By Qian Gang — A post called “Conversations with an Old Comrade on the Eve of the 60th Anniversary of the PRC” (国庆60周年前夕一位老同志的谈话) has made the rounds on the Internet this week. The post, which comes ahead of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, and urges a critical reassessment of the Communist Party’s record, is now being systematically removed from blogs and bulletin boards inside China.
“Conversations with an Old Comrade” was purportedly compiled from recent interviews with a former high ranking CCP official. The online text refers to him as a “leader of the country and the party” (党和国家领导人), suggesting he held a position at the national level.
Although the authenticity of the post has not been confirmed, most who have read it believe it was indeed sourced from a senior party member. Readers have also remarked that the post is reminiscent of “50 Years of Trials and Hardships” (风雨苍黄50年), an influential piece penned by party elder Li Shenzhi (李慎之) on the occasion of the party’s 50th anniversary in 1999.

[ABOVE: Party elder Li Shenzhi, author of an important reflection on the CCP in 1999, passed away in 2003.]

Certainly, both Li Shenzhi and the mystery author of this week’s post share an interest in treating major PRC anniversaries as opportunities to talk about the shortcomings of CCP rule. If “Conversations with an Old Comrade” is authentic, however, it seems that the “old comrade” in question is even higher ranking than was Li Shenzhi.
The post begins in a very unconventional way. It relates how a young professor from the Central Party School paid a visit one day to the “old comrade” and addressed to him a series of questions raised by local and regional leaders. What things have gone unchanged in the 60 years since the establishment of the PRC? Why have these not changed? Is change possible?
The old comrade responds to the professor:

There are so many things that have not changed in the 60 years since the nation’s founding. The most basic, underlying fact is that this nation is still ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, and this is a truth everyone is clear about. But what other things stand behind this fact? For example, the CCP is a party of 70 million members. It is the world’s largest political party. And yet, the party has not yet been registered with the government authorities responsible for managing social organizations [namely, the Ministry of Civil Affairs]. And why is that? Our country still has no Political Party Law (政党法). After 60 years, this is something that has not changed. Our country still, to this day, does not have a political system in the modern sense. It is truer to say, in other words, that “the nation belongs to the CCP” than to say that “the CCP is the party of the nation.” After 60 years the concept of “party and government leaders” (党和国家领导人) has not changed. And in terms of national finances, no barriers whatsoever have been erected between the CCP treasury and the national treasury.
Look further and you see that China’s millions of soldiers are still called the People’s Liberation Army. In this area too nothing at all has changed. We still have no national armed forces in the true sense. The highest member of the armed forces is the highest leader in the CCP . . . After 60 years, nothing whatsoever has changed on this front.
Look within the CCP itself, and you see also that in 60 years no competitive system in the true sense has been established [to determine leadership positions]. It goes without saying that the same is true of the government.

The “old comrade” strongly opposes the slogan “60 years of resplendence,” which has been used to refer to the legacy of Communist Party rule in China. Is it possible to argue that the three or four years of the Great Leap Forward or the disastrous decade of the Cultural Revolution were resplendent? The CCP may not wish to subtract those painful years from the total, he suggests, but ordinary Chinese, historians and even ordinary CCP members most certainly will.
The old comrade recalls an exchange with an elderly party colleague who had presided over some work of the CCP’s Secretariat the early 1980s, and who resided in Shenzhen for several years in the twilight of his life. When the “old comrade” pays a visit to this elderly official, the latter shares one major delight and two major regrets about the path the country had taken.
His delight was that the economic reforms he had personally helped to promote in southern China had become a model for the whole nation to follow. One of his regrets was the party’s inability to rehabilitate its major historical errors. Another was the party’s failure to implement a policy of tolerance for alternative viewpoints. The “old comrade” recalls in the post: “He said very little. When he had finished speaking, the two of us just fell silent.”
The “old comrade” argues that tolerance for differing viewpoints should be a basic political ethic of the ruling party:

The Kuomingtang party lorded it over us for 22 years, closed down our newspapers and magazines, murdered members of our party, and expunged differing opinions from our schools. History has shown that these policies failed. The CCP, which has ruled for 60 years now, must not use similar methods against alternative viewpoints and against other people.

The “old comrade” in fact counts the CCP’s posture of intolerance toward popular viewpoints and ideas from scholars, experts and “members of democratic parties” as one of its most serious errors:

Sixty years is an occasion for both celebration and reflection. The whole nation must reflect back, and the whole party must reflect back. The ruling party, which is the nation’s only ruling party, and which has ruled for 60 years, should always have at least the most basic courage to reflect back. This, in fact, is a responsibility, a responsibility of the ruling party. Naturally, reflecting back would mean the airing of differing viewpoints. There is nothing at all unusual about this. If the climate becomes tense [ahead of the anniversary], if actions are taken to suppress [various ideas and activities], this suggests that the CCP is severely lacking in bearing and self-confidence. In my view, the views of the ordinary people, of members of democratic parties, of experts and scholars, and of the politically frustrated — these four categories of viewpoints — must be heeded and respected, and must not be suppressed. It discomforts me to realize that I am voicing ideas here that the ancients voiced more than a thousand years ago.

“Conversations with an Old Comrade” is identified online as having been “reorganized from four conversations with an old comrade of honor and integrity.” But if this is indeed the work of an elderly party member, who could it be?
There have been plenty of guesses. Most submit that this comrade must be a veteran of 1980s reforms in China, probably a member of the Secretariat of the 12th Central Committee of the CCP. Guesses have included Qiao Shi (乔石), Gu Mu (谷牧) and Wan Li (万里).
Others have suggested the work was done by a younger writer imitating the style of a party elder.
Whatever the case, I believe this article, which urges China and the CCP to mark the 60th anniversary of the PRC’s establishment by engaging in deep reflection rather than indulging in empty eulogies, does represent the views shared by leaders of conscience within the CCP.
[Posted by David Bandurski, August 7, 2009, 8:09pm HK]
SELECT DELETED POSTS of “Conversations with an Old Comrade”

By David Bandurski — Two research collections recently published by the China Media Project were among 44 books selected to the celebrity recommendation list at this month’s 2009 Hong Kong Book Fair. Local books on this prestigious list are compiled on the basis of recommendations by 34 Hong Kong celebrities, who also offer reviews of one or more books on the list.
Chinese Media and Political Reform (中國傳媒與政治改革), written by CMP director Qian Gang, was published in August 2008, while A Record of Change in China’s Media (中國傳媒風云錄), co-edited by Qian Gang and Ying Chan, director of the Journalism and Media Studies Centre, was released last fall.

[ABOVE: CMP co-directors Qian Gang and Ying Chan make an appearance with China Media Project book selections at this year’s Hong Kong Book Fair.]

