Cai Dingjian quote
This has been the honeymoon period of money and power.
This has been the honeymoon period of money and power.
As the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) opened last weekend, Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) urged the need to focus on the “accelerated transformation of [China’s] mode of economic growth . . . [to] ensure and improve the people’s well-being.” But the mechanics of exactly how to “transform” China’s economy involve touchier political reform issues that have pushed into the background at the NPC.
Premier Wen Jiabao’s government work report to the congress mentioned the buzzword “political system reforms,” or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革), just once, and in the context of a grocery list of other vague priorities in the “deepening of reform.”
What exactly is at stake here?
What are the social and economic issues that define this juncture in China’s development? A “crossroads” Wen Jiabao called it last year, when his attempts to bring political reform onto the open agenda met with determined resistance from Party hardliners. Many of these questions, and certainly many of potential answers, are still off limits for China’s mainstream news media. But this doesn’t mean the discussion is not happening at all.
The February 2011 issue of the journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), which is known for its open and sometimes daring discussion of history, politics and current affairs, ran a piece by Cai Dingjian (蔡定剑), a “giant among Chinese legal scholars,” who passed away in November 2010. In the piece, Cai wrote about the factors and policies that have shaped China’s economic development over the past thirty years and more.
Cai argued that the biggest factor driving China’s “economic miracle” since the early 1990s has been “the combination of money and power.” The underlying challenge behind many of the urgent social issues we have been hearing about during the National People’s Congress — housing costs, a widening wealth gap, rampant corruption — is now the de-coupling of money and power. And that, Cai Dingjian’s arguments suggest, simply cannot be done without political reform.
“This has been the honeymoon period of money and power,” Cai wrote. And how, his question unfolds, is China to continue its love affair with economic development?
Selected portions of Cai’s rather weighty piece follow:
After the disintegration of Eastern Europe, many people believed that China must not make an attempt at Western democracy, that it should learn from the lessons of the Soviet disintegration and ensure stability before all else. Without stability [the logic went], we can accomplish nothing. On the economic front we spoke of a few getting rich first. It was a social development policy of efficiency first, with due consideration to equality. We put all of our energies into developing the economy, Internationally, meanwhile, we took a policy of hiding our capacities and biding our time (韬光养晦).
What did the second phase of reform give to China? Economic development and increased wealth in society. During this second phase, every National Party Congress political report has talked also about political reform. But in fact we have seen no institutional arrangements. Our entire society has busied itself with economic development, and wealth has increased as a result. But our value system has essentially collapsed. The sense of credibility among people has utterly disintegrated. We have welcomed investment from the world, and we have produced a generation of nouveau riche. But we have deepened the gap between rich and poor and the generation gap. We have achieved our century-long dream of surpassing strong nations in the West, and the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 gave the Chinese people a sense of backbone. At the same time, we have extremely lofty nationalist sentiments [in our country today], and nationalism is a double-edged sword. It has its good side and its harmful side. To offer one simple example, the Boxer Rebellion in the late Qing Dynasty was like this, taking up the banner of patriotism and killing Westerners on sight without any distinctions whatsoever, and creating trouble for the nation as a result. Nationalism is a double-edged sword. We cannot justify our actions as correct simply because we say we “love our country.”
Reform has brought change to the function of politics, and yet the interests of the government itself have increased. The government itself is a stakeholder, its interests vying with those of society. The government [now] has even greater capacity. On the one hand, we say that market reforms means the role of government has changed, been reduced, and that [we must] limit government power. But owing to changes in our economic capacity and other systems of administration, the government’s capacity has actually been increased. We have created a class of rich, but some in our rich classes now have little need for reform. What direction will political reforms in our country go? I believe that the past reform, the one relying on ideas for support, is already dead, already passed. Our young intellectuals and students of the past felt fervently about reforms, but they had no support in terms of interests — it was a conceptual reform. But I believe a new reform is now in the process of germinating, one that emerges from the soil of the market economy. Political reform that arises from the demands of society is right now germinating.
Summing up this second phase [of reform], after 1989 (under the united force of money and power) economic system reforms surged ahead. Mr. Zhang Wuchang (张五常) has said that China’s economic miracle has been about competition at the county level, and I’ve written to criticize this reading, saying that I believe the biggest thing was the combination of money and power. In pushing economic reforms, local governments relied on various policies and preferential methods to create environments for investment. These environments were not legal environments, and they were not democratic environments. They were forms of resource environments, essentially labor environments with land and natural resources as the underlying cost. This has been the honeymoon period of money and power.
