By David Bandurski — Not so long ago, the suppression of any and all information about mass incidents in China was a matter of virtual certainty. But Chinese officials have surprised over the past year. They have often been right on top of strikes, riots and opinion storms. And crisis management has been, at least on the surface, more about press conferences and press releases, and less about police muscle.
At CMP, we have used the term Control 2.0 to talk about an emerging new order of information management and control in China, something more nuanced and clever, and something altogether more Hu Jintao.
But the government’s handling of the recent situation in Shishou, Hubei province, raises serious questions about whether Hu Jintao’s policy of first reporting is actually drawing support among the leadership.
There were more explicit rumblings of Control 2.0 in early 2007, when Hu talked about “using” the Internet more actively to more effectively achieve “guidance of public opinion.” But in June 2008, when Hu spoke in a pivotal address at People’s Daily of a “new pattern of public opinion guidance” for the information age, the framework of Control 2.0 was more clearly drawn [MORE on “guidance” and “channeling”].
Hu’s policy of “grabbing the initiative” in news coverage of sudden-breaking events, including mass incidents, has been stretching its wings ever since the riots in Weng’an, Guizhou province, one year ago. We have had since then: Menglian in Yunnan (孟连事件), Longnan in Gansu (甘肃陇南), Jishou in Hunan (湖南吉首非法集资事件), taxi strikes in a number of areas, a primitive armed conflict in Dongfang, Hainan (海南东方械斗事件), and incidents in Ningxia’s Haiyuan (海南东方械斗事件) and Jiangxi’s Nankang (江西南康事件).
In all of these cases, we have seen must faster response on the part of the government, which has moved to release limited information quickly through official media, such as Xinhua News Agency. Is this openness? Or as a correspondent of the Telegraph recently asked: “Is this because media restrictions have been lifted, allowing news of riots to spread . . . ?”
No. And a thousand times, no.
For news stories that are especially sensitive politically — like that surrounding the verdict in the Yang Jia case, the corruption case against former Shanxi governor Yu Youjun (于幼军), and the more recent corruption case against Shenzhen mayor Xu Zongheng (许宗衡) — media controls are as strict, or stricter, than ever. And controls are also more nuanced than ever. Many so-called “negative reports” are handled by limiting coverage, even at People’s Daily and CCTV, to news bulletin style releases from Xinhua News Agency, and in-depth reporting is strictly controlled.
Media controls this year are tighter even than in 2008, owing especially to the 20th anniversary of June 4 and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the P.R.C.
So we have to see these overtures of “transparency” within the context of tightening control.
To understand what kind of “transparency” we are looking at, in fact, we would do well to return to the words of Jiang Zemin, the policy author of “guidance of public opinion,” on that very subject. It was Jiang Zemin who said after June 4, 1989: “There are things that should be transparent, or must be transparent; there other things that cannot be made transparent right away; then there are those things that must not be made transparent.”
Is that clear?
The difference with Control 2.0 is that the party is moving from a defensive position, as passive controllers and censors, to a more active position. That is to say, they are now on the offensive.
Control 2.0 is control that makes a shrewdly realistic assessment of China’s new information environment — the result of the Internet, predominantly — and recognizes there are some events that cannot be entirely controlled. So the core of Control 2.0 is reporting at the first possible moment those news events that cannot be concealed, getting the government’s official explanation and version of the facts out first. This preempts other media, including international media.
By getting the information out, officials can get the “peripheral media” (especially influential portal news sites, but also commercial newspapers) to work for them. These media feed off of the original Xinhua reports, amplifying their effect. Those same reports, with only slight permutations in many cases, become AFP, Reuters and AP reports. Finally, using those methods that create the smallest stir, you kill the information it is most critical to keep under wraps, keeping rabble-rousing professional media away, and punishing those media that “don’t listen.”
BUT. In the recent Shishou incident, Xinhua News Agency did not report the news at the first available moment, and it was five days before Hubei provincial leaders relayed the news that “the incident had been calmed.”
This handling of the incident has drawn some criticism from the same official media, including People’s Daily, that have been drumming home Hu’s point about “taking the initiative” in news reporting, the Control 2.0 mantra. People’s Daily wrote back on June 25 that:

Weng’an was a seminal moment for the government’s new approach to information control and the handling of important news events. Guizhou’s top leader, Shi Zongyuan (石宗源), said during this year’s meeting of the National People’s Congress that a policy of information transparency had been the key to calming down the crisis at Weng’an.
As in the case of Weng’an, the Shishou mass incident originated with a death under suspicious circumstances, in which the explanation provided by police did not satisfy the family members of the victim and the general public.
The problem was that the authorities did not work fast or effective enough in getting out “the government’s point of view.” Meanwhile, posts in Internet forums multiplied.

The People’s Daily piece concluded by repeating Hu Jintao’s gospel of media control:

In the age of the Web, everyone can potentially be a source of information and a wellspring of opinion. It is as though everyone has a microphone before them. This has raised the bar on the need for public opinion channeling. Faced with sudden-breaking issues, it is not sufficient for the government and mainstream [official] media to release information. They must also move quickly to understand the pulse of new information emerging on the Internet, reacting quickly to public doubts. This requires that governments, and especially propaganda offices, be equipped with the ability to rapidly and accurately compile and analyze public opinion.

Now we are hearing from media insiders that orders have come down from the propaganda department telling news media not to report critically on the handling of the Shishou incident.
Is it possible that the Shishou incident signals the weakness of Hu Jintao’s bold new media control strategy, a reticence at even the highest levels about the wisdom of opening things up at all — even when the ultimate objective is control?
The response to Shishou, and the reversion to traditional information control tactics in its aftermath, could suggest a reassertion of the old “guidance.”
We’ll have to keep watching.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 29, 2009, 8:09pm HK]

By David Bandurski — There is plenty of discussion in the West about whether the international response to Iran’s election crisis has been strong enough. But the Guangming Daily newspaper, published by China’s Central Propaganda Department, pressed the point yesterday that “Western factors” have been working nefariously behind the scenes to capitalize on a sensitive political situation.
The newspaper said that one important reason the “election crisis” in Iran was becoming “more and more serious” was that “Western forces” were “adding fuel to the fire.”
The article argues that the demonstrations contesting the election results would not have happened at all had Western governments not offered “outside support.”

“It can be said, only with outside ‘support’ would the ‘reform party’ dare to challenge Khamanei and the power of the government.”

After briefly summarizing the pressure applied by Western leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the article enumerates, without a hint of skepticism, all of the charges Iran has leveled against the West, such as the use of special agents and the coordinating of “propaganda” efforts through the BBC and CNN.

[ABOVE: Yesterday’s edition of Guangming Daily discusses Western “interference” in Iran’s internal affairs.]

The article’s author, Li Jiabin (李佳彬), has written a number of such articles in recent days. Li wrote on June 23 that the U.S. government had “demanded that the operator of the Twitter service cooperate with the activities of Iran’s opposition party.” Surely, the newspaper means to say that the U.S. State Department requested that Twitter postpone a scheduled maintenance.
Portions of yesterday’s Guangming Daily article follow:

In addition, they [the Western forces] arranged for intelligence agents and anti-government organizations to “cause trouble and disorder.” Iranian security officials said on June 20 that they had arrested a large numbers of members of Mujahideen militia groups. Those arrested have already admitted that they were trained at in Iraq run by the American military, tasked with sowing chaos after the elections in Iran. Meanwhile, in Britain, there are still Mujahideen command centers which control there movements within Iran. Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said on the 21st that Britain had begun sending large numbers of intelligence agents to Iran ahead of the presidential election, brazenly interfering in the internal politics of Iran. At the same time, he warned France against interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. On June 22, Iran’s foreign ministry called together ambassadors from Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other nations and issued a note of protest, demanding that these countries respect Iran’s election results and cease participation in hostile propaganda and other activities toward Iran. While these nations have denied “meddling” in Iran’s election, it is a widely known secret that Western intelligence agents have long participated in activities to subvert the Iranian regime.
Thirdly, [the West] has used its media and the Internet to foment unrest. After the election crisis occurred, the Western media filled the headlines with coverage of the situation in Iran. CNN, for example, repeatedly interrupted its regular news programming to do several hours of continuous live coverage of demonstrations by Iran’s opposition party. On June 20, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said that in recent news reports on the Iranian elections, Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation had taken on the role of mouthpieces for the United States and Britain and command centers for inciting unrest in Iran with the objective of driving a wedge of separatism among the Iranian people.
At the same time, the Internet became a new platform for the Western media. Even as Iran’s government temporarily suspended mobile phone and Internet services, Western media continued to use Websites or real-time communication tools to obtain photos and video of the protests and demonstrations . . . Western hackers were also active, attacking the computer systems of the Iranian government and the foreign ministry and Websites supportive of President Ahmadinejad.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 25, 2009, 8:55am HK]

By David Bandurski — Have you ever wondered why China persists with a one-party political system? Have you ever scratched your head over why China refuses to check the concentration of political power by separating the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government? Well, my friends, perhaps you’ll find resolution in China’s latest brand of ideological infant formula.
We introduce to you . . . the “Six Why’s.” That’s right, Hu Jintao and his army of CCP theorists have worked out a simple political primer for us all, a kind of FAQ of market-Leninism.
The “Six Why’s,” which could be read as an indirect response to the 20th anniversary of the 1989 student movement, and perhaps the CCP’s answer to Charter 08 and the published journals of former premier Zhao Ziyang, seek to answer basic political questions like, “Why should Marxism be our guiding ideology?”
Launched with great party media fanfare back on June 5, they have gotten precious little attention in the Western media. Why? Most likely because the “Six Why’s” formula, for all of its cozy paternalism, is still mostly an impenetrable mess of dogma.
A comparatively brief summary of the “Six Why’s” can be found at the CCTV International website.
We encourage those readers who have strong Chinese reading ability, a great deal of spare time, and the monumental patience it takes to read official Communist Party twaddle to click into the commentary links provided after each summary point — essays like, “We cannot accept ideological pluralism,” “Cleaving to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” or, “Our nation must not practice privatization.”
In any case, the “Six Why’s” are an important formulation of ideology within the CCP, and for this reason we should pay them ample attention. Books, apparently, have already hit the shelves.
Brief translations of one formulation of the “Six Why’s” (from the CCTV International site) follow:

1. Why must we uphold the guiding role of Marxism in the realm of ideology?
The guiding role of Marxism in China has not been decided by any certain person or by the will of one party, rather it is a choice and circumstance of history, and a choice rendered by the people. Our country’s process of revolution, building and reform has thoroughly shown that without Marxism there would be no new China; without Marxism and its renewed development in China, there would be no Socialism with Chinese characteristics. In these times, the struggle and competition for overall national strength grows fiercer by the day, hostile forces in the West refuse to stomach our nation’s development and strengthening, and as they have never ceased to carry out a strategy of “Westernization” toward us, and a conspiracy of “separatism” . . . In these serious international circumstances, if we were to give up the guiding role of Marxism in the sphere of ideology and pursue a path of pluralistic guiding ideologies, this would mean ensnaring ourselves and tearing down our own defenses [lit: “tear down the Great Wall on our own”].
2. Why is it that only socialism can save China, that only socialism with Chinese characteristics can develop China, and why can’t we take the path of democratic socialism and capitalism?
Socialism with Chinese characteristics is not the old path of being closed up and rigid, nor is it the old wicked socialism under a new banner. It is a socialism marked by a determination to seek reform, a striving toward development, perseverance on the path of openness, putting the people first and promoting harmony . . . Over the last 30 years, it has been socialism with Chinese characteristics that has propelled the Chinese people toward modernization, moved them closer to the world and into the future, successfully achieving the transition from a highly centralized planned economic model to a socialist market economy full of energy and vitality.
3. Why must we continue with the system of people’s congresses, and why can’t we practice “separation of powers”?
The history of many countries in the world teaches us that in developing democracy we can only take our own paths. If we depart from the facts and circumstances of our own country, if we disregard the objective demands of social and economic development, if we blindly copy the systems of other nations, not only will we not achieve the peoples’ hopes of developing democracy, we will damage their interests and for the development of the economy and society, or even court disaster.
4. Why must we persist in the system of cooperation and consultation of various parties with the CCP, and why can we not the Western multi-party system?
Political parties are the engines of politics in the vast majority of countries in the world today, and they have an important role in political life. Employing a political party system that suits the circumstances and features of a nation, and which accommodates its state of social development, is an important precondition of that nation’s development and progress. The system of cooperation and consultation of the CCP with various political parties is a great creation in which our party combined Marxist theories of political parties with the theory of the united front as suited realities in China . . . The system is a historical necessity, and it is both greatly original and highly superior.
5. Why must we persist in a public ownership system in which various types of economic ownership systems co-exist? Why can’t we carry out privatization or a “more pure” form of public ownership?
Persisting in a system of public ownership is a demand and special characteristic of our nation’s socialist economic system, and it meets with the needs and special features of the operation of our national economy. Ours is a populous nation with a weak economic basis and very unequal development. The hardships facing us in our task of advancing economic reforms and socialist modernization are of a seriousness such as the world has never before seen. If the socialist system of public ownership is overturned and we pursue privatization, then the socialist system will no longer exist, and we will then forfeit our basis for leading the people through various obstacles and challenges, for liberating and developing productive forces, and for moving toward common prosperity.
6. Why must we persist in our economic reform policies? Why can’t we turn back?
Economic reform and opening is a necessary historical choice. Our experience has shown that the path and direction of economic reform is entirely correct. The past, present and future of economic reforms lie in the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and in the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 19, 2009, 1:25pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Most news coverage so far of China’s “Green Dam” censorware controversy has dialed the timeline as far back as April 8, 2009. It was on that day that four government departments, including the Ministry of Education, ordered that computers at all primary schools across the country be installed with the so-called “Green Dam – Youth Escort” software to protect China’s youth from harmful content. [Frontpage photo by “Prescott” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The controversy over “Green Dam” may have blown up in just the last week, but coverage of the software itself can in fact be traced back months earlier, to a piece appearing in Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily on January 14, 2009. Though the “Green Dam” software is not the focus of the news report, the story does raise some interesting questions about how the software was conceived and promoted.
The Southern Metropolis Daily article, run on page A32 that day, deals with a January 2009 government campaign against so-called indecent Web columns and content.
By all accounts, the campaign was an aggressive one, resulting in the shutdown and purging of many Web columns and chat forums. But the chief driver behind that campaign was not, in fact, the government — not directly, anyway.
While the government was most certainly calling the shots, the ostensibly non-government Internet Society of China (ISC) was actually wielding the truncheon, beating down Web offerings that were “indecent” or otherwise illegal (Read also: politically and/or socially sensitive).
As I noted in the Far Eastern Economic Review a year and a half ago, organizations like the ISC are now strange animals operating as proxy arms of China’s information control structure. On the surface, they are “civic organizations,” stacked with “voluntary” members like Microsoft, Nokia, Ericsson and others. Behind the scenes — as can only be expected — government officials are pushing larger agendas.
In the December 2007 FEER report, I focused on the Beijing Association of Online Media (BAOM) and its team of content violation informants.
Despite its public face as a professional association with “voluntary” membership from leading Internet companies (including Microsoft China, Baidu, Sina, Sohu, Alibaba, Bokee, Siemens Communication Networks Beijing), ISC clearly (like BAOM) has an enforcement arm too. It is called the Illegal and Indecent Internet Information Informing Center (违法和不良信息举报中心), and Websites took its orders very seriously back in January.
Southern Metropolis Daily wrote:

This reporter noticed that after [the release of] the Informing Center’s report [on content violations], the vast majority of sites shut down whatever was highlighted [by the Informing Center], and they responded quickly. Just like the Cat898 Forum (凯迪社区), for example, Kugou.com closed down its Dong Zhang Xi Wang (东张西望) section, which had been accused of running many vulgar images, at the first available moment yesterday.
This special campaign is no longer limited to those sites named [by the Informing Center]. Many sites not singled out have begun on their own to clean up [their content] and raise the bar on Web postings.

Further down in the article, the “Green Dam – Youth Escort” software emerges, months before its shameful international debut.
Interestingly, the software is mentioned as part of the ISC-led campaign against “vulgar” content. Here is that portion, which is set off with a subtitle that reads: “A green web-surfing software program bought with a pricetag of 41.7 million yuan.”

Aside from exposing [a list of] sites that contain vulgar content, and shutting down illegal and violating websites, the promotion of a green web-surfing software program has also become an important part of this special clean-up campaign.
The Internet Society of China released an urgent notice yesterday demanding that member companies “organize and carry out Internet clean-up campaign work for self-discipline against vulgar content.” That notice says that aside from implementing rigorous self-checks on Website content and cutting off the transmission of vulgar content at its source, [companies] must also take effective preventive measures from client-side computers (从电脑终端上有效防范).
The notice in particular introduced a software program called “Green Dam – Youth Escort”, and ordered that “the Websites of member companies actively provide free downloads and upgrades of this software, or build links with official websites for this software.” This means that most well-trafficked Websites in China, including a few publicly-listed portal sites, will be required to provide downloads of this software.

The January ISC notice plugging “Green Dam” is real. It took a bit of work to dig it out of the Chinese side of the ISC Website, which does not offer a search function, but it is right there where Southern Metropolis Daily said it would be, on January 13, 2009.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of January 13, 2009, notice from the Internet Society of China ordering all members to promote the “Green Dam” software.]

Such an order from the Internet Society of China poses some very troubling questions, particularly now as we are hearing about the alleged use in the “Green Dam” software of proprietary data from a U.S. company.
Information Week wrote yesterday that the IP issue with “Green Dam” could pose legal problems for manufacturers complying with China’s order that the software be installed in all computers.
But what are the possible legal implications for foreign companies and, say, Nasdaq-listed companies who, as a condition of doing business in China, are ISC members and are ordered by this quasi-government “professional association” to promote and even offer downloads of this problematic software?
This just keeps getting messier and messier.
Any professional association in China has to have a government chaperone, or “unit in charge” (业务主管单位). And as long as we are connecting the dots here, it might interest readers to know which government agency is backing up the Internet Society of China.
That’s right, folks. It is the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工业和信息化部), the government agency that started this whole mess in the first place.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 16, 2009, 3:37pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Last week at CMP, we began our countdown to the one-year anniversary of President Hu Jintao’s bold re-working of China’s media control and propaganda system with a speech by Jiangxi’s top party leader, Su Rong. This week we turn to another article in official party media that helps to clarify Hu’s much misunderstood policy, which combines traditional media controls with the active “channeling” of public opinion.
The article, “International Commentary in the Context of Globalization: Forestalling Opponents by a Show of Strength, Actively Channeling [Public Opinion]” (全球化背景下的国际评论:先声夺人主动引导), appears in the most recent issue of China Journalist (中国记者), a key official journal dealing with press policy.
The authors are Chen Hegao (陈鹤高) and Qi Zijian (齐紫剑), both journalists with China’s official Xinhua News Agency.
Chen and Qi give readers an inside picture of how changes in style and outlook at Chinese state media are linked directly to Hu Jintao’s press policy — and DO NOT necessarily signal more openness or the breaking of taboos.
They describe their task as commentary writers for Xinhua’s new international commentary section in the context of a global struggle for public opinion pitting China against the West. They talk about the need to serve the party and adhere to “correct guidance of public opinion,” and at the same about the need to “take into account the varying value judgements” of both foreign and domestic audiences in order to achieve the greatest impact.
Chen and Qi clearly spell out the policy of targeting propaganda products for different audiences, with differing standards and approaches for Chinese and foreign readers.
A partial translation of the China Journalist piece follows. It should perhaps be taken as a reference next time Xinhua, China Daily or the English edition of the Global Times surprise us with ostensibly “open” coverage:

In 2008, a series of major events happened internationally, and in the complex international struggle for public opinion, Xinhua News Agency pioneered its “Xinhua International Commentary” section (新华国际时评). Over the past year, “Xinhua International Commentary” has offered timely and in-depth commentary on major international events and matters that touch on our interests, and it has wielded rather substantial influence.
Experience has shown that the strengthening of international commentary work at Xinhua News Agency has been extremely critical in facing a complex international public opinion environment, increasing the influence of international news reports and gradually reversing the state of a “strong West and a weak China” in the international competition for public opinion.
The Need for Channeling, Influencing Public Opinion
Wide-reaching and radical changes are now happening in our world, and the public opinion environments at home and overseas are incredibly complex. On the one hand, along with China’s development and strengthening and its growing position internationally, China has an ever greater influence and function in international affairs, and the international community urgently hopes to have a timely grasp and understanding of China’s policy positions on a range of major international questions. On the other hand, hostile forces in the West have never turned from their conspiracies to “Westernize” and divide China. A number of Western media have added fuel to the fire, ramping up negative reports about Chinese issues with the intent of blackening China’s image.
Facing the complex public opinion environment arising from these new circumstances, Xinhua News Agency must further strengthen its international commentary work, planning and arranging [commentary on] general [strategic] interests both domestically and internationally, actively reflecting the policy position of our national government on major international political, economic and social issues and other issues of urgency.
Over and against negative public opinion in the West that twists China’s image, we must express our viewpoints in a timely manner, setting the facts straight and refuting fallacies in order to ensure a right understanding of the facts. We must enhance correct channeling of public opinion domestically, and actively influence the directedness and effectiveness of international public opinion [in China’s interests].
[The writers say Xinhua News Agency commentaries have generally speaking had a strong impact over recent decades.]
Since the “Xinhua International Commentary” section was launched in 2008, we have focused on general [strategic] interests both domestically and internationally, actively sought avenues for continued development, and worked hard to achieve [at least] one commentary per day, putting out Xinhua News Agency’s voice on major questions, expressing China’s viewpoint, keeping hard to the inside track of the public opinion struggle, using our discourse power (话语权) effectively on critical international questions.
The “Xinhua International Commentary” section has released more than 100 editorials [since its launch], including on the March 14, 2008, riots in Lhasa, the international leg of the Olympic torch relay, the Wenchuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games, the American financial crisis and on international issus making the headlines. Some of these editorials have been released with foreign language translations, or even written directly in foreign languages. Some of these commentaries have clarified the facts, denouncing such fallacies as support for “Tibetan independence.” Some commentaries extolled the spirit of international humanitarianism and the spirit of the Olympic Games. Others set forth our country’s policy positions on important international issues. These international commentaries were widely used by media both domestically and internationally, so that the influence of international reports from Xinhua News Agency
is further expanding.
This year, the “Xinhua International Commentary” section has further strengthened the intensity of its commentary, expressing China’s position in a timely and accurate manner on major international incidents, and incidents concerning China’s interests.
At noon, Beijing time, February 14, 2009, the U.S. Congress passed a 787 billion dollar economic stimulus plan, which included a “Buy America” clause that smacked clearly of trade protectionism. This [clause] posed a serious challenge to pushing the global economy out of the doldrums as early as possible, and it also would have had a profoundly negative impact on developing nations. That night, our editorial desk [at Xinhua News Agency] released [a commentary called], “Trade Protectionism is ‘Toxic’ as We Face the Financial Crisis.” The Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France-Presse made substantial and objective use of the commentary, and re-printings and references appeared also in the International Herald Tribune, the Wall Steet Journal, England’s Guardian newspaper, the Financial Times, on the BBC website, and in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post.
When an international controversy raged over the auctioning off of treasures stolen from the Summer Palace [in Beijing], our editorial desk released, “It is Sad and Absurd to Hold Cultural Artifacts Ransom for ‘Human Rights’!” (用“人权”绑架文物，荒唐、可悲！). The commentary was used by 96 media domestically. When the U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament passed resolutions on the Tibet issue, [Xinhua] immediately released several commentaries expressing China’s standpoint, including “Tibet Resolutions Confuse Black and White,” and “A Portion of European Parliament Reps Suffer from Amnesia and Ignorance.”
Principles in Strengthening the Work of International Commentary
Modern China’s relationship with the world is now going through historic changes. Under the influence of economic globalization in particular, China’s hot-button issues and the world’s are now mutual and interwoven. Editorial staffers dealing with international news must broaden their vision and expand their range of criticism, seizing on critical domestic issues on which international public opinion is focused, and writing relevant commentaries [on these issues, from China’s own standpoint]. With the correct lines, principles and policies of the Communist Party and the policy positions of the government as the guide, we must deploy international commentaries on major emerging international incidents, critical issues, and matters touching on China. We must make rapid and timely responses to meet negative public opinion in the West that misrepresents China, as suits the needs of our nation’s major foreign relations struggles.
1. International commentary must strictly uphold correct guidance of public opinion
Taking a clear stand [for the party] in commentaries is the most direct form and method for correctly channeling domestic opinion and effectively influencing international public opinion.
Even though our international commentaries are not equivalent to statements or policy declarations from the government on key questions, the spirit of our ideas as they emerge in our reports on major international questions and problems concerning China must remain entirely consonant with the spirit of the CCP Central Committee and the policy positions of the government.
When writing international commentaries, editorial personnel must put correct guidance of public opinion first throughout, making no deviation whatsoever. In order to accomplish this, editorial personnel must earnestly study the spirit of the 17th Party Congress, they must earnestly study the language of party and national leaders on the domestic and international situation and key questions . . .
[Personnel should study party work reports, dialogues with foreign ministry spokespeople, etc.] . . . From this, they must strengthen their political sensitivity and power of dicrimination, maintaining proper control of their commentary writing on important, sensitive and current issues, ensuring international commentaries uphold correct guidance of public opinion.
2. International commentaries must prioritize timeliness, speaking with an authoritive voice as soon as possible on major international questions and critical issues.
International news personnel must grasp the initiative in the international struggle for public opinion (把握国际舆论斗争的主动权) on major international questions and critical issues, forestalling their opponents by a show of strength (先声夺人). China is a responsible and influential nation in the world. After major international incidents occur, the international community looks especially to reports from China’s national newswires and other central-level media in order to understand the policy position of the Chinese government. This presents the finest opportunity for Xinhua News Agency’s international commentary section to exert its influence, and this [opportunity] must be used to full effect . . . When sudden-breaking news events occur, we must do our utmost to ensure relevant commentaries are out within 24 hours, so that Xinhua News Agency’s voice can be heard on all on major international questions and critical issues.
3. Commentaries must be written according to various audiences, with differentiation between domestic and outside (内外有别).
Our audience for international commentaries consists mostly of foreigners. Whether we are describing our [country’s] policy position on major events or questions, or refuting certain incorrect trends of thought or opinion internationally, we must take into account the varying value judgements, political attitudes, religious beliefs, modes of thinking and reading habits of domestic and foreign audiences when we write international commentaries, being artful and strategic in our commentary writing. We must be objective, truthful and clever in expressing our viewpoints, making our reports as convincing as possible. Against negative public opinion in the West, and against the slander and personal attacks from anti-Chinese forces internationally, we must argue our case well, convincing others by our reasoning. Particularly, we must use news facts and news background that are accurate, not giving any cause to find fault.
Facing different incidents and problems, facing different audiences domestically and overseas, we can utilize different styles of commentary writing, raising the level of intimacy, attraction and vitality [of content for various target readers].
There is no demand that international commentary “speak with a rigid face” [NOTE: this is a reference to the stiffness that prevails generally in party politics in China]. Rather, we need to work hard to speak the essentials, make our topic clear, keep our logic tight and be lively and engaging . . .
[Talks briefly about the effectiveness of engaging and personal stories in addressing the international uproar during the international leg of the Olympic torch relay, and following the Sichuan earthquake.]
Changing and Renewing the Mindset of International Commentary Work
The reform of international commentary is faced with a complex public opinion environment, and international commentary work at Xinhua News Agency must be reformed and renewed. As we write international commentaries we must strictly adhere to correct guidance of public opinion, we must enhance the intimacy, attraction and vitality [of our commentaries], and we must at the same time strengthen the aim and actual effect of public opinion channeling . . .
How do we resolve the difficulty of maintaining [a party] tone in writing international commentary? Ensuring that international commentaries at Xinhua News Agency abide by correct guidance of public opinion involves at least the following aspects:
Maintaining consonance with the standpoint of the party and government; The ability to adequately handle the relationship between the news and foreign relations, actively accommodating our [nation’s] foreign relations work, in order to benefit the projection of a peaceful, cooperative, open and progressive international image; The ability to observe, understand and explain world affairs according to a Marxist world view and methodology, helping the audience achieve a correct understanding and vision of deep and complex changes in the world; The [current official] saying, “Help, don’t add to the chaos” (帮忙而不添乱) is the most basic expectation of international commentary work. The principal reason for the poor grasp of some international commentaries is the failure to maintain tonal consonance with our [nation’s] policy positions, [the failure to] adequately abide by correct guidance [of public opinion] . . .
Critical to strengthening international commentary work is the building of international commentary teams that are devoted to their work and are politically alert [to party policies and propaganda discipline].