Also on the celebrity recommendation list was Gravestone (墓碑), a book on mass starvation in China in the 1950s and 1960s written by CMP visiting fellow Yang Jisheng.
Yang visited Hong Kong several times on CMP fellowships while conducting research for his book. Yang was also one of the speakers for the China Media Forum, hosted by the China Media Project in October 2007.
[Posted by David Bandurski, July 31, 2009, 9:50am U.S. Eastern Standard Time]

By Qian Gang — A winter, bleak and gloomy, seems to be upon us. On July 14, Beijing Gongmeng Information LLC (hereafter referred to as “Gongmeng”), a non-governmental organization formed by a group of prominent Chinese lawyers, and registered as a private company, was fined 1.42 million yuan by tax authorities. Soon after, the Ministry of Civil Affairs banned the activities of Gongmeng’s research center.
I wrote in my last piece about how Chinese officials are rashly resorting to the use of the political catchphrase “stability is the overriding priority.” But there are other more palpable signs, like the troubles facing Gongmeng, suggesting the political environment in China is growing more tense.
Chinese media have been unable to speak at all on the Gongmeng affair, and this is an icy silence indeed. Aside from a brief report in Guangzhou’s Southern Weekend, we had only two blog entries on the issue. These were re-run by the Rural Issues Online site (三农在线). One of the bloggers was Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), an expert researching contemporary social conflict in China. He hit the nail on the head when he wrote: “The difficulties facing Gongmeng are a tragedy for our entire society.”

[ABOVE: Chinese lawyer Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Gongmeng’s legal representative. Xu has tried numerous rights defense cases. This picture was taken on June 9, 2004, in a petitioner’s village in Beijing. Xu’s blog may be found HERE.]

Gongmeng’s fate is rooted in the nature of its emergence and identity. It is a corporation in name, but in fact works as a non-governmental organization (NGO) that does legal assistance work. The organization represented the plaintiffs in China’s poisoned milk scandal, and was involved in the case of Deng Yujiao (邓玉娇), the waitress who stabbed a local official, as well as the Yang Jia (杨佳) case. Why did it not register as a social organization? Because registering as a social organization is much more difficult than setting up a private enterprise.
China’s constitution states that citizens enjoy freedom of association [Chapter II, Article 35], but has this freedom ever been realized? Registering social organizations requires association with a “sponsoring unit” approved by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and there is a further requirement that “there is no social organization with the same or similar scope of operation within the same jurisdiction.” If you don’t wish to be “yamen-ized” (衙门化), or co-opted into the bureaucracy, then your only alternative is to commercialize. But once you have taken this route, you fall into the snare of taxation authorities, opening yourself up to fraud charges.
There have been many guesses as to the precise reasons for Gongmeng’s troubles. I don’t wish to add my own speculation here. But we should pay close attention as this situation unfolds, observing the potentially serious political signs emerging from the Gongmeng story.
It is no secret that China’s political reform process has long been hamstrung. Still, it is not entirely accurate to say that the Chinese Communist Party is utterly indifferent to political reform. CCP political theorists have long expended effort to carve out what they see as the safest and most reliable proposals for Chinese political reform. More recently, they have publicized a “60 year schedule,” counting from 1980, that has China establishing democratic politics (民主政治) by 2040. [See Gongjian (攻坚), pg. 45, by Zhou Tianyong (周天勇)、Wang Changjiang (王长江) and Wang Anling (王安岭)].
This “democratic politics” would of course come with the precondition that the CCP’s leadership position be preserved, that the party would maintain control over official appointments (党管干部), over the military (党管军队) and the media (党管新闻). This means that even according to the most progressive political reform plan party theorists can muster, China will still not have general elections, a private-sector military or freedom of speech in 30 year’s time.
But the CCP has planned to “test the waters” (试水) in two areas in particular — the first is “civil society,” or minjian (民间), the second is religion. The party has talked about “bringing into play the active role of civil society organizations and religion” (发挥民间组织和宗教的积极作用), creating a “modern civil society” by 2020 (形成现代的公民社会). It was a positive sign for NGOs like Gongmeng that the party should venture language like this.
In fact, mainland China had quite a lively civil society during the Republican Era. But in the half century since the CCP came to power in 1949, the nation has been under the party’s comprehensive control, and socialism has made space only for the “ism” and has left “society” out in the cold. Since the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, the term “civil society” (公民社会) has appeared more regularly in China’s media.
An active civil society is an indispensable median zone between the government and the public. It plays a positive role in promoting information sharing, reducing conflict and encouraging people to be good citizens. Whether in Taiwan or Hong Kong, a civil society is an absolutely necessary factor in the process of social development. After the earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, the government recognized the tremendous potential of NGOs and volunteers.
I accept the argument for gradual political reform. The CCP bears substantial historical burdens, and citizens must become more mature and engaged, and if political reform leapt straight to core changes to the system, this might be too hasty. Working toward the development of civil society, and protecting the basic rights of citizens, might be an effective way to move forward in a steady manner. But senior leaders in the CCP remain coy about civil society development. The term “civil society” is not a sensitive one in China, and party theorists have generally treated it as a positive factor, and sometimes even actively advocated it. Strangely, though, party leaders have never used the term in speeches or official documents.
If NGOs are cravenly obedient, they might continue in China without incident. But if, like Gongmeng, they work determinedly toward democracy, rule of law and social justice, making their presence felt in major legal cases, they will find opposition from the authorities.
Steadily through the years news has emerged from the mainland about NGOs being harassed and shut down. They have pressed ahead through a political minefield, one terrible explosion following another. In this sense, actions against NGOs have been unexceptional occurrences. But the Gongmeng affair has andcome at time when we are again hearing language from the leadership about stability being the overriding priority, and we must therefore pay close attention.
It is chilling indeed to see an NGO to be targeted in such a way. The party now seems to regard even the most moderate forces of change as a scourge on its leadership. And the only explanation for this can be that hardline, extreme elements within the party are making their influence felt. These are dangerous signs!
[Translated by David Bandurski]

