Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Baidu the Fetching Dog

In a July 30 cartoon, artist Xu Jun (徐骏) lampoons the Baidu search engine service for its alleged acceptance of payment to doctor search results. The cartoon points specifically to the prevalence and prominence of ads for quack medicines on the site. A report from China Central Television in 2008 exposed Baidu’s acceptance of money from Chinese pharmaceutical companies to feature them more prominently in web searches. In Xu’s cartoon, a man labeled “Fake Medicine Website” shouts, “My search results go to the top for the right price!”, as he throws a Chinese yuan sign out for the Baidu dog to go fetch.

Top testers a distraction for China's schools

When college entrance examinations come around each year, testers with top-placing marks become a major topic of conversation. And behind this fever over China’s “top scholars” looms an atmosphere of fierce competition among China’s universities for these top-scoring young students.
For the past two years, as universities in Hong Kong have become hotter commodities on the mainland, the competition for top scorers on the college entrance examinations has become fiercer still, and the smoke of battle rises from all quarters.
Universities with deep pockets, like Peking University and Tsinghua University, have thrown money right and left, so that funds are being poured recklessly into the struggle to draw top-scoring students.
A hangover of China’s imperial examination system, the so-called “top scholars,” [or zhuangyuan (状元),] has always been hotly pursued commodities. In modern times, provinces have touted their “top scorers”, and now cities and even counties have started advertising their own scholastic elites.
Once a top scorer emerges, all paths are cleared for them. Officials step out to praise them. Media report on them. Companies announce their sponsorship . . . Various top-name universities then jump on the bandwagon, doing everything they can to recruit them. There is seemingly no end to the lures and attractions employed to invite interest, and universities send their own recruiters out en masse.
As China’s most esteemed institutions of higher education, with reputations to preserve, Peking University and Tsinghua University have the loftiest of ambitions concerning the scooping up of top test scorers [in the college entrance examinations].
But is there really so much value in these top scholars? Those who are familiar with Chinese history know that in the past top test results could open big doors. Still, precious few top testers ever accomplished anything of note, and fewer still achieved great things as officials [in the imperial government] . . .
Standardized tests have always borne a large measure of unpredictability. Most often where one places on the roster of test results reveals nothing, and high test scores do not reflect true ability or scholarship. If the testing content is unreasonable, test results are even less objectively reflective of a person’s level, much less their scholastic potential.
Generally speaking, so-called “top scorers” from ancient times to now were talented people, but that did not mean that they were “the best under heaven.” History teaches us that “top scorers” were those who had the highest scores among all testers, but this has no particular value in and of itself, and even less does it mean that [the top scorers] were of more value than the rest of those scoring favorably or toward the top. Anyone interested in researching the question could easily go and look at how many of the success stories in our society have been top test scorers.
I am sure the ladies and gentlemen at Peking University and Tsinghua University, which represent the pinnacle of our higher education system, completely understand what I’m talking about here. To make the point more directly, all of this running around and dumping of resources to scoop up top testers has very little to do with education. It is nothing more than a futile exercise in preserving the elite status of one’s own institution.
In the past, before universities in Hong Kong had entered the competition for top scorers, top scorers from various provinces generally went to Tsinghua University or Peking University. In recent years, as Hong Kong universities have stepped into the game, Chinese institutions sense a real danger that top scorers will be lost, and the media have also jumped on this story about the threat to the excellence of Peking University and Tsinghua University. This is why we’re seeing this situation now.
In fact, not long after the college entrance examinations were re-instituted, the competition for top scorers became the focus of the struggle for status among universities. As the state poured funds into Peking University and Tsinghua University, other universities could no longer compete with these front-running institutions in terms of attracting students. Competing for top scorers therefore became a two-sided battle between these universities, a way of showing up their “greatness,” so that whoever attracted the most top scorers was seen to have the edge, and no outsiders could even compete. Suddenly, competitors have emerged on the scene — and strong academic competitors moreover — so they begin to feel a sense of danger and crisis.
A sense of danger is a good thing, always better than taking one’s strength for granted. But the competition facing Peking University and Tsinghua from a number of well-known universities in Hong Kong comes not from the size of the scholarships on offer, but from academic freedom, from the quality of their teaching methods, from their international outlook, from the strength of their library and information resources. Our top universities do not make an effort to compete on these fronts, but seek only to offer financial incentives, which amounts to buying people over and not to true competitiveness.
The University of Hong Kong is a mirror on ourselves that is less distant that other elite universities. Because the admissions and enrollment capacity of HKU is limited, there is no way it can run off with all of our top-scoring students. But this mirror brings our own maladies and deformities into sharp relief. If we do not address our shortcomings, and if we do not wipe away the stains that blacken our own face, but rather respond only with more robust efforts [at the same sort of game], then there is really no way to save us.
This editorial originally appeared in Chinese at Southern Metropolis Daily.
Homepage image of China’s Beihang University by Peiyu Liu available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.

