Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

The tragedy of Zhao Wei

While the arguable non-story of China’s “Jasmine protests” enjoys excited and widespread coverage internationally, boiling over into a tug-of-war over the very real harassment of foreign journalists in China, there is one potentially great big story missing from everyone’s agenda — the mysterious death of Chinese college student Zhao Wei (赵伟).
And yet, the chilling story of Zhao Wei, who was very possibly murdered by railway authorities on his way home to Inner Mongolia during the Spring Festival rush more than a month ago, goes to the very heart of the issues and anxieties that are of most immediate relevance to all Chinese, and could contribute to demands for change.
How can the government ensure safety of life and property for ordinary Chinese? How can Chinese find justice in a society where special interests can get away — possibly quite literally in this case — with murder?
Given such immediate concerns about justice and fairness in Chinese society, Zhao Wei’s case has the potential — just the potential, mind you — to become what the Sun Zhigang case was for China’s detention and repatriation system back in 2003.
For those of you fishing around for another news hook, let us remember that China’s powerful Railways Ministry, subject right now to one of the biggest corruption probes in memory, is involved in Zhao’s case too. They are, Xinhua reports, now charged with the official investigation, despite the possibility that their own local authorities in Daqing are culpable.
Got your attention?
Zhao Wei’s story drew a firestorm of interest online earlier this week after a link to an open letter written by his desperate parents emerged through Sina’s microblog, or “weibo,” platform [WARNING: this link includes a photo some may find disturbing].
The essentials of Zhao Wei’s story, which receives basic corroboration by an official Xinhua News Agency release today — we’ll come to that in a moment — runs as follows.

*Zhao, 23, a fourth-year student at Hebei University of Technology, boarded the 1301 train from Tianjin bound for Inner Mongolia on January 22, 2011. He sat in Car 12. A classmate and companion sat in Car 11.
*According to Zhao’s classmate, Zhao was taunted by a train attendant over the issue of a seat change. Zhao complained about this matter to the train conductor. *Later that night, Zhao traded seats with someone in Car 11 so that he could sit next to his classmate. He told the classmate it seemed he had somehow gotten on the train conductor’s bad side.
*At around 3 a.m. the railway police came and led Zhao away from Car 11. Zhao’s parents received a call at around 8 a.m. on the morning of January 23, 2011, saying that Zhao had jumped from a building at the Daqing Railway Station and was being treated. Unable to get clear confirmation of the hospital where their son was being treated, the parents went directly to the Daqing Railway Station, where police told them their son had already died.
*Zhao parents asked to see police photographs from the report on the alleged jump — the police said there were none and the crime scene had not been properly secured. The parents asked to see video surveillance footage — they were told the station was not equipped with video surveillance (which apparently is false).
*When family members were finally allowed to view Zhao Wei’s body, they found wounds that apparently could not be explained by his alleged jump from a building.
*All attempts by the Zhao family to petition various government offices in various jurisdictions for further investigation failed.

Online posts made on March 1 and 2 were accompanied by numerous photographs purported to be of Zhao Wei’s body, documenting various wounds and bruises on his body. The photos were allegedly taken by Zhao’s relatives when they were permitted to view Zhao’s body at the Daqing Mortuary, and found that he had already been dressed in new funeral clothes (which is not general practice).
By mid-morning yesterday, March 2, nearly all references to Zhao’s story had been scrubbed from China’s Internet.
The Sina Microblog post on the case was still available, however, as was the Phoenix Online BBS page it linked to, which included the open letter from Zhao Wei’s parents.
News searches on Baidu revealed that a mainstream newspaper had covered the story yesterday (but perhaps only online), and the report had been available online, attributed to Jinan’s Metro Information Times (城市信报), a commercial spin-off of Shandong province’s official Dazhong Daily.
But the story, still available (as of noon today) via China.com, is attributed there to Xinmin Online, the website of Shanghai’s Xinmin Evening News, a commercial newspaper published by the Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group. The story covers all of the essentials of the Zhao Wei case as known from online materials, and notes that the case has received a great deal of attention from web users “in recent days.”
[UPDATE: China.com story removed on the evening of March 3, sometime before 22:55 HK time. We have an archived version of the story HERE 1 and HERE 2.]


[ABOVE: A Baidu search on March 2 reveals only one news article on the Zhao Wei case, but following the link leads to a “Page Not Found” error.]
Noting yesterday that coverage of the Zhao Wei case was clearly being restricted, CMP set about gathering and translating as many materials as we could. Our number one question yesterday: what will happen tomorrow?
What we find today is an official news release, or tonggao (通稿), on the Zhao Wei case from the official Xinhua News Agency. The release is very brief, and very scant on details. Here it is:

Railway Departments To Investigate Death of Hebei University of Technology Student in Daqing Railway Station
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing
March 3, 2011
Reporters Bao Zhiheng (鲍志恒) and Ge Rongjin (葛熔金)
The reporters learned from railway authorities concerning the death of Hebei University of Technology student Zhao Wei (赵伟) in the Daqing Railway Station, that relevant parties are giving the case high priority. An investigative team has already been sent, and will carry out in-depth investigation to clarify the circumstances [of this case], which will be handled according to the law. The results of the investigation will be released quickly.

The most important detail to note about the Xinhua release itself is that the official investigation into the Zhao Wei case is to be conducted by railway authorities, whose role in Zhao’s tragedy is already suspect.
The Xinhua release appears at a number of online sites today, both state and commercial. Here is the Xinhua release as it appears at People’s Daily Online, a site operated by the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper. And here is the Xinhua release as it appears at QQ.com, one of China’s leading commercial Internet portal sites [and posted at Global Times Online at 14:15 HK time on March 3 archived HERE].
The difference between the two posts lies below the line.
QQ has drawn a line under the Xinhua release and then included much more material — in fact, an entire report about the Zhao Wei case including fresh interviews with various sources. Where does this report come from?
With a bit of sleuthing through the WiseNews database, we found that only one mainstream newspaper report has appeared in the Chinese media on the Zhao Wei case, and this can be found in today’s edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. As it turns out, this is the story that at least two websites, QQ and Sina, have chosen to add to the Xinhua release. [UPDATE 22:45 HK time: QQ has now removed the Oriental Morning Post material, and only the Xinhua release remains. We will provide an archived page of the earlier QQ version tomorrow. Screenshot of current QQ page HERE].
The fact that the Zhao Wei story is still being actively scrubbed from the Internet, combined with the fact that no other mainstream media have touched the story, strongly suggests there has been some sort of directive from press authorities on this story that either defines it as off-limits or sends the signal that coverage is risky. Often such directives will refer media to a Xinhua release like the one above and instruct them to avoid additional coverage.
It is also possible, therefore, that the Oriental Morning Post, the same paper that busted the tainted milk scandal wide open in 2008, has shown courage with its story today.


