By David Bandurski — Are China’s leaders becoming more responsive to the concerns and demands of the public? Is China, thanks to the Internet, moving toward a more “deliberative” and participatory political culture? Rebecca MacKinnon’s forthcoming work on what she is calling “cybertarianism” will no doubt address these and other related questions, and her preliminary comments are well worth a read.
We are still a long way from understanding the real effects of the Internet on public discourse in China. But first and foremost, we must not assume the Internet has been the only deliberative mechanism working in China’s controlled media environment.
China has a long tradition of journalists working within the system, controls notwithstanding, to expose social injustices and other wrongs. And there are signs that hard-nosed journalism, investigative journalism carried out under the banner of “supervision by public opinion” — or Chinese watchdog journalism — has been under threat on several fronts during the past few years.
Can blogs and online forums pick up the slack?

[ABOVE: Chinese President Hu Jintao chats online with Web users for the first time on June 20, 2008, as propaganda chief Liu Yunshan (far left) looks on with furrowed brow.]

Another critical question is to what degree some of the apparent signs of greater “deliberation” are in fact more aggressive, grandstanding attempts by the leadership to massage public opinion — while traditional controls, we must remember, are perhaps stronger than ever.
How excited should we be about Hu Jintao’s online conversation with “web friends”? [Chinese transcript of conversation here].
This is where all of our chatter about what we have called “Control 2.0” intersects with the discussion of “cybertarianism,” “deliberative authoritarianism,” whatever you wish to call it.
We have only to look at the party’s own discourse on news and propaganda policy to understand that the CCP is interested in harnessing the power of the Internet, not unleashing it.
A few interesting articles have emerged from Chongqing this month about how the CCP can become more effective at “channeling public opinion on the Internet.”
Chongqing’s deputy propaganda chief, Zhou Bo (周波), published an article in the official Chongqing Daily earlier this month called “Leaders and Cadres Must Continually Strengthen Internet Public Opinion Channeling Capacity.” The piece argued that the Internet has transformed “the structure of public opinion channeling.” Leaders, said Zhou, must appreciate the new and growing role of the Internet and “move away from misunderstandings about the Web.”
Typical Hu Jintao “use the Web” kind of stuff, right? It doesn’t really sound that bad. Zhou seems to be saying that party leaders should not fear the Internet and should not react to it irrationally. He is advocating a change of attitude, and that’s probably a good thing if you’re looking for reasons to feel encouraged.
But while Zhou’s article talks about the Internet as “an important agent for promoting the building of democracy in our country,” “an aggregation platform through which people can vent their emotions and voice their demands” and “a new point of economic growth” (a profit-making industry in its own right, in other words), he also views the Internet in dangerous and aggressive terms as “a key strategic position as we battle our enemies for public opinion.”
“We” refers here to the leadership of the CCP, of course. So while the Internet is core to China’s continued development, and is itself an important part of the economy, it must be conquered and held against — who else? — those nasty “hostile forces” that would seek to divide China against itself.
This is fundamentally about preserving the leadership of the party, not about opening it up to questioning.
The argument is a strange compound of old impulses and new thinking. But as I’ve written elsewhere, it basically boils down to the fact that the CCP has finally embraced the Internet — and it is not letting go.
Lest we forget that control is the overarching priority, Zhou Bo’s piece emphasizes that the Internet is now the focus of propaganda work, which seeks to ensure “correct guidance of public opinion.”
Another interesting and related story to come out of Chongqing earlier this month was news that one of the municipality’s districts, Nanchuan (南川), has issued a policy requiring district-level leaders (or specially designated representatives in case important business takes leaders away) to participate in an online interview program on the last Monday of each month.
The district document, “Provisional Proposal for Nanchuan Online ‘Internet Discussion’ Work”, mandates the creation of this monthly program at the local government news website, Nanchuan Online (南川在线). Through the program, the document says, leaders will “listen to the voices of Web friends, all working together for the betterment of Nanchuan,” and they will field questions about problems and issues of concern to the masses.
That sounds like an entertaining exercise, certainly. And perhaps residents can feel they’re getting all chummy with district planning officials, for example. But what happens when someone asks a probing question like, “Could you tell me, Sir, why land was requisitioned in our district without providing residents with adequate compensation?”
Have a peek at the link directly above and you’ll see how real my hypothetical question probably is. I simply made an educated guess as to what kind of grievances people in the district might have. I plugged “Nanchuan” and “requisition” into a search engine and presto — alleged protests and police beatings over property seizures. Was I lucky? Or are such problems endemic? Do local officials really need “web friends” to point these problems out?
Experience shows that local officials are far more adept at looking out for themselves than they are at monitoring their own behavior. So what level of responsiveness can local people expect from the gracious party leaders of Nanchuan?
Nevertheless, the “Nanchuan Model” has begun to receive some attention outside Nanchuan as a bold new idea to be applied to the work of “enhancing public opinion channeling.”
Writing at Chongqing News Net on August 4, Liang Jiangping (梁江平) said that the “Nanchuan Model” offered a good example of how the drive to “enhance public opinion channeling” can be furthered by seeking “systematic and regularized” mechanisms.
“I believe the ‘Nanchuan Model’ has definite merit as a example, and it deserves emulation elsewhere,” he wrote.
The piece was re-posted on the Website of Shanghai’s Xinmin Evening News, so perhaps the idea will begin to take root.
Disgruntled citizens, start working on those lists of questions.
[Posted by David Bandurski, August 13, 2009, 2:00pm HK]

