Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Disney Lands in Shanghai

Shanghai’s First Financial Daily and other Chinese media reported yesterday that a signing ceremony was held on Shanghai on November 5 for Shanghai Disneyland, signaling that construction of the four square-kilometer theme park will formally begin soon. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck step off the plane in Shanghai and are greeted by a entourage of local Chinese characters, including Shanghai Expo mascot Haibao, the Monkey King from the Chinese classic Journey to the West, and Chinese heroine Hua Mulan (about which Disney has already made a film).

Who is "Zheng Qingyuan"?

CMP reported earlier this week about a bold feature page at Sohu.com, one of China’s top internet news portals, that took a not-so-subtle jab at a heavyweight series of official Party editorials appearing recently in People’s Daily under the mysterious assumed name “Zheng Qingyuan” (郑青原). Topping the Sohu page, which was quickly “harmonized” but can be downloaded in PDF form here (Sohu Missing Page 11.2), was an unmistakable visual reference to the disquieted era of the Cultural Revolution, when ideological rancor tore the country apart.


The Sohu feature page dealt with so-called “writing task groups”, or xiezuo xiaozu (写作小组) — referring to teams of editorial writers generating pieces to articulate the voices and viewpoints of specific political interests within the Communist Party — as a unique feature of China’s political environment and history.
Here is the “Editor’s Note” accompanying the feature page:

Lately, a series of articles under the assumed name “Zheng Qingyuan” have sailed into the world, and have been re-posted by major internet portals. Masses of [Chinese] readers have speculated as to who this person is? So suddenly commanding banner positions at major sites, this must be [someone] of no ordinary background. Actually, “Zheng Qingyuan” is not any specific person, but rather is [the name given to] a writing task group. But its “background” is out of the ordinary indeed. In the history of New China [since 1949], these writing task groups have existed all along.

A couple of subsections on the feature page linked to the same Beijing Morning Post article, called “Who is People’s Daily’s ‘Zheng Qingyuan’?” The Sohu page originally containing the article was expunged along with the feature page itself, but is still available elsewhere.
We have a (more or less) full translation of the Beijing Morning Post piece below.
Further down the feature page, Sohu provided a convenient table revealing a number of important “writing task groups” and the specific political interests behind them. The assumed name “Tang Xiaowen” (唐晓文), for example, is used for editorials from the Central Party School. The assumed name Ding Xuelei (丁学雷) is used for the Shanghai Party Committee, representing the city’s top Party leaders. Readers can see the full (unfortunately brief) list by clicking on the link to the feature page PDF at the top of this post.