[ABOVE: Today’s Oriental Morning Post, the only newspaper in China to brave coverage of the Zhao Wei story. This coverage appears on its National page.]
Earlier this week we posted about the Zhao Wei case via our CMP Newswire, noting that the original Sina Microblog post (NOTE: the post comes with a photo) was getting a surge of attention. As of today at 10:26 a.m., this Sina Microblog post, originally posted on February 28 at 23:21, had 66,014 re-posts and 13,986 comments.
The post reads as follows:

[Railway murderers, a college student dies an unnatural death riding the 1301 line] The deceased is Zhao Wei, a college student. Due to a problem over the changing of seats, Zhao Wei was mocked by the train attendant, and he reported this problem to the train conductor. At around 3 a.m., railway police took Zhao Wei away. When a classmate on the same train next saw Zhao Wei, his eyes were already black and blue, and he was dead. The aggrevied: Zhao Wei’s father, Zhao Tingfu; Zhao Wei’s mother Tian Jingrong: http://sinaurl.cn/h5MdgT

The “Sinaurl” link at the end of the post goes to a BBS page at Phoenix Online, which contains the full text of the letter written by Zhao Wei’s parents, which given today’s Xinhua News Agency story we can now safely assume to be genuine.
The posting of the letter to the Phoenix Online BBS was made on February 27, 2011, exactly one month after the date on the “signature” of the letter. Readers may note that this letter was translated by the Ministry of Tofu blog on March 1, so we encourage visits to their version. Ours, however, is below.
More photographs and documentation on Zhao Wei’s death can be found on this Health BBS page at Phoenix Online, including a photograph of the autopsy report — but we warn you that many of the images are unsettling. [UPDATE: Both links on Phoenix Online were disabled early afternoon on March 3, 2011, but we have archived the original link from Sina Microblog HERE and the page on the Phoenix Online Health BBS HERE].

Esteemed Leaders and Friends:
We write to you to complain about the incident of the unjust death in the Daqing Train Station in Heilongjiang province of our son Zhao Wei (赵伟), and we plead that you act on our behalf so that this case can be cleared, the criminals brought to justice, and the wrongs against Zhao Wei be redressed.
Zhao Wei was a fourth-year student at Hebei University of Technology. In Tianjin he purchased [a ticket for] seat 045 in Car 12 of the 1301 line from Tianjing to Zalantun [in Inner Mongolia]. One of his classmates was in Car 11.
According to this classmate, after they got on the train, because of some issue about changing seats, Zhao Wei was taunted and ridiculed by a train attendant. Zhao Wei made a complaint to the train conductor about this problem. At around 10 o’clock that night, Zhao Wei came into Car 11 with his luggage and said to this classmate that it seemed he had done something to upset the conductor. He then switched seats with the person sitting next to this classmate. At around 3 o’clock in the morning, the railway police came and asked Zhao Wei to come with them.
When this classmate next saw Zhao Wei, Zhao Wei’s eyes were already black and blue, and his life was gone.
On January 23, 2011, at around 8 o’clock in the morning, we received a telephone call saying that Zhao Wei had jumped out of a window at the Daqing Railway Station and that he was at the hospital being treated. We asked him which hospital? He said the name twice but couldn’t say it clearly. We then hailed a cab and went to the Daqing Railway Station. Police told us that Zhao Wei had jumped from a building and was already dead. (The train arrived on time to Daqing at 6:21am. The coroner determined that [Zhao Wei had] fallen at around 7:20am. Zhao Wei’s train ticket destination was for the city of Zalantun. The time between 3am and 6:21am is lost, and no one knows exactly what happened. Nor does anyone know what happened at the Daqing Railway Station between 6:21am and 7:20am). We asked: How did Zhao Wei get off the train at Daqing? The police said: We don’t know. We asked to see the surveillance camera footage from the train station, but the police told us that the Daqing Railway Station has no surveillance cameras. We then asked to see photographs or video footage from the scene [of Zhao Wei’s death, or alleged jump], but the police said: The scene was not properly secured, and there are no photographs or video. We asked to see Zhao Wei’s body. The police told us now wasn’t the time. At a loss, we waited until the night of the 24th. Some of our relatives came to Daqing. The police drew out and showed us a medical certification from the Oilfields General Hospital [in Daqing], which concluded that Zhao Wei had died as a result of cranial trauma. Only after much back and forth did the police allow us then to go and see Zhao Wei.
Zhao Wei’s body was being kept in the cold storage at Daqing Mortuary. They pulled him out for us to see, and his body was dressed in brand new funeral clothes. There was no sign of the Yishion brand coat and Nike brand pants he had been wearing. (The head of the Daqing Railway Station told us he had paid 2,600 yuan for this set of [funeral] clothing). We saw that Zhao Wei’s right eye was purple, and the cotton in his nostrils was bloody. There were three wounds inside and outside his left ear. There were wounds in two places on his right lower jaw. There was a large purple bruise on his right hip and buttock, and a wound in the middle. There were five wounds on his right groin, and his scrotum had swollen up to the size of a pear. There were many wounds on both hands, and his left wrist bore purplish red marks that suggested he had been handcuffed. Could so many wounds possibly have come from jumping from a building? Moreover, there were streaks of blood on the coat, pants and shoes Zhao Wei left behind. Could these too have come from a jump?
We asked that a medical examiner look into the cause of Zhao Wei’s death. The police said we would have to find a medical examiner ourselves. At a loss, we demanded to file a petition. Only then did the police carry out an autopsy on January 26, and the results left us even more shocked. Aside from Zhao Wei’s external wounds and cranial trauma, there were fatal injuries to Zhao Wei’s internal organs as well. But the autopsy report (刑事技术鉴定书) made no mention of the swelling of Zhao Wei’s scrotum, and we don’t know whether this was an omission or something intentionally left out. There were wounds in so many areas, scars on different parts [of his body], and still this autopsy report determined Zhao Wei died as a result of a fall from a height that resulted in a massive subarachnoid hemorrhage, and a brain hernia that caused massive craniocerebral trauma and death.
We must ask: this nation, a country which [dedicates itself to] creating a harmonious society, and which [pledges itself] to protecting the lives and the property of the masses — how can it not even protect the safety of life and property of an undergraduate student making his way home for the new year? A human being dies without anyone understanding why. And no one cares.
We must also ask: Zhao Wei was an excellent university student, and very intelligent. How was it that he got off the train only halfway through his journey? Why is it that there are surveillance cameras at the Daqing Railway Station, and [the police] say there are not? How is it that the Railway Police claim that they cannot protect the scene of [an alleged] jump from a building within their own jurisdiction? How could photos or video not be taken of the scene of the [alleged] jump from a building? Why were Zhao Wei’s bloody clothes exchanged for new ones before his relatives arrived?
What in heaven’s name are the Daqing Railway Police and the Daqing railway authorities up to? We called the criminal vice squad of the Daqing Police and they said there was nothing they could do. This was the territory of the railway police. The railway authorities in [the city of] Harbin said this would be referred back to [authorities in] Daqing. And for their part, [the authorities] in Daqing have left a hundred questions unanswered.
If we cannot get to the bottom of Zhao Wei’s death, there is the risk that the same kind of thing could happen to a Qian Wei, a Sun Wei or a Li Wei.
We ask that anyone from any corner of our society with a conscience, that they extend a hand. We ask that relevant departments be able to open up an investigation into Zhao Wei’s death, exposing the circumstances of his tragedy before all. Deal with the murderers, return justice to this harmonious society, and hand justice back to this simple peasant couple who raised Zhao Wei all these 23 years. Let Zhao Wei pass in peace.
Signed, The Aggrieved
Zhao Wei’s father, Zhao Tingfu (赵庭富)
Zhao Wei’s mother, Tian Jingrong (田井荣)
January 27, 2011

