By David Bandurski — We wrote recently at CMP about how Xinhua News Agency is leading the charge as Chinese media go global. And we argued that this global push can be seen both as a commercial venture and as the international dimension of what we have termed “Control 2.0,” the CCP’s effort to improve “channeling” of what it calls “global public opinion.”
Today we offer as part of our expanding dossier of translations on Hu Jintao’s re-working of media policy, or “Control 2.0,” a portion of a piece from the most recent issue of the official media journal China Journalist dealing with changes at provincial-level television stations in China.
The article is written by Ma Laishun (马来顺), vice-chairman at the official Hebei Television and head of the station’s News Center. It offers an informative look at how local television stations are responding to Hu Jintao’s mandate to achieve more effective “public opinion channeling” — that is, staying on top of news and issues with a mind to more effectively managing and influencing them in the topsy turvy new media age.
Since Hu Jintao’s important speech on media policy on June 20, 2008, “public opinion channeling,” or yulun jindao (舆论引导), has joined the ranks of top CCP news and propaganda buzzwords. It is now an important complement to “guidance of public opinion,” or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向), which encompasses the notion of media control and censorship as a core priority of the CCP.
“Public opinion channeling” seems to encompass an ambitious nationwide project to re-package and modernize propaganda. The piece below refers explicitly to “all-around packaging” and “branding” even as it emphasizes serving the interests of party superiors.
It is crucial to understand that this modernization project seeks to take the boring and the boilerplate out of propaganda, not the propaganda out of news. The emphasis on discipline and the party line is still there. But there is a recognition too that traditional media control tactics, while still crucial, are no longer as effective in the age of modern communications.
So to all of you phoning to ask whether the Internet has made a difference. Yes. Of course. But be careful how you understand that change.
Chinese media are changing. And so are controls.
Interestingly, the China Journalist piece also gives us a glimpse into how major Chinese media corporations, like Shanghai’s SMG Group and China Central Television, are supporting the media modernization drive at home.
Technology upgrades and personnel training to improve “public opinion channeling” are now evidently big business for big players like SMG and CCTV.

Employing Innovation to Raise the Level of Public Opinion Channeling in Television
By Ma Laishun (马来顺)
Innovation is the inexhaustible motivating force of news and propaganda work, and is most critical in constantly increasing our capacity for public opinion channeling.
1. The concept of innovation, breaking through intellectual bottlenecks that inhibit our ability to raise our capacity for public opinion channeling
Since the end of last year, the News Center of Hebei Television has engaged in a “grand discussion of thought liberation” concerning the topic of “raising capacity for channeling of news and public opinion,” the objective being to transition everyone [involved in news production and control] from a “passive style” (被动式) of traditional thinking about communication concepts to an “active mode” (主动型) of modern communication concepts.
One issue is moving from “by the book application of rules” (照本背书) to active transmission [of information]. On December 15, 2008, we had the first direct links across the straits [between mainland China and Taiwan]. According to established protocol, provincial-level television stations would not have done timely reporting for this sort of news story of national importance. We felt, however, that giving this story adequate attention benefited the strengthening of Hebei’s dialogue and cooperation [with Taiwan] in economic, cultural and other terms, that this case had extraordinary importance and value.
So on that day “Hebei Headline News” (河北新闻联播) [the official newscast of top provincial leaders] did its own prominent report on this story, all at once satisfying the demands of television viewers, reenforcing Hebei’s uniqueness and diving due attention at the provincial level to a story of national importance. The results were very satisfactory.
Second, we need to move from simple “defense of one’s territory” (守土) to more active channeling [of information on breaking local news stories].
Along with the rapid expansion of new communication technologies, the field of public opinion (社会舆论场) has become more diversified. As a mainstream medium [of the party], television, if it wishes to maintain the “home field advantage” (成为新闻舆论的“主场”) in news and public opinion, cannot rely solely on “protection” (守土) and “defense” (防御), but must instead actively channel [public opinion] with the mainstream voice of the party and government. Only then can it gain the upper hand (主导权) in public opinion.
At the beginning of this year, as the international financial crisis was making waves, voices of “decay” (衰) the domestic and overseas media were heard constantly. A problem of confidence emerged in the public opinion sphere.
Faced with this [mood] of public opinion, in accordance with the policy spirit of “confidence is more precious than gold” conveyed by the central and provincial leadership, we gathered our strength and released a series of reports called “Confidence ’09” speaking of the rosy prospects of modern industry development in Hebei. With timeliness and strength, [these reports] restored the confidence of cadres and the people in our province.
Third, we must move from “standardized broadcasting” (本位传播) [NOTE: a reference to the drab, boilerplate official news coverage of the past, and present] to actively serving [the public]. We must respect “audience demand” and adhere to a popular orientation [in news coverage], actively seeking closeness [to viewers], channeling while providing service, providing better service while channeling [public opinion].
After H1N1 spread through Latin America, “Hebei Headline News” broadcast related stories in its morning, noon and evening editions, inviting experts to introduce the causes of infection and methods of prevention.
When the first homegrown case of H1N1 infection was discovered in Cangzhou, we reported news about the patient’s treatment and recovery at the first available moment and sought information about those who had been closely associated with the patient. In this way, we effectively stabilized the public mood.
2. Innovating content, steadily enhancing the focus (针对性) and (实效性) effectiveness of news and public opinion channeling
Innovation at the level of news content is core to raising our capacity for news and public opinion channeling. This means we must improve the focus and effectiveness of public opinion channeling.
First, we must adhere to a pulling together of our own news media focal points and the work impetus [and objectives] of the CCP, taking the promotion of scientific development as our first responsibility as a news media.
This year . . . [a whole series of programs and segments at Hebei Television] . . . have favorably brought out and represented new bright points in Hebei’s scientific development over the past year.
Second, we must adhere [in our work] to a pulling together of responsibility toward our [party] superiors above and toward our audiences below, serving as bridges and bonds between party and government leaders and the general public. In order to support this year’s “Year of Cadre Work Character Improvement” movement, we introduced large-scale series of interview programs in April . . . [Examples provided of programs, mostly interviews with local leaders] . . . The programs were interactive, creating a platform through which key leaders from various cities [in Hebei] could interact face-to-face with people at the grassroots . . . .
[The third point is about the need to improve social character by reporting on exemplars of good behavior, and the need to improve supervision by public opinion.]
3. Innovating methods, working hard to raise the attractiveness and infectiveness of public opinion channeling
In recent years, the News Center at Hebei Television has worked hard to break through old modes of news reporting, innovating program production methods, reforming operation processes for program production, and improving production resources for programming. [We have seen, as a result] a steady improvement in the attractiveness and infectiveness of public opinion channeling. Ratings for “Hebei Headline News” have gone up dramatically, and was listed in the top-20 for all programs on all channels in the Shijiazhuang area.
First, [we must work toward] particularizing the characteristics and positioning [of various programs] (特色化定位). [NOTE: perhaps this would be best translated as “branding and positioning”]. The branding and positioning (特色化) of news broadcasting means breaking through formalistic molds and abandoning attempts at program uniformity. We need to work creatively to generate programs with different content, of different types, with different styles, making them more personalized, more unique, with stronger branding (品牌化) . . .
[Skipping through the second, third and fourth points here. The fourth is about making programs that are “close” to the people, an invocation of Hu Jintao’s policy of the Three Closenesses.]
Fifth, we need to stress packaging [of information] in the round. In order to enhance the attractiveness and infectiveness of news programs, we must carry out an all-round, all-directional process of packaging of columns and programs.
Investing around 2.5 million yuan, we updated the sets of “Hebei Network News” and several other programs, replacing them with more modern, serious and lively electronic sets. We also reworked the opening themes for a number of programs, bringing them more in line with the unique positioning of these programs. We placed greater emphasis on the post-production process for programs, carefully handling cuts and transitions, adding explanations, voice-overs and dubbing sound so we could achieve the most optimal visual effect and draw viewers into the programs.
In addition, we spent 20 million yuan to install an advanced broadcast system from Shanghai’s SMG Group, carrying out a comprehensive digital upgrade of studio equipment for our news center employing state-of-the-art broadcast equipment and improving the broadcast quality of news programs.
4. Innovating [work and production] systems, stimulating news teams to produce great content, improving public opinion channeling to make it more active and innovative.
In recent years, the News Center at Hebei Television has worked hard to grab hold of the reins in carrying out system reforms, systematically building up its mechanisms for management and operations . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, November 4, 2009, 2:17pm HK]

