By Qian Gang — This has been a winter of unusual weather patterns in China’s media landscape. And the latest drop in temperature came on November 28, as many television viewers in China discovered they could no longer receive programs from Hong Kong-based Sun TV. It is clear now that Sun TV broadcasts to the mainland through the government-operated Asia-Pacific Six satellite have been terminated.
How is it that this “small-scale” network specializing in cultural programming with no direct news coverage has fallen afoul of Chinese authorities?
I have watched Sun TV for a few years now. It was back in 2008 that I came across “Cause” (论衡), which caught me a bit off guard. Sun TV CEO Chen Ping (陈平) opened up the conversations himself, or served as anchor, and I found this unusual.

[Sun TV CEO Chen Ping appears on the program Zi Ye.]

One day in 2009, I saw the program “Zi Ye” (子夜) for the first time. The program was organized into so-called “seasons,” each consisting of at least ten 25-minute episodes. All of the episodes in a “season” dealt with a single topic, and they were broadcast through the week in a kind of unbroken discussion, even over the weekend.
There have been ten seasons of “Zi Ye” already. Large-scale discussion programs of this sort are a rare find, and I was particularly astonished by its boldness of vision.
In “Cause, “Zi Ye” and a number of other Sun TV programs, it gradually became clear to me that this network was blazing its own very unique trail.
In addition to providing viewers with history and culture programs purchased overseas, its own oral history programs, and documentaries, Sun TV also began developing in-depth discussion programs that served as platforms for the serious exchange of ideas (思想谈话节目). The network eventually did a complete makeover of its image and programming, focusing on strongly branded discussion programs running for more than 30 hours a week.
The launch of “Cause” happened to correspond with the onset of the global financial crisis. Conversations at Sun TV offered many perspectives at the time that I found unique and incisive, and which immediately drew me in.
One major flashpoint of the economic crisis has been the “fictitious economy”, but what were the real underlying causes of the crisis? In Chen Ping’s view it was over-capacity of production and undersupply of resources, and one of the deeper causes was that industrial civilization is in decline.
As far as China was concerned, the causes of this crisis were external, at least on the surface. But there were more fundamental causes, in Chen Ping’s view, that were internally derived. The proportion of domestic demand in China’s economy has been steadily shrinking, particularly private demand, while state consumption is rising steadily. In China, the development of new technologies and related mechanisms is lagging behind, and the availability of resources is a problem growing worse by the day.
For Chen, the global economic crisis is a signal that humanity can no longer be dependent on a linear model of production and development based on the consumption of non-renewable resources. We have reached a point where industrial civilization must give way to an ecological civilization. And this is China’s critical juncture too.
China faces immense challenges as it attempts a transitional leap from a traditional Chinese post-authoritarian age to a modern democratic industrial civilization, and from an early industrial civilization to a democratic and ecologically sound society.
Many of the conversations on Sun TV chat programs have dealt with social transition and political reform in China, and sparks of thought have been flying off everywhere.
“Our middle class in China is already of substantial size. The structure of our society already sits in many ways on the eve of massive change,” said People’s University of China professor Wen Tiejun (温铁军). “The key to whether a nation can continue to develop its base of wealth and whether its economy can sustain its growth is whether or not it has a good political system,” said China University of Political Science and Law professor Cai Dingjian (蔡定剑).
“Political reform relies on the one hand on strong political leaders who are clear-minded. It relies on the other hand on the grassroots, including those inside and outside the party, and including popular [or non-governmental] actors,” said Central Party School professor Wang Changjiang (王长江).
Chen Ping’s discourse has a thick reformist bent. He firmly believes that humanity has shared universal values, and he is staunchly opposed to the use of “national circumstances” as a billy club to beat down those who explore the idea of political reform. At the same time, he advocates taking a clear look at China’s history and present, making an earnest and true reading of China’s national circumstances.
When describing China’s history, Chen talks about a transition from “sovereign rule to party rule to popular rule” (君主→党主→民主). He believes that China’s democratic foundations are weak because China has traditionally lacked a cultural sense of the value of the natural person, and a belief in rights and equality.
Here is Chen Ping on “party rule” as a transitional phase:

Party rule is a preparation for democracy, and the age of party rule is a necessary precondition of the arrival of democracy. Party rule can also be seen as a particular historical era, a special form of elite democracy.

Chen approves of the idea that democratic politics could emerge peacefully from party rule, but he confesses that “the most intractable thing to deal with here is [the protection] of vested interests [by party leaders].”
On the program “Cause,” Chen Ping engaged in a dialogue with China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) professor Xu Xiaonian (许小年) about “using pardon and redemption to break through resistance to change.” This conversation made a deep impression on me.
Since the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party has mulled the idea of sunshine measures that would set up a personal income reporting system for public officials. But to this day no progress has been made on this front. Vested interests have now become the most significant impediment to reform. At the same time, the influence of vested interests is the most basic reason why monopoly enterprises have avoided tackling necessary reforms.
Xu Xiaonian and Chen Ping expressed support for forgiving the crimes of some corrupt officials as a condition for building a system of integrity, and they advocated a policy of universal pardon for monopoly enterprises in exchange for privatization reform. Xu Xiaonian referred to this as “a rather practical path” of “incremental reform.”
These are divisive issues about which there is a lot of disagreement. But the Chen-Xu dialogue was thought-provoking:

Xu Xiaonian: This is about opening a road. If you don’t open up a road then it just won’t work.
Chen Ping: It’s about reform and betterment.
Xu Xiaonian: Reform. Reform.
Chen Ping: And reform means admission.
Xu Xiaonian: Yes, admission of the past.
Chen Ping: Admission.
Xu Xiaonian: Through acknowledgment, we can write off the past and look ahead. For the sake of national development. For the sake of the development of our national peoples. For the interests of each individual person. We must acknowledge the past, and look to the future. Our hope is to develop, and as best as possible to avoid dramatic swings in the process of reform.

This sort of dialogue stirs up complex emotions. It doesn’t simply hand you simple answers. It tells you the truth about the complexity of the situation facing China, and it demands reason of the government, of the party and of the people. It urges us to pull together to find a way out of the morass.
Rational and serious dialogue is not easily found in China. In fact, it is far, far too rare.
“What a revolutionary party should most fear is the failure to hear the voice of the people, for the most fearful thing is utter silence,” Deng Xiaoping said back in 1978. In the 1980s China went through a period of clamoring voices and rich debates. Chen Ping, in fact, was a researcher of political reform during that era. Now, 30 years on from Deng’s words, as China moves at great risk into the deep end of reform, what the country needs most urgently is powerful brainstorming.
At the moment, however, our poverty of good ideas is drowned out by cries heralding a glorious golden age.
In China’s information environment today, already narrow lines of communication are congested with empty and obsequious words serving the interests of power and profit, and harsh truths at the lower-levels of Chinese society are buried over.
Party rule is the reality that Chinese face today. But China’s rulers must be alert to the fact that the greatest danger to party rule is the failure to monitor and check power. The most disastrous result of the monopolization of speech and information is closing of one’s own eyes and ears.
Do our leaders today have friends who can speak up with forthright admonition? Can they tolerate frank remonstration? On major issues that concern the fate of our nation, do they understand the hearts and minds of the people?
Chinese media are venturing today through a deep gorge of history. Political controls, existential pressures, reliance on advertising, restrained by powerful interests — and this has caused many media to keep idealism at an arm’s length. They avoid risk. They listen, do as their told, and make money.
Compliant propaganda is now oddly mixed with the kitsch and low-brow as media bend to the commands of the government on the one hand, and tilt toward the demands of the market. Meanwhile, on those major issues of direct concern to the future of our country, there is no discussion, or there are only fits and starts. Substantive inquiry and argument, and free criticism, are relegated to the sidelines or eradicated altogether.
This is why I have such respect for Sun TV, and why I feel so distressed about the interruption of its mainland broadcasts.
In the past I believed that the space for Sun TV’s development on the mainland would be rather small. A channel that targets a specified audience must rely predominantly on service subscriptions, and this is not yet a mature model for the television market in mainland China. But I discovered this year that even in a tough Chinese media environment, squeezed between political and economic pressures, Sun TV had emerged as a successful oddity. Its investors were not focused on maximizing profits, but instead used investment gains from elsewhere to support media development.
Sun TV acted responsibly and ambitiously, opening up a valuable window on China’s realities, discussing its problems, and seeking solutions. Through its extraordinary efforts, the network brought out the core public character of the media.
And as it had anticipated, Sun TV resonated with audiences in mainland China.
China’s political landscape should not be denied the ray of sunshine afforded by the lively debate at Sun TV. And the public has the right to demand of the government that they make clear the reasons behind the interruption of the network’s signal.
For such a moderate voice to be snuffed out for such mysterious reasons in the midst of this bitter winter sends an ominous signal to the Chinese people.
[Posted by David Bandurski, December 11, 2009, 7:24pm HK]

