In China this week, “fake news” is in the news. But given the confusion of China’s press environment, where controls and propaganda crisscross with the worst commercial appetites and the best professional impulses, it is often difficult to tell which articles are real “fake news”, which are officially sanctioned falsehoods, and which are fake “fake news,” branded as such by government officials who have an active interest in suppressing the truth.
The first story to talk about — almost certainly an authentic piece of “fake news” — was a popular news story in the Chongqing Evening News last week about the saga of Li Chunfeng (李春凤), a migrant worker in Zhejiang who reportedly drove a motorcycle 2,000 kilometers home to Chongqing after being seized with an irrepressible desire to see her six-year-old son. Seeing the story rising to the top at China’s leading online news site, QQ.com, we wrote on CMP Newswire last week that we suspected the story, which was drawing national attention and sympathy, was fake, and many Chinese journalists and readers have said the same since.
The Chongqing Evening News story seems to play wantonly on popular sympathies ahead of the Chinese New Year, when millions of Chinese struggle to find their way back home to reunite with their families against the world’s biggest transportation logjam, when train and bus tickets are virtually impossible to buy. It tells how Li Chunfeng dreamt one evening in Zhejiang that her boy’s body was covered in blood and under attack by rats, so she decided the next day to make the long journey home on a motorbike she had purchased with an advance from her boss, disguising herself as a man for the sake of safety on the long journey.

Li Chunfeng is the only source for this saccharine “news feature,” printed on a full page with two photos that look suspiciously posed, including one taken from the front as Li, with safety helmet on, rides a motorcycle with a look of heartfelt determination. The story is too much, too over the top, and too thin on real facts and sources — despite the fact that it is apparently a concerted effort by a “reporter”, a “correspondent” and an “intern,” all of whom are credited in the byline.
The story instantly found a warm-hearted following among Chinese Internet users, who gave Li Chunfeng the affectionate name “Motorcycle Mama” (摩托妈妈). But doubts about the authenticity of the story were voiced just as quickly, as reported in this China National Radio story. Some asked, for example, whether it was humanly possible for anyone to survive six days on half a bottle of water, as the news story claimed Li had.
Before long Xi’an’s commercial Huashang Bao (华商报) followed up on the story with Li Chunfeng herself and found that she was unable to confirm basic facts, such as exactly when she had set off on the journey and whether she had taken national roads or expressways. Li seemed able to recall only one or two specifics about the journey at all.
Writing at Southern Metropolis Daily today, well-known journalist and blogger Wu Yue San Ren (五岳散人) noted with good humor:

The story suspected of being fake news . . . told how a mother had driven her motorcycle 2,000 kilometers . . . and in her four days on the road slept only 6 hours and basically ate nothing. Of course, the greatest thing on earth is a mother’s love — but this greatness certainly doesn’t translate into superpowers. If this mother were truly a superhero, she would simply have flown home.

