In a speech given to a “seminar” attended by top provincial-level leaders in China over the weekend, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) called on Party officials to strengthen management and control of the Internet. Hu’s speech was initially reported at the top of QQ.com, one of China’s most popular Internet news sites, with the headline, “Hu Jintao in Address to Provincial Leaders: Web Controls Must Be Strengthened.” The headline — presumably a bit too truthful for Web censors — was quickly changed to, “Hu Jintao in Address to Provincial Leaders: Strengthen and Improve Social Management.”
Responding to Hu Jintao’s speech through China’s major Twitter-like microblog services, or “weibo,” some Chinese interpreted his language as a response to recent political unrest in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East.
In the address, Hu Jintao said:

The fundamental goal in strengthening and renewing social controls [or “management”] is the preservation of social order, the promotion of a harmonious society and ensuring people live and work in peace and contentment, creating a favorable social environment for the conduct and development of national undertakings. The basic tasks of social control include coordinating social relationships, regulating social behavior, resolving social issues, dissolving social tensions, promoting social fairness, dealing with social risks and ensuring social stability. Doing an adequate job of social control and promoting social harmony is a basic precondition of the comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society and the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Defining the basics of his social control strategy, Hu Jintao presented his so-called “eight opinions” (８点意见), each dealing with specific aspects of control, such as “increasing the social management capacity of the government” and “improving the social management and service system at the grassroots level.”
Point number seven on Hu’s list dealt specifically with Internet controls. It read: “[We must] further strengthen and improve controls on the information web, raising our level of control over virtual society, and perfecting our mechanisms for the channeling of public opinion online.”

It might have been a badge of honor at one time in China for a young person to rise up as a pillar of society, achieving things well beyond their years. Today such precocity is an invitation to rumor and ridicule, a thing best hidden away from the prying eyes of the public. To understand why we need only look at the online controversy broiling this week, though only very briefly, around the figure of Wang Shengqi (王圣淇), who at the tender young age of 24 is already vice-president of northern China’s Liaoning Shihua University.
Ms. Wang and her improbable achievements slipped quite by accident into the Internet’s field of view this week, and the so-called “human flesh search engine” pounced into action. According to unconfirmed reports, Wang is the daughter of the mayor of a certain city in Liaoning. But no sooner had Wang become a focus of the news than the online speculation started to systematically disappear. The pages where she had been discussed with such keen interest now kicked up warnings that read: “The page you are visiting no longer exists, or has been deleted.”
Even as all discussion was being scrubbed from the web, Liaoning Shihua University responded that Wang Shengqi’s appointment had been made according to rigorous standards. It was the result, the university said, of a policy designed to prepare young cadres for work at the institution. They denied that Wang Shengqi had been appointed because she is the daughter of an influential official.
One might have supposed web users were barking up the wrong tree, and that Wang Shengqi actually was not a so-called “offspring of the powerful,” or guan er’dai (官二代), reaping special privileges on the strength of her parents’ power and connections. But the tide of questioning and speculation was cut short as related posts were scrubbed from the Internet — something not just anyone can do — and that in itself provided some finality: perhaps there really is a skeleton in that closet.
This latest case is just one among many recent sparks over the issue of perks for the sons and daughters of those in positions of power. Over the past few years, Chinese media have continually exposed cases where the kids of sitting officials have been handed perks and privileges, or afforded special protections. These stories have attracted a great deal of public interest.
In many of these cases, local governments respond by saying they have hired or appointed young political elites in “strict accordance with regulations.” Further scrutiny reveals, however, that these local “regulations” themselves were tailored to rationalize the hiring of this or that favored young candidate.
In our everyday lives, we see special treatment for China’s guan er’dai happening as a matter of course. This is something we’ve all just grown accustomed to. In some cases, we have even seen officials pulling strings to ensure they are succeeded in their posts by sons or daughters. Most often, though, these arrangements are a tit-for-tat process of exchange among officials holding positions in different corners of power — so that a police official, for example, arranges for the child of a court official to get a post inside the police department, while the opposite arrangement is made for his own child.
Why are these arrangements permitted at all? When our media do ask this question, the answer that comes back from government personnel departments is that there is a need to “ensure stability in the civil service.”
The real reason is much more basic than that. Given a routine and universal lack of real checks on the exercise of power in China, it’s foolish to imagine officials wouldn’t use the power at their disposal to ensure the path is smoothed for their children. China has a long and deep tradition placing great importance on family relationships. Why would government officials, whom we know to behave recklessly over such trifling matters as food and drink, refrain from doing their utmost for the welfare of their children?
In fact, most all of these guan er’dai issues exposed by web users through the so-called “human flesh search” have to do with the behavior of lower-level officials whose power is insufficient to give them better options. With a greater level of influence and wealth, officials in higher positions will already have settled the affairs of their children, packing them off to world-class foreign universities from which they return gilded and ready to assume cushy jobs. Local officials are simply doing their best to follow this example with the resources they have at hand.
In most cases, it’s the Internet that plays the dominant role in unearthing these hidden abuses. On the heels of the Internet wave, experts step out calling for respect for rules and regulations.
But the deeper and more important question is exactly who establishes these game rules, and how they are established. Supposing the rules are unfair, how can we set things straight? When officials are responsible only to themselves in enforcing their own discipline, it makes sense that they offer one another protection, recognizing that they are all in the same boat.
Resorting to web censorship to keep problems like this under wraps, deleting online posts and the like, is an ill-advised tactic. The only result is to deepen tensions and resentment, and at the same time tarnish with doubt the images of officials who have done no wrong.
Anxiety over endemic unfairness and injustice has already developed to such an extent that it has become a major sticking point in Chinese society. The only way to promote real social fairness is to encourage social change on the basis of new thinking on the importance of citizens’ rights. This issue cannot be dealt with by patching over problems with more government red tape. Only in this way can we have any hope of dispelling the resentment many Chinese feel, offering everyone the opportunity to rise. And only in this way can we make civil service a decent and respectable line of work, so that the children of officials who show real promise can show their faces without fear.
A version of this editorial appeared in Chinese at the Shanghai Morning Post (新闻晨报), a commercial spin-off of Shanghai’s Liberation Daily.

