Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
As cities in Ukraine are reduced to scenes of devastation, and as Russian forces step up their deadly assaults in the country’s west, one might think the closing ceremony of the Beijing 2022 Paralympic Winter Games on Sunday would have little hope of making today’s headlines. But the Games are the major story, and the only story, on the front page of the People’s Daily newspaper today.
This is the day’s top news on a day when US national security adviser Jake Sullivan is in Rome for talks with China’s top foreign affairs official, Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), that could have a dramatic impact on the course of events in Europe, and for the world. This is the news as there are reports that Russia has asked China for military equipment to support its war against Ukraine, a request that is sure to be discussed at the Rome meeting.
On the one hand, the People’s Daily page is a portrait of the acute myopia and chronic tone deafness that prevails at the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper. On the other hand, the page does convey important information. It serves as a reminder, at this key juncture for US-China relations and the war in Ukraine, that the top-most priority for China’s leadership this year is the 20th National Congress, which is expected to seal Xi Jinping’s dominance as leader of the Party.
To a great extent, China’s internal power politics, and how Xi Jinping chooses to understand and define his own leadership prospects, will define the prospects for broader peace.
In the main article on the closing ceremony of the Paralympic Winter Games, Xi Jinping and the other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee, all in attendance, are primary. They are announced in the first paragraph, right at the start of a listing out of the glorious successes of the host country, of China’s 18 gold medals, of the music and fireworks of the ceremony itself. And they round out the article too:
Fireworks with the words “Beijing 2022” bloomed over the stadium amidst the heavenly singing of the children of the blind children’s choir.
Members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, the First Secretary of the Central Secretariat, the Vice-Secretary of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. . . . and members of the Central Military Commission attended the closing ceremony.
There is no talk whatsoever of the challenges facing the world, of the need for peace, or even of the “Olympic spirit.” There is mention of the address given by International Paralympic Committee President Andrew Parsons, who reportedly called the Games “amazing, safe and reliable, wonderful and extraordinary.” But there is no mention of the faint hint in Parsons’ address of the troubles facing the world: “During the darkest of times,” he told the athletes, “your performances shone brightly.”
A separate article right next to the masthead reported a congratulatory note sent by China’s State Council to China’s Paralympic athletes. It said that the athletes had “fully demonstrated the results of China’s human rights protection and national development.” But the article concluded, predictably, with a focus on the glories of the CCP under Xi Jinping, and mention of Xi’s “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), marking his legacy:
At present, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, the whole Party and the people of all nationalities are moving forward with vigor toward the second centennial goal. We hope that you will all, with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as your guide, carry forward the glorious tradition of sports for people with disabilities . . . .
Even on such a day of reckoning for peace in our world, power signaling about Xi Jinping’s status is the primary and core concern of the CCP. The front-page news in the People’s Daily gives us an image of Xi standing, an image of Xi waving – but nothing whatsoever to indicate what, behind his red mask, Xi Jinping might be thinking or planning.
“We meet on the path of peace”
If there was any reference to the world in the closing ceremony of the Beijing 2022 Paralympic Winter Games, it seems to have been the anthem that boomed out as “the national stadium at night was glittering” and Xi Jinping walked to the podium, along with his wife, Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛), and members of the Standing Committee.
The anthem, “Peace: Community of Destiny” (和平 – 命运共同体), was written by composer Guan Xia (关峡) and lyricist Zhu Hai (朱海) as part of a campaign by the Central Propaganda Department from 2014 to compose thematic national anthems on the “Chinese dream.” It was unveiled ahead of the 70th anniversary of the PRC in 2019, and it has appeared at a number of events having to do with China’s foreign relations. It was played, for example, on October 26, 2021, as China marked 50 years of membership in the United Nations, when the People’s Daily reported that “Xi Jinping stepped into the venue amidst the music of ‘Peace: Community of Destiny,’” and “the venue erupted in applause.”
Sheet music for “Peace: Community of Destiny” (和平 – 命运共同体), was written by composer Guan Xia (关峡) and lyricist Zhu Hai (朱海).
The title of the song is a reference to Xi Jinping’s foreign policy notion of a “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体), the phrase that was written into China’s Constitution in a 2018 amendment (along with an amendment abolishing term limits for the presidency). The idea of a “community of common destiny” is associated with the CCP’s conviction that the international order must be re-made, promoting “more democratic international relations” — as the concept was conveyed through Xi’s joint statement with Putin just over a month ago.
We should remember that the joint statement, signed just over two weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, included Russia’s formal acknowledgement of “the significance of the concept of constructing a ‘community of common destiny for mankind’ proposed by the Chinese side to ensure greater solidarity of the international community and consolidation of efforts in responding to common challenges.”
And how are we now to understand this Russian acknowledgement, and the significance of Xi’s foreign policy concept, in light of Ukraine’s wanton destruction? In the days and weeks to come, “Peace: Community of Destiny” could become an anthem for many things. For peace? Perhaps. But possibly for saccharine falsehood, double-speak and inaction. Or even for the cynical rationalization of war.
PEACE: COMMUNITY OF DESTINY The garland of life never fades 生命的花环永不凋谢 blooming in the path of peace. 盛开在和平之路 The dignified light of righteousness shines like the moon and sun 正义的尊严光耀日月 illuminating the future. 照亮前途
We remember the sufferings of the past. 曾今的苦难我们记住 Peace is the only way. 和平是唯一的通途 All people yearn for a better world 美好的世界人人向往 together with love. 与爱共赴
“Peace: Community of Destiny” is performed during commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the PRC in 2019.
We meet on the path of peace. 相约在和平之路 Love has never stilled its steps. 爱从未停下过脚步
We move forward on the path of peace 前进在和平之路 and dreams touch down where the flowers bloom. 梦正在花开处着陆
The beautiful Silk Road unfolds with the sunrise. 美丽的丝路伴随日出 Warm blessings pass from hand in hand. 牵手起温暖祝福 Heart and hand, our destiny is joined, 我们的命运心手相连 stopped by neither wind nor rain 风雨无阻
Happy days are no longer distant 幸福的日子不再遥远 We share this journey of joy 共享这快乐旅途 Our future sparkles across the land 我们的未来灿烂天地 as together we build our homeland. 家园共筑
We meet on the path of peace. 相约在和平之路 Love has never stilled its steps. 爱从未停下过脚步
We move forward on the path of peace 前进在和平之路 and dreams touch down where the flowers bloom. 梦正在花开处着陆 We move forward on the path of peace 前进在和平之路
Throughout most of the world, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is “Russia’s war.” But as international media have reported, China has refused to talk about an “invasion” or a “war” in the two weeks since Vladimir Putin launched his military attacks. In its first press conference on February 24, the day attacks began, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs set the tone by saying that China had noted Russia’s “special military operation in eastern Ukraine.”
Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) seemed finally to break the pattern Thursday in a meeting with his French counterpart, Jean-Yves Le Drian, in which he said that China supports “a ceasefire to stop the war.” Nevertheless, voices critical of Putin, or even calling for peace, continue to be systematically removed from Chinese social media platforms, and content critical of Ukraine and the West, particularly the United States, proliferates.
To examine China’s framing of “Russia’s war” more closely, the China Media Project studied a randomized sample of reports over the past seven days. From among 721 total reports returned in the Wisenews database including the term “Russia-Ukraine” (俄乌) in mainland China, we isolated a subset of these reports including the word “war” (战争), yielding a total of 114 articles (87 print and 27 online). Randomizing these results we focused on just 25 articles for analysis.
The “war” references in our set of Ukraine-related stories were not necessarily labels applied to the conflict in Ukraine, but they could sometimes offer interesting insights into when and how Chinese media use “war” in reference to the war, its causes, and its development.
Operation, Conflict and War
Of the articles studied in our sample 12 were from the Global Times (环球时报), accounting for 48 percent of the total. It is clear that the Global Times is a dominant voice when it comes to the coverage of foreign affairs in China, and it has had an outsized presence in overall overage of the Russian-Ukraine war. The only other news sources to have multiple articles on our sample were the official China News Service (2), and China Agricultural Info Web (中国农业信息网), a comprehensive agricultural information platform that was launched in 1996 by the Information Center of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (2).
How was the war in Ukraine identified in the CMP sample? And how did articles in the sample use the word “war”?
A sizable group (10 articles) referred to the war as the “Russia-Ukraine conflict” (俄乌冲突), while a slightly smaller number (7 articles) referred to the war as a “special military operation” (俄罗斯军事行动). Next came “Russia-Ukraine war” (俄乌战争) with a total of four articles, followed by “Russia-Ukraine military conflict” (俄乌军事冲突), “Russian military operation” (俄罗斯军事行动) and “this war” (这场战争) with one each.
One fact we can note immediately is that while the war has generally not been called a war over the past week in the Chinese media, with 80 percent of media referring to it as some form of “operation” or “conflict,” the “special conflict” language is by no means universal, and there is some slight variation, suggesting that there may be some grey areas when it comes to propaganda-related restrictions and how these are being applied.
“Special Military Operation”
Beginning with the label “special military operation,” it quickly becomes clear that this is label being used almost exclusively by central-level media and newswires. The 10 articles including the term come from five media sources, including the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (深圳特区报), Guangxi Daily (广西日报), Shanghai Morning Post (新闻晨报), the Global Times and China News Service. But there are in fact just three sources for these syndicated stories: Xinhua News Agency, China News Service and the Global Times. The Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, Guangxi Daily, and the Shanghai Morning Post all run reports from Xinhua News Agency.
While two of the Global Times stories in our subset use the term “special military operation,” it’s worth noting that the newspaper actually varies in its use of labels, most often referring to the war as the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” but also referring to it in two separate articles as the “Russia-Ukraine war.”
Here are several of the contexts in which “war” is mentioned in articles referring to the war as a “special military operation,” arranged chronologically:
Global Times March 8, 2022 Headline: “U.S. mulls more extreme sanctions, Russia publishes ‘unfriendly list,’ Russia vows to accomplish operational goals in Ukraine” (美国酝酿更极端制裁 俄方公布”不友好名单”俄誓要完成在乌行动目标)
[Regarding sanctions on Russia] If this measure is put into action, it will inevitably further anger Russia and increase the risk of war spillover.
AFP said it would be the first event Lavrov has attended abroad since the war led to Russia’s isolation by the West.
Global Times March 9, 2022 Headline: “Safeguarding national assets and making it harder for foreign companies to exit, Russia strikes back at Western economic sanctions” (维护本国资产安全 增加外企退出难度 俄出手回击西方经济制裁)
The secretary of the General Committee of the United Russia party, Andrei Turchak, said the party proposes to nationalize the factories of foreign companies that announced their withdrawal from the Russian market and stopped production in Russia during the special military operation against Ukraine. According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant on [March] 8, he said that the West’s “sanctions war” against Russia, which includes not only the government but also private companies, is tantamount to “deliberate bankruptcy.”
China News Service March 9, 2022 Headline: “Zelensky asks the West, “Where is the aid?” — will the situation in Ukraine change? (泽连斯基质问西方”援助在哪”，乌克兰局势将变?)
On [March] 8, after realizing that NATO is not ready to accept Ukraine, Zelensky said that he “has lost interest in this matter.” He believes that NATO is “afraid of confrontation with Russia.” Zelensky stressed again that he is ready to open a dialogue with the Russian side. “There should be an end to the war, and we should sit down and negotiate.” The Ukrainian side can seek a compromise with Russia on “how to live” with the people of the Crimea and Donbas regions, he noted.
Shanghai Morning Post (Xinhua News Agency) March 11, 2022 Headline: “Ukraine’s foreign minister: the parties failed to make progress on a ceasefire” (乌克兰外长：双方在停火问题上未能取得进展)
According to Xinhua, Ukrainian Foreign Minister [Dymtro] Kuleba said on October 10 that Ukraine and Russia have failed to make progress on the ceasefire issue and he is ready to continue negotiations with the Russian side to end the war.
In all four of these examples, it is clear that responsibility for “war” lies with Ukraine and with the West. In the case of both the China News Service report and the Xinhua report via the Shanghai Morning Post, the implication is that “war” is something for the Ukrainian side to stop by coming to the table – not something that has been waged against the country. In both of the Global Times reports, the only act of “war” is the “sanctions war” (制裁战争) that has been brought on Russia by the West, and which risks “war spillover.”
“Russia-Ukraine Conflict”
Here are several of the contexts in which “war” is mentioned in articles referring to the war as the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” arranged chronologically:
Shanghai Morning Post March 6, 2022 Headline: “Self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology to win the initiative of development” (以科技自立自强赢得发展主动)
The sanctions and counter-sanctions between the U.S. and the West and Russia are a game at the level of war.