Journalists boycott Chongqing newspaper

On June 28, more than one-hundred Chinese journalists and scholars signed an open letter pledging a professional boycott of the Chongqing Morning Post, a commercial spin-off of the official Chongqing Daily, after the newspaper issued a statement on June 24 refuting alleged “fake reports” about police investigations of three of its employees suspected of sharing “unacceptable” content in the wake of a police raid of the Hilton Chongqing.
Journalists signing the statement argued that the June 24 statement by the Chongqing Morning Post violated the spirit of professional solidarity by attacking colleagues who were merely exercising a professional obligation to report the story of the police investigation.
According to a June 24 story from China’s Economic Observer newspaper, a reporter with the Chongqing Morning Post was sentenced to labor re-education after posting “unacceptable speech” on the Tianya Forum in the wake of the raid on the Hilton Chongqing.
The Economic Observer also said two other reporters from Chongqing Morning Post were taken in for questioning by police after sharing “unacceptable content” (不当内容) through the QQ instant messaging service.
The next day, June 25, the Beijing News confirmed that Chongqing Morning Post reporters Chen Songbo (陈宋波) and Qiu Jinyi (裘晋奕), and an employee for the paper’s website, Liao Yi (廖异), had been investigated. Chen and Qiu had reportedly returned to work, the newspaper said, while Liao was still being investigated.
Signers of the letter of boycott against the Chongqing Morning Post include many well-known liberal figures in China’s media.
A full translation of the letter follows:

Personal Letter of Sanction Concerning the Intimidation of Professional Colleagues by the Chongqing Morning Post
On June 24, the Chongqing Morning Post openly refuted an [alleged] rumor about one of its journalists being sentenced to re-education through labor, issuing a statement saying: “[Our newspaper] hopes that various media keep strictly to professional ethics, that they pay no heed to idle reports and do not transmit untrue information. As for those rumor-mongers who invent stories from nothing, our newspaper reserves the right to pursue the relevant persons and hold them legally responsible.”
We believe that the Chongqing Morning Post has engaged in the intimidation of its brother media and fellow journalists, that this intimidation does not accord with professional ethics and behavior, and that it must therefore by condemned.
Even as the Chongqing Morning Post has issued its refutation, it has not yet made any statements concerning the specific nature of the situation, or concerning what faces the three reporters who have been investigated by Chongqing police. In fact, police in Chongqing have been more forthcoming than the Chongqing Morning Post, openly confirming that three Morning Post reporters have been investigated and suggesting that rumors that a journalist had been sentenced to re-education through labor were not entirely unfounded. The brief report from a journalist with the Economic Observer [that in part prompted the refutation from Chongqing Morning Post] stated clearly in its text that it would “follow up with further news reports,” and that “this information has not been confirmed by official sources.” This accords entirely with [the spirit of] follow-up reporting and can be regarded as professional journalism conduct satisfying the public’s right to know. It accords with normal fact seeking and follow-up reporting, and is not “fake news” [as the Chongqing Morning Post has suggested]. As the journalists are being investigated by the police, and in a high-risk environment in which the outcome is difficult to foresee, the early entry of professional journalism colleagues (“brother media”), which can push transparent handling of the situation through open reporting, is necessary to safeguard the [the rights of the] journalists. This is a moving act of mutual aid and regard.
However, toward this just action by brother media, the Chongqing Morning Post shows contempt with its so-called statement of refutation. Just as universities have an obligation to protect their students and professors, media have an obligation to protect their own editors and reporters. The recent move by China Economic Times editor Bao Yueyang to protect the right of Wang Keqin (王克勤) to carry out normal reporting activities [in the fallout resulting from Wang’s report on the problem vaccines in Shanxi Province earlier this year], and the protection of its own by the Nanfang Daily Group in the misfortunes that followed [the reporting of] the Sun Zhigang affair [in 2003], have both drawn respect and praise from journalism colleagues around the country. Of course, we also know that not all of those responsible at our media have this level of moral consciousness, and that they must do the bidding of power in order to protect their own official status. This is something we can understand to a certain degree. But regardless of this, they must submit themselves to rule and control to an unlimited extent.
不能臣服chen fu/submit oneself to the rule of到毫无气节的程度。
Not only is Chongqing Morning Post incapable of protecting its own journalists, and not only has it proven incapable of revealing the truth, but it goes as far as to carry out threats and intimidation against its brother media and professional colleagues. Facing open suppression of speech, it elects not to huddle together in professional solidarity, but quite the opposite strikes out against its own colleagues in the profession. These unimaginable actions leave us angry and cold in our hearts.
Under the current system, it is difficult indeed to find restitution for violations of our rights and interests. However, we can still express our positions in a personal capacity. We can decide to stand up and protect ourselves. Beginning here, we make our professional principles clear, guard our professional honor and dignity, and build anew our professional community (职业共同体).
For this, we call on our media colleagues to involve themselves in the investigation of the facts in this case to the widest extent possible, getting to the bottom of the unfolding events. We announce that from this day forward, we will engage in no personal cooperation with Chongqing Morning Post on no level, including but not limited to:
1. Not subscribing to Chongqing Morning Post
2. Not participating in any meetings or other activities sponsored by Chongqing Morning Post
3. Not publishing any works in any form in Chongqing Morning Post
4. Not having any other business cooperation with Chongqing Morning Post
The abovementioned personal sanctions will considered in effect up until the point that the Chongqing Morning Post issues a public explanation and apology to its brother media and fellow journalists concerning its so-called statements denouncing rumors.
June 28, 2010
SIGNED . . .
白振侠 北京 自由职业者
陈斌 广州 媒体人
陈鸣 北京 媒体人
陈思 广州 媒体人
陈初越 广州 媒体人
陈江 北京 媒体人
陈卫民 北京 思考者
崔卫平 北京 学者
邓志新 广州 媒体人
邓飞 北京 媒体人
邓莉 重庆 新闻专业研究生
戴志勇 广州 媒体人
大雪封山 北京 媒体人
董啸 长春 媒体人
丰鸿平 北京 媒体人
顾海兵 北京 学者
韩洪刚 广州 媒体人
郝建 北京 学者
何雪峰 广州 媒体人
何忠洲 北京 媒体人
何满 广州 媒体人
韩浩月 北京 媒体人
航亿苇 广州 作家
华新民 北京 学者
靳树乾 珠海 媒体人
靳颖姝 北京 媒体人
康不德 广州 媒体人
高战 广州 媒体人
郭力 广州 媒体人
郭延洪 宁波 学生
林涛 广州 媒体人
林明理 浙江 教师/作者
林峰 广州 媒体人
李冰 北京 媒体人
李铁 广州 媒体人
李思磐 广州 媒体人
李千帆 广州 时评作者
李宗泽 西安 大学生
李解 济南 媒体人
李公明 广州 学者
李藜 成都 媒体人
李继锋 广州 媒体人
梁文道 香港 评论人
刘洪波 武汉 评论人
刘海龙 石家庄 大学生
令狐补充 广州 媒体人
卢为健 上海 学生
梁鸿兴 云南 媒体人
吕明合 杭州 媒体人
雒有谋 黑龙江 教师
兰燕飞 北京 媒体人
老鬼 重庆 音乐人
江南藜果 广州 前媒体人
冒安林 北京 媒体人
马书军 广州 中国公民
马尔西 北京 公共关系行业
牧沐 海南 媒体人
苗蛮子 广州 媒体人
茅明荣 北京 编辑
聂亮超 广州 学生
彭晓芸 广州 媒体人
彭远文 北京 媒体人
彭伟步 广州 传媒学者
彭至 四川 媒体人
彭有明 深圳 IT媒體
潘葱霞 广州 媒体人
朴抱一 上海 记者
盛大林 北京 专栏作家
秦轩 北京 媒体人
史哲 广州 媒体人
石扉客 上海 媒体人
石川 杭州 新闻专业学生
单小亮 广州 媒体人
宋石男 成都 评论人
孙旭培 武汉 学者
苏小和 北京 财经作家
沙之白 内蒙古 自由职业者
沈敏特 南京 文化评论家
stone 上海 记者/作家
田路 北京 媒体人
陶卫华 北京 媒体人
王克勤 北京 媒体人
王力雄 北京 作家
王吉陆 上海 媒体人
王则楚 广州 政府参事
王小山 北京 专栏作家
五岳散人 北京 媒体人
文涛 北京 前媒体人
吴娟 广州 媒体人
吴明良 广州 媒体人
吴君强 北京 媒体人
魏剑美 湖南 专栏作者
王安 北京 媒体人
徐伟 广州 媒体人
笑蜀 广州 媒体人
萧瀚 北京 教师
徐庆全 北京 媒体人
徐益平 杭州 媒体人
许佳 上海 作家,媒体人
许晖 自由作家 北京
向继东 湖南 媒体人
夏业良 北京 学者
谢良兵 北京 媒体人
谢许牧秋 杭州 媒体人
叶檀 上海 专栏作家
余以为 广州 媒体人
鄢烈山 广州 媒体人
杨早 北京 学者
杨维维 武汉 学生
易水寒 长春 专栏作家
姚文嚼字 山西 网民
袁剑 独立评论人
章文 北京 媒体人
张若尘 河北 教师
张立 北京 前媒体人
张耀杰 北京 时评作者
张强 广州 媒体人
张初亮 上海 媒体人
张彦河 山西 评论人
朱新民 北京 网络工作者
朱健 杭州 媒体人
左小刀 北京 媒体人
郑建峰 北京 媒体人
郑渊洁 北京 童话作家
郑褚 成都 媒体人
翟明磊 上海 媒体人
子夜的昙 成都 媒体人
子莫 自由职业者
啄木 上海 教师
2可器 广州 媒体人
截至2010年7月1日23:00