CMP fellow and veteran journalist Cheng Yizhong (程益中), the founder of China’s Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper, addressed a packed audience at the University of Hong Kong on January 20, sharing his experiences in China’s media and urging Chinese journalists to push harder.
Various versions and transcriptions of Cheng’s speech at HKU have appeared online, and Cheng asked that the China Media Project post the original full version of the speech for the record. [A PDF of Cheng’s speech is available here: Cheng Yizhong_HKU Talk and Q&A].
一個報人的反思
(程益中在香港大學新聞及傳媒研究中心的演講)
先講兩個故事。
第一個故事：我週一從廣州出發來香港，途徑我老東家南方報業集團門口，看到有很多人在那裡喊冤請願。這是在南方報業集團門口經常見到的場景。按理說，中國老百姓喊冤應該去法院，請願應該去政府；但是大家都知道，法院沒門，政府沒門，弄得不好還要被抓進去，申不了冤、達不成願事小，失去人身自由、甚至生命不值得。所以他們只好去南方報業集團喊冤請願。但是為什麼是去南方報業集團喊冤，而不是去其它的媒體集團呢？我想這一定是有原因的。後邊我會觸及這個問題。
第二個故事就是樂清錢雲會被車撞致死案。政府下結論說是普通交通事故，但是公眾輿論普遍不認可，鬧得沸沸揚揚。有很多網友也逼我表態，要我斷定這是車禍還是謀殺。我又不是神探，我只是公共知識份子，所以我不輕易斷案。但這不妨礙我發言。我已經超越對真相的追問和探究，看到其中隱含的更嚴重問題。為什麼當局說什麼、怎麼說都沒人信？為什麼強大得不能再強大的國家機器百口莫辯、還沒有我這個被當局打壓的個人講話有分量？為什麼我一個人發言的分量就足以抵得過整個國家機器？道理其實也不複雜，很簡單，無非兩點：淺層原因是當局一貫撒謊成性，長期奉行愚民政策，從不講真話，也不准說真相，毫無誠信可言，道德上完全破產；深層原因是掌權者雖是人民供養但又非人民選出，掌權者的權力來自暗箱操作、暗室私授，既不許言論自由，又不許司法獨立，法理上完全站不住腳。道德上破產，法理上站不住腳，這樣一來，真相產生的前提和條件就不存在，信任產生的前提和條件就不存在，怎麼服眾？怎麼能信？這個事件暴露出我們這個國家社會存在的深刻危機。如何重建信任、重建權威，是一件很迫切的事情。這個故事又跟第一個故事相映成趣，有某種隱秘的關連。
今天我就不講客觀和外部的環境，不批評中國的輿論環境和政治局面，單從我曾經作為中國報業的從作人員，從一個總編輯的角度，來談談我的一點反思。
我講九個問題：
第一個問題：我們在中國大陸可以言說到什麼程度？
中國大陸媒體從業人員遇到的首要問題，就是到底什麼話是可以說的，什麼話是不可以說的，都很糾結很傷腦筋。這也是大陸所有人很糾結很傷腦筋的一件事。這聽起來很荒唐、很不可思議，都二十一世紀了，嘴巴只有吃飯的自由，沒有說話的自由，但這卻是我國大陸的現實，將來總有一天我們會對此感到不堪回首。我今天不講這個，而是講我們主觀怎麼認識和對待這個事實，怎麼認識自由和反抗，知道自己的籠子有多大？底線在哪裡？天花板又在哪裡？
要明白真正的禁忌其實只有一個，就知道我們的籠子其實不止我們想像的這麼小。別人都奇怪我為什麼這麼熱愛自由，其實是我因為我心中沒有籠子。報人最大的禁忌不在於被奴役，而是自我奴役，不是被審查，而是自我審查。所以報人最高的職責是想方設法把籠子做大，想辦設法逼迫當局把言論自由還給人民；而最低最低的責任是要把籠子裡的空間用盡，現在最大的問題是空間還沒有用盡。很多時候我國還是處於無知和蒙昧的狀態，對一切都敏感得要死；一個人要幹多少壞事、要做多少惡、要處在多麼不義的立場，才敏感至此！脆弱至此！當局裝聾作啞，愚弄人民，那是當局不負責任和無恥；我們自己還是要對自己負責任。他敏感，你可以不敏感，越是他敏感的你就越不敏感，這樣久而久之就不敏感了。中國大陸的媒體有給當局和社會脫敏的義務，我們自己要百無禁忌，越是敏感的話題越是多提一提，就不敏感了，這對社會的健康是大有益處的。
這裡我要特別強調：在不違憲、不違法的前提下，我們可以使用的言說空間，遠遠大於我們已經使用的言說空間。1982年的《中華人民共和國憲法》第35條明確規定了中國公民依法享有言論、出版、集會、結社和遊行示威的自由。只要我國憲法和法律沒有公開禁止言論自由，那麼我們的自由還是在那裡的，倘若我們不使用、不爭取，那就是我們的責任。我幾次由海外歸國過關時，海關要查扣我帶的圖書，我都要質問他們憑什麼？有哪條法律規定公民可以看什麼書、不可以看什麼書？是誰有什麼權力決定別人可以看什麼書、不可以看什麼書？
如果我們放棄憲法賦予我們的言論自由不用，而是處處自我設限、自我審查的話，那麼我們被奴役、被損害就是自找的。在中國從事媒體行業，尤其是當總編輯的，要有這個使命感和責任意識。但如果你是為了一己私欲，為了當官，那就另當別論，你可能不是很適合這個職業、這個職位。
第二個問題：辦報的首要問題到底是什麼？
在中國內地辦報時，大家首先想到的問題是能不能和給不給辦的問題，是輿論環境問題。覺得輿論環境太差了，辦不好，不給辦好和不能辦好。或者就是糾結技術問題，認為首要問題是怎麼操作才能把報紙辦好。這樣想問題是遠遠不夠的。
我認為首先還是想不想和願不願意把報紙辦好的問題。只要你想、你願意把報紙辦好，在中國你就能把報紙辦好；只要你辦的報紙，堅持獨立公正客觀的立場，不參與制造和宣傳謊言，不助紂為虐，不愚弄公眾，不掩蓋真相，你的報紙就一定是大陸最好、最成功的報紙！你一定要有思想準備和下定決心把報紙辦好，而不是簡單地說客觀環境不好，或者埋怨輿論監管太嚴。我覺得主觀上首先要有死磕的思想準備。為什麼那些荒誕的、反智的、無良的、傷天害理的新聞禁令，還會得到貫徹執行，還有人買帳呢？我們應該團結起來，反抗！去衝破這個由謊言和卑鄙編織的牢籠！把套在人民頭上的這些紙枷鎖徹底撕碎！這樣的禁令存在，天理不容。