SUPPORTING MATERIALS:
Two screenshots of the two most popular Sina Microblog posts on the topic, which enjoyed runaway popularity across the Weibosphere. As of March 3 at 15:00, these microblog entries are fully accessible with a Sina Microblog account. At publication of this article, post #6916701255 recorded 66,000 reposts and 14,000 comments over the course of three days. Post #6914233491 had 43,000 reposts and 10,000 comments.
Sina Microblog post #6916701255 (screenshot — graphic contents)
Sina Microblog post #6914233491 (screenshot — graphic contents)
A screenshot of a Baidu News search showing 12 articles from various online sites on March 2, 2011. Click systematically through these and you get various messages such as “page no longer exists.” The snippet of content visible on the search results page reads: “The online post read: ‘Zhao Wei was a fourth-year student at Hebei University of Technology. In Tianjin he purchased [a ticket for] seat 045 in Car 12 of the 1301 line from Tianjing to Zalantun [in Inner Mongolia]. One of his classmates was in Car 11. ‘ That night, ‘because of some issue about changing seats, Zhao Wei was taunted and ridiculed by a train attendant. Zhao Wei made a complaint to the train conductor about this problem.'”


Readers can view the “Page Not Found” warning for the news story at Sina.com by clicking HERE. The page re-directs to Sina’s homepage after five seconds.
Readers can view the “Page Not Found” warning at Netease (163.com) by clicking HERE. The page re-directs after several seconds.
Below is the warning from Xinmin Online for the story: “We’re sorry. We cannot find the page you requested.”

Below is the March 3, 2011, Xinhua News Agency release on the Zhao Wei case published on People’s Daily Online, the website operated by the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper. There is no use of the Oriental Morning Post story.

Below is a Baidu News search conduced on March 2, which reveals only one news story on the Zhao Wei case. Following the link gives a “Page Not Found” message. This story, which is still available at China.com (but apparently nowhere else in China), is attributed to Xinmin Online, the website of Shanghai’s Xinmin Evening News, a commercial newspaper published by the Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group, which also publishes Shanghai’s Wenhui Daily.

China's leaders embrace social media

Watch the story unfolding in the media about change gripping the Middle East and North Africa and you could be forgiven for assuming that Twitter and other social media are progressive new tools that spell doom for authoritarian governments everywhere. Social media may of course be a “critical tool,” but the most critical question of all is about who is using these tools — and how.
The debate over whether the Internet and social media promote change — read “positive and democratic” change — or not is often couched in terms of “cyber-optimism” (or “cyber-utopianism”) versus “cyber-pragmatism” (is there a “cyber-cynicism” too?). Some have written about “networked authoritarianism” and the possibility that new communication technologies might actually help to sustain repressive regimes.
Given its recent efforts to assert control over dissidents and the Internet, China certainly seems on alert for some sort of “contagion” from events happening elsewhere in the world. But it’s worth pointing out as well that China’s leaders — “networked authoritarians”? — are also catching the social media cold, exploring new ways to use these tools to their advantage.
A piece from the CCP’s official People’s Daily today, promoted prominently on many, many websites, including Sina, QQ and Xinhua Online, introduces attempts in Sichuan province to use domestic Twitter-like microblog platforms as a means to push the government’s own agendas.


[ABOVE: Sichuan’s official government microblog on the Sina Microblog platform, which now has close to 255,000 followers].
The People’s Daily article is a sycophantic piece of propaganda, a plug for leaders in Sichuan that includes a priceless paraphrase of web user response to the launch of the provincial government microblog: “Sichuan is so hip!”
But the piece also points to some of the ways governments across China are exploring the use of social media to further their own agendas. Microblog platforms, for example, might be effective ways to release timely information on so-called “sudden-breaking public events,” which are often social flash points leaders work energetically to contain.
Obviously, if official microblogs were just one among many unmediated sources of information, this might be trend to celebrate. But strict control of information about sudden-breaking news events, combined with timely reporting by official media (and restrictions for others, including commercial media), is now policy in China, a strategy President Hu Jintao outlined in June 2008.
Is this openness, or Control 2.0? More responsive leaders, or leaders “grabbing the megaphone“?
The following is a partial translation of the People’s Daily piece.