At the same time, political reform has lagged behind, and lost its way. A split has occurred in the alliance between intellectuals and the government. The traditional current of intellectuals in the humanities has been rapidly marginalized, and a portion of economists emphasizing economic efficiency have stepped to center stage. As ideology has faded, the ethical system and beliefs built up in the new China [since 1949] have also faded. As economic reforms have brought results, a portion of political, business and intellectual elites have become increasingly conservative politically. During this period, reforms related to political reform, such as administrative reform and legal reform, have resulted in nothing — for example, grassroots democracy, reform of the organizational structure, civil service system reforms, legal system reforms, reforms on vehicle use [by government officials], anti-corruption, et cetera. Top-down reforms from the government have become weaker and weaker. China’s economic reforms have had success, and not whether or not to carry out political reforms has become a question.
. . .
At the moment resistance to political reform is of two basic aspects: resistance in terms of ideas; resistance from vested interests.
Resistance to the idea of political reform is first of all a question of whether or not we want political reform. When China’s economy has been so successful, is there any need to carry out political reforms? Haven’t our successes demonstrated already the road China should take? Does China’s path of development require democratization or not? Can we build a society that has long-term stability simply by making the economy work? And so, we absolutely must answer this question of whether or not we need political reform.
The fruits of 30 years of opening and reform have for some been used to show that China can do without political reform. I don’t really understand what logic this is that takes our economic development accomplishments as a reason for not having democracy.
It’s true that economic development doesn’t necessarily require democracy. There are many factors that drive economic development. I think Yale University professor Chen Zhiwu’s (陈志武) viewpoint is accurate. He has said that national economic development is driven by four important basic factors. The first is institutional capital, including rule of law, democracy, administration systems and other forms of institutional capital. The second is natural resource capital, for example oil. The third is labor capital. If labor capital is abundant, and is not exhausted, then this can generate value. To a large extent, this is what we have relied upon. The fourth is extensive land. Land is a resource. Australians and Canadians are able [for this reason] to be quite prosperous without being very diligent. If [a nation] is particularly strong on any one of these counts this can generate economic development. Capital elements are something soft, not directly resulting in GDP but able to provide steady support to economic growth. Singapore and Hong Kong, for example, are relatively rich in terms of institutional capital, but have nothing on the other counts, and still they can develop. But no one can top the United States, which possesses all four elements.
What will we rely upon for our development over the next 30 years? How will our economy develop? If we rely on our natural resources, not thinking of costs and gambling on our resources, then our rivers and much of our land will be polluted. Will we rely on our labor resources to develop, our abundant and inexpensive labor, generating very cheap value, and sending Chinese products all over the world?
Our economy has been successful, but can it be continued? Is it sustainable? We all know that Western countries at one time were all about low-end industries, but have now moved away from this, shifting it to the Asian tigers [of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan]. The Asian tigers developed [on that model] for several decades before this shifted to China. It is inconceivable for China to sustain this sort of production model for another 20-30 years. We must transition our system, and this requires the improvement of our political and legal environments and other soft systems.
Among the four elements [Chen Zhiwu points to] we need first to improve our institutional capital. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore do not have land or natural resources, so what do they rely on to develop? How has their development been sustainable? What Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea rely on are legal institutions. Without these things, can we develop like this for another 20 or 30 years? It think this would be impossible.
Historical experience clearly shows us that flourishing economies are not sustainable without democracy. Major nations without democratic systems cannot possibly become powerful nations. It is entirely possible to generate a strong economy over thirty years, so long as the rulers make a determined effort, avoid war, allow the people to revitalize themselves. Any emperor of old could create a so-called flourishing age during their reign. We have had such an age in our country already in the modern era. After the Second World War, Western countries and the Asian tigers were able to create economies that flourished over a period of around 30 years.
History has given us so many examples of rising great nations with flourishing economies: Spain, Portugal, Holland, Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Japan. Those nations that could not democratize rose and then collapsed. Clearly, only countries that build democratic systems and protect human rights can enjoy sustainable economic strength. . .
. . .
4. New Forces for Political Reform
In this new historical period, where exactly does the impetus for political reform lie?
