By David Bandurski — In yet another volley in the stand-off over Google and Internet censorship in China, the State Council Information Office, the external voice of China’s government and the core body charged with controlling the Web in China, released a statement on Monday rejecting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s criticism of Internet controls in China.
The release, carried at the top of all major Web portals in China Monday and yesterday, was framed as an interview with an unspecified Information Office spokesperson by the official Xinhua News Agency.
I don’t want to get bogged down in the text of the Information Office release, but there are a couple of general points worth noting.

[ABOVE: The State Council Information Office statement on the Internet in China remains the biggest headline at QQ.com yesterday.]

First of all, while the overarching tone of the release was one of clinch-fisted defiance, there was a hint (just the slightest hint) of the extended hand, suggesting China does wish to keep lines of communication with the U.S. open:

China’s Internet is still in the midst of rapid development, and we are willing to enhance international dialogue and cooperation on the issue of Internet development and management, on the basis of equality and mutual respect, in the interest of enhancing mutual understanding and achieving common development.

It would be very easy, of course, to dismiss this as an insincere gesture. But it might be the only opening for cool heads over this issue.
Secondly, while the Information Office makes a number of exaggerated claims, notably that “Chinese web users can fully express their views within the scope permitted by the law” (which experience has shown to be demonstrably false), some of the assertions about China’s progress in Internet development should be acknowledged.
I make this last point because it is important to remember, in the midst of the high-minded rhetoric and saber rattling, that China’s Internet has developed remarkably, though of course not altogether freely, over the past 15 years.
It should not surprise anyone to learn that our Chinese fellows at CMP are vocal opponents, privately and often publicly, of restrictions on the Internet and on free speech generally — but few if any would deny at the same time the important progress China has made in the area of Internet development.
Of course — and now I’m scurrying back to the other side of the fence — we also have to recognize that China does not have solely the CCP to thank for its progress in Internet development.
The Information Office makes much of the big numbers China has posted — 384 million Web users, 3.68 million Websites and four million blog posts on average per day. But to the extent that China’s Internet does offer a new space for expression, it is Chinese citizens who are responsible for pushing open this new space (often at substantial risk to themselves, as the recent jailing of Web users has shown).
And now, back to the saber rattling . . .
China’s official People’s Daily ran an editorial yesterday by He Zhenhua (何振华) — the pen name for well-known party columnist Lu Xinning (卢新宁) — criticizing the stance on Internet freedom taken by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last week.
The He Zhenhua editorial heaped scorn on what it called the “cultural hegemony” of the United States, and concluded by asserting that “the world rejects the forced imposition of value systems, and the Internet has no need for coercive captaining by ‘American-style freedoms.'”
A more or less complete translation of the People’s Daily editorial follows:

“China’s Internet progress has nothing to do with ‘American-style freedom’”
In her speech on “Internet freedom,” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized China’s management of the Web, saying it was [walling itself off from] “the progress of the next century.” And she suggested that without her so-called “Internet freedom,” other nations would make no progress.
Is this really how it is?
Up to the end of last year, China had 384 million Internet users, and 3.68 million Websites . . . more than one million online forums, more than two million blogs, with more than four million blogs posts on average every day . . . Such a scale of development, and such ardent and rich expression, strikes amazement in other countries, including the United States.
Just ask yourself, if China’s Internet is truly without freedom as Clinton says, how is it that it has become a reservoir of public opinion, a major platform for speech, and a new channel of political participation for the Chinese people? How could we see the emergence of such recognizable dark horse brands as Sina, Sohu and Baidu? And how could it be that major Internet companies like Microsoft, Cisco and Amazon are profitable in China’s market?
The only rational explanation is that Clinton has set up China’s legal regulation of the Internet in opposition to her so-called “Internet freedom.”
Should the Internet be controlled in accordance with the law? The answer goes without saying.
Put simply, if there is no lawful control of the Internet, we would have no way of relieving Clinton’s concerns — “The same networks that help organize movements for freedom also enable al-Qaida to spew hatred and incite violence against the innocent.” And we would have no way of ensuring the security Clinton speaks of — “Our ability to bank online, use electronic commerce, and safeguard billions of dollars in intellectual property are all at stake if we cannot rely on the security of our information networks.”
It is precisely because the Internet is a “double-edged sword” that the control and regulation of the Internet is a priority for many nations, and that this has become international practice. The United Nations World Summit on the Information Society [WSIS] pointed out clearly at its Tunis conference [in 2005] that: “Governments must play a role in Internet governance.” [NOTE: The Chinese used here seems to be more direct than the original language in English. The portion I found most closely corresponding to the People’s Daily language is: “[We] acknowledge the key role and responsibilities of governments in the WSIS process.”]
In fact, whether it is the “The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,” or the “Can-Spam Act of 2003,” the United States has always paid special attention to the management of the Internet. How is it that when this management is the same, America is [portrayed as] protecting freedoms, while China is [portrayed as] standing against freedom? . . .
The Internet should be free, and it should governed by rule of law. If we set aside legal regulation, if we set aside security assurances, we will have no Internet freedom to speak of whatsoever. If a nation applies strict controls to its own Internet [as the editorial has just asserted that nations in the west do], and on the other hand orders another country to implement “unrestricted Internet access,” it has to be said that this is an unreasonable provocation and slight on the dignity of that country’s rule of law.
China has ever placed great priority on the balance between Internet development and control. China’s management of the Internet suits the necessary demands of a nation governed by rule of law, and accords with international practice. It can be said that China’s rapid Internet development has benefited from an environment of freedom and openness, and has benefitted also from standardized and orderly management. In this respect, if others resort constantly to double standards, holding that only their vision of freedom is freedom, and only what they determine to be regulation is regulation — this type of rigid thinking is, to put it rather politely, wishful thinking. To put it more pointedly, it is cultural hegemony.
In her speech, Clinton elevated the issue of “Internet freedoms” to the question of “what kind of world we want,” and this certainly deserves some consideration. Of course, there is one thing that has always been clear: the world rejects the forced imposition of value systems, and the Internet has no need for coercive captaining by “American-style freedoms.”

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 27, 2010, 10:43am HK]

[Homepage image by Windy Sydney available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

By David Bandurski — If we tightened the focus on our mental microscopes, dropping through the broad strokes of Chinese history and politics, and through the thicket of foreign aggression — would it then be possible to locate the root of China’s historical weakness in the micro-details of Chinese culture itself, in China’s “cultural genes”?
That may sound like sticky and dangerous territory, but it is exactly where Sun TV chairman Chen Ping (陈平) stood last Thursday evening as he addressed an audience at the University of Hong Kong.

In his talk, “People, Party and Princedom: The Chinese People on the Road to Republicanism,” hosted by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, Chen Ping made a cultural reading of the nature and history of politics in China, arguing that one of the most fundamental stumbling blocks to China’s social, political, economic and cultural development has been the “lack of respect for the individual, and for the notion of the individual.”
This idea — whose simplicity was perhaps both its virtue and its vice — formed the basis of Chen’s argument that China had been unable to transition from a “princedom,” or junzhu (君主), to a democratic republic in the early 20th century because the concept of the individual had not yet taken root.
Instead, China moved into what Chen characterized as a “transitional phase” between princedom and democracy — a system of “party rule,” or dangzhu (党主).
“We are still in the midst of an age of party rule,” Chen said to his mostly Chinese audience.
And the suppression of the individual, he added, remains a key stumbling block for the future of China’s growth and development today.
In Chinese society, said Chen, individual identity is routinely erased. “What we have in China are roles allocated for us by society (社会分工的角色),” he said.

“If you attend a conference in mainland China, people will open up the session by saying things like, ‘Dear Leaders,’ or ‘Dear Special Guests.’ Everyone has a role, an abstract identity — they are not there as individuals. In Chinese culture, when I look at someone, it may seem that I am looking at a flesh-and-blood human being, but in fact, what I’m looking at is a sign [denoting something else]. I am looking at [the concrete manifestation of] a particular social role.”