Official Government Microblogs Become New Platform for Connecting with the People
More and more government departments are opening up official weibo accounts
Reporter Liu Yuguo (刘裕国)
2010 has been dubbed the “Year of the Microblog in China” (中国微博元年). Now more and more government departments are opening up official weibo accounts, and this is become a new platform for connecting with the masses.
At 3:33pm in the afternoon on December 29, 2010, the People’s Government of Sichuan Province officially launched its “Heavenly Province Focus on Sichuan Microblog” (天府微博聚焦四川). As a rare example of a provincial-level microblog platform for information openness, the “Heavenly Province Focus on Sichuan Microblog” had 260 “fans” within the first four hours, meaning one new web user was becoming a “fan” every minute.
By February 25, the Sichuan provincial government already had close to 240,000 “fans.”
The Provincial Party Secretary Sends New Year’s Greetings Via Microblog
After the launch of the “Heavenly Province Focus on Sichuan Microblog,” the very first post came from Li Qibao (刘奇葆) the party secretary of Sichuan and head of the standing committee of the provincial people’s congress: “Sichuan today is a place of history and actuality, with a deep history and culture, its people intelligent and hardworking, its economy open and flourishing, its mountains and rivers vast and beautiful.” Within minutes the post had drawn notice from more than a hundred web users, and more than 10 made comments.
Right at the turn of the new year, at 0:0:2011, Liu Qibao made a weibo post in which, among other things, he “express[ed] heartfelt thanks to all people nationwide and overseas who have supported the rebuilding of my Sichuan after the disaster, and [encouraged] its economic and social development!” Instantly, web users discussed the post passionately: Sichuan is so hip!
Many web users clicked “promote” [the equivalent of a “retweet” on Twitter] for this post. Web user “Blackclothed Mozi” (青衣墨子) wrote: “A provincial party secretary sending a New Year greeting by microblog, now that’s new. I have to promote this.”
At the same time, the story of the “Sichuan Party Secretary Uses Microblog to Wish the People Happy New Year” drew widespread attention in the media. People’s Daily Online, Xinhua Online, China Daily Online and other website placed the story in prominent positions.
[NOTE: This piece was written by Sichuan Daily and posted on Sichuan Online, the province’s official news platform. It was then cross-posted on other websites].
A spokesperson with the press office of the Sichuan government says that: “Sichuan will use the external transmission platform provided by the microblog to propagate various information about Sichuan to the entire province, the nation and the outside world in a timely manner, providing links to news on [government] decisions and policies so that more people take notice of Sichuan’s development and progress. More and more people are now using microblogs to issue information quickly, and the special strength of the microblog as a means of releasing news and information is now patently clear.”
. . . A representative with the external propaganda office of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee said that new media as a broadcast form had already broken through relatively closed geographical boundaries and had enabled quick delivery of information about changes in Sichuan.
Government Microblogs Have Been Born, With Their Own Character
It is said [NOTE: presumably by Sichuan government sources] that 11 local-level governments in Sichuan province have already set up certified official microblogs. Seven government offices in Sichuan have set up microblogs at Sina Microblog, including two government offices at the provincial level — the information office of the provincial government, and the provincial tourism office. Four city-level government microblogs, including the “Chengdu Microblog,” have been set up at QQ Microblog . . .
[The story introduces various Sichuan government microblogs here and their followers and characteristics]
Microblogs Open New Round of Online Politics
Famous [Sichuan-based] microblogger [and Sichuan official at a CPPCC delegate] Fan Jianchuan (樊建川) commented by saying: “We should really research the principles of how transmission via microblogs works, so that [information is] accurate and easy to understand.” To this [Chengdu’s official government Microblog] “Chengdu Release” (成都发布) responded head on that: “Using this modern transmission tool of the microblog to release breaking developments on sudden-breaking public events would certainly for propaganda offices be a new experiment . . . We’re confident that we will become better and better, and more and more professional.”
Xiang Zhuchun (向志纯), director of the Guangyuan City Internet Management Center [NOTE: this is the city-level office from which web controls are implemented in the city of Guangyuan] says that microblogs are are a great through train (直通车) for connecting with online public opinion. Since launching the “Guangyuan Microblog,” information they have received and responses to information they have posted have resulted in a number of messages and requests from the masses.
A spokesperson from the Information Office of the People’s Government of Sichuan Province said that ever since the information office of the government launched its microblog its “fans” have increased, and they plan next to set up microblogs on other major platforms, including QQ, Sohu and Netease, so that they can cover different user bases. In the future, all 21 of the province’s cities and prefectures will release information through this microblog platform for openness of information on government affairs, so that the content on “Heavenly Province Focus on Sichuan Microblog” can be continually diversified and its influence can increase.

FRONTPAGE PHOTO a version based on a photo by LarimdaME available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.

Yu Jianrong to set up nursing institution for children

People’s Daily Online reports that Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar and CMP fellow Yu Jianrong is planning to set up a “nursing institution” in Baoding, Hebei province, to provide shelter and counseling for child beggars.
Yu recently launched an online microblog-based campaign to combat child trafficking and the phenomenon of child begging, calling on web users to take photos whenever they found children begging on the streets, and post these to a designated online group.
The People’s Daily Online piece begins:

The initiator of a campaign to prevent children from begging plans to set up a nursing institution in Baoding city, North China’s Hebei province, in cooperation with the local branch of the Red Cross Society of China (RCSC).
The institution is designed to provide rehabilitative services to child beggars who suffered physical or mental abuse and to offer educational programs to those who are of school age, said Yu Jianrong, who has launched a nationwide micro-blogging campaign aimed at eliminating child begging in China.
Yu also revealed on Monday that he is prepared to build another nursing home in the Honghe Hani and Yi autonomous prefecture in Southwest China’s Yunnan province.

Click HERE for more.