Global Times March 9, 2022 Headline: “Russia says destruction of U.S. nuclear facilities was ‘self-directed’” (俄称乌核设施被毁是”自导自演”)
[IAEA Chief] Groce said, “We must act to help avoid a nuclear accident in Ukraine that could have serious consequences for public health and the environment. We can’t afford to wait.” He also said he was prepared to meet with officials from both countries at a location agreed to by Ukraine and Russia to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities in the event of an escalating war in the future, which would require ensuring the “physical integrity, communication channels and supply chain” of nuclear facilities.
Beijing Youth Daily March 11, 2022 Headline: “Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers meet in Antalya, Turkey” (俄乌外长在土耳其安塔利亚举行会晤)
The meeting took place in the small town of Belek outside Antalya. After the meeting, the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers held separate press conferences on the meeting, with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba saying that the Ukrainian and Russian sides had failed to make progress on the ceasefire and that he was ready to continue negotiations with the Russian side to end the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia is ready to continue dialogue with Ukraine.
Beijing Daily March 11, 2022 Headline: Paradox of sanctions against Russia highlights Europe’s strategic autonomy dilemma (对俄制裁悖论凸显欧洲战略自主困境)
Since the Crimean War in 2014, the EU has failed to make substantial progress in reducing its energy dependence: in 2020, total EU gas imports from Russia are 26% higher than in 2010.
As in the previous examples, these mentions of “war” in the context of the “Russia-Ukraine conflict” largely place responsibility with Ukraine and the West. It is Ukraine, in the Global Times story, that has (according to Russia sources) destroyed its own nuclear facility at Chernobyl, exposing all to “serious consequences.” It is the Ukrainian side that is mentioned in relation to “war” in the context of negotiations. And the only obvious “war,” as clear in the Shanghai Morning Post story, is that instigated by the US through its sanctions.
“Russia-Ukraine War”
Here are several of the contexts in which “war” is mentioned in articles referring to the war as the “Russia-Ukraine war,” arranged chronologically:
Xinmin Weekly March 7, 2022 Headline: “Witnessing Her Decline” (眼見她的衰落)
[About Sun Guang, a student studying abroad in Ukraine]: That was also the most difficult time Sun Guang had experienced in Ukraine before this recent Russian-Ukrainian war broke out.
In the early hours of February 24, 2022, Russia launched a war against Ukraine, and artillery fire rang out in Kiev immediately afterwards. Sun Guang was the first to call his Chinese friends he knew from all over Ukraine, urging them to be safe and offering to help at any time.
China Agricultural Info Web March 9, 2022 Headline: “Wheat is starting to cool down, what about corn?” (小麦开始降温，玉米呢)
As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict escalates, international food prices have soared. Since the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on February 24, international wheat and oil have risen several times, and corn is also climbing. On March 7, corn futures at the Chicago Board of Trade closed with mutual gains and losses, but trends were weak overall. With our country’s integration into the international community, the global butterfly effect impacting us [in China] is quite high. Xinhua News Agency commented that the Russia-Ukraine war has prompted a spike in energy and commodity prices, including wheat and other grains, further exacerbating inflationary pressures stemming from supply chain disruptions and the recovery from the covid epidemic. Affected by the war, Black Sea ports have suspended transport.
China Agricultural Info Web March 9, 2022 Headline: “Foreign sugar continues to rally, Zheng sugar futures prices stabilize and rebound” (外糖继续反弹 郑糖期价企稳回升)
Friday night raw sugar futures prices continue to rise, coupled with the continued sharp rise in crude oil prices, and this is expected to boost the trend of Zheng sugar futures prices today. Last week, sugar futures prices rebounded weakly and positions dropped significantly. Last week the Russia-Ukraine war opened, resulting in the price of crude oil rose sharply, affecting the Brazilian sugar alcohol ratio, which in turn affected the supply of raw sugar in the international market, foreign sugar prices continued to move higher.
Global Times March 10, 2022 Headline: “Russia plans to investigate US biological lab in Ukraine” (俄计划调查美在乌生物实验室)
The fate of U.S. biological laboratories in Ukraine has raised strong concerns since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. U.S. government data show that Washington has 26 biological laboratories and other related facilities in Kiev. Russian forces have found more than 30 biological laboratories in Ukraine that could produce biological weapons, according to the Russian newspaper Opinion. At a U.S. Senate hearing on the 8th, [Under Secretary of State Victoria] Nuland also claimed that if there is a biological or chemical weapons attack in Ukraine, then Russia must be behind it.
Global Times March 10, 2022 Headline: “Famous Russian designer is ‘banned’” (俄知名设计师被”封杀”)
The New York Post reported on August 8 that Ralph Toledano, the Fédération de la Haute Couture et de la Mode, the organizer of Paris Fashion Week, had confirmed to the media that [Russian designer] Valentin Yudashkin had been “banned,” saying that the organizer had tried to find out the designer’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war, but it was clear that he was on the Russian side. Toledano also said that Yudashkin’s ties to the Russian military were an important factor in the organizers’ decision to ban him from attending.
Among these five stories in our subset using the term “Russia-Ukraine war,” only the first Global Times story clearly follows the pattern of anti-American coverage, essentially passing along discredited Russian propaganda about the presence of US biological weapons facilities in Ukraine. The second Global Times story is plays it rather straight in sharing a report from the New York Post about the exclusion of Russian designer Valentin Yudashkin from Paris Fashion Week. The Global Times, in fact, has been rather inconsistent in its labelling of the war, though reports blaming the West have predominated at the outlet. In several stories today (here and here), the outlet persists in calling the war a “special military operation.”
China Agricultural Info Web is an interesting exception in coverage of the war. It has no explicit agenda, other than informing its target audience about corn futures and sugar prices, and the “Russia-Ukraine war,” which is has no problem calling a war, is simply important background.
But the first story in the “Russia-Ukraine war” list above is worth singling out because it is a reminder, however faint, that professional reporting, and more creative thinking about stories, still persists in China even under the thick cloud cover of domestic media control and the opportunistic pushing of pro-Russian and anti-West propaganda. Based in Shanghai, Xinmin Weekly is published by Shanghai United Media Group (SUMG), which also publishes Jiefang Daily, the Shanghai committee of the CCP. Xinmin Weekly is part of what could now be considered the old guard of professional journalism emerging in China from the 1990s under an environment of commercial experimentation in the media.
