The plagiarism case involving the well-known “left” scholar Wang Hui (汪晖) has made ripples in the press lately, and some academics in the West have stepped up to defend Mr. Wang. My own readers have written to me about this. Why, they ask, do Western academics rush to defend such a scholar?
I’ve read only a number of essays by Wang Hui. Nevertheless, I do have some understanding of scholars of Wang’s ilk. Scholars in China who have, like Mr. Wang, been branded with the label “left” tend to criticize Western democratic systems and universal values with an aptitude not greatly unlike that of Western academics. Their scholarship and pronouncements on such matters as “Chinese characteristics” and Chinese models have found some favor among Western academics [for whom such material provides fresh fodder]. As a result, many Western academics enjoy and “respect” these scholars on China’s “left”, and not without their reasons.
It only makes sense that Web users should have trouble separating truth from fact in the Wang Hui case, and that they should end up turning some things on their heads.
I want to use this Wang Hui affair as an opportunity to talk about the academic environment in the West. Allow me, if you will, to approach this topic in a roundabout sort of way. Friends who have read my piece called “Why I do not criticize America” will perhaps remember my experience as a young man being a visiting fellow in the United States. Looking back now, I realize that my academic abilities at that time were almost nonexistent. I was simply a combination of an “educated youth” and a “political angry youth.” Owing to my educational background and my work experience, my head was at the time stuffed full of the idea that “China can say no,” and with various articulations of “unhappy China,” and I was most certainly no less influenced by these ideas than the authors of the two books [dealing principally with these issues], China Can Say No and Unhappy China.
At that time I was avidly pursuing “academic” opportunities in order to seek out opportunities personally, and I would simply cobble together things I recalled from my textbooks and from Chinese newspapers and spill these out cathartically to American scholars and experts. But it was in exactly this way that I earned the “respect” of Americans. Americans listened to me eagerly, and many scholars were quite willing to engage in discussion with me. Some research centers even invited me to give talks, and these were all Washington, D.C., think tanks. How’s that for villainy?
Even more villainous was what came later. When my ideas and attitude later underwent change, when I began to feel that democracy and freedom were pretty decent after all, and also quite suited to us Chinese, when I finally awakened to the realization that being a Chinese person was not about going to great ends to criticize America for the benefit of America’s improvement, and that I would better serve China’s progress by criticizing China, I found that my points of commonality with Western academics were fewer and fewer, up to the point where I ultimately had no interest at all in conversing with them.
The reason for this was simple — they cared about their country and I cared about mine. Many times, when I invited them to talk about their criticisms of China, they were far more interested in talking about my criticisms of America. Humph. What time do I have to criticize your country? I am no traitor, devising strategies for the benefit of your country.
If you don’t get what I’m talking about, just indulge me while I address this issue by talking a bit about the role of intellectuals. The greatest utility of intellectuals lies in their capacity to “sing against” those who hold power, to monitor power, to improve government performance, to encourage national change and promote social progress.
Once we understand this fact, we are ready to ask another question: what constitutes the mainstream of political power in Western nations? What I mean is, would you best characterize the ideas of those holding power as “left” or “right”? Without a doubt, the “right” holds sway – particularly when measured by China’s academic establishment, where all those who advocate democracy and universal values are labeled as “right.”
And if the ideas of those who exercise public power tend to the “right,” when the political establishment is in the hands of the “right,” what should the natural attitude of intellectuals be? Should they like me, Yang Hengjun, spend all day praising universal values, democracy and freedom? Of course not. If this were the case, they would appear as co-opted intellectuals, even lackeys one might say. What we see as a result is a very interesting phenomenon in which the mainstream in Western academia, and most scholars of note, are principally of the “left.” They do not focus particularly on democracy, freedom and universal values, but rather nitpick from within democracy, freedom and universal values, singing songs of opposition to power. Only this kind of scholar earns any respect.
This trend has invited another phenomenon in China, and that is the species of the Chinese “left.” These are scholars who have a rich experience with China, who understand the experiences of China in recent years, and also understand so-called Chinese models (which Western scholars do not adequately understand). Capitalizing on these advantages they find a great deal of welcome in the West.
Let me tell you about an experience I personally found very discouraging. I once told a number of Western professors (not particularly renowned ones) about four well-known mainland liberal intellectuals whose work I particularly enjoyed, and they knew nothing about any of them. When I muttered the names of a couple of Chinese scholars who advocate the “China Model” and attack universal values, however, they were immediately on familiar ground, and they eventually added: you know, Vietnam and Ukraine also have strong scholars like this, who like Western scholars recognize the shortcomings of Western democracy.