Yang Hengjun McChrysal quote

Whether you’re a Chinese expert scholar, an ordinary citizen or a government official, you are sure to find things helpful in solving of current problems in China from a study of the questions Westerners debate in their media, and how they debate these questions.

Ant Tribe 蚁族

The term yizu (蚁族), or “ant tribe,” refers to unemployed college graduates born after 1980 — in other words, the crop of college graduates over the past two years — who generally live on the margins of China’s cities, in urbanizing villages or districts where they can find cheaper housing and search for economic opportunities. The yizu, as a young, restless and educated new segment of Chinese society, are a growing social concern for the government as a potential source of instability. According to a report from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences released in June 2010, yizu now number more than one million nationwide, and an estimated 100,000 live in Beijing alone.

Reporter punished for online remarks on Hilton Chongqing raid

According to a story from China’s Economic Observer, a reporter with the Chongqing Morning Post has been sentenced to labor re-education after posting “unacceptable speech” on the Tianya Forum in the wake of the recent raid on the Hilton Chongqing.
The Economic Observer also said two other reporters from Chongqing Morning Post, a commercial spin-off of the official Chongqing Daily, were taken in for questioning by police after sharing “unacceptable content” (不当内容) through the QQ instant messaging service.
The Chongqing Morning Post has reportedly requested that its employees keep quiet about the matter as they deal with the authorities.
The Economic Observer journalist reported learning from “several channels” that the two reporters taken in for questioning had returned to work. The reporter sentenced to labor re-education, however, would likely be formally charged “owing to the seriousness of the matter.”
Government authorities in Chongqing have made no formal announcement about the actions against these journalists.
The Economic Observer, with offices in Jinan, Shandong Province, and editorial operations in Beijing, is a nationally-circulated commercial newspaper published by the Sanlian Group, which also publishes Lifeweek magazine.
UPDATE: The Beijing News follows up on the Chongqing Morning Post reporters under pressure story today, June 25. The Beijing News has confirmed that Chongqing Morning Post reporters Chen Songbo (陈宋波) and Qiu Jinyi (裘晋奕), and an employee for the paper’s website, Liao Yi (廖异), have been investigated. Chen and Qiu have reportedly returned to work, while Liao is still being investigated.
Special thanks to orangeking for the valuable insight as we’ve followed this story. A portion of the story today from The Beijing News follows:

Yesterday evening at around 6pm, Deng Song (邓松), head of the publicity division of the Chongqing Municipal Public Security Bureau, said that some people at Chongqing Morning Post had posted rumors online that impacted the normal social order, and police are continuing their investigation. Deng Song also said that information online had said this person [in question] had been sent to labor re-education, but this is not true, and Chongqing Morning Post would soon issue a statement making this clear.
At around 7:30pm yesterday, the Chongqing Morning Post placed a statement in a prominent position on its website. The statement said: “On June 24, the news that ‘a reporter from Chongqing Morning Post has been sentenced to labor re-education for [sharing] unacceptable information’ traveled through the internet. This newspaper firmly states that: action has been taken by the police against no journalist or other employee of Chongqing Morning Post. In this statement, we clearly deny that any journalist from this newspaper has been punished by the police, but we do not deny that journalists from this newspaper have been investigated by the police.

It is certainly worth noting, as The Beijing News did, that police in Chongqing announced that a statement from the Chongqing Morning Post was forthcoming. That has to raise questions about how active the police have been in managing the fallout from this news.

SOEs play key role in China's soft power push

At an “external propaganda work forum” for state-owned enterprises in Beijing yesterday, Wang Chen (王晨), head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO), said that as Chinese state-owned enterprises pursued a “going out” strategy, pushing more actively into global markets, “external propaganda work” concerned not only the development and reputation of China’s enterprises but also the shaping of the country’s international image and the enhancing of its cultural soft power.
“We must seize this historic opportunity,” said Wang, “applying ourselves diligently to innovation, giving full play to the role of enterprises, strengthening overall coordination, integrating the resources of our government, our enterprises and our media in a joint effort, pushing the external propaganda work of state-owned enterprises to a higher level.”
Representatives from China’s top state-owned enterprises gathered at the meeting, where they heard also from Liu Yunshan (刘云山), the chief of China’s Central Propaganda Department, and Li Rongrong (李荣融), head of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
Top brass from China’s state-run media were also reportedly in attendance.
Li Rongrong said during the forum that the “going out” of China’s state-owned enterprises had already in recent years been “a important force in our country’s massive external propaganda effort.” These experiences, he said, must be gathered, assessed and learned from. [Read more about SASAC at the China Leadership Monitor]
[Frontpage image by Toga Wanderings available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

When being an official became dangerous

For government officials in China, these are perhaps the best and the worst of times. As economic development has surged ahead over the past two decades, and as substantive political reform has been stalled, the opportunities have been vast for those holding both the strings of power and the purse strings. In a society in which power is the most indispensable asset one can have, even a child can recognize the game for what it is. As one primary school student told Southern Metropolis Daily last year when asked what he wanted to be when he grew up:

Child: I want to be an official.
Reporter: What kind of official do you want to be?
Child: A corrupt official, because corrupt officials have lots of stuff.