Official Seal for Hire

According to a recent news report by South City News, a commercial spin-off of the official Jiangxi Daily, posted to Xinhua Online, authorities at a residential committee office in Jiangxi’s Wuyuan County (婺源县) have been routinely applying their official government seal to any document so long as residents pay 10 yuan per stamp. In the wake of media reports, authorities in the county said relevant responsible persons have been questioned about the matter. In the following cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, citizens line up before the local residential office and pass 10 yuan bills into a slot while a black figure inside wearing an official cap signifying his government role grins malevolently, bearing the official government seal in his hand. Behind him stand stacks of bills.

People's Daily on social fairness

Chinese President Hu Jintao’s calls on February 19 for regional leaders in China to strengthen social controls, including controls on information, and the government’s aggressive and preemptive actions to suppress dissent in recent days, can be read at once as a show of strength and a sign of creeping weakness. There is no denying that China faces complex and nagging social issues — a yawning gap between rich and poor, rising inflation, poor access of healthcare and education, and highly unpopular land-use actions, to name just a few — and the country’s leaders are clearly alert to the possibility that festering resentment might lead to broader social unrest and demands for political change.
To understand this, we can observe how Chinese leaders are attempting to persuade the population as much as suppress dissenting voices.
Last month, four separate editorials in the CCP’s official People’s Daily addressed deep economic and social problems in China, and attempted to assure an uneasy population that the country’s leaders are mindful of the needs of China’s citizens. The editorials were as follows:
1. “Working Hard to Reverse the Trend of Growing Income Disparity
2. “We Must Squarely Face the Income Gap
3. “A Rational Approach to Prevailing Issues of Social Justice
4. “Industries Are Not Afraid of the Income Gap but of Unfairness
All four of these editorials addressed the question of social fairness and the rising gap between rich and poor in China, issues that are a source of ongoing friction. The tone of the editorials is paternalistic and highly theoretical. “An accurate understanding of social fairness requires that we grasp three aspects: social fairness is historical, relative and concrete,” reads the third editorial, language unlikely to have a palliative effect on farmers who have no legal or other recourse once their farmland is stolen by local officials.
Published on February 16, the third editorial, “A Rational Approach to Prevailing Issues of Social Justice,” prompted a great deal of discussion on China’s domestic microblog platforms, QQ and Sina.
We have translated the official “content summary” of the article and a brief portion below to provide a taste of this series.

CONTENT SUMMARY:

* Social fairness is a value judgement about whether a member of a society is “desirable” to that society. It’s true nature lies in the demand that various rights and interests are reasonably allocated among members of a society, so that everyone can obtain that which they deserve; various responsibilities are taken on by members of society, and everyone must take on that which they should. Social fairness is a term with rich connotations. An accurate understanding of social fairness requires that we grasp three aspects: social fairness is historical, relative and concrete.
* Social fairness is a value judgement made by the “person” as subject concerning the “society” to the object. A rational approach to the question of social fairness in our country requires that we grasp two perspectives, that we grasp the two factors of “society” and the “person,” and that we connect questions of social fairness with our development situation, and with changes in the expectations in people’s hearts.
* Resolving issues of social fairness today requires emphasis on three points: accurate recognition (认识到位), taking social fairness as the basic problem in whether society can or cannot achieve sustainable development; competent measures, achieving scientific development, continually enlarging the cake [of economic development], while working hard to divide the cake; cohesion of forces, with the government taking on the principal role, and society serving a cooperative role (协同作用) and individuals fostering a sense of justice.

Social fairness is an issue that has been around since ancient times. Ever since the dawn of human history, people have thought about how to make society more just. Social fairness is also a routine and perennially fresh issue — along with the development of human society, people will continually raise new demands in terms of social fairness. As an important measure of how civilized and progressive a society is, social fairness goes hand in hand with the development of human society.
Right now, our country’s development stands at a new historical starting point, a time at which strategic opportunities are woven together with [social] tensions. The problems we face are more complex than those in the past, more prominent, and accommodating various interests becomes steadily more difficult. This has meant that issues of social fairness are more plain and noticeable to us. In the online surveys about “what you care about most’ conducted by various websites ahead of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, the issue of social fairness has been among the top concerns. In a number of cases of “flaunting of wealth” (炫富) and “hatred for the rich” (仇富), “flaunting of power” (炫权) and “hatred of government officials” (仇官) that have drawn widespread public attention, the crucial reasons lying behind these cases have to do with social fairness. It can be said that many of the issues in [Chinese] society today that become the focus, that are hotly discussed and sticking points, have on some level to do with social fairness. Dealing appropriately with the issue of social fairness has already become a major question that our country must confront. Dealing appropriately with the issue of social fairness requires first of all a rational view of the problem of social fairness.
Historical, Relative and Concrete: Understanding Social Fairness Requires a Grasp of Three Aspects
What is social fairness? Generally speaking, social fairness is a value judgement about whether members of society are “content” with their society. It involves essentially whether various economic, political and cultural rights and interests are reasonably distributed among members of society, so that all can receive what is due them; and how members of society reasonably take on various duties and responsibilities, with each person taking on their measure of responsibility.

FRONTPAGE IMAGE: A cartoon graph from Guangzhou Daily showing dramatic inflation in China, from rising food prices to rising home prices.

Scared Silly by Chinese Milk

The Beijing Times, a commercial spin-off of China’s official People’s Daily, reported on February 28, 2011, that 70 percent of Chinese they approached in their own survey of shoppers said they avoid domestically-produced milk products out of safety and quality fears. The Beijing Times survey pre-dated fears this month of alleged excessive levels of leather protein in China’s domestic milk supply. In recent months, mainland consumers have thronged to Hong Kong and Macau to purchase milk powder and formula, tightening supplies of products in the two cities. In this cartoon, by artist Kuang Ye (邝野), a terrified mother runs off with her baby in swaddling clothes as a huge can labeled “domestically-produced milk” looms up behind her.

