Earlier this month Beijing’s Sanwei Shuwu bookstore [blog here] organized a lecture by Xin Ziling (辛子陵) called “The Political Reform Question.” The lecture, scheduled for 3 p.m. on Saturday, October 16, was suddenly cancelled and replaced with another lecture on rule of law by Xiao Han (萧瀚), a professor at China University of Political Science and Law.
Sanwei did not specify the reason for the cancellation, but it should be noted that Xin Ziling was one of the 23 Party elders who penned an open letter on October 11 calling for freedom of speech in China.
Xin, a former official at the China National Defence University, is also the author of The Accomplishments and Sins of Mao Zedong (千秋功罪毛澤東), a book assessing the legacy of Mao.
Xin Jiling’s original lecture for Sanwei Shuwu has now been posted online, and the piece has drawn a flurry of interest today.
A portion of the lecture follows. In it, Xin attacks those who seek, as he sees it, to hijack the political reform debate with the outdated “theory of delimitation” — distinguishing between “proletarian” democracy and “bourgeois” democracy — which he calls a “protective amulet . . . for single-party dictatorship” handed down by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin.
We recommend that readers of Chinese review the comments beneath Xin’s essay at Chinavalue.net, including Xin’s own remarks. There is plenty of discussion there of yesterday’s People’s Daily piece as well, which is a good counterpoint to Xin’s arguments.

The Political Reform Question
October 16, 2010
By Xin Ziling (辛子陵)
Political reforms in China have dragged behind and scarcely budged, retarded by instinctual resistance from networks of influence and power. The protective amulet of their Leninism is the “theory of delimitation” (划界论). I’ve written an essay called, “Challenging One Paper and Two Magazines, Overturning the Theory of Delimitation,” which I posted online. It sets out to thoroughly overturn and shatter this “theory of delimitation.” [NOTE: “One paper and two magazines” (两报一刊) refers to the complete monopolization of the press by political power, particularly under Mao Zedong, but refers more directly in this case to recent pieces of conservatism on political reform appearing in prominent Communist Party newspapers.]
As soon as the winds of political reform start to blow, the writing hands of the mainstream media [NOTE: this means “Party media”] turn out to clearly delimit the issue. They ask whether we are surnamed Proletariat or surnamed Capitalist (姓无姓资), and they draw a clear line between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy. On September 4, the Guangming Daily came out with this piece called, “Two Democracies of Different Natures Must Not Be Confused,” [https://chinamediaproject.org/2010/09/06/7345/]. The same day, the Liberation Army Daily issued a piece written by Jiang Ganlin (蒋干麟), the head of the People’s Liberation Army’s Nanjing Political Studies Academy, which spoke of the need to delimit “four crucial boundaries.” Issue 18 of the journal Seeking Truth ran a piece under the headline, “The Institutional Superiority and Basic Characteristics of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” which also urged the need to “clearly delimit the differences between the democracy of socialism with Chinese characteristics and Western capitalist democracy.” The Party media [NOTE: The term used here is “one newspaper and two magazines.”] are lining up for battle, puffing up for opposition to political reform.
This theory of “delimitation” is a legacy passed down from Lenin, our patriarch, and the representative work in question is, “The Proletarian Revolution and the Traitor [Karl] Kautsky.” Lenin said at the time that “proletarian democracy is more democratic by a factor of 100 than any other form of democracy; Soviet political power is more democratic by a factor of 100 than even the most democratic bourgeois republic.”
[1]. There are two key positions behind this thinking. The first is class theory, that in the democratic system of the proletariat, the worker’s classes, the peasants the masses of ordinary people rule the country, and this has class superiority. Then there is [the superiority arising] from numbers theory, in that the worker’s classes, peasants and the ordinary masses account for more than 90 percent of the national population, and this means superiority of numbers. Lenin said: “The proletarian democratic system (of which Soviet political power is one form) exists for the vast majority of people, and for the expansion of democracy across the world to a level never before seen for the sake of exploited labor.”
[2]. Once these two positions were admitted, the opposition withered. For decades ever after, the Communist Parties of the various socialist nations of the world took this up as their protective amulet, confidently going ahead with their single-party dictatorships.