By some accounts, “fake news”, or xujia xinwen (虚假新闻), has plagued news media in China since at least the Cultural Revolution, at which time media fabricated news to suit the political purposes of the Gang of Four. Chinese government officials, however, deny definitions of the term that lump in state propaganda, and the allegation of “fake news” can often signal action against news seen to violate propaganda restrictions — news, in other words, that is too true.
Over the past twenty years, as economic reforms have moved rapidly ahead, the problem of “fake news” has certainly grown more serious. Many officials and academics point to the commercialization of media industry and intensified market competition as the root causes.
But what about propaganda itself? It is not “fake news” when state media run news stories quoting rescued mine workers declaring as they emerge to safety: “Glory be to the Communist Party, glory be to the government, and glory be to the people!”?
In a highly commercialized media environment subject to strict propaganda controls, media find it safer and more profitable to avoid real public interest stories in favor of pleasant, harmless and salable falsehoods. Control, therefore, has played a central role in undermining truth and credibility, and is the soil that nurtures “fake news.”
Relevant to the issue of state media and “fake news,” there has also been quite a bit of online chatter in China in recent days about remarks made by Deng Yaping (邓亚萍), a former ping-pong champion who is now deputy secretary of the Party’s official People’s Daily. Deng claimed in December that the official “mouthpiece” of China’s leadership has “never published fake news” in the past 62 years. But that claim rankles with many, who can cite endless cases of false, misleading or sloganeering coverage in recent months and years — not to mention in decades past.
Unfortunately, we also have this week an example of “fake news” being used as a tool of political control. We learn from Chinese-language reports by Deutsche Welle and Radio France International, since confirmed by numerous Chinese journalists and activists writing on Twitter, that Chengdu Commercial Daily reporter Long Can (龙灿) was dismissed on January 21 for “serious violations” and “false reports,” or baodao shishi (报道失实).
Sichuan-based blogger Song Shinan (宋石男) reported on Twitter that the Central Propaganda Department had ruled as “fake news” (假新闻) Long Can’s December investigation for Chengdu Commercial Daily into the rescue of 18 students from Shanghai’s Fudan University who had hiked into a rugged mountainous area near China’s scenic Huangshan, a rescue that led to the death of a police officer.
For much of December, popular anger in China focused on the Fudan University students. Many said their recklessness and insufficient preparation had put the local police rescue team in a dangerous position. Long’s report revealed that local police in Huangshan had ignored three emergency calls to “110” by student Shi Chengzu (施承祖) earlier in the day. Receiving no response from local authorities, the students contacted “Number Two Uncle” (二姨夫), a relative of one of the students many have speculated is an influential Shanghai official.
Once contact with “Number Two Uncle” was made, authorities in both Shanghai and Anhui sprang into action. The local mayor, propaganda chief and police chief of Huangshan all joined the rescue, according to Long’s report. By this time night was falling on Huangshan and conditions were treacherous, but Shanghai officials reportedly said that “rescue must be made whatever the cost.”
Deutsche Welle reported that China’s General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) subjected Long’s report to its own investigation under pressure from the Central Propaganda Department and unspecified official pressure in Shanghai (“Number Two Uncle”?). GAPP then meted out the following punishment for Chengdu Commercial Daily:

1. journalist Long Can to be dismissed; 2. editor Zhang Feng (张丰) to be fined 1,000 yuan; 3. executive editor Xu Jian (徐剑) to be dismissed; 4. head of the news desk, Zeng Xi (曾熙), to be dismissed; 5. Zhang Quanhong (泉洪), editorial board member in charge of the news desk, to be suspended from duties and subjected to severe examination; 6. editorial board member on duty that day, Wang Qi (王奇), to be fined 3,000 yuan; 7. chief editor Chen Shuping (陈舒平) to be fined 3,000 yuan.

Speaking to Deutsche Welle, Long Can upheld the truth of his report, and voiced his deep anger and frustration at the actions taken against him and his paper:

My situation right now is really difficult. I’ve been a journalist for 10 years. I’ve never accepted a red envelope [in payment for or against news coverage]. What we make can’t be considered an enviable wage. We keep to our original journalism ideals through the years, and those “ideals” are what we lean on as we plod ahead. Being a journalist has always been cruel and difficult. We always hope for even the simplest measure of care, even the merest regard for our ideals, but these have never in fact been granted — not in terms newspapers themselves or the larger media environment. As journalists we bear all of the risks and pressure. But then we find at the critical moment that we’re “cast as failures” (被失败者). What I most want to say is that if all journalists within a news media are silent, this can only cause more journalists to face the danger of being expelled . . . and within the world, if all the people in a country keep silent, it will be like Iran or North Korea. Is there meaning in that? Silence takes away all meaning. Before I worked hard to ensure that I kept my cool. But this time I’m furious. I feel I’ve lost hope for “journalism.”