Ran Yunfei: a bookworm blogging for social justice

In the midst of China’s continuing crackdown on activists and dissidents, prominent academic, activist and blogger Ran Yunfei (冉云飞) was detained on February 19 by police in his native Sichuan. Five days later, Ran was formally accused, family members say, of “subverting state power,” a charge that can carry heavy sentences. Earlier reports made through Twitter, but unverified, had said Ran had been accused of the even more serious crime of “inciting subversion of state power.”
A well-known and respected blogger, Ran Yunfei is also a signatory of the Charter 08 manifesto, a 2008 petition calling for democratic reforms in China. Ran is one of a number of important bloggers featured in CMP’s recent book China’s Bold Bloggers (中国猛博), compiled by Chinese investigative reporter Zhai Minglei (翟明磊) and edited by CMP directors Ying Chan (陈婉莹) and Qian Gang (钱钢).


[ABOVE: Ran Yunfei appears at the 2009 China Blogger Conference, photo taken by Rebecca MacKinnon and posted to Flickr.com.]
The following is a translation of a profile of Ran Yunfei published on August 10, 2010, in Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily, an outspoken commercial newspaper that has recently come under a great deal of pressure from authorities in China. The profile was written by reporter Yu Shaolei (余少镭) and intern Wu Baolin (吴宝林).

Ran Yunfei (冉云飞)
An essayist, scholar, writer and Sichuan native. Graduated from the Chinese Studies department at Sichuan University in 1987. His books in Chinese include Intense Autumn: Rainer Maria Rilke (尖锐的秋天:里尔克) and Jorge Luis Borges: The Trapped Pioneer (陷阱里的先锋:博尔赫斯).
“I’m not the one you pine for”
If you go out for a bite to eat with Ran Yunfei, he’s apt to draw out some book or another and suggest you read a few pages to “take the edge off your hunger” while you’re waiting for the dishes to arrive. When he did this, I responded with an intense question posed in a playful tone: “If some day you lose your freedom, and you are told you can only take three books with you, which ones would you choose?” After thinking carefully, he said he would first take a dictionary, and second he would take something he hadn’t read (which of course had to be something hefty). Third, he would take along a classic, something he could pore over again and again, and “that way not feel lonesome.”
This is just the kind of bookworm he is, a self-styled “brigand” who refers to his personal library as a “reactionary abode.” . . .
Who could have guessed that this “reactionary abode” would be tucked away in the dormitory building of the Sichuan Provincial Literary Federation. I climb up to the eight floor, out of breath, and find myself blocked in on all sides by books. For a moment, I forget to breathe. There are so many books. And the space is so narrow. The principal collection of books is kept in two levels in a loft space fashioned next to the rooftop patio . . . and the books practically crash in on one’s head. These are all books he routinely peruses — special collections on religious studies, psychology, journalism and history. A series of bookshelves downstairs that resemble old wardrobes house his collection of classical works. On another side of his patio, he has built an archives room about eight square meters in area. Here are housed his files on popular and folk culture. I ask Ran Yunfei if he has ever attempted to count how many books he has in his collection. There are somewhere between 30 and 40 thousands books, he estimates. Some are stored away due to insufficient space.
[Hanging in the library] is a calligraphic couplet penned by the [nineteenth century painter] Ji Xiaolan (纪晓岚), which reads, “Books like mountains in chaos piled/lamps like red beans lovesick all the while.” Ran Yunfei explains that his wife dedicated this couplet to his “reactionary abode,” saying: “I’m not the one you pine for.”
Certainly, there is nothing on this earth Ran Yunfei “pines for” more than books. When it comes to collecting books, he regards himself as something of an expert. But he has had his moments of regret, or his bitter experiences you might say. It was around 2003 that he came across 20 volumes of The Posthumous Writings of Liu Shenshu (刘申叔先生遗书) in an old bookstore run by a friend, a very rare find, and inexpensive to boot. He decided to buy them, but hadn’t brought any cash along. He forgot to ask his friend to hold them, and by the time he returned they had already been sold to someone else.
Ran Yunfei has spent some twenty-odd years collecting books, ever since his college graduation. He knows every old book market in the country — and of course in Chengdu — like the back of his hand, much better than locals do. And he’ll collect collect any kind of book so long as he finds it worthwhile . . .
Ran Yunfei says he doesn’t collect books for their investment value but only in order to read them. He says his family was quite poor when he was growing up, and having books to read was something really special. For this reason, he says, he doesn’t have an peculiarities of taste, and he doesn’t follow crazes, reading what everyone else is raving about. He keeps on as always, reading and writing.
Each day, if he has no specific writing to do, Ran Yunfei will get up early and write on his blog. Then he’ll switch off his mobile phone and sit at home reading. If he has writing to do in the afternoon, he’ll often write straight through to nighttime. If he has social obligations he’ll go out, but otherwise he’ll stay at home reading, not bothering to go out. When engagements demand more of his time, he is careful to control himself, only going to those that are most necessary.
If there’s anything unusual about the way he reads books, it would have to be the way he enjoys his drink while he reads.
Of course I’m talking about beer. In the summers, when he drinks beer as he reads, he can often go through six or seven bottles at a sitting, perhaps ten bottles in a single day. And if he had to choose between books and beer, I ask? “Books, of course,” he says. “I could survive without beer, but being without books would be the end of me.”
Ran Yunfei’s writings are citizen’s writings. He blogs, commenting on current affairs. For twenty years he has written steadily, stopping for neither wind nor rain. He has never given a moment’s consideration to what can and cannot be written. Being an intellectual, he says, requires an extra measure of social responsibility.
Ran Yunfei’s acclaim and influence have come primarily online. He has been on the Internet since 1998, for 12 years now, and the Internet has changed and influenced him in major ways. He also uses the Internet, of course, as a way of offering his own feedback and changing society. He says: “It’s unacceptable for there to be no one who criticizes this society! If no one criticizes it, then this society will have an even greater deficit of morality and justice.” He confesses that his greatest interest still lies in research, particularly in academic scholarship and in a peaceful life among his books. “But when you sense the collective silence of our intellectuals, you begin to feel just how unacceptable it is . . . ”
His rich collection of books is his “ammunition,” and they also help to ensure that his aim is true.
A phone call came in the midst of our conversation, and while I couldn’t understand the Sichuanese dialect, I could tell that Ran Yunfei was patiently listening to a meticulous story someone was telling on the other end. After about ten minutes he hung up the phone and I made bold to ask who it was. He said it was a farmer from Dujiangyan (都江堰) who had had his rights violated. A friend had referred him to [Ran Yunfei] for help.
“Does that happen a lot?” I asked.
It happened all the time, he said.
“How will you help him?”
“I’ll make an appeal through my weblog, but little can be done,” he said. “This kind of thing happens all the time. All we can do is apply a little bit of pressure.”