By David Bandurski — This winter has brought another of China’s seasonal purges of fakery in its news media. The government is cracking down on “fake news reports,” and it plans to stamp out the problem of “fake journalists” by getting tougher about press accreditation.
But once again, all of these official measures overlook the fundamental issue driving media corruption in China.
In an environment where there are too few protections for conscientious journalists, and where the party’s chief prerogative remains the control of information, journalism is about monopoly and privilege rather than professional obligation — and that invites abuse, whether one has an official press card or not.

[ABOVE: Screenshot from Yinchuan Evening News of coverage of China’s new press cards in June 2009.]

Issued in October, China’s revised measures on accreditation for media personnel are essentially about making sure the legal right to gather information is granted only to those who can be trusted not to be naughty.
The idea seems to be that if the right people are granted “press cards” in the first place, and these cards are loaded with so many security features that they can’t be forged, then corrupt behavior will simply disappear.
While the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) will do the issuing, news outlets themselves bear responsibility for watching their staff carefully. They must “thoroughly examine the daily work of their news journalists and news bureaus, working to reform and correct behavior in violation of [government] regulations, and carrying out news gathering in accordance with the law.”
Mainstream coverage was quick to seize on a passage about journalists’ “right to legal news gathering” as the “bright point” of the revised regulations.
The official Xinhua News Agency spelled out the key differences from the 2005 regulation in a series of bullet points, putting the rights-related language at the top:

1. [The regulation] further refines the definition of the news journalist and content relating to the protection of [journalists’] rights. The regulation states that those carrying out news and editorial activities in the People’s Republic of China must possess a press card issued by the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP). The regulation makes clear that ‘news journalist’ refers to those editorial personnel holding press cards who are under official hire [or “establishment”/编制] by news organizations or otherwise formally employed by them, and who work in a professional editorial capacity. The regulation states that journalists who possess press cards and are carrying out news gathering in accordance with the law are protected by law. Local governments, functional departments and their employees must provide the necessary conveniences and protections for legal news gathering activities. The regulation also states that no organizations or individuals may obstruct or interfere in news organizations or the legal news gathering activities of news journalists.

That might sound encouraging. We can’t forget, however, that there are no additional protections whatsoever to ensure that officials respect these new guidelines. The language about journalist being “protected by the law” is a nice sentiment, but its utility stops there.
And there are, besides, several things about the new measures that are worrying and puzzling.
First and foremost, the scope of the “journalist” has been further limited and demarcated, to the point that the measures seem to criminalize citizen journalism.
Writing in the Oriental Morning Post on November 13, columnist He Sanwei (何三畏) said the regulations on press accreditation went even further in making press passes “badges of privilege” (特权证), the only legitimate and legal manifestation of the public’s “right to know” (知情权) or “right to gather information” (采访权).
As He Sanwei pointed out, according to this revised “Regulation on Journalist Accreditation Cards,” citizens who are not “journalists” in the sense that they do not possess valid press cards issued by GAPP do not have the right to gather news (采访权). A logical consequence, should the regulation be actively enforced, would be that individual citizens and research organizations that carry out investigative work would be, or could be, restricted in their activities.
This creates a strange symmetry of problems with China’s National Ordinance on Openness of Government Information (政府信息公开条例). It has been argued that that legislation, which allows “citizens” to request access to a whole range of government information, does not apply to journalists, who are performing a state function. The updated rules on journalist accreditation, however, give only licensed journalists the right to gather information.
So if citizens attempt to access government information through the former, aren’t they violating the latter? It would certainly seem so, particularly if they share that information through new media of some kind. He writes:

Consider the tension and confusion that will occur simply as a result of the “Ordinance on Openness of Government Information” which has already gone into effect and the backwardness of the “Regulation on Journalist Accreditation Cards.” Before, [at least in theory] citizens could formally request that their local government release information on revenues and expenditures, and government offices that didn’t wish to release them would have no way of refusing. But now things will be different. The latter can simply ask: “Do you have a press card?”

Almost immediately, of course, local governments across China pounced on the opportunity to garnish the national rules with their own local strictures — to show just how serious they are about implementing policies from the center.
Leaders in Sichuan repeated the call to strengthen regulation and control:

We must use effective means to strengthen regulation of the industry, raising the level of management work for press cards and news bureaus. First, we must improve the system of oversight of press cards and news bureaus, building a three-part regulatory system comprising management by news organizations, supervision by the public, and government administrative oversight. We must also improve mechanisms for the reporting of violations, setting up telephone hotlines. Second, we must strictly standardize the conduct of media personnel, building dynamic regulatory mechanisms and a database of personnel showing poor conduct, achieving a situation where legal conduct is the rule and violations are pursued.

As defining and dealing with “poor conduct” will remain the prerogative of the local governments journalists are supposed to monitor and report on, it’s very easy to see how empty the language about rights really is.
But further, the measures may actually contribute to the underlying causes of media corruption by tethering the “right to report” so tightly together with press accreditation. As He Sanwei writes:

The legal right to report (合法采访权) is in fact precisely the legal right to freedom of expression (合法言论权). Even while it is practically impossible, the “regulations” have coupled the right to report (采访权) with press accreditation, and this has turned the press card into a kind of scarce resource with monetary value, and a kind of “dangerous weapon” (带危险性的武器).