In reporting on Ukraine, Xinmin Weekly takes the interesting approach of writing a feature story centered on Sun Guang (孙光), a 19 year-old Chinese student in Ukraine whose life is upended by the war. The story opens unflinchingly: “In the early hours of February 24, 2022, Russia launched a war against Ukraine . . . “
“Witnessing Her Decline,” a story in Xinmin Weekly about Ukraine that tells the story of Sun Guang (孙光), a 19 year-old Chinese student studying in the country.
Another interesting outlier in our subset is story #21, which happened to come from Caixin Weekly (财新周刊), the business and current affairs magazine published by Caixin Global under the professional leadership of Hu Shuli (胡舒立). This is the story in our group referring to the war in Ukraine simply as “this war” (这场战争), and it is – as one would generally expect from Caixin – in a class of its own.
Called “Russia and Ukraine Reorganize the World” (俄烏重組世界), the cover story appeared on March 7, in the last edition of the magazine. Like the Xinmin Weekly story, it begins with a reference to the “war” in Ukraine that does not pull punches:
In the midst of this war in the spring of 2022, the Crimean Peninsula, the site the last major conflict over sovereignty between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, has become a key departure point for the Russian military’s offensive push deep into Ukraine.
Not only does the Caixin Weekly story begin with acknowledgement that the current conflict is a “war” and not a “special military operation,” but it also provides a clear and active sense of Russia as the primary agent, its “offensive” pushing deep into Ukraine.
Though just two cases in a torrent of US-blaming, West-shaming Chinese content on Ukraine, the Caixin Weekly and Xinmin Weekly stories are a reminder that central-level newswires, the Global Times and the foreign ministry are not a complete reflection of Chinese views. Nor are they fully reflective of Chinese reporting. Despite the immense changes under Xi Jinping, and despite the preponderance of “pro-Moscow posturing” on Chinese social media, professionalism in the Chinese journalism and information space can still be quietly insistent.
In open and democratic societies, the university press serves a special role in publishing academic work that has been reviewed by the scholarly community. Through books, journals and reference materials, university presses often help to ensure that research insights, including those that might be overlooked or underappreciated, are made accessible in order to broaden conversations within and across disciplines.
In China, this role is complicated and interrupted by the demands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is keen to see works reviewed prior to publication not just for their intellectual value but also for their political fitness. As sensitivities in China intensify ahead of the 20th National Congress of the CCP this fall, one university press has announced that it is going the extra mile to ensure its political i’s are dotted and t’s are crossed.
On February 23, China Renmin University Press, an academic publishing house affiliated with Beijing’s Renmin University of China (RUC), which is known for its relative strength in the humanities and social sciences, announced that it was forming a Political Content Review Committee (政治内容审读委员会). The committee, which held its first training session after the formal inauguration of the group, will be tasked with reviewing the roughly 3,600 titles the press releases each year to ensure that they abide by what the CCP calls “political guidance” (政治导向), or “guidance of public opinion” (舆论导向) – essentially, the enforcement of control over facts and ideas to support the political stability of the regime.
Members of the Political Content Review Committee at China Renmin University Press attend their first training session on February 23, 2022.
In a speech to mark the formal launch of the committee, the head of the press, Li Yongqiang (李永强), said its purpose was to maintain a grasp of “political guidance” as well as product quality in the midst of the current climate in which “ideological work is steadily increasing.” Members of the Political Content Review Committee, said Li, would need to “have boundaries under their pens” (笔下有边界) – meaning that they would need to apply political standards consistently as they reviewed works to be published.
Li added that they must be “adept at discovering [political] problems” (善于发现问题) as well as resolving them, “clearly distinguishing the good and the bad in the sea of information” (海量的信息中明辨是非优劣).
Making headlines on Hong Kong yesterday was news that Xi Jinping had issued a directive to the government in the special administration region urging officials to bring the worsening Covid-19 outbreak there under control. According to front-page reports in both the Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po, state-owned newspapers operated under the Chinese government’s Central Liaison Office, Xi urged the Hong Kong government to take “all necessary measures” to contain the territory’s Omicron-fueled outbreak.
In characterizing the directive from Xi, reportedly conveyed to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam by Politburo Standing Committee member Han Zheng (韩正), both papers used the phrase “important instructions,” or zhongyao zhishi (重要指示). Han then urged the Hong Kong government to “implement the spirit” of Xi’s “important instructions,” and he directed Central Government agencies and authorities in neighboring Guangdong to assist the SAR in any way possible, such as through medical supplies and increased testing capacity.
But the odd question about these “important instructions”: Why have they not appeared at all in the mainland Chinese media?
The February 16, 2022, editions of the Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po newspapers.
As we explain in our CMP Dictionary, the phrase “important instructions” in fact denotes a specific decision-making act at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party. In the Xi Jinping era, that act has become even more specific than in the past, limited to Xi Jinping as the CCP’s “core” and unquestioned leader. While in the Hu Jintao era, “important instructions” could be issued not just by Hu as the top leader, but also by Premier Wen Jiabao and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the phrase is now exclusive to Xi.
Given the preeminent status of Xi Jinping within official CCP discourse, we would generally expect anything bearing the label “important instructions” to have pride of place on the front page of the official People’s Daily as well as top provincial CCP papers. But this is not what happened with the directive on Hong Kong. Instead, it has been entirely absent from the mainland media.
For the last headline appearance of “important instructions” from Xi we have to go back nearly a month to January 22, when Xi addressed the issue of “Party construction” (党的建设), referring to the strengthening of the CCP and its work and theories. In this case, news of Xi’s “important instructions” appeared exactly where we would expect it to in the People’s Daily – at the upper right-hand corner of the front page, just beside the masthead.
Xi’s “important instructions” on Party building appear in the most prominent position in the January 22 edition of the People’s Daily, just to the right of the masthead.
Why would China’s leadership decide to splash Xi Jinping’s most recent “important instructions” across the front pages of local state-run newspapers in Hong Kong, but keep them off all newspaper pages inside China. This is a tough question to answer.
In an interview with Radio France Internationale (RFI), current affairs commentator Johnny Lau (劉銳紹) speculated that the high-profile reporting of Xi Jinping’s directive by the Hong Kong media was meant to underscore Xi’s overarching control and establish his prestige ahead of the 20th National Congress to be held in the fall. This reasoning, however, does not explain why Xi’s power in this case would not be telegraphed in the same way inside the PRC.
What we can be sure of is that the Chinese government will play an even more active role in tackling the current outbreak in Hong Kong, and that this is likely to be viewed with a measure of unease by many in Hong Kong, who fear further erosion of autonomy. In all likelihood, we will continue to witness also a blurring of lines in the Hong Kong media, and a progressive recasting of their role.