Over the last several days, scores of leading journalists and activists in China have discussed the Long Can case, and shared his investigative report, through Twitter and domestic microblog services. Earlier this week, Long Can shared the full text of his investigative report online, inviting scrutiny from fellow professionals: “This is my original draft, with not a word removed. I hope everyone will offer their criticism and analysis from the standpoint of [professional] news writing. I’ll accept them all. Thank you. As to whether my report can be called fake news, everyone can come to their own conclusions in their hearts.”
Long Can’s microblog post was shared by likes of CMP fellow and top Chinese investigative reporter Wang Keqin (王克勤).
Shen Yachuan (沈亚川), a veteran journalist and reporter for Southern Weekend who often writes under his online alias Shi Feike (石扉客), sent Chinese microblog users to a link outside China’s firewall, where they could find the reports on Long Can’s dismissal by journalist Cao Guoxing (曹国星) at Radio France International: “They are of the best possible quality. I encourage everyone to scale the wall and read them,” Shen said.
According to the RFI report in question, Shanghai police criticized Long Can’s investigative report on the Huangshan rescue, saying they had never received a report from a “so-called influential person” related to the trapped hikers.
Speculation as to the possible identity of Shanghai’s “Number Two Uncle” is one of many questions that remain unanswered in the dismissal of journalist Long Can.
Now, clearly, the specific issues with Long’s report for Chengdu Commercial Daily and the reasons why he and others have suffered as a result are not open for discussion in China. Long’s career as a professional journalist is almost certainly over, and a tragedy that is all too real hides behind an unsupported accusation of “fake news.”

In December 2010, the Beijing municipal government responded to the problem of severe overcrowding of the city’s roads by limiting the number of personal cars approved for purchase. The city government said it would limit new licenses to 240,000 this year, one-third the number of licenses approved in 2010. Gridlock on Beijing’s roads has become a major issue in China’s media in recent months [See “Why do Beijingers Feel They Must Have Cars?“]. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his blog on top Chinese Internet site QQ.com, city residents are surrounded by a flood of personal automobiles and must seek refuge on top of their homes and in treetops.

According to a news report from People’s Daily’s overseas edition re-posted on People’s Daily Online, China’s Ministry of Railways announced on January 17 that the problem of “hard-to-get tickets” (一票难求) will be solved by 2015. The 40 days between January 19 and February 27 this year are expected to be the nation’s busiest, with millions of Chinese trying to make it home for the holidays then returning. Tickets are notoriously difficult to buy during this time. But the People’s Daily Online report took on a subtle tone of criticism, and humor, as news editors posted it at a number of major websites in China, adding screenshots of identical claims from the Ministry of Railways in past years. Back in 2007, for example, the Ministry of Railways said the problem of hard-to-get tickets would be “substantially solved” by 2010. This is the link for the original People’s Daily Online post, and you can see here what QQ did by clicking here. In this cartoon, posted by artist Xu Jun (徐骏) to his blog at popular Chinese Internet site QQ.com, a Ministry of Railways officials crosses out the year 2012 with a red brush on a sign that reads “Hard-to-buy train tickets, problem to be solved by.” He paints a new year, 2015, and as he walks away thinks to himself, “I’d better hold on to this brush.”

According to Huashang Bao, a commercial newspaper in the city of Xi’an, 31 people, including 13 children, suffered serious burns and eye injuries at Tongchuan City People’s Hospital in Shaanxi province when ultraviolet lighting was mistakenly turned on in a hospital ward. The reporter from the newspaper found upon visiting the hospital that the ultraviolet switch was located right next to the normal light switch. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, hospital patients desperately try to shade their eyes as violet light rains down from overhead. Switches right next to one another on the wall read: “Floor lamp/flourescent lamp/ultraviolet light.”