The people still subscribed to this idea was during the first generation in these socialist nations. Once political power had been violently seized, who would rule if the chiefs did not? With the second generation, a crisis of legitimacy emerged, and by the third generation we had the disintegration of the Soviet Union, dramatic change in Eastern Europe, and new paths of reform and opening in China and Vietnam.
This protective amulet that Lenin created for single-party dictatorship was issued in 1918, more than 90 years ago. There have been fundamental changes since to the proletarian democratic system and the bourgeois democratic system. These fundamental changes can be seen in the transposition of these two. The so-called “proletarian democratic system” has gradually transformed into a system representing a small capitalist elite holding political power (in China and North Korea, for example), and the “bourgeois democratic system” has grown beyond the scope of the wealthy to become a democratic system of the whole people (as in the United States and the nations of the European Union) in which the vote has become a powerful weapon by which ordinary people protect their rights and interests.

Ultimately, the question of what kind of political system a nation employs, and what path of political development it takes, is something determined by the will of that country’s masses, and by the specific national circumstances, history and culture of that nation.

In recent months, China has been immersed in what some, including Du Daozheng (杜导正), director of the editorial board at the journal Yanhuang Chunqiu, have characterized as a newly intensified debate about the country’s future. And much of that debate has centered on the question of political reform.
In the most (dangerously) simplistic terms, the debate pits Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and those advocating political reform — Wen recently said China was at “a great new juncture in our history” and obstructions to reform were a “dead end” and “contrary to the will of the people” — and conservative elements in the Party who are opposed.
In the midst of these debates came the recent decision to award the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), and attacks by official Party media on the Nobel decision have also criticized what they characterize as the foolish deference to Western political ideas of democracy and human rights.
In a piece over the weekend, the official People’s Daily newspaper denounced Western democracy as a “bogus” sham and an “ideological snare” meant to keep the Chinese people enslaved.
The piece also took a jab at Liu Xiaobo, saying he couldn’t possibly understand the “spirit and belief” in socialism that drives the Chinese people on to acts of bravery and selflessness in the face of disaster. Liu was placed snidely in the same sentence at schoolteacher Fan Meizhong (范美忠), known popularly as “Running Fan,” infamous for deserting his students (or so one side of the story goes) to save his own life during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.
Portions of the People’s Daily editorial follow. We also recommend a glance at the comments under the editorial at the Tianya forum, including sarcastic gems like: “Well said! We must firmly oppose the Western road of democracy, and travel instead the Western road of socialism! Aye! Either way, aren’t they both Western?”

The Chinese People Will Not Be Imposed Upon
October 23, 2010
For a long time, certain forces in the West and those sympathetic to them have schemed in the name of political system reforms (政治体制改革) to drag out so-called “constitutional reform” programs involving multi-party systems (多党制) and separation of powers (三权分立), promoting western democracy, freedom, human rights, etcetera, throwing dust in the people’s eyes, confusing the masses, attacking the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system. Essentially, they believe that we must mimic the political systems of the West, and that “the changing of ruling parties” (政党轮替), “separation of powers” (三权分立), “parliamentary democracy” (议会制民主) and such things are the very best things possible, treasures that apply universally all over the world. In ideological terms, this understanding is wrong — in practical terms, it is harmful.
Most of the values trumpeted in the West are bogus, and they don’t even live by them themselves. They advertise that human rights are higher than sovereignty, for example, but do Western countries open their borders to allow populations from developing nations to go to Western nations in search of work, enjoying their clean air and water and sanitary environments? Deng Xiaoping pointed out during his discussions in the south [during his famous “southern tour”] that, “The major questions of world peace and development have not yet been solved.”
Why have they not been solved? One important reason is there is no democracy in the realm of international relations. When has the club of rich nations at the top of the international food chain ever given late-development countries democracy and freedom, relinquishing the discourse and negotiation power they hold? They will not do this. In the Chinese people’s one-hundred year journey toward democracy and freedom, it is not as though they have not attempted to embrace and transplant Western political forms of democracy. But each time they have been strangled by other powers and feudal forces, who want only to give the Chinese people a slavish freedom. Ultimately, it was under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party that the Chinese people overturned imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, and found the path to liberation of our people.
