China’s strategic thinkers expend a lot of time and a lot of ink these days on the question of how the country can project a positive image across the world. The basic idea is that if China can strengthen its “discourse power” (话语权) by “telling China’s story well” – Xi Jinping’s catchphrase in the arena of public diplomacy and soft power – then its strategic priorities globally can move ahead smoothly.

If there is one underlying flaw in all of this strategizing, however, it may be the fundamental difficulty China’s planners have in grappling honestly with the country’s own conduct and framing as a possible source of global perception problems.

Recently, the Shanghai Institute of International Studies cooperated with the Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee and other official organizations to hold a seminar on “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想) and “theoretical innovation of the Party’s foreign work” (对外工作). A number of the presentations at the seminar were published through the official WeChat public account of SIIS as a related series, and these were cross-shared at The Paper, a digital newspaper run by the Shanghai United Media Group (SUMG), which is controlled by the Shanghai committee of the CCP.

The Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) is one of China’s most important government-affiliated think tanks on foreign policy. As David Shambaugh has explained, SIIS, like many government institutions dealing with international affairs, performs a “dual function,” both projecting Chinese talking points (as part of a general “soft power” push) and “[collecting] views and intelligence from foreign experts and officials.”

Reading through the recent SIIS series published at The Paper, one certainly gets the impression that China’s think-tankers are talking. But are they listening?

Nearly all the pieces in the series repeat official CCP talking points, emphasizing the pre-eminence of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想) and its component concepts, including “a community of common destiny” (人类命运共同体). They reaffirm rather than question claimed achievements like the Belt and Road Initiative, whose shared benefits, they say, “are more and more obvious.”

In fact, official think-tankers seem far more preoccupied with projecting loyalty upward – with talk of “maintaining the authority of the CCP Central Committee as the commander” (维护党中央权威为统领), and so on – than with thinking intelligently and outwardly about foreign audiences and their concerns. At times, one could be forgiven for thinking that the real audience, for all the chatter about “telling China’s story” to the world, is a single man at the top of the Party’s ranks.

To the extent China’s failings in external communication are acknowledged at all, these are chalked up to prevailing prejudices about China and the CCP, and to the “suppression” of China’s voice by “Western countries” or by “anti-China forces.” No consideration is given to whether it might be problematic that the “China story” and the “story of the CCP” have become so intertwined that they are impossible to untangle, and that narratives of the Party’s greatness and infallibility may do more to encourage skepticism than to inspire respect.

Of the talks in the SIIS series at The Paper, one in particular stands out for its attempt to address the current state of China’s external communications efforts, and their limitations, though some of these familiar patterns are also visible. In his remarks, Zhang Jian (张建), Secretary General of the Center for the Study of World Political Parties and Politics at SIIS, moans about the negative “narrative forms employed toward China by the US and the West,” as though reading China’s own rigid and centralized approach to narrative formation into complex democratic political cultures and societies. He decides that the “severe suppression” (严重打压) of China’s overseas communication platforms, such as Confucius Institutes, is again conspiratorial.

But it is interesting to see Zhang admitting at one point that even “the perceptions that developing countries have of China are also becoming complicated.” And he does, unlike many of his colleagues, attempt to offer strategic points, though these are broad-brush and not exactly original. He outlines six points that China should heed in its effort to be “accepted by the international community.” These include, for example, using “differentiated storytelling approaches” for different countries and regions; attempting to “localize” (在地化) stories, making them more palatable and relevant to audiences; and complementing the “grand narrative” (宏大叙事) with more concrete examples, in the form of case studies, of Chinese approaches in various policy areas and how these have succeeded.

This last point brings us to another fundamental contradiction at the heart of China’s external propaganda work – the insistence on offering Chinese lessons and experiences as a form of soft power even as China’s leadership is emphatic that these stories must serve a propaganda role, making the case for the capable leadership of the CCP. When the starting point is political and ideological, and narratives must conform to political objectives, this can, or should, raise serious issues of credibility for foreign audiences.

A translation of Zhang Jian’s remarks in the SIIS series follows.