我舉個例子：汶川地震，首先照例想的是趕緊發禁令，馬上開會強調，除了新華社和中央電視臺，其它媒體不得擅自到現場採訪和發佈報導，下面有別的中央媒體領導站起來回話：我們的記者已經出發，快到現場了。上海靜安大火，也是命令各家都不許報導、不得評論，只能統一發通稿。再往前，非典的時候，他們也是一道禁令接著一道禁令，一個謊言接著一個謊言。最終禍國殃民啊。
不知道這樣做是基於什麼樣的道理和邏輯？這樣的時代，這麼重大的事件，不是想著怎麼充分報導，而是想著怎麼不要報導，多麼荒誕啊。這樣的禁令，對政府的威信，對當局的名聲，對當事各方，對誰都沒有好處，都是有害的。我們為什麼不說不！我希望大家都要敢於對這些喪盡天良的禁令說不。在資訊公開這件事上，衝破禁令的沒錯，錯的是發佈禁令的。要是全國的媒體都對這些禁令說不，看他們還怎麼野蠻、還怎麼專制。
另外，我覺得媒體要有很強的大局意識和政治意識。像溫家寶七談政改，我看國內只有瀟湘晨報等兩家報紙跟進報導、做出了適當的反應。不少媒體都是自我審查，都在等著上邊指示，結果可想而知，把溫總理害慘了。他就像《讓子彈飛》裡的張麻子，高喊攻打黃四郎，幾次喊哪沖啊都沒有人應沒有人跟。一個七十歲的老人，四十天之內高喊了七次政改和民主，愣是沒有媒體呼應，這不是一個很好的兆頭，說明我國的媒體沒盡到責任。還遠遠沒到明知不可為而為之的地步啊。
所以我覺得辦報的首要問題是職業理想、道德勇氣和政治情操的問題。
第三個問題：報紙的終極價值在哪裡？
有的報紙賺錢，有的報紙不賺錢。為什麼？這是報業的內在規律在發揮作用，是報紙的終極價值決定的。報紙的終極價值就是監督掌權者、制衡公權力、落實知情權，是公眾需要報紙和報紙存在的理由。客觀、真實、獨到、獨立、公正、公開，這就是報紙的價值。所以老一代的報人說，報紙有不可以說的真話，但是絕不可以說假話。這當是一條底線，不能突破的底線。
我想光這不突破底線還是遠遠不夠的。我想在中國這樣權力通殺的人治社會，在這個政治不文明、制度不完善、法制不健全的特殊歷史時期，報紙在監督掌權者、制衡公權力、落實知情權方面，具有不可替代、不可或缺的作用，尤其珍貴。
我認為中國現在最珍貴的是公信力，比黃金還珍貴。為什麼那麼多人要到南方報業集團去喊冤請願，這說明公信力太珍貴了。為什麼國家權力機關公佈錢雲會之死真相的時候沒人相信，說明缺乏公信力。只要媒體堅守公信力至上這一點，它就能獲益，就不僅能賺大錢，還能建大功、立大德，就能為中國的政治文明進步、為國家的長治久安發揮積極作用。我覺得這是報紙實現價值唯一路徑。我對此體會殊深。
另外，我覺得現代死板的財務制度，是不利於好媒體產生和發展的。那些只盯著財務報表和投資損益的老闆，是不可能辦出好媒體的。我所幸的是當年沒有碰到這樣目光短淺的老闆，他們沒有在財務上給我斷水斷電，我們只是一心一意地要做全中國最好的報紙，只要全中國最好的人才，給他們最好的平臺和待遇，其它的、尤其是財務報表之類的就不管那麼多，所以才有今天。
第四個問題：企業的核心競爭力到底是什麼？
我們在辦報紙的時候一定要想好我們的核心競爭力到底是什麼。我在1995年起草南方都市報基本大法的時候，認為企業的核心競爭力漸次為制度、人才、產品。現在我想調整為：人才、制度、產品。有什麼樣的人才，就會有什麼樣的制度，因為制度由人設計、發展和執行，人才優劣最終決定制度優劣，所以人才的優劣，特別是當家人的優劣，直接決定制度的優劣，這和國家是一樣的，始終都需要有一個制度的先驗者、一個制度之父；有什麼樣的人才、什麼樣的制度，自然就會有什麼樣的產品。
這裡特別需要闡明的是，一般都認為企業的核心競爭力是產品，有核心競爭力的產品，其實我覺得需要顛倒過來，產品恰恰是最不重要的，人才、制度都比產品重要。
太多的社長和總編輯把太多的精力放在不該放的產品上，整天想的只是不違反新聞宣傳紀律、讓領導滿意，或者把精力都放在控制錯別字上，這都是不合格的、不負責任的，是對社長和總編輯職責的諷刺。我認為好的社長和總編輯，應該把人才培養、制度建設放在比產品生產更加重要的地位。
第五個問題：企業到底要對誰負責？
企業、報業到底要對誰負責。不要覺得這個問題不重要、和我們沒有關係。我在設計南方都市報制度大綱時開宗明義，南方都市報的企業目標第一條，就是對員工及其家人的幸福負責，要讓員工在南方都市報這個平臺獲得最大的社會認同和社會價值、獲得最高的經濟收益和勞動回報，讓員工及其家人以南方都市報為榮的同時，過上富足和有尊嚴的體面生活。不要認為員工的個人福祉和公眾福祉和利益無關，而是大有關係的。好的領導人就是要通過好的制度設計，促使企業內各種要素良性互動、相得益彰。
第二是對合作企業和上下游企業的員工和他們額家庭幸福負責，讓紙張供應商、印刷服務商、廣告合作商、發行供應商感到光榮和幸福。
第三才是對顧客負責，這裡需要強調我並沒有把「顧客至上」掛在嘴上。我認為「顧客至上」如果不建立在以上兩點之上，難免會是虛偽的、功利的和自欺欺人的。如果一個企業只是強調顧客至上，而它的員工卻一肚子苦水，他們對顧客擠出的笑容將是多麼悲慘。如果一個企業員工表面上對顧客點頭哈腰，背地裡卻對自己的老闆恨之入骨，那顧客至上還有什麼意義。報業的顧客一個是讀者，一個是廣告主。讓讀者覺得看我們的報紙不丟人、不掉分，看我們的報紙顯得有獨立性、有判斷力，讓讀者和廣告主覺得我們的報紙剛正不啊、不作惡、不助紂為虐，就是對讀者和廣告主負責。讓我們的廣告合作商以參與見證報紙的發展壯大為傲、為榮，很重要。
第四是對促進所在地區的繁榮和幸福負責。我敢說，作為矮子中的高個子，廣州差不多是中國發展得最好的市民社會；我又敢說，廣州之所以是中國發展得最好的市民社會，重要一條就是有《南方週末》、《南方都市報》等這些敢於說真話、講真相、監督政府、為民請命的報紙。總會有人說我們報紙污蔑廣州的大好形勢、損害了廣州的形象，但吊詭的是，正是我們的報紙，為這個地區贏得了好聲譽和好形象，我們污蔑廣州的結果是那麼多人愛廣州；同樣的，太多的媒體每天都在對當局和當地歌功頌德，但最終結果又怎麼樣呢？朝鮮的媒體說過自己一句壞話嗎？怎麼朝鮮就成了世上最大的制度悲劇？再舉一例，當年《南方都市報》對深圳也差不多堅持了“以負面報導為主”的方針。後來南方都市報讓我談當年報導深圳是怎麼想的，我說打個比方：你如果愛一個美女，看到她臉上有污漬，是指出來還是不指出來更愛她呢？我矯情地說一聲，《南方都市報》正是以這樣的方式愛一個地方，參與地方的建設，對城市繁榮和公眾幸福負責。有讀者寫信來說如果廣州沒有你們這樣的報紙就沒有那麼可愛。正是報紙揭露公權的肆虐、官員的貪腐，才讓他們覺得廣州相對還是安全的，畢竟這屋裡有這麼一隻貓，不停地走著叫著，也經常逮到耗子。
第六個問題：企業管理的秘訣在哪裡？
中國大型國有企業的管理都是有問題的。我在參與創辦《南方都市報》、《新京報》的時候，主要精力都花在企業管理上。企業領導人職責何在？我認為不能事無巨細，雞毛蒜皮，不能只把精力耗在一篇報導、一個語句上，這是很糟糕的。
