By David Bandurski — In last month’s issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review, I wrote about how the CCP’s ban on extra-territorial reporting, the practice of media from one region reporting sensitive news about other local governments, was placing extraordinary pressure on hard news in China. I also discussed how the ban itself exposed a deeper change in media controls in China — the intensification of local controls and the overall “commercializing” of the propaganda apparatus.
At a recent session of the Yanshan Forum in Beijing, Chinese media scholar and former CMP fellow Zhang Jiang (展江) touched on these issues and others in a broader discussion of China’s unique brand of watchdog journalism, what is best and most accurately expressed as “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督).
The Yanshan Forum is a weekly public forum hosted by the law school at China University of Political Science and Law and Tencent, the operator of the popular Shenzhen-based website QQ.com.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of coverage of Zhan Jiang talk at QQ.com.]

In one sense, what I found most interesting about Zhan Jiang’s talk was the fact that it was available in the public domain, despite Zhan’s reasonably provocative statement about the CCP’s policy on cross-regional reporting. The forum’s co-sponsor, QQ.com, in fact played up Zhan’s comments about the need to eliminate restrictions on cross-regional reporting, with this pull-quote from the talk posted in bold right under the main headline:

“Why do we call for the cancellation of restrictions against cross-regional reporting? Because this resolution is of disadvantage to the central party. Local party officials have pressured the local media to death, so that all they can do is sing the party’s praises all day long, and media from other regions have at the same time been encircled, pursued, obstructed and intercepted.”

But Zhan Jiang’s open call for an end to restrictions on cross-regional reporting was, in my view, both the boldest and the most clear-headed statement in his wide-ranging talk. Aside, that is, from his always keen knowledge of the history and nature of Chinese watchdog journalism.
On a number of points — and I say this with an abundance of respect for his scholarship and expertise — Zhan’s optimism seemed to get the better of his judgement.
He makes a point, for example, about violence against journalists, saying that while reporters are often killed in places like Colombia or Mexico, “not one person has suffered bodily harm while carrying out investigations” in China. He cites the example of Wang Keqin, who, even with a hefty price on his head after his muckraking reports in Guizhou, was never harmed. But this, of course, is the very same Wang Keqin who was beaten on a recent reporting stint to Shandong.
Zhan also seems to misread recent changes (or alterations) to press policy. “Hu Jintao’s speech on June 20 at People’s Daily especially deserves reading,” he says. “That speech no longer places the emphasis on ‘guidance’, but emphasizes instead channelling (引导) and leading (疏导).”
This point does not stand up when one actually does scrutinize Hu Jintao’s speech.
Zhan seems to jump to the conclusion that Hu Jintao’s statements about the need for a “new pattern of public opinion guidance” and active reporting on disasters by state media must necessarily mean a relaxation of controls. They do not.
In fact, there is no meaningful distinction in Hu’s usage between “guidance,” or daoxiang (导向), and “channeling,” or yindao (引导). Both clearly drive home the notion of party media control from the outset in Point One:

1. [Media] must uphold the Party spirit, firmly grasping correct guidance of public opinion (正确舆论导向). Correct channeling of public opinion (舆论引导正确) benefits the party, the nation and the people; Incorrect channeling of public opinion wrongs the party, wrongs the nation and wrongs the people.
第一，必须坚持党性原则，牢牢把握正确舆论导向。舆论引导正确，利党利国利民；舆论引导错误，误党误国误民.

In our previous translation of this passage, which includes the so-called “three benefits and three wrongs” (三利, 三误) formula, we opted to translate both daoxiang and yindao as “guidance”:

1. [Media] must uphold the Party spirit, firmly grasping correct guidance of public opinion. Correct guidance of public opinion benefits the party, benefits the nation, and benefits the people. Incorrect guidance of public opinion wrongs the party, wrongs the nation, and wrongs the people.

How excited can we be about shaking up the terminology with the addition of “channeling” — if we insist on differentiating these translations — when the context clearly places both within the framework of media control?
The party is still determining here what is “correct” and what is “incorrect.” That is the crux.
In all fairness, however, Zhan Jiang’s talk may be as much a vehicle for pushing changes in media policy as it is a platform for sober analysis. At those points where his analysis seems to hold up least, his point may in fact be advocacy.
On the issue of information openness, for example, Zhan once again praises the State Council’s Ordinance on Openness of Government Information, which took effect on May 1 last year. Zhan rightly points out that the ordinance changes the presumption about information from one of secrecy to one of openness. Indeed, the ordinance was hard won, having faced a great deal of internal opposition — so pushing gently in this direction with compliments may not be a bad tactic from an advocacy standpoint. This does not change the fact, however, that attempts by citizens to use the ordinance since it took effect have been fruitless.
Zhan Jiang is also quite complimentary about what he presumes to be Hu Jintao’s open attitude toward media. He points to the period of relative openness in the immediate aftermath of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, conveniently disregarding the restrictions that followed soon after:

Hu Jintao has said that the Chinese government’s reporting of the disaster situation was not only well received by the vast majority of party cadres, but also earned the praise of the international community, marking the end of the era when the Western media would be branded as “scourges” (洪水猛兽/scavenging wild animals that emerge after floods) at the slightest provocation. Hu Jintao’s speech surpassed the level of the vast majority of officials.

But how do we square this professed openness with the extended campaign of “positive propaganda” that extended through the Olympics and beyond? As insiders generally attest, the focus in 2009 is on the “comprehensive control of negative news reports,” or quanmian kongfu (全面控负), not on a lighter touch. Looking back, it seems earthquake coverage no more marked a change in attitude on the media than did coverage of the 2003 SARS outbreak, which was followed by a firestorm of disciplinary action against bolder media.
Hu Jintao’s June speech did mark a change. But this change was about a re-ordering of priorities within China’s media control regime, not about a relaxation of controls.
Zhan’s remark about the end of the age of the scapegoating of Western media hardly needs refutation. Western media were under attack by China’s state media all last month as suited the needs of China’s own official message on Tibet. Remember foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang’s snide comment about the YouTube clip that (probably) prompted the blocking of the video site in China?

“Maybe the Dalai Lama and his followers got some image-editing tips from some Western media,” he said.

We encourage those who read Chinese and have an interest in media developments in China to read the first three sections of the article at QQ, in which Zhan defines three types of “supervision by public opinion” and discusses the stages in the development of this form of monitoring up to 2003.
We pick up our translation further down in the talk, as Zhan concludes his discussion of watchdog reporting in China in 2003:

The most outstanding case in 2003 was the Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) case. The national influence of Southern Metropolis Daily can be directly linked to [its reporting of] the Sun Zhigang case. Southern Metropolis Daily was the first media [in China] to separate its news reports from its editorials. The headline of the news report on Sun Zhigang, “The Death of a University Student,” was not particularly emotive. But later came their editorials. Under the influence of overseas journalism concepts, our news process has increasingly accepted concepts of journalistic professionalism, including the separation of news and opinion. China’s media tradition is all about the primacy of opinion, but now newspapers rely principally on information, and they separate news and opinion.
At the same time, some media might select comparatively marginal topics for supervision by public opinion. For example, many people had died as a result of using the quintessentially Chinese medicine “Longdan Xiegan Wan” (龙胆泄肝丸). Xinhua News Agency reporter Zhu Yu (朱玉) reported on this problem, and even later criticized herself — How could I not have known about this sooner, before so many people were harmed? Supervision by public opinion was still in a very healthy state in the first half of 2004. The Weekly Quality Report (每周质量报告), [a program investigating harmful products], had been launched just as SARS was raging. The principal focus of the program was food products, as it was originally a cooperative venture with the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine. It did not deal with politics, concerned consumer interests and had the support of the government, so 2003 and 2004 were very good years [for the program].
Third Phase: September 2004, a ban is issued against cross-regional reporting and investigative reporting virtually comes to a stop
The third phase of [supervision of public opinion] began in September 2004, with the issuing of a document [from the Central Party Office] on September 18 (“9•18”) placing restrictions on media conducting reports across regional jurisdictions. After this document was released, investigative reports by media virtually came to a stop. It is said that local and regional governments made reports to central party leaders saying that media carrying out supervision in this way made it impossible to do their work. This is something we have heard, and it awaits corroboration. Since this time officials have encircled, pursued, obstructed and intercepted journalists in the field. For example, [former CMP fellow] Wang Keqin (王克勤) went to Henan to do a report on AIDS in Xingtai, and local authorities put the village under lockdown. Once Wang Keqin had finished his reporting, he found it very difficult to get out, and had to disguise himself as a peasant, placing his laptop in a gunnysack and sneaking out finally in a three-wheeled cart. The local peasants bowed down before him, pleading with him to report the truth. After his article came out, the local government [was unhappy and] made a report of the case to the central party.
But during this period, conversely, commentaries have been on the rise. Commentaries are not impacted by the cross-regional issue, and commentary writers are known often not by their real names but by their Web aliases, such as Wu Yue San Ren (五岳散人) and Ten Years Chopping Wood (十年砍柴). I have not conducted quantitative research [in this area], but while the earliest group of commentary writers emerged from Chinese studies, they come now from all sorts of backgrounds, including economics, politics and law, etcetera, and the study of politics and law has had a growing influence on society . . .
After the ban on cross-regional reporting, many reporters could do nothing, particularly media like Southern Metropolis Daily. At the time, one deputy editor from Henan Commercial Daily conducted watchdog journalism a bit to aggressively, and he fell afoul of one of his classmates in the provincial propaganda department. As a result he opted for early retirement. He later moved on to another media in Henan and started undertaking watchdog journalism there, but now he has moved to Hainan, and he says there is no longer any way for him to continue living and working in Zhengzhou [Henan]. His is an example of failure. Yes, officials were subjected to supervision, but as for the agent of supervision, his whole sphere of existence was impacted negatively as a result. Only major central media can carry out investigations of a cross-regional nature anymore, for example China Economic Times [which is published by the Development Research Center of the State Council] and China Youth Daily [which is published by the Communist Youth League]. China Youth Daily is a newspaper steeped in the intra-party democratic tradition, a tradition built by Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦). The atmosphere within the newspaper is very relaxed, and no-one calls the chief editor by his title, but all address him instead by name. I’ve heard that when one chief editor subsequently came on, he asked why no-one ever came to the airport to greet him [when his flight came in]. In 2006, China Youth Daily reported the Wang Yanong (王亚忱) case, which was quite a successful instance of supervision of government officials.
Why do we call for the cancellation of restrictions against cross-regional reporting? Because this resolution is of disadvantage to the central party. Local party officials have pressured the local media to death, so that all they can do is sing the party’s praises all day long, and media from other regions have at the same time been encircled, pursued, obstructed and intercepted. I can give you one example [however]. Last year, Southern Weekend resumed its extra-territorial reporting and reported on the case of the “toughest nursery school” in Guangrao County (广饶县), Shandong Province. This nursery school covered 150 mu of land (24.7 acres), about the same size as this university campus, but the truth was that while the site had been approved as a nursery school, they had built the largest shoe wholesaling market in northern China.
In the economic sector, the media still had a bit of space in 2005. The Weekly Quality Report (每周质量报告) slowly got into food safety and essentially conducted investigations into famous local products in local areas [all over China] — ham sausages, Dezhou roasted chicken, etc. One program revealed that Jinhua Ham was manufactured with dichlorophos, but this report had an impact no one could have guessed. On this case, the program had done quite successfully. There was one scene I remember quite well, in which a peasant had a burning cigarette clinched in his teeth, the ashes just about to fall, and as he stepped on a ham said right into the camera: “I just came out of the toilet.” I’ve heard about people who set down their bowls of food as they reached this point in the program and tossed out any ham they had in the house. This program created a lot of discussion, and many said the show was harmful to the economy, every week destroying a famous Chinese brand, even things perhaps quintessentially Chinese.
Finally in 2005, an episode was cancelled. At the time a foreign reporter called me up to ask what was going on. Later, I called up the producer and asked whether the program had been stopped by a technical issue. In fact, he said, it was not a technical issue. For that episode they had been preparing a piece on Harbin sausage. The program is still around today, but it has been transformed into something entirely different — “Consumer Academy,” it is called, a show about how to cook . . .
The individual cases I’ve just mentioned are to a certain degree the unfortunate results of the suppression of watchdog journalism. Facing a difficult climate, apart from China Youth Daily and Xinhua News Agency, both of which can conduct supervision by public opinion, Caijing magazine does not face restrictions on the practice. At the same time, commentaries have continued to rise, discussing all sorts of important issues. Commentary writers are more and more diversified, including intellectuals, judges, lawyers, etc, but there are very few women among commentary writers, just two or three, very different to what we see overseas, where many women have received Pulitzer Prizes. Southern Metropolis Daily‘s commentary section has been rather strong, and Southern Weekend‘s has not been shabby either. In recent years television has fallen behind, owing in part to its weakness in the area of commentary. CCTV 2 does have Mabin Reads the Headlines, which consists mostly of the reading of opinion pieces, and now there is a program called News Observer that isn’t too bad.
But some people are concerned that while [hard news] reporting faces pressure, the prospering of commentaries can only be a false prospering. Commentaries must rely, after all, on news reports, and if news reports are under pressure, how can commentaries prosper? I find this concern is unwarranted, because the Internet provides a richness of information and has become a new source of information . . . Even if news reporting does face restrictions, commentaries should be able to continue to develop and prosper.
Fourth Phase: 2007 to April 2008/The influence of the Internet grows
In the last phase [I discussed], the media faced numerous hardships and difficulties. A number of top editors at newspapers were removed, and some newspapers were shut down or stopped publishing. But things took a turn for the better in 2007. The government too recognized that while supervision by public opinion was not a magic bullet, doing without it was of great disadvantage . . . In this phase, people slowly came to recognize that supervision was still necessary, but should be taken a bit more easy. Some media that had been disciplined began conducting cross-regional reporting once again — stories in Henan, or in Hebei, so long as one’s own officials said nothing you could begin to do it. The situation we saw was a kind of relaxation. In addition, I think personally that the Internet is the richest media in China permitted by the government. Rich in what way? On the one hand, various opinions and viewpoints and a degree of information can be revealed and expressed. On the other hand, blogs have to a degree developed into personal newspapers of a sort. In our country, individuals cannot start up media, but blogs are essentially individual newspapers . . .
Another mark of progress has been the State Council’s active promotion of the Ordinance on Disclosure of Government Information. The debut of the Ordinance on Disclosure of Government Information is right now changing our political landscape, from the [emphasis upon] preserving secrecy to openness to the greatest extent possible. What is the basic principle behind openness of government information? The idea that openness is normal, and that secrecy is the exception. At the 17th Party Congress, Hu Jintao made a point of raising the question of the “four rights” (四权), and his report spoke also of the need to strengthen supervision by public opinion. Over the last 20 years, all official reports [to the party congresses] have raised the issue of strengthening supervision by public opinion. None have ever spoken of putting an end to supervision by public opinion. And there is even an ordinance of the Chinese Communist Party that includes in Part Four a Section 8 called “Supervision by Public Opinion.”
There were a number of cases in 2007 that were highly influential, including the Shanxi brick kiln case, on which Hu Jintao issued instructions. While it is true that the case now is that if leaders do not issue instructions things sometimes do not get attention, we believe that this is an interim as China makes the transition from autocracy to rule of law. In 2007, Caijing‘s first cover story was “Whose Luneng?”, revealing how a private entrepreneur purchased Luneng, valued at tens of billions of yuan, for just several billion yuan in a merger deal . . . This report did not create quite the stir of the brick kiln case, but as Caijing followed the story the merger was eventually dissolved . . .
Still, the pressures media now face come from a number of areas. Sanlu and Mengniu, for example, were major advertisers [so media were cautious about reporting negatively on them ahead of the poisonous milk scandal]. But I still believe China’s journalists are relatively safe, and not one person has faced harm while carrying out an investigation. In country’s like Columbia and Mexico journalists are often murdered . . .
At the same time, the influence of the Internet grows larger and larger. In 2007 and 2008, television was essentially replaced by the third form of supervision by public opinion.
Fifth Phase/After May 2008
The next phase [of watchdog journalism] began in May of 2008. Hu Jintao’s speech on June 20 at People’s Daily especially deserves reading. That speech no longer places the emphasis on ‘guidance’, but emphasizes instead channelling (引导) and leading (疏导). After the Sichuan earthquake, a number of local officials wanted to suppress the media and the Sichuan government was opposed to media reporting of such issues as [the collapse of] school buildings. But Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao took an open attitude toward media, particularly media from outside Sichuan. Hu Jintao has said that the Chinese government’s reporting of the disaster situation was not only well received by the vast majority of party cadres, but also earned the praise of the international community, marking the end of the era when the Western media would be branded as “scourges” (洪水猛兽/scavenging wild animals that emerge after floods) at the slightest provocation. Hu Jintao’s speech surpassed the level of the vast majority of officials.
[In concluding sections, Zhan Jiang turns to the emerging role of the Internet in supervision by public opinion.]

[Posted by David Bandurski, April 9, 2009, 12:51am HK]

By David Bandurski — Last month Chinese media reported the transfer of Tan Li (谭力), the top-ranking party official in the earthquake-ravaged city of Mianyang (绵阳), to the island of Hainan, where he will serve as propaganda chief. The relocation is an upward move for Tan, who has been praised by party bosses for his rapid response to the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.
Why should Tan’s good fortune mean anything to anyone?
Tan, as some may remember, was the focus of an Internet controversy last year after official news reports following the earthquake were accompanied by this photo, in which Tan seems to be smiling euphorically during what should be a solemn visit to the scene of the earthquake by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of recent news coverage of Tan Li’s promotion, with the photo that sparked last year’s controversy.]