By David Bandurski — A top theorist involved in drafting Chinese President Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007 has been promoted to the post of deputy head of the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), according to China’s official Xinhua News Agency. The appointee, Wang Xiaojun (王晓晖), was formerly deputy secretary general of the Central Propaganda Department and chairman of the CPD’s Theory Office.
An elite party theorist and commentary writer, Wang replaces Jiao Li (焦利), who in May this year was appointed to take the place of Zhao Huayong (赵化勇) as chairman at China Central Television.

[ABOVE: Wang Xiaojun replaces Jiao Li as deputy head of China’s Central Propaganda Department.]

Mainland news reports on Wang Xiaojun’s appointment offered few details about his work at the propaganda department, where he has served for a number of years. But a report in Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao today said it was Wang Xiaojun who spearheaded the formulation of Hu Jintao’s “Six Why’s” earlier this year.
According to Chinese media reports, Wang arrived in Nanchang on August 7 for his first official visit as deputy propaganda chief. During a tour of the area, Wang and his entourage visited a memorial commemorating the August 1, 1927, “Nanchang Uprising” (南昌八一起义), which in CCP lore marks the birth of China’s Red Army, as well as other sites of party patriotism.
A report on the local government website in Nanchang also mentioned Wang’s visit to sites commemorating Deng Xiaoping’s work in Changsha, where Deng and his wife, Zhuo Lin, were exiled for three years beginning in October 1969, during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution.
[Posted by David Bandurski, August 10, 2009, 12:33am HK]

By Qian Gang — A post called “Conversations with an Old Comrade on the Eve of the 60th Anniversary of the PRC” (国庆60周年前夕一位老同志的谈话) has made the rounds on the Internet this week. The post, which comes ahead of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, and urges a critical reassessment of the Communist Party’s record, is now being systematically removed from blogs and bulletin boards inside China.
“Conversations with an Old Comrade” was purportedly compiled from recent interviews with a former high ranking CCP official. The online text refers to him as a “leader of the country and the party” (党和国家领导人), suggesting he held a position at the national level.
Although the authenticity of the post has not been confirmed, most who have read it believe it was indeed sourced from a senior party member. Readers have also remarked that the post is reminiscent of “50 Years of Trials and Hardships” (风雨苍黄50年), an influential piece penned by party elder Li Shenzhi (李慎之) on the occasion of the party’s 50th anniversary in 1999.