一個好的企業掌門人首先是一個預言家，他不應該管今天的事，他應該管明天、明年、後年、三五年後的事。他要有長遠的設計和規劃，同時有擔當的勇氣和高瞻遠矚的能力，對於所在的行業要有異于常人的洞察力。一定要有人瞭望世界，觀察業界。所以——
好的企業領導人首先是預言家，其次應該是制度設計師、模式構架師、環境營造師和文化培育師。他不必是記者、編輯和校對師。南方報業集團當時最好的一點就是鼓勵我們制度創新。在這樣一個傳統的國有事業單位，讓我們放手去設計一套全新的制度，那真是一國兩制啊。我當時做的最大膽的一件事，就是打破原有國營體制，廢除既有的國企工資體系，設計出一套完全建設在個人價值，即從業經驗、過往業績的基本工資體系，量化和質化考核體系，通過寫稿發稿編版的數量品質，進行嚴格打分評級。我覺得這個重要，牽一髮而動全身，相當於破解國有企業管理難題的一把鑰匙。
這說明制度設計是很重要的，制度也是需要不斷完善的。每年一到兩會的時候，就說我們國家的制度是世上最好的，絕對不搞西方的多黨制度、絕對不照搬西方的民主制度，兩個絕對實在令人絕望。世事無絕對！怎麼能說得這麼絕對呢？這不符合任何理論和學說，除非獨門秘笈和絕世法寶。制度是可以批評的，也是需要不斷完善的，制度不是宗教，也不是魔咒，怎麼就摸也摸不得、碰也碰不得？
扯遠了，回來。我覺得領導人知道什麼不該管，比知道什麼該管更重要。很多領導人就是因為管了不該管的，所以沒有管好該管的。
第七個問題：怎樣才能把報紙辦好？
我的思考模式經常與人不同。
有一個故事被很多人說過。南方都市報創辦初始，報業集團也沒給什麼錢，也沒有投資的概念，第一年掛賬經營虧了八九百萬，很多質疑就來了，要我回答。我當時就給大家講了一個關於賽跑的故事。說是三個人萬米賽跑，第一個是《羊城晚報》，已經跑了八九千米，無論發行量還是廣告量，多年雄霸中國報業龍頭地位；第二個是《廣州日報》，也跑了七八千米，上升勢頭還很強勁，如日中天；第三個就是我們《南方都市報》，剛剛趴到起跑線上。現在的問題是，我想當冠軍，這該怎麼跑？答案只有一個：換一個規則跑。如果按照原來的規則跑，我們爭第一應該說是不可能的；但是如果我們按照自己的方向和方案跑，就一定有可能。這就是我解決辦好這張報紙的一個小小的竅門、一個大大的秘密。原有的中國報業殿堂沒有我們位子，我們只好建造一個殿堂供奉自己。
做一個行業，當領跑者其實是最自由的，最無拘無束的；當追隨者其實很慘，很不輕鬆；因為追隨者永遠不知道領跑者往哪裡跑？怎麼跑？前面是拐彎還是掉頭？是刹車還是加速？這一切，規則和主動權全掌握在領跑者手上；而追隨者的命運就是老二。在中國搞報業，當領跑者其實是比較容易的。因為中國最缺的就是公信力，報紙只要有公信力就能做到第一，真的不難。
第八個問題：做報紙難在何處？
報業又肯定比其它行業更難。
一難：與其它行業不同，報業必須進行“二次銷售”才能獲益。首先是要把報紙銷售給讀者，也就是發行環節，但這是反利益的行為，銷的越多，賠的越多，基本沒有靠發行就能賺錢的報業。而其它行業的商品銷售基本都是一次完成的，賣多少，賺多少，控制好成本和定價即可。報業還要把廣告賣給廣告客戶，才有可能獲利。並且只有第一次虧得越多，第二次才能賺得越多。所以這是一個很難把握好平衡點的蹺蹺板。兩次定價是拿捏的關鍵：對讀者，是要訂好報紙訂閱和零售價；對廣告客戶，要訂好廣告版面價和遊戲規則。
這裡要特別提一下南方都市報對廣東報業的一大貢獻，就是防止廣東報業的價格戰和惡性競爭。南方都市報是中國第一家零售定價一塊錢的報紙，之前廣東的報紙都是定價五毛錢、打折三毛錢，南京甚至還有定價一毛兩毛還打大折頭的，幾乎免費了。南方都市報1998年就定價一塊錢，當時正面臨新快報創刊的淩厲攻勢，逆流而上，既透露出對自身品質的自信，也成功地把對手和公眾帶入品質競爭和關注內容品質的層次，從而避免兩敗俱傷、一損俱損的競爭局面。後來在創辦新京報時，我們乾脆一步到位定價一塊錢，我想當地那些定價五毛錢的報紙基本都松了一口氣，同時也在等著看我們笑話。但我們沒有讓他們看笑話。南方都市報和新京報，都創造了後來競爭者以更高定價參與競爭並獲得商業成功的範例。
其實我的經驗只有一條：高定價和提價，發行和廣告都高定價和提價，並且堅持價格剛性。
二難：必須兼顧經濟效益和社會效益。這是報紙的特殊商品屬性決定的。而管理層就必須要兩者均衡發展。當二者抵觸時，一定要堅持社會效益。南方都市報有很多這方面的經驗。南方都市報創辦伊始，批評深圳一家企業，這個企業老闆說我給你們報紙投放八百萬廣告吧，被我們拒絕了。還有當年南方都市報鑒於醫療衛生廣告民憤極大、陷阱很多，毅然決然在全國首倡不刊登包括醫療衛生廣告在內的四類不良廣告，廣受好評：一份以市場為導向的報紙，首先舉起了抵制醫療衛生等不良廣告的大旗。
三難：在中國辦報，要做到群眾和領導都滿意。但領導很難滿意。我想要做到領導不把你弄死，或者至少不敢隨意把你弄死就行了。在現在的中國，領導滿意了群眾就很難滿意，群眾滿意了領導就不滿意。這不是我們的問題，也不是群眾的問題，而是領導的問題。他的利益計算方式和你的不一樣。在中國做媒體，要是全部做到領導滿意，那麼這份報紙也就沒有什麼存在的價值了。這是我們這個制度決定的。我們就是一方面盡力把工作做好把報紙辦好，但又不能讓領導把你幹掉，這是很難拿捏的。當年我們的做法是，給他一個激動人心的產品，一個無比激動人心的發展方向，還有激動人心的現實回報，領導一看這麼多的錢，這麼多的發行量，這麼好的社會名聲，冒一點險就冒一點險吧。所以也要說，在中國辦一張好報紙真的太難了。
第九個問題：報紙如果什麼都做不了怎麼辦？
至少改版！
不停改版，優化版面，改良設計包裝，也是一條行之有效的辦法。產品設計也是品質和形象的重要組成部分。並且決定消費者的第一印象，往往見效最快，不可小視。
總結一下，我講的九個問題，是三個層次：前三個問題是講“取勢”，就是“因勢利導、順勢而為、乘勢而上”，我在南方都市報的時候曾做五年、十年規劃，每年年終統計，所有資料與規劃高度吻合，這是我對自己滿意的一點，這說明我對“勢”判斷得准；中間三個問題是講“明道”，就是“注重策略、科學管理、有章有法”；後三個問題是“優術”，就是“追求卓越、拒絕平庸、精益求精”。
這都是我和我的同仁的經驗：拒絕平庸，追求不凡，渴望完美。
【現場提問】
提問：我是港大商學院的，今天聽您說了很多商學院的東西。我對港報不是很滿意，似乎很平庸。您對港報的評價怎樣？
答：我想可以也應該辦的更好。我不認為香港報紙只有一種辦法，也不覺得所有的人只有一種趣味。所以要從這裡尋找突破口。如果給我機會，我認為可以在香港辦一份非常高雅、高品質的、嚴肅的報紙。香港這麼好的地方，這麼好的輿論環境、市民社會、公民意識、經濟條件，辦好報紙是不成問題的。當然我也不拒絕八卦，問題是不能都是八卦。