Our society is still developing. Since 2002 in particular, our society has experienced fundamental change. This change is indicated in the emergence of a civil society. The rights defense actions of citizens at the grassroots are driving political reform. For example, when three doctoral students petitioned the National People’s Congress [for the repeal of China’s law on detention and repatriation of rural migrants] following the Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) case . . . We have had rights defense actions by village committees, over the question of rural land use, over the question of urban demolition and removal. These kinds of things have happened over and over again, and the impetus coming from civil society has become more and more fierce. The people are more prosperous, and they have definite economic status. They have become independent people, people with their own personality and character, people with their own economic interests — and of necessity they want their own guarantees.
FRONTPAGE PHOTO: Cai Dingjian, by Southern Metropolis Daily.
One of the most interesting proposals reportedly made on the floor of China’s National People’s Congress yesterday came from delegate Fang Ming (方明), an anchor at China National Radio, who suggested advertising be prohibited on Channel 1 of China’s state television broadcaster, China Central Television. Fang said television programming was now too dominated by advertising, and he advised that CCTV1 concentrate exclusively on news content.
In the course of his proposal, Fang Ming mentioned recent changes at Chongqing Satellite Television, which he said has “opened a new chapter” in domestic television. So what changes was Fang referring to?
On March 1, Chongqing Satellite TV underwent a complete makeover, and by all official accounts the network’s programming is now richer and more unique. As an article in, well, the city’s official Chongqing Daily, the mouthpiece of its top Party leadership, gushed in a report earlier this month: “The great masses of viewers have clapped their hands in praise, but there are doubts too.”
Doubts you say? But why?
Apparently, the television network has “gone red,” filling its lineup with nostalgic tributes to classic Communist Party culture and at the same time jettisoning much popular entertainment programming as well as advertising. The changes have been reported widely in Chinese media over the past week, but there was a burst of coverage in early January as well, when there were reports that Chongqing was launching a “red channel” and would stop broadcasting television dramas.
Back on January 6, Chinese Twitter user @stang227 wrote: “I just called home to my mom, and she said she was watching television dramas. I asked her if she was watching Chongqing Satellite TV. Mom said: ‘I don’t watch Chongqing Satellite TV. They play those red anthems all day long. It’s insufferable!”
Attempting to address concerns about this Maoist makeover, Chongqing Daily ran an interview with the city’s top propaganda leader, He Shizhong (何事忠), earlier this month.
Reporter: What is the biggest characteristic of this makeover at Chongqing Satellite Television? What will the content be like post-makeover?
He Shizhong: We know only too well that Chongqing Satellite TV is Chongqing’s most important, most convenient and most effective propaganda front . . . The goal of this makeover is . . . to devote ourselves to creating the country’s first public interest television channel, truly making it a mainstream media that broadcasts advanced culture and thoroughly combines “a Chinese manner, a Chongqing style, mass appeal and artistic charm”; that actively promotes and develops red culture (红色文化), mainstream culture, and high culture; that does a better job of advertising Chongqing, leading society, disseminating knowledge, teaching the people and promoting development.
What does all of that mean? Well, He Shizhong sums it up with Chongqing’s new formula: “1 No, 2 Reductions and 3 Additions” (一不二减三增). Basically, this boils down to no commercial advertising, fewer television dramas (and none at prime time), plus fewer programs from other domestic networks. At the same time, Chongqing Satellite TV will increase news programming, add more of their own cultural programming, and increase the frequency of public service announcements.
The purpose, said He, was to provide a public service, and “to offer more spiritual sustenance of a higher quality.”
One example of the network’s new cultural programming is a show called “The Daily Red Anthem Show” (天天红歌会), a 15-minute program in which various performers sing songs from among a list of 100 Communist Party classics pre-approved by Chongqing’s propaganda department, along with some folk songs with local Chongqing flavor.
Over the weekend at the NPC, top Chongqing leader Bo Xilai (薄熙来), whose heavy-handed and creative approach to governing this booming inland municipality has garnered worldwide attention, said that the singing of “red songs” was “actually a kind of reading, a kind of study, a kind of spirit, a kind of culture.” Chongqing, he said, needed more than just the pursuit of wealth and economic prowess — it needed “thought and substance” (思想和内涵).