By David Bandurski — Not so long ago, the suppression of any and all information about mass incidents in China was a matter of virtual certainty. But Chinese officials have surprised over the past year. They have often been right on top of strikes, riots and opinion storms. And crisis management has been, at least on the surface, more about press conferences and press releases, and less about police muscle.
At CMP, we have used the term Control 2.0 to talk about an emerging new order of information management and control in China, something more nuanced and clever, and something altogether more Hu Jintao.
But the government’s handling of the recent situation in Shishou, Hubei province, raises serious questions about whether Hu Jintao’s policy of first reporting is actually drawing support among the leadership.
There were more explicit rumblings of Control 2.0 in early 2007, when Hu talked about “using” the Internet more actively to more effectively achieve “guidance of public opinion.” But in June 2008, when Hu spoke in a pivotal address at People’s Daily of a “new pattern of public opinion guidance” for the information age, the framework of Control 2.0 was more clearly drawn [MORE on “guidance” and “channeling”].
Hu’s policy of “grabbing the initiative” in news coverage of sudden-breaking events, including mass incidents, has been stretching its wings ever since the riots in Weng’an, Guizhou province, one year ago. We have had since then: Menglian in Yunnan (孟连事件), Longnan in Gansu (甘肃陇南), Jishou in Hunan (湖南吉首非法集资事件), taxi strikes in a number of areas, a primitive armed conflict in Dongfang, Hainan (海南东方械斗事件), and incidents in Ningxia’s Haiyuan (海南东方械斗事件) and Jiangxi’s Nankang (江西南康事件).
In all of these cases, we have seen must faster response on the part of the government, which has moved to release limited information quickly through official media, such as Xinhua News Agency. Is this openness? Or as a correspondent of the Telegraph recently asked: “Is this because media restrictions have been lifted, allowing news of riots to spread . . . ?”
No. And a thousand times, no.
For news stories that are especially sensitive politically — like that surrounding the verdict in the Yang Jia case, the corruption case against former Shanxi governor Yu Youjun (于幼军), and the more recent corruption case against Shenzhen mayor Xu Zongheng (许宗衡) — media controls are as strict, or stricter, than ever. And controls are also more nuanced than ever. Many so-called “negative reports” are handled by limiting coverage, even at People’s Daily and CCTV, to news bulletin style releases from Xinhua News Agency, and in-depth reporting is strictly controlled.
Media controls this year are tighter even than in 2008, owing especially to the 20th anniversary of June 4 and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the P.R.C.
So we have to see these overtures of “transparency” within the context of tightening control.
To understand what kind of “transparency” we are looking at, in fact, we would do well to return to the words of Jiang Zemin, the policy author of “guidance of public opinion,” on that very subject. It was Jiang Zemin who said after June 4, 1989: “There are things that should be transparent, or must be transparent; there other things that cannot be made transparent right away; then there are those things that must not be made transparent.”
Is that clear?
The difference with Control 2.0 is that the party is moving from a defensive position, as passive controllers and censors, to a more active position. That is to say, they are now on the offensive.
Control 2.0 is control that makes a shrewdly realistic assessment of China’s new information environment — the result of the Internet, predominantly — and recognizes there are some events that cannot be entirely controlled. So the core of Control 2.0 is reporting at the first possible moment those news events that cannot be concealed, getting the government’s official explanation and version of the facts out first. This preempts other media, including international media.
By getting the information out, officials can get the “peripheral media” (especially influential portal news sites, but also commercial newspapers) to work for them. These media feed off of the original Xinhua reports, amplifying their effect. Those same reports, with only slight permutations in many cases, become AFP, Reuters and AP reports. Finally, using those methods that create the smallest stir, you kill the information it is most critical to keep under wraps, keeping rabble-rousing professional media away, and punishing those media that “don’t listen.”
BUT. In the recent Shishou incident, Xinhua News Agency did not report the news at the first available moment, and it was five days before Hubei provincial leaders relayed the news that “the incident had been calmed.”
This handling of the incident has drawn some criticism from the same official media, including People’s Daily, that have been drumming home Hu’s point about “taking the initiative” in news reporting, the Control 2.0 mantra. People’s Daily wrote back on June 25 that:

Weng’an was a seminal moment for the government’s new approach to information control and the handling of important news events. Guizhou’s top leader, Shi Zongyuan (石宗源), said during this year’s meeting of the National People’s Congress that a policy of information transparency had been the key to calming down the crisis at Weng’an.
As in the case of Weng’an, the Shishou mass incident originated with a death under suspicious circumstances, in which the explanation provided by police did not satisfy the family members of the victim and the general public.
The problem was that the authorities did not work fast or effective enough in getting out “the government’s point of view.” Meanwhile, posts in Internet forums multiplied.

The People’s Daily piece concluded by repeating Hu Jintao’s gospel of media control:

In the age of the Web, everyone can potentially be a source of information and a wellspring of opinion. It is as though everyone has a microphone before them. This has raised the bar on the need for public opinion channeling. Faced with sudden-breaking issues, it is not sufficient for the government and mainstream [official] media to release information. They must also move quickly to understand the pulse of new information emerging on the Internet, reacting quickly to public doubts. This requires that governments, and especially propaganda offices, be equipped with the ability to rapidly and accurately compile and analyze public opinion.

Now we are hearing from media insiders that orders have come down from the propaganda department telling news media not to report critically on the handling of the Shishou incident.
Is it possible that the Shishou incident signals the weakness of Hu Jintao’s bold new media control strategy, a reticence at even the highest levels about the wisdom of opening things up at all — even when the ultimate objective is control?
The response to Shishou, and the reversion to traditional information control tactics in its aftermath, could suggest a reassertion of the old “guidance.”
We’ll have to keep watching.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 29, 2009, 8:09pm HK]

By David Bandurski — There is plenty of discussion in the West about whether the international response to Iran’s election crisis has been strong enough. But the Guangming Daily newspaper, published by China’s Central Propaganda Department, pressed the point yesterday that “Western factors” have been working nefariously behind the scenes to capitalize on a sensitive political situation.
The newspaper said that one important reason the “election crisis” in Iran was becoming “more and more serious” was that “Western forces” were “adding fuel to the fire.”
The article argues that the demonstrations contesting the election results would not have happened at all had Western governments not offered “outside support.”

“It can be said, only with outside ‘support’ would the ‘reform party’ dare to challenge Khamanei and the power of the government.”

After briefly summarizing the pressure applied by Western leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the article enumerates, without a hint of skepticism, all of the charges Iran has leveled against the West, such as the use of special agents and the coordinating of “propaganda” efforts through the BBC and CNN.

[ABOVE: Yesterday’s edition of Guangming Daily discusses Western “interference” in Iran’s internal affairs.]

The article’s author, Li Jiabin (李佳彬), has written a number of such articles in recent days. Li wrote on June 23 that the U.S. government had “demanded that the operator of the Twitter service cooperate with the activities of Iran’s opposition party.” Surely, the newspaper means to say that the U.S. State Department requested that Twitter postpone a scheduled maintenance.
Portions of yesterday’s Guangming Daily article follow:

In addition, they [the Western forces] arranged for intelligence agents and anti-government organizations to “cause trouble and disorder.” Iranian security officials said on June 20 that they had arrested a large numbers of members of Mujahideen militia groups. Those arrested have already admitted that they were trained at in Iraq run by the American military, tasked with sowing chaos after the elections in Iran. Meanwhile, in Britain, there are still Mujahideen command centers which control there movements within Iran. Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said on the 21st that Britain had begun sending large numbers of intelligence agents to Iran ahead of the presidential election, brazenly interfering in the internal politics of Iran. At the same time, he warned France against interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. On June 22, Iran’s foreign ministry called together ambassadors from Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other nations and issued a note of protest, demanding that these countries respect Iran’s election results and cease participation in hostile propaganda and other activities toward Iran. While these nations have denied “meddling” in Iran’s election, it is a widely known secret that Western intelligence agents have long participated in activities to subvert the Iranian regime.
Thirdly, [the West] has used its media and the Internet to foment unrest. After the election crisis occurred, the Western media filled the headlines with coverage of the situation in Iran. CNN, for example, repeatedly interrupted its regular news programming to do several hours of continuous live coverage of demonstrations by Iran’s opposition party. On June 20, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said that in recent news reports on the Iranian elections, Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation had taken on the role of mouthpieces for the United States and Britain and command centers for inciting unrest in Iran with the objective of driving a wedge of separatism among the Iranian people.
At the same time, the Internet became a new platform for the Western media. Even as Iran’s government temporarily suspended mobile phone and Internet services, Western media continued to use Websites or real-time communication tools to obtain photos and video of the protests and demonstrations . . . Western hackers were also active, attacking the computer systems of the Iranian government and the foreign ministry and Websites supportive of President Ahmadinejad.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 25, 2009, 8:55am HK]