提問：現在的國內媒體都關注標新立異的東西，比如說農民工奇特的討錢方法，才能引起注意。你對此怎麼看呢？
答：我覺得這還是挺有創意的，因為這樣的新聞太多了。就像最近的新聞，一個男子沒有買到火車票，於是裸體跑到火車站站長辦公室示威。我挺敬佩這樣的維權意識和行為藝術，這也能讓他在新聞中脫穎而出。媒體報導這樣的新聞是沒有問題的，多多少少是有益，至少是無害的，總能推動社會的進步和公平吧。如果沒有當年熊德明讓總理幫忙討薪，那麼中國農民工的工資拖欠問題就還是一個沒有解決的問題。所以我們都變著法子逼社會改良。
提問：你說國內的媒體想要達到“制衡公權”的終極目標要怎麼做呢？是去衝撞籠子嗎？
答：從憲法立場看是沒有問題的，但是中國還不是一個法治的國家，還是一個人治的國家。但是我們不能等客觀條件具備了才去做事，而是應該通過合法的途徑和程式，通過新聞操守和操作規範，不斷嘗試。
提問：能一直在說媒體要突圍，但是在中國這種至上而下的環境裡面，中國媒體的趨勢是什麼？錢老師曾提到，中國的管制進入到一個control 2.0 的階段，變得更聰明，機制化。但是我們還是看到荒謬的禁令。您有什麼看法？還有，那您對政改有怎樣的預測？
答：近年的言論鉗制手段強、措施越來越具體到位，包括全國宣傳工作會議中傳出的蕭殺之風，還真的不是空穴來風。當局鉗制言論自由的手段的確是加強了，措施越來越嚴，也越來越講究實效了。中國傳媒無疑將面臨更為嚴峻的局面。
但是世界潮流浩浩蕩蕩，不以人的意志為轉移，尤其不以傲慢的掌權者的意志為轉移。很多貌似強大的東西，也可能瞬間坍塌，土崩瓦解。當個體面對強權時，似乎很絕望，但仍要在心底默默堅守，盡最大可能去突破、去衝破牢籠。現在微博推特等自媒體、新媒體的發展，我堅信他們鉗制言論的做法註定會破產。為什麼他們的公信力這麼差，沒有人相信，說到底就是鉗制言論自由造成的。
至於說到政改，總理都說到那個份上，把我想說的都說了，已經很到位了。總理說，風雨無阻，至死方休！我想這是肺腑之言，說到點子上了。說到這個份上，還不改，就不知道他們是想幹嘛了。我們只能期待、推動，並把他們好路子上逼。
提問：我想問整改中，媒體被鉗制的情況早就要破產了，那麼會在什麼時候呢？
答：我也很想知道，但我比較悲觀。一切都不確定，未來懸而未決，問題沒有答案。
提問：南都會不會有妥協？ 您認為媒體獨立的力量怎麼樣才能結合起來、集體突圍？我覺得現在鉗制新聞自由的人也慢慢變成弱勢群體了，當我們提到他們的時候總是當成假想敵，這些人究竟是誰呢？您的報社和維琪解密的終極價值有什麼異同？政治良心到底怎麼解構？您剛才把深圳比作姿色可嘉的美女，臉上有瑕疵，那麼你怎麼評價中國政治治理的姿色和改變呢？南都在香港面世了，您覺得南都在香港的市場會怎樣？有沒有必要出香港版？你為什麼不生氣，不害怕？你說到言論自由、公信力危機，您敢作敢為的風格也使你有入獄的災禍。那麼我們聽你講話，怎麼能不害怕？
最後回答：我很生氣，也很害怕。看我的微博就知道我很生氣，很憤怒。我對中國出現的很多醜惡現象，對當局鉗制輿論自由的做法，很生氣，很憤怒，相當。我在做出譴責、努力和號召的時候，也有些害怕。但總體上還好，現在的局面總比用槍抵在腦袋上不讓你發言好。我做了最大程度的努力和嘗試，付出的代價是我願意承受的，我曾給自己準備的下場比這糟糕得多。的確，我願意搏一把。這一輩子有這樣的經歷，獲得公眾的認可，比什麼都重要，我很值得。此外，經濟上獨立，實現財務自由也很重要，要能生活得下去，而我做到了這一點。
人間之所以還有希望，人生之所以還值得留戀，是因為作為個體，人有向善的一面，有嫉惡如仇的一面，這是人性中光輝、溫暖的一面，也是人間還有希望的原因。人類美好的品性會把我們拖上更好的道路。我堅信這一點。再見吧，謝謝大家！

If anyone had doubts about the future health of Caijing magazine as a place for harder-hitting journalism after the departure of founding editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立) in November 2009, the magazine’s latest issue is cause for optimism, if not applause.
Archived report available here:
Report 1
Report 2
Report 3
Report 4
Report 5
A new investigative report in Caijing from journalist Luo Changping (罗昌平), known for his recent book about the 2003 Chenzhou corruption scandal, uncovers how the corruption cases against a number of prominent officials in recent years, including former Qingdao party secretary Du Shicheng (杜世成) and former Sinopec CEO Chen Tonghai (陈同海), all have a shadow figure in common — a former Vietnamese refugee named Li Wei (李薇).
The Caijing report alleges that Li Wei (李薇) used her relationship with her husband, a former tobacco official, to get close to top officials in Yunnan, Guangdong, Beijing and Qingdao, creating a vast network of protection and favor that she used to personally enrich herself.
