Nine workers have died as a gas explosion rocked a mine in Hancheng, Shaanxi Province, and four people responsible for the facility have now been taken into custody by authorities, according to China’s official Xinhua News Agency. Hancheng is located in northeastern Shaanxi, about 240 kilometers from the provincial capital of Xi’an.






陕西韩城致9死矿难4名责任人被刑拘



中新社西安5月1日电(记者 冽玮)记者1日从陕西省有关部门获悉，发生于4月1日、造成9死1伤的陕西韩城泉子沟煤矿瓦斯燃烧事故原因查明，包括矿长朱守怀在内的4人涉嫌重大责任事故罪已被当地警方刑事拘留。



陕西省韩城市位于关中平原东北隅，距省会西安240余公里，矿产资源丰富，其中煤炭储量达103亿吨，其矿区属高瓦斯矿区，煤矿灾害多发区。韩城市泉子沟煤矿是一家证照齐全、年产6万吨的乡镇煤矿，位于距离韩城市区10余公里的龙门镇。今年4月1日19时许，该矿发生瓦斯燃烧事故，当班井下有27人，17人安全升井，9人遇难，1人受伤。其中遇难者有6人为当班矿工，另3人是正在检查安全生产的人员，包括一名主管安全的副矿长。



事故发生后，渭南煤矿安全监察分局、渭南市煤炭局、安监局、检察院等部门成立了事故联合调查组。经调查组初步认定，这是一起生产责任事故。泉子沟煤矿矿长朱守怀以涉嫌重大责任事故罪，被韩城警方刑事拘留。同时涉案的还有该矿生产副矿长、掘进采煤队长和当班瓦检员。(完)