By Qian Gang — On National Day this month, as the capital was swept up in waves of carefully contrived jubilation, my thoughts turned to China’s future. What would China be like on the 70th anniversary in 2019? On that day, just over the horizon, would we witness a replay of this pageantry? Would party leaders roll out another top-50 list of political slogans?
Would independent voices — “noise and static,” as the party calls them — still be suppressed? Would Beijing again be wound tight with security under the slogan of “stability before all else”?
Or would Chinese have something more to celebrate?
If I may be allowed a bit of simple prognosticating, let me say that the next ten years will decide China’s future.
2012 is the year that Hu Jintao will pass power to the next generation of leaders. While the CCP’s statutes do not place limits on the tenure of the general secretary, provisional rules on term limits issued in 2006 (党政领导幹部职务任期暂行规定) specify that party leaders should hold office for no more than two terms.
If during the coming ten years China’s political climate continues at its present tempo, if there are no dramatic political bumps, we can be fairly certain that the leader who takes the reins at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 will remain as China’s national leader when the 70th anniversary rolls around in 2019.
China cannot be allowed to slide into chaos. This is something all Chinese can basically agree on. But if the CCP continues to drag its feet on political reform, we should all be deeply concerned.
Ahead of the 50th anniversary of the P.R.C. in 1999, party elder Li Shenzhi (李慎之) wrote an open letter to then-President Jiang Zemin [Chinese here] calling on him to seek progress on political reform where Deng Xiaoping had been unable as a result of historical exigencies.
In 2009, on the eve of the 60th anniversary, a conversation with someone purported to be a high-level party elder was circulated widely on the internet. The article, “The ruling party must build a basic system of political ethics” (执政党要建立基本的政治伦理), urged the CCP to reflect on its past and move ahead with political reforms.
The article stirred the secret hopes of countless Chinese.
During Jiang Zemin’s tenure as general secretary, there was nothing whatsoever to signal an interest in pursuing political reforms. In the early days of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration, there was some chatter about the “new politics of Hu-Wen” (胡温新政). This “new politics” was encompassed in the political catchphrase “people first and foremost” (以人为本).
During the past seven years, however, the topic (not to mention the project) of political reform has gathered dust on the back shelf. The corrupting force of crony capitalism has expanded unchecked. Party and commercial special interest groups have become more and more entrenched, and present an ever-graver challenge to social stability.
In the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Premier Wen Jiabao made a solemn pledge that responsibility would be sought for the death of schoolchildren as a result of shoddy school construction. This pledge came to nothing, however, fizzling out in behind-the-scenes power brokering.
The hopes Chinese had vested in Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have slipped ever since the zenith of confidence reached during China’s fight against SARS in 2003.
China today is a cripple, one leg healthy and striding ahead, the other twisted and underdeveloped. Economic reforms surge ahead. Meanwhile, progress in China’s political system is thwarted.
The experience of June 4th, 1989, left deep traumas. China now suffers from a sickness that covets power, feeds and encourages corruption, and punishes goodness and honesty. The ripe atmosphere for political reform that existed in China in the 1980s is no longer there.
Politically confined, Chinese have been unable to explore and prepare for the possibilities of political reform. The conditions for implementing substantial political reforms do not exist in the short term in China. This will almost certainly remain true over the next decade. But nevertheless, the CCP can no longer avoid tough decisions on political reform.
For the remainder of their terms in office, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao can be expected to push economic development. But no one stakes any hope on the idea that Hu and Wen might offer a blueprint for political reform.
For the next three years, all eyes will turn on Hu Jintao and the question of succession. One of the key questions is whether his transfer of power will serve as a model for intra-party democracy (党内民主).
Who Hu Jintao’s successor will be is of lesser importance than how this successor will be determined. The most critical question is whether Hu Jintao, this leader designated as successor [to Jiang Zemin] by Deng Xiaoping himself, can set a precedent for “democratic, open, competitive and merit-based” (民主、公开、竞争、择优) leadership selection principles during his tenure in office, thereby breaking through the “old man politics,” or gerontocracy (老人政治), that has for so many years worked at odds with intra-party democratic principles.
If China’s top leader could be selected in such a manner, this would mark an important shift in the direction of more democratic politics.
It was at this time a century ago that the government of the Qing Dynasty was thrown into turmoil. Facing intense pressure from society, the Qing was forced to grapple with the question of political reform.
In 1906 the Qing government announced that it was preparing a constitution. Two years later it released the general outline of its constitution in a document called, “Imperial Decree on the Outline of the Constitution” (钦定宪法大纲), which allowed nine years for the drafting process.
The Qing’s was an extremely conservative blueprint for political reform, and yet it did manage to provide a timetable.
In the end, though, there was no time for such a process. The Empress Dowager Cixi and the Guangxu Emperor died in 1908, and the Qing government quickly descended into chaos.
Fifty years ago, as the People’s Republic of China was preparing to celebrate its 10th anniversary, army commander Peng Dehuai (彭德怀) criticized Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward as a dramatic policy mistake. At the Lushan Conference held in the summer of 1959, Peng, an ardent CCP supporter, was disgraced and branded an anti-CCP agitator.
Mao Zedong’s catastrophic missteps continued. Behind the shallow veneer of 10th anniversary celebrations that year, the horrors of China’s Great Famine were already becoming clear.
Forty years ago, in 1969, China’s national leader, Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), who had been selected through a constitutional process, was absent from National Day celebrations. That year, at Mao’s behest, Liu was branded a traitor and expelled from the party.
Standing beside Mao Zedong on that National Day was Lin Biao (林彪), his designated heir. But within two years, Lin Biao too fell victim to Mao’s politics. He was branded a traitor and killed in an apparent attempt to flee the country that remains clouded with mystery.
There are so many lessons from our recent history that we Chinese must bear forcefully in mind. We must understand that without a better and fairer political system, we will have no peace and harmony in our country, and no hope for stability.
These next ten years will be critical.
The next generation of leaders will inherit many painful and difficult problems. It will be their responsibility and historical burden to act with political courage, seeking long-term solutions to problems from their root causes.
And what is the root of China’s social and political ills today? It is the monopolization of power and privilege.
We hope party leaders seek solutions to China’s predicament by “breaking through monopoly” (破除垄断); by breaking through the monopolization of politics, leading China toward a process of normalized political competition, whereby power is checked and monitored in accordance with the constitution; by breaking through monopolization of the economy by the state; by breaking through the monopolization of civil affairs, allowing the healthy development of a civil society; by breaking through the monopolization of culture, allowing Chinese to think and speak freely in an atmosphere of tolerance and openness, and ensuring the unfettered flow of information.
How might political reforms begin? They might begin with the relaxing of controls on speech.
The political system, an issue bearing directly on the lives of hundreds of millions of Chinese — our next generation of leaders cannot expect the people to keep their mouths shut on this account. What direction China’s political system should head is a major question that should invite discussion, exploration, and experimentation.
This is the first thing. That China’s leaders must not monopolize the right to expression. That China’s leaders cannot simply muzzle society with simple declaratives like, “We will not copy the West” (我们绝不照搬西方).
The next ten years will determine China’s fate. Of course the great edifice of constitutional governance in China is not a project that can be completed in the space of ten years.
But we appeal to our leaders: do not delay. Tell the people what direction you intend to take us, and work with us to reform our system, building the foundations of constitutionalism in time for our 70th birthday celebrations.
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 29, 2009, 3:38pm HK]