The report’s title, “The Public Band”, or gonggong qundai (公共裙带)), references the intersection of money and power, or “crony capitalism,” which in Chinese can be literally translated “skirt-band capitalism,” or qundai ziben zhuyi (裙带资本主义).
According to the article, many high-level officials now being held in Beijing’s Qincheng Prison — including former Yunnan governor Li Jiating (李嘉廷), former Beijing deputy mayor Liu Zhihua (刘志华), former deputy judge of the Supreme People’s Court Huang Songyou (黄松有), and former deputy chief of the China Development Bank Wang Yi (王益) — all had previous dealings with Li Wei’s network of power and money.
The report also mentions, withholding names, two high-level state officials who previously supported Li Wei. As a matter of general practice in China’s media, the withholding of the names of “high-level officials” in news reports indicates those concerned are officials at the most senior levels.
Many of the corruption cases crossing through this Caijing report stretch back years. The Li Zhihua corruption case, for example, hit headlines in China well ahead of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, and was handled with great care in the state media, given that Li was responsible for the construction of Olympic sites in the capital.
We’re just poring through this report now, but we commend it to readers of Chinese. As there are signs of a tightening climate for domestic media in China — and particularly as investigative reporting has grown more difficult in recent years — the appearance of a report of this nature is highly significant.

It is understandable that the Chinese child-raising style of Chinese-American “tiger mom” Amy Chua has ignited controversy in the United States. But Americans may find it difficult to understand why the “tiger mom” controversy has blazed across China. Many assume the “tiger mom” child-rearing style portrayed in Chua’s book is the dominant Chinese way. What they may not realize is that in China, especially in the major cities, the “tiger mom” style of discipline and education has faded into the past.
For thousands of years, the Chinese family style was the “tiger mom” style. The will of the parents dominated in all things, and little thought was given to the autonomy of the child. The parents’ will was forced on the child, with the cudgel if necessary. According to modern concepts of child-raising, this is unacceptable. It doesn’t jive with child psychology, and it doesn’t respect the child’s character.
Whatever the shortcomings of this style, however, we have to acknowledge that it didn’t fail to produce stand-outs. Most of China’s strong personalities in the last century were products of this child-raising style — the poet Hu Shi (胡适), the writer Lu Xun (鲁迅) and the novelist Lao She (老舍). By contrast, the children of these more modern fathers failed to distinguish themselves through their actions.