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 15, 2009, 10:58pm HK]

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By David Bandurski — In this year of sensitive anniversaries in China, there is one anniversary that perhaps will not seem obvious to many. June 20 marks the one-year anniversary of President Hu Jintao’s bold new vision for China’s media and its propaganda function in the 21st century.
On June 20, 2008, Hu Jintao delivered his first speech since taking office in 2002 to deal comprehensively with PRC news media and their role in China and the world. In the year since Hu made this “important speech” (重要讲话) to propaganda leaders, its policy implications have become somewhat clearer, and at the China Media Project we have labeled this new regime of information control tactics “Control 2.0.”
Control 2.0 is still evolving, of course, but at its core is the idea that Communist Party leaders must “use” media more artfully and actively to drive the agenda.

[ABOVE: Front page of June 8 Jiangxi Daily covers the provincial party secretary’s speech about propaganda in the “new era.” See below for details.]

By the middle of last year, even before Hu’s speech, Chinese media professionals, particularly at Internet portals, were telling CMP that there was a much stronger push by party leaders not just to discipline and control them, but to “use” them.
In the age of Control 2.0 — in the face of new information technologies — it is no longer sufficient for party leaders to stopper information through traditional press control tactics (propaganda orders, disciplining of journalists, etc.). They must also push the party’s own agendas by making use of the Internet and China’s new generation of commercialized media.
Invoking the post-June 4th buzzword for media controls, Hu Jintao referred to this media policy as a “new pattern of public opinion guidance.”
Part of this policy is a first-strike mentality being pushed at central party media and English media such as China Daily, the idea that official versions of the story should be hustled out quickly to take the wind out of the sails of “Western media” and drive the agenda early on.
Reported by foreign news media, these strike-first reports have been mistaken repeatedly for more positive and fundamental changes to media policy in China. That may make for a decent story hook, but the thesis is not borne out by other signs in the media terrain.
The advent of Control 2.0 can also be seen in the reworking of the relationships between various party media control terminologies. As we have said repeatedly in our analyses, the primary term in the media control lexicon since June 4, 1989, has been “guidance of public opinion,” or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向).
“Guidance of public opinion” links the complex business of press censorship together with the overarching priorities of economic and political stability, and it still encompasses the larger notion of media CONTROL.
Insofar as media control remains the top priority, “guidance” is still supreme. But a new phrase, superficially similar, seems to be on the rise: “Public opinion channeling”, or yulun yindao (舆论引导).
Some media scholars in China, including former CMP fellow Zhan Jiang, have noted a terminology transition since Hu Jintao’s June 2008 speech from public opinion “guidance” to public opinion “channeling.” Zhan has further suggested, if I understand his point properly, that this might mark a softening of approach on the party’s part.
In our estimation, however, this terminology shift reflects only the new focus on pushing and amplifying party messages and agendas, and does not suggest a diminishing interest in “guidance.” “Channeling,” in other words, is a modification that complements more traditional controls to meet the challenges of propaganda work in the 21st century.
We will have to keep our eyes on these terminologies, but it seems they should probably be used simultaneously rather than interchangeably.
In concert, “guidance” and “channeling” may reflect Hu Jintao’s two-pronged approach to propaganda work. The former is all about CONTROL, which is still at the heart of media policy, while the latter reflects the party’s renewed determination to “use” the media to actively push certain messages while others are “guided” out of existence.
These policies come to us through the murky lens of official-speak, and of course we have to puzzle out their meaning from media practice. But the way local party leaders implement and talk about them can also be very revealing.
Earlier this week, Jiangxi Daily, the official party newspaper of Jiangxi province, ran the full text of a speech to local journalists by party secretary Su Rong (苏荣) to honor Jiangxi Daily‘s 60th anniversary.
In his speech, Su Rong lays emphasis on “guidance” and “channeling”, and places both in a wider ideological context that leaves little room for the liberalization thesis that these changes signal a new openness in China’s media environment.
It’s all there. Mao Zedong’s assertion that “politicians must run the newspapers.” Deng Xiaoping’s insistence that “news work must uphold the principle of the party spirit.” The Pre-eminence of the “Marxist view of journalism.” The sharp mockery of Western “freedom of speech.” And after all of these keystones are set firmly in place, Su Rong develops Hu Jintao’s argument for the need to adapt and make propaganda savvier and more salable.
A partial, but still very hefty, translation of Su Rong’s speech follows:

Firmly Grasping Correct Guidance of Public Opinion (正确舆论导向) and Striving to Raise Our Capacity for Public Opinion Channeling (舆论引导) — Jiangxi Provincial Party Secretary Su Rong’s Speech at a Forum with News Unit Comrades
Jiangxi Daily
June 5, 2009
Comrades:
I felt both delighted and inspired this morning as I made an inspection of central party media units stationed here in Jiangxi and of principal news units from our own province. Just now, a number of comrades from various news units addressed us, and they said it well. In recent years, news workers have deployed themselves strictly around the core work and critical policies of the provincial party and government, holding firmly to correct guidance of public opinion, organizing and executing a series of important propaganda campaigns, creating a favorable public opinion environment for Jiangxi’s rise and expansion.
The mass of news workers have remained faithful to the cause of the party’s news work, cherishing their positions and devoting themselves wholeheartedly to work, contributing selflessly. In each major event, in one major incident after another, at each critical juncture, they have been tried and tested. Experience confirms that news work teams (新闻工作队伍) in our province are of strong political conviction [ie: loyal to the party], clear in their professional duties, strict in their discipline [ie: keep to propaganda discipline] and upright in character. They are reliable, full of vim and vigor, and capable of striking strong blows [for the party].
In two days we will mark 60 years since the founding of Jiangxi Daily . . . [Has done great work for the party, doing excellent propaganda, etc.] . . . Here, I represent the provincial party committee and the provincial people’s government in warmly congratulating Jiangxi Daily as it celebrates 60 years. And I express also my warm greetings and utmost respect to all the news workers of our province! At the same time, I express my earnest thanks to news workers representing central party media here in our province!
Raising our capacity for public opinion channeling is a newer and higher demand of our news work defined by President Hu Jintao under the new circumstances [of globalization, digital media, etc.]. Lately, with the interacting of different cultures and complex changes in the public opinion environment, whether or not we can effectively regulate and control the mass media and correctly channel public opinion in society, establishing dominance amid diversity (在多元中立主导) and find consensus amid diversity (在多样中谋共识), is a crucial test of propaganda and public opinion work. We must adhere throughout to solidarity, stability and positivity, emphasizing positive propaganda (正面宣传为主), improving the aim and actual effect of public opinion channeling, continually raising the public opinion channeling capacity of mainstream media [ie: party media], giving full play to news media in publicizing the party’s views, propagating a spirit of moral uprightness, tapping into social conditions and popular feeling (通达社情民意), channeling issues of immediate social concern (引导社会热点), siphoning off public emotions (疏导公众情绪).
On this, the raising of our capacity for the channeling of public opinion and doing an adequate job of news and propaganda work, I’ll just talk about a couple of points. First of all, as to raising our capacity for channeling public opinion, we must uphold the Marxist view of journalism (马克思主义新闻观) and adhere to correct guidance of public opinion — these are the preconditions and foundation of enhancing our capacity for the channeling of public opinion.
Comrade Mao Zedong once said, “In doing news work, the politicians must run the newspapers” (“搞新闻工作，要政治家办报”). Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that “news work must uphold the principle of the party spirit” (“新闻宣传必须坚持党性原则”). Comrade Jiang Zemin once pointed out: “In upholding the principle of the party spirit, we must not permit vagueness or vacillation on the part of the news media” (“在坚持党性原则上，新闻媒体不允许有任何的含糊和动摇.”).
General Secretary Hu Jintao emphasized on an inspection of People’s Daily last year: “Correct channeling of public opinion benefits the party, the nation and the people; incorrect channeling of public opinion harm the party, the nation and the people.” These important pronouncements are distinct embodiments of the essence of the Marxist view of journalism, and they are embodiments of the fundamental demands of public opinion channeling.
We know that the Marxist view of journalism is a concrete manifestation of the ideological line of dialectical and historical materialism in the news and broadcasting sector, and it is the theoretical basis for doing adequate news and propaganda work in the new century and in this new phase. Its core is that the news media must adhere to and submit to the principles of the party, adhere to the principle of serving the people and serving socialism.
The Marxist view of journalism is a beacon light for journalism in all socialist nations, and if we depart from the correct guidance offered us by the Marxist view of journalism, the Socialist journalism enterprise will lose direction and go astray . . .
The news media of our nation are the mouthpieces of the party and the government, and they possess a clear and distinctive party character. In recent years, a number of people in the West have declared that “the media are public instruments,” that they are “public information platforms,” and they hold that “China has no freedom of speech.” Media, they say, should become a “fourth estate” independent from the party and the government. Whether consciously or unconsciously, some of our comrades may have been influenced by these arguments. Actually, for news reports in the West concerning important political matters and issues bearing on their vital interests, in every case strict controls are placed on the media. During the Iraq War, America did its utmost to put into effect President Bush’s plan for a “news filter,” seeking to lessen the space available to domestic news outlets whose views might clash with the government’s, using whatever means necessary to prevent journalists from going out and reporting. They strictly prevented reporters imbedded with American troops from reporting on or providing images of troop or civilian casualties, and punished journalists and television stations in “violation.”
Last year’s Deutsche Welle case was another strong indication of the West’s control and interference with its media. Zhang Danhong (张丹红) was deputy head of the Chinese news desk at Deutsche Welle, and during one interview she objectively assessed the achievements of China’s economic reform policies and said she understood the Chinese government’s moves to block “Tibet independence” and “Falun Gong” websites. For this, she was put on indefinite suspension from Deutsche Welle. This is not all. Western media, in order to protect the vital interests of the West, routinely ignore the facts and make outright fictions when they report international news. Without a doubt, this is a mockery of the “freedom of speech” Western nations have boasted of for so long. What Western media in fact represent are the political parties and big money behind the scenes. The “freedom of speech” they talk about in Western communications studies is fundamentally nonexistent.
And so, on questions of major importance concerning our basic political system and national interest, our news media must take a firm, clear-cut stand for the Marxist view of journalism, firmly and unshakably holding to correct guidance of public opinion. There must not be any deviation [from the party line] in news and propaganda. This is especially true this year, when many major events are happening in our country, when there are many important matters. News media at various levels have a high degree of political responsibility. They must firmly grasp news and propaganda work in this sensitive period, quickly grasping trends and tendencies and sensitive issues where they are emerging . . . working hard to bring about wholesome and high-spirited mainstream public opinion throughout society. At the same time, those at the head of news media at various levels must constantly raise their political consciousness, their consciousness of the overall situation and their sense of responsibility, maintaining throughout a high-level of consonance with the central party . . .
Secondly, raising our capacity for channeling public opinion must thoroughly revolve around the core of economic and social development. Serving the overall situation [of economic and political stability and development] is ever the business of news and propaganda, and it is a critical task of news and propaganda work.
News and propaganda work must serve the expansion of economic development . . . Recently, media in and outside our province widely reported that power consumption increases in Jiangxi maintained a high level and came in highest in the country [compared with other provinces].
[Editor’s NOTE: This report is available here. Clearly written from the standpoint of Jiangxi leaders, the news lede calls the latest power consumption statistics “exciting” and ends with an exclamation point. It then goes on to quote the party secretary of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics as saying that power consumption is an important economic development indicator.]
People’s Daily ran in a prominent position the news that “Jiangxi’s industrial economy is accelerating well.” These news reports had a very good effect [on Jiangxi’s image] and echoed strongly. Henceforth, media at various levels [in our province] must cleave tightly to the core work of the provincial party and government, energetically publicizing the work of various regions and departments in thoroughly implementing the “Three Safeguards” (三保一弘扬) [of President Hu Jintao]. [Editor’s NOTE: On a visit to Jiangxi province this year, Hu Jintao addressed the global economic downturn and said that the party’s goal would be to “safeguard economic development, safeguard the people’s livelihoods and safeguard social stability.”]
[The “media must” language continues in this section. The media must “energetically praise the socialism core value system” and “sing the main theme [of the party]” etc.]
News and propaganda work must promote social harmony and stability. Development is the absolute principle, and stability is our principle task. Without a harmonious and stable social environment, we can accomplish nothing, and that which we have accomplished might be undone. Our nation’s economic development has lately entered a key phase (关键时期), and the relationships between various social interests show increasingly complexity. New situations and new problems are emerging constantly. News media at various levels must have an earnest grasp of [public opinion] channeling of urgent social issues and problems. They must actively carry out [public opinion] channeling for issues of key perennial concern to the public, such as employment, healthcare, housing, education, the stock markets, the campaign against corruption, etc., transforming extreme agitation into calmness (化过激为冷静), transforming opposition into understanding, transforming resentment into trust. Particularly in the case of sudden-breaking news and mass incidents, we must get in faster, forestalling our opponents by a show of strength (先声夺人) [NOTE: basically, “stealing the thunder”], creating strong public opinion [in our favor], quickly seizing the initiative and the power to speak authoritatively (话语权和主动权), thoroughly leveraging public opinion channeling to resolve social conflicts, settle emotions, eliminate misgivings and rally popular feeling.
Thirdly, in order to enhance our capacity for public opinion channeling, we must heed the wisdom of the ancients concerning news and propaganda: “Absent literary grace, words have neither influence nor place” (言之无文，行而不远). From the standpoint of journalism, the character for “words” in this saying points to the need for a richness of facts in news reports, but it places even greater emphasis on the relevant arts and techniques of public opinion channeling. Lenin once said: “The art of every propagandist and mobilizer lies in employing the most effective means of influencing his own listeners.” In raising our capacity to channel public opinion, we must pay particular attention to the art of propaganda, and artfully carry out propaganda. Only in this way can we attract an audience to the greatest degree possible.
To enhance our capacity for public opinion channeling we must expend effort in raising the attractiveness and infectiveness [of news products]. Our goal in conducting propaganda is to make people understand and accept [the party’s position]; if people do not understand or accept [the party’s position] then our work is done for nothing, and this is also a waste of propaganda resources. Experience teaches that only by disseminating the party and government’s voice from an angle the masses care about intimately and in a way that the masses enjoy can we better utilize the benefits of public opinion channeling.
We understand that Phoenix TV is a media very welcomed on the mainland. A market study has shown that 81.3 percent of those surveyed here in mainland China know Phoenix TV. Phoenix TV is welcomed not just because of its authoritative, in-depth and timely news content, but because of its rich and varied, fresh and lively program formats and reporting styles. If we want our news products to channel [public opinion] effectively and attract audiences, we must be clear and concise, understandable and easy-going, vivid and realistic. We need to cut down on stuff that is standard and uniform and build up stuff that is unique and original. We need to cut down on empty verbiage and have more real voices from the grassroots and the masses . . . We need particularly to adhere to a popular orientation (以人为本), unifying the Party’s views and the people’s will, upholding correct guidance of public opinion while tapping into social conditions and popular feeling. . . .
In order to raise our capacity to channel public opinion, we must make an effort to choose our timing well. Public opinion channeling must be both timely and opportune.
The same propaganda content, released at different moments, might bring very different results. There is an art to when things are said and what things are said at different times. Last year, some anti-China forces internationally severely interrupted the Olympic torch relay and stirred up a surge of public opinion. Some domestic Chinese media followed suit in pan-frying this story, so that not only did media not serve a positive channeling role, but in fact they stirred up the irrational emotions of some of the masses, particularly young students.
People’s Daily was timely in putting out a series of editorials, including “How Patriotism Can Become More Powerful” (爱国主义如何更有力) and “Patriotic Feeling and National Interest” (爱国热情与国家利益), which promoted rational exercise of one’s patriotism. These strongly channeled the emotions of the masses, served a very favorable public opinion channeling role, and they were well received by readers. On February 2 this year, as Premier Wen Jiabao offered a witty response after his address at Cambridge University was disturbed by the “shoe throwing” incident, domestic Chinese media did detailed news reports at the first available moment, quickly exposing the villainous faces of the anti-China agitators and earning good marks both domestically and overseas. These examples thoroughly demonstrate that only through accurate selection and finding the appropriate moments to report can we use news resources effectively and . . . give full play to the influence of information.
[In this section the secretary talks about the need to grasp the concept of “degree” in news reports. Even “positive propaganda,” if over-amplified, he says, can create a negative effect. He says a number of domestic Chinese media over-reported the dangers of H1N1, “not only driving a downturn in consumption of pork products, but also creating a definite degree of panic.”].

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 11, 2009, 2:17pm HK]

By David Bandurski — News came last week of the death of CCTV Network News co-anchor Luo Jing (罗京), a stern news reader whose face was familiar to television viewers across China. This week comes with speculation that Network News, one of China’s most important conduits of official party propaganda, is due for an overhaul, or perhaps a tweak — a tiaozheng (调整).
We could be forgiven for rolling our eyes and moving on to other “news.” After all, we’ve heard the exact same story before.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of online news coverage today of upcoming changes to CCTV’s Network News program.]

It was exactly three years ago that I rattled off my views on another Network News “face change,” providing the kicker for this piece by the Wall Street Journal.
Changes back in 2006 were supposed to infuse the news program with new vitality and soul. Whether or not this was achieved is purely a matter of personal taste. Do you find Kang Hui (康辉) and Li Ziming (李梓萌) endearing as they read off the news stories of the day, shaped and signed off on by top CCP leaders, and delivered going right down the chain of command, starting with President Hu Jintao?
Though they may come with a heap of media hoopla, “changes” like those at CCTV’s Network News are generally not important in and of themselves.
But they are interesting illustrations of the underlying factors both promoting and inhibiting media “change” in China. They are classic examples of the commercially-driven changes mandated by Hu Jintao’s policy of the “Three Closenesses.” At the same time, however, they are stunted and held back by the overarching priority of media control — which goes a long way to explaining why, ultimately, these “changes” are so ineffectual.
Hype about the latest round of Network News changes is just getting off the ground. But it is bolstered today by comments from Yu Guoming (喻国明), a respected professor of communications at People’s University of China. He tells Jinghua Times, the commercial spin-off of the official People’s Daily:

“Network News is attempting to draw itself closer to the people.” (“《新闻联播》也试图变得更为亲民.”)
Yu Guoming said that among television programs in China, Network News did in recent years suffer from a certain seriousness and lack of vitality. “As I understand it, China Central Television will make adjustments to its news programs, including Network News, this month or in the near future.”

Professor Yu also told the Jinghua Times that: “This will possibly be the biggest change to CCTV programming in the last 10 years.”
Yu Guoming’s first quote above gives us the precise framework in which we should understand upcoming changes at Network News, however they take shape. His reference to “closeness to the people,” or qinmin (亲民), is a direct invocation of Hu’s “Three Closenesses” policy.
We’ll have to wait and see, of course. And this “news” might make an interesting blurb for the foreign newswires.
But don’t hold your breath.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 8, 2009, 12:53pm HK]

By David Bandurski — It’s no secret that coverage of the 20th anniversary of the June 4th crackdown in Beijing is off limits to China’s media. But that doesn’t exactly mean China is passing the anniversary in silence. If you read China’s newspapers closely, in fact, you’ll realize a great deal is being said — and more to the point, done — about this highly sensitive anniversary. [Frontpage Image: “Tiananmen,” by Mayakamina available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The whole nation has sprung into action — police action, that is.
On the front page of today’s Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of top municipal party officials, the June 4th anniversary screams through dry official-speak about routine party business.
An article just below the main news bit about Hu Jintao’s meeting with Taiwan Kuomintang party chairman Wu Poh-hsiung concerns Beijing’s high-priority push to strengthen its “stability preservation work” (维稳工作).
“Stability preservation,” or weiwen, has been a major buzzword in 2009, signaling the party’s resolve to maintain social stability in the face of a series of highly sensitive anniversaries. Among these anniversaries, June 4th is obviously one of the real humdingers.