By David Bandurski — At the recent World Media Summit in Beijing, China’s official Xinhua News Agency placed itself at center stage with other international “media giants.” It was at once a symbolic enunciation of China’s coming of age as a global media superpower — whatever that means — and a reflection of China’s future ambitions in the arena of global information.
As we took pains to point out, Xinhua is far more than just another media organization, a fact that lent a strange asymmetry to the proceedings in Beijing.
For China, the summit was an act of statecraft. Xinhua was there representing not its own interests but those of the Chinese Communist Party as the embodiment of the nation’s voice. For the rest, the summit was about business. Rupert Murdoch was there, as he should have been, to represent his own interests and those of his shareholders — not our voices as Australians or Americans, Canadians or Indians.
Xinhua’s global information strategy is China’s global information strategy. But what exactly is that strategy?
We’ve been hearing for months now about how China is laying aside something like four billion US dollars to expand the presence overseas of core central media like China Central Television and Xinhua.
How is that global push — “going out,” as it is called in Chinese — going to take shape?
A recent article from the Media and Entertainment Industry Reporter offers some glimpses into developments at Xinhua this year and how the official news agency’s role globally is envisioned by CCP leaders.
The article’s chief source is Wu Jincai (吴锦才), deputy editor-in-chief of Xinhua News Agency and a key figure behind Xinhua’s push to develop television and online video content.
In an interview that follows the article Wu invokes a quote from Mao Zedong in the 1950s, in which he purportedly said, “Let Xinhua News Agency span the globe, let the whole world hear our voice.” Wu elaborates: “When we say international transmission, this is not about disseminating Chinese content overseas but about using Chinese voices and a Chinese perspective to view the news and view the world.”
Xinhua’s role is not just as a broadcaster, of course, but also as a mediator of content, as a kind of central political clearing house for global news. Xinhua is entrusted with China’s global media push because it can be trusted politically with “China’s voice.”
As one Chinese media scholar puts it rather euphemistically to the Media and Entertainment Industry Reporter:

Many local television stations are willing to use news from Xinhua News Agency. Right now that means text and image. In the future it will mean video material as well, because Xinhua News Agency is a news copy provider that “can maintain its grasp politically.” “There are a lot of people at Xinhua News Agency who really understand politics, who really understand [China’s] national circumstances. When these people produce news, it will be more grounded.”

The CCP’s determination to maintain “propaganda discipline” as central party media step out into the world is clear. But the article also hints at how “going out” — the primary goal of which is to change and influence “global public opinion” to the CCP’s advantage — might present realistic challenges to this objective.
Wu Jincai says, for example, that in the future Xinhua will “emphasize the localization of news bureaus, increasing the proportion of local hires.” How “grounded” in China’s political realities will those journalists be?
A partial translation of the Media and Entertainment Industry Reporter article follows:

“Xinhua News Agency television sets off on a run in 2009, influencing the television news arena”
[NOTE: “Xinhua News Agency TV” refers not to a television channel or station, but Xinhua’s audio and video content production and distribution business comprehensively.]
On March 1, 2009, Xinhua News Agency’s Chinese-language television channel was formally launched. On July 1, trial broadcasts began for Xinhua’s English-language news channel. On September 1, [Xinhua’s] Chinese-language television news channel was separated into [audiovisual] wire copy and programming channels. On the same day, Xinhua News Agency’s Mobile TV was launched through China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom, and Xinhua’s financial news channel, CFC, started broadcasting.
In late 2008, the news that Xinhua News Agency would launch its own television programming spread like wildfire. All of this stemmed from the July 2008 release by the agency’s leading party group of “Opinions on the Further Development of Xinhua News Agency Video Reports” (于进一步发展新华社视频报道的意见). In early 2009, Xinhua News Agency’s audio-visual department was restructured to form the Xinhua News Agency Audio and Video News Desk (新华社音视频新闻编辑部). At the same time, the Xinhua Audio-Visual Center (新华音像中心), originally an enterprise directly under Xinhua’s main office, was placed under the management of Audio and Video News Desk. All of these moves laid the foundation for the continued progress of “Xinhua News Agency TV” in 2009.
As it continues to launch television and new media products, the volume of original television news reports from Xinhua News Agency is continually increasing. “Right now Xinhua News Agency is offering between 600 and 700 minutes of original English-language television wire content and programming each day. The biggest advantage in the separating of channels is that the raw material and finished programming can be produced according to their own rules and specifications, and the duration of news can be further extended,” says Wu Jincai (吴锦才), Xinhua deputy editor-in-chief and head of the audio and video news desk. Originally, a goal of 480 minutes per day of original content was set for “Xinhua News Agency TV” in 2009 (and it was believed then that even something like 280 minutes per day would be difficult to manage), and 960 minutes per day for 2010. But the daily targets for this year have already been met. “Television equipment is now being provided to Xinhua News Agency bureaus at home and around the world, and we should start seeing a spike in news gathering this month. And once broadcast vehicles have been allocated, increasing the duration [of coverage] will not be a problem.” . . .
The Advantages of Xinhua News Agency TV
“The biggest advantage of Xinhua News Agency TV is [enhancing China’s] international communication capacity — the biggest stage and the biggest outlet is in taking part in the global competition for news,” says Wu Jincai.
Xinhua News Agency’s work strategy for 2008-2015 (新华社2008-2015年工作设想) points clearly to a three-step strategy for television development at Xinhua:
Step One — increasing the capacity for video content production, distributing the necessary equipment to overseas news bureaus.
Step Two — building up personnel, strengthening training, adding programs, and providing the necessary technologies.
Step Three — Building Xinhua News Agency as a standalone brand and developing a television broadcast platform reaching the consumer directly. (第三步，建立新华社独立品牌的、直接面向终端受众的电视播出平台)
As a state news wire, Xinhua News Agency has 31 bureaus domestically and more than 110 bureaus overseas, and these journalists provide the basic support for the production of television content for Xinhua. Li Xiguang (李希光), executive dean of Tsinghua University’s School of Journalism and Communication, says that the world’s top television reporters and commentators were all once leading print journalists. Xinhua News Agency has China’s best foreign correspondents. They are proficient in the local languages and are highly capable. These journalists are all graduates of various name-brand universities. In terms of talent, Xinhua News Agency’s advantages are clear.
Within the news industry Xinhua News Agency’s ability to get stories, carry out investigations and write internal reference documents (内参) [for the eyes of select officials, depending on the reference’s level of secrecy] is well regarded. It is felt that this owes to Xinhua’s longstanding reserve of talent, leadership and training. But Xinhua’s project of late is the creation of “television” not of a “television station.” How can “Xinhua News Agency TV” become known and accepted by more television viewers? Can its television news products be sold to more and more consumers? Concerning this, Wu Jincai says, “‘Xinhua News Agency TV’ is working to expand export [of its news products] in three ways. The first is the provision of video wire content to various media organizations. The second is using television programming at overseas television networks to interface with viewers. The third is to build Xinhua’s own television channels overseas to the extent this is financially possible.
Professor Liu Hong (刘宏) of the Television and News School of Communications University of China says it should be no problem for “Xinhua News Agency TV” to export [its news products]. Ever since the Yan’an period, [Xinhua] has been active as a news service and gatherer of information, so in terms of export [of information] overseas, as the state arranges the overall dissemination structure [of information export] it will extend to Xinhua News Agency a definite degree of authorization. For [information] distributed domestically, right now the trend of media convergence is becoming more and more obvious, and in the future video material will flow more freely. Many local television stations are willing to use news from Xinhua News Agency. Right now that means text and image. In the future it will mean video material as well, because Xinhua News Agency is a news copy provider that “can maintain its grasp politically” [NOTE: This means Xinhua is most directly subject to propaganda discipline, or controls, and careful in maintaining the party line]. “There are a lot of people at Xinhua News Agency who really understand politics, who really understand [China’s] national circumstances. When these people produce news, it will be more grounded.”
Zhao Guohui (赵国辉), Heilongjiang Satellite Television’s representative in Beijing, says that there are more and more new media channels [for video content] in addition to the demand for video news content at local television stations. Therefore, the demand for “Xinhua News Agency TV” content will be substantial. But television media rely largely on advertising, so there will not be sizable income from the simple provision of news products. If consumer and product information is used to support advertising products, however, simply posting online video content to Xinhua Online should yield substantial income.
Editorial Structure
For now Xinhua News Agency’s overseas bureaus are provisionally divided into three types. Seven main bureaus and the Tokyo, Paris and Rio De Janerio bureaus are already equipped with two to three professional television journalists each. These are designated as [Xinhua’s] professional television journalism teams. Ten bureaus, including the Washington and Berlin bureaus, have print journalists producing video programs and these constitute [Xinhua’s] informal television production workforce. Aside from these two categories, ten bureaus are training a large number of local reporters to take on the work of filming and editing, and they work with bureau reporters to send back reports. This group is known as [Xinhua’s] reporting team. “In the future we want to emphasize the localization of news bureaus, increasing the proportion of local hires,” says Wu Jincai.
According to expertise, professionalism and general hiring standards, Xinhua News Agency is hiring from local television stations and universities around the country. Up to July 8, 2009, Xinhua’s 31 domestic bureaus had already hired 96 television journalists. The Audio and Video News Desk has been actively hiring since its creation in 2009, going from under 100 personnel at the beginning of the year to close to 300 today. Moreover, two-thirds of personnel are under the age of 40, including many from local television stations.
Television is an industry combining many different skill sets, and the demand of combining various work skills grows in particular once live programming becomes the norm . . .
“In filming for television, you can’t just concentrate on the image and forget about ideas,” [says Wu Jincai]. Xinhua’s existing television team has a feel for how to film for television, then there are those who come from a writing background. One important task for the audio and video news division [of Xinhua] is drawing on the strengths of both groups . . .
[Long section here on various Xinhua columns, programs and reports taken on in recent years.]
On July 1, Xinhua News Agency’s English-language news channel was launched on a trial basis, with 90 minutes of content broadcast per day. In the Urumqi riots that shortly followed, Xinhua News Agency journalists on the front lines managed to get hard to obtain footage of the chaos, and this material was quickly relayed to users. Many media in China and overseas, including 20 well-known global media, have become clients of the service on a trial basis. The launch of the English-language service not only enhances Xinhua News Agency’s transmission capacity (传播能力) overseas, but at the same time increases the effectiveness of Chinese [state] media in influencing public opinion overseas. In the future, Xinhua News Agency will also actively encourage personnel at its various bureaus, according to their own needs, to get Chinese and English content into other local languages and broadcast it locally.
It is the hope of Xinhua News Agency President Li Congjun (李从军) that Xinhua’s English-language channel provides overseas not only Xinhua’s own content but also programs from various domestic television stations and other sources, becoming a global platform for the provision of Chinese television news content in order to achieve competitiveness on a much higher level. Many media groups, including CNN and Reuters, are already moving into this market . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 22, 2009, 11:40am HK]