How do we explain this phenomenon? First of all, these scholars on China’s “left” cater to the dominant trend in Western academia. After the end of the Cold War, the principal task of Western scholars was no longer exposing the shortcomings of authoritarian and non-democratic systems, but rather “exposing” the failings of democracy. Everyone must work in common to improve the weak points in democratic systems. Naturally, everyone is working for common improvement, and no Western nation is advocating wholesale adoption of Chinese models. From this vantage point, it seems that the ones who are truly helping Westerners improve their democratic systems are not those of us so-called “Western traitors” of the right, but rather those scholars of China’s left who, with a Bethune-like spirit of devotion, praise China’s “experiences” for the benefit of the West even as China is behind by several decades and the quality of life of the Chinese people falls far short.
At the same time, we cannot deny that in the same way the achievements of China’s leftist scholars for humankind are far greater than that of their counterparts on the right in China. Why? Because America points the direction of progress for all of mankind, and helping America improve itself means by extension assisting with the constant progress of humankind’s most advanced social and political system.
Poor scholars of China’s “right,” meanwhile, like this Yang Hengjun, spend too much energy worrying about China in isolation, and rehashing experiences with democracy and universal values that the West finished with long ago.
I’m not at all exaggerating when I make this argument. A number of Chinese on the “left” are in vogue in the West, but if bona fide rightists find their way to American or European universities and lecture there, they will get very little reaction [Wang Hui at NYU]. Just imagine me going to the United States to lecture about democracy, freedom and human rights. Let’s just search our own souls for a moment. Their thinking on democracy and freedom has developed for hundreds or even thousands of years, and their books and essays and works of literature probably couldn’t be stacked up in all the libraries of Beijing. And here’s me, a Chinese who only a few years ago came to know what democracy and freedom really are, coming from a place where just over ten years ago the word “human rights” itself was banned. What can I possibly talk about to my American audience?
If I were a “leftist” it would be completely different. According to my own experiences and observations, I would stand on stage and use stories to show what a mess democracy is, and to show up the glories of all things with Chinese characteristics, so that everyone was teary-eyed and wanted to shout: democracy has bottomed out, and socialism with Chinese characteristics is here to save us all! . . . This really is like hearing the thunderous sounds of silence! Just think, Western scholars have rattled around for centuries in democratic systems, and just when they’re at their wits end, the cannon fire of socialism with Chinese characteristics sounds out, giving them a “post-modern”
experience and theory to sink their teeth into. How could they not welcome this?
When I see on the Internet that those of us who promote democracy and freedom have been broad-brushed as running dogs of the West, that we have been clumped in a “clique of traitors for the West,” I feel the resistance rise in my chest. In fact, if you really want to win favor in the West, the best way is to viciously attack democracy, freedom and universal values without any thought whatsoever to the welfare of the Chinese people, and to paint a portrait of China’s imperial past as an otherworldly paradise. Of course, you can’t forget to secretly send your wife and kids off to live in a Western country [as many of these thinkers on China’s “left” have done].
As we talk about Western academia, there is another thing worthy of note. When a number of us [who do sympathize with democracy] see that Chinese scholars who have lived in the West disapprove of some aspect of democracy, freedom and universal values, we are unhappy and agitated. We think these Chinese have forgotten their brethren back in China and are merely looking after their own interests. This is actually unfair. When someone lives overseas, they must naturally accommodate customs overseas. Scholars living in the West, if they are true intellectuals, can’t merely cozy up to those in power. That they don’t do so doesn’t at all mean they oppose democracy or universal values outright, nor does it mean their consciences have been eaten by the dogs. Quite the opposite, it means they are behaving like professional Western academics. They live in the West, but this doesn’t mean they have to sing songs of praise for the West day in and day out. If they do, even I would have contempt for them . . .
In American politics there is a tendency toward the “right,” and there is much fear of the left. But more relevant for Chinese scholars is the fact that American academia dwarfs the American political establishment. How many Chinese scholars could enter American politics? It’s in academia that scholars spend most of their time, and its in academia that you can make a name for yourself and make a bit of money. Most grants in the United States also come from academia, not from the political establishment. And there is no way whatsoever that the political establishment can control academia. These factors means that the situation is very different from what we see in China, perhaps even diametrically opposite.
This might be the difference that has created confusion for some Internet users who believe that China’s “right” has taken money from the U.S. government. Don’t forget — the money that any three universities in the United States provide to the Chinese side to fund research probably equals what the American government spends on Chinese scholars to carry out so-called “peaceful evolution.” The United States is a very different country from China, where perhaps all university expenditures come from money directly or indirectly provided by the government.