In other words, these measures may have paved the way for further abuse. Because when the “right to report” (采访权), or to gather news, is monopolized by the party, this leads to rent-seeking behavior. Journalists without scruples — and what good would scruples do them in the Wild West climate of Chinese politics? — will be able to cash in on their unique privileges.
The government maintains the illusion that this sort of behavior only happens among “fake journalists” who are unlicensed. But it has historically occurred quite routinely even among those GAPP-licensed reporters who have sat through grueling training sessions in the “Marxist View of Journalism.”
These doubts and concerns about how ineffectual strong words and “stricter” press accreditation are in addressing the real underlying problems have been replayed over and over again in China’s commentary pages.
In a column almost exactly one year ago in Beijing Evening News, a veteran “real” journalist quipped about his excitement over China’s new high-tech press cards, which were then still months away, then suggested these would probably do little to curb the practice of “fake journalism.”
A full translation follows:

Only timely release of information can deal with the problem of fake reporters at its roots
December 3, 2009
There has been a lot of news about journalists lately. The reporters who break the news have themselves become a story taking up news space at many newspapers. First there was the Shanxi “hush fee” case, in which it was found that a group of “journalists” bearing fake press cards, after which the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) cooperated closely with police to launch a fierce campaign again fake reporters. And then over the last few days we had this case of a real journalist from CCTV taken into custody, not by GAPP and the police, but rather by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and local prosecutors in Shanxi province.
We must curb the practice of abusing the mandate of supervision by public opinion (or “watchdog journalism”) to seek personal profit whether it arises from fake reporters or real ones. This is a matter of the breaking of given laws, and ultimately a decision [on each case] must be rendered by a judge.
But this fuss over fake reporters has reached the point where now hundreds of thousands of journalists across the country must change over to new press cards. Around February next year, my colleagues and I will bid farewell to our “2003 version” (03版) press cards, and change over to our “2008 version” passes.
I’m prone to getting excited any time I hear about something new on the way. And even though I’ve only had my original press card for five years, I’m really looking forward to my new one. Of course, I won’t incur the cost [of getting the new pass] myself. The cost of the millions it will take to change them out will be split among Chinese news media. I hear that the new passes have added security measures over the old ones like those used in Renminbi bills [to discourage counterfeiting] — watermarks, security strips, surface gravure printing technology. The inside pages even have English-language content, one page for each year. It goes without saying that local area [governments] across China will also have to be equipped with machines that resemble currency detection devices [that can nose out counterfeit press cards]. Fortunately, press cards are not Renminbi bills, to be replaced with new ones when fakes are discovered. Otherwise the people at Beijing Mint could never keep up, no matter how much overtime they put in.
We should also thank our lucky stars that journalists don’t have professional attire, like the uniforms worn by police and prosecutors. Because there are people who assume their identities too, dressing up and becoming fake police, fake prosecutors, fake judges. In our case the only thing that needs to be done is to round up the fake [passes] — there’s no need to force everyone in the country into a change of clothes.
Media and the capital reported recently on the break up by police of a fake press card racket. Eight people were charging between 5,000 and 15,000 yuan for fake press cards bearing the name “China Law Observer Online” (中国法制观察网站). They were setting up “news investigative divisions” and “internal reference divisions” all over the country, making money by intimidating companies and lower-level governments with what they claimed were “reports undertaken jointly with CCTV, People’s Daily and 16 other central-level media”
Interestingly, the head of the site was named Ge You (葛优), and I don’t know whether this man just happened to have the same name as Ge You the movie star, or whether this was a purposeful lie . . . Besides reporting on work-related and medical accidents, this group of people had the gall to issue “news investigation dossiers” to local police offices in Henan, Shaanxi, Yunnan and other areas [to extort money with the threat of exposure]. Isn’t this a bit like the rat licking the cat’s nose? Surely, they are asking for death. To be honest, as a real journalist these last 30 years, I’ve never dared mess with these state offices. But then we have this female reporter from CCTV stepping right up and causing trouble.
In setting up this website and selling fake press cards for which people were willing to pay between 5,000 and 15,000 yuan just to join the ranks of the fake press, the people running this racket were looking to use the threat of negative news exposure against government offices to unjustly cash in. At the same time we know that many local governments are willing to fork out “silence fees” (封口费) in order to [buy off journalists and] prevent exposure — and this clearly shows us that the wolves and weasels go after the sickest ducks. As the saying goes: Don’t sell out your conscience, and the ghosts won’t come knocking at your door at night. If you’re guilt-free, why are you handing out “silence fees”? What is it you have to fear? The enterprise of the fake journalist, in other words, is on a certain level just the black eating the black.
Right now, when lower-level governments or bureaus get themselves into a bind, they don’t come clean to the news media. Instead they “pay money to sweep it under the rug” (花钱遮丑), “fork out cash to buy peace” (花钱买平安), “open their checkbook to save their official heads” (花钱保乌纱帽). And this is exactly the kind of behavior that has created an opportunity for extortion by fake journalists. I am quite certain that if problems can be quickly opened up to news media, then the market for “silence fees” will dry up for fake journalists. Then, of course, fake press cards would become worthless.
Once the new “08” press card versions are out, will there still be people counterfeiting them? That’s hard to say. Will fake journalists become extinct? That’s even harder to say. If we do not eradicate the soil that nurtures the fake journalist, if we still fall back on “silence fees” as expedient solutions, then even if our press cards are [loaded with security measures] like our Renminbi currency, then it will be difficult to ensure that journalists don’t fake it.

[Posted by David Bandurski, December 9, 2009, 5:39pm HK]

By Ying Chan — President Obama’s town hall meeting with students in Shanghai was a highlight of his China trip. But more telling was the information war waged by the U.S. and the Chinese behind the scenes. Both sides tried to score points but both failed to win. In the end, it was technology that scored a small victory, offering a glimmer of hope for media openness in China.
The first salvo of the war was launched by the U.S. side on the eve of Obama’s arrival, when the US embassy invited a dozen noted bloggers from around China for a briefing about the visit. The unprecedented move immediately heightened vigilance on the Chinese side.

[ABOVE: Screenshot from The White House Blog discussing Obama’s “town hall” with Chinese students in Shanghai.]