[ABOVE: Front page of today’s official Beijing Daily, with news below the main article (with photo) of Secretary Liu Qi’s inspection of “stability preservation work” in the capital.]

The Beijing Daily article paints an important, if impressionistic, picture of current efforts to bolster security ahead of the June 4th anniversary. Security, for example, has reportedly been heightened in and around Peking University, and police and government departments have been placed on a high level of alert.
Whatever assertions might be made about the irrelevance of June 4th for young Chinese today, the official language of “stability preservation work” underlines the ongoing importance of the 1989 protests in the party’s own mind.
Clearly, officials at every level are under the strictest orders to take the anniversary very seriously. And one must wonder: why is a generation of ostensibly indifferent university students of such concern to Beijing’s party secretary?
As a final note, it is interesting to see leaders referencing the Beijing Olympics as an important precedent for successful “stability preservation work.”
A translation of the Beijing Daily article follows:

Yesterday afternoon, Beijing party secretary Liu Qi (刘淇) paid visits to Peking University and to the Tiananmen division of the municipal public security bureau to inspect stability preservation work (维稳工作) for the whole city. He emphasized the need to conscientiously carry out the spirit of the Central Party’s instructions, giving the highest level of priority to stability preservation work in the capital, to not be careless, to not relax, working seriously to preserve safety and security in the capital city, living up to the expectations of the party and the people.
The Yanyuan (燕园) Police Station, located in the heart of the Peking University campus, is responsible for managing registration of the school’s 20,000 or so students. Liu Qi expressed particular concern for the work of managing the transient population (流动人口) on campus and with registering all visitors. He urged personnel at the [Yanyuan] police station to have a full grasp of the situation, maintaining surveillance of key areas, seriously carrying out entry and exit registration for the campus (入校登记制度), exercising responsibilities in a regimented fashion, going all-out to ensure the safety and stability of the campus.
The Tiananmen district is the area of most urgent priority for stability preservation work in the capital city, and at the Tiananmen division of the municipal public security bureau Liu Qi and other city leaders scanned the security situation at key points around Tiananmen by means of video monitoring terminals. They also heard reports on the [security] situation from the municipal public security bureau, the party’s municipal education committee and other relevant departments.
At this forum, Liu Qi pointed out that stability preservation work in the capital this year has been unlike previous times, with the central party giving this [work] a high level of attention. We must conscientiously carry out the spirit of the Central Party’s instructions, giving the highest level of priority to stability preservation work in the capital, to not be careless, to not relax, working seriously to preserve safety and security in the capital city, living up to the expectations of the party and the people.
Liu Qi emphasized that preserving safety and security in the capital relied first and foremost on ensuring absolute security in key districts and in key positions (重点地区, 重点部位). Various work units and departments must maintain a high level of alert, be strict in carrying out responsibilities, plan thoroughly, and make sure no problems whatsoever appear. [They] must keep a firm grasp of the situation, plan early on for contingencies, discover problems at the first possible moment, and be proactive in carrying out stability preservation work. The safety and security of Tiananmen Square and other key areas is the first and most important priority — they must be rigidly controlled and kept absolutely secure. We must appropriate our successful experiences [in stability preservation] during the Olympic Games, keeping a cool and rational attitude, acting in a civilized manner and according to law, resolving problems quickly. We must adequately guide public opinion and be mentally persuasive, creating a healthy and harmonious public opinion environment . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, May 27, 2009, 8:45pm HK]

By David Bandurski — China Economic Weekly, a spin-off magazine of the official People’s Daily, ran an important story yesterday about the collapse of school buildings in last year’s Sichuan earthquake. But the story, posted initially to People’s Daily Online, was removed by day’s end, a sign that some important officials at least were not pleased.
The original URL for the story at People’s Daily Online is now replaced with a tell-tale trace: “The page you wish to view no longer exists.”

[ABOVE: The China Economic Weekly story about a Tsinghua University report on seismic damage to buildings in the Sichuan earthquake is posted at People’s Daily Online yesterday.]

Nevertheless, this is a story to keep your eyes on — we’ve pasted the full Chinese text at the end of this post — and one that amply illustrates the complexity of China’s media environment. Where did the story come from? Why was it allowed to appear at all?
The story’s jumping-off point is an academic study on construction quality in the quake zone launched last year by Tsinghua University, but it makes much more explicit the findings of the study as they are relevant to the problem of school collapses.
The story, by reporter Zhou Haibin (周海滨), uses the numbers in the Tsinghua study to make it clear that schools surveyed by a team of experts suffered far more crippling damage in the quake than did government buildings. For example, while 44 percent of government buildings studied were still deemed usable, having sustained little seismic damage, only 18 percent of school buildings studied were still deemed structurally sound.
The article quotes the author of the paper, professor Lu Xinzheng (陆新征) of Tsinghua University’s Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Project Research Center, as saying that . . .

. . . the severity of school collapses in the quake owed not to [the inadequacy of] our nation’s earthquake mitigation means and objectives. The problem [he says] is the [failure of] application of these preventive means and objectives in particular regions. He says that owing to China’s national characteristics (我国国情) and limited national [government] strength, the level of seismic resistance [for buildings] in many local areas was as low as .5 to 1.0 when it should have been 1.5 to 2.0.

The long and short of it: negligence by local government officials.
Lu Xinzheng runs a decent personal website in both Chinese and English, which includes PDF downloads of much of his research over the last few years. There’s contact information too, but we’re supposing the news has already cycled past the earthquake anniversary so far as those editors back in New York and London are concerned, right?
Anyhow, a list of Lu’s recent earthquake-related research is here. One of the most interesting papers is a study of the structural weaknesses of buildings in last year’s Wenchuan earthquake. In this study, Lu and his colleagues write about the notable thinness (and hence weakness) of vertical supporting columns in frame structured buildings in Sichuan, which either buckled or broke when the quake struck.
“In the Wenchuan earthquake, most of the many frame structured buildings that either were damaged or collapsed were of this sort, particularly spacious and open buildings that were purely frame structured (most of which were school classroom complexes, see figure 8),” Lu and his colleagues write.
Fortunately, yesterday’s story from China Economic Weekly has not disappeared altogether. As of 10:51am today the story was still available at Qingdao News:

Seismic Investigation Team Reveals Causes of Severity of School Collapses in the Wenchuan Earthquake
China Economic Weekly
Zhou Haibin (周海滨) reporting from Beijing and Sichuan
This reporter recently received a copy of an academic paper called “An Analysis of Seismic Damage Caused to Structures in the Wenchuan Earthquake,” written by a seismic investigation team from Tsinghua University, Southwest Jiaotong University and Beijing Jiaotong University. Of the 54 government buildings that the investigative team studied, 13 percent (or 7 buildings) were deemed to have been irreparably damaged [by the quake]. Of the 44 school buildings that they studied, this ratio was 57 percent (or 25 schools), more than four times the level [of damage] seen with government buildings.
Numbers reveal damage to be most serious among school buildings
After the earthquake struck on May 12 last year, Tsinghua University arranged for a team of relevant experts to travel to Sichuan, and they teamed up with civil engineers (土木结构方面专家) from Southwest Jiaotong University and Beijing Jiaotong University, making a series of three investigations into seismic damage to structures [in the earthquake zone].
The investigative team classed structures sustaining seismic damage into four categories: 1) usable, 2) usable pending repairs, 3) use to be ceased, and 4) immediate demolition. Buildings were divided into types according to their purpose: school, government, business, factory, hospital and other public buildings.
According to the statistical chart provided in the paper, China Economic Weekly has determined that 44 of the 384 structures studied were school buildings. The numbers provided in the chart reveal that of the 44 school buildings studied, 18 percent (or 8 buildings) were deemed usable, 25 percent (or 11 buildings) were deemed usable pending repairs, 23 percent (or 10 buildings) were labeled “use to be ceased” (unusable) and 34 percent (or 15 buildings) were recommended for immediate demolition.
In comparison, the percentages in all categories for the 54 government buildings were: 44 percent usable (24 buildings), 43 percent usable pending repairs (23 buildings), 9 percent “use to be ceased” (unusable) and 4 percent for immediate demolition (2 buildings).
The paper also points out that schools and industrial structures suffered more serious seismic damage due in part due to the functionality of their designs. Schools suffering seismic damage were largely structures of masonry, with large-spanning rooms, large openings for doors and windows, projecting corridors, and in some cases no allowances made for quake resistance, so that their earthquake resistance was low. Factory building were also largely masonry structures, usually of small scale and spaces consisting predominantly of parking areas where there were few personnel. For this reason, little consideration was given [in factory buildings] for earthquake resistance, and seismic damage was rather severe.
Government buildings mostly used reinforced concrete frameworks, and seismic damage to these was minimal . . .
Ever since the quake struck, public opinion in China and overseas has turned to the issue of construction quality in the quake zone. Addressing concerns about “tofu engineering” [shoddily built structures], Sichuan’s acting vice-governor Wei Hong (魏宏) said in answer to questions from reporters that the collapse of schools in this major earthquake was the unavoidable result of natural disaster.
The author of this paper, professor Lu Xinzheng (陆新征) of Tsinghua University’s Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Project Research Center, believes that the severity of school collapses in the quake owed not to [the inadequacy of] our nation’s earthquake mitigation means and objectives. The problem [he says] is the [failure of] application of these preventive means and objectives in particular regions. He says that owing to China’s national characteristics (我国国情) and limited national [government] strength, the level of seismic resistance [for buildings] in many local areas was as low as .5 to 1.0 when it should have been 1.5 to 2.0.

