The Party and the government must further improve laws and regulations, carrying out regulation of social organizations according to law. They must accelerate the relaxing of restrictions on social organizations, better cultivating and sustaining them.

We’ve written a great deal lately (here and here, for example) about the ideological struggle that seems to be going on behind the political scenes in China — a struggle, ultimately, over the direction of economic, social and political reforms pitting the so-called “liberal” right against the conservative Maoist left. Obviously, these ideological lines are not always so cut-and-dried. There are centrists no doubt, and both left and right-leaning centrists, and a great mass of the impassive and unsure. For a decent look at the background issues at stake, we recommend a recent piece in The New York Times, “Mao’s Legacy Still Divides China.”
But in what seems like a sharp leftward political turn in China in recent months, it is the liberal right that seems to be taking most of the hard knocks. Quiet chatter on the right in recent days, for example, has turned to the fate of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and well-known “liberal,” who has apparently been silenced quite vigorously by Chinese authorities.
Xin is no stranger to acts of outspokenness. He was party in October 2010 to an open letter calling for free speech and an end to censorship in China. That letter, which CMP translated into English, was signed by a number of senior CCP officials known for their reformist views, including Mao Zedong’s former secretary, Li Rui (李锐).
Not long after that letter was circulated, a lecture by Xin scheduled for a Beijing bookshop on the topic of “The Political Reform Question” was suddenly pulled due to sensitivities. In the lecture, which circulated online despite the best efforts of censors, Xin attacked those who sought to hijack the political reform debate with the outdated “theory of delimitation” — distinguishing between “proletarian” democracy and “bourgeois” democracy — which he calls a “protective amulet . . . for single-party dictatorship” handed down by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin.
Xin is reportedly now under pressure for a speech called “Our Situation and Prospects” that he delivered to a forum of retired Party cadres at the the Ministry of Science and Technology. He has been prohibited from speaking, writing or “being active” for a period of six months as he undergoes scrutiny for “three major errors” he committed in the speech — including the suggestion, apparently, that Wen Jiabao is under rising pressure from Party conservatives for his persistent remarks on political reform.
The following open letter from an elderly CCP member, which has been shared over the past two days among a range of academics, journalists and liberal Party officials, calls on authorities to end the prohibitions against Xin Ziling and argues that the CCP must allow “different voices and different opinions” if it is to maintain its hold on power and accommodate the “standards of modern society.”
The letter also references a supposed remark from a high-level official in the Central Propaganda Department that has surfaced in a number of places recently, that Premier Wen Jiabao — who has insisted repeatedly in recent months that political reform is essential to China’s continued stability and prosperity — has become a “troublemaker.”

“From an Old CCP Member, a Call on the Authorities: Release Restrictions on Xin Ziling”
Ai Feng (艾风)
Recently, I saw an article online by Mr. Fan Ji (范吉) and learned about the forced silencing of Jin Ziling, about how the authorities have demanded he undergo scrutiny owing to three [alleged] major errors. He has been ordered to avoid speaking, writing or being active for a full half year. I read the speech he delivered to a forum of old cadres at the Ministry of Science and Technology and found it to be a sound and well-reasoned work. So I’d like to speak my mind a bit about this.
I too am a retired cadre. Before I had even turned 16, I joined the Chinese Communist Party when it was underground. So I have a history of more than 60 years with the Party. Now, in the capacity of an old CCP member, looking at the three errors that have been foisted on Xin, and then looking at his speech on “Our Situation and Prospects,” I believe the former is based on specious chop logic while the latter [Xin’s own speech] is theoretically sound, backed up by data and convincing. Perhaps it is precisely this strong theoretical basis and persuasiveness, this penetrative power, that has made the authorities fearful, so that they resort to this “ban” on Xin.
The first charge is that Xin Ziling advocates the capitalist road, severely going against the Four Basic Principles (四项基本原则). I won’t talk right now about how the Four Basic Principles was the new four-part formula with which Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) replaced Hua Guofeng’s (华国锋) “Two Whatevers” (两个凡是) after Deng had denounced them. Looking just from the full text of Xin’s speech, it is clear that Xin affirms that opening and reform and the present economic accomplishments have happened under the leadership of the Party, and this accords with the first of these four “whatevers” [the Four Basic Principles, namely: “Upholding the leadership of the CCP.”] As for the second [basic principle], that of remaining on the socialist path, we should admit that Deng on the socialist path and Mao on the socialist path are already quite divergent. Mao upheld public ownership and annihilated private ownership. Deng permitted the development of the private economy, of a mixed economy, and he added protections for private ownership to the Constitution. In terms of economic forms, Mao persisted in the planned economic model, while Deng promoted the market economy. Well then, as for this [basic principle] of remaining on the socialist path, are we to adhere to Mao’s path or to Deng’s? If our Party is carrying on with opening and reform, then of course we are taking Deng’s path.
Xin Ziling’s entire speech is also an affirmation of Deng’s path, and he even says: “The wisdom of Deng Xiaoping comes in these two words, ‘opening up’.” So if Xin praises Deng’s opening and reform, and affirms our present economic accomplishments, how is this a violation of the Four Basic Principles? . . . As an accomplished scholar himself, naturally he cannot simply parrot what others say. According to his profound study of Marxism, and his profound study of democratic socialism (民主社会主义), he raises the same economic theory of the primary stage of socialism that our Party itself has raised recently, which could also be understood as the “new democracy” (新民主主义) that Mao Zedong promoted but then later discarded, or which could be called social democracy (民主社会主义), or again be referred to in terms of the “new capitalism” (新资本主义) that Mao Zedong once spoke of. All of these appellations can be thought of as readings of the current economic situation and social situation in our country, and all offer affirmation and support of the Party’s basic national policy. If these readings and questionings arising from the world of theory are slapped carelessly with labels, and made out to constitute guilt, has this not pulled us back to the “ten thousand horses all muted, and one-hundred birds prevented from singing” (万马齐喑，百鸟禁声) that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution? Are we again to enforce ideological despotism (思想专制) and cultural despotism (文化专制)?