Today’s homepage at InMedia, the oldest digital news outlet in Chinese still operating after the closure this year of both Citizen News and Stand News, may offer a glimpse of things to come. The site’s top headline, bold beneath a group photo of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, reads: “Statement From All Legco Members: Thanks to General Secretary Xi for Making His Important Instructions.”
Responding to calls for diplomatic boycotts of the Beijing Winter Olympics, the Chinese government and state-run media have repeatedly opposed what they call the “politicization of sports.” But China’s leaders have closely tied the international sporting event to the broader political goal of burnishing the national image, what Xi Jinping has called “telling the China story” – and official discourse makes clear that the Chinese Communist Party is applying broad controls on information to stave off criticism and ensure that the Games are a public opinion success.
At China’s first Global Media Innovation Forum, held last month in Beijing, the CCP’s propaganda chief, Huang Kunming (黄坤明), said that China had already made preparations for Olympic reporting by “our friends in the global media,” and he hoped that everyone would work together to create “a positive and healthy public opinion environment.” This phrase, a regular centerpiece of the Party’s press control vocabulary, describes an atmosphere where “positive voices” prevail through a process known as “public opinion guidance,” meaning that controls on media and the internet ensure social and political stability.
For China’s leaders, the Beijing Winter OIympics are so much more than a sporting event, and they are supremely political. When Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), a deputy propaganda minister and president of the state media conglomerate China Media Group (CMG), addressed the group’s top Party leaders last week, he spoke of preparations for the Winter Olympics and hopes of new breakthroughs in “guiding international society to a more concrete and profound sense of the credibility, love-ability and respectability of China in the new era.” These words directly invoked Xi Jinping’s remarks in May last year at a collective study session of the CCP’s Politburo, where he addressed China’s external propaganda and messaging.
Such talk of positivity might sound relatable to some observers of the Winter Olympics. After all, why shouldn’t the Chinese government hope for a positive outcome? But it’s important to understand that such positive messages for the world are purchased at the expense of open expression in China. Today, the country faces controls on speech that are more stringent than at any point in the reform era. And when the spirit of “positive and healthy public opinion” is expressed alongside talk of “promoting the Olympic spirit,” as it was in Huang’s speech, we should recognize that this is part of the legacy of these Olympic Games.
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the “Cultural Legacy Report” (文化遗产报告) released recently by the Beijing Organizing Committee for the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (北京2022年冬奥会和冬残奥会组织委员会), which describes the cultural impact that preparations for the Games have had over the past six years. In a section on the media, the report notes that “the authority and influence of domestic mainstream media platforms has been fully utilized to guide public opinion and bring out the mainstream voice.”
There are important shades of meaning here that should be made explicit. While the word “mainstream” refers in a global context to ideas or attitudes that are regarded as normal or conventional in a given society, the word “mainstream,” or zhuliu (主流), refers in the PRC context to the consensus political view as determined by the CCP and by Party-state media. Forming the “mainstream” is a key objective for the leadership, and what is essentially meant by “public opinion guidance.”
The Beijing Organizing Committee makes the process seem so casual — as though this is a simple question of publicity — but when it talks about “guiding public opinion” (引导舆论) and “bringing out the mainstream voice” (发挥主流声音), this is fundamentally about amplifying Party-state voices at the expense of dissenting voices and views.
There has been a good deal of reporting outside China of the restrictions foreign journalists face in China, and that athletes are likely to face during the Winter Olympics, as though the question of press freedom in the country hinges on the extent to which international media are free to report. Without minimizing the importance of such concerns, it is crucial to be mindful of the insurmountable restrictions now facing Chinese journalists, and the complete dominance of the Olympic story by politically trusted Party-state media.
Who are the media reporting the Olympic story? The “Cultural Legacy Report” from the Beijing Organizing Committee names the People’s Daily, the flagship publication of the CCP, Xinhua News Agency, the Party’s official newswire, the gigantic China Media Group and other such “mainstream media.” And since Beijing is the host city, the report also mentions the Beijing Daily, the official publication of the municipal CCP committee, as well as Beijing Evening News, a commercial spin-off controlled by Beijing Daily. A whole range of domestic platforms will of course offer content on the Games, drawing on material sourced primarily from these “mainstream” sources. But Party-state media will set the tone, what the CCP likes to call the “main theme” (主旋律), and propaganda authorities will be keeping a close eye on print, broadcast and cyberspace to ensure no voices are left to chance.
As the Beijing Winter Olympics are exploited to “tell the China story,” we should remember that there are voices that cannot be heard — and that the suppression of these voices and the amplification of the CCP’s “mainstream” voice is a deeply political act.
The Chinese Communist Party’s obsession with number-based catchphrases can be exacting for the outside observer: Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Basic Principles” and “Four Modernizations,” Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” Hu Jintao’s “Three Closenesses.” In the Xi Jinping era, there were “Three Confidences” initially. But before long, a fourth was added to the formula – and soon enough it may expand to five.
But this year we can at least simplify matters by focusing on two crucial catchphrases: the “Two Establishes” (两个确立) and the “Two Safeguards” (两个维护). Taken together their import is simple: Xi Jinping will continue leading China beyond 2022.
Both of these catchphrases — though first appearing in January and April of 2018 respectively — have soared in use since the Sixth Plenum held in November last year, and the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Major Achievements and Historical Experiences of the Party’s Hundred-Year Struggle (中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议). This document, only the third such resolution in the CCP’s history, brought a century of Party experience into focus in the person, power and theoretical genius of Xi Jinping – an act of ideational concentration meant both to symbolize and actualize Xi’s dominance into 2022 and beyond.
That may seem like an awful lot to place on the shoulders of a single document. But the CCP takes the game of language seriously. It was the first resolution on history in April 1945, emerging from the 7th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee, that paved the way for the introduction of “Mao Zedong Thought” at the 7th National Congress of the CCP shortly after, which also brought Mao’s apotheosis as the Party’s chairman (主席). Xi is likely on a similar trajectory, with the full-fledged emergence of “Xi Jinping Thought” to be anticipated at or before the 20th National Congress next fall. It is also conceivable that Xi Jinping could push for a re-instatement of the chairman title, which was abolished in 1982 to prevent the rise of a single, supreme leader.
Mao Zedong addresses the 7th National Congress of the CCP in 1945. Image in the public domain.