But the times are changing, too. As tensions escalate between officials who have and citizens who have not, as people become more and more conscious and protective of their individual rights, and as new technologies like the internet (and simple digital recording technology) turn ordinary citizens into watchdogs, informants and even vigilantes, popular pressures are rising on government officials, particularly at the local level.
Tensions are running so hot, in fact, that the simple assertion of privilege by officials can set off public anger on a staggering scale.
The most recent case demonstrating this point was the June 11 mass incident in Ma’anshan, a prefectural-level city in China’s inland Anhui Province known as a center of China’s steel industry. According to mainland media reports, thousands of residents gathered round the scene of a traffic altercation in which a local official was said to have slapped a middle school student for bumping up against his sedan — or, as the opposite version went, slapped the student after he knocked him over with his car.
What angered the crowd that gathered around the incident in Ma’anshan was not the confrontation itself but the extreme arrogance of the sedan’s driver, Wang Guoqing (汪国庆), the head of the tourism bureau in the city’s Huashan District, and his wife, an employee in the district’s auditing department. According to eyewitnesses quoted in state media, Wang’s wife at one point shouted: “I am a government cadre. I know that you are from the Number Two Middle School. I can send people to cause you big trouble in school.”
The crowds clogged the street and brought traffic to a standstill. Ma’anshan’s top leader, party secretary Zheng Weiwen, went to the scene and announced to the crowd that he had dismissed Wang Guoqing from his post. The crowd did not disperse, however, until riot police employed force and fired canisters of tear gas.
The mass incident at Ma’anshan is a crystal clear reminder of why China’s party leadership has shifted emphasis in its news and propaganda policy to the active “channeling” of “hot issues.” The rising temperature of social tensions in China, and the absence of rational mechanisms to address festering grievances, means even the smallest injustice, real or perceived, can spark social unrest.
What observations have been made about the mass incident at Ma’anshan in China’s media? One of the most interesting editorials came earlier this week from Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋), a professor at Nanjing University, who explains how the general failure to put adequate checks and balances on power in China’s rapidly changing society is the leading cause of social instability and mass incidents like that at Ma’anshan.

When did “I’m an official” become a detonation fuse?
Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋)
June 20, 2010
Southern Metropolis Daily
A simple traffic accident, hardly worth a mention, creates a mass incident. On June 11, as the head of the tourism bureau in Ma’anshan’s Huashan District, Wang Guoqing (汪国庆), was driving his car, a middle school student passed by pushing his bicycle and accidently knocked the rearview mirror on Wang’s sedan. An argument ensued, and this official got out of his car and struck the student. Onlookers surrounded the sedan, snarling up traffic along the street. Only when the most senior local official went to the scene, having pledged to fire the local bureau chief on the spot did the situation calm down.
The reasons behind this mass incident were very simply. It was not because a grown up had struck a student, but because people on the scene heard a phrase that has become only too familiar: “Do you all know who I am? I am a leader!” Everyone will probably remember two years ago when the daughter of a deputy maritime affairs bureau chief in Shenzhen shouted: “Do you all know who I am? I was sent here by the Beijing Transportation Department, and my rank is just about as high as your mayor.” Not long after that, the woman who was later called the “toughest wife of a delegation head” struck out at someone and shouted: “I am a person of consequence!” When altercations occurred, they all played the power and position card (权力身份) in precisely the same way. And in each case this angered the ordinary citizens gathering around.
Are there perhaps officials who don’t understand why words like this set the people off and disgust them? . . . Of course, when the people are in terror of power . . . “I am a leader” may work as a talisman of protection. But when bureaucratic positions have become an ordinary line of work, and when people have a general sense of equality, then “I am a leader” only causes them to laugh. And when the old order of power is disintegrating, and a more equal and just order has not yet taken root — and particularly as social tensions are on the rise — shouting “I am a leader” becomes a dangerous detonation fuse. Not only does it not serve to protect, but quite the opposite, turns you into a public target.
This phenomenon should make us take note of the fact that a number of worrisome tendencies have already emerged in the character of social opposition [in our society]. While the reasons for this phenomenon are numerous, the biggest reason is the unbridled and unscrupulous nature of power, and the transformation of our society into a power society (权力社会), [in which power is the dominant currency]. This power society, put simply, means that so long as you hold the power, you can rise above and dominate the resources of society.
We should note that it is often in cases involving lower-level officials, when they assert their superiority in such an undisguised fashion, then sharp tensions between officials and the government emerge. The arrogance of officials toward the people perhaps has its reasons, taking into consideration the fact that power no longer depends upon an ideology of fate and service, and official appointments do not require authorization by the people — so that in a real and definite sense, they cannot control themselves.
Be that as it may, when “I am a leader” means facing real danger, some officials can simply . . . When officials are given priority in the use of social resources, this is power overdrawing on public authority, resulting in a loss of trust and confidence in public power among the people, and an unwillingness to obey.
Also, the rights consciousness of the people has been steadily awakened, and they already understand in a conceptual sense the notion that citizens are equal, and that every person has rights that cannot be infringed upon. When the distribution of rights and benefits has reached a point where it cannot satisfy the rights demands of the people, the normal act of the popular voicing of rights are pressured in the direction of the irrational and the emotional. Some time back, I received a letter from an old man in Kunming, Yunnan Province, whom I had never met. He said in the letter that he hoped someone would make an appeal for his family home that was slated for demolition, and protect his rights and benefits. But in reality, as I’ve seen many times, the rights defense actions of evictees are ultimately and inevitably pushed to extremes. Once they have become serious and extreme incidents, higher-ups in the government weigh their options and finally address the situation out of consideration for social stability. [NOTE: This is a phenomenon CMP fellow Yu Jianrong has noted in his research on “stability preservation” in China, in which petitioners understand the only way they can get action on their issues is to cause the biggest stink possible, which in turn makes local leaders even more nervous and heavy-handed in their stability preservation work.]
In facing the anger and emotions of the people, resorting to force to suppress them is of no use. Because in the vast majority of cases, the apathy and silence of the people does not mean that the pursuit of equality in our society has already be discounted. Quite the opposite, no one whatsoever can tell when pent-up social tensions and emotions will explode, and what impact they will have.
We should recognize that it is understandable and natural for various factors of instability to emerge in a society that is undergoing a transition from a power society (权力社会) to a rights society (权利社会). And the biggest factor of instability is the loss of checks and balances on power.
Bertrand Russell once said that the desire for power was one of the driving impulses of humanity. In traditional monarchies, limitations were placed on the number of people who could achieve power. But in modern societies in which power was opened to a greater number of people, “those who most desire power are those most likely to obtain power.” Therefore, positions of power are generally held by those who most covet power, who in this way satisfy their personal desires and their demand for social standing. This is not about the personal virtues of officials. It arises, rather, from the fact that power is inflated in power societies.
Therefore, it is pure fiction to believe that power that is not subject to checks can put a stop to the arrogance and abuse of power. The only real solution is clear, and that is effective checks on power. If we wish to ensure that power cannot harm, then we must remove power from benefit (让权力变得无利), so that officials cannot form cliques of special interest, and so that the phrase “I am a leader” does not imply special protections and advantages.