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Along with China’s growing strength and its entry into the center of the world stage, the perception of China in the international community has taken on greater complexity. Judging from the international situation in recent years, and particularly from interactions between China and the United States and the West, the narrative forms (叙事方式) employed toward China by the US and the West have tended toward the negative, whether we are talking about power structures or about opinion in society – to the extent that even the perception and understanding of China in some developing countries has been affected. Against this background, in order to tell the story of China (the Chinese Communist Party) in the New Era, we must first clearly recognize the macro environment we currently face, and then move on to the question of how to proceed.

In terms of the current macro environment, the first [issue] is that interactions between China and the West have become more complex. The question of how to recognize, understand and accept a socialist China that has emerged as a major power in the world with a vastly different system is a common “point of difficulty” for the West as it faces China. The perception of China in the West is relatively negative, with perceptions in 14 developed countries having reached their lowest point. Although the West is in the minority in terms of the number of countries [in the world], their influence remains the greatest. At the same time, our own perception of the West has reached its lowest point.

The second [issue] is that the US and the West are exerting pressure on China in the ideological field, and our overseas communication platforms have been severely suppressed (严重打压). If we can say that previously arrangements and deployments overseas, and particularly in Western countries were conducive to speaking and telling the China story, in recent years Confucius Institutes, Chinese-invested enterprises, Chinese associations, Chinese media and others have been suppressed, and our overseas communication has been substantially hindered.

The third [factor] is that a conflicted psychology in the perception of China is on the rise among developing countries. Influenced by various forms of Western incitement (煽惑), by internal political contradictions and struggles, and by gaps in development levels and governance capabilities, the perceptions that developing countries have of China are also becoming complicated.

While the international environment facing China is becoming increasingly complex, as China provides more and more public goods to the international community and as China plays an increasingly positive role in international affairs, there are more and more people in the international community who look at China rationally and objectively, and more and more people who praise China. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has said, “Time and momentum are on our side, and this is where our determination and stamina come from, as well as our resolve and confidence.” To be accepted by the international community, socialist China must expend even greater effort.

In the face of this complex macro environment, when telling China’s story abroad, we must first adopt a differentiated storytelling approach and tell targeted stories from the perspective of the other’s situation and needs. Small and medium-sized countries, and developing countries and regions should be the key areas for spreading China’s story under the tightening conflict and struggle between China and the West.

Secondly, it [is important to] combine grand narratives and subtle emotions, paying special attention to the emotional receptivity of the grassroots and the general public.

Third, telling the China story is the responsibility of every single one of us. In addition to propaganda departments, the main body of external propaganda can be expanded to include concrete individuals, including scholars, grassroots units and individuals, as well as various platforms. All of them can preach (宣讲) the China story and the story of the Chinese Communist Party.  In particular, we scholars in the humanities and social sciences should give full play to our strengths and advantages in international exchanges, and should tell the international community a more diverse story of China and story of the CCP.

Fourth, telling the Chinese story should be localized (在地化). China’s story is not something to be put out in a singular manner. For the international community to know, recognize and understand, the China story must be more integrated with the stories of the local countries, so that China’s story becomes integrated into the society and life of the local country.

Fifth, [there is a need to be] concrete about [China’s] governance practices, linking up the grand narrative (宏大叙事) with China’s concrete experiences in governance. For example, the editing of a collection of cases could be organized that selects governance cases at various levels, particularly at various levels of society — dealing, for example, with ecological governance, the environment, concretization of governance, combining the grand narrative with the concrete practice of China’s governance, for example, can organize the preparation of a collection of cases, selecting cases of governance at all levels, especially at all levels of society, such as ecological governance, the environment, grassroots construction, and even with neighborhood committees and so on. This is more suited to target countries and more relevant to the various social problems they face. It also make [these lessons] easier to absorb in experience.

Finally, [we need to use] professional and scientific language to tell China’s story. Scientists, professional groups and social organizations can tell [the story] on different levels, and can also provide public products on China’s development to the international community in the form of popular science materials, raising understanding and awareness [of China].

In the latest edition of the Chinese Communist Party’s official journal Seeking Truth (求是), released last week, Xi Jinping topped the table of contents – as now seems to be mandated practice. But another prominent byline was that of Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), the head of China Media Group, or “Voice of China,” the official media conglomerate directly under the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) that was created in 2018 to serve as the umbrella group for state media as they sought greater influence internationally.