I might have left the impression at this point that Chinese scholars on the left are the true “clique of traitors of the West.” Actually, so long as what you do is true scholarship, you can support or oppose whatever you wish. The world, after all, needs diversity. So long as scholars are not working for any clear interest, so long as they are doing real academic work, they are scholars and should be respected as such. When I look back I think that, had I stayed in the West and really become an overseas Chinese academic, I would definitely have focused my research on criticizing weaknesses in democratic systems and universal values.
But I did return to China after all, and no matter what benefits and honors you shower me with, I won’t live by criticizing and attacking democracy and universal values. The reason is simple. Democracy and universal values have never come to this land, and they have naturally therefore never caused any harm to the people of this country. However, as times change a day might come when democracy and universal values do finally visit us here. Perhaps then I will change colors just like a chameleon, and crawl over to the “left.”
I sincerely hope that day comes quickly when I have the opportunity to really attack democracy, freedom and universal values against my conscience!
This essay originally appeared in Chinese at Yang Hengjun’s Blog.

When college entrance examinations come around each year, testers with top-placing marks become a major topic of conversation. And behind this fever over China’s “top scholars” looms an atmosphere of fierce competition among China’s universities for these top-scoring young students.
For the past two years, as universities in Hong Kong have become hotter commodities on the mainland, the competition for top scorers on the college entrance examinations has become fiercer still, and the smoke of battle rises from all quarters.
Universities with deep pockets, like Peking University and Tsinghua University, have thrown money right and left, so that funds are being poured recklessly into the struggle to draw top-scoring students.
A hangover of China’s imperial examination system, the so-called “top scholars,” [or zhuangyuan (状元),] has always been hotly pursued commodities. In modern times, provinces have touted their “top scorers”, and now cities and even counties have started advertising their own scholastic elites.
Once a top scorer emerges, all paths are cleared for them. Officials step out to praise them. Media report on them. Companies announce their sponsorship . . . Various top-name universities then jump on the bandwagon, doing everything they can to recruit them. There is seemingly no end to the lures and attractions employed to invite interest, and universities send their own recruiters out en masse.
As China’s most esteemed institutions of higher education, with reputations to preserve, Peking University and Tsinghua University have the loftiest of ambitions concerning the scooping up of top test scorers [in the college entrance examinations].
But is there really so much value in these top scholars? Those who are familiar with Chinese history know that in the past top test results could open big doors. Still, precious few top testers ever accomplished anything of note, and fewer still achieved great things as officials [in the imperial government] . . .
Standardized tests have always borne a large measure of unpredictability. Most often where one places on the roster of test results reveals nothing, and high test scores do not reflect true ability or scholarship. If the testing content is unreasonable, test results are even less objectively reflective of a person’s level, much less their scholastic potential.
Generally speaking, so-called “top scorers” from ancient times to now were talented people, but that did not mean that they were “the best under heaven.” History teaches us that “top scorers” were those who had the highest scores among all testers, but this has no particular value in and of itself, and even less does it mean that [the top scorers] were of more value than the rest of those scoring favorably or toward the top. Anyone interested in researching the question could easily go and look at how many of the success stories in our society have been top test scorers.
I am sure the ladies and gentlemen at Peking University and Tsinghua University, which represent the pinnacle of our higher education system, completely understand what I’m talking about here. To make the point more directly, all of this running around and dumping of resources to scoop up top testers has very little to do with education. It is nothing more than a futile exercise in preserving the elite status of one’s own institution.
In the past, before universities in Hong Kong had entered the competition for top scorers, top scorers from various provinces generally went to Tsinghua University or Peking University. In recent years, as Hong Kong universities have stepped into the game, Chinese institutions sense a real danger that top scorers will be lost, and the media have also jumped on this story about the threat to the excellence of Peking University and Tsinghua University. This is why we’re seeing this situation now.
In fact, not long after the college entrance examinations were re-instituted, the competition for top scorers became the focus of the struggle for status among universities. As the state poured funds into Peking University and Tsinghua University, other universities could no longer compete with these front-running institutions in terms of attracting students. Competing for top scorers therefore became a two-sided battle between these universities, a way of showing up their “greatness,” so that whoever attracted the most top scorers was seen to have the edge, and no outsiders could even compete. Suddenly, competitors have emerged on the scene — and strong academic competitors moreover — so they begin to feel a sense of danger and crisis.