Actually, the Chinese family is now in trouble. For families that can have only one child, raising them well is a real challenge. The old paternal style of raising children with a heavy hand has been shoved aside in favor of indulgence on the one hand and hand-slapping on the other.
While parents are anxious to instill their child with every ability in the world, they are often helpless in the face of the child’s resistance to normal studies. The family dynamic is all about encouraging the child to study, and so long as they study they can do whatever else they please. Everything else is handled by the parents, even routine cleaning at the child’s school.
Children spend money as they please, without restrictions, so long as it is falls within their parents’ means. If children resist anyhow, refusing all boundaries, parents are basically powerless to do anything. Many parents in China today don’t have an iota of authority with their own child. Parents, in fact, have become more like play companions.
Clearly, our our traditional parenting style has already undergone fundamental change. No one dares parent with the cudgel anymore, moulding kids into dutiful children. When discipline is used, it comes hand in hand with reward. So long as a child takes on heaps of knowledge at the parents’ bidding, they earn exemption from household chores and are showered with all the comforts money can buy. Even if the child ultimately digs in its heels and does nothing, becoming completely indolent, unable to hold down a job, living at home, there is nothing the parents can do.
Of course, even this parenting style has its examples of success. Some children, even without the most basic self-reliance, find their strengths in the course of their studies and achieve excellent results at school. Some even test into foreign universities, becoming Harvard graduates and otherwise distinguishing themselves.
We must confess to ourselves, however, that we face a parenting vacuum in China. We have left the old style behind, and in its place we have nothing. This presents us with hidden perils on a scale overseas Chinese “tiger moms” like Amy Chua probably cannot even fathom. In America, versions of the tiger mom’s strict parenting style are reproduced in various forms in schools and in society. Not so in China. Not only that, but our schools and our society at large are just as shaky as our families on the question of education and character building.
In the midst of this ailing education environment, our children don’t know the meaning of gratitude, responsibility or self-reliance. And the full effects of this may not be felt until these children have become adults and entered society.
This editorial originally appeared in Shanghai Morning Post, a commercial spin-off of Shanghai’s Liberation Daily.
[Frontpage photo by “whisperwolf” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

Their names sometimes stretch back farther than our memories: King Norodom Sihahouk of Cambodia, Kim Jong-il of North Korea, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Egypt’s Mubarak, and a handful of others. For me, a student of international relations, their names are like the very ghosts of history, arrayed across the sky, haunting us always.
But today we can rub out one of these names. Hosni Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for more than three decades, has resigned under the relentless pressure of his own people. The age of Mubarak has ended.
Not having stood beside these Egyptians who have taken to the streets, or experienced what they have, I cannot feel any deep hatred for Mubarak. I even feel somewhat at a loss. Egypt without Mubarak? Isn’t Mubarak part of what Egypt is all about?
Certainly, for people of my age who grew up reading about Egypt, Mubarak is an integral part of the Egypt we know, as symbolic as the mummies of the Pharaohs. We have long seen facts, or been presented with Mubarak’s facts, showing that he ushered in decades of stability for Egypt in a historically turbulent North Africa. Under Mubarak’s rule, Egypt enjoyed a period of rapid economic development. And his government, moreover, was one of the most secular in the region.
It was Mubarak who resolved the basic deprivation of the Egyptian people and brought stability. He became, along with Egypts mummies, a ready symbol of the country. For some time, this name, Mubarak, bore the dreams and glory of the Egyptian people and defined the vision the world had of this ancient nation.
Egypt and Iraq are among the world’s most ancient civilizations, along with a number of countries in East Asia. In countries in these regions, modern ideas of democracy have often come into conflict with deep-rooted ancient traditions, and they have been among the last to explore the possibilities of democracy.
Ah, Mubarak, this might have been a wonderful opportunity for you! Had you only realized that democracy, while it can be delayed for some time, cannot be stopped indefinitely. Why, during the more than thirty years that you ran the country, did you not make an effort to promote change, using the political power in your grasp to stand with your people, reinvigorating an ancient civilization? Instead you played for time, standing against reforms that might have bettered Egypt and provided for you a way out. Now, in the bitter end, you have no choice but to somberly step down.
Mubarak might have carried on the hopes of the Egyptian people. If he had carried out political reforms, even in the last moments of those thirty plus years during which he held nearly absolute authority [NOTE: the parallel between Mubarak’s 30 years and the 30 years of economic reform and opening in China is subtle but clear in the Chinese original]. If he had seized the opportunity, heeding the good advice of his own people, he might have been regarded not just with dignity but with gratitude as well, his place in the heart of Egypt secure. Egyptians might have regarded him as Americans regard Washington.
The opportunity has passed. Mubarak’s greatest mistake was not to heed those words of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who said: “If you want total security, go to prison.”
Based on my limited knowledge of international affairs, I honestly don’t think the Egypt of the future will necessarily experience better economic development than it did under your rule, Mubarak. The country’s political situation won’t necessarily be more stable, or Egyptian society more “harmonious.” This was always the justification you waved for holding back political reform and refusing to hand the power to the people. It was also the reason you always enjoyed support from the United States.
But if you are a student of history, it should be clear to you that no matter what pain or hardship Egypt faces in the future, it will never return to the era of Mubarak. Before long the people of Egypt will come to realize that the chaos of their country’s democratic transition is not without your shadow, Mubarak. For its roots will lie in part in the very fact that your rule was so unduly extended. Goodbye, Mubarak!
When I was in college, I learned by heart how you ruled your people, how you led them to war, and how you brought them out of an era of deprivation, using your own method with Egyptian characteristics to build a harmonious society [NOTE: this is a clear play on CCP discourse about “socialism with Chinese characteristic” and the “harmonious society”].
My son has read about you in his own history books. But now the people of Egypt have stood up, and they have given you and the world its most important lesson yet in how nations must be governed: illegitimate political power can never be legitimized, it says — no matter how high and mighty the justifications given may be, no matter how exalted the words, no matter how powerful the military. For an old man such as yourself, this is understandably the final lesson. But for the few people in the world who still wield absolute political power in a handful of countries, this is not the final lesson. I truly hope that you have the opportunity to speak about your own experiences in this moment, so that you might leave something beneficial behind for the world.