In fitting form as the 100^th anniversary of the CCP approaches, Shen’s article was essentially an act of declaration (表态), expressing loyalty to Xi Jinping, to the Party and to its principles. In a series of deferential remarks greased with the phrase “General Secretary Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out” (习近平总书记深刻指出), Shen stressed the glories of CCP history, and the great gifts bequeathed to the Chinese people in the form of “red traditions” (红色传统) and “red genes” (红色基因).

Shen revealed little, however, about China’s push to expand its international “discourse power” (话语权), the strategy that was the focus at the May 31 collective study session of the Politburo. On this issue, the media chief offered only a bland re-statement of purpose: the CCP must “build a new type of first-class international mainstream media with a strong capacity to lead, communicate and influence.”

But how do Shen Haixiong and the China Media Group hope to actually achieve this broad objective? To answer this question, we must look beyond Shen’s hymn on Party history in Seeking Truth to a speech he gave back on June 3 as he chaired a “thematic session” (专题会议) to convey the “spirit” of Xi Jinping’s remarks at the May 31 collective study session.

Shen, who is also a deputy minister at the CPD, emphasized at the June 3 session that “telling China’s story well” (讲好中国故事), and showing a “true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China” (展示真实立体全面的中国) necessitates the creation of “international discourse power that matches our country’s comprehensive national power.” One crucial point of breakthrough in reaching this objective, said Shen, was to create “a studio for influencers in multiple languages” (多语种网红工作室).

Beyond the usual buzzwords in the realm of external propaganda (外宣) and public diplomacy (公共外交), which often become indistinguishable in CCP strategizing, this talk of an “Influencer Studio” (网红工作室) is an intriguing clue. Generally, the phrase “influencer studio” can refer online in China to the space where influencers, as they hock the latest eyeliner, halter top or body cream, appear to their dedicated fans. It might be a backdrop that reads Danish modern or Japanese spa. But in this context, Shen Haixiong is talking instead about a state-supported training program for online influencers that would, at least in theory, allow the leadership to better capitalize on new media platforms as they are used by millennials.

The bottom line here is that CCP planners are strategizing about how to better reach younger media consumers globally, designing external propaganda for the next decade. And that means that China’s external messaging, even as it strictly adheres to political “red lines,” must learn to be youthful and viral.

Back in August 2019, these priorities were addressed openly at the China Media Group as it announced the formation of the International Communications Planning Bureau (国际传播规划局), the new buzzing hive of the CCP’s external propaganda planning, execution and assessment. In his speech introducing the International Communications Planning Bureau (ICPB), Shen Haixiong said that China Media Group must “actively explore new methods of external communication, including the Influencer Studio (网红工作室), and creating a ‘mobile app cluster in multiple languages’ and a ‘cluster of overseas social media platform accounts,’ thereby steadily raising our influence among young people and mainstream people.”

Here we can glimpse three distinct approaches at the China Media Group. First, a program to train and support online influencers that could be attractive for foreign audiences on social media platforms, all the while “maintaining political discipline” (坚持政治导向), the prerequisite for all content. These influencers, says in his recent speech on June 3, should be instrumental in reporting on “headline projects” (头条工程) and major topics (重大主题) – think initiatives like Belt and Road, and issues like Hong Kong – and training must be strengthened, he says, for influencers in “priority regions and priority languages” (重要地区重点语言).

The second distinct approach is to develop a cluster of information apps that can engage foreign audiences, whatever language they speak. Thirdly, the China Media Group must capitalize on overseas social media platforms to reach foreign users, particularly young users, who increasingly connect and engage through such tools. The focus in Shen’s speech on “young people and mainstream people” is a reminder of just how broadly the CMG conceives of this campaign – the goal being a groundswell of changing perception internationally on China.

We might respond that China’s state media have tried this last tactic before, launching accounts on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. But the formation of China Media Group’s ICPB, which has nine subsidiary departments, suggests more concerted planning along several key lines. The departments now include: the 1) General Division (综合处); the 2) Project Coordination Division (项目统筹处); the 3) Overseas Brand Promotion Division (海外品牌推广处); the 4) Asia Division (亚洲处); the 5) West Asia and Africa Division (西亚非洲处); the 6) Europe and Latin America Division (欧洲拉美处); the 7) Americas and Oceania Division (美洲大洋洲处); 8) the Chinese Language Promotion Division (汉语推广处); and the 9) Overseas Evaluation and Verification Division (海外评估核查处).

