist Party is unable itself to solve the problem of checks and balances. [NOTE: Zhang’s point is that first the internal problems facing the Party must be addressed, then the question can be asked about where reforms should head next.]