Deng Xiaoping saw the truth of Western democracy when he said: “The democracy spoken of in capitalist societies is the democracy of the bourgeoisie, and in truth it is the democracy of monopoly capital.” For those peoples who are weak, these beautiful trappings are no doubt nothing more than ideological snares.
. . . .
In our social lives, [policewoman] Ren Changxia (任长霞), Wang Ying (王英), [model policeman] Tan Dong (谭东), [model worker] Guo Mingyi (郭明义) and others who worked heroically on the front lines, the officials and soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army taking part in disaster relief work, they risk their lives, fearlessly facing all risks, serving the nation and the people — and what spirit and belief is it that drives them on? It is the spirit of serving the people, this is the soul of the people’s democracy of our socialist political model, and the value orientation of all Chinese.
This is something that the “Running Fans” [a teacher from Sichuan who was said to have fled his classroom during the 2008 earthquake to save his own hide], and the “Liu Xiaobo’s” cannot possibly understand, and it is something various forces in the West utterly detest. Our socialism can overcome the savage aggressors, it can detonate two nuclear devices and send a satellite into space, it can overcome plagues, flood, freezes and quakes — this [socialist spirit] is the magic weapon that sends us Chinese people ever to victory. The Chinese have their own scientific choices to be made for their path of political development. They do not need “Western lessons” from the “great Westerners.”

Editor’s Note: A story from the Associated Press yesterday reported how a display by Chile at Shanghai’s World Expo that highlights the country’s recent success in rescuing 33 trapped miners has raised questions among visiting Chinese about China’s own appalling safety record. “I have to say they respect human life and human rights more than us . . . China should learn from Chile, not just rescue skills, but also their inner spirit,” the AP quoted a retired Chinese professor as remarking after seeing the exhibit. As the AP also noted, the official Xinhua News Agency has reported on the exhibit and the lessons it holds for China. In the following piece, written for China Reform, Yan Changhai (颜昌海), a Shenzhen-based freelance writer and former official, talks about the lessons the recent mining disaster in Chile has for China and its political system. [Frontpage photo by Gwydion Williams available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

What Lessons Does the Mine Disaster in Chile Have for China?
By Yan Changhai (颜昌海)
China Reform
October 21, 2010
When an earthquake struck Chile earlier this year, Chinese internet users took this occasion to compare the disaster to China’s Wenchuan earthquake. They pointed out that Chile’s quake measured 8.8 on the Richter scale, its intensity surpassing that of the Sichuan quake. Moreover, its destructiveness was 15 times that of the Wenchuan quake. But only 800 people died in Chile, compared to close to 90,000 in China, meaning the loss of life was more than 100 times greater than in Chile. The reason for this dramatic difference was that Chile has “the world’s strictest” building standards, and these are strictly enforced. So homes in the country are solid and earthquake resistant. In China, many of the buildings that collapsed, schools in particular, were so-called tofu suds structures of inferior quality. Chile’s democratic system, and its robust market economy, a legacy of the Pinochet years, was also distinct advantages over China in terms of disaster relief.
The recent mine collapse in Chile that drew the attention of the world, in which 33 miners trapped underground for 69 days were all rescued, has once again stood in marked contrast to China’s own handling of mining-related disasters, underscoring for many the differences between the systems and governments in these two countries.
First of all, after the mineshaft collapsed, the government in Chile pursued the matter with full force, not slacking in their rescue efforts regardless of how many days it had been since contact had been made with the miners. In China, we have never seen a case in the event of a mining disaster where the government has treated the situation as a priority above priorities. Chinese internet users remarked that in situations like this (where for half a month there had been not a whisper from the miners), if occurring in China, authorities would have long ago pronounced the miners dead. In Chile, [they said], miners “rose out of the shaft” (were saved, that is), while in China they could only “rise to heaven” (or die beneath the ground).
Secondly, when the miners in Chile were located, they had already been underground for 17 days, and the reason they could survive for so long was that a safety chamber had been prepared deep in the mine, equipped with supplies of oxygen, water and food. In China, miners inform us that they have never seen hide or hair, nor have they ever heard, of the preparation of such things as “safety chambers.” So in the event that mines do collapse, there is no oxygen, no water, no food, and no way to survive for any length of time. When you add to this the number of small, privately operated mines in China that are flouting safety standards, you get China’s world-topping annual statistics for death in mining disasters. In 2009, official Chinese figures put the number of mining deaths at 2,631 (in the US the number was 34). The numbers were highest for 2002, when China had 6,995 deaths in mining disasters. Experts say, however, that the real numbers are higher than those in official figures.