Chen explained how he was often referred to at Sun TV as “Chairman Chen,” to which he sometimes jokingly replied: “What? I don’t have a name?”
In Chinese culture, said Chen, the “natural person” has disappeared in a culture of pre-defined roles and identities. “Much to our sorrow, we [Chinese] have lost sight of the individual,” he said.
In Chen’s view, this cultural fact explains why democracy did not take root after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the May Fourth Movement of 1919. While China sought at the time to develop into a democratic republic, which was “all the rage worldwide,” the concept of the individual, the basic foundation of human rights and democracy, had not yet taken root.
“How could a society based on role assignment (分工角色) possibly transform itself [so quickly] into a democratic society?” he asked.
The result, said Chen, was the emergence in China of party rule, or dangzhu (党主).
According to Chen’s reading of 20th century Chinese history, the system of party rule was instituted by Sun Yat-sen, then carried on by Chiang Kai-shek. Finally, said Chen, to a peal of audience laughter, “party rule was perfected by Mao Zedong.”
As China gazed into its own past for something with which it could re-organize society, the only playbook it found was dictatorship (专制). But dictatorship could no longer center upon an emperor who embodied the divine nature of “Heaven” (天). The imperfect solution, said Chen, had been to transition to a system of party dictatorship in which the new Marxist ideology was used to once again suppress the individual.
While Chen did not address the mechanics by which the concept of the individual and individual consciousness is taking root in China today, the assumption was there in his insistence that “party rule” is a necessary “transitional phase.”
“Party rule,” he concluded, “is a preparation for democracy.”

[ABOVE: Published in 2009, Chen Ping’s latest book, Recessionary Times, offers his reflections on China and the recent global economic crisis.]

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 22, 2010, 4:12pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Since the global financial crisis, Mr. Chen, the chief executive officer of Hong Kong-based Sun TV, has stepped into center stage at the network, leading on-air discussions on a range of controversial political, economic, cultural and historical issues, and establishing the network’s position as a leader in television talk shows. In December last year, authorities in China terminated Sun TV’s broadcasts on the mainland.
Tonight Mr. Chen will give a public talk at the University of Hong Kong discussing China’s political past and future. Please see details below.

People, Party and Princedom: The Chinese People on the Road to Republicanism
Public Talk by Chen Ping, Chief Executive Officer of Sun TV Hong Kong (In Putonghua)
The Seminar is open to all. Admission is free.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER:
Mr. Chen Ping was an active figure in promoting reforms in China in the 1970s, and in the 1980s worked for several government think-tanks in China. In 1989, Mr. Chen resigned from his official post and left China to pursue business opportunities overseas. In 1990, he founded Tide Group, which purchased Sun TV in 2005.
Date: January 21, 2010 (Thursday)
Time: 6:30-8:00pm
Venue: P3, Chong Yuet Ming Physical Building, The University of Hong Kong
For Enquiries please contact Miss Celine Zhang ([email protected])
To Learn more about the Journalism and Media Studies Centre, Please go to http://jmsc.hku.hk

By David Bandurski — Chinese journalists, and particularly Chinese investigative reporters, have never had it easy. Despite the fact that “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), or “watchdog journalism,” has been recognized officially by the CCP as a crucial form of monitoring since 1987, there have been few protections and a great number of restrictions on their work — from old-fashioned censorship and trumped-up libel charges, to grinding commercial pressures.
But according to some reports, things have gotten much worse for journalists — and, again, particularly for investigative reporters — in the last few years, owing to a number of factors.
The CCP’s central directive against the practice of cross-regional reporting, or yidi jiandu (异地监督), in which journalists pursue stories outside of their administrative territory (say, a neighboring province) to avoid censure by their direct superiors, has certainly had a chilling effect — although the practice does still go on. [See my article, “Jousting with China’s Monsters“].

[ABOVE: Beijing lawyer Zhou Ze, who champions journalists’ rights in China, is pictured in online news coverage of a recent unrelated case in which three students are suing a university official.]