Listen to the citizens, and control them

Yang Yanyin (杨衍银), executive deputy secretary of the Working Committee of Central and State Organs, delivered a speech via People’s Daily Online on June 12 in which she explained how the party-state must both embrace media change and strengthen media controls — a seeming contradiction that is now at the heart of media policy in China.
Yang’s speech again shows us the delicate balance China’s leadership is now striking between encouraging new media development and limited public participation, and maintaining strategic control over information and public opinion. Part of this changing approach to controls — what we have termed “Control 2.0” — is a new kind of reflexivity, what Rebecca MacKinnon has termed “networked authoritarianism.”
It is important to emphasize, however, that this reflexivity does not owe entirely to the growth of the internet and other new media — although these have been, and are increasingly, critical factors — but has traditionally been seen through such practices as “supervision by public opinion,” which has formed the policy basis for much investigative reporting in China since the late 1980s.
Readers should note in Yang’s speech the presence of two media control terms, the post-Tiananmen media control concept of “correct guidance of public opinion” and the relative newcomer, “channeling of public opinion,” which overtook “guidance” in March 2008 and came formally on the scene with Hu Jintao’s June 20, 2008, speech at People’s Daily.
The thrust of Yang Yanyin’s speech — and of President Hu Jintao’s media control approach — is that party-state leaders must “treat, use and control the media well” (善待, 善用, 善管). The responsiveness element can be glimpsed in the language about the need for leaders to use public opinion as it emerges on the internet to better understand the needs and demands of the people, and shape policy accordingly. There is also a mention of the “people’s right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to supervise,” the so-called “four rights” (四个权利) that Hu Jintao mentioned in his political report to the 17th National Party Congress in October 2007.
The “four rights” should not, of course, be taken at simple face value. So far, they have been realized predominantly through greater emphasis on the reporting of sudden-breaking news incidents in China, or tufa shijian (突发事件). While this in some sense represents greater openness, we should note that this “right” has so far been exercised mostly through state media, whose critical role in “channeling public opinion” President Hu emphasized in 2008. Meanwhile, there have been further moves to prevent in-depth reporting of news events, and investigative reporting has faced greater restrictions since 2004-2005.
Xinhua News Agency’s summary of Yang Yanyin’s remarks follow. Most of the direct control-related language can be found in the second report below, which is available in Chinese here.
The tension and contradiction between media control and the notion of factual reporting becomes clear in Yang’s statement that: “We must resolutely ensure the news principles of objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and timeliness, ensuring that new media uphold correct guidance of public opinion from start to finish.” News, in other words, must convey the facts — but those facts must be our facts.