Third, when the mining disaster occurred in Chile, President Sebastian Pinera, who was on a state visit overseas, returned immediately, and he went quickly to the scene to be with the family members of the miners. He stayed in a temporary shelter right outside the mine and personally directed the rescue effort. He was quoted as saying to the First Lady, “We will not rest, day or night, until even one miner is rescued and brought up.” From the beginning to the end, the Chilean president was at the scene. Every miner rescued was hugged by the President and his wife, and given immediate congratulations and comfort. Chinese internet users sighed: how we envy this country where people are treated as human beings, where even the president is close by! No one even knows how Chinese miners die. Not only do top Chinese leaders not go to the scene of the disaster to command the rescue effort, but when media film high-level local leaders [on the scene] they are not depicted in sadness but always wear a smile.
One of the miners trapped in the Chile disaster was a Bolivian national, and after he was rescued he knelt down on the ground, extremely moved. Not only was he embraced by the Chilean president – the president of Bolivia had traveled especially to the scene to take part in the rescue effort and be there when this miner from his own country emerged. The miner was conveyed back to Bolivia in the presidential jet and given a parcel of land. Because those who cross national borders to work as miners are all very poor people.
Fourth, when mining disasters and such incidents occur in China, the first thought of the authorities is to close down the area, prevent media from reporting and keep the rest of the world from finding out. But the scene of Chile’s disaster was opened to the entire world, and 1,700 reporters from all over the world gathered there, filming the actual situation on the scene – and a billion people around the world were following the story. The Chilean government even used fiber optics to show television audiences around the world the real situation of the miners trapped 700 meters below the surface. Chinese internet users sighed: “They even dare to broadcast live to the whole world. And we don’t even let reporters in!”
Fifth, not only did Chile not suppress the news — they were much more open in accepting help from advanced nations. On the scene of the mining disaster, aside from the national flag of Chile, there were American, Canadian and Argentine national flags flying – demonstrating that the rescue effort was an international effort. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which has moon-landing technology, sent an expert team to the scene, advising on nutritional and behavioral health issues. The underground fiber-optic line was provided by Taiwan, the crane was made in China. Chile used technology and expertise from all around the world to carry out the most difficult and most successful rescue known to mankind, accomplishing “an impossible task.” But in China, even during the Sichuan earthquake, during the 72-hour “golden period” in which saving lives is most urgent, the government spurned overseas assistance, turning away even the very experienced earthquake rescue teams from Japan and Taiwan. This was little different from the attitude of the Gang of Four during the Great Tangshan Earthquake [of 1976]. The attitude toward disaster response in mainland China is to put political considerations first, in order to fully ensure the face of the Party and the government, or to protect the secrets of official and corporate special interests. So officials can disregard the lives and safety of people in the disaster area, turning away the advanced technologies, equipment and experience of foreign nations – or they can postpone the entry of foreign disaster relief teams, resulting in greater loss of life and property. These are things with which we’ve become familiar in the Tangshan earthquake, the Wenchuan earthquake and other natural disasters, as well as in perhaps all mining disasters.
China places its emphasis on politics, on what is beneficial to [Party] rule. Chile, on the other hand, places its emphasis on life, on the government being responsible to the people. Chinese media reported during this recent disaster how a Chinese made crane was used in the rescue effort. They said that the Chilean government chose this “San Yi” crane among many different brands. In fact, what this tells us is that the focus of the Chilean government was on the miner’s lives, and they thought nothing of equipment’s country of origin as they engaged in the rescue. It also tells us about the government’s openness and transparency, in which no details were covered up. Seen the other way around, this focus tells us about the lack of respect given in China to the lives of miners, because we’ve never seen such “San Yi” cranes being used on the scene of mining disasters in our own country. In China, human life is worth nothing, and certainly not worth the employment of advanced machines.
. . . . [Portions of the essay here have not been translated for the sake of length].
Chilean disaster relief efforts tell the Chinese people: only a government chosen by the people can put its whole heart into the people. The barrel of the gun may give rise to political power, but never will it serve the public . . . .