A sense of danger is a good thing, always better than taking one’s strength for granted. But the competition facing Peking University and Tsinghua from a number of well-known universities in Hong Kong comes not from the size of the scholarships on offer, but from academic freedom, from the quality of their teaching methods, from their international outlook, from the strength of their library and information resources. Our top universities do not make an effort to compete on these fronts, but seek only to offer financial incentives, which amounts to buying people over and not to true competitiveness.
The University of Hong Kong is a mirror on ourselves that is less distant that other elite universities. Because the admissions and enrollment capacity of HKU is limited, there is no way it can run off with all of our top-scoring students. But this mirror brings our own maladies and deformities into sharp relief. If we do not address our shortcomings, and if we do not wipe away the stains that blacken our own face, but rather respond only with more robust efforts [at the same sort of game], then there is really no way to save us.
This editorial originally appeared in Chinese at Southern Metropolis Daily.
Homepage image of China’s Beihang University by Peiyu Liu available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.

On June 28, more than one-hundred Chinese journalists and scholars signed an open letter pledging a professional boycott of the Chongqing Morning Post, a commercial spin-off of the official Chongqing Daily, after the newspaper issued a statement on June 24 refuting alleged “fake reports” about police investigations of three of its employees suspected of sharing “unacceptable” content in the wake of a police raid of the Hilton Chongqing.
Journalists signing the statement argued that the June 24 statement by the Chongqing Morning Post violated the spirit of professional solidarity by attacking colleagues who were merely exercising a professional obligation to report the story of the police investigation.
According to a June 24 story from China’s Economic Observer newspaper, a reporter with the Chongqing Morning Post was sentenced to labor re-education after posting “unacceptable speech” on the Tianya Forum in the wake of the raid on the Hilton Chongqing.
The Economic Observer also said two other reporters from Chongqing Morning Post were taken in for questioning by police after sharing “unacceptable content” (不当内容) through the QQ instant messaging service.
The next day, June 25, the Beijing News confirmed that Chongqing Morning Post reporters Chen Songbo (陈宋波) and Qiu Jinyi (裘晋奕), and an employee for the paper’s website, Liao Yi (廖异), had been investigated. Chen and Qiu had reportedly returned to work, the newspaper said, while Liao was still being investigated.
Signers of the letter of boycott against the Chongqing Morning Post include many well-known liberal figures in China’s media.
A full translation of the letter follows:

Personal Letter of Sanction Concerning the Intimidation of Professional Colleagues by the Chongqing Morning Post
On June 24, the Chongqing Morning Post openly refuted an [alleged] rumor about one of its journalists being sentenced to re-education through labor, issuing a statement saying: “[Our newspaper] hopes that various media keep strictly to professional ethics, that they pay no heed to idle reports and do not transmit untrue information. As for those rumor-mongers who invent stories from nothing, our newspaper reserves the right to pursue the relevant persons and hold them legally responsible.”
We believe that the Chongqing Morning Post has engaged in the intimidation of its brother media and fellow journalists, that this intimidation does not accord with professional ethics and behavior, and that it must therefore by condemned.
Even as the Chongqing Morning Post has issued its refutation, it has not yet made any statements concerning the specific nature of the situation, or concerning what faces the three reporters who have been investigated by Chongqing police. In fact, police in Chongqing have been more forthcoming than the Chongqing Morning Post, openly confirming that three Morning Post reporters have been investigated and suggesting that rumors that a journalist had been sentenced to re-education through labor were not entirely unfounded. The brief report from a journalist with the Economic Observer [that in part prompted the refutation from Chongqing Morning Post] stated clearly in its text that it would “follow up with further news reports,” and that “this information has not been confirmed by official sources.” This accords entirely with [the spirit of] follow-up reporting and can be regarded as professional journalism conduct satisfying the public’s right to know. It accords with normal fact seeking and follow-up reporting, and is not “fake news” [as the Chongqing Morning Post has suggested]. As the journalists are being investigated by the police, and in a high-risk environment in which the outcome is difficult to foresee, the early entry of professional journalism colleagues (“brother media”), which can push transparent handling of the situation through open reporting, is necessary to safeguard the [the rights of the] journalists. This is a moving act of mutual aid and regard.