One of the most damaging factors, however, is the noxious mixture of entrenched local power and rampant corruption driven by breakneck commercial growth in lieu of institutional checks and balances.
Add to this a looming crisis of credibility in China’s media, the lack of a press law to protect journalists (a controversial issue), and declining public respect for their work, and you have the perfect recipe for violence against reporters.
Guangzhou’s Southern Weekend, and other publications of the Nanfang Press Group, which have traditionally led the charge in the arena of Chinese watchdog journalism, have been some of the only newspapers in China to consistently pay attention to the professional, political, legal and ethical challenges facing Chinese journalists today. In recent months Southern Weekend in particular has given much attention to the work of Beijing lawyer Zhou Ze (周泽), who has focused on growing violence against journalists in China as one of his particular concerns.
In the following interview, published in the most recent edition of Southern People Weekly, another strong publication in the Nanfang arsenal, Zhou discusses the growing pressure on journalists, and how this is having a “chilling effect” on the profession as a whole.
Incidentally, readers may notice in the introduction to the interview what looks like an indirect but very timely swipe at the row over Google in China.

“Why are More and More Journalists Being Beaten and Arrested?”
Southern People Weekly
January 18, 2010
Criminal cases against journalists have been on the rise, a number of them clearly acts of retribution against reporters who have written exposes. This could potentially have a chilling effect on the work of journalists as a whole.
If you Google the phrase “journalist beaten” (记者被打) right now, you’ll return 14 million results. Journalists who are charged with “protecting freedom of speech” are being beaten, arrested, and “sentenced for accepting bribes.” This has become a peculiar trait of China’s media ecology. In the most recent case, Fu Hua (傅桦), a reporter from First Financial Daily, was sentenced to three years in prison for accepting bribes.
The work of the journalist necessitates being on the scene, where the news is happening, and conveying facts to the general public. But when the basic safety of news reporters cannot be secured, or when the very safety of the person is threatened, will journalists dare reveal the truth and the facts? This being the case, won’t the crucial force of supervision by public opinion [or “watchdog journalism”] be weakened?
In this issue, we interview China Youth University of Political Science and Law professor and Beijing Wentian Law Firm partner Zhou Ze (周泽), who has represented a number of journalists who have faced arrest and prosecution.
SW: Why have you been so interested in journalists as a group?
Zhou Ze: I worked for eight years as a journalist myself, and I found that the ordinary people, particularly those who faced injustice, looked to journalists with a sense of expectation, hoping the media might bring them justice. If the interests of journalists cannot be protected, this will serve as a deterrent to reporting, and ultimately it is the people who will despair.
SW: You have said that “it is a tragedy to pursue journalists for the official crime of bribery.” Well then, how do you propose we deal with the temptations facing journalists? Some fear the alternative means indulging their crimes.
Zhou Ze: What we’ve seen recently is an abuse of power. It is essentially using the pretext of the anti-corruption crusade to go after reporters for bribery who have been carrying out watchdog journalism. I think this [anti-corruption campaign] has become a declaration of open season for retaliation against journalists on the part of official power. It has impeded watchdog journalism, and it has done serious harm to the public interest.
SW: Do you think we should simply look the other way when certain journalists are found to have accepted red-envelope payoffs after disasters at coal mines and that sort of thing?
Zhou Ze: I am adamantly opposed to leveling the charge of official crime of bribery against reporters, but I do not at all believe it is acceptable for journalists to accept payments. I think payments for positive coverage (有偿新闻) or payments for no coverage (有偿不闻), such as silence fees, are issues that fall into the category of professional misconduct. They should be dealt with through industry self-regulation (行业自律).
SW: What are the prevailing rules in this respect elsewhere in the world?
Zhou Ze: In other countries these are treated as issues of professional ethics. Actually, strict self-discipline within the media industry has been sufficient to ensure that such practices are kept in check. No journalists will treat their career prospects carelessly [by engaging in such behavior].
SW: There are some who point out that under current laws, doctors and teachers who accept payments can be charged with official bribery. Why should journalists be any different?
Zhou Ze: When doctors accept kickbacks, this generally involves the corruption of medical practice, of the use of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, through relationships with medical and pharmaceutical enterprises [and violating the rights of patients] . . . In purchasing textbooks, classroom materials and school uniforms, the behavior of teachers similarly has power attributes, so if teachers accept kickbacks, the nature of this is the same as for doctors.
But as for journalists, no one would ever claim their rights have been violated because a journalist reported someone else’s problems but not their own. The abuse of power and position does not apply to the work of journalists. The case is different for doctors and teachers.
[NOTE: My translation is admittedly quite garbled here. Zhou’s logic might be best understood through the example of a mining disaster. Imagine that the person postulated by Zhou is the family member of a miner killed in an explosion, which perhaps local officials are trying to cover up. The journalist’s original intention might be to report the story and thereby redress the grievances of the family member. Instead, the journalist accepts a hush fee, or fengkoufei (封口费), and does not report the story. Zhou Ze’s logic is that the family member will not feel therefore that her rights have been violated by the journalist’s behavior itself. Rather, the family member will place blame on the mine owners and/or local officials who suppressed the story by paying off journalists.]
SW: What do you think are the underlying reasons for the increase in cases of violence against journalists?
Zhou Ze: Our society has already fractured into various interest groups, and points of social conflict and tension emerge all the time. Journalists with a sense for watchdog journalism routinely appear now on the scene, exposing issues as a matter of course that threaten those who have behaved illegally, negligently, or who have violated the rights of others. In such cases of opposition and conflict, it is difficult to avoid the situation boiling over into violence against the reporter.
SW: The Guangdong bureau chief of Democracy and Law News, Jing Jianfeng (景剑峰), was found not guilty because “he is not a state functionary, so does not meet the qualification for the crime of bribery.” But the journalist Fu Hua (傅桦) was sentenced to three years for bribery. Why are we seeing different results for very similar cases?
Zhou Ze: While it is accurate to say that “journalists do not meet the qualification for the crime of bribery,” getting people to accept this is itself a process. Meanwhile, we see courts going after journalists for bribery, so there is a need to change the mindset of judicial organs.
SW: As prosecutions of journalists increase, what do you believe the effect will be?
Zhou Ze: The increase in prosecutions includes a number of clear cases where journalists are being targeted for carrying out investigative reporting. This could potentially have a chilling effect on the work of journalists as a whole, and ultimately harm the public interest.
SW: Do you believe the making of a [press] law is the only way to protect the rights of journalists?
Zhou Ze: As our country is presently without a press law, the creation of a press law is right now the first prerequisite in working toward the protection of journalists’ rights.
SW: What is the most obvious change you’ve seen in lawsuits against journalists in the last few years?
Zhou Ze: In cases against journalists and media in the past, the public was generally sympathetic and supported the media and journalists. Now, however, when journalists and media face lawsuits, it is hard to see the kind of public opinion support we saw in the past. This indicates that lapses in discipline among journalists and media in recent years has already done substantial damage to the reputation and image of the entire profession. The credibility of the media is now seriously tested.