Much research on the transformations in China’s media landscape is now available from communications scholars inside China. And while much of this research is overgeneralized (looking expansively at the impact of commercialization, for example), repetitive (the ubiquitous thesis paper looking quantitatively at “negative” coverage of China in the Western press) and ideological (failing to look critically at the role of the government or at its policies), it can often provide us with some good general bearings in looking at media change in China.
The following paper suffers from all of the aforementioned faults. There are thousands of other papers like it, all talking in general terms about the changes new media have brought to China’s traditional media landscape — and to the process of agenda setting, or yicheng shezhi (议程设置). It makes naive assumptions — because it must? — about shows of openness by Party and government leaders. Was the “eluding the cat” affair of 2009, in which a team of “internet users” was cobbled together to “investigate” a case of wrongful death, really a simple demonstration of the power of the internet and a gesture of official openness? Or was it a propaganda sideshow that nevertheless tells us how the internet can shape news stories and how the government deals with them?
For all of its problems and blind spots, however, this paper, published in the most recent issue of Today’s Mass Media — a magazine published by the Shaanxi Administration of Press and Publications — provides an informative look at how the mechanisms of public opinion in China have changed over the past ten years as a result of the internet and new media. [Frontpage Photo: Tiananmen Square in Beijing, by Marcusuke available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons attribution license.]
We have not translated with the latter sections of the paper, which deal with how the government can rise to the challenges of China’s changing media landscape and better “channel” public opinion.

The Development and Channeling of Chinese Online Public Opinion Over the Past Decade
Today’s Mass Media
Xie Wenya (谢文雅), People’s University of China
October 21, 2010
The sheer scale of online public opinion in our country is massive, and according to figures released by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) the number of internet users in China has already surpassed 300 million. From People’s Daily Online’s set up of online forums in 1999 to oppose the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, to making a comprehensive surveys of major news stories in recent years, online media have been active participants, and they have manufactured public opinion through the selection of news reports, comments on the news, interactive blogs, news forums and other means. This [mechanism for] public opinion feedback and the [resulting] build up of the public sphere (公共领域) has reached a point where control authorities and all those concerned cannot possibly dismiss them.
Over the past ten years, online public opinion has passed through three stages of infancy (初生), development (发展) and expansion (壮大), and the [internet’s] influence has thoroughly permeated [Chinese] life. The government has also groped its way through the process of online public opinion channeling in each major online public opinion incident occurring over the past ten years, resulting in the emergence of a relatively mature ideological framework and strategy for channeling [of online public opinion].
1. The Infancy Stage of Chinese Online Public Opinion: 1999-2002
It was in 1994 that our country officially connected comprehensively with the internet, and after this web’s influence entirely and profoundly seeped into people’s political, economic and cultural lives, becoming an important means and method for news media events. In the year 2000, our country’s internet technology entered the Web 1.0 era, which drove the development of internet technologies and began in earnest the [environment of] online public opinion. Peng Lan (彭兰), the scholar of online broadcasting, believes that May 9, 1999, when People’s Daily Online set up the Strong Nation Forum to organize resistance to the bombing on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade [by U.S.-led NATO forces] was a landmark moment for domestic websites in becoming platforms for the expression of public opinion. However, owing to limitations in internet technology and computer penetration, online public opinion had not yet been systematized and popularized. Only when major incidents happened, particularly major political events, did people turn to internet forums to express their own opinions. But language was routinely deleted or limited by forum managers, and so their influence was still relatively weak, and generally speaking this phase merely opened the curtain for the development of online public opinion [in China].
2. The Development of Online Public Opinion in China: 2003-2004
It was in 2003 that Chinese online public opinion developed to the point of real strength. In discussions surrounding the outbreak of SARS, the Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) case, the Liu Yong (刘涌) case, the Iraq War, the “BMW death case” (宝马车撞人案) and other major stories, online public opinion became an important pivotal force influencing the development of these cases. Some even dubbed 2003 “the year of online public opinion” (网络舆论年), a landmark year in which online public opinion moved out of the fringes and into the mainstream. From this point on online public opinion grew stronger, constituting a very lively sphere of public discourse (公共话语空间). Discourse also moved from more peripheral issues to more mainstream issues such as social development, national strengthening, social and political stability.