Whatever transformations are in store this year, these are fundamentally about maintaining Xi Jinping’s “core” status and ensuring the loyalty of those around him. Which is where the “Two Establishes” and the “Two Safeguards” come in.
To understand these phrases, we can turn back to the November Resolution, which included this important line:
For the Party to establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party’s Central Committee and of the whole Party, and to establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, expresses the deepest wishes of the whole Party, the whole military, and the peoples of the whole country.
In this passage, Xi Jinping is staking claim to two fundamental and unshakeable principles: 1) that he must be the single, unquestionable leader of a unified CCP and that 2) his ideas, soon enough to be lionized as “Xi Jinping Thought,” are by necessity the bedrock of the Party, its policymaking and its legitimacy for the 21st century.
These are the “Two Establishes.” The “Two Safeguards” are even more elemental. The phrase is a fist-bang on the table that commands Party members, and all others, to fall in line. They are about the need to 1) safeguard the “core” status of Xi Jinping within the CCP, and 2) to safeguard the centralized authority of the Party.
Together, the “Two Establishes” and the “Two Safeguards” lay claim to the basic principles governing China today, centered on Xi himself. And they define the protection of these principles as the chief task of the country.
Just remember this simple formula: 2 + 2 = Xi.
Bow Down to the General Secretary
As might be expected, this pair of Xi-related catchphrases has been mobilized since the Sixth Plenum in November as a means of signaling loyalty, which can be another core function of CCP discourse, or tifa (提法).
The first headline for the “Two Establishes” in the People’s Daily came on November 26, 2021, two weeks after the close of the Sixth Plenum. The article, appearing on page nine, was written by Ma Jiantang (马建堂), the Party chief of the State Council’s Development Researcher Center, a public institution under the central government that advise the Central Committee on policy-related issues. Pitched as part of a theoretical series on the study of the “spirit” of the recent Sixth Plenum, the article was called: “Profoundly Recognizing the Major Significance of the ‘Two Establishes’”.
Ma’s article, which was widely shared across Party-state media, said (author’s emphasis) that “establishing the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party’s Central Committee and of the whole Party, and establishing the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, is the call of the times, the choice of history, and the direction of the people.”
The first appearance in a People’s Daily headline of the “Two Establishes,” on November 26, 2021.
Note the clear sense of destiny, as though history – including what is to be an historic path forward for the people of China – has condensed in Xi and the genius of his ideas. We could continue to wade through Ma’s stiff Party verbiage, about how Xi’s ideas, for example, are a “great flying leap for the Sinicization of Marxism.” But in essence this is a tribute, a dance of loyalty, an elaborate bow achieved through the Party’s cliquish discourse.
Reading these days through the official Party-state media, one can see a long line of supplicants, all mincing forward to prostrate themselves at Xi’s feet.
An article by the head of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs in January 2022 pledges loyalty to Xi Jinping with the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards.”
Referring to the “Two Establishes” as the “most important political result since the 18th National Congress [in 2012],” and the “fundamental guarantee of ever greater victories,” Li writes that Party members throughout the Ministry of Civil Affairs bureaucracy “must deeply understand, resolutely implement and consciously practice” the principle. Li, then, is pledging loyalty not just for himself but for the entire national bureaucracy under his sprawling ministry.
Provincial CCP leaders are also lining up. To offer a taste, here is Liu Qiang (刘强), the top leader of Shandong province, writing a similar tribute using the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” in the Study Times, the official publication of the CCP’s Central Party School:
Entering the New Era, and following on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s designation as the core of the Party’s Central Committee following the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, and the establishment of the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era at the 19th National Congress, the Resolution [on history] distinctly puts forward the “Two Establishments,” which is the call of the times, the choice of history, and the aspiration of the people. . . .
This passage traces Xi’s progressive aggrandizement within the CCP, from his designation as “core” in 2016 to the enshrining of his banner term in the CCP Charter the next year, to the framing in the November Resolution of the “Two Establishments.”
An article in the Study Times by the top leader of Shandong province, pledging loyalty to Xi Jinping.
But if this is a progression, how do we explain the fact that the “Two Establishments” designate precisely Xi’s “core” status and the centrality of his banner term, both of which are already fait accompli? The answer is that the 20th National Congress of the CCP this year will establish Xi’s core status beyond 2022, his continued leadership, and will also bring the formal emergence of his powerful “Xi Jinping Thought,” putting him on par with Mao Zedong.
The “Two Establishes” are a process that will continue unabated through 2022, the priority around which all other priorities will orbit. So buckle your rhetorical seatbelts.
In closing, I’ll just note that acts of obeisance like that of Liu Qiang can be found everywhere in the Party-state media once one knows what to look for. Here is a partial list of recent tributes to Xi Jinping from top provincial-level CCP leaders:
In the United States, TikTok has become a lively space for social and political activism, defining a “distinct and wide-ranging audiovisual vernacular” that has been applied to issues from police violence and LGBTQ rights. Back in China, where TikTok was born as “Douyin,” the popular video app created by the Beijing-based internet company Bytedance, collective political expression is strictly off limits. Posts on Douyin and other video-sharing apps focus on e-commerce, influencer networks and those fatuous acts of fleeting self-expression for which TikTok has become known in the West (though Douyin can also give rise to some interesting forms of consumer activism.)
But as the Chinese Communist Party has hammered home the need to develop “convergence” (融合发展) within the Party-dominated media ecosystem, Xi Jinping having stressed back in 2013 that mainstream media must advance and must not be “marginalized,” state media have taken self-innovation seriously. And that has made for interesting – if not always compelling – hybrid forms of propaganda for the TikTok age.
One “convergence” approach recently touted by Xinhua News Agency is called “Learning and Reviewing Xi” (学而时习之). The official CCP newswire claims that this product, whose name is a play on Xi’s surname inspired by a famous line from the Confucian classic The Analects (论语), has “deepened [its] understanding of the principles of the dissemination of core reports on mobile social platforms.” The Confucius reference, used in this political context, suggests that this mobile-based offering, available on Douyin (抖音), Kuaishou (快手) and WeChat Video (微信视频), will encourage the persistent study of Xi Jinping’s ideas.
The logo for Xinhua’s new series on Xi Jinping’s speeches over the past 10 years.
Xinhua claims that “Learning and Reviewing Xi” has been a sensational success, “generating enthusiastic reactions from netizens and constant traffic.” As of January, the new short-video product, with just 30 posts, had generated more than 550 million views, 700,000 shares, 500,000 comments and 24 million “likes.” To put this into perspective, this would mean an average of 18 million views for each “Learning and Reviewing Xi” post. That would make the Xinhua product extremely viral, rivaling many of the strongest trending videos internationally on TikTok – with stiff competitors like stunt-performing cats and baby frog colonies.