By David Bandurski — Have you ever wondered why China persists with a one-party political system? Have you ever scratched your head over why China refuses to check the concentration of political power by separating the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government? Well, my friends, perhaps you’ll find resolution in China’s latest brand of ideological infant formula.
We introduce to you . . . the “Six Why’s.” That’s right, Hu Jintao and his army of CCP theorists have worked out a simple political primer for us all, a kind of FAQ of market-Leninism.
The “Six Why’s,” which could be read as an indirect response to the 20th anniversary of the 1989 student movement, and perhaps the CCP’s answer to Charter 08 and the published journals of former premier Zhao Ziyang, seek to answer basic political questions like, “Why should Marxism be our guiding ideology?”
Launched with great party media fanfare back on June 5, they have gotten precious little attention in the Western media. Why? Most likely because the “Six Why’s” formula, for all of its cozy paternalism, is still mostly an impenetrable mess of dogma.
A comparatively brief summary of the “Six Why’s” can be found at the CCTV International website.
We encourage those readers who have strong Chinese reading ability, a great deal of spare time, and the monumental patience it takes to read official Communist Party twaddle to click into the commentary links provided after each summary point — essays like, “We cannot accept ideological pluralism,” “Cleaving to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” or, “Our nation must not practice privatization.”
In any case, the “Six Why’s” are an important formulation of ideology within the CCP, and for this reason we should pay them ample attention. Books, apparently, have already hit the shelves.
Brief translations of one formulation of the “Six Why’s” (from the CCTV International site) follow:

1. Why must we uphold the guiding role of Marxism in the realm of ideology?
The guiding role of Marxism in China has not been decided by any certain person or by the will of one party, rather it is a choice and circumstance of history, and a choice rendered by the people. Our country’s process of revolution, building and reform has thoroughly shown that without Marxism there would be no new China; without Marxism and its renewed development in China, there would be no Socialism with Chinese characteristics. In these times, the struggle and competition for overall national strength grows fiercer by the day, hostile forces in the West refuse to stomach our nation’s development and strengthening, and as they have never ceased to carry out a strategy of “Westernization” toward us, and a conspiracy of “separatism” . . . In these serious international circumstances, if we were to give up the guiding role of Marxism in the sphere of ideology and pursue a path of pluralistic guiding ideologies, this would mean ensnaring ourselves and tearing down our own defenses [lit: “tear down the Great Wall on our own”].
2. Why is it that only socialism can save China, that only socialism with Chinese characteristics can develop China, and why can’t we take the path of democratic socialism and capitalism?
Socialism with Chinese characteristics is not the old path of being closed up and rigid, nor is it the old wicked socialism under a new banner. It is a socialism marked by a determination to seek reform, a striving toward development, perseverance on the path of openness, putting the people first and promoting harmony . . . Over the last 30 years, it has been socialism with Chinese characteristics that has propelled the Chinese people toward modernization, moved them closer to the world and into the future, successfully achieving the transition from a highly centralized planned economic model to a socialist market economy full of energy and vitality.
3. Why must we continue with the system of people’s congresses, and why can’t we practice “separation of powers”?
The history of many countries in the world teaches us that in developing democracy we can only take our own paths. If we depart from the facts and circumstances of our own country, if we disregard the objective demands of social and economic development, if we blindly copy the systems of other nations, not only will we not achieve the peoples’ hopes of developing democracy, we will damage their interests and for the development of the economy and society, or even court disaster.
4. Why must we persist in the system of cooperation and consultation of various parties with the CCP, and why can we not the Western multi-party system?
Political parties are the engines of politics in the vast majority of countries in the world today, and they have an important role in political life. Employing a political party system that suits the circumstances and features of a nation, and which accommodates its state of social development, is an important precondition of that nation’s development and progress. The system of cooperation and consultation of the CCP with various political parties is a great creation in which our party combined Marxist theories of political parties with the theory of the united front as suited realities in China . . . The system is a historical necessity, and it is both greatly original and highly superior.
5. Why must we persist in a public ownership system in which various types of economic ownership systems co-exist? Why can’t we carry out privatization or a “more pure” form of public ownership?
Persisting in a system of public ownership is a demand and special characteristic of our nation’s socialist economic system, and it meets with the needs and special features of the operation of our national economy. Ours is a populous nation with a weak economic basis and very unequal development. The hardships facing us in our task of advancing economic reforms and socialist modernization are of a seriousness such as the world has never before seen. If the socialist system of public ownership is overturned and we pursue privatization, then the socialist system will no longer exist, and we will then forfeit our basis for leading the people through various obstacles and challenges, for liberating and developing productive forces, and for moving toward common prosperity.
6. Why must we persist in our economic reform policies? Why can’t we turn back?
Economic reform and opening is a necessary historical choice. Our experience has shown that the path and direction of economic reform is entirely correct. The past, present and future of economic reforms lie in the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and in the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 19, 2009, 1:25pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Most news coverage so far of China’s “Green Dam” censorware controversy has dialed the timeline as far back as April 8, 2009. It was on that day that four government departments, including the Ministry of Education, ordered that computers at all primary schools across the country be installed with the so-called “Green Dam – Youth Escort” software to protect China’s youth from harmful content. [Frontpage photo by “Prescott” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The controversy over “Green Dam” may have blown up in just the last week, but coverage of the software itself can in fact be traced back months earlier, to a piece appearing in Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily on January 14, 2009. Though the “Green Dam” software is not the focus of the news report, the story does raise some interesting questions about how the software was conceived and promoted.
The Southern Metropolis Daily article, run on page A32 that day, deals with a January 2009 government campaign against so-called indecent Web columns and content.
By all accounts, the campaign was an aggressive one, resulting in the shutdown and purging of many Web columns and chat forums. But the chief driver behind that campaign was not, in fact, the government — not directly, anyway.
While the government was most certainly calling the shots, the ostensibly non-government Internet Society of China (ISC) was actually wielding the truncheon, beating down Web offerings that were “indecent” or otherwise illegal (Read also: politically and/or socially sensitive).
As I noted in the Far Eastern Economic Review a year and a half ago, organizations like the ISC are now strange animals operating as proxy arms of China’s information control structure. On the surface, they are “civic organizations,” stacked with “voluntary” members like Microsoft, Nokia, Ericsson and others. Behind the scenes — as can only be expected — government officials are pushing larger agendas.
In the December 2007 FEER report, I focused on the Beijing Association of Online Media (BAOM) and its team of content violation informants.
Despite its public face as a professional association with “voluntary” membership from leading Internet companies (including Microsoft China, Baidu, Sina, Sohu, Alibaba, Bokee, Siemens Communication Networks Beijing), ISC clearly (like BAOM) has an enforcement arm too. It is called the Illegal and Indecent Internet Information Informing Center (违法和不良信息举报中心), and Websites took its orders very seriously back in January.
Southern Metropolis Daily wrote:

This reporter noticed that after [the release of] the Informing Center’s report [on content violations], the vast majority of sites shut down whatever was highlighted [by the Informing Center], and they responded quickly. Just like the Cat898 Forum (凯迪社区), for example, Kugou.com closed down its Dong Zhang Xi Wang (东张西望) section, which had been accused of running many vulgar images, at the first available moment yesterday.
This special campaign is no longer limited to those sites named [by the Informing Center]. Many sites not singled out have begun on their own to clean up [their content] and raise the bar on Web postings.

Further down in the article, the “Green Dam – Youth Escort” software emerges, months before its shameful international debut.
Interestingly, the software is mentioned as part of the ISC-led campaign against “vulgar” content. Here is that portion, which is set off with a subtitle that reads: “A green web-surfing software program bought with a pricetag of 41.7 million yuan.”