Chinese Web users seized on the image of Tan and ignited a nationwide debate over the cadre’s impropriety, with some even suggesting angrily that he had responded too slowly to the disaster. Tan’s moment of glee earned him the unfortunate nickname “Grinning Tan” (“谭笑笑”).
This Internet firestorm was apparently generated first at Tianya (天涯), one of China’s most trafficked community Websites — and this is where Tan’s new 2009 appointment takes on particular relevance.
Tianya is based in Hainan and, along with the site Kaidi (凯迪), is a regional media jewel in a province where the traditional media have not been particularly influential.
Media sources in China tell us all eyes have turned with anticipation on Hainan and Tan Li. Will Hainan’s new media overlord let bygones be bygones?
For more background on the “Grinning Tan” case, see ESWN’s June 2008 post, “The Laughs and Cries of Secretary Tan,” a translation of this piece from Southern Weekend — or Jonathan Watt’s piece for The Guardian.
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 7, 2009, 1253pm HK]

How have currents of nationalism changed in China over the past year on Tibet and other issues, and how has this impacted Chinese media? Veteran editorial writer Chang Ping, author of one of the most controversial Chinese editorials of 2008, talks about how Chinese writers struggle to assert their own ideas in an atmosphere of rising popular nationalism in China.
The Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong, invites you to a public seminar with Chang Ping, to be held on April 8 at 5pm. Please see the details below:

Writing Against the Grain: China’s ‘Unhappy’ New Nationalism and Commentary Writing
A talk by Chang Ping, columnist and editorial writer
WHEN: April 8, 2009, 5:00pm to 6:30pm
WHERE: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
ABOUT THE SPEAKER:
Zhang Ping (Chang Ping) is one of China’s leading journalists. His commentary “Tibet: Nationalist Sentiment and the Truth,” unleashed an outpouring of hostility last year. He has served as news director at Southern Weekend, deputy editor-in-chief of The Bund magazine and deputy editor-in-chief of Southern Metropolis Weekly. He is currently a senior research fellow at the Southern Metropolis Communication Institute, and a guest professor at East China University of Political Science and Law.
Enquiries: Ms Rain Li (2219 4001/ [email protected])

Zhang Ping (Chang Ping) is one of China’s leading journalists. His commentary “Tibet: Nationalist Sentiment and the Truth,” unleashed an outpouring of hostility last year. He has served as news director at Southern Weekend, deputy editor-in-chief of The Bund magazine and deputy editor-in-chief of Southern Metropolis Weekly. He is currently a senior research fellow at the Southern Metropolis Communication Institute, and a guest professor at East China University of Political Science and Law.

By David Bandurski — Last week we reported the arrest of Sichuan-based environmental activist Tan Zuoren (谭作人), who has reportedly been accused of “inciting subversion to state power” after organizing an “independent citizen investigation” into the death of teachers and students in last year’s Sichuan earthquake. But how exactly did Tan and others plan to arrive at a credible picture of the scale of student and teacher deaths in the quake and the deeper causes of this tragedy?
In order to offer a clearer picture of Tan’s activities, we provide several 5.12 documents that were to have been used to conduct the independent survey Tan Zuoren had planned. These were forwarded by a mainland source.

[ABOVE: “People’s Square Candlelight Vigil” in remembrance of the earthquake, by Sinosplice available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license. Homepage image also by Sinosplice.]

It is worth noting that the Tan Zuoren case gives us yet another a glimpse into the inner workings of China’s emerging, yet troubled, civil society. With that in mind, we have provided a translation further down of a post written last year by writer Fu Guoyong (傅国涌) in which he writes of Tan as an inspirational figure in a society cowed into silence over their own rights.
We begin, though, with the following message, a memorial to students who died in last year’s Sichuan earthquake. This message was sent out by the 5.12 Independent Citizen Investigation Student Archive using a general e-mail address, and was later forwarded to us from a recipient inside China. The message came with a powerpoint presentation that we have posted to Slideshare (contains some graphic imagery):

Grave Sweeping Day. As I write these words to you, my heart is uneasy. Uneasy because I feel a certain terror, that from the time you were buried, the scars of these terrors passed away with you. It is not injury, for all possible injuries of this world are borne and kept by your mothers and fathers, by those close to you . . .
This uneasiness comes from forgetting, from the disregarding of human life, and this indifference to the value of human life is now swallowing the souls of every living person.

Tan Zuoren’s objective, as we have said, was to arrive at a reliable and independent figure for teachers and children who died in the May 12, 2008, Sichuan earthquake. To accomplish this he used grassroots activism and the medium of the Internet to distribute survey materials throughout quake affected areas.
Below is our translation of Tan’s questionnaire, to be distributed in local areas by members of the 5.12 project and then returned to “the person in your area responsible for collection.”

How many children did we actually lose in the May 12 earthquake? The official version is not credible, and the popular version lacks factual support. In order that we respect life, should we not have a parents version that comes closer to the actual truth? Please fill out this form — the one-year anniversary of our children fast approaches!
Scale of Loss of Teacher and Student Lives in Our Education System on May 12, 2008 (教育系统5.12地震死亡师生情况)/Survey Questionnaire (for parents)
Explanation: This questionnaire has been formulated on the basis of objectivity and impartiality in order to investigate the true situation of teachers and students in our province during the May 12 earthquake, and in particular the scale of the loss of life among teachers and students. The aim of this investigation is to understand the principal reasons behind the death of teachers and students in various regions, at various schools through an independent citizen investigation, and to understand the demands and actual situations facing the parents of students who died [in the quake], thereby providing a rational basis for public policy making. The basis goal of this investigation is to gain a clear picture of the losses incurred as a result of the earthquake disaster, particularly loss of life, to understand those people and/or actions legally responsible for causing and/or exacerbating damages, and to encourage citizens to defend their rights in accordance with the law, preserving the dignity of national laws, protecting the impartial nature of the judiciary, and upholding social stability. Therefore, we ask that those taking part in this investigation, in a spirit of responsibility toward those teachers and students who died, truthfully fill in the following questionnaire, using the truth and your own pen to preserve your legal rights and benefits. Thank you!
1. What number for total deaths of teachers and students are you familiar with?
A) Teacher and student deaths in the entire province ____ people.
B) Teacher and student deaths in local area (city or county, district or village) ____ people.
Source of this information: Print Media □ Television □ Internet □ Word of Mouth □ Guessing □ Investigation Results □
C) Teacher and student deaths at your local school ( ______ School) ____ people.
Source of this information: Print Media □ Television □ Internet □ Word of Mouth □ Guessing □ Investigation Results □
2. What do you think is the chief contributing cause of the death of students and teachers [in the quake]?
A) Construction quality issues □
B) The intensity of the natural disaster □
C) Construction + Intensity (A + B) □
D) Other reasons □
3. What do you believe is the chief reason for school collapses?
A) Construction quality was not up to standard □
B) Buildings were old and poorly maintained □
C) The scale and intensity of the earthquake □
D) Combination of factors (A + C □) or (B + C □)
4. Do you accept the government’s public explanations of the causes of school collapses?
A) Yes □
B) No □
C) A combination of both □ (半信半疑)
5. Are you satisfied with the actions the government has taken concerning collapsed schools?
A) Satisfied □
B) Unsatisfied □
C) Don’t know □ (不好说)
6. Are you satisfied with the economic compensation given for student victims?
A) Satisfied □
B) Unsatisfied □
C) Extremely unsatisfied □
7. Do you believe legal responsibility should be sought for those responsible for the accident (事故)?
A) Yes □
B) No □
C) Don’t care □
8. Are you interested in legal defense of your rights?
A) Interested □
B) Not interested □
9. If you face difficulties in your attempts to defend your rights under the law, are you prepared to give up?
A) Yes □
B) No, I won’t give up □
C) I will seek other means □
10. What relationship do you have to students who died in the quake?
A) Direct parental relationship □
B) Relative or friend □
C) No direct relationship □
Notice: Please mark a √ in the relevant boxes above, and then return your questionnaire to the person in your area responsible for collection.
Name of respondent (signed) _________ Contact telephone: ____________
Address: ______ city (county) ________ town (township) _______ village ______ brigade. ______ year ______ month _____ date.
We ask that parents please return their completed forms quickly. Address: XXXXXXXXXXXXX
E-mail: [E-mail and phone for Tan Zuoren provided on form]

In addition to the above questionnaire, Tan had prepared at least two data sheets to be filled out for the 5.12 Student Archive throughout the earthquake-affected region. An image of one of the documents follows:

[ABOVE: Tan Zuoren’s “5.12 Student Death Circumstances Data Sheet,” asking respondents to list deaths of which they have knowledge and the relevant circumstances. Sheet asks for parents names and contacts, student names, ages, male or female, whether died, lost or injured, and injured where (in or outside school).]

To conclude, the following are portions of a November 2008 post by writer Fu Guoyong (傅国涌) in which he discusses what he sees as the grave challenges facing rights defense actions by Chinese citizens since the 2007 Xiamen PX case heightened expectations of progress. Fu reposted the entry, which mentions the work of Tan Zuoren in Sichuan, on his blog on April 3 following news of Tan’s detention, and the article has been passed along via e-mail and on the Web in China over the last few days. Comments on the post can be seen here.