So what new and inventive approaches is Xinhua taking? Are they offering video shorts of Xi Jinping’s furry friends (he is rumored to have pet dogs) frolicking through the Zhongnanhai compound? Let’s have a look.
Below is an image of the “Learning and Reviewing Xi” post on January 19, which in fact shares a story from two years earlier, as Xi Jinping was on an inspection tour of Yunnan province and visiting a border defense battalion of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). There, he had a photo op in the canteen kitchen, where he stirred a pot of soup, smiled for the camera and said: “Let the fighters eat well. They are defending our homes and protecting our nation.”
The logo for Xinhua’s new series on Xi Jinping’s speeches over the past 10 years.
Viewers of the “Learning and Reviewing Xi” post are treated to a short video of the scene, with Xi’s quotable words offered in shiny gold characters. They can “like” the post, share it to WeChat or comment. But there is no other magic here. Nothing that distinguishes the content from the thousands of other posts and news stories (and longer video segments already online). The other posts from Xinhua’s “Learning and Reviewing Xi” are equally boilerplate: a segment from a 2019 speech in which he tells provincial leaders they must “step over hardships to find the path”; a segment from a January 2020 speech in which he tells his Party comrades that, “Time belongs to those who strive, and history belongs to those who strive.”
Still, if we are to believe the story dished out by the official website of the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA), this series is a breakthrough, “effectively filling a gap in regular columns of core reporting on mobile social platforms.” Moreover, the series “effectively expands the reach (到达率) and readership (阅读率) of propaganda, so that positive energy (正能量) is transformed into major traffic.”
There is a lot here to be unpackaged. First of all, what does the ACJA piece mean by “core reporting,” or hexin baodao (核心报道)? Core is not about news value in the journalistic sense, but rather about Xi Jinping specifically, about the top leader who since 2016 has been formally designated as the CCP’s leadership “core,” a mark of his concentration of power. This becomes crystal clear when the ACJA piece tells us that the new Xinhua product has “created a new situation for core reports, highlighting the image of the General Secretary as a relatable and respectable leader of the people and a world leader.” As we note in our CMP Dictionary, the term “people’s leader” (人民领袖) is a rare title of praise in China’s political discourse, reminiscent of the personality cult that prevailed during the Mao Zedong era.
“Positive energy” is a term, in currency since 2013, that is synonymous with the control of information in order to avoid “negative,” or critical, news coverage and public opinion.
What we can gather from the ACJA article on “Learning and Reviewing Xi” is that the new Xinhua offering is innovative only in the sense that it transfers propaganda to new platforms, building up the image and prestige of Xi Jinping in ways that Mao Zedong could scarcely have dreamed of. As for accommodating the distinct audiovisual vernacular of the short-video platform culture, this is something that cannot so easily be accomplished – because the strictures of the Party-state media culture do not allow for creative departures. The result is familiarly insipid propaganda pitched for the user of mobile social media, but likely to be swiped aside.
Nevertheless, we are to believe that the short videos released through “Learning and Reviewing Xi” have been extraordinarily, stratospherically, popular. The ACJA article shares a selection of the more than 500,000 comments, each more revealing that the last.
“What grounded words,” one user writes. “It’s the New Year and he’s busy at home! Just like us ordinary Chinese.” Translation: Xi Jinping is a man of the people.
“So close to the people,” writes another, bringing the point right to the surface. “I’m so warmed that prosperous China has you!” Translation: Xi Jinping is a man of the people, and all happiness and goodness in the country owe to his solicitude for the masses.
“Our good leader,” yet another writes. “I’m so very fortunate to have been born in China.”
These are not natural comments, but rather were born of the propaganda system, where the leader must by definition be “close to the people” (亲民), “close to the ground” (接地气) and “warm” (温暖), even if there are no hot-mike moments and every interaction is ceremoniously scripted. Which brings us to the question of impact. When content that is decidedly untransmissible consistently goes viral, this naturally raises questions about whether and how that content is being artificially pushed. One of the most fascinating questions, therefore, is how exactly traditional propaganda outlets like Xinhua are working with commercially operating platforms like Douyin to re-shape their distribution channels and command attention (or its pretense) in cyberspace.
There is a lot of big talk in the ACJA piece on “Learning and Reviewing Xi” about innovation and pushing the envelope. But if Xinhua has made any advances at all in “understanding of the principles of the dissemination” through mobile social platforms in this case, the most that can be said is that it has grasped the elementary fact that short videos must be, well, short. This is nothing to write home about. And yet the ACJA has written thousands of words essentially praising the success of a campaign of praise.
Those who study CCP propaganda will be familiar with such circles of self-realization. Propaganda is deeply imbedded in the governance of the Party, its task to write the success story of every failure. And because propaganda is so essential to the Party’s vision of itself, it follows that propaganda too must be a success. Hence meta-propaganda is born, the story of the success of the story. Circles within circles within circles.
At a meeting on Monday of the All-China Journalist’s Association (ACJA), former Xinhua News Agency chief He Ping (何平) was formally appointed as the new chairman of the organization, an ostensible “non-governmental organization” that in fact serves as an important layer of exercising CCP control over news organizations and the country’s more than one million registered journalists.
Born in 1957, He Ping has spent his entire career within Xinhua News Agency since graduating from Peking University in 1982, at the outset of the reform and opening period. In 2007, he was appointed editor-in-chief of the agency, and in October 2020 finally became chairman.
In his closing remarks to the meeting, He Ping said that top ACJA officials had met with Xi Jinping and other leaders in the CCP Central Committee, including Huang Kunming (黄坤明), head of the Central Propaganda Department. He Ping told those in attendance that Huang had raised “clear demands” for the work of journalists and the heads of local and regional ACJA chapters. “We must take the concerns of the General Secretary and the CCP Central Committee as a powerful spiritual impetus in better performing the duties and missions entrusted to us by the Party and the people,” said He.
The more concrete instructions for those present, to be conveyed to all journalists working in China, were couched in dense CCP terminologies. He Ping said, for example, that Chinese journalists must enhance their sense of “political nature” (政治性), a reference to maintaining uniformity with the ideology of the Party and the state – including on the Party line and policies, on questions of sovereignty and foreign relations, and so on.