Then there was the bargain over the town hall meeting that the Obama team had wanted so badly. Negotiations over details of the meeting continued, down to the last hour. The U.S. team pushed for live television broadcast that would carry Obama’s face and words into the homes of the 1.3 billion people in China, where 97 percent of homes have TV. The Chinese side would not budge and decided that the meeting would be carried by Shanghai television to be aired in the city only. Xinhua.net, the online arm of China’s state news agency, would also “broadcast the meeting live.” That was the limit of how far the Chinese would go.
The Americans were not about to give up. They turned to the Internet which was then becoming a weapon in the media war. The White House hired ConnectSolutions, a California-based company, to stream live the Shanghai meeting on its own website. The CoNx team also unveiled a chat room, calling on all Chinese to submit questions for Obama on the occasion of his China visit. [Link to White House Live page.]
In the chat room, the anger over the censorship of the Internet in China was palpable. CoNx reported that “over 75 percent of the roughly 7,000 Chinese who submitted questions in the chat room cited internet censorship as their greatest concern.” Some compared the “Great Firewall of China” with the Berlin Wall, citing the 20th Anniversary of the fall of the Wall. One of the questions submitted later became the famous Twitter question that reverberated from Shanghai to the United States.
Not be outdone, Xinhua started soliciting questions and received several thousand questions by the closing of the poll. Not one question asked about Internet censorship, according to Xinhua.
Amidst the wrangling, the meeting went forward. But unlike previous visits by former presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush, the meeting was not held on university campuses where presidential visits would attract crowds and gawkers. Instead, it was held at the Shanghai Museum of Science and Technology, located in Pudong, opposite Shanghai’s city center across the river. Students from eight universities were bused in. The area around the museum was cordoned off from the public. The museum itself was closed to visitors for two days ahead of the Presidential visit.
Further disappointments followed. As the town hall meeting started rolling, no video streaming showed up at Xinhua.net, only transcripts. Savvy Internet users had to turn to the White House website, where high definition video was served. In Beijing, the U.S. officials hosted viewing meetings for students and guests. “Many thousands more young (and not so young) people throughout China attended the event virtually in classrooms, coffee houses, living rooms, and at ‘watch parties’ organized by the U.S. Embassy and Consulates,” according to The White House Blog.
Meanwhile, the dueling continued inside the meeting hall. As the students were asking mostly soft questions, the Obama team advanced in an attempt to crack the Chinese information blockade. At Obama’s invitation, U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman fielded the President the now famous question on Internet freedom “on behalf of Chinese netizens.” With the easy serve, Obama got the opportunity to deliver a mini-lecture on the need for openness on the Internet. The maneuver broke through the Chinese defense line and became headlines for the Western media that next day. The answer also helped Obama address his liberal constituency back home who has been egging him on to play tough with China on human rights issues.
Even though Xinhua made claims of broadcasting the event in a “global exclusive,” CNN, Bloomberg and many other non-Chinese television stations managed to air the event live, using pool feeds from the Associated Press. Bloomberg did a decent job with a live cablecast. CNN was disappointing. Instead of letting Obama talk, Ed Henry, CNN’s White House correspondent who was traveling with the president, interjected often with his own remarks on camera. The worst came when CNN cut away to Henry when Obama addressed the Internet issue, his proudest moment of the show. On the Internet, angry bloggers threw curses and profanities.
In the meeting’s aftermath, the White House bragged that the town hall event was an “historic” public dialogue. That was true in a perverse way. Among all previous U.S. presidents’ meeting with Chinese students, the Obama one was the most controlled and managed. From the encounter, a few lessons could be learned.
First, Chinese authorities can maintain a high level of control using traditional means. Every aspect of the town hall meeting was scripted and managed, from choice of the meeting venue, the drilling of participants, to the questions asked.
Secondly, in spite of the tight control, cracks are showing. As a foreign government, the U.S. showed how it could challenge Chinese control of the Internet by serving as an information distributor. For the first time, the White House collected Chinese public opinion on Chinese soil and distributed information, in text and video form, throughout China.
Thirdly: China’s vibrant community of bloggers is challenging the government’s highhandedness. Twitter was blocked in China, but bloggers were sharing information online about the Obama visit, and tweeting real time throughout the town hall meeting. Challenge to the Internet censorship will grow.
Finally, the hundreds of Shanghai students at the town hall meeting were the biggest losers. They were ridiculed for lack of energy, poor English and asking softball questions to pander to Obama. “They talked according to formulae, first greeting or paying respect (to Obama), followed by self-introduction and then the question” said a blogger. But it was not the students’ fault that they were treated as stage sets. Adults have to take the blame for programming the young minds.
But there’s a glimmer of hope, the ubiquitous Internet has rendered society more transparent and all government must become more transparent. There is no turning back.
FURTHER READING:
“Obama Wades Into Internet Censorship in China Address,” By Helene Cooper and David Barboza, The New York Times, November 17, 2009
“Barack Obama Meets Shanghai Students in China,” By Tania Branigan, The Guardian, November 16, 2009
“Chinese students, netizens and shops welcome Obama to Shanghai,” By Jean Yung, LA Times, November 15, 2009

By David Bandurski — Today, just over one week after Guangdong’s Southern Weekend published the results of an independent report by activist lawyer Zhou Ze (周泽) on rising violence against journalists in China, news comes of the vicious beating of a senior editor in the northern province of Hebei.
Le Qian (乐倩), deputy editor-in-chief of Hebei Youth Daily and a former editor at Beijing Youth Daily, was reportedly waiting for the elevator at her apartment complex in Shijiazhuang Saturday night when an unknown male assailed her from behind with a brick.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of coverage at Sichuan’s Huaxi Metropolis Daily of an attack on Hebei Youth Daily deputy editor-in-chief Le Qian. Photo is of Le receiving treatment in a Shijiazhuang hospital.]

Le, who is now in the hospital recovering, told reporters from her own newspaper that her assailant said, “This is for your report!” again and again as he struck her head and face. She believes the attack was in response to watchdog journalism (舆论监督) carried out by the paper.
Hebei Youth Daily also reported today that it received a threatening phone call on November 7, in which a woman said higher-ups at the paper would be held to account for an investigative report it had done.
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 23, 2009, 1:39pm HK]

By Qian Gang — For more than a month now, rumors have flown back and forth about the problems facing Caijing magazine and its editor-in-chief, Hu Shuli (胡舒立), a former CMP fellow. Hu formally announced her resignation earlier this week. She will take up a position as head of the School of Communication and Design at Guangzhou’s Sun Yat-Sen University, and also work on her options for the launching of a new publication.
Caijing has long stood out as one of China’s finest professional publications, and troubles there have drawn attention from many quarters.
As could perhaps be expected, media outside China have leapt directly to speculation about the political factors behind Caijing‘s troubles. Some have positioned this as yet another story about a media crackdown in China.
But things are not so simple.
Anyone who has observed the ups and downs of Chinese media over the past decade will recognize that Caijing‘s troubles are very different in nature from explicit official moves in the past against such publications as Southern Weekend, Southern Metropolis Daily, and Freezing Point.
Based on what we know thus far, the Caijing affair arose primarily out of a row over ownership and interests between the editorial team led by Hu Shuli and the magazine’s bosses at the HK-listed SEEC Media, led by Wang Boming.
Beyond that, we are far from knowing the full story behind the upheaval at Caijing. But we can safely suppose – this is China, after all – that the story is a complicated knot of factors. It is about politics, yes. But it is also about profit, about dollars and cents. And further, it is about varying visions of how media reform in China should proceed.
For many Chinese journalists, this turn in Caijing‘s saga is cause for great emotion and agitation.
One observer wrote of the danger that the professional ideal and spirit in the media might “vanish into thin air.” China.com.cn, a website operated by the State Council Information Office, ran a special feature page about the story and tagged on a major headline that read: “Caijing is already without Hu Shuli.”

[ABOVE: Special page at China.com.cn aggregates content on Hu Shuli and Caijing.]

It is important to note that Hu Shuli’s departure from Caijing is not just a topic of conversation, but a topic of coverage too. The major points emerging from these discussions and comments are that people in China’s media industry generally have immense respect for Hu Shuli and what she represents, and that they are, at the same time, very concerned about the fate of journalism in China.
“To say people are deeply concerned about Hu Shuli prospects and those of Caijing is not so to the point as to say they are worried about whether [Chinese media] will make it through this thorny stretch of the path,” wrote blogger Chen Jibing (陈季冰), a former editor at Shanghai’s Oriental Daily.
By “thorny stretch of the path” Chen was referring, of course, to the present climate facing Chinese media and professional journalism in China – and this characterization is certainly more than fair.
Hu Shuli and Caijing traveled along this “thorny path” together for 11 years. As an editor, she held fiercely to the ideals of freedom of the press and journalistic professionalism.
From the earliest stages of Caijing‘s launch, she was crystal clear and steadfast about the need to produce independent news and conform with international journalism practices. She used the words “independent, exclusive and original” (独立、独家、独到) to encompass the magazine’s editorial goals.
Hu Shuli was fond of drawing analogies between the needs of the market and the importance of professional media. “Nothing can override the principles of ‘openness, fairness and equitability’ in the market,” she would say. “And of these three, openness has the first place. The public’s right to know and the media’s right to criticize offer the only guarantee of openness.”
Upholding these ideals, Caijing engaged in serious investigative reporting. The magazine courageously exposed corruption, challenged power and parsed the existing economic and political environment, becoming in the process one of China’s most trusted media.
News reports about the upheaval at Caijing, whether from party media or commercial media, have uniformly expressed enormous respect for Hu Shuli.
An article in the official Changjiang Daily (长江日报), “Ten Years of Hu Shuli’s Leadership at Caijing Re-defined the Image of Chinese Media,” spoke of the powerful example Hu’s magazine had set for the rest of China’s media.