What I want to write today is a departure from the usual. As readers who follow my blog know, I rarely ever offer criticisms or opinions on articles or books written by others, particularly personal works. It’s generally my belief that even if an author offends universal values and democratic freedoms, his act of speech accords with the exercise of freedom of expression, the most important of our universal values. The best criticism I can offer, therefore, is to exercise my own freedom of expression, and to write essays that articulate my own views and perspectives.
But today I must make an exception. There is a certain book about which I feel that if I don’t write something to pick it apart, my moral being and conscience cannot be at peace. The book to which I refer is John Naisbitt’s China Megatrends. The first time I heard about this book was when Dong Jianhua (董建华), deputy chairman of the National People’s Political Consultative Congress (NPPCC) recommended it to Hong Kong delegates and journalists earlier this year, saying it could help Hong Kong people understand China and its strong points.
Not long after, I bought the book at Guangzhou’s Baiyun International Airport before boarding an international flight. During that twelve-hour journey, there were quite a number of times that the book made my skin crawl, and I could scarcely keep myself from leaping out of the aircraft . . .
Once I was overseas, I set my mind to tracking down the English version [of Naisbitt’s book], because I doubted that this China Megatrends was written by that same person who wrote Megatrends. I suspected, rather, that the book had been written by his Chinese secretary and published under his name. I even thought it possible that I had purchased a black-market book, and that the publisher had dared to print Naisbitt’s name on the cover.
Much to my disappointment, not a single foreign friend of mine had ever heard of this book China Megatrends, which was such the rage in China. Finally, one person told me the book hadn’t even been published in English yet.
Imagine my surprise at learning that a well-known American writer — one who doesn’t even understand Chinese, much less write it — has published a book in Chinese. A foreign author who doesn’t understand Chinese first publishing a book in Chinese, and then coming out with an English version? This must be a first for publishing in both America and China.
Moreover, from the first page onward, you could sense that this was a book written by a foreigner for foreigners, a book in which a foreigner sought to “use the eyes of the Chinese to gaze upon China. To face China’s weaknesses, but not to pass judgement according to our own values and standards.” (Preface, page two) . . .
I have no intention of embarking on an in-depth analysis of the views expressed in this book. Because I can say, on the basis of my limited learning and experience, that such an exercise would be an utter waste of time.
This book is not even worth refuting.
Please do not understand this as my summary verdict [on this book]. Every year I read something like 120 different books, roughly half of which speak against democratic freedoms and universal values, including works of China’s angry youth like those “say NO” books and those “unhappy” books, and even tomes in which Americans refute the notion of democracy. But never have I come across a book like this one by internationally-known author John Naisbitt that I find so shallow and ignorant to the point of shamelessness.
The book is not long, and I think it best to leave as much intact as possible to reflect the book’s theme and ideas — then add on a few comments by Old Yang. The version I have was published by Jilin Publishing Group in September 2009.
Allow me first to describe this book’s biggest distinguishing feature. The book gives greater attention and credence to the discussions, speeches and utterances of the three generations of top leaders since Deng Xiaoping than anything of comparable length [in the official CCP canon], including government work reports and People’s Daily. When I flipped through a few pages and noticed the liberal use of these names and references, I had the impression I was indeed reading a government work report.
I suppose that as a futurist, resorting to the use of the summaries and pledges of the top leaders who are most capable of determining China’s future is a practice beyond reproach. But let me emphasize that never in the last 20 years have a I read a book thicker with the names and utterances of China’s top leaders. In many cases, he writes about the pledges made by leaders as though they bear the hope and guarantee of China’s future. I’m sure that, as an American, Naisbitt is not so credulous about the plans and promises of his own country’s top leaders. So perhaps we should start by thanking him for the unwavering belief he has in China’s leaders!
Another characteristic of this book is its tendency at every point to speak of “China” and the “Chinese people,” so that we are collectively summed up in a single American’s affirmation of who we are. For example: “Chinese people are more inclined to regard themselves as a part of the group. Moreover, they welcome leadership by strong and steady personalities, because this can ensure good performance to the benefit of all” (page 16). “[Chinese people] rejoice at their modern living conditions, and feel that their future is full of promise” (page 17). These sorts of judgements about the “Chinese people” appear everywhere, but nowhere do I see reference to any sort of opinion poll conducted by the author. In fact, if it weren’t for the fact that he is everywhere claiming to represent the “Chinese people,” with conclusions prompting endless surprise from Old Yang, I don’t think it would have occurred to me to break with habit and write this response.
Now, let us relax, take a deep breath, and turn our attention [to the book] . . .
“Analyzing China’s own conditions and advantages, it is not difficult to realize that the lines and policies of the Chinese Communist Party are working steadily in the interests of the people” (page 1). “The misunderstandings Western countries have for the political situation in China are far too deep, and the CCP has done too little to explain itself, causing the West to mistakenly believe that the people of China desire Western democracy” (page 56).
Old Yang responds:
I, Old Yang, speaking as a crotchety member of the Chinese Communist Party, would like to express my deepest regret for the party’s insufficiencies in conducting propaganda work — that we should be remiss in properly publicizing our achievements to an American who has never had a Central Propaganda Department, whose government does not operate a single newspaper, and whose nation’s two political parties do not control a single media between them.
As to Naisbitt’s perspicacious observation that my party is “working steadily in the interests of the people,” I offer up my thanks on behalf of the whole party. We too understand that we are “working for the interests of the people.” It’s just that we don’t dare say it out loud. Because the “Chinese people” whose interests we are working for just won’t admit it.
For an American to travel all this way to China, and to use the Chinese language, which he doesn’t understand, to courageously tell us “truths” like this — what kind of animus is this?
“Why is it that so many Western countries have always sought to push China to adopt Western democracy, but domestically in China such voices are rarely heard?” (page 1) “The pro-democracy calls that these Western countries so energetically support do not arise out of a thirst for free elections, but rather out of disappointment over the economic situation, and particularly out of disappointment and dissatisfaction with corruption” (page 55).
Old Yang responds:
During the several years in which this book, China Megatrends, was written, Naisbitt came to China many times, and Old Yang traveled many times to the United States and other Western countries. I’m sure my travels have taken me to at least as many places. So I’d like to ask, where are these Western countries that are demanding China adopt Western democracy? Are not those who are now advocating that China progress towards democracy, freedom and rule of law in fact flesh-and-blood Chinese people, as well as CCP members of conscience who cannot bear to see things go on as they are? Where are the statistics to support Naisbitt’s conclusions here?
Old Yang could be regarded as being at the vanguard in promoting democratic freedoms in China, but at no point have we said that we need to copy Western democracy. Nor has any Western government or Westerner approached me at any point and said, look, we support you. In fact, those who have supported Old Yang — by the thousands and tens of thousands — are all Chinese brothers and sisters, from every province, city and village!
If Naisbitt understands the disappointment the Chinese people feel over corruption, then he should know that the experiences of perhaps every nation on earth have proven that systems of democracy and rule of law are the surest means of rooting out corruption. Is there any example on earth of any unelected government that has been able to effectively eliminate corruption?
“Many Westerners believe wholeheartedly in the breakthroughs, new ideas and innovation that come with debate and disharmony. But this sort of debate and disharmony are not suited to the psychology of the Chinese, particularly on the difficult question of governance” (page 40).
Old Yang responds:
Yes, Westerners do believe wholeheartedly that breakthroughs, new ideas and innovation come through debate and the interchange of ideas. But since when do Westerners believe “disharmony” can bring new ideas and breakthroughs? Here Naisbitt, it seems, has altered Western ideas to suit Chinese circumstances. Westerners believe, in fact, that harmony is created through debate and argument, rather than through repression and coercion.
“Chinese leaders emerge differently than in the West, their legitimacy arising from merit and achievement” (page 27).
Old Yang responds:
How is the legitimacy of leaders determined? This question was resolved long ago, and the Chinese people have no doubts about this. But this American, Naisbitt, wants to go and say that legitimacy is determined by “merit and achievement.” So I’ll ask: when the Japanese invaded and occupied China, building railway systems and opening mines and factories, and developing a number of regional economies, did that mean that their rule of China was legitimated?
This essay was excerpted from an April 28 entry on Yang Hengjun’s weblog, where there is much, much more criticism reserved for Naisbitt’s book.