In the past few weeks, as your people took to the streets, the situation shifting so rapidly, you must have hesitated, not knowing which way to go. Perhaps you even considered ordering an attack on your people. In the end, you hoped the people would give you some time, even if it was just a few months.
Some have said you wanted this time to prepare your route of retreat, and transfer the vast riches your family and the special interests around you had amassed during your rule. I have a different take on this — a different fancy, you might say. Perhaps you, an old man in his eighties, struggled in those weeks to hold on to power because you woke rudely to a fresh regret. Is that it? And at that moment you hoped to use your final burst of power to do something meaningful for your people, giving them the right to free and fair elections. This way you might have, all at once, given hope to the people and left in a cloud of glory, preserving your place in history?
Oh, but it was too late! You had more than thirty years, but you never gave the people of Egypt an opportunity. So of course they were not willing to give you even a few days. You were unworthy.
Because you have exited the stage, it is as though Valentine’s Day has come early this year. It has suddenly dawned on the people of Egypt, who have lived so long in a nation musty with the smell of its mummified rulers, that every one of them has an unmissable date with a precious life of freedom and democracy.
Goodbye, Mubarak!
February 12, 2011, two days from Valentine’s Day.
[Frontpage Photo by “darkroom productions” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

Lu Xun’s short story Diary of a Madman, published almost a century ago, ends famously with the appeal: “Save the children!” In an age of social media the Chinese writer surely never envisioned, has this rallying cry found its most potent means and support?
One of the biggest domestic stories of the week in China has been a grassroots, web-based initiative to locate abducted children and reunite them with their parents. Dubbed the “take a picture” movement, the initiative calls on Chinese internet users to photograph children seen begging on the streets and post these photos with time and location on special community groups formed through Twitter-like “microblog” platforms (or weibo) at QQ.com and Sina.com. [Roland Soong is posting copiously on this story in China, and his translations are well worth a read].
So far the movement, launched by CMP fellow and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences professor Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), who has a reputation for uniting social research with social action, is credited with locating 6 children. In one of the first signs of the government grappling with the swell of opinion around this issue, the Public Security Bureau called yesterday on police around the country to “staunchly prevent such crimes from occurring.”
But while the response from Chinese citizens seems so far to have been overwhelming supportive of Yu Jianrong’s inspired idea, there are also isolated voices of dissent who are raising some very valid doubts.
On February 9, Hecaitou (和菜头), a prominent Chinese internet writer, provocatively likened China’s unquestioning internet masses to the children in the legend of the Pied Piper of Hamelin, who follow the piper right out of town. Everyone, in other words, is jumping on the bandwagon — and no one is asking some very basic questions.
Hecaitou takes issue with the logic and economics of one of the fundamental premises of the “take a picture” movement, the notion that children in China are being routinely abducted, then mutilated by their keepers to ensure they become more pitiable and profitable beggars:

Buying an abducted child happens because one lacks a child. Begging happens because one lacks a means of livelihood. No matter how you figure it, whether from the standpoint of risk or cost, abducting a child then handicapping them in order to turn them to begging is something that can only be a very rare occurrence. But now the whole country is up in arms, as though there is a class of people in China who are willing to spend years slowly creating handicapped children and dragging them all over the place. Moreover, [we suppose] this must be a very profitable business, otherwise why would this group of people dare to face the risk of exposure . . . ?

Hecaitou suggests by implication that it is much more reasonable to suppose the vast majority of abducted children are now living undetected with families that “adopted” them. That’s a tragedy social media will undoubtedly prove less effective in dealing with.
The rights and privacy of individuals are also recurring concerns in the rare instances of dissent over this hot-button issue. Is it right for web users to be photographing child beggars in every corner of the kingdom, then posting their photos online?
In a blog post yesterday, a Chongqing-based blogger writing under the alias “Flying Nuthouse” (飞越疯人院) — “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest”? — argued that the justice-fueled emotions of China’s internet users are little more than a form of cowardice. It is the government they should be monitoring and pressuring, he says, not the poor street urchins and their (illegal) guardians.
The following is a partial translation of the post:

I’ve felt a bit uneasy these past few days, and it’s all because of this “microblog anti-abduction” campaign that has blown up on the Internet leaves me apprehensive.
The “microblog anti-abduction” campaign was launched by Yu Jianrong. This person is known to the world largely for his role in organizing the citizen investigation group that went and probed into the reasons for the death of [village leader and activist] Qian Yunhui (钱云会). The “microblog anti-abduction” campaign is said to have arisen after a woman from Fujian province sought help from Mr. Yu, saying that her child was abducted, turned into a cripple and forced to beg on the streets. Thereupon, Yu Jianrong used his microblog and called on internet users to take up their cameras, take photos of juveniles out begging, and post these on the web, with the idea that these parents might more easily track down their lost children. At the same time he urged internet users to report cases of child begging to the police.
I immediately harbored doubts about Yu Jianrong’s call. What if the child was not being forced in any way but rather was out begging of their own free will? Isn’t taking a picture of someone begging and then posting it on the internet an infringement on their rights?
As soon as I voiced these reservations, I was verbally attacked . . . They said that children shouldn’t be begging, and there was no such thing as children “begging of their own free will.” If a child could not meet the basic needs of existence, then the state should care for them, and they should not be left to beg on the streets.
There is of course of lot of reason in what these web users said. You could say they are entirely right. But this absolutely right response not only failed to dispel my doubts — it could not possibly explain why this photographing [of children] was warranted.
Imagine for a moment a child without means of subsistence — the famous cartoon character San Mao, for example — left to beg on the streets. Not only has the child not received assistance from the government, but their most basic level of dignity has been intruded upon by these internet users. Can this be called humane?
If internet users believe there should be no beggars in our society, and that the government should take responsibility for these child paupers, well then, ather than taking casual pictures of these begging children and post them online, what these internet users puffed up with a sense of justice should do is press their government to take on the responsibility is should have. But the reality is that it’s much easer to trample on the weak than it is to probe those in power. It seems to me that these justice-loving web users much prefer doing things that come easily.