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震害调查组披露汶川地震校舍损毁严重原因
青岛新闻网　2009-05-26 09:06:52　中国经济周刊
记者近日获得一份由清华大学、西南交通大学、北京交通大学震害调查组撰写的《汶川地震建筑震害分析》论文报告。在调查组所调查的54处政府建筑中，有13%(7处)因被毁严重无法修复；在44处学校建筑中，这一比例为57%(25处)，是政府建筑的4倍多。
数据显示学校震害最严重
去年5·12地震发生后，清华大学组织了相关专业的专家赶赴四川，并会同西南交通大学和北京交通大学土木结构方 面专家，先后分三批开展建筑震害调查。
调查组将震后建筑结构的破坏程度分为四个等级：可以使用、加固后使用、停止使用和立即拆除。对于所查访的建筑，按使用功能分为学校、政府、商住、工厂、医院、其他公建7类。
根据论文所列出的建筑震害情况统计列表，《中国经济周刊》计算得出，在调查组查访的384处建筑中，有44处是学校建筑。统计列表给出的数据显示，在44处学校建筑中，可以使用的占18%(8处)，加固后使用的占25%(11处)，停止使用的占23%(10处)，立即拆除的占34%(15处)。
与此相对应，54处政府建筑的各项比例为：可以使用的占44%(24处)，加固后使用的占43%(23处)，停止使用的占9%(5处)，立即拆除的占4%(2处)。
论文还指出，从建筑使用用途上来看，学校和工业建筑的震害最严重。震区的学校建筑主要以砌体结构为主，加上建筑上的大开间、大门窗洞、外挑走廊，有时甚至无抗震构造措施，导致其抗震性能较差。乡镇的工业厂房多为砌体结构，规模不大而且多为人员较少的车间，因此其抗震设计的要求也很低，导致震害较为严重。政府机构多用框架结构，其震害最轻。其他类型建筑的震害介于这两类建筑之间。
震后以来，国内外有舆论直指震区建筑质量问题。对于被质疑的“豆腐渣工程”，四川省常务副省长魏宏在回答记者提问时说，大地震中校舍倒塌属于不可避免的天灾。
该论文执笔人、清华大学防灾减灾工程研究所陆新征副教授认为，地震校舍损毁严重不是我国地震设防目标和手段的问题，问题在于设防目标和手段在具体地区的应用。他表示，受我国国情、国力限制，很多地区的设防烈度实际上偏低0.5度-1度，应该+1.5度甚至2度。
专家称多原因造成教室倒塌
调查组成员之一、清华大学土木工程系副教授冯鹏接受采访时表示，教室由于开间大、墙少，抗震能力比较差，所以在地震中倒塌多。
“一直以来，我国校舍的抗震设防标准和普通建筑是一样的。而在日本，校舍的抗震设防标准要比普通建筑高一度。应当把学校建成紧急避难场所，让学校成为最安全的地方。”冯鹏建议。
记者了解到，2008年7月，住房和城乡建设部、国家质量监督检验检疫总局联合发布了新修订的《建筑抗震设计规范》和《建筑工程抗震设防分类标准》，其中将学校校舍等人员密集的公共建筑提高到重点设防类，学校建筑的抗震设防烈度要高于本地1度。
“单纯质量问题不会造成大规模倒塌，原因是多方面的”，冯鹏认为，一是由于教室开间大、墙少，抗震能力比较差。二是和建设年代有关，上世纪90年代初建造的希望小学是按“89规范”来做的，倒塌情况并不严重。而那些不按规范或更早年代的学校，则毁坏严重。
此外，工程质量也被认为是影响因素之一，“所有的工程都和工程质量有关”，冯鹏表示。
国内一家建筑科研机构的一位专家表示，曾在地震后被派往灾区进行调研，他说，凡是按照抗震规范进行正规设计、且施工质量有保障的房屋，在高烈度地区大部分做到了开裂而不倒塌，在低烈度地区震害程度大部分较轻。“一所坍塌严重的学校所在地的另一所希望小学，同样的结构，却只有轻微裂缝，完全不像劫后余生的样子。”他表示。“考察中，确实发现了施工质量问题，如配料上的偷工减料，还有的不按抗震要求施工、操作上的不合理，使得震害雪上加霜。”
提高设防水平受制经济水平
据冯鹏介绍，目前我国大城市中仅有北京等少数城市的抗震设防为8度，全国省会城市中只有海口是8.5度。抗震设防度越高，抗震能力就越强。
此前，北京清华大学土木工程系教授陈肇元就提出，大规模提高我国建设安全度。
“从8度到9度，一度之差，建筑的荷载却可增加一倍。”冯鹏也表示，提高抗震设防度和经济发展水平有关，“89规范”实施前后，盖一座房子所花的钱要提高20-30%以上，因为提高抗震设防标准需要增加基建投入。公开资料显示，抗震烈度每增加一度，结构的成本可能要增加5%-10%左右。
“山西有很多地方是9度区，没有人愿意去做投资，原因就是建造成本太大。从6度提高到7度，所需成本不是非常大，从7度到8度，成本就会很大。”冯鹏坦言。
目前我国房屋建造一般都是仅满足国家最低设防标准，冯鹏建议，国家应该鼓励业主自己选择盖更加安全的房子，选择更高级别的设防标准。(记者 周海滨/北京、四川报道)
[Posted by David Bandurski, May 26, 2009, 11:39am HK]

By David Bandurski — The scope and reach of the criminal offense of bribery (受贿罪) has never been clear in China. But the lines become even murkier when the charge is applied to one of the country’s most nebulous professions: journalism. Are Chinese journalists “government officials” or “state personnel” to whom stiffer penalties should apply? Or are they performing ordinary service jobs outside the purview of the Criminal Law on bribery involving state officials?
These questions, which we saw in the Meng Huaihu (孟怀虎) case two years ago, have been replayed this month in the trial of Fu Hua (傅桦), a former reporter for Shanghai’s China Business News. They concern us here because they touch on more fundamental questions about press freedom, the role of journalism and journalists in China, and related issues such as the need (as some say) for a press law that might clear up ambiguities about journalists’ rights and obligations.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of news of recent Fu Hua case running on a Chinese website, pictures Fu Hua outside the court in Beijing.]

Anti-bribery laws in China have been “primarily directed to ‘bribe-takers,’ i.e., governmental officials, state personnel (guojia gongzou renyuan) and high ranking company managers and directors.”
At first glance, journalists don’t seem to fit the bill. But despite the many changes that have come to China’s media in the recent two decades — which have, in complicated ways, upset the traditional notion of the press as a “mouthpiece” (喉舌) of the party and government — the idea that journalists are NOT working for the state remains dangerous from the party’s point of view. The notion that the party must control, or “guide,” public opinion is deemed critical to the survival of one-party rule.
If journalists aren’t working for the state in China, who ARE they working for? Not the public, surely.
For now, we’ll let that million-dollar question hang and turn to some coverage of the recent Fu Hua case, which hints at these questions.
Last week, China News Service, the country’s number-two official newswire, ran an interesting play-by-play of goings on inside the courtroom during the Fu Hua case, which was heard earlier this month in Beijing’s Chaoyang District Court.
Interestingly, the article begins with an “editor’s note” that is really a disclaimer of sorts, making it clear that the news service is not taking a position on the case or the arguments presented therein.
For readers who aren’t familiar with the Fu Hua case, a general sketch is provided in the translation below. Basically, it seems Fu Hua did accept cash (5,000 yuan, by his own admission) in exchange for a list of sources for a story about construction problems at an airport in Jilin Province.
But the circumstances of the case are complicated, seemingly involving also a coerced confession Fu Hua later retracted, and Fu has maintained that he “was wrong, but not guilty [under the law].”