However, toward this just action by brother media, the Chongqing Morning Post shows contempt with its so-called statement of refutation. Just as universities have an obligation to protect their students and professors, media have an obligation to protect their own editors and reporters. The recent move by China Economic Times editor Bao Yueyang to protect the right of Wang Keqin (王克勤) to carry out normal reporting activities [in the fallout resulting from Wang’s report on the problem vaccines in Shanxi Province earlier this year], and the protection of its own by the Nanfang Daily Group in the misfortunes that followed [the reporting of] the Sun Zhigang affair [in 2003], have both drawn respect and praise from journalism colleagues around the country. Of course, we also know that not all of those responsible at our media have this level of moral consciousness, and that they must do the bidding of power in order to protect their own official status. This is something we can understand to a certain degree. But regardless of this, they must submit themselves to rule and control to an unlimited extent.
不能臣服chen fu/submit oneself to the rule of到毫无气节的程度。
Not only is Chongqing Morning Post incapable of protecting its own journalists, and not only has it proven incapable of revealing the truth, but it goes as far as to carry out threats and intimidation against its brother media and professional colleagues. Facing open suppression of speech, it elects not to huddle together in professional solidarity, but quite the opposite strikes out against its own colleagues in the profession. These unimaginable actions leave us angry and cold in our hearts.
Under the current system, it is difficult indeed to find restitution for violations of our rights and interests. However, we can still express our positions in a personal capacity. We can decide to stand up and protect ourselves. Beginning here, we make our professional principles clear, guard our professional honor and dignity, and build anew our professional community (职业共同体).
For this, we call on our media colleagues to involve themselves in the investigation of the facts in this case to the widest extent possible, getting to the bottom of the unfolding events. We announce that from this day forward, we will engage in no personal cooperation with Chongqing Morning Post on no level, including but not limited to:
1. Not subscribing to Chongqing Morning Post
2. Not participating in any meetings or other activities sponsored by Chongqing Morning Post
3. Not publishing any works in any form in Chongqing Morning Post
4. Not having any other business cooperation with Chongqing Morning Post
The abovementioned personal sanctions will considered in effect up until the point that the Chongqing Morning Post issues a public explanation and apology to its brother media and fellow journalists concerning its so-called statements denouncing rumors.
June 28, 2010
SIGNED . . .
白振侠 北京 自由职业者
陈斌 广州 媒体人
陈鸣 北京 媒体人
陈思 广州 媒体人
陈初越 广州 媒体人
陈江 北京 媒体人
陈卫民 北京 思考者
崔卫平 北京 学者
邓志新 广州 媒体人
邓飞 北京 媒体人
邓莉 重庆 新闻专业研究生
戴志勇 广州 媒体人
大雪封山 北京 媒体人
董啸 长春 媒体人
丰鸿平 北京 媒体人
顾海兵 北京 学者
韩洪刚 广州 媒体人
郝建 北京 学者
何雪峰 广州 媒体人
何忠洲 北京 媒体人
何满　广州　媒体人
韩浩月 北京 媒体人
航亿苇 广州 作家
华新民 北京 学者
靳树乾 珠海 媒体人
靳颖姝 北京 媒体人
康不德 广州 媒体人
高战 广州 媒体人
郭力 广州 媒体人
郭延洪 宁波 学生
林涛 广州 媒体人
林明理 浙江 教师/作者
林峰 广州 媒体人
李冰 北京 媒体人
李铁 广州 媒体人
李思磐 广州 媒体人
李千帆 广州 时评作者
李宗泽 西安 大学生
李解 济南 媒体人
李公明 广州 学者
李藜 成都 媒体人
李继锋 广州 媒体人
梁文道 香港 评论人
刘洪波 武汉 评论人
刘海龙 石家庄 大学生
令狐补充 广州 媒体人
卢为健 上海 学生
梁鸿兴 云南 媒体人
吕明合 杭州 媒体人
雒有谋 黑龙江 教师
兰燕飞 北京 媒体人
老鬼 重庆 音乐人
江南藜果 广州 前媒体人
冒安林 北京 媒体人
马书军 广州 中国公民
马尔西 北京 公共关系行业
牧沐 海南 媒体人
苗蛮子 广州 媒体人
茅明荣 北京 编辑
聂亮超 广州 学生
彭晓芸 广州 媒体人
彭远文 北京 媒体人
彭伟步 广州 传媒学者
彭至 四川 媒体人
彭有明 深圳 IT媒體
潘葱霞 广州 媒体人
朴抱一 上海 记者
盛大林 北京 专栏作家
秦轩 北京 媒体人
史哲 广州 媒体人
石扉客 上海 媒体人
石川 杭州 新闻专业学生
单小亮 广州 媒体人
宋石男 成都 评论人
孙旭培 武汉 学者
苏小和 北京 财经作家
沙之白 内蒙古 自由职业者
沈敏特 南京 文化评论家
stone 上海 记者/作家
田路 北京 媒体人
陶卫华 北京 媒体人
王克勤 北京 媒体人
王力雄 北京 作家
王吉陆 上海 媒体人
王则楚 广州 政府参事
王小山 北京 专栏作家
五岳散人 北京 媒体人
文涛 北京 前媒体人
吴娟 广州 媒体人