From Nanping in Fujian Province, to Taizhou in Jiangsu, there have lately been a number of attacks on children that have shaken our society. And as we’ve reflected on these tragedies, a new interest has been triggered in the issue of media ethics.
As a major mainstream news site deleted some information in Internet posts, it explained that the media are not always “obligated to share anything and everything” (有闻必报) they have — implying that the deletion of Internet posts arises out of the sense of responsible media behavior. [Read a play-by-play of how news of yesterday’s attack in Jiangsu was reported in China’s media at CMP Geo Events.]
Those supporting such action argue that the lower levels of our society are prone to emotional responses, and that by “exaggerating” (过度渲染) these responses the media could put more innocent children at risk.
I want to start by correcting some of these exaggerated statements. It is a bit sophistic and misleading to confute the idea of having an “obligation to share anything and everything” and “exaggeration.” There’s no need to argue too much about this. I think most people would agree that the media should not report absolutely everything. Moreover, in reporting cases of homicide, mass media need to show a degree of restraint. They should not exaggerate the process of the crime or the horrors of the scene. And when the needs arises, of course they must respect the privacy of the victims.
What I want to talk about here is whether or not media must or should report on this kind of incident — or whether they should report so heavily on such cases.
Media reports certainly can offer example and inspiration to potential attackers, suggesting to them that physical violence might present an outlet for the venting of their own frustrations or “grievances.” Of course, those who would limit media reports on these grounds see only one aspect of the role of the news media.
The social impact of media reports is diverse and intermixed, and we have to consider a number of aspects together before we can reach a conclusion. There are at least four aspects we should take into consideration.
First of all, the public has a right to know, and they wish to understand the environment in which they live. They want to know what is happening right next to them, and know what problems face our society. Naturally, there are national secrets that cannot be shared publicly. But too many secrets will cause the distortion of society. Besides, if we don’t view public opinion narrowly as the publication of information in mainstream media and on official websites, then the blocking of information is futile anyway. Information won’t spread less quickly by word of mouth. Quite the opposite, rumors and exaggeration will fly.
Secondly, it is a mark of respect and condolence to the victims for the media to draw the attention of the public to such a tragedy, voicing sympathy with the victims and their families, and denouncing the perpetrator. This is a way of caring for and helping the family members of the victims. If such a tragedy were to happen beyond the gaze of society, our insensible joy would no doubt add to the pain of the victims and their families.
Thirdly, media reports serve as a warning system, and in particular put pressure on those responsible for managing our society. They compel everyone to reflect on social problems that face us. That we need to ease underlying social tensions, and that we need to reexamine safety measures at our kindergartens and schools in order to be prepared for the future.
Fourth, news reports on tragedies like this are not simply setting an example to possible future perpetrators — they can also serve as a warning and caution. The suffering of the victims might reawaken the conscience of possible perpetrators. And the outrage of the public might allow cause to see that this sort of act is no way to vent their own frustrations. There is no possible way of knowing how many people are exhorted to violence by media reports of this kind, and how many are encouraged to set their knives down.
For those who have already set their wills on seeking revenge against society, the silence of the media on a tragedy like this one might encourage even more ambitious acts of violence. Their goal is to create terror in the public mind. So killing one does not move you — how about ten, one-hundred, a thousand? This is the logic of the terrorist.
Therefore, it is most important to talk about issues like this, and to think of ways we can prevent them from happening in the future. My guess is that those who oppose media reporting of cases like this would not agree that the community should utterly ignore them. They would suggest that internal channels be used, allowing leaders to understand the situation. Naturally, government leaders will prioritize these cases and find ways to prevent them.
But this way of thinking has already been shown to be false. The prevailing modern view of politics is that it is not essentially virtuous, that only supervision and restriction of power by the will of the people can ensure that power is exercised in their interests. And the will of the people is voiced chiefly through public opinion.
What we can be certain of is that those most opposed to media reporting of incidents like this are local officials. Officials will use any manner of tactics to prevent reporting by the media, while family members of the victims will do everything in their power to get the news out. If you carefully consider the reasons for this difference, you will no longer see only the negative side of media reporting.
This article was originally posted in Chinese at Southern Metropolis Daily.