By Fu Guoyong (傅国涌)
April 3, 2009
[This is an article that I previously posted (on November 22, 2008). The day before yesterday, I received an e-mail from a friend whose name I will not mention informing me that, according to Mr. Tan Zuoren’s wife, Little Wang (小王), Tan was taken into custody last Friday (March 27) and has fallen into darkness. His crime is given as “inciting subversion of state power”! I hope people will closely watch the fate of this big-bearded citizen who was traveling “the third road.”]
The successful opposition of the public in Xiamen in 2007 to the PX [chemical project] brought whoops of joy, as a peaceful march pushed a stern government toward dialogue and eventually toward concession. This case left China’s media drunk [with expectation], and caused some people in our nation to harbor fragile hopes, believing that if they were to face a similar situation, which is to say that their local collective interests stood in harm’s way, this sort of sober and moderate form of expression might be generally effective. Nevertheless, when hundreds took to the streets to march on May 4, 2008, opposing a massive petrochemical project in Pengzhou (彭州) [Chengdu, Sichuan], they were attacked by police and at least four people were taken into custody. That was on the eve of the May 12 earthquake, and as the earthquake struck, news of the disaster drowned out everything else and this incident [in Pengzhou] did not get the attention it deserved. Half a year later, the scars of the earthquake have yet to pass, and in Pengzhou, which is located in just 30 kilometers from Chengdu proper and is one of the areas of the disaster zone hardest hit (just 30 kilometers from the epicenter at Yingxiu), this petrochemical project is about to start up. The National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Environmental Protection and the China Earthquake Administration have already signed off on the project. A friend of mine in the Beijing news media said that around 800 scientists and other experts were involved in the discussion of this major petrochemical project, including 103 national-level experts . . . Of these scientists and experts, the vast majority gave the go-ahead for this project, which is so damaging to the interests of citizens (“殃民毁城”的项目). He [this journalist] said with some measure of anger in an e-mail: “They have a duty and responsibility to uphold scientific conscience and the scientific spirit, making a public explanation to the people of Chengdu and to those around the world who care about the people in the area of the earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan.”
At this point, it seems that the die has been cast, and under powerful monopolizing interest groups, at the behest of a national machine that grinds everything to dust, all citizen opposition and all voices that differ have been snuffed out. Despite this, the citizens of Chengdu have not been entirely silent. They continue to struggle. Mr. Tan Zuoren is one example. He organized a movement among ordinary citizens to “peacefully surround the city,” encouraging the people of Chengdu to take to the streets carrying a simple piece of A4-sized white paper, wearing white face masks, white hats, white corsages . . . so that the whole city of Chengdu became white, the color white expressing their will. In his words, “using a mass expression of weakness to replace a collective showing of strength, using a passive act in order to actively advocate their own rights. Using white expresses opposition to the black dealings [of local officials], studying the democratic process in an orderly and progressive manner.”
These words are moving, and in China, this land where autocracy has held sway for so long, invisible bonds restrict not only our physical bodies but also our hearts and minds, so that we don’t dare think, don’t dare act, to the extent we refuse even to express our most basic disaffection, and fail to express our lack of submission or our disagreement. In the face of power, we comply with its interests, tell ourselves to persevere, and even refuse ourselves anger, refuse ourselves even that. “Resigning oneself to adversity” has become the wisdom by which we measure ourselves as a people. One could say that in Chengdu, Tan Zuoren created a new model for resistance, thinking to use “a show of weakness” to stand in for “a show of strength,” using non-overt actions to advocate actively for one’s rights. I know in the depth of my being that we must opt for shows of weakness because the state apparatus (国家机器) has deprived us of all possibilities to show our strength. We must opt for passive acts because all routes by which we might actively push for our rights have been sealed off. In a nation where demonstrations are not permitted, where even collective marches (集体散步) are not permitted, his ideas have great significance for action. That is to say, if only one’s heart and mind remain clear, if only one recognizes one’s own rights, no matter what situation you face you can conceive of resistance and find your own special way of saying “No.”
Of course, even this low-key movement of white was regrettably aborted under pressure from local police [in Chengdu]. But this does not mean Tan Zuoren’s actions failed, nor does it mean that the people of Chengdu failed. I believe that this road of civic resistance will continue, and the “storm of environmental protection in Chengdu” is just the beginning . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, April 6, 2009, 10:58am HK]

By David Bandurski — Unhappy China (中国不高兴), a now best-selling book by several Chinese academics arguing in Darwinian terms that China should carve out for itself a pre-eminent role in world affairs, has been the focus of much coverage outside China, and of fierce debate within China. [Homepage Image: A recent issue of Shanghai’s Xinmin Weekly magazine deals with Unhappy China, its significance and its underlying commercial motivations.]
Some Chinese scholars and journalists have expressed concern about Unhappy China‘s pugnacious and even jingoistic tone. The following are two responses to the book. The first is an editorial by Nanjing professor Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋), which appeared in a recent issue of Southern Metropolis Daily; The second is an interview with Shanghai scholar Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦), part of coverage of the book by Shanghai’s Xinmin Weekly.

[ABOVE: Unhappy China, written by Wang Xiaodong, Liu Yang, Song Qiang, Huang Jisu, and Song Xiaojun, has captured the imagination of many Chinese, and concerned others.]

Jing Kaixuan begins his critique of Unhappy China against a backdrop of the myriad domestic issues with which China must contend — a not-so-subtle suggestion that China has plenty of its own concerns, and does not need to strike a confrontational tone internationally. He also invokes Hu Jintao’s term “boat-rocking,” or zhe teng (折腾), suggesting the path marked by the book’s authors is a dangerous loss of focus on the essentials.

“‘Unhappy China’ is All for Show”
By Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋)
Southern Metropolis Daily
March 31, 2009
PG A31
When I first heard about the book Unhappy China, I thought it was probably about how laid-off workers were unhappy, or about how peasants who had lost their land were unhappy. Maybe it was about how college graduates searching for work were unhappy, about how stock market investors were unhappy, or about how victims of the poisonous milk powder scandal were unhappy. [This would make sense], because the actual expression of such unhappinesses is a mark of the progress China has made. Instead, the book’s authors cast their sights much farther afield for the source of China’s unhappiness. They talk about the collective anger of Chinese toward Western nations, and say that Chinese anger demands the emergence of a group of heroes to “lead our people to successfully control and use more resources, ridding [the world of] of bullies and bringing peace to good people.”
No sooner do we drop our guard than we find others speaking once again on our behalf. But I wonder, if this is really about an invasion by foreign enemies, whether we shouldn’t be furious rather than merely “unhappy.” Relationships between nations are not like romantic relationships, which might demand a bit of petulance and coquettishness. If this [issue the authors are talking about] indeed amounts to an international dispute, it should be a matter for diplomatic negotiation to mutual benefit, not something handled with this sort of bluffing and spitting nationalism. When I read an interview with the authors at Sina.com, I found that the whole thing surged with naked Darwinism. The world works by the laws of the jungle, and if Western nations are insolently hegemonic, well then, we should behave like that too. China, therefore, must define its major objective as “first, to get rid of the bullies and bring peace to good people and, second, to control more resources than China currently has in order to bring blessings to all the people of the world.” Even Hitler’s old slogan about “using the swords of Germany to gain lands for the ploughs of Germany” was dragged out and given a new face with the Chinese term “conducting business with a sword in hand” (持剑经商).
Other than these [sentiments], I detect no other basic concepts in the authors’ work . . . In the words of one of the authors, a former author of China Can Say No, Song Qiang (宋强): “Saying ‘no’ expresses the idea that ‘China just wants to govern itself,’ while ‘unhappiness’ expresses the idea that ‘China is able to lead the world.'” If you want to rule this world, though, you must first suppose China already possesses both super powers and lofty ambitions in a number of [strategic] areas. Clearly, the “unhappy” authors don’t see things this way — they believe China can already lead the world, and they object to the idea of “soft power.” The net result is that they ring empty when they talk about China’s internal affairs, and they come off as falsely proud when they talk about foreign affairs. Moreover, realizing their ultimate goal of overthrowing the global capitalist structure would mean not just a “qualified break” with the West, but could only be accomplished through [what they call] the “liberation of the whole world.”
These authors hail from neither the left nor the right. Rather, they are modern proponents of realism . . . thinking about problems only from the standpoint of “power,” hoping that some day the politicians will offer their good graces. In the pre-Qin, there was a school called the “political strategists” (纵横家), and unlike the Confucians and Moists, they subscribed to no clear value concepts. They spent all of their time stumping for this or that cause, using their tongues as weapons, maneuvering about, always changing sides, empty of knowledge but full of tactics. But the political strategists were at least able to size up the situation and to come up with positions to argue . . . In this way, they were quite unlike our “unhappy” authors, who disregard all facts and all logic and sink into their own fantasies, saying what they please without presenting an argument, subjecting themselves to fits of conspiracy theory, and remaining all the time entirely amused by their own boat-rocking (“zhe teng”/折腾) . . .
I hear that the book is selling well, and that it has caught the attention of the Western media — perhaps this is what they mean by a “qualified break.” Generally, I don’t like to speculate about others’ motivations in writing this or that book, as this is something you can never be clear about. But [Phoenix TV correspondent] Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇) has revealed that: “On the day it was published, one of the books authors told me that this was a kind of method of (speculation) (“是一种(炒作)手法”), to publish a provocative book and then bandy it about. Having written this commentary up to this point, I confess I’m beginning to feel a bit thick — expostulating with such seriousness about [a book that is little more than] a circus of patriotism with its eye on the bottom line.
The writer is a professor at Nanjing University.