The second charge holds that Xin Ziling set leaders at odds. This is because in his speech Xin said [Premier] Wen Jiabao must not be criticized [or “isolated” or “attacked”], and he strongly advised [President] Hu Jintao against aligning with other influential power cliques to target [and isolate] Wen Jiabao. Because recently one deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department dared say that Wen Jiabao was “a troublemaker” (麻烦制造者), which signaled a shake up. After I read this passage from Xin’s speech, I came away with the feeling that Xin’s motivation was the good of the Party. I didn’t have the merest sense that Xin was attempting to set leaders at odds by making this suggestion. This is because Xin is making this suggestion, first of all, on the basis of the lessons of history, and the way in his later years Mao Zedong targeted Zhou Enlai (了周恩来). And secondly, there are signs that [Xin Ziling’s remarks about the intention of dealing with/isolating/targeting Wen Jiabao] are factual. Even if the Party leadership has no intention whatsoever to deal with Wen Jiabao, and all of this is Xin’s own guesswork, there’s no need at all to go to war over this, leveling accusations against Xin. He could simply be cautioned to be more mindful in future speeches of the factual grounding [of his remarks] and their possible negative impact.
The third charge alleges that Xin used materials he found on the [overseas Chinese] Epoch Times website, criticizing Zeng Wei (曾伟), the son of the former vice-premier Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红), of spending a stupendous sum to purchase a home in Australia. First off, Epoch Times Online is a Falun Gong website, and secondly there are two Zeng Wei’s in Australia. How [they asked] do you have the evidence to say that the Zeng Wei who bought this expensive home is the son of Zeng Qinghong? On these two points, there is not a whole lot I can say, because I don’t know whether Xin used material from the Epoch Times, nor do I know which Zeng Wei bought the house in question. But there is one thing I am certain of in looking at the full text of Xin’s speech, and that is that his criticism of Zeng Wei is meant for the betterment of the Party, because as stage of crony capitalism definitely has already emerged in our society, and if it is allowed to proliferate this spells disaster for our country. And so Xin Ziling reminds us in this speech: “If the Chinese Communist Party wishes to maintain its hold on political power and preserve its leadership status . . . [it must] employ peaceful methods of transition to resolve the issue of crony capitalism.”
In summary, I hope the authorities do not make mountains out of molehills and mistake every bush for an enemy. I hope [they] do not take the old path of Mao Zedong, capriciously enforcing a “three bans” policy — limits on speech, writing and action — inside the Party and in larger society by means of organizations or public security means. For the Party to achieve modernization in leading the nation, the Party must first steadily modernize itself, gradually transforming itself from a violent Party of revolution, a Party not allowing different voices and different opinions, to a ruling party suiting the standards of modern society. From leading ideologies to organization structure, to various policies and measures, the ideas and conduct of our leaders must first accord with the demands of modernization. If this is done, our nation with prosper! The people will prosper!
Ai Feng (艾 风)
May 7, 2011

[Frontpage photo from Hong Kong’s Open Magazine.]

On May 5, a post purporting to be the full transcript of an interview by now-detained Chinese artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未) with a so-called “Internet commentator,” or wangluo pinglunyuan (网络评论员), made the rounds on China’s Internet, where it was quickly removed and just as quickly reposted on various blogs and online forums.
Online commentators, known colloquially in China as “50 Centers” or the “50-Cent Party” (五毛党) because they were once rumored to earn 50 Chinese cents for each pro-CCP comment made in online forums or the comment sections of major news stories on Web portals such as QQ.com and Sina.com, are now a generally acknowledged fact in China. But given the secrecy that still surrounds all methods of public opinion control in China, precious little is still known about these hired hands.
For some introductory reading on the topic, please see David Bandurski’s 2008 piece in the Far Eastern Economic Review, which also places the “commentators” in the context of President Hu Jintao’s media policy, which is centered around the relatively new buzzword “public opinion channeling”, or yulun yindao (舆论引导). Another popular term for these “commentators” in recent months has been “public opinion channeler” (舆论引导员), which is used often in this purported Ai Weiwei interview.
[UPDATE: We have confirmed the authenticity of the interview with a volunteer at Ai Weiwei’s studio, who writes: “The source is reliable. We first provided him with an interview outline, with close to one-hundred questions. After he had answered them, Ai Weiwei conducted a telephone interview with him on the basis of the written responses, adding the material from the telephone interview to the written responses.”] While we cannot confirm the authenticity of the interview, said to have taken place on March 22 this year, some have suggested it was compiled and posted by one of Ai Weiwei’s assistants. Posted in full form at the blog of Xin Liyang, among other places, the transcript was also posted at “Ai Ai Weiwei,” a site a site set up in support of the artist.
When and if we have further information on the origin of the posted transcript, we will make note of it here. Until then, we offer a translated portion of the purported Ai Weiwei interview, which offers and interesting glimpse into the world of the “public opinion channeler.”

Interviewee: W, Male, 26 years old. Public opinion channeler.
Interviewer: Ai Weiwei
Date of Interview: March 22, 2011
Method of Interview: E-mail and over the phone [NOTE: The Chinese suggests that perhaps questions were sent to the interviewee by e-e-mail and then a followed up with a phone call.]
Question: Could you tell me your name, your age, what city you’re in. And your Web alias as well (though you could choose to neglect that).
Answer: I definitely can’t make my name known in any form to the outside world. For this interview you can just call me “W.” I’m 26 years old. You can say I’m in Shanghai. As for my Web aliases and such, there are too many. Generally, I register and use new ones all the time. I won’t give examples here.
Question: How about your level of education, and your work experience?
Answer: I graduated from university, in the area of journalism studies. As for my work experience, I previously worked at a television station, then I started working for online media. Basically, I’ve been working all along in the news media industry, for about four to five years now.
Question: So when and under what situation was it that you began conducting channeling of public opinion work?
Answer: It was a little over a year ago, I guess. There wasn’t any special circumstances to speak of. I had a friend who said he was doing this, and I was online a lot every day, so he asked me whether I would be interested in doing it. I needed a bit of extra income at the time, so I said I’d give it a try. Once I started doing it, I realized just how easy it is, and it all started from there.
Question: How do you describe yourself the work you’re now doing?
Answer: My basic job is working for Internet media, but I don’t do journalism per se. Mostly I handle entertainment events, and from time to time I’ll go out and conduct interviews and things like that. Because I spend a lot of time on the Internet, I can do this online commentary work (网评的工作) as a part-time gig. Whatever you want to call it is fine — Internet commentator (网络评论员), public opinion channeler (舆论导向员), or even the “50-cent Party” (五毛党) everyone is so familiar with.
Question: What sort of conditions and qualifications are required of public opinion channelers?