More fake remedies for "fake news"

Earlier this year, press authorities in China announced a concerted campaign to deal with the problem of “fake news.” As we mentioned in a recent bit of analysis on “fake news,” this accusation is often used by government officials in China to attack news seen to violate propaganda restrictions — news, in other words, that is too true.
Every time the government launches these seasonal campaigns against “fake news,” the focus is on the need to train journalists more actively in the old fundamentals, control and propaganda. There is renewed official chatter about the importance of adhering to the “Marxist View of Journalism,” whose three tenets are:

1. Media as tools of the CCP
2. Denial of the bourgeois notion of “free speech”
3. The need to uphold “correct guidance of public opinion”

Clearly, while combatting “fake news” is ostensibly a call to greater professionalism, the Party’s uncompromising definition of the role of the press as a mouthpiece of the government goes against the very idea of journalism as a profession.
In a highly commercialized media environment subject to strict propaganda controls, media find it safer and more profitable to avoid real public interest stories in favor of pleasant, harmless and salable falsehoods. Control, therefore, has played a central role in undermining truth and credibility, and is the soil that nurtures “fake news.”
Like past efforts, the current campaign against “fake news” emphasizes the reassertion of control, principally through the General Administration of Press and Publications. But control itself is one of the chief causes of poor professionalism in China’s media.

[ABOVE: In a special page on “fake news” linked prominently on its main news page, Sina.com shows the authorities that the news portal is it dutifully following the government line. Such pages do not feature as prominently at other major news portals.]

The following editorial, printed on February 15 in Press and Publication Report (中国新闻出版报), an official publication of the General Administration of Press and Publications, offers a glimpse yet again of the mislead, paternalistic approach authorities are taking toward professional deficiencies in China’s media.

Eliminating Fake News Reports and Enhancing Social Responsibility
Xinhua News Agency
Published in Press and Publication Report (中国新闻出版报)
February 15, 2011
Journalism is a profession for the young. Young people, who are brimming with enthusiasm and can push on through and get things done, are the fresh blood and vital force of the news profession. But young people are also lacking in worldly experience. They sometimes lack sufficient knowledge, and they can fall prey to simplistic views on certain issues. So they can run into various problems in the reporting process. If subsequent links in the news production chain are weak or do not stay alert, if mechanisms are not carried out with due strength, then fake news reports can easily proliferate.
Therefore, the character of news production teams, and the strength or weakness of their grip [on procedure], directly concerns the development and well-being of media and their degree of social credibility. Raising the intensity of training and education of editorial teams should become the most critical priority as we work to eliminate fake news.
In strengthening training, we must start from the outset, as soon as reporters and editors step over the threshold into the profession. Owing to quick turnovers of news staff, some media overlook the important step of training, which leads to reporters who are unable to face difficult situations and simply record whatever anyone says. They are unable to adjust to new situations, and they can easily be manipulated by others.
In order to deal with these problems, it is crucial that news organizations organize regular sessions during which employees study the Central Committee’s latest directions on news works and relevant laws and regulations. Most urgent and of the moment is education in the area of value systems, leading news personnel to firmly grasp the Marxist View of Journalism, to promote a lofty professional spirit and professional ethics, and create correct value judgements and professional pursuits. Only when these values, this professional spirit and these ethical demands have become internalized can every journalist stand firmly against fake news, conscientiously upholding a favorable image of those in the news profession.
. . . In strengthening training, we must strengthen the training of those in positions of responsibility at media organizations at all levels. We must strengthen our direction of self-study and self-education activities among these leadership groups [at these organizations]. Only be steadily raising the political conduct and professional conduct of those in the lead can we ensure that the [news] teams as a whole do not go off track or derail, that they move forward while keeping to a correction direction.