ARTICLE ONE: 3 Aspects of New Media Use
Yang said that new media had become an important channel influencing the social lives and thought terns of the people, and that new media are also important resources and methods for “our party” to maintain its governance and leadership. As the most representative form of new media, [Yang said], the internet is rapidly becoming the means by which the CCP exercises scientific rule (科学执政), democratic rule (民主执政) and rule according to the law (依法执政). Party leaders must therefore work to accommodate these changes, recognizing the importance of new media and making the best possible use of its advantages.
The use of new media by party leaders can be summed up in three aspects, Yang said:
1. Treating the media well. The party must be tactful with interactions and contacts with the media. Leaders must not hide away [from the media] or spurn them. They must have an open attitude and treat the media as friends. They must listen to both positive and the negative views in the media, accepting supervision by the media and the public.
2. Using the media well. Using the media well encompasses many aspects. The internet has already become the largest-scale mass media, and much of the feelings and thoughts of the people are voiced online. Leaders can thoroughly utilize this far-reaching and rapid interactive platform to enable interactive conversations with netizens, actively responding to issues that concern them, explaining in real time things that trouble and confuse them, and helping them out of their difficulties. In the process of policy making, leaders can also use the internet to listen to citizens’ perspectives, and can work to strengthen citizen participation through such means as [online] public opinion polls, in this way gathering the knowledge and views of the people and ensuring democratic decision making.
At the same time, we can use the internet to obtain feedback in the process of policy implementation, thereby steadily improving our work. Leaders can also use the media to mobilize action and organize the people, particularly in the handling of certain sudden-breaking incidents, such as the earthquakes in Wenchuan and Yushu, during which our party and government successfully used the media to disseminate information, quickly rallying public sympathy and uniting the people in the disaster relief effort.
3. Controlling the media well. We must energetically support the development of new media, and also strengthen their management, ensuring management according to rule of law, scientific, regulated and effective management. We must resolutely ensure the news principles of objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and timeliness, ensuring that new media uphold correct guidance of public opinion from start to finish. This is extremely important. We must channel online public opinion in a timely manner, actively, quickly and effectively responding to the reasonable demands of the people, and avoiding online sensationalism.
ARTICLE TWO: 3 Aspects of Channeling
1. The CCP must use the internet to gather the knowledge of the people, raising the party’s capacity for scientific and democratic governance. The party must, by means of the internet, involve the people in politics, involve the people in [policy] planning, and learn the people’s demands (问政于民、问需于民、问计于民). Before making major policy decisions, the party and the government should seek the opinions of China’s internet masses, seriously dealing with the issues raised by internet users, keeping an open mind to the reasonable views of internet users, and actively guaranteeing the people’s right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to supervise . . .
2. Keeping a grasp on guidance of public opinion. This is also extremely important. [The party] must actively foster and develop new media. [It must] seek the principles of new media development. [It must] give full scope to the advantages of mainstream media. [It must] propagate the correct line, principles and policies of the party. [It must] grasp the discourse power in online public opinion. [It must] utilize the mainstream [party] media to capture the [strategic] position on the Web. [All of these will serve to] uphold and develop a correct, healthy and positive guidance of public opinion.
3. [The party must] channel hot points in society and dissolve social tensions. A number of hot topics are generally what internet users focus on and emphasize. Undeniably, hostile forces use the internet as a tool of infiltration, incitement and destruction against us, as was the case with the Urumqi riots of July 5 [2009], which were directed by Rebiya Kadeer‘s network by means of SMS messaging. Therefore, the party and government must deal sensitively with hot social topics, quickly grasping trends in society, issuing authoritative information, and explaining the truth and facts to the people, understanding public opinion, providing an outlet for popular feeling, and dissolving social tensions. This is also an important aspect of strengthening the party’s capacity for public opinion channeling.