Answer: I’m not sure what qualifications and such are required for other Internet commentators. When I started doing this, it was all just through the help and connections of this friend. All I did was provide proof of identity, and there weren’t any special or rigorous qualifications or conditions. Personally, I think to do this you need a definite degree of competency with language, because you have to write constantly.
Question: Did you go through any special work training? And if so, what specifically did it involve?
Answer: No, my friend just introduced the basics of the work process.
Question: What are the standards or criteria that govern the work?
Answer: I’m not sure how to answer that. Actually, there are no standards. If there are, I would have to say it’s understanding clearly what the guiding ideology of your superiors is (上级的指导思想). You first get a clear sense of what the public opinion orientation is up top, then you start your own work.
Question: Could you introduce the work process?
Answer: This question is pretty hard to answer. Actually, the work process is really simple [on the surface], but in terms of concrete practice it’s a lot of trouble, or it might vary according to certain incidents, particularly various sudden-breaking incidents. I’ll just give a general outline first, and the rest I can talk about through specific examples, and that should make it clear to you.
Generally, it works with one of us, or a small group of us, being responsible for certain major websites. I principally deal with a number of our BBS (bulletin-board) sites and major news portals, and I’ll often spend time in the news section at QQ.com. The work flow is generally in three major steps like this — receive a task, then begin searching for topics, and after that begin making posts to channel public opinion (引导舆论). So next I’ll get in to the specifics of what each step entails.
So receiving a task basically means making sure you check your e-mail every day, often checking your messages, or we set up a QQ Group. But generally we don’t talk about this content in the Group. We generally just say there’s work to be done, and remind everyone to check their e-mails. Generally, after something happens, and sometimes before new stories even break, we’ll receive an e-mail. It will tell you first about the incident, about the news, and then tell you what orientation to take (什么方向). So it tells you a general ideological orientation, and you go and channel the ideas of web users toward that orientation, or you go and blur the focus of web users, or you might go and stir the emotions of web users [over some issue] . . . Once you understand these instructions, you begin to select your subjects [or objectives], finding relevant news or articles on websites and then writing one’s own articles, making posts [in the response section, and responding to other responses, all along the lines of the general orientation given above. This requires a lot of skill. You must hide your own identity. And you can’t write in too official a way. You have to write articles of many different styles. Sometimes this means talking, fighting and disputing with yourself. Essentially, it’s about creating a facade and then channeling web users over to you. The art of doing this is actually quite profound.
In fact, in a single forum you have to play three different roles. One is the leader. Another is the follower. The third is the observer, which is to say the masses ignorant of the facts (不明真相的群众). So first off is the leader. This is a speaker with relative authority. The leader generally steps into the debate later on, drawing out strong evidence with which to speak. The language from this character is relatively authoritative. Generally, the public will view this sort of person as credible. As to the second, the follower, there are basically two types, two types in opposition. These two characters are constantly debating and arguing, and even name calling, in opposition in the forum. This serves to draw the attention of observers. Then, in the end, the leader steps out, drawing on strong evidence. And ultimately, public opinion is drawn over to this third side [of the leader]. You could say we are like directors, and we write, direct and act all on our own, and in this way influence our audience. So there are times when I feel my personality is quite split.
Question: When do you receive your instructions or requirements from whomever?
Answer: Basically, around 9am every day you receive an e-mail, which basically tells you the principle news stories you’ll be commenting on for that day. Sometimes it will also tell you which principally which website to comment on. But in most cases the websites aren’t specified, and you go yourself and find relevant news. And then start commenting.
Question: In carrying out this specific work, are you able to see related [government] documents? Or is it just e-mails?
Answer: There aren’t any documents at all. It’s just an e-mail sent over, a command and their general intentions. For example, these past couple of days oil prices have been set to go up, or there might be a certain news story, and certain hearsay circulates. Before any clear news comes out, [we] need to do our best to channel this information elsewhere, doing our utmost to push it down. That’s basically it.
Question: Could you list out the content of some of the e-mail “tasks” you’ve received?
Answer: I’ve thought over and over this point, and think it’s best for me not to get into these e-mails, the links on which I’ve commented or the content, these aspects. If I do that, it would be very easy for them to search out who I am, for them to know who it was that opened their mouth up about these things. I can only offer a few cases. For example, the recent panic buying of salt [after the Japanese earthquake and nuclear crisis]. The content of the e-mails I received was basically telling everyone: don’t spread rumors, don’t believe rumors. Or, “Influence the public’s understanding of XXXX incident, promote the correct guidance of public opinion of XXXX.” As for thwarting rumors, they said: “Strengthen explanation and clarification of the XXXX incident, avoiding the emergence of inaccurate or illegal speech.” Then some were relatively directed, like: “Directed at the unfavorable social impact of the recent XXXX incident, the stress must be on channeling the thoughts of web users toward XXXX correct orientation.”
Question: In the midst of your “guidance of public opinion” work, how much do you think is directed from above, and how much is based on your own understanding [of what’s expected]?
Answer: In all of it I listen to the instructions from above, but your superiors don’t indicate how you should do it. Your superiors will only tell you the overall orientation of your public opinion channeling. They’ll tell you that this incident requires channeling the people toward this or that orientation, that the public can’t be allowed to think this or that, or that we can’t tolerate this or that kind of speech. But [in this work] you basically have to understand the meaning and intention of your superiors. You can’t add on your own subjective ideas.

In China today, the [political] divisions between right and left are severe. But if we can say at all that there is some point on which there is consensus on both sides, this would have to be that both sides believe our universities are in trouble. The doubts raised by [CCP elder] Qian Xuesen (钱学森) — [who asked rhetorically some years before he passed away in 2009, “Why can’t our schools produce outstanding talent?” — are in fact the same doubts that many people have about education in our country. And yet, as questions and doubts pile up, our universities have continued to degenerate, and the downward slide is rapid indeed.
If I’ve said in the past that our universities are like the old imperial institution of the yamen, [in which serving bureaucrats were primarily concerned with enriching themselves], our universities today are more yamen than yamens ever were. Time and again, journalists have asked me which I am more hopeful about, Chinese football [notorious for its weakness and corruption] or Chinese universities? I always say Chinese soccer.