This week China’s State Council passed in principle a draft regulation that seeks to do away with the widespread practice of forced home demolition to make room for development projects. Forced demolition, or qiang chai (强拆), and its social fallout has been one of the most pernicious issues to haunt China over the past decade, as local government leaders across the country have recklessly seized land and destroyed property in a race to fuel local economic development, and to personally enrich themselves.
Over the past year, as discussion and debate of the regulation dragged on, China experienced a number of horrific tragedies stemming from forced demolition. In one of the most high-profile cases, three members of one family in China’s southern Jiangxi province set fire to themselves in a final, last-ditch act of protest as local police converged on their home to carry out a forced demolition order.
The draft regulation comes amid a building consensus in China that the issue of forced demolition must be seriously addressed. But is this draft State Council regulation the answer? Is there cause for even guarded optimism?
The draft does away with the practice of forced “administrative demolition” (行政拆迁) and appears to put decisions on demolition in the hands of China’s courts, favoring “judicial demolition” (司法拆迁). It demands also that “the degree of public participation be expanded” ahead of proposed demolitions, and that “compensation for [demolished] residences does not fall below the market price for similar properties.” The regulation further stipulates that companies involved in development projects slated for the demolition site not be involved in the demolition and eviction process, a problem that has contributed to abuses, as developers with strong political backing have often acted above the law.

[ABOVE: Residences face forced administrative demolition in Tianjin in 2007.]
Some commentators argue that the new draft regulation is a positive step forward, even if imperfect. CMP fellow Zhan Jiang (展江), a professor of journalism at Beijing Foreign Studies University, acknowledged problems with the new regulations but noted four points of progress:

Major points of progress include: 1. compensation for residences [on which demolition actions are] being imposed must not fall below the market price for similar properties; 2. the expansion of the degree of public participation, the opinions of the public should be sought for proposals for compensation for acts of demolition; 3. the cancellation of compulsory administrative demolition and removal (行政强制拆迁); 4. prohibition against development companies taking part in demolition and removal. These were not easy, and they are worthy of compliment.

“Just think how many people shed blood in exchange [for these concessions],” Zhan wrote. “Everyone should continue to observe the actions of local governments.”
But criticism has harried the draft regulation since its release on December 15 last year, and it certainly fails to address a number of key issues. It deals only, for example, with demolition carried out on state-owned land while many of the most serious incidents stemming from demolition actually occur on collectively-held land — for example, in villages on the fringes of expanding cities — a legacy of China’s land reforms in the 1950s.
One of the biggest concerns is how much impact the regulations can have in the absence of deeper reform to the system making local leaders more accountable. The regulations, for example, stipulate that government officials must now provide a demolition notice issued by the courts before a demolition can go forward. Critics point out correctly that such a stipulation will make little difference so long as the local courts (as well as the police) are in the hands of local officials.
Writing at the Caixin Media website, Yuan Yulai (袁裕来), a Chinese legal expert and member of the All-China Lawyers Association, said the new draft regulation would not be a step forward and might actually be a step back. The reason lies, he said, in the nature of China’s legal system.

The unit of decision-making power in our country is the Party committee, and demolition actions, which are generally related to major projects, are decided through local Party committees and standing committees and then handed to the government for implementation. The word “government” here has a very broad meaning, including the government, the local people’s congresses, the courts and other agencies. In the case of the courts, the Party committee exercises [its decisions] through the Politics and Law Committee. The chief of the court is the Secretary of the Party Committee, and the leading body of the courts is the court’s Party organization, comprising members of the leading Party group. The chief judge is not even a member of the local Party committee, and that he is not a member of the standing committee goes without saying. When the Party committee makes decisions on such issues as demolition and removal, the chief judge does not even have the power to attend as a non-voting delegate. The only thing he can do is carry out the decision of the Party committee.
Even worse is the fact that the People’s Courts are often garbed with the cloak of independence and fairness, and this idea is impressed upon many people’s hearts. At the heart, this is true of systems of justice, but over here where we are things are entirely not that way. The character of independence has already been totally hollowed out. Some time ago we were calling all the time for an end to the localization of court justice, but now we uphold the idea that courts must accommodate local Party leaders. I’m afraid there’s no way in a short period of time that we can redeem the outcomes we have reaped from this.