吴明良 广州 媒体人
吴君强 北京 媒体人
魏剑美 湖南 专栏作者
王安 北京 媒体人
徐伟 广州 媒体人
笑蜀 广州 媒体人
萧瀚 北京 教师
徐庆全 北京 媒体人
徐益平 杭州 媒体人
许佳 上海 作家，媒体人
许晖 自由作家 北京
向继东 湖南 媒体人
夏业良 北京 学者
谢良兵 北京 媒体人
谢许牧秋 杭州 媒体人
叶檀 上海 专栏作家
余以为 广州 媒体人
鄢烈山 广州 媒体人
杨早 北京 学者
杨维维 武汉 学生
易水寒 长春 专栏作家
姚文嚼字 山西 网民
袁剑 独立评论人
章文 北京 媒体人
张若尘 河北 教师
张立 北京 前媒体人
张耀杰 北京 时评作者
张强 广州 媒体人
张初亮 上海 媒体人
张彦河 山西 评论人
朱新民 北京 网络工作者
朱健 杭州 媒体人
左小刀 北京 媒体人
郑建峰 北京 媒体人
郑渊洁 北京 童话作家
郑褚 成都 媒体人
翟明磊 上海 媒体人
子夜的昙 成都 媒体人
子莫 自由职业者
啄木 上海 教师
2可器 广州 媒体人
截至2010年7月1日23:00

Whether you’re a Chinese expert scholar, an ordinary citizen or a government official, you are sure to find things helpful in solving of current problems in China from a study of the questions Westerners debate in their media, and how they debate these questions.

According to a story from China’s Economic Observer, a reporter with the Chongqing Morning Post has been sentenced to labor re-education after posting “unacceptable speech” on the Tianya Forum in the wake of the recent raid on the Hilton Chongqing.
The Economic Observer also said two other reporters from Chongqing Morning Post, a commercial spin-off of the official Chongqing Daily, were taken in for questioning by police after sharing “unacceptable content” (不当内容) through the QQ instant messaging service.
The Chongqing Morning Post has reportedly requested that its employees keep quiet about the matter as they deal with the authorities.
The Economic Observer journalist reported learning from “several channels” that the two reporters taken in for questioning had returned to work. The reporter sentenced to labor re-education, however, would likely be formally charged “owing to the seriousness of the matter.”
Government authorities in Chongqing have made no formal announcement about the actions against these journalists.
The Economic Observer, with offices in Jinan, Shandong Province, and editorial operations in Beijing, is a nationally-circulated commercial newspaper published by the Sanlian Group, which also publishes Lifeweek magazine.
UPDATE: The Beijing News follows up on the Chongqing Morning Post reporters under pressure story today, June 25. The Beijing News has confirmed that Chongqing Morning Post reporters Chen Songbo (陈宋波) and Qiu Jinyi (裘晋奕), and an employee for the paper’s website, Liao Yi (廖异), have been investigated. Chen and Qiu have reportedly returned to work, while Liao is still being investigated.
Special thanks to orangeking for the valuable insight as we’ve followed this story. A portion of the story today from The Beijing News follows:

Yesterday evening at around 6pm, Deng Song (邓松), head of the publicity division of the Chongqing Municipal Public Security Bureau, said that some people at Chongqing Morning Post had posted rumors online that impacted the normal social order, and police are continuing their investigation. Deng Song also said that information online had said this person [in question] had been sent to labor re-education, but this is not true, and Chongqing Morning Post would soon issue a statement making this clear.
At around 7:30pm yesterday, the Chongqing Morning Post placed a statement in a prominent position on its website. The statement said: “On June 24, the news that ‘a reporter from Chongqing Morning Post has been sentenced to labor re-education for [sharing] unacceptable information’ traveled through the internet. This newspaper firmly states that: action has been taken by the police against no journalist or other employee of Chongqing Morning Post. In this statement, we clearly deny that any journalist from this newspaper has been punished by the police, but we do not deny that journalists from this newspaper have been investigated by the police.

It is certainly worth noting, as The Beijing News did, that police in Chongqing announced that a statement from the Chongqing Morning Post was forthcoming. That has to raise questions about how active the police have been in managing the fallout from this news.