In his interview with Chongqing Daily — which, let’s remember, it is his job to control — He Shizhong sought to dispel fears that the “red China” theme being unveiled at Chongqing Satellite TV means a celebration of China’s “leftist” past:
What does “China is red” mean? In its makeover, Chongqing Satellite TV upholds the principle of “I love Red China.” When we talk of “red” some people express opposition, saying that we are encouraging “leftist” sympathies, or even taking the old road of the Cultural Revolution. This is entirely wrong. The Chinese people have revered the color red since ancient times . . . The color red represents life, vitality, youth, ardor, brightness, vividness, strength, fullness of life force. In a limited sense, so-called “red culture” (红色文化) points to the way the Chinese Communist Party has, since the last century, led the Chinese masses through an explosive period of revolution and war, how it has built [China up], and about the spirit of the age that has emerged through opening and reform. China under the leadership of the CCP is a “red China.”
In a press conference last week, Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan (黄奇帆), also a delegate to the NPC, said Chongqing Satellite Television stood to lose 300 million yuan in advertising revenues as a result of its “red” makeover. The city will reportedly subsidize its local television channels under Chongqing Satellite TV to the tune of 150 million yuan.
Is China on the verge of unwinding two decades of media commercialization and heading back to a bygone era of state-supported mouthpieces? That’s hardly likely. But these are interesting happenings in Chongqing, and it’s well worth watching how the rest of the country responds.
High property prices have been one of the popular quality of life, or minsheng (民生), issues focused on at this years “two meetings” of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress. In recent months, local governments across China have tried to cool down the property market by introducing property taxes, but the measures have been largely ineffective. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his QQ blog, a hand tries to douse roaring flames labeled “property prices” with a small shaker of water labeled “property taxes.”
As China’s annual “Two Meetings” of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference kicked off in Beijing on Saturday, the focus was on greater social fairness. This was a theme Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) emphasized ahead of the meetings last month when he compared economic development to a cake and said it was important to make sure that cake was divided fairly.
But during the first two days of the “Two Meetings” the theme of fairness resonated through an online story about China’s wealthiest delegate that raised the hackles of many web users — once again underlining the problem of privilege and favoritism.
Chinese microblogs buzzed with allegations over the weekend that Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate and billionaire Liu Yonghao (刘永好), vice chairman of Minsheng Bank and chairman of the New Hope Group, gave red envelopes of cash late last week to news reporters covering the “two meetings.”
According to a report in Yunnan Information Times, red envelopes given to reporters, allegedly by Liu Yonghao, contained amounts of 100-200 yuan. Zhao Jianfei (赵剑飞), a reporter for Hu Shuli’s Caixin Media, said in a microblog post that a fellow reporter took part in the event last week at which envelopes were handed out by organizers.
Representatives from the New Hope Group have responded, say Chinese media, by saying that it reimbursed “transportation fees” (交通费) for reporters attending a press conference a few days ago, but said these were not red envelopes and had nothing to do with the NPC or CPPCC.
A number of Chinese media reports on Sunday said allegations against Liu Yonghao have drawn anger from Chinese Internet users, many suspecting Liu, who was designated by Forbes magazine last year as China’s richest man, of attempting to draw favorable news coverage by handing out cash.
Click HERE for more articles in Chinese.
FRONTPAGE PHOTO: Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, by Buck82 available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
The following hardline editorial ran on the front page of the March 5 edition of Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of the top Beijing CCP leadership. The editorial uses the hardline term “people with ulterior motives” (别有用心的人) to refer to unspecified enemies “inside and outside” China who have sought to sow chaos in the country on the heels of change in the Middle East.
The editorial clearly targets the recent so-called “Jasmine Revolution” calls made online for gatherings of citizens at specified locations in Beijing and other major Chinese cities.
“Conscientiously Preserving Social Harmony and Stability”
Beijing Daily
March 5, 2011
The annual “Two Meetings” have begun, and National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegates have arrived in Beijing from all over the country, their plan to work out the national development strategy for the “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” period. The Beijing capital has become a focus for the whole world.
Recently, our nation’s society and economy have had good development momentum, and the beautiful prospect of the great revitalization of the Chinese people is before us. Through the hard work of the “Eleventh Five-Year Plan” period, our national economy has leapt into second place in the world, and our comprehensive national strength has grown substantially. The people’s lives have seen clear improvement, and our international status and influence have experienced a clear rise.
Like the nation as a whole, our capital’s development has entered a new period in history. The face of our city changes by the day, and the people live and work in peace and contentment. But recently abnormal phenomena have occurred to which we must remain alert.