When Yuan said courts must now “accommodate local Party leaders,” he was referring to the policy of the “Three Supremes,” first introduced by Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) during a 2007 session on national politics and law attended by senior judges and prosecutors. The policy represents a sharp change — and many say a clear step backward — in China’s judicial policies, and is summed up as follows:

1. “Supremacy of the business of the CCP” (党的事业至上)
2. “Supremacy of the interests of the people” (人民利益至上)
3. “Supremacy of constitutional law” (宪法法律至上)

Chinese legal scholar He Weifang (贺卫方) told Hong Kong’s Asia Weekly magazine in August 2010 that legal system reforms in China now face a major challenge in the form of this policy, and the term “Three Supremes” has entirely replaced the erstwhile policy goal of “judicial independence” (司法独立).
Also at Caixin Media, Ding Jinkun (丁金坤), an attorney at Shanghai’s Debund Law Offices, wrote of the new draft demolition regulation:

Some people believe this is a bright moment — what an absurdity!
First of all, the new draft regulation is an administrative regulation, a law made by the government. So how can administrative bodies stipulate the work that courts do? Clearly, administrative organs have overstepped their authority, regarding themselves as the National People’s Congress or the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. We need to know that the function of the courts is determined by law, and whether or not judicial demolition (司法强拆) goes ahead is something that must be determined by law. Judicial demolition deals with land and housing, and deals with the personal rights of those facing demolition. These are all basic civil rights stipulated in the constitution, and they also fall under the Law of Land Administration and the Property Law. For a low-level demolition ordinance to come along and rock all of these, how can we not say it has overstepped its authority.
Secondly, in terms of actual application, how big is the difference between administrative demolition and removal and judicial demolition and removal? If we had judicial independence and our courts could check administrative power, then judicial demolition and administrative demolition would naturally be different. But our courts certainly are not independent . . . In a word, the courts don’t dare fall afoul of the government, but can only accommodate the government. Therefore, judicial demolition is a superficial change, swapping the broth but not the medicine. Ultimately, what faces demolition will be demolished. . .
The only small note of progress in judicial demolition over administrative demolition is that the court procedures are a bit more normalized, and this will stop some demolitions that are out of bounds. But this progress is virtually insignificant.

Chinese blogger Wu Yue San Ren (五岳散人) expressed his reservations about the draft regulation more caustically on Twitter:

The regulations on demolition passed by the State Council say that stability preservation assessments (维稳评估) [of possible social fallout] must be made before seizures go ahead. Local governments might make their assessment as follows, for example. ‘This village has 500 residents, of which 150 are young and fit. Our city has a 1,000-strong police force, 500 urban management personnel, a 300-strong armed police unit that can be utilized, and we have an overwhelming advantage in terms of weaponry. Aside from that we can put at least 200 men from the criminal underworld out front. Assessment result: stability preservation is not a problem, the demolition can proceed.

Cheng Yizhong, founder and former chief editor of Southern Metropolis Daily and The Beijing News, gave a his first-ever public talk in Hong Kong on Thursday, January 20 at the University of Hong Kong, where he reflected on his career and issues of press freedom in China.