Of course, there’s an element of resentment to this response. China’s universities, having come to their present-day plight, are actually quite similar to Chinese football, for the reason that they are both bureaucratic bodies that have trended toward commercialization [or industrialization]. The result has been the formation of massive interest groups. Our universities have in fact become shrines at which various education-related interest groups can personally profit. Only by perpetuating bureaucracy can they ensure that their own interest groups profit as handsomely as possible. And only with their continued monopolization of the education sector can they ensure that their highly bureaucratic institutions survive. So regardless of what the rest of us have to say about it, laughing and scorning, they remain impervious, determined to guard their own turf.
The only possible road out for China’s universities is reform. The most critical reason universities in the Republican Era were run so well by comparison was that there was a three-tiered system in place. National, private and church-run universities coexisted. The national Peking University and Tsinghua University were both pretty strong. The privately-run Nankai University and Xiamen University were also strong. As for the church-run schools, while their names may not now come readily to us, they were perhaps all decent schools. Names like Yenching University in north China, Fu Jen Catholic University, Peking Union Medical College, Ginling College, Saint John’s University, Hangchow Christian University, Central China University, and Canton Christian College (later Lingnan University). In the history of higher education in China, which of these are not distinguished? And while the church-run universities had strong religious overtones to start with, this was substantially toned down after the May Fourth Movement, and they were later largely secularized, indistinguishable from national and private universities.
Everyone knows that our universities are not some quintessence of Chinese culture, but rather are imported products. Even if the Imperial Capital University, founded in 1898 to later become Peking University, was the earliest to be founded, the first people to advance higher education curricula in China were foreigners. For Chinese, the founding of universities was a learning process, involving study outside China as well as study on our own doorstep.
The competition afforded by church-run schools was critical. The principles of university autonomy, academic freedom and faculty governance of universities are the result of accumulated experiences of the academic world outside China, and they are established practices that must be followed by any university that wants to excel. In the Republican Era there were also government authorities that sought to meddle with the universities, and there were privately-run universities driven by greed. But in a dominating atmosphere of competition, these instances did not infect the overarching climate of higher education.
In the Republican Era, China also had many so-called “wild chicken universities” (野鸡大学), fake universities or diploma mills that catered especially to those who required instant diplomas. But these universities were largely ignored, as though they didn’t even exist. Those who founded universities, regardless of who they were, had to follow established practices if they were serious about creating competitive institutions. In those days, universities founded by warlords, such as Zhang Xueliang’s (张学良) Northeastern University, Tang Jiyao’s (唐继尧) Dong Lu University (which later become Yunnan University) and Cao Kun’s Hebei University managed to barely make par because they generally kept to established practices, and the wills of these men were never uniformly imposed.
While the Republican tradition of higher education no longer exists, universities in China today must on a most basic level follow the principles of other advanced countries. If we insist against this trend, and harp on about our unique characteristics, we would be better off just establishing old-style imperial academies and forgetting about universities altogether. All of our disciplines can just follow along ancient lines — Confucian classics, history, philosophy and literature. We have no need then for such things as natural science, engineering and law. Our college students can avoid studying foreign languages. And of course there’s no need to fuss about the Science Citation Index (SCI).
The situation we now have, where we’ve only halfway accommodated established international practices, which can be violated left and right, is actually even more frightening. We talk about scholarship, but belittle academic freedoms. We pursue the Science Citation Index [as a measure of the influence of academic research] but we don’t put any stress on where influence is rooted. We found universities, and our universities look exactly like government agencies. With universities like this it makes no difference how many we build, or how much equipment we stuff into them, they will ultimately avail us little. Our so-called vocational universities can’t even provide us with the kind of talent we need to carry out basic industrial upgrades and raise efficiency.
And so, if we hope to have universities with an impact, our only option is to join up with established [international] practices — like [the newly formed and not yet approved] Nanfang University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen, which is taking its cues from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
Right now, however, encouraging universities to do as Nanfang University of Science and Technology has done is unrealistic. Owing to monopolistic control of the education sector, no matter how big a mess any given university [which manages to get licensed from the Ministry of Education] is, so long as there are Chinese capable of sending their children, the market will be there. So long as they can preserve the honeypot their monopoly affords, universities will have no impetus to reform themselves.
The only way out of this morass is opening up. We need more than just a few more anomalies like Nanfang University of Science and Technology. What we need is a government green light for private capital to establish universities, not just the small-scale, low-level academies now permitted to private capital. A much bigger door needs to be opened, allowing foreign investment in universities as well as church-run universities. The religious-affiliated universities we once had in China should return. If the concern on this count is loss of political control, this matter is easily solved with policies and regulations to govern such institutions.
As everyone knows, China has made major accomplishments on the economic front in recent years, and this owes to the Open Door Policy. But in fact, it is opening that creates the conditions for reform to happen. If no opening comes, there can be no reform. If we do not step out, if we do not adopt [outside practices and knowledge], there will be no market reforms in China to speak of, nor will there be any basis to talk about the building of a modern enterprise system.
Marketization and industrialization hold nothing to fear. What we must fear is marketization and industrialization utterly devoid of rules. The present problems in China’s economy result from monopoly control of a whole range of sectors, and from the actions of the visible hand of the state throughout the market. Getting a handle on state power is the primary goal of the next stage of reforms. For our universities, the most serious problem is bureaucratism and monopoly control, and this kind of industrialization is the true arch-criminal we face. This is also why many people feel that our universities today are not as good as they were in the era of the planned economy.
Relative to average incomes in our country, university tuition is already incredibly high. This means that whether or not education authorities are willing to admit it, the degree of industrialization in higher education is already quite high. The reason the education services provided to consumers are so poor is that they are forced to be compatible with a stepped monopoly system based on imperial-style government-run national examinations. There is just one store, with no branches. People have no choice but to compare bad apples, choosing from the substandard barrel those that are least rotten.
There is nothing to fear about industrialization [of education services]. What is frightening is being unable to get the service you deserve even after you’ve paid for it. In terms of education, this means students fail to gain the knowledge, training and abilities that prepare them for the job market.
If, as some have suggested, our universities were still fortresses of the planned economy, then reform would be a simple matter. Administrative leverage alone might prize the sector open. But our universities today have already been transformed into a vast monopoly enterprise fortified by official power. There is no other way except to encourage opening up, drawing on external factors.
While the stench of death is thick on the surface of our education sector, we should recognize that it has like other sectors experienced a great deal of change over the past 30 years of reform. Further reform means dealing with a massive wall of vested interests. The only force that can bring down that wall is opening up.
This editorial originally appeared in Chinese at Southern Metropolis Daily.

Every night from seven o’clock to seven-thirty I have to watch China Central Television, just to see what kind of nonsense it’s saying.