Three foreign journalists from the United States and Australia phoned me up [after the Qinghai earthquake]. Not to interview me, but hoping I could offer some news angles on the disaster. Recognizing that disasters in China happened all too frequently, they were concerned that if the same reports came one after the other Western audiences might lose interest. And seeing that my own comments on the quake were not appearing on my blog, they had decided to give me a call.
I offered a few points of view, and one of them went like this: in dealing with the quake and the process of reconstruction, Han Chinese and Tibetans could raise mutual trust and understanding . . .
At first they thought I was leading them on, that I’d been ‘harmonized’ to have suggested such a thing. I explained that as a Chinese person, everything I had always seen about Tibetans while in mainland China was singing and dancing, as though all Tibetans did all day long was sing and dance. Once I went overseas, I saw a very different side.
I felt that in the disaster relief and rebuilding effort, mainland television sets would be unable to avoid showing Chinese audiences truer and more authentic pictures, so that more and more Han Chinese would see what Tibetan people and their homes were really like, that they are flesh and blood people like the rest of us, dealing with poverty, suffering and hope.
Afraid these foreign journalists might have misunderstood me, I leapt into action as soon as our conversations were over, quickly putting together some similar ideas on my blog.
I never imagined that these posts would be swiped from the Web so quickly. Even less did I imagine that Cankao Xiaoxi, the mass-circulation digest of foreign news published by Xinhua News Agency, would re-publish my comments right across the banner headlines. In the twinkle of an eye, here I was transformed into “blog writer and social critic Yang Hengjun” [in a translation of a foreign news story] . . . The Xinhua News Agency translation was at roughly the level of those people at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who don’t know which three characters to use for Mao Zedong’s name. They even got a character in my name wrong.
* * * * *
One foreign journalist said anxiously a couple of days ago that the earthquake had struck more than 24 hours earlier, but your top leaders have not yet to gone to the scene — what was the deal here? I answered that this was no cause for concern. Not only would top leaders go, I said, but even leaders off on overseas visits [i.e., President Hu Jintao] would come hurrying back to China within the next 24 hours.
As it happened, not 24 hours had passed before a phone call came from the same reporter, who was brimming with warmth and admiration [having learned about President Hu Jintao’s return from his overseas trip]. I listened for a long time before I realized that he really thought I had possessed some sort of inside knowledge, that I had been privy to the decision-making of central party leaders, and that I had shared my inside scoop with him.
I found it really funny, and I asked him — if an earthquake happened in your country and your national leaders were off on overseas visits, what would their response be? He said without hesitation that they would head home right away. Yes, I said. Your leaders would head home right away, so what surprises you about the fact that our party chairman cuts short his overseas trip and returns home? He said nothing, but quickly changed tack. If that’s the case, he said, why do you spend so much time criticizing your leaders? It was my turn to be speechless. I wanted to say to him — you pig head! What good is it if they only go through the superficial motions but spurn the most important core values, and fail to carry out reforms to the system!
* * * * *
This reporter still wouldn’t give up. After we hung up, he managed to find me online. He said, I just can’t understand how it is that you guys manage to always turn disasters into happy affairs. How is it that every time there’s a disaster, you manage to bring it to a “victorious conclusion” (“胜利结束”)? Is it just about the government, he wanted to know. Or is there a popular dimension to it as well? He emphasized that he had spoken to a number of quake victims who had offered thanks this way and that. The only thing they had stopped short of doing was kneeling down on the earth in tribute. But still, so many people had died . . . What was this all about?
That victory, I said, had come through the piling up of the dead — the problem is that the dead cannot accept your interviews, and they have no way of telling you the truth. For those who survived, the fact that they can go on with life is naturally a major victory.
The above is excerpted from a recent entry on Yang Hengjun’s blog.