Aside from exposing [a list of] sites that contain vulgar content, and shutting down illegal and violating websites, the promotion of a green web-surfing software program has also become an important part of this special clean-up campaign.
The Internet Society of China released an urgent notice yesterday demanding that member companies “organize and carry out Internet clean-up campaign work for self-discipline against vulgar content.” That notice says that aside from implementing rigorous self-checks on Website content and cutting off the transmission of vulgar content at its source, [companies] must also take effective preventive measures from client-side computers (从电脑终端上有效防范).
The notice in particular introduced a software program called “Green Dam – Youth Escort”, and ordered that “the Websites of member companies actively provide free downloads and upgrades of this software, or build links with official websites for this software.” This means that most well-trafficked Websites in China, including a few publicly-listed portal sites, will be required to provide downloads of this software.

The January ISC notice plugging “Green Dam” is real. It took a bit of work to dig it out of the Chinese side of the ISC Website, which does not offer a search function, but it is right there where Southern Metropolis Daily said it would be, on January 13, 2009.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of January 13, 2009, notice from the Internet Society of China ordering all members to promote the “Green Dam” software.]

Such an order from the Internet Society of China poses some very troubling questions, particularly now as we are hearing about the alleged use in the “Green Dam” software of proprietary data from a U.S. company.
Information Week wrote yesterday that the IP issue with “Green Dam” could pose legal problems for manufacturers complying with China’s order that the software be installed in all computers.
But what are the possible legal implications for foreign companies and, say, Nasdaq-listed companies who, as a condition of doing business in China, are ISC members and are ordered by this quasi-government “professional association” to promote and even offer downloads of this problematic software?
This just keeps getting messier and messier.
Any professional association in China has to have a government chaperone, or “unit in charge” (业务主管单位). And as long as we are connecting the dots here, it might interest readers to know which government agency is backing up the Internet Society of China.
That’s right, folks. It is the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工业和信息化部), the government agency that started this whole mess in the first place.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 16, 2009, 3:37pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Last week at CMP, we began our countdown to the one-year anniversary of President Hu Jintao’s bold re-working of China’s media control and propaganda system with a speech by Jiangxi’s top party leader, Su Rong. This week we turn to another article in official party media that helps to clarify Hu’s much misunderstood policy, which combines traditional media controls with the active “channeling” of public opinion.
The article, “International Commentary in the Context of Globalization: Forestalling Opponents by a Show of Strength, Actively Channeling [Public Opinion]” (全球化背景下的国际评论:先声夺人主动引导), appears in the most recent issue of China Journalist (中国记者), a key official journal dealing with press policy.
The authors are Chen Hegao (陈鹤高) and Qi Zijian (齐紫剑), both journalists with China’s official Xinhua News Agency.
Chen and Qi give readers an inside picture of how changes in style and outlook at Chinese state media are linked directly to Hu Jintao’s press policy — and DO NOT necessarily signal more openness or the breaking of taboos.
They describe their task as commentary writers for Xinhua’s new international commentary section in the context of a global struggle for public opinion pitting China against the West. They talk about the need to serve the party and adhere to “correct guidance of public opinion,” and at the same about the need to “take into account the varying value judgements” of both foreign and domestic audiences in order to achieve the greatest impact.
Chen and Qi clearly spell out the policy of targeting propaganda products for different audiences, with differing standards and approaches for Chinese and foreign readers.
A partial translation of the China Journalist piece follows. It should perhaps be taken as a reference next time Xinhua, China Daily or the English edition of the Global Times surprise us with ostensibly “open” coverage:

In 2008, a series of major events happened internationally, and in the complex international struggle for public opinion, Xinhua News Agency pioneered its “Xinhua International Commentary” section (新华国际时评). Over the past year, “Xinhua International Commentary” has offered timely and in-depth commentary on major international events and matters that touch on our interests, and it has wielded rather substantial influence.
Experience has shown that the strengthening of international commentary work at Xinhua News Agency has been extremely critical in facing a complex international public opinion environment, increasing the influence of international news reports and gradually reversing the state of a “strong West and a weak China” in the international competition for public opinion.
The Need for Channeling, Influencing Public Opinion
Wide-reaching and radical changes are now happening in our world, and the public opinion environments at home and overseas are incredibly complex. On the one hand, along with China’s development and strengthening and its growing position internationally, China has an ever greater influence and function in international affairs, and the international community urgently hopes to have a timely grasp and understanding of China’s policy positions on a range of major international questions. On the other hand, hostile forces in the West have never turned from their conspiracies to “Westernize” and divide China. A number of Western media have added fuel to the fire, ramping up negative reports about Chinese issues with the intent of blackening China’s image.
Facing the complex public opinion environment arising from these new circumstances, Xinhua News Agency must further strengthen its international commentary work, planning and arranging [commentary on] general [strategic] interests both domestically and internationally, actively reflecting the policy position of our national government on major international political, economic and social issues and other issues of urgency.
Over and against negative public opinion in the West that twists China’s image, we must express our viewpoints in a timely manner, setting the facts straight and refuting fallacies in order to ensure a right understanding of the facts. We must enhance correct channeling of public opinion domestically, and actively influence the directedness and effectiveness of international public opinion [in China’s interests].
[The writers say Xinhua News Agency commentaries have generally speaking had a strong impact over recent decades.]
Since the “Xinhua International Commentary” section was launched in 2008, we have focused on general [strategic] interests both domestically and internationally, actively sought avenues for continued development, and worked hard to achieve [at least] one commentary per day, putting out Xinhua News Agency’s voice on major questions, expressing China’s viewpoint, keeping hard to the inside track of the public opinion struggle, using our discourse power (话语权) effectively on critical international questions.
The “Xinhua International Commentary” section has released more than 100 editorials [since its launch], including on the March 14, 2008, riots in Lhasa, the international leg of the Olympic torch relay, the Wenchuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games, the American financial crisis and on international issus making the headlines. Some of these editorials have been released with foreign language translations, or even written directly in foreign languages. Some of these commentaries have clarified the facts, denouncing such fallacies as support for “Tibetan independence.” Some commentaries extolled the spirit of international humanitarianism and the spirit of the Olympic Games. Others set forth our country’s policy positions on important international issues. These international commentaries were widely used by media both domestically and internationally, so that the influence of international reports from Xinhua News Agency
is further expanding.
This year, the “Xinhua International Commentary” section has further strengthened the intensity of its commentary, expressing China’s position in a timely and accurate manner on major international incidents, and incidents concerning China’s interests.
At noon, Beijing time, February 14, 2009, the U.S. Congress passed a 787 billion dollar economic stimulus plan, which included a “Buy America” clause that smacked clearly of trade protectionism. This [clause] posed a serious challenge to pushing the global economy out of the doldrums as early as possible, and it also would have had a profoundly negative impact on developing nations. That night, our editorial desk [at Xinhua News Agency] released [a commentary called], “Trade Protectionism is ‘Toxic’ as We Face the Financial Crisis.” The Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France-Presse made substantial and objective use of the commentary, and re-printings and references appeared also in the International Herald Tribune, the Wall Steet Journal, England’s Guardian newspaper, the Financial Times, on the BBC website, and in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post.
When an international controversy raged over the auctioning off of treasures stolen from the Summer Palace [in Beijing], our editorial desk released, “It is Sad and Absurd to Hold Cultural Artifacts Ransom for ‘Human Rights’!” (用“人权”绑架文物，荒唐、可悲！). The commentary was used by 96 media domestically. When the U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament passed resolutions on the Tibet issue, [Xinhua] immediately released several commentaries expressing China’s standpoint, including “Tibet Resolutions Confuse Black and White,” and “A Portion of European Parliament Reps Suffer from Amnesia and Ignorance.”
Principles in Strengthening the Work of International Commentary
Modern China’s relationship with the world is now going through historic changes. Under the influence of economic globalization in particular, China’s hot-button issues and the world’s are now mutual and interwoven. Editorial staffers dealing with international news must broaden their vision and expand their range of criticism, seizing on critical domestic issues on which international public opinion is focused, and writing relevant commentaries [on these issues, from China’s own standpoint]. With the correct lines, principles and policies of the Communist Party and the policy positions of the government as the guide, we must deploy international commentaries on major emerging international incidents, critical issues, and matters touching on China. We must make rapid and timely responses to meet negative public opinion in the West that misrepresents China, as suits the needs of our nation’s major foreign relations struggles.
1. International commentary must strictly uphold correct guidance of public opinion
Taking a clear stand [for the party] in commentaries is the most direct form and method for correctly channeling domestic opinion and effectively influencing international public opinion.
Even though our international commentaries are not equivalent to statements or policy declarations from the government on key questions, the spirit of our ideas as they emerge in our reports on major international questions and problems concerning China must remain entirely consonant with the spirit of the CCP Central Committee and the policy positions of the government.
When writing international commentaries, editorial personnel must put correct guidance of public opinion first throughout, making no deviation whatsoever. In order to accomplish this, editorial personnel must earnestly study the spirit of the 17th Party Congress, they must earnestly study the language of party and national leaders on the domestic and international situation and key questions . . .
[Personnel should study party work reports, dialogues with foreign ministry spokespeople, etc.] . . . From this, they must strengthen their political sensitivity and power of dicrimination, maintaining proper control of their commentary writing on important, sensitive and current issues, ensuring international commentaries uphold correct guidance of public opinion.
2. International commentaries must prioritize timeliness, speaking with an authoritive voice as soon as possible on major international questions and critical issues.
International news personnel must grasp the initiative in the international struggle for public opinion (把握国际舆论斗争的主动权) on major international questions and critical issues, forestalling their opponents by a show of strength (先声夺人). China is a responsible and influential nation in the world. After major international incidents occur, the international community looks especially to reports from China’s national newswires and other central-level media in order to understand the policy position of the Chinese government. This presents the finest opportunity for Xinhua News Agency’s international commentary section to exert its influence, and this [opportunity] must be used to full effect . . . When sudden-breaking news events occur, we must do our utmost to ensure relevant commentaries are out within 24 hours, so that Xinhua News Agency’s voice can be heard on all on major international questions and critical issues.
3. Commentaries must be written according to various audiences, with differentiation between domestic and outside (内外有别).
Our audience for international commentaries consists mostly of foreigners. Whether we are describing our [country’s] policy position on major events or questions, or refuting certain incorrect trends of thought or opinion internationally, we must take into account the varying value judgements, political attitudes, religious beliefs, modes of thinking and reading habits of domestic and foreign audiences when we write international commentaries, being artful and strategic in our commentary writing. We must be objective, truthful and clever in expressing our viewpoints, making our reports as convincing as possible. Against negative public opinion in the West, and against the slander and personal attacks from anti-Chinese forces internationally, we must argue our case well, convincing others by our reasoning. Particularly, we must use news facts and news background that are accurate, not giving any cause to find fault.
Facing different incidents and problems, facing different audiences domestically and overseas, we can utilize different styles of commentary writing, raising the level of intimacy, attraction and vitality [of content for various target readers].
There is no demand that international commentary “speak with a rigid face” [NOTE: this is a reference to the stiffness that prevails generally in party politics in China]. Rather, we need to work hard to speak the essentials, make our topic clear, keep our logic tight and be lively and engaging . . .
[Talks briefly about the effectiveness of engaging and personal stories in addressing the international uproar during the international leg of the Olympic torch relay, and following the Sichuan earthquake.]
Changing and Renewing the Mindset of International Commentary Work
The reform of international commentary is faced with a complex public opinion environment, and international commentary work at Xinhua News Agency must be reformed and renewed. As we write international commentaries we must strictly adhere to correct guidance of public opinion, we must enhance the intimacy, attraction and vitality [of our commentaries], and we must at the same time strengthen the aim and actual effect of public opinion channeling . . .
How do we resolve the difficulty of maintaining [a party] tone in writing international commentary? Ensuring that international commentaries at Xinhua News Agency abide by correct guidance of public opinion involves at least the following aspects:
Maintaining consonance with the standpoint of the party and government; The ability to adequately handle the relationship between the news and foreign relations, actively accommodating our [nation’s] foreign relations work, in order to benefit the projection of a peaceful, cooperative, open and progressive international image; The ability to observe, understand and explain world affairs according to a Marxist world view and methodology, helping the audience achieve a correct understanding and vision of deep and complex changes in the world; The [current official] saying, “Help, don’t add to the chaos” (帮忙而不添乱) is the most basic expectation of international commentary work. The principal reason for the poor grasp of some international commentaries is the failure to maintain tonal consonance with our [nation’s] policy positions, [the failure to] adequately abide by correct guidance [of public opinion] . . .
Critical to strengthening international commentary work is the building of international commentary teams that are devoted to their work and are politically alert [to party policies and propaganda discipline].

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 15, 2009, 10:58pm HK]

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By David Bandurski — In this year of sensitive anniversaries in China, there is one anniversary that perhaps will not seem obvious to many. June 20 marks the one-year anniversary of President Hu Jintao’s bold new vision for China’s media and its propaganda function in the 21st century.
On June 20, 2008, Hu Jintao delivered his first speech since taking office in 2002 to deal comprehensively with PRC news media and their role in China and the world. In the year since Hu made this “important speech” (重要讲话) to propaganda leaders, its policy implications have become somewhat clearer, and at the China Media Project we have labeled this new regime of information control tactics “Control 2.0.”
Control 2.0 is still evolving, of course, but at its core is the idea that Communist Party leaders must “use” media more artfully and actively to drive the agenda.

[ABOVE: Front page of June 8 Jiangxi Daily covers the provincial party secretary’s speech about propaganda in the “new era.” See below for details.]