Since the end of last year, a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa have experience continued tumult, their societies sliding into chaos, the personal safety of their people unassured, their lives facing deep difficulties. These upheavals have already created major disaster for the people of these countries. What we must take note of is that a number of people with ulterior motives (别有用心的人) have attempt to direct this chaos toward China. They have used the Internet to incite illegal assemblies, seeking to create disturbances and whip up “street politics.” The masses are fiercely displeased with this, and the performances of a few can only become a clamorous play put on for themselves. Some foreign media have called it “performance art.” These few who mistakenly believe that they can manufacture Middle Eastern style stories in China can only ultimately fail.
Through more than 30 years of reform, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and the efforts and striving of all of our ethnic peoples, our country’s politics have been stable, our economy has developed, the Party’s beneficial policies toward the people have lodged in their hearts, we have had unity, and all of these receive the wholehearted support of the masses . . .
This has so far been a star-studded century for social media on the field of international politics. We watched a “Twitter revolution” take hold in Moldova in 2009, and “Facebook politics” unfold in Iran and elsewhere. These cyber-fueled convulsions have seemed to culminate this year with a “Facebook revolution” in Tunisia and social media influenced revolutions in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.
For many observers, revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are already archetypes pointing to the political magic that happens when people are networked and empowered by information technology. But for many Party hardliners in China, these convulsions tell a different story. That story is less about the “political power of social media” than about the national interests that power serves — those of the United States, of course.
And the story is also hackle-raisingly familiar, opening up a wellspring of galvanizing national shame. Western powers are once again seeking world domination through unrestricted monopoly trade in dangerous products. But this time it isn’t opium — it’s information.
As “web user” Zheng Yan (郑岩) wrote in an article posted Friday on People’s Daily Online, a website operated by the CCP’s official People’s Daily, “[Google] is not just a search engine tool — it is a tool to extend American hegemony.” The Mountain View, CA, based company is, says Zheng, “America’s British East India Company.”
The article was cross-posted on more than 300 websites in China, including Xinhua Online, QQ.com, China Youth Daily Online and Sina.com.
And since this is a story about good guys and bad guys, you should know that Chinese search engine provider Baidu is a national hero that “strongly blocked” Google in China.
Read on with joy.
“From the East India Company to Google”
People’s Daily
March 4, 2011
By Zheng Yan (郑岩)
As an American company, Google’s enthusiasm for the politics of other nations goes beyond what is right.
Recently, Google, Facebook, Twitter and other American Internet giants have participated directly in the social storm that has engulfed the Middle East. They have played a key role in manufacturing social disorder, serving a role entirely inappropriate to their status. Wael Ghonim, Google’s chief representative in the Middle Eastern and North African markets even rendered assistance to Mohamed ElBaradei in driving forward the anti-government movement [in Egypt], becoming the chief agent behind Egyptian demonstrations. The facts have shown that Google is not purely a company, that it seeks not only to make the money of other nations, but also meddles in the political affairs of other countries. It is not just a search engine tool — it is a tool to extend American hegemony.
In the Internet age, whoever dominates the Internet dominates the world. As the world’s leading hegemonic power, America has always prioritized the Internet and sought to use the Internet as a means of promoting America’s national interests around the world. Google has been very cooperative with this strategic motive of the United States government, and [its cooperation] has been active.
The enterprise with the world’s highest online traffic, Google monopolizes the online search engine markets for the vast majority of nations and regions in the world, and it has the capacity to dominate online information, widely propagate lies and influence [the information] climate. When a number of countries in the Middle East experienced signs of instability due to inflation and other problems, Google immediately went on the offensive, even allowing a senior company manager to directly establish the online general headquarters of the anti-government movement, fostering successive protest movements and nakedly interfering with the internal politics of other nations. These actions of Google’s are astonishing, and they lead people naturally to recall the British East India Company.
In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the British East India Company, through the monopolization of trade, the sale of opium and open plunder, accomplished great works for England in its development of an “empire on which the sun never sets.” Marx once said concerning the British East India Company that there was a 200-year history of the British government carrying out wars in the name of this company, until this reached the natural boundaries of India.
In the colonial era, the British East India Company used the monopolization of trade in the colonies to traffic opium and assist Britain in building its hegemony. In the Internet era, Google uses its monopoly of Internet information search to traffic American values and assist American in building its hegemony.
While there are differences in the ways the two [companies] served hegemony, they are uncannily alike in the way they rely upon hegemonic governments to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations and attain monopoly positions globally. It can be said that today’s Google is America’s British East India Company.