The term “political nature” has been used by the CCP in reference to the obligations of the press since at least since the early 1950s. An article on page two of the People’s Daily on August 26, 1951, criticized the publishing of advertisements in Chinese newspapers that did not follow the Party line, and urged papers across the country to struggle against “lack of political leadership by the editorial board” over advertising decisions.
An article in the People’s Daily in August 1951 criticizes newspaper advertisements that do not follow the CCP line, saying that ads too must have “political nature.”
He Ping also emphasized the need for media to “adhere to correct public opinion guidance” (坚持正确舆论导向), a term that relates directly to CCP control of the media in order to maintain the stability of the regime, and the need for journalists to “serve as disseminators of the Party’s policies and propositions” (做党的政策主张的传播者).
In the midst of the current outbreak of Covid-19 in Shaanxi, the province’s Chinese Business News (华商报), a leading commercial daily in the locked-down capital city of Xi’an, has drawn national attention for its colorful and creative front page designs – and prompted some nostalgia for the fading era of print media in China.
In a tribute posted on Thursday to its WeChat account, the Media Observer (传媒大观察), a media-related publication run by the state-owned Xinhua Daily Press Group, likened recent pages at Chinese Business News to “a light in the darkness, lighting the way for people in their fight against the epidemic.”
“While paper media are weak, particularly under the serious situation of the epidemic,” the tribute read, “we still see this paper coming out daily with heart and soul.”
The city of Xi’an, with more than 13 million residents, was placed under lockdown in late December following a spike in Covid cases. Within 10 days, the strain on human lives caused by China’s zero-Covid strategy was evident, with residents complaining of inadequate food and other essentials.
But according to the Media Observer, the Chinese Business News has continued to provide inspiration in the midst of desperation.
The post through the Media Observer‘s official WeChat account, “Media Observer Think Tank” (观媒智库), has an undeniable sense of the sentimental about it, focusing on the “positive energy” aspects of the Covid-19 story in Xi’an. Nevertheless, it provides an interesting view of the role of the local newspaper in an era of growing digital dominance.
Here are several of the front-page designs published recently by the Chinese Business News, and singled out for praise by the Media Observer.
HEADLINE: My City, My Xi’an DATE: December 23, 2020
HEADLINE: Peacefully Waiting in Chang’an DATE: December 24, 2020
HEADLINE: Lifting the Vegetable Basket DATE: December 24, 2020
HEADLINE: Hope to Open Hope DATE: December 27, 2020
HEADLINE: Persist DATE: December 30, 2020
HEADLINE: Life is Looking Up! DATE: January 8, 2022
HEADLINE: We Protect Xi’an Together DATE: January 10, 2022
HEADLINE: Healing is the Best Form of Healing DATE: January 12, 2022
The Chinese Business News was launched in 1995, at the start of the heyday of modern metropolitan newspapers (都市类报) in China, which saw the creation of hundreds of new magazines and newspapers catering to a rising middle class.
The paper was originally started in Hong Kong in April 1941 by a trio of journalists and political activists including Hu Zhongchi (胡仲特), the famous editor of Shen Bao (申报) and grandfather of Caixin editor-in-chief Hu Shuli, Zou Taofen (邹韬奋), editor of the celebrated Life Magazine (生活周刊, and Fan Changjiang (范长江), the Ta Kung Pao stringer and later founder of China’s national journalist’s association for whom the country’s official journalism prizes are now named (and who would also become the chief editor of Xinhua News Agency).
In recent years, print media in China have undergone a dramatic contraction as the industry faces a profound transformation brought about by the dominance of new digital platforms. The closure or transformation of traditional newspapers has itself become regular news. In December 2020, just ahead of the new year, 30 publications announced that they would shut down.
Confidence seems to be proliferating at the top-most levels of the Chinese Communist Party. When Hu Jintao delivered his political report to the Party’s 18th National Congress back in November 2012, the outgoing leader spoke of three points of self-confidence that were to propel the CCP into the future. “The whole party must firmly uphold confidence in the path, in the theory and in the institutions [of socialism with Chinese characteristics],” Hu said.
As the Xi Jinping era dawned, then, there were just “Three Confidences,” or sange zixin (三个自信), at the heart of what has been termed China’s “confidence doctrine.” By 2014, however, a fourth confidence had crept into the formula. The new buzzword was “cultural confidence,” or wenhua zixin (文化自信). The Party needed to have faith not only in the rightness of its policies, governance and theoretical foundations, but also in its identity – to be found in a combination of 5,000-odd years of Chinese culture (中华文化) and the rich revolutionary legacy of the CCP itself.
The “Four Confidences” were affirmed as an integrated formula in Xi Jinping’s speech to commemorate the 95th anniversary of the CCP in 2016, and at the 19th National Congress the year after they were included in amendments to the Party Charter (党章). The “Four Confidences” have been codified ever since as:
“confidence in the path” (道路自信) [of socialism with Chinese characteristics]
“confidence in the theory” (理论自信) [of socialism with Chinese characteristics]
“confidence in the system” (制度自信) [of socialism with Chinese characteristics]
“confidence in the culture” (文化自信) [of socialism with Chinese characteristics]
But this month, confidence has advanced again. The top headline on the front page of the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper today included a fifth confidence, marking the further advancement of the confidence doctrine to accommodate this year’s 100th anniversary of the CCP and last month’sResolution of the Central Committee of the CCP on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century. The new buzzword is “historical confidence,” or lishi zixin (历史自信).
The top half of the front page of today’s People’s Daily, with the phrase “historical confidence” in the main headline highlighted.
This phrase was mentioned by Xi Jinping in his “important speech” (重要讲话) this week to the latest “democratic life meeting” (民主生活会), an event at which members of the CCP Politburo are meant to criticize and assess their own performance. In the speech, promoted in today’s People’s Daily, Xi stressed the importance of “drawing wisdom and strength from the Party’s century-long history.”
The appearance of “historical confidence” in a front-page headline in the People’s Daily signifies its emergence in strength, as a phrase likely to continue to rise in 2022. But the first prominent appearance of the phrase came in mid-November as Huang Kunming (黄坤明), the head of the Central Propaganda Department, used it to convey the “spirit” of the 6th Plenum in a video conference with propaganda leaders across the country. Prior to Huang’s address in November, “historical confidence” had appeared just once in the People’s Daily, in an essay published in July 2016 and written by Huang Yibing (黄一兵), the deputy director of the Third Research Department of the Central Party History Research Office.
The “Five Confidences” (五个自信) is definitely a phrase to look out for in 2022.