By the middle of last year, even before Hu’s speech, Chinese media professionals, particularly at Internet portals, were telling CMP that there was a much stronger push by party leaders not just to discipline and control them, but to “use” them.
In the age of Control 2.0 — in the face of new information technologies — it is no longer sufficient for party leaders to stopper information through traditional press control tactics (propaganda orders, disciplining of journalists, etc.). They must also push the party’s own agendas by making use of the Internet and China’s new generation of commercialized media.
Invoking the post-June 4th buzzword for media controls, Hu Jintao referred to this media policy as a “new pattern of public opinion guidance.”
Part of this policy is a first-strike mentality being pushed at central party media and English media such as China Daily, the idea that official versions of the story should be hustled out quickly to take the wind out of the sails of “Western media” and drive the agenda early on.
Reported by foreign news media, these strike-first reports have been mistaken repeatedly for more positive and fundamental changes to media policy in China. That may make for a decent story hook, but the thesis is not borne out by other signs in the media terrain.
The advent of Control 2.0 can also be seen in the reworking of the relationships between various party media control terminologies. As we have said repeatedly in our analyses, the primary term in the media control lexicon since June 4, 1989, has been “guidance of public opinion,” or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向).
“Guidance of public opinion” links the complex business of press censorship together with the overarching priorities of economic and political stability, and it still encompasses the larger notion of media CONTROL.
Insofar as media control remains the top priority, “guidance” is still supreme. But a new phrase, superficially similar, seems to be on the rise: “Public opinion channeling”, or yulun yindao (舆论引导).
Some media scholars in China, including former CMP fellow Zhan Jiang, have noted a terminology transition since Hu Jintao’s June 2008 speech from public opinion “guidance” to public opinion “channeling.” Zhan has further suggested, if I understand his point properly, that this might mark a softening of approach on the party’s part.
In our estimation, however, this terminology shift reflects only the new focus on pushing and amplifying party messages and agendas, and does not suggest a diminishing interest in “guidance.” “Channeling,” in other words, is a modification that complements more traditional controls to meet the challenges of propaganda work in the 21st century.
We will have to keep our eyes on these terminologies, but it seems they should probably be used simultaneously rather than interchangeably.
In concert, “guidance” and “channeling” may reflect Hu Jintao’s two-pronged approach to propaganda work. The former is all about CONTROL, which is still at the heart of media policy, while the latter reflects the party’s renewed determination to “use” the media to actively push certain messages while others are “guided” out of existence.
These policies come to us through the murky lens of official-speak, and of course we have to puzzle out their meaning from media practice. But the way local party leaders implement and talk about them can also be very revealing.
Earlier this week, Jiangxi Daily, the official party newspaper of Jiangxi province, ran the full text of a speech to local journalists by party secretary Su Rong (苏荣) to honor Jiangxi Daily‘s 60th anniversary.
In his speech, Su Rong lays emphasis on “guidance” and “channeling”, and places both in a wider ideological context that leaves little room for the liberalization thesis that these changes signal a new openness in China’s media environment.
It’s all there. Mao Zedong’s assertion that “politicians must run the newspapers.” Deng Xiaoping’s insistence that “news work must uphold the principle of the party spirit.” The Pre-eminence of the “Marxist view of journalism.” The sharp mockery of Western “freedom of speech.” And after all of these keystones are set firmly in place, Su Rong develops Hu Jintao’s argument for the need to adapt and make propaganda savvier and more salable.
A partial, but still very hefty, translation of Su Rong’s speech follows:

Firmly Grasping Correct Guidance of Public Opinion (正确舆论导向) and Striving to Raise Our Capacity for Public Opinion Channeling (舆论引导) — Jiangxi Provincial Party Secretary Su Rong’s Speech at a Forum with News Unit Comrades
Jiangxi Daily
June 5, 2009
Comrades:
I felt both delighted and inspired this morning as I made an inspection of central party media units stationed here in Jiangxi and of principal news units from our own province. Just now, a number of comrades from various news units addressed us, and they said it well. In recent years, news workers have deployed themselves strictly around the core work and critical policies of the provincial party and government, holding firmly to correct guidance of public opinion, organizing and executing a series of important propaganda campaigns, creating a favorable public opinion environment for Jiangxi’s rise and expansion.
The mass of news workers have remained faithful to the cause of the party’s news work, cherishing their positions and devoting themselves wholeheartedly to work, contributing selflessly. In each major event, in one major incident after another, at each critical juncture, they have been tried and tested. Experience confirms that news work teams (新闻工作队伍) in our province are of strong political conviction [ie: loyal to the party], clear in their professional duties, strict in their discipline [ie: keep to propaganda discipline] and upright in character. They are reliable, full of vim and vigor, and capable of striking strong blows [for the party].
In two days we will mark 60 years since the founding of Jiangxi Daily . . . [Has done great work for the party, doing excellent propaganda, etc.] . . . Here, I represent the provincial party committee and the provincial people’s government in warmly congratulating Jiangxi Daily as it celebrates 60 years. And I express also my warm greetings and utmost respect to all the news workers of our province! At the same time, I express my earnest thanks to news workers representing central party media here in our province!
Raising our capacity for public opinion channeling is a newer and higher demand of our news work defined by President Hu Jintao under the new circumstances [of globalization, digital media, etc.]. Lately, with the interacting of different cultures and complex changes in the public opinion environment, whether or not we can effectively regulate and control the mass media and correctly channel public opinion in society, establishing dominance amid diversity (在多元中立主导) and find consensus amid diversity (在多样中谋共识), is a crucial test of propaganda and public opinion work. We must adhere throughout to solidarity, stability and positivity, emphasizing positive propaganda (正面宣传为主), improving the aim and actual effect of public opinion channeling, continually raising the public opinion channeling capacity of mainstream media [ie: party media], giving full play to news media in publicizing the party’s views, propagating a spirit of moral uprightness, tapping into social conditions and popular feeling (通达社情民意), channeling issues of immediate social concern (引导社会热点), siphoning off public emotions (疏导公众情绪).
On this, the raising of our capacity for the channeling of public opinion and doing an adequate job of news and propaganda work, I’ll just talk about a couple of points. First of all, as to raising our capacity for channeling public opinion, we must uphold the Marxist view of journalism (马克思主义新闻观) and adhere to correct guidance of public opinion — these are the preconditions and foundation of enhancing our capacity for the channeling of public opinion.
Comrade Mao Zedong once said, “In doing news work, the politicians must run the newspapers” (“搞新闻工作，要政治家办报”). Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that “news work must uphold the principle of the party spirit” (“新闻宣传必须坚持党性原则”). Comrade Jiang Zemin once pointed out: “In upholding the principle of the party spirit, we must not permit vagueness or vacillation on the part of the news media” (“在坚持党性原则上，新闻媒体不允许有任何的含糊和动摇.”).
General Secretary Hu Jintao emphasized on an inspection of People’s Daily last year: “Correct channeling of public opinion benefits the party, the nation and the people; incorrect channeling of public opinion harm the party, the nation and the people.” These important pronouncements are distinct embodiments of the essence of the Marxist view of journalism, and they are embodiments of the fundamental demands of public opinion channeling.
We know that the Marxist view of journalism is a concrete manifestation of the ideological line of dialectical and historical materialism in the news and broadcasting sector, and it is the theoretical basis for doing adequate news and propaganda work in the new century and in this new phase. Its core is that the news media must adhere to and submit to the principles of the party, adhere to the principle of serving the people and serving socialism.
The Marxist view of journalism is a beacon light for journalism in all socialist nations, and if we depart from the correct guidance offered us by the Marxist view of journalism, the Socialist journalism enterprise will lose direction and go astray . . .
The news media of our nation are the mouthpieces of the party and the government, and they possess a clear and distinctive party character. In recent years, a number of people in the West have declared that “the media are public instruments,” that they are “public information platforms,” and they hold that “China has no freedom of speech.” Media, they say, should become a “fourth estate” independent from the party and the government. Whether consciously or unconsciously, some of our comrades may have been influenced by these arguments. Actually, for news reports in the West concerning important political matters and issues bearing on their vital interests, in every case strict controls are placed on the media. During the Iraq War, America did its utmost to put into effect President Bush’s plan for a “news filter,” seeking to lessen the space available to domestic news outlets whose views might clash with the government’s, using whatever means necessary to prevent journalists from going out and reporting. They strictly prevented reporters imbedded with American troops from reporting on or providing images of troop or civilian casualties, and punished journalists and television stations in “violation.”
Last year’s Deutsche Welle case was another strong indication of the West’s control and interference with its media. Zhang Danhong (张丹红) was deputy head of the Chinese news desk at Deutsche Welle, and during one interview she objectively assessed the achievements of China’s economic reform policies and said she understood the Chinese government’s moves to block “Tibet independence” and “Falun Gong” websites. For this, she was put on indefinite suspension from Deutsche Welle. This is not all. Western media, in order to protect the vital interests of the West, routinely ignore the facts and make outright fictions when they report international news. Without a doubt, this is a mockery of the “freedom of speech” Western nations have boasted of for so long. What Western media in fact represent are the political parties and big money behind the scenes. The “freedom of speech” they talk about in Western communications studies is fundamentally nonexistent.
And so, on questions of major importance concerning our basic political system and national interest, our news media must take a firm, clear-cut stand for the Marxist view of journalism, firmly and unshakably holding to correct guidance of public opinion. There must not be any deviation [from the party line] in news and propaganda. This is especially true this year, when many major events are happening in our country, when there are many important matters. News media at various levels have a high degree of political responsibility. They must firmly grasp news and propaganda work in this sensitive period, quickly grasping trends and tendencies and sensitive issues where they are emerging . . . working hard to bring about wholesome and high-spirited mainstream public opinion throughout society. At the same time, those at the head of news media at various levels must constantly raise their political consciousness, their consciousness of the overall situation and their sense of responsibility, maintaining throughout a high-level of consonance with the central party . . .
Secondly, raising our capacity for channeling public opinion must thoroughly revolve around the core of economic and social development. Serving the overall situation [of economic and political stability and development] is ever the business of news and propaganda, and it is a critical task of news and propaganda work.
News and propaganda work must serve the expansion of economic development . . . Recently, media in and outside our province widely reported that power consumption increases in Jiangxi maintained a high level and came in highest in the country [compared with other provinces].
[Editor’s NOTE: This report is available here. Clearly written from the standpoint of Jiangxi leaders, the news lede calls the latest power consumption statistics “exciting” and ends with an exclamation point. It then goes on to quote the party secretary of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics as saying that power consumption is an important economic development indicator.]
People’s Daily ran in a prominent position the news that “Jiangxi’s industrial economy is accelerating well.” These news reports had a very good effect [on Jiangxi’s image] and echoed strongly. Henceforth, media at various levels [in our province] must cleave tightly to the core work of the provincial party and government, energetically publicizing the work of various regions and departments in thoroughly implementing the “Three Safeguards” (三保一弘扬) [of President Hu Jintao]. [Editor’s NOTE: On a visit to Jiangxi province this year, Hu Jintao addressed the global economic downturn and said that the party’s goal would be to “safeguard economic development, safeguard the people’s livelihoods and safeguard social stability.”]
[The “media must” language continues in this section. The media must “energetically praise the socialism core value system” and “sing the main theme [of the party]” etc.]
News and propaganda work must promote social harmony and stability. Development is the absolute principle, and stability is our principle task. Without a harmonious and stable social environment, we can accomplish nothing, and that which we have accomplished might be undone. Our nation’s economic development has lately entered a key phase (关键时期), and the relationships between various social interests show increasingly complexity. New situations and new problems are emerging constantly. News media at various levels must have an earnest grasp of [public opinion] channeling of urgent social issues and problems. They must actively carry out [public opinion] channeling for issues of key perennial concern to the public, such as employment, healthcare, housing, education, the stock markets, the campaign against corruption, etc., transforming extreme agitation into calmness (化过激为冷静), transforming opposition into understanding, transforming resentment into trust. Particularly in the case of sudden-breaking news and mass incidents, we must get in faster, forestalling our opponents by a show of strength (先声夺人) [NOTE: basically, “stealing the thunder”], creating strong public opinion [in our favor], quickly seizing the initiative and the power to speak authoritatively (话语权和主动权), thoroughly leveraging public opinion channeling to resolve social conflicts, settle emotions, eliminate misgivings and rally popular feeling.
Thirdly, in order to enhance our capacity for public opinion channeling, we must heed the wisdom of the ancients concerning news and propaganda: “Absent literary grace, words have neither influence nor place” (言之无文，行而不远). From the standpoint of journalism, the character for “words” in this saying points to the need for a richness of facts in news reports, but it places even greater emphasis on the relevant arts and techniques of public opinion channeling. Lenin once said: “The art of every propagandist and mobilizer lies in employing the most effective means of influencing his own listeners.” In raising our capacity to channel public opinion, we must pay particular attention to the art of propaganda, and artfully carry out propaganda. Only in this way can we attract an audience to the greatest degree possible.
To enhance our capacity for public opinion channeling we must expend effort in raising the attractiveness and infectiveness [of news products]. Our goal in conducting propaganda is to make people understand and accept [the party’s position]; if people do not understand or accept [the party’s position] then our work is done for nothing, and this is also a waste of propaganda resources. Experience teaches that only by disseminating the party and government’s voice from an angle the masses care about intimately and in a way that the masses enjoy can we better utilize the benefits of public opinion channeling.
We understand that Phoenix TV is a media very welcomed on the mainland. A market study has shown that 81.3 percent of those surveyed here in mainland China know Phoenix TV. Phoenix TV is welcomed not just because of its authoritative, in-depth and timely news content, but because of its rich and varied, fresh and lively program formats and reporting styles. If we want our news products to channel [public opinion] effectively and attract audiences, we must be clear and concise, understandable and easy-going, vivid and realistic. We need to cut down on stuff that is standard and uniform and build up stuff that is unique and original. We need to cut down on empty verbiage and have more real voices from the grassroots and the masses . . . We need particularly to adhere to a popular orientation (以人为本), unifying the Party’s views and the people’s will, upholding correct guidance of public opinion while tapping into social conditions and popular feeling. . . .
In order to raise our capacity to channel public opinion, we must make an effort to choose our timing well. Public opinion channeling must be both timely and opportune.
The same propaganda content, released at different moments, might bring very different results. There is an art to when things are said and what things are said at different times. Last year, some anti-China forces internationally severely interrupted the Olympic torch relay and stirred up a surge of public opinion. Some domestic Chinese media followed suit in pan-frying this story, so that not only did media not serve a positive channeling role, but in fact they stirred up the irrational emotions of some of the masses, particularly young students.
People’s Daily was timely in putting out a series of editorials, including “How Patriotism Can Become More Powerful” (爱国主义如何更有力) and “Patriotic Feeling and National Interest” (爱国热情与国家利益), which promoted rational exercise of one’s patriotism. These strongly channeled the emotions of the masses, served a very favorable public opinion channeling role, and they were well received by readers. On February 2 this year, as Premier Wen Jiabao offered a witty response after his address at Cambridge University was disturbed by the “shoe throwing” incident, domestic Chinese media did detailed news reports at the first available moment, quickly exposing the villainous faces of the anti-China agitators and earning good marks both domestically and overseas. These examples thoroughly demonstrate that only through accurate selection and finding the appropriate moments to report can we use news resources effectively and . . . give full play to the influence of information.
[In this section the secretary talks about the need to grasp the concept of “degree” in news reports. Even “positive propaganda,” if over-amplified, he says, can create a negative effect. He says a number of domestic Chinese media over-reported the dangers of H1N1, “not only driving a downturn in consumption of pork products, but also creating a definite degree of panic.”].

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 11, 2009, 2:17pm HK]