At an “external propaganda work forum” for state-owned enterprises in Beijing yesterday, Wang Chen (王晨), head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO), said that as Chinese state-owned enterprises pursued a “going out” strategy, pushing more actively into global markets, “external propaganda work” concerned not only the development and reputation of China’s enterprises but also the shaping of the country’s international image and the enhancing of its cultural soft power.
“We must seize this historic opportunity,” said Wang, “applying ourselves diligently to innovation, giving full play to the role of enterprises, strengthening overall coordination, integrating the resources of our government, our enterprises and our media in a joint effort, pushing the external propaganda work of state-owned enterprises to a higher level.”
Representatives from China’s top state-owned enterprises gathered at the meeting, where they heard also from Liu Yunshan (刘云山), the chief of China’s Central Propaganda Department, and Li Rongrong (李荣融), head of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
Top brass from China’s state-run media were also reportedly in attendance.
Li Rongrong said during the forum that the “going out” of China’s state-owned enterprises had already in recent years been “a important force in our country’s massive external propaganda effort.” These experiences, he said, must be gathered, assessed and learned from. [Read more about SASAC at the China Leadership Monitor]
[Frontpage image by Toga Wanderings available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

But for them to be this rebellious. This is certainly barbaric behavior to find in a civilized society.

For government officials in China, these are perhaps the best and the worst of times. As economic development has surged ahead over the past two decades, and as substantive political reform has been stalled, the opportunities have been vast for those holding both the strings of power and the purse strings. In a society in which power is the most indispensable asset one can have, even a child can recognize the game for what it is. As one primary school student told Southern Metropolis Daily last year when asked what he wanted to be when he grew up:

Child: I want to be an official.
Reporter: What kind of official do you want to be?
Child: A corrupt official, because corrupt officials have lots of stuff.

But the times are changing, too. As tensions escalate between officials who have and citizens who have not, as people become more and more conscious and protective of their individual rights, and as new technologies like the internet (and simple digital recording technology) turn ordinary citizens into watchdogs, informants and even vigilantes, popular pressures are rising on government officials, particularly at the local level.
Tensions are running so hot, in fact, that the simple assertion of privilege by officials can set off public anger on a staggering scale.
The most recent case demonstrating this point was the June 11 mass incident in Ma’anshan, a prefectural-level city in China’s inland Anhui Province known as a center of China’s steel industry. According to mainland media reports, thousands of residents gathered round the scene of a traffic altercation in which a local official was said to have slapped a middle school student for bumping up against his sedan — or, as the opposite version went, slapped the student after he knocked him over with his car.
What angered the crowd that gathered around the incident in Ma’anshan was not the confrontation itself but the extreme arrogance of the sedan’s driver, Wang Guoqing (汪国庆), the head of the tourism bureau in the city’s Huashan District, and his wife, an employee in the district’s auditing department. According to eyewitnesses quoted in state media, Wang’s wife at one point shouted: “I am a government cadre. I know that you are from the Number Two Middle School. I can send people to cause you big trouble in school.”
The crowds clogged the street and brought traffic to a standstill. Ma’anshan’s top leader, party secretary Zheng Weiwen, went to the scene and announced to the crowd that he had dismissed Wang Guoqing from his post. The crowd did not disperse, however, until riot police employed force and fired canisters of tear gas.
The mass incident at Ma’anshan is a crystal clear reminder of why China’s party leadership has shifted emphasis in its news and propaganda policy to the active “channeling” of “hot issues.” The rising temperature of social tensions in China, and the absence of rational mechanisms to address festering grievances, means even the smallest injustice, real or perceived, can spark social unrest.
What observations have been made about the mass incident at Ma’anshan in China’s media? One of the most interesting editorials came earlier this week from Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋), a professor at Nanjing University, who explains how the general failure to put adequate checks and balances on power in China’s rapidly changing society is the leading cause of social instability and mass incidents like that at Ma’anshan.

When did “I’m an official” become a detonation fuse?
Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋)
June 20, 2010
Southern Metropolis Daily
A simple traffic accident, hardly worth a mention, creates a mass incident. On June 11, as the head of the tourism bureau in Ma’anshan’s Huashan District, Wang Guoqing (汪国庆), was driving his car, a middle school student passed by pushing his bicycle and accidently knocked the rearview mirror on Wang’s sedan. An argument ensued, and this official got out of his car and struck the student. Onlookers surrounded the sedan, snarling up traffic along the street. Only when the most senior local official went to the scene, having pledged to fire the local bureau chief on the spot did the situation calm down.