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 20, 2010, 11:58am HK]

By David Bandurski — Chinese journalist and blogger Tan Yifei (谭翊飞) wrote earlier this week that “China’s Internet is now going through a most bitter winter [of regulation and censorship controls].” Tan’s remarks would seem to support the suggestion that Google’s decision to go public with its frustrations was at least partly the result of intensifying government pressure in China, a market Google’s chief legal officer said this week had become “intolerable for us.”
Tan writes:

The day before yesterday, I was in the city of Chongqing and I sat down for beers and grilled fish with a group of friends in IT. An air of desolation and death is prevailing in the IT sector as a result of severe controls. One of these friends was preparing his immigration papers. Another joked cooly that he would switch careers and start selling barbecue. China’s Internet is now going through a most bitter winter [of regulation and censorship controls].
I saw news yesterday that aside from the recent ban on individuals registering CN domains, an order had suddenly come down that all individually registered CN domains would be reviewed before January 31, and all overseas agency services for the registration of CN domains would be prohibited.
China’s Web is in the midst of a clean-up and rectification campaign such as has never before been seen. Internet Data Centers at Shanghai Mobile, Shanghai Telecom Company, Bengbu Telecom Company [in Anhui], Jingdezhen Telecom Company, Shandong Unicom and Chengdu Shahebao have been collectively pulled offline for rectification, and have not yet been restored.