[Photo by Vincent Du]
“The cage [of press control] is actually much larger than we can see,” said Cheng, who argued that the greatest stumbling block for Chinese journalists is self-censorship rather than government censorship, even as he said controls have tightened in recent months. “Often [the real question for journalists] is not how to expand the space for reporting, but about how to use the space that is available to the greatest extent possible,” he said.
Cheng, now vice-president of the Modern Media Group and executive publisher of Asian Business Leaders, was jailed for five months in 2004 following Southern Metropolis Daily’s groundbreaking reporting on the case of Sun Zhigang, a 27-year-old college graduate who died while in police custody after being detained for failing to carry proper identification. In 2005 Cheng was awarded the UNESCO World Press Freedom Prize in 2005 for his dedication to journalistic professionalism and the pursuit of press freedom.
In his talk at the University of Hong Kong, Cheng said that the minimum responsibility for Chinese journalists should be to do as much as possible within the official limits imposed by the government and Party propaganda officials. Beyond that, “we should try to enlarge the space within the cage, and to urge authorities to fulfill the commitment of freedom of speech,” he said.
Cheng said that Chinese journalists could still accomplish much more without violating China’s constitution — which, he stressed, formally guarantees freedom of expression — and its laws. Rather than waiting for the most ideal external conditions, journalists must use their professional strengths and ideals to promote freedom of expression. Many reporting restrictions in China are plainly unreasonable and even “absurd”, Cheng said, and he urged Chinese media to unite in breaking through them.
Chinese media have managed to break through restrictions for such major stories as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the 2010 Shanghai fire, both of which were initially subject to outright bans on coverage, said Cheng.” Facing big stories like this, the [propaganda department’s] first thought is not how to report them as well and thoroughly as possible but how to cover them up,” Cheng said. “I hope in the future our media will have the courage to say NO to these backwards and absurd news bans.”
As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao issued seven important calls for political reform within a single month last year, this major news story was reported by overseas media but appeared prominently in only two Chinese newspapers. This, Cheng suggested, reflected a deficit in “political conscience, professional ideals, and courage” on the part of Chinese journalists. “Who says political reform can’t be talked about? Do they dare say so publicly?” Cheng said.
One of the most serious outcomes of press control and insufficient monitoring of power in China is what Cheng described as a crisis of credibility. “Credibility is something there’s a serious shortage of in China, and it’s something of great value,” he said.
Cheng raised the recent Qian Yunhui incident, in which a 53-year-old village head in Zhejiang province with a long history of petitioning against alleged abuses by local authorities, died last month after being crushed by a truck. While local authorities continue to insist that Qian’s death was an “accident,” many Chinese refuse to accept the official explanation. Whatever the truth behind the Qian Yunhui incident, said Cheng, it underscores the extreme deficit of credibility facing government power in China.
“Nobody trusts the government no matter what it says and no matter how it says it. Why? It’s a tragedy for the credibility of the state machine,” Cheng said.
Cheng said that reporting the truth was the only real value underlying the media’s existence. “Truth is even more precious than gold for transforming a country with an imperfect legal system and a flawed political system,” he said. And given the extreme deficit in credibility, he said, truth is also a very viable business proposition for the media: “I’m confident that if you offer credibility, you will be profitable. If you respect this fact, you will make money [in this business].”
Concerning the current situation in China and the government’s efforts to suppress freedom of the press, Cheng said these make him “furious and fearful” just as they do others. “However, it’s a lot better than having a gun to my head. This is enough for me.” He said that ultimately the price he had paid for giving journalism his best effort was far lower than he had originally expected and prepared for.

[Photo by AJ Libunao]

In February 2009, the auction house Christie’s auctioned off two bronze sculptures taken by foreign troops from Beijing’s Summer Palace during the Second Opium War in 1860. The fountainheads, a rabbit and a rat, were initially sold to bidder Cai Mingchao (蔡銘超), a man associated with a Chinese state fund whose mission is to locate and repatriate Chinese cultural artifacts. Cai later refused to pay the 28 million Euros he had bid for the two heads, citing moral grounds [Coverage from the Associated Press]. Understandably, many Chinese took this issue personally, a reminder of the ills and indignities China had suffered at the hands of invading foreign armies. Some Chinese commentators, however, cautioned against overly nationalistic emotions surrounding these treasures, and suggested the Summer Palace had been a symbol not of national pride but of imperial greed. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com back in 2009, the bodies of the Summer Palace bronzes attend the Christie’s auction to bid for their own heads, a bald assertion of the absurdity of suggesting that they do not rightfully belong to China.