Who is People’s Daily’s ‘Zheng Qingyuan’?” [original link, now “missing”]
Beijing Morning Post
November 2, 2010
Readers who read the People’s Daily and People’s Daily Online will know that commentaries at the newspaper and website have a pre-eminent place among central Party media. In the past, aside from essays from a number of well-known commentary writers, there have been other bylines, like “Ren Zhongping” (任仲平) and Zhong Zuwen (仲祖文) with unique backing. Ren Zhongping is byline referring to group commentaries by People’s Daily, and a series of influential commentaries on the occasion of the PRC’s 60th anniversary were written under the name “Ren Zhongping,” a writer who is expert at commenting on major affairs, but who is really a group of handsome guys and pretty girls at People’s Daily. These sorts of commentaries have not only tight logic, but are written with literary grace as well, and they are generally well received by readers.
Another name often seen at People’s Daily is “Zhong Zuwen,” who we understand is a name given to commentaries written in the name of the Organizational Department of the CCP Central Committee. So if there is expounding on principles that touch on issues of ideological building (思想建设) or organization building (组织建设) within the Party, these come under the name “Zhong Zuwen.” For example, the study and practice of the scientific view of development (科学发展观), creating excellence (创优争先), and important language about various important movements in the past, are all expounded under the name “Zhong Zuwen.” There is no specific writer behind the name, and the focus is on the importance of the essay, the depth of its thought, and on how its views serve to direct . . .
Plainly, among these two bylines, the political status of the latter is greater than that of the former. While the former (“Ren Zhongping”) is after all the voice of the editorial department at People’s Daily, commentaries from the latter must go through the approval of the Organizational Department.
Following the [recent] Fifth Plenary Conference of the 17th Central Committee, an article under the name “Zheng Qingyuan” (郑青原) appeared to the world at People’s Daily and People’s Daily Online. This is an entirely new name that has never before appeared, and People’s Daily and People’s Daily Online have run three consecutive pieces under this name, including “To Promote Reform With Greater Resolve and Courage,” “Strive for a Brighter Future” and “Moving in a Correct Direction to Reliably Advance Political Reform“. Each article was weightier than the last, particularly the third, an essay that dealt with the sensitive issue of political reform and which was posted to the very top of People’s Daily Online for 24 hours, something itself unprecedented. All of this points to the importance of these pieces under the name “Zheng Qingyuan,” and implies that this “Zheng Qingyuan” is no ordinary writer [or set of writers], something that has piqued the curiosity of readers.
The piece, “Moving in a Correct Direction to Reliably Advance Political Reform” was released after the official bulletin on the resolutions of the Fifth Plenary Conference of the 17th Central Committee, and in an atmosphere in which the high expectations of some people ahead of the conference that there would be [actions on] political system reforms were disappointed. The article was brief and concise, offering a full description and clarification of the major question of political system reforms in our country. The article stated clearly that “the question of what kind of political system [a nation] employs, and what path of political development it takes, is something determined by the will of that country’s masses, and by the specific national circumstances, history and culture of that nation. Looking back on 30 years of opening and reform in our country, [the article said], it was clear that political system reforms had never ceased, that [reforms] had been promoted steadily while keeping to a correct political direction, and that the results obtained had been impressive; [the essay] struck back against a number of overseas media that had criticized our country for “lagging seriously behind on political reforms,” and once again raised Deng Xiaoping’s three standards by which to measure political reform . . .
The raising and emphasizing of these major viewpoints is clearly not something a single individual alone would have the ability to accomplish. Moreover, the conspicuous placement of these articles in People’s Daily and People’s Daily Online suggests that these are articles meant to explain and publicize the spirit of the Fifth Plenary Conference of the 17th Central Committee, and that they set the direction on the issue of political system reforms in the near term. They serve as bugle calls to set the tone, and they are of no ordinary political significance. For the outside world, and for people’s understanding of political reform, they serve to clarify matters and get to the bottom of things (正本清源). Therefore, internet users [in China] have, according to the past tendencies of People’s Daily [in selecting special bylines of this sort], taken [the name] “Zheng Qingyuan” to mean “clarifying matters and getting to the bottom of things. It is understandable that they have drawn wide interest.
However, analyzing the content of the above-mentioned articles, it seems to me that this understanding [of the significance of the pen name] is a more superficial understanding. I think [the name] represents a much higher-level personality or concord, and we can only understand this series of articles from “Zheng Qingyuan” as the public opinion guidance (舆论导向) [emerging from] the level of the politburo. These are the views emerging from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, a masterwork making clear the shared will and ideology undertaken by the whole Party, given an assumed name as befits media practice and other considerations and needs.

China's educated youth face a tough future

China’s so-called “educated youth,” or zhiqing, have played an interesting role in modern Chinese history. The term generally recalls those millions of young people with secondary or university educations who left China’s cities to labor in the countryside beginning in 1953, and especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). But the plight of China’s “educated youth” today is an urgent yet overlooked issue in our country, and its implications are not yet fully clear.
Looking at educated youth in China today, we can divide them into two distinct groups. The first group, those who are privileged by virtue of their access to the resources of wealth and power, principally through their parents, have united themselves through shared privileges and vested interests. They have created their own alliance of educated elites holding leading positions in Chinese society. The second, and much larger, group have become united by their common lack of privilege. Shut outside the halls of wealth and power, this second group has formed a sub-layer of educated youths who conscientiously oppose the mainstream values of Chinese society because they have been systematically shut out. While they possess a definite degree of knowledge and experience, this group has been excluded from dominant state institutions (国家体制内), so they tend to drift without stable employment.
This sub-layer of educated youths and their maturing attitudes have far-reaching implications for Chinese society.