It was also in this year that online public opinion influenced the government and policy for the first time, becoming a monitor and check on government power and authority, promoting judicial fairness through immense public opinion pressure. This had landmark significance for online public opinion, and even for public opinion in a broader sense. As a result of the death of Sun Zhigang [and subsequent reporting and opinion] the system of detention and repatriation . . . was ushered into the past. The same year, the case surrounding [Shenzhen gang leader] Liu Yong was a force promoting reform of China’s judicial system. Forums were no longer merely virtual online communities, but were already vested with the real characteristics of a public sphere. China’s masses increasingly turned to the internet to express their demands, participate in social and political life, monitor government power and influence the public policies of the government. After 2003, as a relatively open public platform, the new media of which the internet was representative has an increasingly powerful influence in the areas of social discourse, administrative supervision (行政监督), and the framing of public opinion.
During this phase, one reason for the rapid development of online public opinion was lack of openness of government information, and restrictions and even outright blockades on information at its source, so that traditional media had no way of carrying out timely and effective propagation [of news and information], and the people meanwhile had an urgent demand to understand relevant information and make their views known. Under this situation, the internet came along to fill the space left unoccupied by traditional media, fulfilling the media role that society needed. As SARS was raging, for example, and the government clamped down on relevant information, traditional media remained silent under government pressure. In the midst of panic, people had no way of getting information through the normal channels and could only turn to the internet forums for information.
3. The Strengthening of Online Public Opinion: 2005-present
In recent years, Web 2.0 has become the bright point on the internet. Web 2.0 has first and foremost resolved the need for interpersonal communication, exchange, interaction and participation. It is vested with a strong autonomy (自主性) and flexibility (灵活性) . . . As [Professor] Yu Guoming (喻国明) has said, “As a new communications tool, Web 2.0 has given people an extreme degree of autonomy through the three characteristics of personalization (个性化), decentralization (去中心化) and information decision-making power (信息自主权)” [1]. Under Web 2.0, blogs, podcasts and other personal media (自媒体) have expanded the space for releasing information, expressing views and carrying on conversation. Many topics of discussion are now first raised in blogs and other personal media, and after heating up as topics through online interaction and taking on definite influence in terms of online public opinion are taken up by traditional media, which follow up with more in-depth reporting. Along with the development of blogs, podcasts and other personal media, ordinary members of the public can freely share information and express their views. Ordinary people can also break news stories (for example popular news), participate in the discussion of state affairs, and contribute policy ideas (for example through the Strong Nation Forum at People’s Daily Online). They can also promote various social activities online (such as boycotts of Carrefour, or anti-Japanese protests). Web 2.0 technologies have made personal media become a new force in the overall communications mix (传播格局), having a mutual effect with traditional media, and they have strongly promoted the development of online public opinion.
In this phase of development there is no denying that online public opinion has had a revolutionary impact on the traditional public opinion structure. This impact is evidenced first and foremost in the fact that online public opinion already constitutes a mainstream force in interactions between the government and the people. In 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) responded to the words of English web users at a news conference during the two meetings [of the National People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Congress] and expressed in a pragmatic gesture the importance the government placed on online public opinion and popular counsel. On June 20, 2008, President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) interacted directly with internet users on People’s Daily Online’s “Strong Nation Forum” during a tour of People’s Daily, thoroughly showing the priority our national leaders and government place on online public opinion, and closing the distance between the government, rights and the people. During the “eluding the cat” affair of 2009, the organizing by propaganda authorities in Yunnan of a team of internet users to investigative the case was an affirmation of the strength of online public opinion, and was a strong show of the government opening up government information.
Another sign of the influence [of online public opinion] is the effect it has had on the nature of news reporting [in China]. Under the traditional public opinion environment, the traditional media had the authority to set the public agenda and create public opinion. In terms of agenda setting and broadcast effectiveness, online media have impacted traditional news. In recent years, online media have interacted with traditional media, and have even set the agenda for traditional media. This interactive role of the internet has provided the traditional media with news sources, and the reports produced by traditional media on the basis of these sources is also amplified by means of dissemination and discussion via the internet, attaining or surpassing the anticipated level of influence.