The reasons behind this mass incident were very simply. It was not because a grown up had struck a student, but because people on the scene heard a phrase that has become only too familiar: “Do you all know who I am? I am a leader!” Everyone will probably remember two years ago when the daughter of a deputy maritime affairs bureau chief in Shenzhen shouted: “Do you all know who I am? I was sent here by the Beijing Transportation Department, and my rank is just about as high as your mayor.” Not long after that, the woman who was later called the “toughest wife of a delegation head” struck out at someone and shouted: “I am a person of consequence!” When altercations occurred, they all played the power and position card (权力身份) in precisely the same way. And in each case this angered the ordinary citizens gathering around.
Are there perhaps officials who don’t understand why words like this set the people off and disgust them? . . . Of course, when the people are in terror of power . . . “I am a leader” may work as a talisman of protection. But when bureaucratic positions have become an ordinary line of work, and when people have a general sense of equality, then “I am a leader” only causes them to laugh. And when the old order of power is disintegrating, and a more equal and just order has not yet taken root — and particularly as social tensions are on the rise — shouting “I am a leader” becomes a dangerous detonation fuse. Not only does it not serve to protect, but quite the opposite, turns you into a public target.
This phenomenon should make us take note of the fact that a number of worrisome tendencies have already emerged in the character of social opposition [in our society]. While the reasons for this phenomenon are numerous, the biggest reason is the unbridled and unscrupulous nature of power, and the transformation of our society into a power society (权力社会), [in which power is the dominant currency]. This power society, put simply, means that so long as you hold the power, you can rise above and dominate the resources of society.
We should note that it is often in cases involving lower-level officials, when they assert their superiority in such an undisguised fashion, then sharp tensions between officials and the government emerge. The arrogance of officials toward the people perhaps has its reasons, taking into consideration the fact that power no longer depends upon an ideology of fate and service, and official appointments do not require authorization by the people — so that in a real and definite sense, they cannot control themselves.
Be that as it may, when “I am a leader” means facing real danger, some officials can simply . . . When officials are given priority in the use of social resources, this is power overdrawing on public authority, resulting in a loss of trust and confidence in public power among the people, and an unwillingness to obey.
Also, the rights consciousness of the people has been steadily awakened, and they already understand in a conceptual sense the notion that citizens are equal, and that every person has rights that cannot be infringed upon. When the distribution of rights and benefits has reached a point where it cannot satisfy the rights demands of the people, the normal act of the popular voicing of rights are pressured in the direction of the irrational and the emotional. Some time back, I received a letter from an old man in Kunming, Yunnan Province, whom I had never met. He said in the letter that he hoped someone would make an appeal for his family home that was slated for demolition, and protect his rights and benefits. But in reality, as I’ve seen many times, the rights defense actions of evictees are ultimately and inevitably pushed to extremes. Once they have become serious and extreme incidents, higher-ups in the government weigh their options and finally address the situation out of consideration for social stability. [NOTE: This is a phenomenon CMP fellow Yu Jianrong has noted in his research on “stability preservation” in China, in which petitioners understand the only way they can get action on their issues is to cause the biggest stink possible, which in turn makes local leaders even more nervous and heavy-handed in their stability preservation work.]
In facing the anger and emotions of the people, resorting to force to suppress them is of no use. Because in the vast majority of cases, the apathy and silence of the people does not mean that the pursuit of equality in our society has already be discounted. Quite the opposite, no one whatsoever can tell when pent-up social tensions and emotions will explode, and what impact they will have.
We should recognize that it is understandable and natural for various factors of instability to emerge in a society that is undergoing a transition from a power society (权力社会) to a rights society (权利社会). And the biggest factor of instability is the loss of checks and balances on power.
Bertrand Russell once said that the desire for power was one of the driving impulses of humanity. In traditional monarchies, limitations were placed on the number of people who could achieve power. But in modern societies in which power was opened to a greater number of people, “those who most desire power are those most likely to obtain power.” Therefore, positions of power are generally held by those who most covet power, who in this way satisfy their personal desires and their demand for social standing. This is not about the personal virtues of officials. It arises, rather, from the fact that power is inflated in power societies.
Therefore, it is pure fiction to believe that power that is not subject to checks can put a stop to the arrogance and abuse of power. The only real solution is clear, and that is effective checks on power. If we wish to ensure that power cannot harm, then we must remove power from benefit (让权力变得无利), so that officials cannot form cliques of special interest, and so that the phrase “I am a leader” does not imply special protections and advantages.