Let’s look first at the makeup of this sub-layer of educated youths, which can be divided into three basic types. First, there are those urban youth who were born in the city, but are unable to find work after college graduation and so drift home to live with their parents. Second, there are youth who were born and raised in the countryside, study at urban universities, and are unable to find work after graduation. Many of these permanently enter China’s cities after graduation, becoming part of what has been called the “ant tribe” (蚁族), young educated drifters living on the margins. Finally, there are those youth who were taken along to the cities as their parents went there in search of migrant labor jobs. They have grown up in the city but identify fully with neither the city nor the countryside. They too remain mostly jobless after attaining a definite level of education.
Among these three groups, the second and third are in most dire need of attention. The sons and daughters of migrant workers are especially critical, as experts estimate that they number around six or seven million, accounting for about 6 percent of the total floating population of 130 million in China’s cities. Moreover, this youth segment accounts for a substantial proportion of the adolescent population living in China’s cities.
If we look at the ideas and identities emerging within this substantial sub-layer of educated youths, we can see important patterns that clue us in to larger problems of inequality and unfairness in our society, and their longer-term implications. The green shoots of these ideas are readily visible on the internet, for example. Emerging now behind every political position, and behind every hot-button social issue, we can see sharply dissenting points of view (反弹观点), standing directly at odds with the predominant values articulated by the state.
These dissenting views arise from the disaffection and resistance of this sub-layer of educated youths. If these emotions, and the real injustices that cause them, continue to develop without relief, they could give rise to a sharp conflict of interests between a significant portion of the public and entrenched state interests.
The current pains facing this sub-layer of educated youths result from a system of exclusion (排斥性体制) in China that has accompanied economic reform and opening. This system of exclusion imposes severe restrictions on social mobility in our country, and puts opportunity overwhelmingly in the hands of the sons and daughters of the rich and politically connected.
Systemic inequality has destroyed the very idea of fairness and equality among this sub-layer of educated youths, and has set them on a path of antagonistic opposition.
It has become extremely urgent, therefore, that those in power deal with the monopolization of political and economic resources by the those with influence and power. Action should be taken to ensure that all people, particularly educated youth who have been denied opportunities, have a fair and equal chance to become upwardly mobile.
At the same time the government must work on the following issues.
The first thing that needs to be done is that we need to better understand the lives, actions and aspirations of these sub-layer educated youths. That is to say, in researching politics in our country, we must turn our focus beyond elite intellectuals. We need to look at the internal structure of disadvantaged people living in our society, and explore the real, root reasons why social conflict and disaffection occur.
We need to foster among China’s sub-layer of educated youths, who have been shut off from the benefits of opening and reform, a basic sense of identification with mainstream Chinese society. For those living in the countryside, this means identification and inclusion with their place of origin. For those living in the cities, this means identification and inclusion in urban communities. All must feel that they are a part of, accepted by, and cared for by the society in which they live.
Government leaders at all levels need to provide these youth with the same public services enjoyed by other locals, and the most important of these is the building of a social safety net.
A version of this article appeared originally at Yu Jianrong’s Blog.

Yu Jianrong

Professor Yu Jianrong is head of the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Born in Hengyang, Hunan Province, in 1962, he studied politics and law at Hunan Normal University in the 1980s, and in 2001 received his post-doctorate in legal studies from Huazhong Normal University. Professor Yu’s writings include “Change in Political Structures at the Village Level in Transitional China,” “Rights Defense and the Modern Rural Population: An Investigation of Hengyang, Hunan” and “Class and the Contemporary Chinese Worker.”