Below is a screenshot we took at 12:32 p.m. today of a notice dated December 9, 2009, announcing the temporary shutdown of the Chengdu Shahebao IDC (成都沙河堡机房). These shutdowns were part of the general Internet purge reported last month by the Wall Street Journal and others.

News coverage late last month in China unambiguously reported the shut down of IDC’s as a “shock therapy” action to combat indecent content:

Beginning in late November, services at IDC’s run by telecommunications operators in many provinces and cities across the country were interrupted, temporarily shut down or services thoroughly stopped. In the midst of this, many Websites were shut down without warning, affecting the normal operations of many Websites.
In fact, this round of “Website incidents” is not caused by attacks, but rather by the use of “shock therapy” by various regional IDC’s to prompt self-inspection and correction among Internet services.
IM286.com founder Dong Qinfeng (董勤锋) said his site was unavoidably dragged into this storm. Dong Qinfeng said that the method now being employed by the IDCs was one of “first shutting down, then carrying out inspections” (先封再查), which meant first cutting off all servers and then culling through servers one at a time. Service could be restored for those without problems.

For a good timeline of Internet censorship events in China in 2009, we recommend this post from Tania Branigan at The Guardian.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 16, 2010, 1:39pm HK]

[Frontpage photo by thaths available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

By David Bandurski — While the possible exit of the search engine giant Google from China’s market received prominent coverage in China’s newspapers yesterday, it remains to be seen how far China’s propaganda leaders will stomach discussion of the broader significance of this story. There are many sensitive issues and emotions involved, and the CCP is no doubt intent on ensuring this does not spiral into a strident contest over government Internet controls.
For now at least, there have been some interesting remarks on the Google story in China’s media.
Once again we turn to yesterday’s edition of Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily, where an opinion piece by Liu Hongbo (刘洪波), a regular columnist for Changjiang Daily (长江日报), voiced concern over the impact of Google’s possible exit — and what it might represent for the long-term development of China’s Internet as an industry, social tool and vibrant cultural space.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of coverage at the Southern Metropolis Daily website yesterday of Chinese laying flowers outside Google headquarters in Beijing.]

Liu Hongbo argued in so many words that strict government controls on the Internet could have a devastating impact on China’s international social life.
A complete translation of the editorial follows:

In Suspense About the Fate of Google in China
By Liu Hongbo (刘洪波)
Southern Metropolis Daily
January 14, 2010, A31
When domestic media saw this news [about Google] they were not shocked, only disappointed. They were not shocked because rumors had already been circulating. The announcement on Google’s corporate blog was merely confirmation. Google’s fate in China is still not sealed, but the likelihood of its closure is already there, and I cannot imagine the prospect of life online after Google.
Of course we can still use Baidu. And it’s true that Google in China (Google.cn) was never a match for Baidu in terms of market share. But even if just for the sake of preserving normal market competition in China, Google should still exist.
Even if we imagine Google holding an even smaller market share, what would that really matter? If it were simply an issue of ensuring enough competitors in China’s search engine market, it might suffice, in the absence of Google, to have a new online search provider take its place. But what impact might the departure of the world’s biggest Internet service provider have on China’s Internet?
Whether we’re talking about MSN or Google, these are not just services but forms of culture. They represent the online lives of many people, and they have helped to build many people’s conceptions about the Web. Their existence in China does not just serve to provide competition for Chinese players. As important Internet brands, they demonstrate the Chinese Internet’s connectedness to the global Internet. If Google’s departure does come to pass, this would mean MSN is the only major international Internet service provider still operating on Chinese soil.
China is in the midst of becoming a “major power” (大国). We are in the midst of the online age. And the world’s biggest Internet service provider withdraws from China. If a major manufacturing enterprise of the same caliber were to withdraw entirely from China, I imagine that would cause us to reflect with some urgency on our development environment. So will the closure of Google in China urge us in the same way to consider what sort of environment we are providing for Internet development?
The uncertainty of Google’s fate in China is something we can look at in two ways. First of all, the existence or absence in a given place of products or services that symbolize modern life is one way we can judge the level of openness there. In commemorating 30 years of reform in China, for example, people might rejoice at Coca Cola’s entry into China. Secondly, there is the reverse pressure (反向压力) exerted by the bargaining position and “significance index” (意义指数) of major international enterprises — the sorts of capital forces that are often the object of attack by the left end of the political spectrum in the West.
Google China has said it is considering shutting down, but still hopes to negotiate with those who control China’s Internet (中国互联网管理者). This can be read as a throwing down of the mantle, or as an amorous advance. People deal with threats and flirtation in different ways, naturally, and with varying degrees of urgency. But the threat and the come on are in fact the same thing, the only difference abiding perhaps in the reading of the act as either solicitous or malicious. A challenge that resolves in agreement can be read as amorous. An advance that is disagreeable may be perceived as a threat.
While unhappy all along with China’s Internet environment, Google still made allowances. So perhaps in saying it is considering closing up shop, we can read a measure of hope that concessions might be made. But the situation is such now that those who control the Internet and those who serve it must seriously talk turkey. If the degree of openness and tolerance cannot be readjusted, then management powers [i.e. the government] might face an uneasy situation, and the use of the Internet by society might be affected.
If Google exits China, this will be a setback for Google’s business. It will also be a setback for the development of the Internet in China. This would mean not just the withdrawal of capital but the withdrawal of a brand, the withdrawal of a culture. This would impact not only people’s use of the Internet but would also mean, taking a longer view, their alienation from the mainstream international culture of the Internet.
The Web has already become a form of basic and shared human life. This goes without saying. The Internet is still in a stage of rapid development, and new types of service are emerging all the time. The Internet has freed us from geographical restrictions on information . . . and has flattened the world. And still, controls [on the Internet] may in the end mean “the world is not flat.” This is the reason why we are still unable to fully understand the Internet. Language is not the only obstacle to information access. Imagine if Chinese websites too become inaccessible.
The saga of the Google search engine is already more than a decade long. In recent years we have seen Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and other Internet services emerge. But we have no way of directly accessing these new “international communities” (国际社区). These services have their substitutes, of course. But there is something farcical and cheap in the Internet age about this “substitute provision” of services isolated from the [global] mainstream.
How do we connect with the Web, enter the Internet age and “gear up with international standards”? These are very real questions.

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 15, 2010, 2:33am HK]

By David Bandurski — Since news came of Google’s possible withdrawal from the Chinese market, we have been inundated with media requests for our views and remarks. Bizarrely, from the perspective of observers who rarely lift their gaze from China’s media terrain, the first question many journalists seem to be asking is whether Google’s move is likely to push the Chinese government into changing its policy on censorship. Say again?
Our answer: No, of course not.
There has never, not since the leadership shakeup following the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, been any ambiguity among China’s leaders about the fundamental role of the press and of information in China, and about the need to “guide” or control public opinion in order to maintain social and political stability. And over the past several years, Internet controls have moved to center stage in the CCP’s struggle to control public opinion.
There is no bluff to call in Google’s case. China will, as Jonathan Zittrain said on BBC News this morning, “show Google the door.”

[ABOVE: Google’s possible departure from China gets big play on the front page of today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, one of China’s more outspoken newspapers.]

The Reuters news service has now reported the inevitable story, citing a statement from the Information Office, the external voice of China’s government and a core body taking charge of domestic Internet controls:

In a statement posted on the State Council Information Office website, cabinet spokesman Wang Chen warned against pornography, cyber-attacks, online fraud and “rumors,” saying that government and Internet media have a responsibility to shape public opinion.