At its heart, Google is quite similar to the British East India Company. But in managing its outward appearance it is far more skillful than the British East India Company ever was. Google does not burn, kill and pillage, but rather is a master of disguises. Against the modus operandi of the British East India Company, which was to “carry out trade when necessary and plunder when possible,” Google’s slogan is far more bewitching: “Do no evil.” The problem is that no company on earth “does evil” as a matter of creed, and it is a bit hypocritical for Google to say it “does no evil.” The facts show that this “Do no evil” is actually an admission of guilt through a protestation of innocence.
This company that claims to “do no evil” has cooperated with America’s National Security Agency to monitor the private information of American citizens. It has been taken to court by publishing companies in France, Germany, Belgium and many countries for violations of copyright. It has been compelled by China and other countries to clean up its act because it disseminates pornographic content. And most recently it has also openly released subversive information, fomenting unrest in other countries. Before the facts, Google’s creed of “Do no evil” is like a joke. Is it any wonder that Apple CEO Steve Jobs once said that Google’s “Do no evil” creed was complete nonsense?
A company that hold a monopoly position in its industry is of course formidable, but Google is not without its enemies under heaven. In China, it was strongly blocked by Baidu. According to statistics from the China Internet Network Information Center, Baidu held 75.5 percent of China’s domestic search engine market in the fourth quarter of 2010, and Google’s share of the market, which had fallen for four consecutive quarters, stood at just 19.6 percent . . . Losing its competitive advantage, this Google which had swept across the entire world market, was furious with shame and started playing the political card.
[This portion includes a summary of Google’s pullout from China, and how China remained determined to “govern the Internet in accordance with the law” despite Google’s arrogant exceptionalism.] But this momentary setback could not deter a company like this from its ways. Seizing on social unrest in the Middle East, it once again raised its ugly head and again it sought to play the political card against China. China has no illusions about such a company. It disregards basic truth and international law to wantonly interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. China has the right to monitor and control it in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations.
During the Opium Wars more than a century ago, the British East India Company forced open the doors of China with its own gunships, sending China into a century of chaos and leaving Chinese with a bitter history of humiliation. Today, China will not stand by and let a new British East India Company repeat the events of history.
FRONTPAGE IMAGE: Statue at Opium War Museum in Humen Dongguan, available from dcmaster at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
In the Internet age, whoever dominates the Internet dominates the world.
Today China’s annual “two meetings” of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) get officially underway in Beijing.
Coverage in China’s media in recent days and weeks indicates that issues relating to the “people’s livelihood,” encompassed by the Chinese word minsheng (民生), will be front and center — issues like inflation, housing costs, access to healthcare and education.
In yesterday’s edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily, however, Wu Jianmin (吴建民), president of China Foreign Affairs University, and a deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC, managed to bundle together the minsheng agenda, foreign relations and changes in the Middle East in a single editorial.
Wu’s piece revisits Deng Xiaoping’s famous phrase, “development is of overriding importance” (发展才是硬道理), and argues that development, and not necessarily democracy, is what the Middle East and the rest of the world really need.
“Wu Jianmin: Changes in the Middle East Affirm that ‘Development is of Overriding Importance’”
March 4, 2011
People’s Daily
At the end of February, I attended an international discussion forum on “America, Emerging Nations and Transnational Threats” in Abu Dhabi. The situation in the Middle East was not on the agenda at the forum, but as the forum was held in the midst of dramatic changes in the Middle East, and was hosted in the Gulf region, much of the discussion during and on the sidelines of the forum centered on the Middle East situation.
A number of American and European delegates attending the forum were of the belief that these changes in the Middle East were sudden. However, when I discussed this with Arabs attending the forum, they expressed the belief that they were not sudden. In May last year, I attended a forum on international issues in Doha, and a well-known entrepreneur from the Middle East gave brief remarks that nonetheless drew the attention of the audience. He said: “The Middle East is resting on a huge ticking time bomb. This is rapid population increase in the Middle East and massive employment pressures. In the next six to seven years, 100 million jobs will need to be created in order to accommodate young people who will be entering the job market. In order to accomplish this, we will have to ensure that economies in the Middle East maintain annual growth rates of eight percent. But growth rates in the Middle East are around four percent, far from satisfying the demands of armies of job seekers.” He closed by saying worriedly: “This ticking time bomb could explode at any time.”