Bold page on Party editorials killed

This afternoon Sohu.com posted a very interesting special page dealing with a recent series of conservative articles appearing in the official People’s Daily, including this one, which we fully translated here at CMP. Topped with a Cultural Revolution-era image of Party writers — an image uncomfortable to many Chinese, who would rather not repeat the ideological rancor of those days — the special page asked who the writer of these editorials, identified as Zheng Qingyuan (郑青原), really is.


The page also included a table revealing the flesh-and-blood people behind a number of prominent official editorial pen names.
We barely had time to pull the content on the page down and save it before the link to the special page was “harmonized.” Many of the links at Sohu for content included on the special page, such as an article from Beijing Evening News headlined, “Who is Zheng Qingyuan?”, were also removed, yielding “404” messages.
Here is a PDF of the full page: Sohu Missing Page 11.2

Cashing in on "Culture"

According to recent Chinese media reports, the Cultural Market Management Office of Weinan (渭南) in China’s northern Shaanxi province, an office under the local Cultural Department, has been running a lucrative racket by charging monthly “management fees” (管理费) of 1,000 yuan to the hundreds of local Internet cafes it is charged with overseeing, and by levying sky-high penalties for the smallest of infractions. Local Internet cafe operators who spoke with Chinese media said the levying of penalty fees generally happened at lavish dinners at which the cafe operators were asked to foot the bill. Media reports said the office’s lucrative rent seeking activities have necessitated the office’s personnel expansion far beyond the eight officials under formal contract (编制). At least 62 additional people are listed as earning wages from the office, and a total of 54 work there regularly. In this cartoon, posted by artist Fan Jianping (范建平) to his QQ blog, an octopus stretches its tentacles of self-interest out of the “Cultural Market Management Office,” grabbing piles of cash from frowning Internet cafes.

Tied to the Land

According to a recent news report in Guangzhou Daily, the official Party newspaper of the southern city of Guangzhou [view on the CMP Media Map], a recent survey of migrant workers in China found that 80 percent of those born before 1980 did not wish to change their rural identity registration, or hukou, in exchange for urban registration. Of those who were willing to change their identity registration, only half said they would agree to relinquish their claims to contract land, or chengbaodi (承包地), in their place of original registration in the countryside. The survey results, if accurate, seem to suggest that many rural migrants still associate the land with security and are unwilling to formally part from it. In this cartoon, posted by the Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, a rural resident holds on tenaciously to his plot of land — even though it is devastated by environmental damage — as a local official tries to yank him away with the promise of a new urban flat. A digger stands behind, suggesting the land is slated for a new development project

Is anyone really secure in China?