Moving on from the issue of press freedom in China — which is shot through with disingenuousness on both sides (Did we ever seriously believe Western corporations would unbalance the equation in China?) — there are some interesting questions floating in Chinese cyberspace about how Google was perhaps singled out for attack for activities in China (such as alleged copyright violation) that have arguably been par for the course for years. [The print version of the editorial is HERE].
In the following editorial, writer Feng Lei (冯磊) writes in Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily, that if Google’s exit from China is about more than simple market pressures, then Chinese “have more to reflect on than just Google China.”
Wink wink.
A full translation of Feng’s editorial follows:

Google’s pullout, a game with many losers
By Feng Lei (冯磊)
January 14, 2010
Google has announced through a [corporate] weblog that it is preparing to withdraw from the Chinese market. This news has struck many web users dumb with astonishment. For some time now, China’s search engine market has been balanced in a state of “70-30” (三七开). Baidu has held a 70 percent market share; Google has held around a 30 percent market share. This share [of the China market], I hear, accounts for less than one percent of Google’s global market share.
As web users, how should we understand Google’s sombre departure? Has this giant truly lost heart over the Chinese market, this piece of the cake? Is its departure for economic reasons, or the result of institutional factors? If the reasons were purely economic, then everyone might feel a sense of gratification — through more than a decade of hardening ourselves [in the market], our domestic Internet industry has chalked up enormous progress in terms of development capacity and management know-how, to the point that even Google has been knocked from its perch. How could we not say that this is a sign of the advancement of Made in China?
On the other hand, if Google has other reasons for exiting [the China market] — for example, institutional strictures or other factors — well then, we have more to reflect on than just Google China.
What is the ideal situation that should prevail in the arena of business competition? Without a doubt, first and foremost is an environment characterized by fair competition . . . Put another way, if Google’s departure is strictly about commercial factors, then this affair would hardly elicit a sigh.
But clearly, things are not so simple. There are many Web users in China who have let out sighs.
Intellectual property protections in China have always been the subject of much criticism in the world. Look at the sharing of information (including online books), for example. Sina’s “Sharing Warehouse” (共享资料库) has consistently permitted Web users to freely upload and download [book content]. Of course, this behavior is in accord with the nature and spirit of the Web. However, it was Google whose electronic library faced attack for operational reasons from the China Writer’s Association, the China Written Works Copyright Society and Internet users. Obviously, the issue of copyright violation needs to be pursued. But there is a fierce tendentiousness about the way we Chinese have applied different standards [to different companies] on the question of copyright.
A number of major Web portals in China have all along adopted an almost free-for-all approach to the provision of works from writers. These naked acts of infringement helped to make these major Web portals what they are, and at the same time posed a major challenge to the commercial subsistence of newspapers and other traditional media. No one in China has raised a finger about these unfair methods of competition.
Moreover, we can see from the [copyright] violations committed by the major Web portals and the controversy over Google’s digital library that some are still being shielded from their own wrongdoings.
Without the availability of the Google search engine, what will the market look like? Some news has said that Yahoo! has welcomed the news of Google’s withdrawal. Well then, can we suppose Google’s actions might invite similar decisions by others? And what would a Chinese Internet look like without the likes of Google and Yahoo!?
Does Google’s exit mean Baidu will be left as the lone, massive player? Particularly intriguing is the question of whether Google’s departure will become a model or example for other international Internet operators to follow.
Without a doubt, Google’s departure [from China] is a game no one can expect to win. A couple like Google not only serves as a technology leader in China’s domestic market, but also, by virtue of their presence, has a “catfish effect” [raising overall performance in the industry]. Without this presence and effect, there will be a definite impact on the development of the industry domestically.
Naturally, as a corporate entity, Google should undergo its own process of self-reflection. As an “overseas competitor”, aside from its the mission of perfecting its own products, [Google] should have understood China’s system and concepts, and the invisible rules that pertain everywhere in China. These are all, in fact, necessary homework.
Another extremely important issue, of course, is how exactly what posture and frame of mind this China and this Chinese market, which are actively integrating into the world economic system, should take in facing competition from others.
Clearly, this game has no winners.

[Posted By David Bandurski, January 14, 2010, 3:27pm HK]

[Frontpage image by Maxwell96 available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]