In a fresh reminder that one can always expect the unexpected from China’s media, the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily ran an editorial yesterday calling on a tolerant attitude toward new and different ideas. In apparent reference to the recent suppression of dissident voices, such as that of Ai Weiwei (though the circumstances of the editorial are at this point speculative), the editorial called intolerance “a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness” and said “diversity is the secret to prosperity.”
The full Chinese text of the editorial can be found at QQ.com here, at China Elections and Governance here and in traditional characters at Sina.com HK here.
Our nearly full translation of the editorial follows:

Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.
. . . China’s society today stands in an age in which ideas and culture are pluralistic, diversified and always changing. As we move into the deep zone and a crucial stage of reforms, the modulations and game playing of different interests will naturally give rise to the expression of different demands. As our opening expands and we move deeper into globalization, it is inevitable that various values and ideas, traditional and modern, foreign and homegrown, will collide and clash.
Without a doubt, this is a historic change. From one voice to a hundred flowers in bloom, from a thousand uniform faces to richness and diversity. This expresses a great liberation of ideas, and it shows that China is advancing.
When you have diverse expression, it is difficult to avoid having “contrary ideas,” so that it seems chickens are talking to the ducks [and neither side understands the other]. In this process, we must appreciate calm and rational discussion, being ready to admit our own errors. But it is with some regret that we note that some cannot countenance differing views in discussion, but resort to mutual insult, dragging up old misdeeds, and leaping to slap the other side with ugly labels, so that personal emotion trumps the pursuit of truth. In dealing with criticism and differing opinion, some not only fail to keep an open mind, but even raise charges of “slander” and exercise their power to suppress different voices.
Mr. Lu Xun once said that threats and execrations are a far cry from combat. Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.
In this sense, it is only through having a merciful attitude toward “contrary ideas,” adjusting our opinions through dialogue and dissolving tensions through discussion that we can we reach consensus to the greatest degree possible, promoting the progress of ideas. In dealing with ordinary people, those rulers who hold power especially require this “tolerance.” While the narrow-mindedness of the former might amount to verbal violence, the narrow-mindedness of the latter can lead to real harm, as we saw in the “Pengshui poetry case” (彭水诗案) and the “Lingbao text case” (灵宝帖案). If the tolerance of the former shows strength of character, the tolerance of the latter shows not only a kind of “magnanimity” (雅量), but further meets the needs of rule for the people, and the demands of a society rule by law.
“Because we serve the people, if we have faults, we do not fear the people criticizing them and pointing them out.” Criticism can perhaps be right or wrong, and some may even go to extremes. But so long as they are well-meant, do not violate laws and regulations, and do not harm public order and morals, they should be met with an attitude of tolerance. They cannot be subjectively dismissed as something being “done in opposition.” Quite the contrary, we should recognize that in a diverse society respecting different voices and opinions is a necessary part of respecting citizen’s right to express, and moderating anxieties within society.
. . . Actually, differing voices and even opinions of opposition, are important resources in raising the bar on leadership. So called “not making decisions without hearing different opinions” can only happen if different voices are allowed to exist. This is the only way different situations can be understood, rational assessments be made and accurate decisions rendered. This is why Mao Zedong said that the sky wouldn’t fall if people were allowed to speak. This is why Deng Xiaoping said that “seven mouths and eight tongues are not frightening, but most frightening is when not a crow or sparrow can be heard.” This is why central Party leaders have continuously emphasized that “we must create the conditions for people to criticize and monitor the government.”
Diversity is the secret to prosperity. The further a society develops, the more need it has for the expression of diverse personalities, and the more capacity it needs to draw on different opinions to create unity of will. If we treat different voices with tolerance, seeking “unity” in “diversity”, we will not become like “a sack of potatoes with no continuity,” but we will through the discussion and collision of ideas continue to coalesce and rise.

On April 26, prominent reformist and social critic Mao Yushi (茅于轼) ran a piece on Caixin Online, the website of the media group now run by former Caijing editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立), called “Returning Mao Zedong to Human Form” (把毛泽东还原成人), enumerating the various crimes of the Chinese Communist Party’s revolutionary leader, and noting with criticism that the image of this “backstage orchestrator who wrecked the country and brought ruin to the people” still hangs over the Gate of Heavenly Peace. To call the appearance of such a piece in China’s media highly unorthodox would be a vast understatement. It is probably fair to say that such an essay has never, ever appeared in China’s media.
Of course, the essay disappeared quite quickly. By mid-day yesterday it had been scrubbed clean away from China’s internet.
The appearance of the piece is particularly interesting and significant in light of the recent tightening of pressure on dissident voices in China — such as Ai Weiwei, as well as other artists, activists, journalists, academics and lawyers — and in light of the apparent Maoist resurgence in places like Chongqing and Henan.
We have also seen what seems to be an intensification of intellectual divisions in China along ideological lines — along, that is, what is typically characterized as a fault line between the conservative Maoist “left” and the reformist liberal “right.” While the former emphasizes the glories of Chinese socialism, Maoism and the “China Model,” with a clarion call to maintain “stability” and not rock the boat (remember Hu Jintao’s bu zheteng 不折腾?), the latter emphasizes the importance of “universal values” such as democracy and freedom, and calls for a deepening of political reforms.
Exchanges along this fault line often get nasty. There were two relevant controversies last week. The first was between liberal scholar and CMP fellow Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) and Fan Zemin (樊泽民), deputy director of the university’s Student Affairs Division at the University of International Business and Economics, which we’ve profiled here. The second was between Wang Wen (王文), the head of the editorial desk at the Chinese-language Global Times, a newspaper generally known for its nationalistic bent (and most recently, for its character attacks on Ai Weiwei), and the poet and essayist Ye Fu (野夫). We have a full rundown of that exchange right here.
As Xiong Peiyun mentioned in his “cancelled” lecture at the University of International Business and Economics, both he and Mao Yushi, the author of this Mao Zedong bombshell, have been recently branded “slaves of the West” (西奴) by “angry youth” online, who have called for their hanging.
Without further ado, let’s get right into Mao Yushi’s piece, which is sure to draw blood from the eyes of those “angry youth.” We have translated the beginning of the essay to give readers a flavor. We include the rest in Chinese below.