By David Bandurski — Noting a softer pitch to Hu Jintao’s newest media policy buzzword — “public opinion channeling,” or yulun yindao (舆论引导) — some have supposed that a relaxation of media restrictions in China is in the offing. That misguided notion has perhaps been re-enforced by another aspect of Hu’s policy re-orientation, namely more active reporting of breaking news stories by central CCP media like People’s Daily Online and Xinhua News Agency.
Hu’s policy is motivated not by an impulse to loosen the party’s grip on the media, but rather by an interest in more effective control. How do we know this?
Partly, of course, from the intensification of traditional media controls designed to enforce propaganda discipline — the issuing of orders and bans, the killing of news stories, the blocking of Websites and keywords.
But we can also look at the political valence of the party’s own language used to articulate and disseminate Hu Jintao’s new media policy.
While we would expect moves toward greater media openness in China to arise from the right end of the political spectrum (the right end of the party spectrum, that is), the tactics of Control 2.0 are articulated in decidedly hardline, leftist tones.
There is an interesting tension here, in fact, between the softened tone of propaganda under Control 2.0 — the need to make the party’s messages less staid and ideological and more attractive (in the spirit of The Founding of a Republic) — and the rigid, uncompromising language used to describe the CCP’s ultimate news and propaganda objectives.
One of the best examples is a recent piece by Hu Xiaohan (胡孝汉), the head of the Central Propaganda Department’s Information Bureau and vice-chairman of the All-China Journalist’s Association. Hu is a a former Xinhua News Agency journalist now rising rapidly through the ranks of China’s propaganda bureaucracy. [You can visit Hu’s blog at the online site of the official Guangming Daily, published by the Central Propaganda Department].
In a piece published recently in China Journalist (中国记者), a key official vehicle for news policy published by Xinhua News Agency, Hu Xiaohan writes in starkly militaristic terms of Hu Jintao’s more robust media policy. The essence of the piece is the need to fight out a more commanding position for “China’s voice” on the international stage, and to push back against Western media and other “hostile forces” that attack and demonize China.
CMP director Qian Gang wrote earlier this month that “if China’s leaders have a faith today, it is not Marxism-Leninism but pragmatism.” And Hu Xiaohan’s China Journalist article shows us clearly how pragmatism is driving the CCP’s vast system of press controls.
Hu (and we could be talking about either Hu now) draws inspiration directly from Sun Tzu’s practical art of war [in Chinese]. He writes about the need for the CCP to gain the advantage in international public opinion by striking first, or xian fa zhi ren (先发制人), for major news stories. He writes about forestalling China’s enemies on the “battlefield of public opinion” by making an overwhelming show of force, or xian sheng duo ren (先声夺人).
In their foreign policy, CCP leaders push the notion of a “harmonious world.” But China’s media policy is predicated on a hard-line world view that sees China “at war” with a monolithic bloc of hostile Western nations and their shameless media bent on keeping China down.
A partial translation follows of Hu Xiaohan’s article, which is one of the most important media policy-related documents to appear in China in recent months:

“Holding the commanding position: thoughts on enhancing public opinion channeling under new conditions”
China Journalist
September 21, 2009
By Hu Xiaohan (胡孝汉)
Holding the commanding position (占领制高点) means grabbing hold of the discourse in the midst of news campaigns. Standing on the offensive in the war for public opinion is an important method and means of grasping the initiative [and advantage], and by employing this important battle tactic and strategy we may mark up victories [in the struggle for the agenda]. In recent years, in fighting news campaigns surrounding everything from large-scale natural disasters to major sudden-breaking incidents, from public opinion channeling for key social issues to the struggle for public opinion in combating secessionist violence, news media have actively taken the commanding position, working hard to strike first and win successive [public opinion] campaigns. And they have accumulated a wealth of experience [on this front].
1. The crucial meaning and active role of holding the commanding position
The original meaning of ‘commanding position’ derives from the art of warfare, in which one can, within a particular area or context, gain a view from an elevated position of how the enemy is positioned and how his firepower is arrayed. By holding a commanding position one has the advantage of looking down from above and grasping the overall position. One therefore maintains an advantage in terms of both attack and defense. In this way, the various weapons in one’s arsenal can be deployed to their fullest advantage, maximizing injury to and containment of the enemies arrayed in positions below one’s own armies. This is often the key to victory or defeat in warfare.
This idea and strategy of war is something we must borrow and expand upon. Holding the commanding position means that in the midst of various conflicts and engagements of public opinion, we grasp the overall picture of how public opinion [on a given issue] is shaping up, grasp the key points and main attack objectives of public opinion channeling, and gain the position of first advantage in terms of content, timeliness, position and angle. It means that we take the initiative, gain control of the situation, and restrain the space in which negative public opinion can spread . . .
Gaining the commanding position is a tactic of war, and it is crucial to determining whether or not a campaign is won; gaining the commanding position is a strategy, and it relates directly to whether or not an overall war strategy can be achieved.
Just as in the fighting of military wars, the fighting of public opinion wars requires careful consideration of tactics and strategy. In each struggle for public opinion, the commanding position must be sought and held and initiative must be taken, in order that the goals and tasks of public opinion channeling are reached and that success and victory result in the struggle for public opinion.
Of late, the international and domestic environment facing news and propaganda work has dramatically transformed. Grabbing hold of the discourse and taking the commanding position are tasks of absolutely critical importance. As for the channeling of critical domestic issues, the reform process has developed to a critical stage — social and economic segments, modes of association, forms of employment, benefit relationships and modes of distribution are becoming daily more diverse, and mindsets are in a state of growing diversity and change. Therefore, the channeling of pressing social issues is of extreme importance. Ensuring that news and propaganda cleave to the core [demands of the party], serve the overall [political] circumstances, promote economic development and protect social stability requires that we fight each propaganda engagement effectively, that we are not reticent about engaging hot issues, that we are adept at channeling points of difficulty [or social and political sensitivity], that we strictly grasp the initiative in public opinion, and stand in a commanding position.
Judging from changes to the terrain of international public opinion and the conversations between various cultures and systems of thought around the world . . . the struggle for and against infiltration in the ideological sphere has become intense and complex. Hostile forces have whipped up successive waves of public opinion against China, and the international struggle for public opinion grows more fierce by the day. The question of how our national image and national interests can be protected and preserved in the realm of news and propaganda in an international order in which “the West is strong and we are weak” (西强我弱) demands that we apply our hand to every public opinion engagement, give careful consideration to strategies and methods — turning tactics into active victories in [public opinion] engagements, turning the tide of the war through strategic victories . . .
As communication technologies have advanced and the Internet and other new media have achieved rapid development . . . this has had a profound impact on the mechanisms by which public opinion emerges in society and the channels through which it is communicated. The public opinion environment is now far more complex, and gaining a solid hold on public opinion channeling has become a far more difficult task. In order to grasp the initiative in public opinion formation under the conditions of Internet and information technology development (网络化/信息化) — thereby ensuring the healthy coordination of news public opinion, public opinion in society and online public opinion — we must hold the commanding position on the Internet, this critical battlefield for the contesting of public opinion. We must extend the fibers of propaganda, and we must disseminate the mainstream [CCP] voice, ensuring that [the Internet] becomes an effective platform for the channeling of public opinion . . .
Holding the commanding position works toward gaining the advantage by striking first (先发制人) and toward grabbing the initiative. In reporting on sudden-breaking incidents, it is only by holding the commanding position, releasing authoritative information at the earliest possible moment, overawing others with an initial display of strength (先声夺人), issuing timely and accurate reports on the incident and reporting objectively and comprehensively on measures being taken to handle it . . . that we can grasp the initiative in public opinion channeling and promote the resolution of the situation. [NOTE: The above reference to coverage centers on coverage of the immediate facts surrounding sudden-breaking incidents, and does not suggest coverage will deal in-depth with the causes behind various incidents.]
The April 28, 2008, train collision was a relatively successful example of public opinion channeling. Overseas media did not turn this into a major focal point, largely due to the fact that relevant [government] departments were quick to release information and report the facts, holding a commanding position over public opinion.
Holding a commanding position is an advantage in staying on top and expanding influence in the struggle for international public opinion. International news reporting is still largely in the hands of Western developed nations. Their reports to a large degree determine the first reactions of publics around the world to international news events and shape their understanding of events. Owing to differences in its political system and ideology, the demonizing of China has gone on unabated internationally. Some Western media whip up attach after attack in the public opinion arena . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 30, 2009, 4:46pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Just as we were beginning to feel downright pessimistic about the prospects for China’s media, particularly around the 60th anniversary, AFP and the BBC picked up our mood with reports about how the city of Shenzhen is opening up to the press. This is very exciting news. It is unfortunately also utter nonsense.
The original font of misinformation was this article from the English-language China Daily, which drew attention to a document passed recently in Shenzhen called, “Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government Regulations on News Release Work” (深圳市人民政府新闻发布工作办法) .
The China Daily article, which carried the hopeful title “Law will guard journalists’ right to know,” quoted three sources, two of which were Shenzhen’s deputy propaganda chief, Xuan Zhuxi, and the head of the city government’s press office, Su Huijun.
These guys are basically the Tweedledum (party) and Tweedledee (government) of press control in Shenzhen. They must be laughing behind their sleeves right now about the rather generous foreign press they’ve gotten.
The third source quoted in the China Daily article, named as national radio reporter Li Qiang, sets up the shot for any of us who are prepared to be skeptical. Here’s what he says, in the final paragraph no less — which should suggest the writer of the report is winking at us too:

“It will be more convenient to get the right person with an improvement of the spokesman system. But the regulation doesn’t specify that the spokesman or his office must respond to an issue, which would be the real help for us journalists,” said Li Qiang, a reporter at a national radio station.

The online reports from the BBC and AFP suggest their news writers didn’t get the hint. (Here’s a clue: availability of spokespeople, not of information.)
The BBC piece attempts to indicate some skepticism — as in the single quotes in the headline, “China city ‘to open up to media’“. But the report is essentially a hasty rewrite of the China Daily piece, borrowing its quotes (except for the crucial one from Li Qiang) and adding stale little bits of boilerplate background:

Chinese media is tightly controlled by the state and independent investigative reporting is rare.
Shenzhen’s policy follows a relaxation of restrictions on foreign journalists after the Beijing Olympics.

How would any rational reader know up from down here? The first sentence seems to urge us to temper our optimism about these new regulations. The second seems to suggest the local regulations might be part of a general process of liberalization.
Sure, both statements in the block quote above are essentially factual. The problem is that they are shattered fragments not united in any way by conscientious reporting.
The only source for this news piece — discounting a couple of paraphrased statements from the BBC’s own Quentin Sommerville in Beijing — is the original China Daily report.
I’m picking unfairly on the BBC here, but the AFP story is independently identical.
And, yes, I am also feigning naivete here. This sort of thing happens all the time, right? Pick up an official news story (off the Web), move things around a bit, slot in a bit of background and, finally, just for good measure, sprinkle on some artificial skepticism.
But should it be happening all the time? Is it too much to ask, in other words, that a professional news service:

A. Seek two or three outside perspectives on their own?
B. Take a gander at the original policy document in question?

Concerning B . . . In the spirit of openness, I suppose, Shenzhen quickly made the full version of this “media” policy available online. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if people actually read it before they wrote about it? (Having said that I’m starting to feel genuinely naive.)
But let’s do take a look. Even a cursory one will suffice.
First of all, let’s remember that this document is called: “Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government Regulations on News Release Work.” Right. So the key question has to be: what exactly is meant by “news release work”?
OK. Moving on.
We can just ignore the first clause of Article One. All that language about how the purpose of the regulation is to “increase the level of transparency in government” and to “create a sunshine government” — that’s just the pretty preamble telling us what Shenzhen officials want us to think this document is all about.
Clause Two gives us the definition of “news release work” we’re looking for:

“News release work” refers in these regulations to the use of press spokespersons or other authorized forms by the government and administrative departments (hereafter called administrative organs) to release information concerning these administrative organs through news media and other channels, expressing [the government’s] arguments and positions, addressing social concerns, answering questions from the public and otherwise strengthening the work of connecting with the public.