When a recent forum in Beijing brought together deans from law schools around the world, the most stirring moment came as Zhou Yongkang (周永康), the most senior Communist Party leader in charge of legal affairs in China, delivered an address stressing his support for a strong legal system. Zhou said China must “comply with the universal principles of law” and “adopt and learn from all great human precedents in the area of rule of law.”
The idea of building a “rule of law culture” is now all the rage in China’s media, and a look at recent major news stories tells us exactly why. Rule of law is no longer just about protecting the rights of the weak in China, but concerns the safety and security of government elites as well.
The first news story to make ripples lately is the bribery case against Long Xiaole (龙小乐), a senior Party official at Wuhan University in China’s inland Hubei province. Not long after the trial began, Long Xiaole told the court his confession had been extracted through torture, involving three consecutive days and nights of interrogation during which he was subjected to beatings and extreme cold. Long’s prosecutors acknowledged dismissively that “the interrogation had been rather long.” But they countered that “there are no laws or regulations [in China] about the length of interrogations, and so there no illegalities were involved.”
Legal scholars, including Ding Dafan (丁大帆), quickly pointed out that China signed and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture more than twenty years ago. Article I of the convention states that “torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession . . . ” Insofar as the convention applies to criminal law in China, any infliction of physical or mental suffering by public officers is illegal and constitutes torture.
The second major news story was the trial of Yang Jiannong (杨建农), a top police official in Hunan province. Shortly before Yang’s arrest, his wife, Chen Ling (陈玲), had made an internet post exposing a hornet’s nest of “dark plots” within the Hunan Public Security Department. Right on the heels of these online revelations, the department announced on its official website that Yang Jiannong was under investigation by provincial discipline inspectors for alleged acts of bribery reaching into the millions.
Both husband and wife are now prisoners. We can only speculate as to what connection this has to Chen Ling’s online muckraking.
Lawyers on the Hunan case have pointed to all sorts of problems in how the cases against Yang Jiannong and his wife have been handled. To begin with, Yang’s telephone line was reportedly monitored secretly while he was serving in his post. According to China’s Criminal Procedural Law, the family of Yang Jiannong’s wife, who was subsequently arrested for “fraudulent registration of assets”, should have been notified within twenty-four hours — they were not. Nor was the paperwork for her arrest handled properly.
Chen Ling has still been unable to meet with her lawyers, Hunan authorities claiming the case deals with “national secrets.” This explanation is ludicrous considering that “fraudulent registration of assets” is a common criminal offense, having nothing at all to do with matters of national secrecy. Everything gives the appearance local authorities are acting as they please, in utter contempt for the law and procedure.
Long Xiaole and Yang Jiannong are elites within China’s political system. They are, to use a popular phrase, “men of men.” But regardless of their privilege and status, their fates are fragile and every step is fraught with danger. Knocked down a notch, they find no more protection for their most basic rights than the most ordinary of Chinese. The system deals with them as it deals with all those who fall through the cracks and find themselves in positions of weakness.
In China, where modern rule of law effectively does not exist, and where experts say more than 70 percent of total social wealth is now concentrated in state hands, the national grab for wealth by those within the system operates by the law of the jungle. There are no rules or boundaries. This means the prospects for those inside the system, like Long Xiaole and Yang Jiannong, are as unpredictable as for anyone else. No one enjoys security, and the nightmare facing Long and Yang is shared by all those in positions of power and privilege. The system offers no guarantees, and might at any moment pull them down into the maelstrom.
We often assume the purpose of rule of law is to protect the weak. But this couldn’t be further from the truth. Rule of law is about protecting the rights of everyone, regardless of how much wealth or power they have, and it should mean anyone can plan for the future with a sense of security.
If China’s ruling elite want this kind of security, the only way forward is developing a culture of rule of law in China. This is why Zhou Yongkang’s words were so timely and understandable. It is not enough for the weak to clamor for rule of law. The resources of our society are not in their hands, after all.
Only when both weak and strong reach a broad consensus on the urgency of this issue can we turn the resources of our country toward the development of rule of law. And only then will change truly come. Clearly, the time is already here.
A version of this article originally appeared in Chinese at Time Weekly. [View Time Weekly on the China Media Map].

Tears of Love for the CCP

According to recent media reports, Li Shujian (李树建), chairman of the Henan Theater Association, said after a recent audience with Henan’s top leader, party secretary Lu Zhangong (卢展工), “I was beside myself with excitement, and my face was washed with tears.” Almost immediately, the phrase, “My face [was] washed with tears,” became an internet sensation in China, Chinese heaping ridicule on this anachronistic expression of fealty to a leader pledged (at least in name) to serve the people. This cartoon, posted by artist Li Jianing (李嘉宁) to his QQ blog, satirizes Li Shujian’s excessive pro-CCP emotion by contrasting it with real public need. At left, a man tries to wash his face but finds no water running in the tap. Li Shujian, at right, perches dramatically on his stage, a toilet, and intones: “Just think of the graces bestowed on us by our leaders, and wash your face with tears!”