“Returning Mao Zedong to Human Form”
Caixin Online
By Mao Yushi (茅于轼)
Mao Zedong was once a god. Now, as more and more materials have come to light, we have been able slowly to return him to human form, a person of flesh and blood. But still there are those who who regard him as a god, and who regard any critical remarks against him as a mark of disrespect. If you suggest that he committed errors, well that’s something really not permitted.
In the eyes of these people, Mao Zedong is someone for whom criticism is eternally unexcused, someone who cannot be looked at directly, a spirit that cannot be questioned. They refuse to see how Mao Zedong was unable to control himself and drooled, how he couldn’t even speak clearly, how he couldn’t step inside a car himself but had ask people to lift him up, that he was frequently bedridden, and that his legs were thin and weak. Fortunately, more materials are now available, and we can now view Mao Zedong as an ordinary human being, and form new impressions. There is no doubt about his humanity, and regardless of his great intellect he could not escape being caught up in the patterns that we all come up against. He could not escape these patterns, but in fact was limited by them. He was not a god, and all of the superstitions about him will gradually vanish . . .
One of the major things of his hand was the Cultural Revolution. This was his response to the dread of his responsibility for the three-year famine. More than 30 million Chinese starved, surpassing all estimates of starvation in the entire history of the world outside China, in peace and in war. In such a time of peace, there was no reason to be put forward by which [Mao Zedong] might evade responsibility. Who was responsible? Without a doubt, Mao Zedong was responsible . . .
Utterly without reason, he opposed the criticisms of Peng Dehuai (彭德怀), terrified that Peng Dehuai would seize his power. He ignored the calamities already caused by his left-leaning [policies], and continued his severe deflection to the left, not allowing people to speak the truth, carrying on with the so-called so-called “three red flags” and their complete divorce from reality — the Great Leap Forward, backyard steel production, and the People’s Communes. The result was the Great Starvation. In order to avoid this responsibility, he instigated the Cultural Revolution, hounding Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), who had criticized him for the three year famine [and the Great Leap Forward], to his death. He sought to destroy all of his opponents in the political arena, and he planned as well to hand over his own power after his death to the person he trusted above all others, Jiang Qing (江青). In his eyes, the people were just meat and muscle, tools he could use to shout out “Long live!” His thirst for power dominated his life, and to this end he went entirely mad, paying the ultimate price in his quest for power, even though his power was actually weakened as a result.
His means of seeking power was the class struggle. The original idea of class struggle was to pit the bourgeois classes against the proletariat. But Mao Zedong’s class struggle wasn’t about the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. What he called the bourgeoisie meant those people he did not like, and most of these were true members of the proletariat. Ultimately, he himself was destroyed in this unprincipled class struggle. His obsession with class struggle began in the 1950s. The campaign of criticism against [Shanghai cultural figure] Hu Feng (胡风), the Anti-Rightist Movement, opposing “rightism”, the Four Cleanups Movement, the Cultural Revolution, all were launched around the notion of class struggle.