The following is a partial translation of an interview by Xinmin Weekly with Shanghai scholar Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦):

“Xiao Gongqin: I Oppose the Nationalism of False Pride — A Criticism of Unhappy China”
On March 27, 2009, Xiao Gongqin, a professor of history at Shanghai Normal University, agreed to an interview with Xinmin Weekly at his Shanghai residence.
Xiao Gongqin was born in Shaanxi Province, and his ancestral home is Hunan. This well-known scholar, who in the 1980s became synonymous with theories of “neo-authoritarianism,” has for many years researched contemporary political developments in China, the history of modern Chinese ideas and culture, and the political history of China in the 20th century. A few years ago, Xiao Gongqin wrote a piece entitled, “Why I Oppose Radical Nationalism” (为什么我反对激进民族主义), which was broadly influential, and he has been a shrewd observer of the latest nationalist currents.
There is no need for us to “manufacture” enemies
Xinmin Weekly: Lately, the book Unhappy China has been the source of much debate. What are your thoughts?
Xiao Gongqin: Over the last few days I’ve gone online and checked out pages dealing with Unhappy China, and in the last few weeks the number of pages dealing with it have surpassed two million, so clearly this book has had a substantial social impact. There is no question that what the authors of this book are promoting is a high-pitched, vainly arrogant and radical form of nationalism. One of the book’s authors, Wang Xiaodong (王小东), has been a friend of mine for many years, and many of the liberal intellectuals singled out for criticism in the book are also friends. China’s intellectual culture has, it seems, already entered a period of diversity, and although I do not agree with many of the views expressed in Unhappy China, as one among many voices in this developing culture, its existence, and its dialogue with differing viewpoints, can at least serve to catalyze a clash of ideas. What is most terrible, for any society or any people, is homogeneity of thought. The balancing and clashing of varying voices, whether liberalism or nationalism, cultural protectionism, etcetera, can only have a positive outcome for the enriching of our people’s capacity for thought. People holding different views should have an attitude of tolerance.
The publication of this book has created ripples, and there are many reasons why it has had such an influence, including its jarring title and its clever commercial strategy or “build up.” But one reason is certain, and that is because it seeks to answer the question of modern China’s relationship with other peoples of the world. This question tugs at people’s hearts because 30 years of reform have made the Chinese people stronger, and so after a century of shame Chinese people face the question of how to re-define ourselves.
XW: One of the book’s authors, Song Qiang (宋强), has said that he prefers the term “new patriotism” (新爱国主义) to describe the popular sentiment of nationalism [today]. What are your thoughts?
Xiao Gongqin: I’ve long held the view, even before this book came out, that China’s nationalism was marked by a reactive quality, that it was goaded by a sense of tragedy and shame over the Chinese experience in the last century. This form of reactive nationalism could be stirred up, and so if these stimuli from the outside world vanished, this sort of nationalism would fade as well. Look, for example, at the May 8, 1999, incident [in which the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade], and the 2001 collision of a Chinese fighter jet and an American spy plane. Both could be seen as examples of this reactive form of nationalism.
Nevertheless, the form of nationalism represented in this book can no longer be defined in these original terms. Overall speaking, the attitude of Western countries toward China is warmer now than it has been in the past, particularly in the midst of the economic crisis, as the West has looked to China . . . hoping for friendly cooperation, and peaceful development has already become a general consensus among nations. Under this situation, the nationalism as represented by Unhappy China, which persists in striking this menacing tone, cannot be characterized as reactive. I believe that for some time to come this nationalist wave as epitomized by Unhappy China will continue to exist, and foreigners will have to learn to come to terms with this non-reactive form of Chinese nationalism.
What is the character of this new nationalism? Its crucial point is the positing by necessity of an “external enemy,” and this is seen by the authors as a basic condition of China’s existence and development. One of the authors, Wang Xiaodong (王小东) holds precisely this. He believes that, “any species, if it is not challenged by its external environment, will certainly degenerate.” He finds a root for this new nationalism in social biology. He believes also that China has at present no “selective pressures,” so “everyone believes that things are fine, and that its OK to muddle along, and this makes degeneration unavoidable.” Particularly interesting is this line: “America too faces this problem, and so it actively goes in search of enemies.” I’m not sure, but it seems Brother Xiaodong is actually suggesting that in order for our people to grow strong, China must, lacking “selective pressures,” go and search for “selective pressures.”
I think the logic here can be summed up like this: If external pressures are the necessary condition of the development and existence of a people, if they then lack pressures, they must as a matter of course manufacture these pressures. If this is the argument, then it is both fearsome and dangerous. I really, really hope this is not what the authors mean, but what of the “angry youth” who are more radical than they are? They can certainly seize upon this logic . . . It is in this theoretical logic of nationalism that I see something frightful and dangerous. It does not lie too far, in fact, from bullying racism and jingoism.
More than ten years ago, Xiaodong applied himself to promoting nationalism, and I don’t question his academic earnestness, but if a thinker finds himself invested in a theory fraught with danger, and this framework of thought once again drags into peril a people who have only just emerged from a century of pain and who have the opportunity to thrive, that is poor timing.
Perhaps the authors will think I’ve made my case too strongly, that this is not what they intend, that they only want to urge the Chinese people not to grow idle. But what is crucial to realize is that this form of nationalism is by its own logic a Pandora’s box that will release monsters that cannot be put back.

FURTHER READING:
“Book Stokes Nationalism in China,” Jason Dean, Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2009
“China is Unhappy: censors take hands-off approach to bestseller,” Jane Macartney, The Times, March 26, 2009
“A new book reveals why China is unhappy,” Austin Ramzy, Time.com, March 20, 2009
“‘Unhappy China’ bestseller claims Beijing should ‘lead the world’,” Malcolm Moore, The Telegraph, March 29, 2009
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 2, 2009, 11:34am HK]

By David Bandurski — Reuters reported 20 minutes ago the news of the detention of environmentalist Tan Zuoren in Sichuan, so we’ll post now an evolving translation of a personal e-mail we received early this morning from a prominent Chinese filmmaker familiar with the case. Prior to his detention, Tan had been conducting independent research on the death of students in last year’s Sichuan earthquake, in many cases a direct result of shoddy building construction.

[ABOVE: “Mourning,” by Joshua and Eva, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license. A collage of Chinese newspaper front pages on the Sichuan earthquake from May 2008 ]

Our translation of the letter, which includes the text of Tan’s formal proposal urging the creation of a “May 12 Student Archive” (5·12学生档案), follows:

Tan Zuoren is a good friend of mine. He is a very reasonable and good person. Signed, ****
Friends:
On March 28, Chengdu-based environmentalist, writer and former editor of Literati magazine (文化人) magazine Tan Zuoren (谭作人) was taken into custody under charges of “inciting subversion of state power” (涉嫌颠覆国家政权). [NOTE: This is the same charge that was leveled against Hu Jia (胡佳) in January 2008]. Prior to this Mr. Tan was working on an investigation into the death of children in shoddy school buildings during the Sichuan Earthquake, and was verifying a list of students who died. On the morning of the 28th, police barged into his home and took away all computer disks, handwritten notes and other materials. Only his children were home at the time, as the police proceeded to photograph the scene.
Tan Zuoren was an organizer and participant of many charitable events that drew attention from citizens in Chengdu and wider Sichuan. He organized a “peaceful protection” (“和平保城”) movement concerning a petrochemical project in Pengzhou (彭州), and submitted to the local government a petition called “Opinions and Proposals from Citizens Concerning the Penzhou Petrochemical Project” (关于成都彭州石化项目的公民意见建议书). Following the earthquake in Sichuan last year, Tan Zuoren published many analytical articles. This spring Tan Zuoren wrote a formal written proposal for the creation of a “May 12 Student Archive” (5·12学生档案) and began research on the ground with the hope that he might complete an independent citizen investigation in time for the one-year anniversary of the Sichuan quake.
Tan Zuoren’s mobile phone cannot be reached at present, and his wife and two small children have been along at home since his detention. Prior to his detention, his computer was stolen and his household dog was stabbed with a knife [by an unknown person]. Tan Zuoren felt that these were possibly acts of revenge against himself, and he had considered separating from his family in order to protect his wife and children from harm. As of now, Tan Zuoren’s friends have managed only to reach his home phone: ******.
Below is a copy of Mr. Tan’s formal written proposal:
Where there are Web users, there is openness and fairness. Web users of China, let us do our bit for the children!
A Proposal Concerning the Creation of a “May 12 Student Archive”
For the children who died in the May 12 earthquake disaster, Chinese law has collectively been lost. This is to the shame of judicial circles, and to the collective shame of Chinese people today.
Through 30 years of reform, the Chinese people have drawn the lessons of an autocratic society (人治社会). They have put right to wrongs, and steadily built the system and laws and the judicial system demanded of a society ruled by law. In the last 30 years, the idea of governing the country according to the law has entered the hearts of the people, becoming a basic consensus praised by all.
Nevertheless, following the May 12 earthquake in Sichuan, in the faces of masses of school buildings that collapsed without reason and before thousands of students and teachers who perished as a result, China’s courts have closed their doors and China’s laws have retreated. The house of rule of law that the Chinese people have worked so hard to build is lurching on its foundations, and is in peril. China’s has started to turn back on its journey toward judicial reforms, and reemerging is the idea that power is above the law and that public power can be used for private gain.
Owing to severe restrictions by the local government on investigation into the cause of the collapse of school buildings [in Sichuan], owing to the fact that education authorities have not launched their own investigations, and owing to the fact that building departments, seismological departments and justice departments have neglected their responsibilities, no one has looked into the reasons behind the collapse of the schools. And so, before the caprice of a small number of local officials and the ridiculous lies of a number of non-experts, China’s media has fallen silent, China’s laws have shrunk away, and Chinese society has turned a blind eye to these crimes against the truth and their terrible repercussions. Given such a state, the conscience and dignity of the Chinese people has already fallen victim to the political expedience and scheming of local officials. This is not right! And it is shameful!
What is tragic is that, out of a need to cover up guilt, we still do not really know how many children we lost in the May 12 earthquake! Because of this, China stands mute before the world — of course, those [local officials] who open their eyes and speak untruths, who close their eyes and speak crosswise, are exceptions.
Particularly disgusting is the fact that when the parents of students who perished in the May 12 earthquake organized themselves and sought to defend their rights in accordance with the law, using actions to preserve the gains of legal system building, they were again faced with man-made setbacks!
The children of May 12 are children of China. Every Chinese person of conscience should feel a twinge of guilt in their hearts and feel responsible for these children. When our children face unfairness and misfortune, can we not, aside from saying a simple “sorry,” take more concrete actions on their behalf?
Only by respecting the dead can we be kind to the living. As the one-year anniversary of the May 12 quake approaches, we hereby propose to Internet media: Web users of China, take action. Put into action all of your resources and build and participate in a “May 12 Student File,” so that the teachers and students who died in the earthquake can receive the respect that should be theirs.
All life is equally valuable. In assessing our losses, we must first calculate the loss of human life. As official statistics are not accepted as credible, and as popular estimates are not substantiated, what we suggest is this: Let China’s Web users act, building on the Internet a “May 12 Student Archive” on the basis of independent citizen investigations that is validated by parents of students who perished, using the Web to return to ourselves the truths that have been glossed over. On this basis, moreover, we must build an online “May 12 Student Memorial (5·12学生墓园) . . .
We recommend the following specific plan for the “May 12 Student Archive”:
1. We request that Web volunteers organize themselves and proceed to disaster-stricken areas in Sichuan, Gansu, Shaanxi to conduct independent citizen investigations. Through interviews with the parents of students, [these groups should] verify the numbers of deceased students in every class, in every schools, in every township and village and every region, in this way building various “May 12 Student Archive (XX Group)” survey databases that can be stored on their own blogs.
2. Through independent citizen investigations, solicit name lists of deceased teachers and students, and through the gathering of survey questionnaires (please see ATTACHMENT) seek the true causes that resulted in the senseless death of students and teachers, the real facts concerning those responsible for these accidents, and come to understand the principle demands of parents of students who have sought to defend their rights according to the law as well as the specific difficulties they face, so that these cases may be quickly moved into judicial proceedings and legal evidence presented in support.
3. To gather and compile the investigation results submitted by the independent citizen investigative groups, providing these to functional departments, decision-making departments, judicial departments and the news media, promoting reasonable public policy decisions and orderly channels for resolution [of lingering issues], fundamentally ensuring social stability and preserving conscience.
4. The facts will serve as evidence, and the law as the yardstick. Through the “May 12 Student Archive” we will preserve Chinese law and dignity, consolidate our gains in the building of rule of law, and work together to build China’s civil society.
Proposal author: Tan Zuoren (谭作人), Chengdu Web user
E—mail：*********
电话：**********
February 20, 2009

FURTHER READING:
“Chinese Quake Activist Arrested,” BBC, April 1, 2009
“Chinese Official Calls for Heightened Security,” Associated Press, April 1, 2009
“Chinese Officials Defend Construction of Schools Felled in Quake,” Keith Bradsher, New York Times, March 8, 2009
Online interview with Tan Zuoren at Vimeo.com, about the Sichuan earthquake
“Our Land is Under Seige,” Tan Zuoren, Human Rights in China, 2006
Link to Tan’s NGO, Green River [List of volunteers at Green River in Chengdu, including Tan].
[Posted by David Bandurski, 2:53pm HK, April 1, 2009]

By David Bandurski — For those who have not discovered it yet, China’s leading business and finance magazine, Caijing, has now launched its own online blog section at Caijing Online. Contributors, including Caijing‘s founder and editor-in-chief, Hu Shuli (胡舒立), also a former CMP fellow, write on a range of topics, including business, politics, current affairs and media.

For just a taste, we translated Hu’s March 25 blog entry, in which she muses about the confusion that ensued at Caijing‘s Washington, D.C.-based finance forum earlier this year, when one audience member asked the panelists how they would suggest translating Hu Jintao’s newest CCP buzzword, “bu zheteng” (不折腾).

It was just after the new year at 1775 Massachussets Avenue in Washington, D.C., the home of the Brookings Institution. For the second year in a row, Caijing magazine was holding the “overseas portion” of its annual conference on “Strategies and Forecasts” at this location, and the main auditorium and two video-conferencing venues were full to capacity.
Later in the afternoon, the conference began its last panel discussion and exchanges were lively between speakers and members of the audience. Suddenly, one audience member asked a question of Chinese economist Xu Xiaonian (许小年), who was onstage as a panelist: “You were just talking about deepening reforms and loosening controls. China observers have noted that Party Chairman Hu Jintao has recently used the term “bu zheteng” (不折腾) in official speeches, and I’d like to know — the concept behind this word is at once very simple and very complicated, so how should we translate it?”
From what I know, it was on December 18, 2008, as Hu Jintao spoke to mark the 30th anniversary of economic reforms [in China] that he used for the first time the phrase, “don’t shake (动摇), don’t slacken (懈怠) and don’t zheteng” (折腾) [NOTE: The full phrase is “不动摇、不懈怠、不折腾”]. And from that time on how to translate the phrase “to not zheteng” became a point of difficulty among experts. Many translations of this term have so far come out among everyone from journalists to Chinese officials, including “don’t make trouble, “don’t do something that will finally prove useless,” “don’t do something that only wastes time,” and even “don’t flip flop,” “don’t get sidetracked,” “don’t sway back and forth” or “no dithering.” There is also the more down-to-earth version “no major changes.” But there has so far been no translation everyone is satisfied with. At a State Council Information Office press briefing on December 30, not long after the term first emerged, a use of the term by [Information Office director] Wang Chen (王晨) was rendered simply [in pinyin] as “buzheteng.”
Xu Xiaonian of course was familiar with all of this background. Thereupon, this man with top-notch translation experience, an American resident PhD economist, responded quite frankly: “I don’t know. I really don’t know.”
Global finance expert Wang Jun (王君), who was also on Xu’s panel, then chimed in, saying he had heard [China’s deputy finance minister] Jin Liqun (金立群), [who was also present in Washington], talking about this same problem. “Would Mr. Jin care to offer his thoughts?” he suggested.
“That’s right, we have a linguist in our midst,” Xu Xiaonian mused.
China Investment Corporation chairman Jin Liqun had already spoken as a guest earlier that afternoon, and he was sitting on the second row in the audience listening in on this session. Amid a peal of applause, the 59 year-old Jin Liqun stood up and shared his own knowledge. A translation of his remarks follows:
“We’ve not yet seen the final version in translation from our officials. The principal point in undertaking translation is to seek out a word that accords with the original meaning, but this is an impossible mission. Therefore, I won’t attempt this myself. As to this “bu zheteng” I think we must not seek out a particular cognate, but must instead work hard to understand history, the history following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. For example, from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution . . .
That is to say, you wish to accomplish something, and you believe it is something monumental, but the result is utter chaos, so then you decide you want to do something else [monumental that ends in disaster]. This history shows that our nation has been through “zhe teng” many times.
(Laughter rolled through the audience.)
So, “zhe teng” is something that cannot be translated into English, just as there are English words that are difficult to translate into Chinese. I think that certain words and expressions within a language, slang in particular, are difficult to translate. The best thing, therefore, is to bring these words directly into English. The English language has accommodated various foreign vocabularies, such as French and German.
So, why go and trouble yourself over a translation? There is no need. Don’t.
(Laughter.)
I feel the only thing I can do is convey this sense, but it is still not enough. Moreover, some people have suggested that Shakespeare has already provided an appropriate expression: “much ado about nothing” (in Chinese translated wushishengfei, 无事生非). There is some reason in this. “Much ado about nothing” is also an acceptable translation, giving us some of the sense. But I still feel it’s not adequate enough. Why? Because “zhe teng” is a verb in Chinese, an intransitive verb, while “much ado about nothing” is a noun phrase and so can’t be used quite in this way.
And so, my answer to the question of translation, still inadequate, is to first propose that the word be directly introduced into English as “buzheteng.” If you insist upon a translation, then I think the closest phrase is “don’t rock the boat,” or “no boat rocking” (in Chinese rendered directly bu huangchuan, 别晃船). Because we are all having a good time and then somebody is starting to rock the boat. So, “buzheteng” is do not rock the boat.
Thank you, everyone.
(Laughter and applause.)
Frankly speaking, Jin Liqun is an English expert, and my own translation [of the exchange at the conference] is possibly insufficient. I’ll only offer my apologies right here, then, and return to the original [English] at the end. An english transcript of this year’s conference is already available at the conference channel on Caijing Online, so those who are interested can go and see for themselves.