Though little information is so far available about the ICPB and its subsidiary departments, this restructuring suggests that the China Media Group is gearing up for a sustained external propaganda campaign that is both concerted and to some extent responsive, considering regional differences and languages and also evaluating impact. In his June 3 speech, as he highlighted the urgency of fostering influencers in multiples regions and languages, Shen also said there was a need for “refined classification” (细化分类), “content deepening” (深耕内容) and “differential development” (差异化发展). The group is striving, at least, to break free of the one-size-fits-all thinking that for years has plagued China’s external communication efforts – and is still very much in evidence.

Two further clues can be spotted in Shen Haixiong’s June 3 speech. As the CMG chief talks about building up the team to conduct international communication (队伍建设), he says that journalists overseas should act as “diplomats” (外交家) and “social activists” (社会活动家). Shen in fact used both of these terms in another address back in October last year, when he spoke of “communication for a favourable impression” (好感传播), which should be taken as further proof that the talk of being “lovable” in the May collective study session was neither fresh nor an indication, as some reported, of a planned change in tone.

The term “social activist” may seem odd here, bringing to mind an individual working for social change through intentional action. In a Chinese political context, however, this refers instead to engagement with more ordinary social actors to further the Party’s agenda and convey its voice, which of course is “China’s voice.” The reference to “diplomats,” meanwhile, suggests CMG journalists internationally should be conveying and defending the official line, particularly to those who are themselves in positions of relative influence in foreign countries, in both leadership and the media.

On Monday this week a collective study session of China’s Politburo, the top decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), addressed the topic of external propaganda and messaging, which in recent years has fallen under the rubric of what Xi Jinping calls “telling China’s story well” (讲好中国故事). Over the past two years, that story has seemed a rancorous one, delivered with venom from the “wolf warriors” at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Analysts who sought clues to a possible tactical reset in the language of the collective study session found encouragement in one phrase in particular: “[The Party] must focus on grasping the tone, being open and confident as well as having modesty and humility, striving to build a credible, lovable and respectable image of China.” Language about the need for China to expand its “circle of friends in international public opinion” (国际舆论朋友圈) added, for some, to the sense of a tonal change.  

The word “lovable” was an obvious temptation. If China wished to be loved, then surely it would begin to speak more cordially, if not affectionately. As for “grasping the tone,” could that not suggest an inclination to tone things down? A report from Bloomberg took the language on lovability and friend circles as “a sign that Beijing may be looking to smooth its hard-edged diplomatic approach,” and that “Xi may be rethinking his communication strategy on the global stage.”

Before we invest ourselves too deeply, we should look carefully at the context.

Within the textual fabric of the news of the collective study session there is plenty to give pause: the characterization of the challenge at hand as a “public opinion struggle’ (舆论斗争), a term redolent of the Mao era; the persistently tone-deaf language about educating foreigners about the goodness of the CCP; the talk of mobilizing, funding and training and, importantly, ideologically assessing local leaders on their input in terms of international communication work, which hardly seems conducive to a broad change in tone. On the issue of broadening the “friend circle,” how can it escape notice that the next line is a reiteration of the “public opinion struggle”? In such a struggle, there are friends in the form of compliant media and apologists, and there are enemies in the form of recalcitrant journalists, academics and politicians who insist on criticism – exactly what this external push is designed to neutralize.

But beyond the text itself, remembering that we have only Xinhua News Agency reporting, there is an important point of context so obvious many observers seem to have missed it.

This was a collective study session, and such sessions, whatever their topic, generally benefit from the instruction of experts. In this case, we are told right at the outset of the official news release that “professor Zhang Weiwei of Fudan University offered his explanations on this issue, and suggestions for work.” What sort of teacher would Zhang Weiwei be?

A professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, Zhang Weiwei (张维为) is director of the university’s Institute for Chinese Studies. In the 1980s he served within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an interpreter for senior leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. He is an old hand when it comes to Chinese diplomacy, and in the course of his career has visited many countries.

Zhang is also a staunch defender of what he regards as the superiority of the political system led by the CCP, and of the so-called “China Model,” which he insists has ‘performed better than other models.” Internationally, one of his most remembered exchanges is his 2011 debate with Francis Fukuyama, in which he extolled the virtues of the Chinese system and suggested that Western democratic systems “might be only transitory in the long history of mankind.”