With Hu Shuli’s departure, Caijing has no choice but to face “life after Hu Shuli.” Hu Shuli’s next step is a matter for her alone to decide, but the professional character and quality evinced by Caijing under her leadership over the past ten years, the intelligence and courage . . . should become resources from which all Chinese media draw lessons.

This article was also re-posted at People’s Daily Online.
For all the reasons cited in the Changjiang Daily editorial, Hu Shuli can be seen as a representative and role model for media reform in China.
Over the past 30 years, Chinese media have limped, slowly if not surely, toward the marketplace, and from a culture of overbearing control to one of greater diversity and openness. In this process, different media have chosen different paths.
Some media have fought bravely for freedom but had less success in the marketplace. Others have successfully entered the marketplace but remained narrow commercial ventures, interested only in leveraging political power for profit. Caijing was a rare example of a publication that had managed to achieve success in the marketplace while upholding its own ideal of independence.
Caijing’s market success was quite formidable, in fact. The magazine reportedly earned more than 60 million yuan in 2008. And Caijing Online, a separate business venture, was shaping up as a pioneering effort to combine the strengths of new and traditional media.
Most important of all, Caijing never restricted itself to a narrow field of financial reporting. It operated editorially with a larger sense of social responsibility, and it keenly observed public policy issues.
Hu Shuli has been a visiting fellow at the China Media Project, and a regular visitor to the Journalism & Media Studies Centre here at the University of Hong Kong.
In March last year Hu delivered a public lecture here in which, in retrospect, she glimpsed the events that would shake Caijing this year. “Whether it’s Caijing or Caijing Online, or Chinese media as a whole, all now face enormous challenges,” she told the audience. “These challenges arise from government controls and from commercial interests. There are a whole range of core problems and issues involved here. I have no doubt that independent media will be one of the most hopeful forces of China’s future. For now, however, media can only face the present.”
Hu Shuli and much of her editorial team have now left Caijing. Naturally, this has brought a fierce round of speculation. What will become of Hu Shuli without Caijing? What will become of Caijing without Hu Shuli?
That this lovely pair has been separated is certainly cause for remorse. But as for anxiety, I think people should be more in suspense about the fate of Caijing without Hu Shuli. We can look forward with confidence and anticipation to Hu Shuli without Caijing.
We hear that in the final days, Hu Shuli’s editorial team at Caijing kept their cool and went about their business producing the best issue they possibly could. Their coolness and precision are a reflection of confidence and ability, of their high level of professionalism.
We should not regard this as yet another “violent sacrifice” (壮烈牺牲), or necessarily as a solemn goodbye.
This marks a new chapter in the saga of change in China’s media. As we raise our heads, we see that “thorny stretch of path.” But I am confident that if we push on ahead, our feet will find the open road.
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 13, 2009, 1:54pm HK]

By David Bandurski — In China, the term “soft power” (软实力), coined by political scientist Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, took some time to gain traction. But since emerging in official party newspapers in late 2001, the idea — and the project — of “soft power” has become something of an obsession. This is true not only in the field of international relations but in the arena of journalism and mass communications as well.
The first use of “soft power” in China’s official party media came on November 15, 2001, in Guangming Daily, a newspaper published by the Central Propaganda Department.
The article in question celebrated China’s successful bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, and concluded:

In sum, the true nature of the “humanistic Olympics” [a term China used during its bid] is, while emphasizing the “hard power” of our country, to place a stronger emphasis on improving and raising our nation’s “soft power” . . .

Since that early use of “soft power” the term has had a much more prominent place in mainland news coverage. Here are what the numbers looked like through the end of last year:

[ABOVE: Appearance by article of the term “soft power” in mainland print publications 1998-2008. Source: WiseNews.]

“Soft power” development now seems to be an area of particular interest for communications scholars in China. As well it should be. China’s leaders are now talking seriously about the need to raise the voice of Chinese news media internationally as part of a kind of centralized “soft power” strategy.
They are staking big money on this strategy as well (a boon possibly for strategic thinkers from China’s journalism schools), all of it focused on central party media that can be trusted to mind their propaganda P’s and Q’s. “China’s voice,” after all, is a matter of strategic national importance. And China’s only legitimate voice, from the standpoint of the CCP, is the party’s.
When China’s top propaganda leader, politburo member Li Changchun (李长春), delivered a speech on the occasion of Journalist’s Day on November 8, he placed heavy emphasis on the need for news media to “coordinate overall national interests on both the domestic and international fronts” (统筹国内国际两个大局).
This signaled the further maturation of the party’s new thinking on its media policy for the era of digital global communications, for what we have called Control 2.0.
Gone is the old way of thinking strategically about communications and their control, in which the domestic and international spheres could be conveniently compartmentalized. In the era of globalized communications, the “external,” or duiwai (对外) has a potentially profound effect on the “internal,” or duinei (对内).
The CCP’s old information worldview might have looked something like this:

It might now look something more like this . . .

. . . in which China’s internal communications concerns — so crucial to its concerns about stability and national security — are inextricably linked with its external communications concerns and strategies.
As Zheng Baowei (郑保卫), a professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at Renmin University of China and director of the university’s Research Center of Journalism and Social Development, argues in a recent piece of official scholarship published in CCP media journal China Journalist:

Experience shows that now the relationship between externally directed and internally directed communications, domestic and international communications, are reciprocal and mutually influential in nature. We truly have a situation in which “I am in you, and you are in me” (你中有我，我中有你), in which domestic problems can very easily bring an international reaction, and international problems can very easily have an effect domestically . . .

Professor Zheng also writes about a “butterfly effect” (蝴蝶效应) in global communications and public opinion, in which “the flutter of a butterfly’s wings in the Atlantic can potentially create a seismic wave in the Pacific.”
The news and communications aspect of China’s global “soft power” push is an important strategic attempt to grapple with the domestic and international challenges emerging in the age of globalized information.
China’s media “soft power” is emerging, of course, as a centralized strategy underpinned by hard media controls at home, by the monopolization and manipulation of information.
Nye talks about “soft power” as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payment.” The CCP’s vision of “soft power” looks rather more like “attractive coercion.”
This is visible in Zheng’s definition of “soft power” as “[a nation’s] news transmission capacity, cultural influence and capacity to channel public opinion” (“以信息传播力、文化影响力和舆论引导力为主的’软实力'”]. The focus here is on the CCP’s “discourse power” internationally, which is of course reinforced by its domestic monopolization of media and culture.
Strategic media and communications thinkers in China understand Nye’s notion of attraction in authoritarian terms, and their primary concern is with how to make news/propaganda that serves the CCP’s objectives more attractive to global audiences.
It is about marketing and re-packaging propaganda.
This is of course why, in Zheng’s (and other’s) formulation, concepts like “objectivity” and factual reporting must work as tools serving the higher goal of fashioning a more favorable image of China overseas.
Take, for example, this darkly humorous passage on the need to report objectively and “speak the truth through facts”:

By “speaking through facts” one can . . make the audience willingly submit to and accept the ideas and opinions conveyed by the disseminator.
Journalists must learn to objectively, reliably and simply convey the facts they have seen and then imbed within these objective accounts the point they wish to explain, in order that when the audience receives the facts reported by the journalist they unknowingly accept various standpoints and viewpoints contained therein. This is the ideal to which news and communications must aspire, and it is one of the most important arts and techniques a news journalist must grasp.