[Posted by David Bandurski, March 27, 2009, 8:21am HK]
　　

By David Bandurski — Tibet is a touchy tinderbox of a subject — not to mention an incredibly complex one — and so we have long avoided mention of the “T” word on our project Website. Sifting through Chinese news coverage, however, is our raison d’être at the China Media Project. And as we’ve gone about minding our daily business in recent days, the headlines have doggedly clamored for our attention:

In People’s Daily: “Treasuring the fruits of democratic reform: celebrating the 50th anniversary of the liberation of millions of Tibetan serfs”
In Guangming Daily: “Treasuring the fruits of democratic reform: celebrating the 50th anniversary of the liberation of millions of Tibetan serfs”
In Economic Daily: “Treasuring the fruits of democratic reform: celebrating the 50th anniversary of the liberation of millions of Tibetan serfs”
At Xinhua Online: “Treasuring the fruits of democratic reform: celebrating the 50th anniversary of the liberation of millions of Tibetan serfs”
In Sichuan Daily: “Treasuring the fruits of democratic reform: celebrating the 50th anniversary of the liberation of millions of Tibetan serfs”

. . . and in Zhejiang Daily, People’s Daily Online, Gansu Daily, Beijing Daily, CPPCC Daily, CCTV.com, Qinghai Daily, Science & Technology Daily . . .

[ABOVE: “Megaphone” by Just Marc, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]

The list goes on and on. The above article, amplified across scores of official newspapers yesterday, even got a steroid injection of pre-publicity on Sunday’s official nightly newscast at China Central Television.
You can’t buy that kind of publicity — unless, of course, you’re an authoritarian government.
We don’t mean to dredge up that old wisdom — Vladimir Lenin’s, wasn’t it? — about how, if you repeat a lie often enough, people will begin to believe it. This isn’t a provocative post about whether the CCP has its facts right or wrong. (For that, we refer you to the latest English-language coverage of protests in Tibet, a rather stark counterpoint to the carnival atmosphere in the official media).
But when we sat down yesterday to sort through a cross-section of Chinese coverage of Tibet in the last few months, it was eye-opening to realize just how much there was. There have been 3,087 articles with the keyword “Tibet” in Chinese newspapers this month according to our database, and 817 of these have had “Tibet” in the headline.
These numbers actually pale in comparison to coverage in March and April last year, when Chinese media heaped scorn on the “Dalai clique” and the “hostile foreign forces” sowing unrest in China after large-scale riots in the region. But last month, even as the CCP was gearing up for the sensitive anniversary of the 1959 uprising, there were half as many articles with “Tibet” in the headline as there have been so far this month — with days yet to go until the 28th, which the CCP has designated “Tibetan Serf Emancipation Day”.
This spring surge in Chinese coverage of Tibet is entirely understandable given the historical significance of this month and what are clearly ongoing political sensitivities in the region.
What struck me, however, as I read through People’s Daily coverage of Tibet yesterday — my database print-out gave me a 183-page tome of coverage in this official paper alone going back to March 1 — was just how insulated and pointless China’s attempt to push its own message seems to have been so far.
There has been a great deal of coverage this year about how China plans to launch its own international media ventures with the (greatly misguided, I think) hope of upping its “share of global public opinion.” Judging from the international response to all of the CCP’s noise on Tibet, it seems they could really use the help. But if these new international outlets play the same game, offering one-sided coverage, they can probably expect the same results.
If you go back just a few weeks, China has spoken volumes about Tibet, the “true situation” in Tibet, the CCP’s cultural contributions to Tibet (gainsaying the “Dalai cliques” supposed slander about the “destruction of Tibetan culture”). It has published supposed personal accounts that testify to progress wrought by the CCP in Tibet. And of course it has peddled the usual propaganda tropes: “Only in the embrace of the socialist national family, upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, cleaving to the socialist system . . . has Tibetan society been able to achieve continued development and the Tibetan people enjoy a prosperous today and an even brighter tomorrow!” (That’s from Sunday’s People’s Daily).
But nothing speaks better to the seeming pointlessness of this public relations effort than the reception given to a flesh-and-blood delegation to the U.S. and Canada recently, which included NPC delegate and “Living Buddha” Shingtsa Tenzinchodrak.
People’s Daily covered the delegation again yesterday, with an article on page 3 that quoted Tenzinchodrak as saying:

“Right now many people in the West have misconceptions about Tibet and basically fail to understand Tibet. I and the other four members of the delegation are all Tibetans, born and raised, and we all come from the grassroots. We are officials, doctors, village cadres, and we understand Tibet and represent the Tibetan people. We have made this journey with the hope of connecting with them face-to-face and having a discussion. I am confident this will help them better understand Tibet.”

Tenzinchodrak was in Toronto, where he hosted a “forum” on Tibet and later, said People’s Daily, gave “exclusive interviews to several major Canadian broadcasters.”
Strangely, though, this official delegation, “Living Buddha” notwithstanding, seems to have gotten no coverage where it counts — zero, zip, ling (零).
The delegation traveled thousands of miles, straight into the milling media hives of North America (Washington, New York and Toronto), with all the propaganda power and determination China’s government could muster. They endured jetlag and bad airline food. And for what?
That’s right. Resounding silence.
A search of the last week for “Tenzinchodrak” in Google News brings up only one small piece from Canada’s National Post , which maintains a sceptical tone about the China delegation and focusses mostly on an October 2007 meeting between the Dalai Lama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. The article’s headline refers to Tenzinchodrak as “Beijing’s ‘living Buddha’.”
The rest of the news coverage stays entirely within the family:

* Xinhua News Agency, in English (also in French)
* China Daily
* Radio China International (also in Polish)

The delegation did manage to earn this story from Epoch Times, but it hardly makes the scoreboard — it is about how certain journalists were allegedly ejected from the Toronto forum by Chinese consulate representatives.
Was it necessary for the delegation to travel so far to get such “positive propaganda”?
The delegation fares no better in a Lexis-Nexis database search for coverage over the last week in major U.S. and international media (including broadcast transcripts).

The articles on the roster are basically: Xinhua, BBC Monitoring Service regurgitation of Xinhua (identified as Xinhua), Xinhua, and China Daily.
Further down there is a brief article from Voice of America, which tags onto Tenzinchodrak’s comments an unflattering “meanwhile” about the ongoing “security clampdown in Tibet”:

A Chinese official has downplayed expectations for further talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s envoys on Tibet. Meanwhile, China has launched a security clampdown in Tibet and neighboring regions to prevent protests marking the 50th anniversary of a failed uprising against Chinese rule. Tibetan rights groups have reported small protests in Tibet and nearby areas in recent days . . .

The last bit of coverage is an item that appeared in the White House Bulletin on March 17. As it reports the delegation’s activities in the U.S. capital, the item sums up very well both the significance of China’s aggressive public relations campaign on Tibet and its enormous challenges:

A delegation of five Tibetan deputies in China’s National People’s Congress said Tuesday morning that economic and social conditions in the troubled region — wracked by political violence last year — are improving across the board.
The group spoke at the Chinese Embassy, and the event was probably more remarkable for what it represented than for what was said. By bringing the deputies to speak in Washington, the Chinese government is showing a far greater willingness to be active in Washington public relations efforts on a deeply sensitive internal issue.