Based on details that have now been made available, Mao Zedong’s class struggle weakened everyone within the Party, and interpersonal relations became extremely abnormal. Every matter orbited around the question of “power.” National unity, the interests of the people, all were given secondary importance. All the country’s top leaders racked their brains about all day long was who benefitted [politically] from certain matters, and particularly what the [possible impact would be] on Mao Zedong’s power and standing. No one dared give offense to Mao Zedong. All national matters became personal matters of the Mao family. Many circumstances people found impossible to understand at the time have no become clear. How did the red-character posters of Nie Yuanzi (聂元梓) [criticizing what she saw as the control of Peking University by “bourgeois” intellectuals] become the red-character posters of revolution? How were a number of rebel leaders in the universities manipulated? How did the Wuhan Incident involving Wang Li (王力) occur? . . . [Other political mysteries are enumerated here] . . . All of these are things outsiders have been unable to understand. But actually they were all Mao Zedong eliminating his political opponents. He was very clear in his own heart, but could not say it . . .
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把毛泽东还原成人
茅于轼
财新网
毛泽东原来是一座神，现在随着越来越多的资料的揭露，慢慢地还原为一个人，一个有血有肉的人。但是至今仍然有些人把他看成神，对他的任何评论都是大不敬。如果说他也有错误，那是万万不容许的。在这些人看来，毛泽东永远是不容分析，不许正视，不可评论的一尊神。他们永远看不到毛泽东控制不住自己而流口水，连说话都说不清，跨不上汽车而不得不请人把他抬上去，他长期卧床而腿肚子又细又弱。幸亏更多的材料的发表，我们能从一般人的角度来看毛泽东，得到了许多新的印象。他无非是一 个人，虽然他的智力过人，但是免不了陷入每一个人都会碰到的规律。他不能突破规律，而是被普遍的规律所限制。他根本不是神，对他的一切迷信将会逐步消退。
他做的一件大事就是文化大革命。这是他对三年灾荒责任恐惧的反应。中国饿死三千多万人，超过中外历史上和平或战争时期饿死人的最高记录。在和平时期，没有任何别的理由可推脱。这是谁的责任。无疑是毛泽东的责任。他毫无道理地反对彭德怀的批评，生怕彭德怀会夺了他的权，不顾已经暴露的左倾祸害，继续更严厉地往左偏离，不许人说真话，搞完全脱离实际的大跃进，大炼钢铁，人民公社的所谓“三面红旗”。导致大饥荒。为了逃脱这个责任，他发动文化革命，逼死曾经因三年灾荒批评过他的刘少奇。他想消灭一切政治上的对手，无限地扩 大自己的权力，还打算把自己的权力在他死后交班给自己最可靠的人，江青。在他的眼中，人民只不过是一推肉，是叫喊
万岁口号的工具。权力欲望控制住了他的生命，他为此而完全疯狂了，用最大的代价去追求权力，以至于他的权力本身因此而削弱。
他追求权力的方法是阶级斗争。阶级斗争的原意是资产阶级和无产阶级斗。但是毛泽东的阶级斗争和资产或无产根本不相关。他所谓的资产阶级实际上就是他所不喜欢的人，大部分还是真正的无产阶级。这种无原则的斗争最后把他自己也毁了。从五十年代开始他就迷恋于阶级斗争。反胡风，反右派，反右倾，四清，文革，都是围绕着阶级斗争展开的。他清除了彭德怀，贺龙，陈毅，刘伯承，陶铸。又利用林彪斗倒了刘少奇。到后来对林彪也不信任，想搞掉林彪。 最后连周恩来也要反，只剩下孤家寡人和几个亲戚，江青，毛远新，王海荣，和极少数几个家丁，像张玉凤等。如果毛泽东不那么相信阶级斗争，而是以和为贵，搞团结，他死的时候绝不会那么孤独，虽然有三年灾荒的责任，他作为开国元勋，还能受到大多数人的尊敬。可见毛泽东是被自己的阶级斗争毁坏的。林彪出事以后毛泽东多次教训江青要团结，他只看见江青到处斗人如何糟糕，但是江青只不过是他的一条狗，叫她咬谁就咬谁。他自己到最后也没有放弃阶级斗争。
毛泽东搞阶级斗争，死人无数，在所不惜。每次搞运动都有人自杀（他杀就不去说了）。特别是文革自杀的人还不是一般的人，大多数是社会知名人士，对社会做出过巨大贡献的人，有许多还是毛泽东的朋友。这些人自杀毛泽东完全知道，但是他 丝毫没有同情心。三年灾荒饿死三千多万人，大部分是帮助他打江山的贫下中农。但是他一点也没有感到痛心。和他有肌肤之亲的孙维世，上官云珠等人也被逼得自杀。他毫无怜惜之意。现在揭发发现，毛泽东奸污过不计其数的妇女。原来他在神坛上，他的人性的兽欲方面谁也不敢说。他从神坛上走下来之后，这些事一桩桩被暴露。其冷血性无与伦比。其心理的阴暗实在叫人吃惊。大家都说，毛泽东有超高的智慧，没人学得了。但是更没人能学的是他的冷酷无情，没有起码的人性。
从现在揭发出来的细节看，毛泽东搞阶级斗争使得党内人人自危，人际关系极不正常。一切事务都围绕一个“权”字。什么国家的团结，人民的利益，统统都放到脑后。国家的几个领导人成天想的是一件事对谁有利，特别是对毛泽东的 权如何。没有任何人敢于冒犯毛泽东，一个国家的事完全变成了毛家的私事。当时许多人无法理解的种种事态，现在一件件都摆清楚了。聂元梓的大字报怎么变成了革命的大字
报，几个大学的造反小将怎么被呼来喝去被利用的，在武汉王力被打，和以后的天安门保卫中央文革的大会的背景，谁是516分子，为什么要整516，何以要批林批孔批周公，这一切外人根本看不懂的事，
其实就是毛泽东消灭政治对手的策略。他心里很清楚，但又不便说清楚。文革中许多重要的事情请示他，他总是模棱两可，叫别人去猜。
因为他的真正目的是见不得人的，他的心理非常阴暗。一个国家由这样一个权力无边，又有不可告人目的的领导人指挥，一直走到了经济和政治双崩溃的边缘，这是一点也不奇怪的。原来许多人都以为毛 泽东发动文化大革命是为了夺取资产阶级在国家机器中的权力，为无产阶级争利。现在这场骗局被完全戳穿了。