The rise of China is what we call “shi” or an overall trend, the scale and speed of which is unprecedented in human history. My own feeling is that the Western system is trekking on a downward slope and in need of major repairs and reforms. Some Chinese always speak and think highly of the US model, but to someone who has lived in Europe and visited the US many times, this is a bit too simplistic and naive.

In a 2013 interview with Phoenix Weekly, “The Chinese No Longer Require the ‘American Dream’”, Zhang spoke glowingly of China’s achievements and the ways in which it has already surpassed the West. “We have learned a lot from the West and will continue to learn in the future, but we have a vision today that goes beyond the West,” he said. Importantly, he spoke of a coming era of “post-Western discourse” (后西方话语) in which the rising dominance of a “Chinese discourse system” (中国话语体系) should be expected.

The notion of a “Chinese discourse system” appears, in fact, in the announcement from the collective study session, and we should note that it has generally not been among the terminologies in the arena of external propaganda, soft power and so on. Here is the portion of the Phoenix Weekly interview in which Zhang discusses this emerging system and its implications for scholarship and the “new world order”:

Chinese intellectuals should no longer be subservient to the Western discourse, but should think independently and, with their own conscience, knowledge and patriotic spirit, absorb the wisdom of the world while rejecting Western neo-obscurantism (西方新蒙昧主义). They should jointly explore and construct a Chinese discourse system in the era of “post-Western discourse,” making their own contribution to the formation of a new world order.

Zhang has repeatedly urged “self-confidence” in China’s model, and in the building of a “Chinese discourse” grounded in self-confidence that can then be applied in public diplomacy. In a 2014 talk called “Chinese Must Have Self-Confidence” (中国人你要自信), Zhang urged an end to uncertainty: “Let us remove the hat of flagging self-confidence and give it to our opponent,” he said. It was with this newly asserted self-confidence that China should combat the distortions and misunderstandings of the West.

Given the unshakable premise that China’s system is superior in terms of its performance, it naturally follows that the core problem is Western resistance. “Because the mainstream media in the West have long reported on China in an manner that is not factual, and with a strong ideological bias and cultural prejudice,” said Zhang, “many people in many Western countries, and even many experts and scholars, have a very poor understanding of China.”

In a video interview with People’s Daily Online posted today, Zhang again places the blame for miscommunication squarely on the shoulders of the West. To the extent that the project of “telling China’s story well” has not succeeded as it might, and misunderstandings persist, this, he says, is “mainly a problem on the part of the West.”

Zhang speaks of the urgent need and responsibility of the West to “understand China.” Given his emphasis on the glories of the “China Model” and the objective truth of “China’s story,” which at its core is about the infallibility of the CCP, this need to “understand China” is not really about dialogue or dialectic. It is about acceptance. China must act with confidence to overcome these misunderstandings. As one senior German diplomat told GMF’s Noah Barkin recently: “Dialogue is now conditional on us not criticizing China.”

If one detects a certain wolfishness in this perspective, Zhang does not disappoint in his views on how China should respond to the prejudices that are standard fare, according to the CCP narrative, for the West. Here is what Zhang said in September 2020, during an interview on the “This is China” television program:

The Chinese have a culture of ‘being kind to others’ and of giving face to others, which the West does not have. That’s why I often say that in order to communicate better with the West (与西方交流), we have to learn to confront the West (与西方交锋), and after confrontation we can often communicate better. Of course, confrontation does not mean you shout yourself hoarse, as the Chinese say. Confrontation is about stating your principles clearly. Western culture is a culture of the strong (西方文化是强者文化). They respect the strong, respect the winner. If they raise a provocative issue and you dare not respond, dare not confront, then you have lost. And you’ve lost representing the country.

Zhang, with his talk here of “crossing swords” (交锋), sounds very much like a proponent of what is so often now called “wolf-warrior diplomacy.” He is a champion of the Chinese system, and of its assertion in international discourse and diplomacy as “self-confidence.” Considering that the Shanghai professor has advised the leadership for a number of years on these questions, including at a May 2016 symposium hosted by Xi, we should perhaps view him not as a moderating voice on the question of international discourse and diplomacy, but rather as a one of a number of architects and supporters of the approaches that have been applied over the past several years.

The West must be persuaded to see things China’s way. And to this end, confrontation, the crossing of swords, will likely remain as a core component of communication as conceived by the leadership.