What changes in Egypt mean for China

It took just 18 days for the people of Egypt to overthrow the Mubarak government, which had ruled the country for 29 years. The pro-democracy movement in North Africa and the Middle East has already spread to 11 countries. In China, these events have been handled very cautiously in the media. Editorials rarely touch on the issue, and even English-language publications like China Daily, which are usually given slightly greater latitude considering their role as publications expressly for foreign consumption, have stuck to the official line as given by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “China hopes Egypt can maintain social stability.”
As Twitter has become the “engine of revolution” elsewhere in the world, similar “microblog,” or weibo, platforms in China have come under greater government pressure. Try plugging terms like “Egypt” or “Mubarak” into searches on these microblog platforms, and the messages come back saying, “Posts related to ‘Egypt’ cannot be found,” or “According to relevant laws and regulations, these search results may not be shown.” While searches may be interrupted, however, Chinese users are still able to make posts containing these terms, and discussion has not slackened.
In the past few weeks, as events have unfolded in Egypt and elsewhere, the usually lively opinion pages in China’s commercial media — which tend to push issues further than their Party media counterparts — have been far more restrained. The most notable exception was a piece published in New Century Weekly, the magazine run by CMP fellow and former Caijing editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立). Called “The Decision Belongs to the People of Egypt,” the piece argued that “dictatorship breeds unrest, and democracy engenders peace.” While it did not mention China specifically, the relevance was clear, and Internet users in China quickly added their own comments, drawing parallels to the Chinese experience.
Few if any other Chinese media have drawn on the events in Egypt to discuss matters at home, but one can easily imagine that those both inside and outside the system are wondering whether the changes that have shaken Egypt will accelerate China’s own moves toward democratization — and whether the web might spark political reform at home. And behind these questions, a more anxious one — will the events on Tiananmen Square that shook the world in June 1989 be replayed?
It goes without saying that the situation in China today is vastly different from that in the 1980s, and very different from the situation in Egypt. Sustained annual GDP growth of above eight percent has catapulted China into position as the world’s second-largest economy. China has made clear strides in alleviating the most basic poverty. China’s international influence and its comprehensive national strength have grown substantially.
Nevertheless, present-day China also has important similarities with Egypt today, and with the China that experienced the “Tiananmen incident” 22 years ago. Market reforms in China in the 1980s deepened the divide between rich and poor, and between the cities and the countryside, and the very reforms that made many people more prosperous excited demands for greater political reform. In much the same way, the gap between rich and poor has grown sharply in present-day China, and high inflation has eroded quality of life.
According to official statistics, inflation stood at 4.9 percent last month, and grain prices were up 15.1 percent. It is also a fact that so-called “mass incidents” — a catch-all term for instances of protest or unrest resulting largely from resentments over basic rights and quality-of-life issues — are on the rise in China, particularly as a result of local government actions such as the demolition of homes to make room for property developments and other signature economic projects.
The yawning divide between rich and poor, endemic government corruption, and rising popular resentment in many areas in China all mean political reform must make it onto the agenda somehow, and soon.
Much as was the case on Tiananmen Square in 1989, two sides have become polarized in the new public space of the Internet. The government remains determined to exercise control with an iron hand, and spurns dialogue with public intellectuals who have become livelier in the online space. Even pro-reform voices within the system have been repressed, as was evident last year when seven important calls for political reform in China by Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) became unmentionables in the country’s domestic media.
As it becomes impossible to have this important conversation at all, mistrust deepens. Many liberal intellectuals harbor doubts about Wen’s intentions, supposing his overtures were little more than a political show.
Despite all attempts by the leadership to stifle the discussion and “guide” public opinion, however, popular voices demanding the truth and pushing for greater openness have only increased. On the virtual public square of the Internet, Chinese explore sensitive issues through the constant invention and re-invention of memes, so that keyword blocking becomes largely irrelevant; they use proxy servers to get around censorship and post what they wish.
The gap between the people and the government is deepening as well, a divide compounding the gaps between rich and poor, and between the city and countryside.
One important difference with the situation in China 22 years ago, in fact, is that democratic demands have progressed. They are no longer limited largely to students as they were before “June Fourth.” In the major social flash points we’ve seen in China in recent years, from poisonous milk powder to the collapse of school buildings in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, forces from all levels of Chinese society have come together.
The mass reach of the Internet means that people from all walks of life can take action and potentially bring about change. The web has already become a powerful force for mobilization, a boundless, all-weather channel for the sharing of information. Differing points of view clash in online forums, everyone benefits from the exchange of ideas, and civil society gradually develops.
The Internet also provides a platform for balanced and moderating ideas. We saw this quite clearly with the recent online campaign against the child abduction and the phenomenon of child begging in China, in which Chinese Academy of Social Sciences professor and CMP fellow Yu Jianrong (于建嵘) called on web users across China to photograph children begging on the streets and post the photos to special microblog accounts set up at Sina.com and QQ.com. The campaign drew broad, grassroots support from Chinese Internet users. But there were dissenting voices as well, from the likes of well-known blogger Hecaitou (和菜头) and columnist and CMP fellow Xiao Shu (笑蜀), who raised doubts about the methods and premise of the campaign.
So, will change come to China? There is great division among international experts on this question. Ever since 1989, the Chinese Communist Party has endured amid a shower of dire predictions of collapse, and it has presided over what many have called an “economic miracle.”
Economic development over the past two decades has allowed a segment of Chinese to prosper, and has engendered a middle class in China that is now a source of social stability. But the difficult question is whether China’s economic development can be sustained. Economists such as Chen Zhiwu (陈志武) have predicted that China’s economy in its present mode of development is sustainable for perhaps another five years.
If much-needed adjustments are not made, China’s population bonus, its environment and its resources will all be exhausted. The bottleneck to sustainable development is not economic, but is all about lagging political reforms.
In this information age the world has changed. One month ago, no one could have imagined such change in Egypt. China’s future too is very difficult to read, but there are two things we can say for sure. First, political change must come. As economic development and the political status quo come more and more into conflict, changes to the system will be a necessity rather than an option. Second, all Chinese, from the grassroots to the government, from intellectuals to ordinary Joes, share the view that upheaval be avoided and that bloodshed be avoided in the process of reform. If China’s leaders can initiate political reforms at the top then there is hope for China to realize its 100-year dream of democracy, which began with the Xinhai Revolution a century ago.
While China’s government may not be able to begin political reforms immediately, it can live up to the promise it has made to the people of China, that it will rule according to law, “allowing the people to live with dignity.” Further, China’s ruling Party must open up real lines of communication with the public, and with public intellectuals. It must not cast moderates as enemies. The CCP has said in the past that it has a need to “build its leadership capacity.” We can only hope this is not about strengthening its dictatorship, but rather about “ruling well” through this difficult period of transition.
Over the weekend, there were vague calls for “jasmine” movements for political reform in several Chinese cities, inspired by recent changes in the Middle East. These became a focus of a lot of activity online, and Chinese authorities moved to prevent any real gatherings. On the surface the calls seemed to fizzle. There were no banners, no shouting of slogans. But there was what some observers characterized as “a very strange atmosphere of anticipation” as activists mixed in with police, pedestrians and casual onlookers.
These scenes themselves were sufficient to illustrate the motivating power of the Internet in this age of information, and just how difficult it is to predict and control. This time, the calls did not materialize into real action, but I’m afraid that unless China’s leaders deal with underlying structure problems, future efforts at forced suppression will prove to be vain attempts.
A version of this editorial appeared in the Tuesday edition of Hong Kong Economic Times.

Pill Popping China

According to a recent news report by the official China News Service, a new online study released this week shows that roughly 70 percent of Chinese households use medications improperly. The online survey found that close to 50 percent of respondents failed to understand “over-the-counter” (OTC) labels, and didn’t realize they should seek medical advice before using such products (which are widely available over the counter in China, regulations notwithstanding). A possible contributing factor not mentioned in the report is the well-documented fact that doctors in China often routinely prescribe medications (and procedures) patients don’t need in order to cash in on unnecessary procedures and arrangements with pharmaceutical companies. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, members of a Chinese nuclear family pour bottles of varicolored pills recklessly into their mouths.