毛泽东的最后几年里，虽然身体完全不行了，但是脑子还很清楚。他知道自己快要死了。国家的领导权交给谁？在他心目中只有江青最可靠。所以决定让江青接班。但是他也明白江青结怨过多，无法获得大多数人的同意，所以让华国锋协助江青。毛泽东一面对华国锋说：你办事，我放心。但是还说：有事找江青商量。毛在他死前一年对他死后的国家领导人的安排是：党主席，江青；总理，华国锋；人大委员长：王洪文或毛远新；军委主席：陈锡联。以后又改为党主席是毛远新。总之没有超出他自己的几个近亲。江青或毛远新何德何能，凭什么能担任国家主席之职？江青在文革中的表现完全是一个泼妇， 丝毫没有远见卓识，自我膨胀，不知天高地厚。粉碎四人帮后对江青的审判把她定为篡党夺权的反革命，判刑死缓，是极其公平的。毛泽东居然想把国家的政权交给一个反革命分子。他脑子里唯一想的就是毛泽东的家天下如何维持。和资产阶级无产阶级毫不相干。
一九七一年林彪出事后全国人民松了一口气，认为林彪为了夺权误导伟大领袖搞文化大革命。现在林彪死了这场毫无道理的文化大革命应该停止了。各处地方都在落实政策，解放原来反林彪和反文革的人。当然，因为反林彪而被处死的人已经不可再生。可是毛泽东因为林彪出事而心情极端压抑，生了一场大病，他的健康再也没有恢复。一国的领袖其心情和百姓的心情极端相反，面对同一件事百姓兴高采烈，、领袖闷闷不乐，真是百姓的极大不幸。在一九 七五年邓小平第二次复出后，首先整顿了梗塞了的全国铁路系统，使其能够正常运作。然后整顿各级政府中的派性，消除互相对立的情绪，并解放了一批被打倒了的干部，抓一部分坏头头，从而使政府工作逐渐走上正轨，生产明显恢复，各项指标转为上升，全国人民感到有了邓小平，形势在好转，破碎的国家有可能恢复正常。可是毛泽东想的和百姓的利益无关，只想着自己的权能不能保住，江青能不能接班。邓小平几次和江青发生正面冲突，毛泽东决定搞掉邓小平。这就是一九七六年毛泽东临死前的批邓运动。邓小平又一次被打倒。毛泽东从一个政治家沦落为处处和人民相对立的人民公敌，就是因为他被权力的迷信所控制，丧失了起码的理性。
权力欲彻底毁掉了毛泽东，使他完全丧失了正常思维，把国家的事看 成了自己一家的事。虽然他知道江青不得人心，说“不出三五年必将腥风血雨”。但是他无法摆脱这个局面。他已经疯狂了，被阶级斗争搞疯狂了。让江青接班是他仅有的最佳选择。他之所以欲置周恩来于死地，就是因为他不相信周会臣服江青。他本来的理想是让周恩来协助江青掌权。但是周恩来无法和江青合作。江青根本不是一个政治家。共产党在建国时期涌现无数英雄人物竟没有一个能够及得上一个泼妇。毛泽东之昏庸和他极高的智力相结合，把中国搞成一个不成为国家的“国家”。在毁坏国家上他的能力发挥到了极致，无人能及得上他的百分之一。
越来越多的资料解密，文革这场闹剧的来龙去脉越看越清楚了。毛泽东是了不起的，能够把这么多的英雄人物一个个斗倒，消灭。毛泽东和斯大林不同。斯大林 的目的就是清除异党，杀人就是目的。而毛泽东的目的不在把人杀掉，而是让他遭受极大的侮辱和痛苦。首先让他被孤立，谁也不敢同情他，把他搞成人民的敌人，继而剥夺他的基本人权，任何一个人都能随意侮辱他，可以随便打他，叫他喝痰盂里的脏水，打伤了不许医院给他治疗。最后让他自己觉得生不如死，自杀算了。而且自杀的时候还要喊“毛主席万岁”如果他胆敢有丝毫对毛泽东的不敬，他死后所有的亲属都会遭遇更悲惨的命运。毛泽东整刘少奇就是一个例子。刘少奇快要死了，毛泽东下令抢救，要等党代会
通过决议，把叛徒特务工贼内奸刘少奇永远开除出党，并选择在他七十岁生日的那天当面宣读给刘少奇听，然后让他慢慢在无助的痛苦中死去。毛整死的高干无一是经过审判（哪怕是走形式）正式处死的，都 是让他们慢慢地在孤立无援的极端隔绝的状态下，受够了一切痛苦再死掉。毛泽东极其痛恨周恩来，因为百姓拥护周远胜于拥护毛。但毛又无法整掉周恩来，因为这个国家内内外外都离不开周恩来。在周活着的最后几天中，病痛极度地折磨着他。毛泽东乘这个机会翻出了几十年前写的批评周恩来的文章，用尽挖苦，讽刺，刻薄的语言，叫人当面念给周恩来听，以增加周的痛苦。这一过程是需要精心设计的，是耗费精力的。毛的精力大部分都用在了这方面。
拿斯大林和毛泽东比，斯大林杀的人比毛泽东杀的多。解放前井冈山肃反杀了十几万人，这笔账该算在谁的头上，我说不清。解放后镇压反革命杀了七十万人。这主要是毛泽东的主意。以后在文革时搞清理阶级队伍，三反五反，杀过一大批。具体数目从来没有公 布，估计不超过二百万人。除此以外没有大规模枪毙人。饿死的三千多万不是直接杀害的；整死的，自杀死的，武斗死的都不是毛泽东直接杀的。而斯大林实实在在处死了几百万人。但是斯大林领导卫国战争，抵抗希特勒的军队并取得胜利，这是谁也不能否认的。反观毛泽东，除了抗战头两年共产党的军队打过几次抵抗日本军队的仗，从一九三九年以后就没有打过一场稍微大一点的仗。共产党的主要精力放在扩大解放
区，培养自己的武装力量。这时候是中华民族生死存亡的关键时刻，毛泽东放着日本人不打，打自己的小算盘，准备胜利后摘果子。他确实做到了。可是解放并没有给中国人带来幸福，相反，带来的是生灵涂炭的三十年。因政治原因死亡达五千万之众。超过第二次世界大战死亡总数。二战结束给世界带来和平 。战败国德国，日本，都变成了民主文明，繁荣幸福的国家。唯独中国这个战胜国却陷入内部无穷无尽的阶级斗争，造成人类史无前例的生命损失。
毛给中国带来的是使人痛苦，然后死去。不但自己用尽办法叫人痛苦，而且动员全国人民互相斗，互相制造痛苦。对一般的小人物，也不是简单地处死，而同样叫他们经受极大的痛苦才杀掉，像张志新，遇罗克，林昭，王佩英，无一不是在就义前叫他们受尽了罪才把他们杀掉。毛泽东还把人间一切美好的东西加以破坏。中国几千年积累的文化，理想，道德，艺术，全部被否定。可移动的古董，绘画，雕刻，统统烧掉砸碎。对不能移动的建筑物则推倒，把美丽的电影明星剃光头，让无知的群众用一切办法侮辱她们。把对社会最有用的知识分 子一个个打倒，甚至逼他们自杀。把宣扬善的宗教领袖关进监狱，甚至干脆杀掉。毛泽东的目的在于全世界都因他而痛苦。如果每个人的痛苦可以相加的话，毛泽东的目的是全社会痛苦的极大化。通过文化大革命他的这个目的确实做到了。痛苦的极大化是文化大革命最本质的东西。这就是“人民的大救星”所给予人民的礼物。
毛泽东不但做到了在国内制造痛苦极大化，而且输出他的理论，让全世界都要残酷斗争。他鼓励在东南亚搞武装革命，制造死亡。在马来西亚，印度，泰国，菲律宾，缅甸，印度尼西亚，尼泊尔，斯里兰卡，都有武装叛乱。他死后三十多年的今天遗留问题还有一大堆。印度的毛派有独立的武装，拥有两亿贫苦群众的拥护，但是三十多年来贫困问题丝毫没有改进。因 武装斗争每年死亡上千人。印度的中央政府拿他们没办法。搞得最惨的是柬埔寨。毛主席的好学生，波尔布特，遵从毛泽东的教导杀人无数，成为全世界近代史中杀人比例最高的人类灭绝案。这就是毛泽东功盖天下的事迹。这一连串事迹也说明一个问题。他的理论非常具有欺骗性，所以会有那么多的人上当受骗。至今还有人高举他的牌子做事。究竟他的理论是对是错？道理很简单，改善人们的生活要靠发展生产，靠人与人斗怎么能变富。所有遵从毛泽东理论的人，也许斗得很开心（被斗的人可倒了霉），但是摆脱不了贫困。无一例外。
但是毛泽东又是幼稚的，他绝没有想到最后自己变成了孤家寡人，没有一个真正志同道合的政治家在身边，剩下一批狐群狗党。最后他信赖的人，只剩 下后来被判刑的四人帮。大家吹嘘毛的高瞻远瞩，其实毛是鼠目寸光。他发动文化革命的时候怎么能想到自己会变成孤家寡人。最初和自己一起奋斗的亲密战友都被整得众叛亲离。毛泽东到死神智都非常清醒，但是是在非常孤独，失望，没有前途，没有同志和朋友的状态下死去的。他绝没有想到自己辉煌的一生竟然是这样一个结局。毛到死也没有丝毫的自责或后悔。毛死后华国锋和叶剑英抓捕了四人帮，最高法院审判了四人帮，把他们判了刑。但是四人帮的头头，这祸国殃民的总后台还在天安门城楼上挂着，在大家每天用的钞票上印着。中国的这幕滑稽剧现在还没有真正谢幕。不过毛泽东是人不是神，他终究要完全走下神台，成为一个普通人，在剥离一切神像外衣的条件下，在消除所有迷信的 条件下接受公正的评判。