An expert on international affairs, a popular Chinese blogger, a business executive, a well-known writer of spy fiction — Mr. Yang Hengjun is a man of many talents. Currently a doctoral student at the University of Technology in Sydney, Australia, Yang served previously in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the People’s Government of Hainan Province. Yang is an active blogger, and Internet users in China refer to him as the “democracy hawker” for his outspoken views on public affairs. Mr. Yang is also vice-president of Hengyuan Group (Australia), and vice chairman of the Guangdong Institute of the Humanities.

Internet politics is a good thing for political life in China, but more important is that its force be seen in real life, through a system that promotes democratic practices.

One of the big China stories of the past 48 hours has been the replacement of 65-year-old Wang Lequan (王乐泉) as the top party leader of China’s restive northwest region of Xinjiang. Wang’s successor, 57 year-old Zhang Chunxian (张春贤), is the former top party boss of Hunan province, and has been described by English-language media as “amiable“, “young” and “fresh.”
But the most apt description came yesterday from Kathrin Hille at the Financial Times, who characterized Zhang Chunxian as “media savvy.”

China has replaced its hard-line Communist party chief for Xinjiang province with a media-savvy politician with economic training more than nine months after the country’s worst ethnic riots in decades claimed almost 200 lives in the restive western region.

How exactly is Zhang Chunxian media savvy?
In China these days, where the Internet is playing an ever greater role in society and politics despite aggressive controls, to be media savvy is to be Web savvy. And for several years now — even before Hu Jintao formalized his policy of active “public opinion channeling,” or what we’ve called Control 2.0 — Zhang has been something of a CCP celebrity on the Internet.
Zhang has been dubbed, in fact, the “Internet secretary”, or wangluo shuji (网络书记), for his smart, and apparently popular, use of the Web as a tool of communication with the masses.
The following is an excerpt from an article that appeared in Hebei’s official Shijiazhuang Daily on January 13 this year. It extolls Zhang Chunxian’s virtues as the “Internet secretary.”

It could be seen on the Internet recently that Hunan Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian (张春贤) was added to [the online list] of “People’s Daily Online’s Top Ten Strong Voices” (人民网十大最强音), where he was listed at number seven. As a native of Hunan’s Daxiangxi, I feel incomparably proud at having such a secretary [or top provincial leader] . . .
Along with the rapid development of the Internet, our country’s online population has grown by leaps and bounds. Our country now has 360 million Internet users. This is an extremely massive group. And while it can be said that this group is a virtual concept, they are in fact citizens . . . and their words and opinions represent the views of this particular group of citizens, conveying the voice and will of the people. A knowledge of the idea of cyber politics (网络问政) has already become a necessary skill in the political literacy of leaders and cadres in the new era.
Since Zhang Chunxian has governed Hunan, he has placed a high priority on the building of Internet infrastructure and on cyber politics. Zhang Chunxian has summed up his “Internet outlook” (网络观) as “understanding the Internet, going online and using the Internet” (懂网、上网、用网). And an important aspect of Zhang Chunxian’s approach to his work has become: “Going online for heart to heart interactions, then serving [the people] offline; Going online to learn about problems, working offline to solve them.”
In recent years, Zhang Chunxian has bravely shown his face online, striking through the sea of the Internet, becoming one with Internet users, making connections with online friends, having heart to hearts with Internet users, and learning about the popular mood and will through the Web, thereby advancing economic and social development in Hunan.
On August 9, 2006, ahead of Hunan Province’s Ninth Party Congress, Hunan’s provincial party committee racked up a national first, organizing a brainstorming event called “Inviting the Party Congress, Seeking New Development Together” (“迎接党代会，共谋新发展) on Hunan province’s official Internet portal, seeking the views and opinions of the general population through the Internet and encouraging Web users to think actively about economic development in Hunan.
On February 15, 2007, Zhang Chunxian made a post on Rednet.cn called “I wish Internet users a Happy Chinese New Year and offer my best regards through Rednet! This brought rave reviews from Internet users, who gathered round and cheered. By the evening of February 19, the post had had around 40,000 views and 400 responses from Web users. Hundreds of websites gave a great deal of attention to this event.
On July 23, 2008, a Web user made a post called “Voice of the People” on Rednet saying they hoped the provincial party committee would demolish a smokestack in the committee office complex that was belching out black smoke. When Zhang Chunxian became aware of this opinion, he made this tiny smokestack a major matter . . . and demolished the smokestack without hesitation. The smokestack was demolished 10 days later, and Zhang Chunxian even went to the scene to witness the demolition himself.