Editor’s Note: Our goal in publishing this article is to objectively report the facts and reveal the points on each side [of this case], exploring the legal questions involved. It is not our intent to comment on the administering of justice or punishment for those involved.
On May 12, Fu Hua (傅桦), formerly a reporter for the Beijing bureau of China Business News, sat in the defendants chair at Beijing’s Chaoyang District Court — the crime in question, bribery. He said: “This whole affair has gone on for several years, and I just hope to bring it to an end soon so that I can go on living in peace.”
A Journalist Accepts Money and Is Arrested
In 2003, Fu Hua managed through his old schoolteacher to get in touch with Zhang Guangtao (张广涛), then deputy director of the Civil Aviation Administration in Jilin Province (and now a defendant in a separate case). The latter said he wished to be interviewed. Getting in touch with Zhang Guangtao, as it turned out, was a pivotal point in Fu Hua’s rapid downward slide.
Our reporter learned from the procurator’s office of Beijing’s Chaoyang District that sometime around April 2005, Zhang Guangtao gave Fu Hua a telephone call and said he hoped Fu Hua would look into the Changchun’s Longjiabao Airport [photo here]. Zhang then arranged contact between Li Shen (李申) — who is a defendant in a separate case — and Fu Hua. After this, Li Shen arrived in Beijing and gave Fu Hua materials concerning construction problems at Longjiabao Airport, implying that there were tensions between the official in charge of Longjiabao Airport, Zhang Jun (张军), and Zhang Guangtao, his deputy. They wished to use the publication of a report on construction problems at the airport to impact unfavorably on Zhang Jun, the ultimate goal being to establish Zhang Guangtao as head of the project. Fu Hua then notified his newspaper about the story, saying he had received a “letter from a reader.” He asked to be sent to Jilin to look into the story. The paper agreed and sent another reporter along with him.
According to the procurator’s office of Beijing’s Chaoyang District, Fu Hua phoned his contact, Li Shen, in June 2005 to inform him he was on his way to Jilin. Li Shen set up a meeting with Fu Hua at a Beijing teahouse and provided a number of sources and contact numbers for the story. Saying it would be inconvenient for him to receive Fu Hua once he was in Jilin, Li Shen gave the reporter 30,000 yuan [NOTE: this is the account given by prosecutors, which differs from Fu’s]. Once they had gotten to Jilin, Fu Hua and his colleague interviewed a number of relevant officials and workers and took photographs at the airport site. After they returned to Beijing, they wrote two stories that appeared in the July 14 edition of China Business News: “Lingering Quality and Safety Problems Stick Out: Behind Consignment Delays at Longjiabao Airport” (质量问题安全隐患凸现　龙家堡机场延误交付的背后) and “Corners Can’t Be Cut on Quality and Safety” (质量安全不能打折扣). After the reports came out, Li Shen and Zhang Guangtao were very pleased.
According to the prosecuting attorney who prepared the case [against Fu Hua], at the end of July and beginning of August 2005, Li Shen arranged to meet with Fu Hua in order to discuss the possibility of re-running the articles on the Internet to amplify their effect. Fu Hua said that it was common practice for Websites to charge 1,000 yuan per article for placement online, and Li Shen responded by giving Fu Hua 10,000 yuan. Later, Fu Hua went through his personal connections to get the articles published on several Websites, perhaps paying nothing in exchange.
In April 2007, police in Jilin Province uncovered evidence of the link to Fu Hua while investigating Zhang Guangtao and Li Shen. In June of the same year, police belonging directly to the Jilin Public Security Bureau criminally detained Fu Hua outside the offices of China Business News on charges of accepting bribes (公司、企业人员受贿罪). The police later ascertained that Fu Hua’s employer, the Beijing bureau of China Business News Company Limited, was a state-owned company, that both its place of business and the site of Fu Hua’s accepting of the bribes in question were within Beijing’s Chaoyang District, and that the case fell within the jurisdiction of prosecutors in Beijing. They delivered the case materials to the Beijing Municipal Procuratorate. In October 2007, the Beijing Municipal Procuratorate handed these materials to prosecutors in Chaoyang District, who began their investigation. Fu Hua was released on bail to await trial with restricted liberty on charges of bribery.
In March 2008, prosecutors brought an indictment in the Chaoyang District Court, accusing Fu Hua of bribery for writing two negative news stories about airport construction [in Changchun] after receiving gratitude fees totalling 30,000 yuan.
[The article goes into the details of charges and counter-charges about the amount of money Fu Hua received. Prosecutors insist he accepted 40,000 yuan, a charge Fu Hua apparently confessed to in Jilin under duress, but subsequently denied.]
In May 2009, the court session was opened [in Fu Hua’s case].
In the courtroom, Fu Hua admitted it was true that he had received 10,000 yuan in online public relations fees (公关费) [for placing his reports on Websites], but he again denied having received a 30,000 yuan payment, saying Li Shen had not given him 30,000 during their meeting but only 5,000 yuan.
Why did he withdraw his confession? A report in Jinhua Times quoted Fu Hua as saying that “they (the police in Jilin) told me after they beat me that Zhang Guangtao, the deputy head of Longjiabao Airport, and Zhang Jun, the head of Longjiabao Airport, resented one another. [They said] Zhang Guangtao and Li Shen had been detained, and that one said I was given 80,000 and another said I was given 40,000. If I continued to be uncooperative [they said], they would handle the case according to the higher figure.” Late at night the next day, [Fu Hua] gave in, admitting he “had known about the resentment between the two men, had accepted 40,000 yuan in gratitude fees and had written the negative reports in line with Zhang Guangtao’s wishes in order to get at Zhang Jun.”
The [Jinghua Times] report said that Fu Hua claims that as soon as he arrived in Jilin . . . his confession was extracted through torture. Fearing trouble he didn’t dare check his injuries at the detention jail [immediately following his release]. Once he returned to Beijing he went to the hospital for an expert examination. There the doctor told him he had multiple rib fractures.
Fu Hua said in the courtroom that as a news reporter his reports [on the Changchun airport] were faultless. But he should not [he said] have taken the 5,000 yuan interview fee Li Shen had offered him, as this was “a violation of journalistic ethics.” He said he “was wrong, but not guilty [under the law].”
Can journalists be guilty of accepting bribes?
While prosecutors maintain that Fu Hua is guilty of bribery, his defense lawyer, Zhou Ze (周泽) believes his client’s actions do not constitute bribery. The two sides parried about this in the courtroom, engaging in fierce debate.
The crime of bribery is a special criminal charge concerning the behavior of government employees (国家工作人员).
The first point of contention between the two sides centered on whether or not Fu Hua could be considered a government employee, and whether [as a reporter] he was carrying out public business (从事公务).
Zhou Ze held that according to the “Summary of a Work Forum on the Hearing of Economic Crime Cases at Courts Nationwide” (全国法院审理经济犯罪案件工作座谈会纪要), released by the Supreme People’s Court in [November] 2003, carrying out public business entails carrying out organizational, leadership, supervisory or management roles for government organs, state-owned enterprises, enterprise or institutional units (企业事业单位), or people’s organizations. Public business primarily involves public affairs directly connected with [state] functions and powers, and assigned duties or activities involving the supervision or management of state-owned property, and “those ordinary labor and technical activities, such as those carried out by salesmen or ticket collectors, are not generally regarded as public business.” Zhou Ze argued on this basis that journalists, whose entire work surrounds the gathering of information and writing of articles, or the production of [television or radio] programs, are not engaged in public business, but rather in ordinary service jobs.
The prosecutors argued that the basic factor in determining the issue of the crime of bribery was engagement in public business. Public business [they argued] is executing in accordance with the law a particular [state] function or power, performing a definite post. All public business [they argued] is manifested either directly or indirectly as the handling of the public affairs of the state or society. “The news reports carried out by news reporters amount to conduct in a post, they are public affairs connected with a [state] function or power, and they are one form of engagement in public business.”
“If we say that the interviewing and reporting carried out by the journalist is ‘engagement in public business’ then refusing to grant a journalist a desired interview or otherwise inhibiting a journalist’s work would constitute a crime of obstruction,” Zhou Ze affirmed [in his counter-argument]. Journalists are not government employees (国家工作人员), Zhou Ze said, so naturally they are not subject to the crime of bribery.
“Journalists represent the broad masses of the people in exercising the right to supervision by public opinion, so of course this has the quality of public business,” the prosecution countered.
“In our country the right to report the news and the right to carry out supervision by public opinon [press monitoring] are vested by authority and standing (享有权威地位). News units are registered and approved according to relevant national regulations, and generally the state is their source of capital. The Beijing bureau of China Business News where [the defendant] Fu Hua was employed was established by three separate state-owned insitutions or state-owned enterprises, and from an asset standpoint it is 100 percent state-owned, so of course it is a state-owned company. News reports are a kind of special form of exercise of the right to supervision by public opinion entrusted to news units (新闻单位), they possess a monopoly quality (具有垄断性) and this right is not something that any individual or any organization can simply have or exercise.”
Zhou Ze pointed out that when Fu Hua proceeded to Changchun to carry out his reporting [for the airport stories] he had not yet obtained his [official] press card [issued by the General Administration of Press and Publications]. Therefore, his behavior could not be regarded as an exercise of authority and could not constitute grounds for the crime of bribery.
Prosecutors maintained that the issue of whether or not [the reporter had] obtained a press card was immaterial to the question of whether or not the crime of bribery applied. Most key was whether [he was] engaged in public business or not, whether he was acting in a journalist’s capacity or not. While it is true that Fu Hua did not possess a press card at the time that he reported and wrote the two articles in question, his newspaper has submitted proof that “Fu Hua began work for Shanghai’s China Business News Group in March 2005, working as a reporter in the assets and finance section of the Beijing news center, his principle work being the reporting and writing of news reports.” Both of the bylined reports in question also say “staff reporter Fu Hua.” From this we can see that the newspaper group has confirmed Fu Hua’s status as a journalist.

The following is a portion of an interview with Fu Hua that accompanies the China News Service story at many Chinese portal sites:

Reporter: The Longjiabao Airport has been approved by Jilin Province as a project up to standard, and prosecutors say they have found errors in your original news reports. How do you see this question?
Fu Hua: I won’t offer my comments on this issue. Anyone who can think for themselves and open their own eyes can grasp the situation at a glance. My report was truthful. There were no problems. We went into the airport and took photographs and made recordings. We even interviewed local government departments such as the Development and Reform Commission and the Administration of Work Safety. Go back to the report and it will all be clear.
Reporter: You’ve worked as a judge before, so you must have know what would come of accepting money?
Fu Hua: I was apprehensive about taking the money at the time. I wouldn’t take the money at the time, and Li Shen said, “Look, if you don’t dare take the money, I don’t dare give you the list of sources. How can I trust you if you don’t trust me?” I took the money in order to dispel Li Shen’s doubts, and I thought I would give the money to the newspaper when the time was right. But the newspaper, bowing to pressure, removed the article from the Website, and one opportunity after another just passed right by until things got really troublesome. This was a ticking bomb being passed around like a hot potato, and it eventually exploded in my hands.
Reporter: You gave a few hundred yuan to your colleague [who helped report the story], so why didn’t you let him in on it?
Fu Hua: I didn’t let my colleague know because I thought it might cause them trouble. I wanted to protect them.
Reporter: When you accepted the invitation to pursue the story, did you know what their goal was?
Fu Hua: I knew at the time that the two of them (Zhang Jun and Zhang Guangtao) did not get along. It wasn’t a personal feud, just a difference over the work styles of the other. But I had no idea this would lead to such huge problems.
Reporter: What warning do you think this whole affair sends to you, to the media, to other reporters?
Fu Hua: Even if its a penny, don’t take it!

ADDITIONAL READING:
“Linfen Gag Fee Case Sparks Media Ethics Debate in China,” CMP, October 30, 2008
“Extortion or official bribery? Zhejiang court rules journalist Meng Huaihu must be punished as a public servant,” CMP, April 20, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, May 25, 2009, 3:03pm HK]