On January 5, China’s official Xinhua News Agency issued a brief news item reporting that the annual meeting of the country’s top ministers of propaganda, the officials charged with controlling the Party’s message in a vast and growing media industry, had closed in Beijing. Full stop. But the report, accompanied by a photo of China’s two top propaganda apparatchiks and another mystery man, in fact said a great deal more.
The clipped Xinhua story included the following photo of three leaders, noting in two simple lines of text: “On January 5, the National Meeting of Propaganda Ministers closed in Beijing. CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun (李长春) led the meeting, and CCP Central Politburo Member, Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and Central Propaganda Department Minister Liu Yunshan (刘云山) gave the keynote speech.”

Li Changchun is the leader pictured at center, and that’s the propaganda minister, Liu Yunshan, on the far right. But who’s the official on the left? The man is Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), and his role in this story is more important than meets the eye.
A vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and dean of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chen Kuiyuan is strongly associated with China’s hardline left, and his presence in the official news photo from Xinhua is for media insiders in China a tangible sign — a flesh-and-blood cautionary note about the need for media to fall into line in 2011.
It was this same Chen Kuiyuan who wrote an influential essay in the People’s Daily in August 2004 arguing that the greatest legacy left by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), the architect of China’s opening and reform policy, was not reform itself but the so-called “Four Basic Principles, or si xiang jiben yuanze (四项基本原则). A favored political buzzword of China’s conservative left, the Four Basic Principles — sometimes referred to as the “Four Cardinal Principles” — are as follows:

1. We must cleave to the road of socialism
2. We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat
3. We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party
4. We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought

.
In his People’s Daily article, “Adhering to the Four Basic Principles was Deng Xiaoping’s Greatest Achievement for the Project of Socialism in China,” published on August 21, 2004, Chen Kuiyuan attacked proponents of so-called “bourgeois liberalization” and praised Deng Xiaoping for slapping them down in the wake of the Tiananmen protests:

After the political turmoil of 1989, bourgeois liberalization did not manifest as the direct incitement to social unrest, but rather applied its energies to the ideological sphere. In order to conceal its true face, it often resorted to the slogan of “emancipation of thought” (解放思想). Deng Xiaoping rebutted them, saying “emancipation of thought” cannot deviate from the path of the Four Basic Principles, because “emancipation of thought” that deviates from the Four Basic Principles actually means placing oneself in direct opposition to the Party and the people. In order to pass fish eyes off as pearls, they also wore the mask of correcting [the errors of] the “left,” and Deng Xiaoping rebutted them, saying that if the Four Basic Principles were not adhered to, correcting the “left” would become “correcting” [the wrongs of] Marxism-Leninism and “correcting” [the wrongs of] socialism. Deng Xiaoping sharply pointed out that they essentially sought to take China down the road of using capitalism to steer the country by waving the flag of protecting economic reform and opening.

In a year-end address to cadres at CASS in 2004, Chen Kuiyuan spoke of adherence to the Four Basic Principles as the most basic requirement of intellectuals in China, particularly those selected for key positions:

The front line of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences holds an important position in the ideological sphere, and in assessing [scholarly] talent we must first emphasize through and through their political and ideological positions and their academic orientations. Currently in the ideological sphere there is still a struggle over whether or not to support the Four Basic Principles. In assessing and selecting [scholarly] talent we must adhere to political standards, and we cannot select for important positions those who oppose the Four Basic Principles. Adherence to the Four Basic Principles is a most basic requirement, and for the vast majority of scholars it is not a difficult standard to reach, but rather is a basic character and quality with which they should be vested.