China’s journalists should aspire, in other words, to think professionally and commercially about their role as propagandists.
Anyhow, it should also be pointed out that Zheng is a State Council expert under special government allowance. He is one of a number of communications scholars helping the CCP sharpen its thinking on its global information strategy. [More on the research objectives of his center here].
A more or less full translation of Zheng’s article in China Journalist follows:

“Enhancing soft power, using ‘smart power’ to effect: thoughts on our country’s present strategy for external news transmission”
China Journalist
By Zheng Baowei (郑保卫)
October 30, 2009
1. “Soft power,” “smart power” and news [or journalism] and communications
The concept of “soft power” comes from Joseph Nye, an American professor from Harvard University. He separates a country’s comprehensive national strength into “hard power” and “soft power.”
“Hard power” refers to the material conditions of a nation’s strength, including its military might, the strength of its economy and its technological prowess.
“Soft power” points to a nation’s influence in the areas of culture and ideology, including its capacity to transmit ideas and information (信息传播力), the influence of its culture, its capacity to channel [global] public opinion, and the level and capabilities it shows in its participation in international institutions.
The state and condition of a nation’s “soft power” decides and influences that country’s comprehensive strength [internationally] and has an important bearing on its existence and development.
In the news and communications sphere, the key to “soft power” competition lies in enhancing the information propagation force (信息传播力) and public opinion channeling capacity of news media, and through this means expanding the influence of news media themselves, ultimately reaching the objective of increasing the nation’s soft power.
The information propagation and public opinion channeling functions of the news media make them important methods and tools for increasing a nations “soft power.”
By reporting and commenting on the news, news media exert influence on the public and channel public opinion, which creates cohesiveness among the people, brings resolution and unity, joins forces for the building of the nation, and through these means manifests the strength and value of “soft power.”
Another concept from Joseph Nye is that of smart power. He says that a combination of soft power and hard power forms a national strategy called “smart power.” At America’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, a center called the Smart Power Commission has been established for the purpose of promoting the use of “smart power” in foreign policy planning in order to preserve America’s international image.
When Hilary Clinton was appointed Secretary of State, she moved quickly to employ this concept [of “smart power”] in the foreign policy arena. During her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as she talked about the new foreign policy thinking and direction of the Obama administration, she said that America must make effective use of “smart power” in order to strengthen its foreign relations. This “smart power” encompassed foreign relations, economic, military, political, legal, cultural and other methods. She emphasized that “smart power” must be used as a bolster and support, and that foreign relations (and not military might) would be the centerpiece of American foreign policy in the future. This means that America sees “smart power” as the guiding force of its policies overseas in the future.
According to Joseph Nye, “smart power” should be separate from the “hard power” embodied in military, economic and technological strength. And it should be separate from the “soft power” embodied in [a nation’s] news transmission capacity, cultural influence and capacity to channel public opinion. It is a special sort of power resulting from the intertwining of “soft power” and “hard power.” [NOTE: In this passage Zhang defines “soft power” in uniquely Chinese terms, as: “以信息传播力、文化影响力和舆论引导力为主的“软实力”]. In this sense, we can understand “smart power” as an aiding intelligence (借助智慧) and technique by which [a country], through various means, can effectively exhibit and expand its vested power (or hard power) and its influence (or soft power).
The key to determining whether a nation has “smart power” or not lies in whether or not it is able to use various means in order to perfectly exercise, demonstrate and develop the reserves of hard and soft power it has at its disposal.
“Smart power” is both a technique and a kind of ability and capacity. Experience shows that it is insufficient for a nation to have only “strength” (hard power) and “influence” (soft power). It must also be able to apply this strength and influence cleverly, adeptly, and at the right time and place. Only through the adept use of “smart power” can one best one’s opponents and achieve success.
“Using smart power adeptly” (善用巧实力) in the area of news and communications means being skilled at using the right knowledge and techniques, and demonstrating and voicing through the medium of news and information your nation’s strength and influence. This means, at the same time, showing and realizing the transmission capacity and public opinion channeling capacity of the news media themselves. [NOTE: The assumption in this last sentence seems to be that news media work as a function of the state, and making these media strong and influential should itself be a core national strategy.] 同时要发挥和体现出传媒自身的信息传播力和舆论引导力 . . .
The basic task of our nation’s news media as they are directed overseas (我国的对外新闻传播) is to allow the world understand China and to allow China’s voice to be conveyed to the world. In this process, the news media have the important mission of raising our nation’s soft power.
The news media can employ timely, accurate and comprehensive news reports that are at the same time vivid, visual and concrete to show the reform achievements, constructive accomplishments and history and culture of our country, as well as the thoughts and customs of our people — and through this means influence viewers overseas.
Aside from this, the news media can use our country’s efforts to achieve economic growth and cultural progress, its efforts to fight poverty, achieve sustainable growth, to create a harmonious society and to thoroughly build a well-off society — and they can use our country’s honest, friendly and responsible attitude toward the international community and its concern about world piece and development . . . to win the trust and approval of international society, creating a favorable national image of China and enhancing China’s international influence.
When the international community is in the midst of quarrel or conflict, particularly when there are dramatic changes in international affairs, the news media can use the means of news and public opinion to emit China’s voice, to make clear China’s position, point of view and value judgements, and as much as possible to earn approval for these points of view and opinions by international public opinion.
In recent years, as the international position of our nation has been raised and interaction with the outside world has grown, the world has paid much more attention to China. People of many nations wish to better understand China’s principles, viewpoints and policies concerning major international issues. They want to understand China’s major decisions and changes in the areas of politics, the economy, military affairs, foreign policy, technology and culture. They want to understand China’s vast territory, its ancient history and resplendent culture. They want to understand the lives, thoughts and customs of China’s rich and varied population. Taking this content is transmitting to overseas audiences in a timely, accurate and comprehensive manner is the important task of overseas directed news and information in our country.
2. Enhancing the soft power and smart power of our nation’s news media in overseas directed communications
It is the author’s view that in order to strengthen soft power and adeptly use smart power, the following strategies and methods must be adopted by our nation in the area of overseas directed news and information.
1. Coordination of our overall national interests on both the domestic and international fronts
Hu Jintao said in his speech during the visit to People’s Daily last year that: “Along with changes in the international situation, along with the steady expansion of our nation’s opening to the outside world, China is more and more intimately connected with the world. In order to accomplish the work of the party and the nation we must coordinate our overall national interests on both the domestic and international fronts (必须统筹国内国际两个大局). In running the newspapers [or media] our comrades must also coordinate our overall national interests on both the domestic and international fronts. I hope our comrades maintain solid footing at home as they turn to the world, steadily raising the quality and effectiveness of People’s Daily‘s international news reports.”
This [statement] arises out of a macro-strategic consideration for the coordination of our overall national interests on both the domestic and international fronts, and emphasizes that news work must also coordinate domestic and international aspects . . .
As new technologies have emerged of late, particularly the emergence of the internet and other new media, these have broken through the original temporal and spacial limitations of information exchange and cultural dialogue. They have also broken through the original regional barriers and political barriers on news, information and public opinion, causing news, information and public opinion to develop in the direction of globalization.
Any particular regional public opinion flashpoint can by means of new communication technologies be quickly conveyed to other regions in the world, which means the influence of public opinion has been internationalized (舆论影响的国际化). This is very much like the “butterfly effect” (蝴蝶效应) talked about in communications studies — the flutter of a butterfly’s wings in the Atlantic can potentially create a seismic wave in the Pacific.
Given such a situation, contact and interconnectedness between various nations economically, culturally and politically is growing closer by the day. The mutual influence and interpenetration of ideas and culture, ideologies and value systems has grown ever deeper. It has become easier and easier for people to become influenced by the cultural ideas and ideologies lurking behind news and information, and this has brought a diversification of the patterns of public opinion in society. Moreover, the public opinion environment in society has grown more complex. Therefore, from the standpoint of the nation, news and information and public opinion are no longer independent and unidirectional, but are rather, to some extent, whether directly or indirectly, influenced by external information and international public opinion.
In this sort of information environment and public opinion environment, the news media’s discourse power (话语权) in the area of externally directed news and information and its capacity to regulate public opinion (舆论调控能力) concern not just the information security (信息安全) of the nation but also have a profound impact on the national dignity and self-confidence of the domestic population.
This [state of affairs] demands that externally directed news and information is timely and effective in responding to various important information, public sentiments and public opinion both domestically and internationally, in an effort to channel them. As much as possible, [our state media] must seize the discourse power (掌握 … 话语权) for externally directed and international communications, expressing our nation’s voice in news reports on major international events.
Amidst these modern trends of political multipolarity, economic integration and the globalization of information and communications, our nation must strengthen links and exchanges with the rest of the world, obtaining the optimal external environment for the building of a favorable national image.