This engagement may for China mark the beginning of a long, arduous and productive lesson in how to build real international credibility. First, of course, they will need to learn from their mistakes.
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 24, 2009, 12:26pm HK]
FURTHER READING:
“Chinese in UK mark reforms in Tibet,” China Daily, March 23, 2009
“West ‘lacks information about Tibet’,” China Daily, March 23, 2009

By David Bandurski — It is no big secret that policies made with the best of intentions can be foolishly unworkable, and perhaps party leaders in the city of Guangzhou should be given the benefit of the doubt — about their intentions, that is. Earlier this week, top city leaders in Guangzhou rolled out measures for a bold new “accountability system” designed to “further systematize” good behavior among cadres.
The only problem, as a few Chinese commentaries have pointed out, is that under these “new” measures, just as under the old status quo, the mandate to supervise rests entirely in the hands of the cadres themselves.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of news coverage of Guangzhou’s “accountability system.” Gov’t document at right says officials will be held accountable for not accepting media supervision. Thought bubble says: “I have to publicly apologize too . . . “]

But let us assume for a moment that the Guangzhou measures are preferable to, say, nothing. We can at least argue — can’t we? — that they make more explicit statements about the kinds of behavior leaders should be held accountable for. [The full text of the Guangzhou document is available here].
Take Article 2, for example, which specifies in general — I realize that’s an oxymoron, but it fits — the various grounds on which a leader may be held accountable for negligent behavior:

1. Formulation and promulgation of decisions or orders that violate the party constitution and other party regulations, and/or [violate] laws and regulations.
2. The making of policy decisions outside one’s scope of authority.
3. Violation of procedures in the selection of cadres, or serious misuse or abuse of employees.
4. Failure to act in accordance with procedural rules in carrying out major policy decisions.
5. Failure to act in accordance with regulations that call for evidentiary hearings, public hearings or other forms of opinion-seeking in carrying out projects that have broad social implications directly touching on the interests of the masses.
6. Failure to make public information on policy decisions that should be made public in accordance with regulations.

Further down, Article 11 deals with the “acceptance of supervision” by officials, and defines four more situations in which they are to be held accountable for being naughty:

1. Failure to accept or cooperate with intra-party supervision, legal supervision, democratic supervision, supervision by public opinion [“watchdog journalism”] and supervision by the masses.
2. Inciting, leading or tolerating employees of one’s department in suppression of, tampering with or opposition to supervisory inspections or case investigations, or physical acts of revenge against those responsible for filing cases, informants, plaintiffs or witnesses.
3. Failure to execute decisions rendered by the People’s Court or administrative decisions.
4. Failure, without proper cause, to rectify violations of the law or party discipline after opinions and comments have been rendered by superior organs, discipline inspection organs or administrative supervision departments.

The basic problem with the Guangzhou measures is evident if you give even cursory thought to any of the specifications listed above.
It is already a serious problem, for example, for officials to “violate procedures in the selection of cadres.” Nevertheless, it happens all the time. Similarly, overstepping one’s line of authority is by definition a breach of responsibility — that’s why the lines are there to begin with.
What good is an “accountability system” if it is nothing more than a verbal statement of the obvious? If it establishes no real cross-checks?
Giving Guangzhou leaders the benefit of the doubt, we can see from the second group of specifics above that they are in fact including external forms of supervision in their “accountability system.” They talk about “legal supervision,” “supervision by the masses,” and about media supervision, or “supervision by public opinion.”
But it is here especially that the tougher institutional questions come to the fore. Clearly, supervision, insofar as it means placing real checks on power, demands some level of independence from those carrying out supervision — and that requires some form of institutional reform, whether it be a more independent legal system or political protections for more independent journalism.
None of these nagging issues come up in the Guangzhou measures, and this is where Chinese critics have cautiously found fault this week.
But we’ll start out with a more positive take by Xu Xunlei (徐迅雷) that appeared in CNHubei’s Donghu Commentary column (东湖评论) on March 18, and dealt with the relationship between officials and the media.
Xu’s column begins with a quote from Abraham Lincoln, the Chinese translation of which cleverly employs the adverbial phrase jianding buyi de (坚定不移地), which Chinese President Hu Jintao used at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 in language about the need to develop socialist democratic politics:

“I believe resolutely in the people. If we allow them to know the truth then we can rely upon them to resolve any crisis facing the nation. The important thing is to answer them truthfully.” These words were left to us by the great American president Abraham Lincoln.
“Answering [the people] truthfully” is [a concept] inseparable from the media. Transmitting information down [to the people] is work that requires the media; The expression of public opinion comes from the media; monitoring by society cannot happen without the media. The power of the media and the news is an important extension of soft power. In the modern age of globalized information, the relationship between officials and the media must grow ever closer.
Here is a bit of good news: Guangzhou’s “Provisional Measures for Accountablity Among Guangzhou Party and Government Cadres” state that [leaders will be] held accountable in cases where personnel are misused, sudden-breaking events are not reported, are reported to late or are not reported truthfully, and in cases where information about policy decisions is not made public in accordance with regulations (Southern Metropolis Daily, March 17). On the question of accepting supervision, [the measures] state clearly that cases where party and government officials do not accept or do not cooperate with media supervision will fall within the scope of accountability. Relevant experts have said that this move clearly shows the enlightened and progressive stance of government offices [in Guangzhou] (New Express, March 17).
This is happy and welcome news. Before the face of public opinion, we can see and touch political democracy (政治民主). Guangdong province is on the front lines of economic reform, and it makes sense that it should be one step ahead in the building of an accountability system for party and government leaders . . .
If our government is to make the transition for a control-based system to a service-based system, it must demand that officials put a premium not on power but on accountability. Accepting supervision should be a clear institutional responsibility. Shanxi province has already chalked one up for progress [on this front]. The attitude toward the handling of the February 22 gas explosion at the Dunlan Mine was essentially one of openness and transparency toward reporters, unlike in the past, when the first thought governments had after mine disasters was to prevent reporting and cover up the truth. Media from outside [Shanxi] said: “This time around it’s completely different. The local authorities employed a high-level of transparency in handling [the disaster], and when reporters showed their press cards to police at the entrance, they were immediately granted entry and were free to move about the area . . . ”

The tone of Xu’s editorial is almost jubilant. One must suppose that he is either genuinely optimistic about changes in Guangzhou, or feels that the change in tone is positive and therefore deserves boisterous praise, whatever the outcome might be in practice.
The final line of Xu’s essay suggests, however, that he has woefully misread the measures, having confused the text with institutional reality. He writes exultantly that, in Guangzhou, “the system has determined that ‘accepting media supervision’ is the first choice.”
Begging Xu’s pardon, but the “system” has done no such thing. The measures no more ensure acceptance of media supervision by Guangzhou officials than China’s constitutional language about free expression (Chapter 2, Article 35) ensures citizens can publicly speak their minds.
One of the best criticisms along these lines came yesterday in the commentary pages at Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News, where Pan Hongqi (潘洪其) wrote that what media supervision required was not “acceptance” by party officials but real institutional protections for journalists:

According to some relevant experts, these regulations in Guangzhou underscored the importance of supervision by public opinion [“watchdog journalism” or “media supervision], and reflected the progressiveness and enlightened attitude of the government. Still, the demands in the “Measures” that officials accept and cooperate with media supervision are still enough to make one feel unsure.
When media carry out supervision of officials, the relationship between media and officials is one of monitor to monitored. When it comes to specific incidences or events, if those who are monitored are confident there are no problems they will have no fear of being monitored, and of course they will openly accept supervision and offer up their cooperation. That sort of supervision is quite safe for those being monitored, and the monitor also feels quite obliging, so the relationship on both sides is quite accommodating and harmonious. But the case more frequently is that officials either worry that this or that small problem will be uncovered by the media, or they are determined at whatever cost to cover up some major scandal. In such cases it is clearly difficult for them to accept and actively cooperate with media supervision.
In the first case above, the official has no problems that prevent him from accepting and cooperating with media supervision (and some officials will artfullyl use active “cooperation” to turn so-called supervision into “positive news reports” about themselves). Therefore, regulations about “officials being held accountable for not accepting or cooperating with media supervision” have no real meaning for them. Moreover, in the second case mentioned above, the fear among officials that they be held accountable for not accepting or cooperating with media supervision is much smaller than the fear they have of being held accountable or being disciplined by the party discipline inspection apparatus as a result of a scandal unearthed through media supervision. In the vast majority of cases, officials will opt against accepting or cooperating with media supervision because in their view the costs of not accepting supervision are much smaller than the cost of a media expose of wrongdoing. In this situation regulations about “officials being held accountable for not accepting or cooperating with media supervision” will be equally meaningless.
In point of fact, whether officials accept and cooperate with media supervision or not is not greatly important. The real important question is whether or not media can confidently and firmly carry out supervision of officials. Supposing media can be bold in conducting supervision, then they can simply include the fact of an official’s “failure to accept and cooperate” in their report — this is itself a form of media supervision.

[Posted by David Bandurski, March 20, 2009, 4:47pm HK]