The prominent presence of Chen Kuiyuan lends additional credence to the suggestion that the recent national meeting of top propaganda ministers was meant to send a stronger signal to Chinese news media and local Party-governments that they must adhere strictly to “propaganda discipline” (宣传纪律), avoiding coverage of sensitive stories and issues.
Last week, Cao Guoxing (曹国星), a Shanghai-based reporter for the Chinese-language Radio France Internationale (RFI), reported the existence of a ten-points bulletin coming out of the recent ministers’ meeting including specific directives from the Central Propaganda Department. We have not yet confirmed this list with our own sources, but we have learned independently about a number of the orders listed in the bulletin, which supports its authenticity.
Here is a translation of the ten-points bulletin as reported by RFI:

1. Create a favorable public opinion climate for the two holidays [including Spring Festival] and “two meetings” (NPC and CPPCC). Do a conscientious job of channeling [public opinion] on such hot topics as income distribution, the stock market and property market, employment and social security, education and public health and sanitation, and safe manufacturing, explaining the issues and dissolving tensions.
2. Strictly control reporting of disasters, accidents and extreme events, and extra-territorial reporting and monitoring is not permitted for these types of stories. For major disaster and accident reports the central news media will report on developments. No [live] reporting [via reporters from other local media on the scene] (不连线) or direct broadcasting [of such stories] is permitted. [Events in which] less than 10 people die, central media will not issue reports. These are to be reported by local media, and media outside the area where the incident occurs are not to carry out extra-territorial reporting. For general accidents not reported by central media, local media can carry out a reasonable degree of reporting, and media outside the area may not do their own reporting.
3. Reports on demolition and removal [of residents to make way for development projects] must be “grasped safely and reliably”, and [media] “must not cast doubt on” normal demolitions and removals done according to laws and regulations. No public opinion support must be given to exorbitant [property] prices, and not reports must be made of “suicides, self-immolations or public incidents” occurring in the course of violent demolitions and removals. Extreme isolated cases must not be built up [with reporting and editorial treatment], and concentrated or serial reporting cannot be done [for such cases].
4. The Central Propaganda Department orders that various regional online news portals and commercial websites must not without exception (一律不得) hold various national-scale selections of [top influential] news stories or [top influential] news journalists. An awards event held for eight years by Guangzhou’s Southern Weekend has been stopped as a direct result of this order.
5. In the case of reporting of regular mass incidents (群体性事件), central media and media outside the region where the event occurs will not report, and “management” of metro city newspapers must be strengthened. In the case of mass incidents the pointing of blame at the Party and government must be prevented.
6. The Central Propaganda Department orders that [in reporting of] cases of anti-corruption, the trend of “vulgarization” must be stopped. Content may not discuss, debate or question on the issue of political system reforms (政治体制改革), the term “civil society” may not be used, and standing on the opposite side of the government is “strictly prohibited.” The use of media opinions to “replace and interfere with” the opinions of the masses is not permitted.
7. A fully adequate job must be done of carrying out public opinion channeling concerning the property market. Questionnaires on high property prices and online surveys must not be done. [Media] must not make assessments about property price trends on the basis of changes in “any given time and place” (一时一地), and they must not build up extreme examples.
8. No reports whatsoever are permitted on exchange of hukou [or “household registration”] by [residents of] the residential areas of collectively-held villages [in urban areas or urban fringes], or concerning the exchange of contracted land (承包地) for social insurance. No reports are permitted concerning questions being internally discussed, or of research essays by experts or scholars [on these and related issues].
9. Reports on the [annual] Spring Festival migration must be positive. Do not report on problems existing during the Spring Festival, such as “hard-to-get tickets.”
10. The document, “Opinions Concerning the Further Strengthening and Improvement of News Reports on Criminal Cases,” sent down recently by the Central Propaganda Department and the Political and Judiciary Commission (中央政法委), divides [criminal] cases into “significantly grievous” (重大恶性), “grievous” (恶性), “routine” (常发) and “special” (特殊), and makes a clear demand on how cases at various levels are to be reported and grasped [in terms of guidance, or control]. [These stipulations] deal with the problem among metro city newspapers of reports being “too frequent and too careless.”