The requires that the news media in our country actively grab the discourse power in externally directed and international news and information, and that they be adept at employing the most superb news and communication techniques and arts of public opinion channeling (舆论引导艺术) in order to positively, actively and effectively (积极/主动/有效) influence international public opinion, preserving the national interest and raising national influence.
Experience shows that now the relationship between externally directed and internally directed communications, domestic and international communications, are reciprocal and mutually influential in nature. We truly have a situation in which “I am in you, and you are in me” (你中有我，我中有你), in which domestic problems can very easily bring an international reaction, and international problems can very easily have an effect domestically . . .
2. Grasping the mood and demands of overseas audiences
“People oriented” (以人为本) is a new government concept introduced at the 16th National Congress [in 2002], and its core idea is that all work must consider the “human” factor, that we must take the “human” as the starting point and center of all work.
In news work the objective of “people orientation” is about the need to be “audience oriented,” taking the interests and demands of the audience as the starting point and end goal. The most basic standard and demand testing the results of news and communications is whether the audience accepts it or not, welcomes it or not, is satisfied or not.
Externally directed news and communications must have a thorough respect for the audience’s psychology of reading and accepted habits. All news content selection must be grounded in the interests and demands of overseas audiences.
To this end, we must strengthen research into overseas audiences, seeking to truly understand what information they would like to know and how kind of help they wish to receive; what they like and don’t like; what they are interested in and not interested in. And relying on this [knowledge] we must organize news reports, providing various necessary services.
Owing to cultural gaps, and differences in ideology and value systems, as well as differences in media concepts and habits, overseas audiences will have special demands toward our news and communications. If we cannot transmit clearly oriented content according to the interests and demands of overseas audiences, then naturally we will be avoided and excluded by them and will find it difficult to achieve our goals and results in news communication.
Therefore, overseas directed news communication must thoroughly consider the interests and real demands of overseas audiences. We must be adept at using factual reports that are concrete, visual, animated and lively, and that overseas audiences can enjoy, in order to achieve our communication objectives. As much as possible, we need to provide in a truthful, comprehensive, timely and active manner the information they hope to obtain about various aspects of China, not binding ourselves hand and foot by artificially creating “forbidden zones.”
Experience shows that in the context of globalized information exchange and the internet, artificial blocks on the transmission of content and delays in news reporting serve only to place one in a defensive position.
3. Openness of information must be timely, thorough, transparent and effective
When major and/or sudden-breaking incidents occurred in China in the past, particularly incidents concerning sensitive internal issues, our nation’s news media would respond slowly and hesitantly, and during this process of vacillation would lose the active advantage. In some cases, in consideration of various concerns, we would resort to outright suppression [of the story], presenting the active advantage to others in information release and public opinion channeling. There have been numerous cases in point. [NOTE: The handling of unrest in Tibet in 2008 would here be seen as a classic case of what the author is referring to. And low and behold, the Tibet example follows right on below.]
In the case of the “March 14 Incident” in Lhasa [Tibet] last year, delays and lack of information transparency by our nation’s news media — [NOTE: As a result, naturally, of propaganda controls] — generated the passive posture that followed. In contrast, during this year’s “July 5 Incident” in Urumqi [Xinjiang] our nation’s news media issued reports within hours. The response was rapid, the reports timely, information transparent, and in this way we achieved the active advantage and won a favorable result.
Overseas directed communications must give special care to techniques and art. They must be adept at employing smart power. They must achieve “clever exercise of power.” [NOTE: Here, “clever exercise of power” (巧使力), is a synonym of “smart power” (巧实力)].
The overseas communication concept summed up by our country’s British ambassador, Fu Ying (傅莹), deserves consideration and reference. She sums it up as: “Speak early, speak a lot, and speak clearly” (早说话，多说话，说明白话). As a diplomat who has spent a lot of time overseas, and who has had direct contact with people overseas, Fu Ying is familiar with the public opinion environment in the West. The [communication] concept and method she lays out is the product of personal experience.
According to the author’s understanding, “speak early” means speaking at the first available moment after an event has occurred. It means speak at the beginning, at the point when people are anxious for information and to understand the situation. If at such a moment you clam up and keep silent, this suggests contempt for the public’s right to know and indicates a disregard for the effect speaking can have.
From the standpoint of news and communications, this so-called “speak early” is about “reporting early and timely reporting” . . .
So-called “speak a lot” points to the need to speak regularly, with initiative and repeatedly. You need to make people feel your sincerity and candidness, to understand that you are willing to have candid dialogue and interaction, and that you will not intentionally bury or avoid something.
In the context of news and communications, this “speak a lot” means “reporting a lot, and reporting thoroughly,” that through the whole process during which the news event is occurring and being handled, the news media issue regular reports following changes and developments, giving the audience a comprehensive understanding of the situation . . .
To “speak clearly” is about speaking accurately, directly and clearly, allowing people to understand what you are saying and your true thoughts so that ambiguities do not emerge.
In the context of news and communications, “speaking clearly” is about “reporting accurately and clearly,” making clear the sequence of events in a news story and paying attention to truth, accuracy and relevant background information . . .
For overseas audiences, bringing them to understand what you are saying requires also attention to the use of language they can understand in their own linguistic context and broadcast concepts and formulated opinions that are generally accepted. Only in this way can you ensure that they can understand your speech and listen to what you have to say.
Analyzing overseas audiences, we understand that the reasons are complicated as to why they harbor an attitude of rejection and exclusion toward Chinese news and communications, creating misunderstanding and estrangement. But some general reasons are as follows:
One kind of person is antagonistic, and this sort of person always has an interest in blackening China’s image and spreading the “China Threat Theory” and such things.
Another kind of person is arrogant, and this sort of person always harbors an unaccountable sense of racial superiority, believing that China cannot do good and refusing to acknowledge the progress China has made.
Another kind of person suffers from prejudice, and this sort of person does not believe China can possibly do so well, and doubts China’s development and progress.
Another kind of person is conventional [or adheres to limited concepts], and this sort of person, having been influenced by cultural traditions and communication concepts (such as those in Western countries who hold that “the worst tidings are the best news”), believes the news media should expose problems and should not speak words of praise and encouragement.
Most people are simply ignorant, the principal problem being that they don’t sufficiently understand China, and that there are gaps and inaccuracies in the information they are exposed to. In these people’s eyes China is still the China of the past — women with bound feet, people dressed in cheongsams, impoverished and ignorant.
The above-mentioned factors take their toll on the effect of our nation’s overseas directed communications, and they present us with an extremely serious issue — how can our overseas directed communications make it through and reach their mark?
Only by thoroughly meeting the demands of overseas audiences and providing information they can accept can our nation’s news media make them better see and understand China and remove misunderstandings about our country.
4. Being adept at using the facts to speak (善于用事实说话)
Based upon our past experiences, the most effective method in getting audiences to quickly accept news and communications and to achieve maximum effect is to be adept at using the facts to speak.
According to basic human psychology, people accept with general ease facts that are specific, lively and inherently convincing. They tend not to accept messages that are hard and preachy, empty or dicey, stiff or inflexible or slogan-like in nature. This is because they prefer to understand the facts and come to their own conclusions rather than listen to posturing and postulation.
“Facts achieve victory over eloquence” (事实胜于雄辩). In prevailing over audiences, and particularly over overseas audiences, the most convincing things are without a doubt those real objective facts. Therefore, when news media are carrying out overseas directed news and communications they must uphold the principle of “speaking through facts,” using specific, lively, visual and convincing examples and models to arouse and guide the audience.
By “speaking through facts” one can . . make the audience willingly submit to and accept the ideas and opinions conveyed by the disseminator.
Journalists must learn to objectively, reliably and simply convey the facts they have seen and then imbed within these objective accounts the point they wish to explain, in order that when the audience receives the facts reported by the journalist they unknowingly accept various standpoints and viewpoints contained therein. This is the ideal to which news and communications must aspire, and it is one of the most important arts and techniques a news journalist must grasp.
Zhao Qizheng (赵启正), head of the School of Journalism and Communication at Renmin University of China, former head of the Information Office of the State Council, former head of the external affairs committee of the CPPCC, and one of our nation’s best known communications experts, not only introduced that communication concept of “explaining China to the world” (向世界说明中国), but also much experience with “speaking through facts.”
When, for example, he delivered a talk during “Chinese culture week” in Paris on September 2, 1999, while summing up China’s changes over the past century, he used many fact and figures. He used facts and figures on China’s annual GDP growth of around 9.2 percent over 20 years to explain the major changes brought on by economic reforms in China. In introducing changes to the situation for women in China over the past century, he contrasted a photo of a foot-bound woman at the outset of the 20th century with a photo of China’s World Cup-winning women’s soccer team. These [facts] were visual, lively, impactful and convincing, and they were used to great effect.