In the China Daily/AFP/BBC version of the story, Shenzhen media seem to be actively empowered by the new regulations. The BBC suggests that “officials could be sacked or reprimanded if they do not respond quickly to media requests.” China Daily tells us that officials “who fail to provide accurate and proper information to the media will face punishments ranging from public criticism to dismissal from their post.”
But Clause Two of Article One makes it patently clear that these regulations are really about government public relations, and are not a real mandate for official accountability.
It is still the government’s prerogative to decide what information is “accurate” or “proper.” The only substantive demand on government offices is that they make sure they are equipped with designated and trained press spokespeople. If they fail to do this “news release work” adequately — holding press conferences regularly to explain what they are busy doing, making statements to the press in the event of sudden-breaking incidents, etcetera — they may be censured.
In point of fact, this has nothing to do with a relaxation of media policy. Since when — and where — has the frequency of government press conferences ever been an adequate measure of press freedom?
Clause Five of Article One does mention a number of positive principles supposed to underpin these regulations, such as the principle of “information openness” and the principle of “truthfulness.” But similar language is already abundant in other local and national legislation. There is the 2006 “Opinion on the Implementation of the ‘Sunshine Project’ in Shenzhen.” And of course there is also the “National Ordinance on Openness of Government Information.”
These local and national regulations have failed to yield real openness because they do not, and cannot, create institutional guarantees of accountability. They are window dressing on a system with no real checks and balances.
Obviously, the most important invisible actor here is China’s news control and propaganda system. There is the party’s Central Propaganda Department, and of course Shenzhen’s propaganda office. On the government side, at the national level, there is the State Council Information Office taking charge of internet controls — and this bureaucracy extends down also to Shenzhen’s press office. Remember Tweedledee and Tweedledum, those two guys laughing behind their sleeves?
At one point in the regulations, this looming system of news controls peeks out from behind the curtain. The language in Clause 19 of Article 4, on procedural specifics, states that: “Information of a routine nature for active release should be released within 7 working days of its preparation and approval [for release].”
And who do you suppose is taking the lead in this “approval” process? That’s right. The propaganda office, whose job it is to defend the interests of party leaders in Shenzhen.
“Shenzhen is a noted laboratory for reform,” reported the AFP piece, underlining the assumption that, here again, was proof of the axiom. But after a glance of analysis this document begins to look much less like reform, don’t you think?
One of the saddest things in this little narrative is that it is the official English-language China Daily that ultimately provides us with the most useful information about Shenzhen’s regulations. The quotes from Shenzhen officials are from China Daily, which also gives us the only real dissenting voice in the form of the cautious, shoulder-shrugging remarks of national radio reporter Li Qiang.
Of course we can shrug our own shoulders and say this is no big deal. But I have this sinking suspicion we are glimpsing the future of Web-based global journalism in this copy, paste and pretend to parse approach to news writing.
And if this is true, China’s leaders may really be on to something with this idea they have of more actively influencing international public opinion by getting their own version of the story out quickly. International media, with their expedient eyes on the balance sheets, may very well follow on the heels of the Pied Pipers of Beijing.
We have arrived now in a place of even-handed despondency, with two pessimisms to take the place of one.
FURTHER READING:
“Shenzhen makes itself media accountable, somewhat,” Tibetan Review, September 17, 2009
“Shenzhen’s ‘Sunshine Project’ Ensures People’s Right to Know” [Chinese], Xinhua News Agency, January 6, 2006
“Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government Regulations on News Release Work” (深圳市人民政府新闻发布工作办法)
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 21, 2009, 9:21am HK]

By Qian Gang — On September 11 the writings of one of Taiwan’s most celebrated cultural critics, Lung Ying-tai (龙应台), were scrubbed from China’s internet. And in a poetic illustration of how the internet is changing the nature of media control in China, the order for an all-out assault on Lung’s essays was delivered via MSN Messenger.
The web censors responsible for this recent action were the usual suspects from Beijing’s web management office — officially, the Beijing Municipal Internet Information Administrative Bureau (北京市互联网宣传管理办公室) — which sits directly under the Internet Propaganda and Administrative Office (网络宣传管理局) of the State Council Information Office (国务院新闻办).
There is nothing municipal at all about Beijing’s Web management office. Jurisdiction over the internet companies of Beijing means effective jurisdiction over the vast majority of websites with broad regional or national reach in China. Even QQ, which has its corporate base in Shenzhen, handles editorial operations from its base in the capital.
The September 11 instructions from the Web management office were crystal clear: delete all essays from Lung Ying-tai, and do not attempt any further posting of her work.
Before the order came down from web censors, the last piece about Lung Ying-tai appearing online was posted on September 3 at Xinhua Online and other sites. It was called “New Lung Ying-tai Book Explores the Great Changes in the World Over the Past 60 Years” (龙应台新书追溯60年沧桑世事 讲述平凡人曲折命运). The new book it referred to was Lung’s Wide Rivers and Seas: 1949 (大江大海 一九四九).
The headline for this piece can still be tracked down at many websites through the Baidu search engine, but the content is inaccessible at all but one link at Xinhua Online: “We’re sorry! The article you’re looking for has been deleted or has expired,” says a notice at the original location at Xinhua Online. A notice at QQ reads: “Page not found. You will be taken to the homepage in 5 seconds.”
When I visited the online sites where many of Lung’s essays had previously been archived, I found that they had all disappeared.
The control of China’s internet has an increasingly important place within the overall media control regime in China today. Web censors have their own advanced technologies to assist them in monitoring the Internet — including, we have been told, their own internal messaging services for the delivery of more sensitive censorship instructions to website editors — and they also use MSN and other shortcuts to exercise more direct and “flatter” control over the web. It takes only a matter of seconds or minutes now for orders and bans from the authorities to make it to the desks of editors at Chinese websites, or to their mobile phones.
In Beijing, where most of China’s websites are concentrated, preparations are underway to implement a real-name registration system to remove the anonymity many web users have hitherto enjoyed. Teams of tens of thousands of “volunteers” are being mobilized by the Web management office to “monitor unfavorable website trends” (监控不良网站动向).
All of these changes are clues to how both the human and technological means of media control are being transformed in China.
In contrast with China’s new generation of Web censors, the old guardians of media discipline in China – the Central Propaganda Department and its News Commentary Group – look like slow and ineffective dinosaurs.
Lung Ying-tai is one of the most influential contemporary Taiwanese intellectuals on the mainland. In the 1980s her essay, “Chinese, Why Aren’t You Angry?” (included in her Wildfire Collection), was all the rage in China. In the late 1990s, she wrote for a number of mainland newspapers, including Southern Weekend. Over a period of roughly ten years, she published hundreds of articles inside China. A few of her books were also published on the mainland, including her book Dear Andreas (亲爱的安德烈), which was selected by the news portal Sina.com as second on its book of the year list in June this year.
The Central Propaganda Department has scratched its head for years over what exactly to do with Lung Ying-tai. Her writings are fiercely unorthodox from the CCP’s standpoint, but she has proven a formidable opponent for China’s censors, wedging her way into deeper issues through social and cultural criticism. Her writing is superb stylistically, and readers adore her.
Her essay, “In Defense of Taiwanese Democracy,” which made the rounds on the internet in China in 2005, and her essays for the China Youth Daily supplement Freezing Point – “The Taiwan You Probably Don’t Know” (你可能不知道的台湾), “What is Culture?” (文化是什麽？) and “Three Bows from the Chairman” (一个主席的叁鞠躬) were seen as a series of glancing attacks on the mainland. These Freezing Point pieces, fortunately, have so far survived at the China Youth Daily website.
In early 2006, Freezing Point, which had frequently invited the displeasure of propaganda officials by printing Lung’s essays, was shut down by the Central Propaganda Department’s News Commentary Group. An essay by historian Yuan Weishi (袁伟时), and not Lung’s writings, was cited as the straw that broke the camel’s back. But Lung Ying-tai, furious at this attack against one of China’s finest publications, fired back with an open letter to President Hu Jintao criticizing press controls. It was called, “Please Use Culture to Convince Me” (请用文明说服我).
Obviously, web censors moved quickly to ensure that Lung’s open letter to Hu Jintao was scrubbed from China’s internet. But even after the Freezing Point affair there were some media in China that walked the tightrope and published essays from Lung Ying-tai. She wrote a number of important articles for Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily.
So why now?
Why is there a move to cleanse China’s internet of Lung Ying-tai’s writings? We do not know what the reasons of the Web management office are. But clearly these actions are related to the PRC’s upcoming 60th anniversary celebrations.
In early August, the same Web management office called together a meeting of representatives from major websites and began mobilizing for online news and propaganda work surrounding the anniversary. They emphasized the need for uniformity and conformity to the CCP’s “main themes,” and urged the need to avoid “static and noise” (杂音/噪音) — which is to say, divergent viewpoints.
To its credit, Lung Ying-tai’s latest book is definitely, to apply the CCP’s standards, “static and noise.” The book opens up the black box of China’s history, taking a direct look at the cruel facts and circumstances of China 60 years ago.
If China’s leaders have a faith today, it is not Marxism-Leninism but pragmatism (实用主义). The basic demand placed on propaganda surrounding the 60th anniversary is not that it show fealty to an ideology but that it benefit the CCP’s position and promote national unity.
Concerning 1949 and its place in China’s history, they must walk a tightrope. On the one hand, they cannot stray from the narrative of CCP victory in the war for China’s liberation. On the other hand, they must take care not to upset relations with the current government in Taiwan.
Wide Rivers and Seas: 1949 is bound to generate lively debate among Chinese from all walks of life and all convictions. At this juncture, with National Day just around the corner, this is something China’s leaders cannot stomach.
We can only hope this campaign against Lung Ying-tai’s writings online is, as I believe it to be, an expedient measure that will fade away of its own once we are through this tough October.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 18, 2009, 1:23pm]