It seems that the dramatic changes in the Middle East were sensed long ago by people in the Middle East.
While I was in Abu Dhabi, I also attended a book launch for former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. He said during the event that masses of unemployed youth had fueled the changes now happening in the Middle East. In Egypt, for example, more than 70 percent of the population are under the age of 30, and the unemployment rate stands at 30 percent. Moreover, 90 percent of those unemployed are young people.
Why has the massive social and economic development we’ve experienced in China not happened in the Middle East? I thought about this for a long time, and I still believe Deng Xiaoping was correct when he said, “Development is the overriding principle.” In the past 30 years, Chinese have wholeheartedly pursued development under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, resulting in earthshaking changes. We can see from the current “Twelfth Five-Year Plan” that not only is our nation continuing to pursue development wholeheartedly, but is paying greater attention to issue of common welfare (民生), ensuring that the fruits of reform and opening are shared by all.
At the forum in Abu Dhabi, a number of Western delegates also expressed the belief that the things happening in the Middle East are the result of a wave of democratization. But many Americans and Europeans also expressed concern at the forum. They said that while democracy is good, this wave of democratization might not result in the kinds of states in the Middle East that the West hoped for. Among populations in the Middle East, anti-American sentiments are strongly-held and widespread. While in Abu Dhabi I visited the Zayed Mosque, one of the world’s three major mosques. The grandeur of its design was breathtaking. I struck up a conversation with one of the mosque’s attendants, and after he learned that I was from China he said: “China is a good place. China has worked with us to develop our economy. America is bad! The Americans made war with Afghanistan, made war with Iraq, and they oppose Pakistan. . . ”
The world hopes that the Middle East maintains peace and stability. Because instability in the Middle East has already resulted in higher oil prices, and higher oil prices bring further inflation of food prices. Over the past year, food prices worldwide have risen between 20 and 30 percent. Further increases would cause many problems and this is not good for global stability.
These massive changes in the Middle East are happening against the background of major changes in the world, and these great changes demonstrate that “development is of overriding importance.” We seek development wholeheartedly, and this is the correct choice. China’s sustained and stable development is a blessing not only for the Chinese people, but it benefits peace and stability throughout the world.
FRONTPAGE PHOTO: Wu Jianmin, by Institute for Education posted to Flickr.com.
The annual session of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) opens with great fanfare in Beijing this week. Today, the country’s major Internet news sites have stacked their main news pages with NPC-related headlines, all in deep red. But as everyone knows, the real decision-making power at the national level in China is vested in the Chinese Communist Party and its elite Central Committee. So the perennial question returns — how relevant is the National People’s Congress?
Happily, we can refer this tough question to one of the CCP’s own leading theoretical lights, Cai Xia (蔡霞), a professor at the CCP’s Central Party School.
[ABOVE: Today’s news page at QQ.com, with NPC-related headlines played up in bold red.]
In an article published in the February edition of Exploration and Free Views (探索与争鸣), a journal launched in 1985 by the Shanghai Social Sciences Association (SSSCI), Professor Cai outlined what she regards at the five major flaws in China’s National People’s Congress system.
Coming from a well-known Party insider like Professor Cai, this explication of the faults and foibles of the National People’s Congress is a rewarding read. For those of you who can’t or won’t bother, here is a brief summation of her five criticisms:
1. The durations of meetings are limited, so that delegates do not have time for
substantive and thorough discussion of issues.
2. Owing to limited knowledge, a portion of the delegates are not competent
enough to decide policy on major national matters.
3. Owing to the part-time, temporary nature of their positions, NPC delegates
find it difficult to actually serve a real representative function.
4. There are too many delegates, weakening the possibility for real decision-making.
5. The structure of the NPC is unreasonable, meaning it cannot play an effective monitoring role [of power generally].
The NPC is now on. Enjoy the show!
And by the way, here’s a great story from Bloomberg about billionaires in the NPC.
OTHER NEWS ABOUT CAI XIA:
“China Sets Up News Spokesman System,” China Daily, July 1, 2010
“Chinese City Extends Direct Elections of CPC Cadres to Villages,” Gov.cn, May 31, 2010
“‘Baptism’ Class for Cadres,” Global Times (English), November 30, 2010
[FRONTPAGE PHOTO: Great Hall of the People, site of the annual NPC (1996). Photo by OZinOH posted to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]