[Posted by David Bandurski, November 12, 2009, 9:58am HK]

By David Bandurski — Tensions between professional values and the party line have quietly marked every Chinese Journalist’s Day since the holiday was inaugurated on November 8, 2000. Nine years ago, the November 8 issue of Guangdong’s Southern Weekend argued boldly that journalists should show “social conscience” by exposing the truth. On the same day, however, propaganda leaders stressed that journalists must “be firm and unshakeable in carrying out the news theory and policy direction of the ruling party.”
This year, Journalist’s Day has come and gone with little cause for celebration among journalists in China who harbor professional ideals. The holiday was marked, in fact, by two distinct warning bells.
The first warning bell came as recent troubles at Caijing magazine culminated in the resignation of editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立).
Hu’s departure marked the end of Caijing as one of China’s most outspoken and professional media outlets, and as a key destination and training ground for top journalists. It also underscored the way the professional spirit in Chinese media is now being squeezed more tightly than ever between the priorities of government censorship on the one hand and the prerogative of commercial profit on the other.
The second warning bell came in the form of a speech by politburo member Li Changchun (李长春) to mark Journalist’s Day, in which the ideological chief laid stronger emphasis on media control and avoided all pretense of caring about the public’s “right to know.”
In a sobering analysis of this year’s speech, Song Zhibiao (宋志标), a journalist who works at Southern Metropolis Daily‘s editorial page, noted important changes from Li Changchun’s 2008 speech. Song’s post was quickly expunged from mainland-based websites.

[ABOVE: A search for Song Zhibiao’s analysis of Li Changchun’s Journalist’s Day speech through Baidu.com comes up with a warning saying results cannot be shown because they do not comply with laws and regulations.]

As in last year’s speech, Li gave top priority to “the principle of party spirit [in journalism]” (党性原则), the notion that news media must adhere to the party’s propaganda discipline and to “correct guidance of public opinion.”
But this reiteration of the priority of media control was complemented in this year’s speech by clear changes in official language concerning citizen’s rights and information.
Song notes that in Li Changchun’s 2008 speech the term “truth in the news” (新闻真实) made an appearance. This year, the term made a rapid exit.
Perhaps more worryingly, Hu Jintao’s so-called “four rights” — the right to know (知情权), right to participate (参与权), right to express (表达权) and right to monitor (监督权) — which appeared in the political report to the last Party Congress in 2007 and made Li’s speech last year, were dropped altogether this year from the main portion of Li’s speech dealing with priority work for the future. The language appears only in Li’s preamble, which outlines “valuable experiences” in media policy over the past 60 years.
These rather conspicuous absences seem to indicate that top leaders would rather not stake out a position on the ethic of neutrality (中立价值) for the news media, and intend to emphasize the news media’s fealty to the party over any interest, however tentative, in social rights.
Li Changchun’s speech on Sunday also placed a great deal of emphasis on the idea of “discourse power” (话语权) — the CCP’s “discourse power,” that is. This underscores in particular an interest in strengthening the party’s capacity to make its voice heard both domestically and internationally.
This is also an important reason why the term “public opinion channeling,” or yulun yindao (舆论引导), rises in the ranks of Li’s speech this year. This further drives home what we have been arguing here at CMP for months — that the party is reworking its media control system to allow traditional controls and active agenda-setting (“grabbing the megaphone“) to work hand-in-hand.
This change, which we have called Control 2.0, sees the priorities and tactics of propaganda as transcending national boundaries and requiring much more clever and aggressive techniques of persuasion. It can be glimpsed again in Li Changchun’s language this year about the need to “coordinate overall national interests on both the domestic and international fronts” (统筹国内国际两个大局).
In other words, China’s is taking its propaganda campaign global, and the success of domestic controls hinges on China’s success or failure on the international battlefield of public opinion.
More on that in tomorrow’s post, which deals with China’s unique vision of “soft power” as what one might call “attractive coercion” — in apt distortion, of course, of Joseph Nye’s formulation of “soft power” as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payment.”
Getting back to Li Changchun’s speech, though. Song Zhibiao sums up both the 2008 and 2009 speeches with the phrase, “Light on citizen’s rights, heavy on official power” (轻民权重官权).
But unlike last year, this year’s speech makes no effort whatsoever to conceal this fact. It is a bald pronouncement of the way things will be, and the way they should remain for some time to come.
“This is the news we receive on this Journalist’s Day,” Song concluded balefully. “We can avoid this holiday, but we cannot avoid attack from these principles that have been newly packaged and presented. This is the situation we in the press must face.”
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 10, 2009, 2:30pm HK]