By Qian Gang and David Bandurski — As we noted in our last piece on Chinese media coverage of the upcoming 60th anniversary of the PRC, signs point so far to extremely tight press controls around the event. Media in China will likely be less capable of pushing the envelope this year than they were even during the last major anniversary ten years ago. That doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that nothing has changed over the past decade.
Looking at the differences between coverage this year and in 1999, two changes become immediately obvious. The first is a dramatic increase in the level of commercialization in China’s media. The second is a rise in the strength and importance of internet media in China.
Chinese media face strict propaganda controls ahead of the 60th anniversary. They must follow the mandate of Hu Jintao’s “five goods” formula, avoiding historical and institutional negatives and focusing praise on the CCP and the socialist system, etcetera.
Nevertheless, the 60th anniversary is a great big event and a great big story, and Chinese media have to stay on top of it. So how do media, as Chinese journalists often say, “dance with their shackles on”?
Looking at coverage at major internet portals so far, we can see this happening in at least three ways:

1. Sticking close to the directives and “main theme” (主旋律) of the central party， but attempting to make propaganda more attractive and salable. The most representative media in this category are China’s two major state media web portals, People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Online. They are the chief actors behind the push to amplify the “five goods” formula. But the way these pro-party messages are being propagated differs substantially from the past. The media tools and techniques are much more diverse.
These portals use online forum discussions, online digital video competitions, animation and quiz competitions, exhibits of old photographs submitted by internet users, online selections of historical propaganda films, and the list goes on. In one form or another, all of these “media products” praise the party and government. But if their message is one-sided, their media permutations are more rich.
2. Towing the official line and cashing in all at once (既要听话，又要赚钱). Commercial websites like Sina.com fall into this category. Their broad National Day content coverage does not stray from the mandates of propaganda discipline, but the explicit CCP hues are toned down or removed altogether — coverage is undertaken in the name of the “country” rather than out of fealty to the party.
Cleverly, these sites have avoided special reports chronicling China’s history since the founding of the PRC (a potential political minefield). Instead, they have opened scores of special pages recording various changes in the material circumstances and material life of China over the past 60 years – style and fashion, jewelry and accessories, makeup and heterosexual relationships. They obliterate hints of Chinese as political animals and focus instead on creature comforts. There are even special pages for the advertisers, like: “Influential Brands Over the Past 60 Years” (六十年影响力品牌专区).
Obviously, all of these content offerings have tangible commercial value. From a political standpoint, this type of treatment may gladden government leaders. But it has the added benefit of pleasing both consumers and advertisers. In much the same way that religious holidays in the West are merchandised to their fullest potential, Chinese National Day is being re-packaged, humanized, commercialized and trivialized at these websites.
3. Keeping distance from the discourse of power, but seeking to publish “words of conscience” within the bounds delineated by the authorities, evincing the professional character of the media. A few web portals, such as QQ.com, have attempted to highlight important lessons of the past 60 years through reasonably safe but backhanded methods.
QQ set up a section allowing users to vote themselves on what they saw as key events in the PRC’s history. Some sites have also tried to walk the line through special interviews with Chinese scholars, who may on occasion step gingerly into progaganda grey areas. Another important tactic is to run tragic personal stories from ordinary citizens in an indirect attempt to highlight the crooked path of China’s history over the past 60 years. Their focus is not on the party or the nation, but on the individual.

Coverage of the PRC’s 60th anniversary in 2009 can be seen as an important test of Hu Jintao’s policy on the media and a measure of the real degree of space Chinese media currently have.
Media are developing rapidly in China. The basic precondition of CCP control over the media is unshaken, however. 60 years ago, Mao Zedong talked about the need for “uniformity of public opinion,” and today, in the midst of the information age, China’s leaders are still grounded in this way of thinking about the media’s role.
Will Chinese media make forays against Hu Jintao’s “five goods” in the coming days? If so, how will they accomplish it?
The time has come to sit back and watch.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 17, 2009, 12:15pm HK]