[ABOVE: Party elder Li Shenzhi, author of an important reflection on the CCP in 1999, passed away in 2003.]

Certainly, both Li Shenzhi and the mystery author of this week’s post share an interest in treating major PRC anniversaries as opportunities to talk about the shortcomings of CCP rule. If “Conversations with an Old Comrade” is authentic, however, it seems that the “old comrade” in question is even higher ranking than was Li Shenzhi.
The post begins in a very unconventional way. It relates how a young professor from the Central Party School paid a visit one day to the “old comrade” and addressed to him a series of questions raised by local and regional leaders. What things have gone unchanged in the 60 years since the establishment of the PRC? Why have these not changed? Is change possible?
The old comrade responds to the professor:

There are so many things that have not changed in the 60 years since the nation’s founding. The most basic, underlying fact is that this nation is still ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, and this is a truth everyone is clear about. But what other things stand behind this fact? For example, the CCP is a party of 70 million members. It is the world’s largest political party. And yet, the party has not yet been registered with the government authorities responsible for managing social organizations [namely, the Ministry of Civil Affairs]. And why is that? Our country still has no Political Party Law (政党法). After 60 years, this is something that has not changed. Our country still, to this day, does not have a political system in the modern sense. It is truer to say, in other words, that “the nation belongs to the CCP” than to say that “the CCP is the party of the nation.” After 60 years the concept of “party and government leaders” (党和国家领导人) has not changed. And in terms of national finances, no barriers whatsoever have been erected between the CCP treasury and the national treasury.
Look further and you see that China’s millions of soldiers are still called the People’s Liberation Army. In this area too nothing at all has changed. We still have no national armed forces in the true sense. The highest member of the armed forces is the highest leader in the CCP . . . After 60 years, nothing whatsoever has changed on this front.
Look within the CCP itself, and you see also that in 60 years no competitive system in the true sense has been established [to determine leadership positions]. It goes without saying that the same is true of the government.

The “old comrade” strongly opposes the slogan “60 years of resplendence,” which has been used to refer to the legacy of Communist Party rule in China. Is it possible to argue that the three or four years of the Great Leap Forward or the disastrous decade of the Cultural Revolution were resplendent? The CCP may not wish to subtract those painful years from the total, he suggests, but ordinary Chinese, historians and even ordinary CCP members most certainly will.
The old comrade recalls an exchange with an elderly party colleague who had presided over some work of the CCP’s Secretariat the early 1980s, and who resided in Shenzhen for several years in the twilight of his life. When the “old comrade” pays a visit to this elderly official, the latter shares one major delight and two major regrets about the path the country had taken.
His delight was that the economic reforms he had personally helped to promote in southern China had become a model for the whole nation to follow. One of his regrets was the party’s inability to rehabilitate its major historical errors. Another was the party’s failure to implement a policy of tolerance for alternative viewpoints. The “old comrade” recalls in the post: “He said very little. When he had finished speaking, the two of us just fell silent.”
The “old comrade” argues that tolerance for differing viewpoints should be a basic political ethic of the ruling party:

The Kuomingtang party lorded it over us for 22 years, closed down our newspapers and magazines, murdered members of our party, and expunged differing opinions from our schools. History has shown that these policies failed. The CCP, which has ruled for 60 years now, must not use similar methods against alternative viewpoints and against other people.

The “old comrade” in fact counts the CCP’s posture of intolerance toward popular viewpoints and ideas from scholars, experts and “members of democratic parties” as one of its most serious errors:

Sixty years is an occasion for both celebration and reflection. The whole nation must reflect back, and the whole party must reflect back. The ruling party, which is the nation’s only ruling party, and which has ruled for 60 years, should always have at least the most basic courage to reflect back. This, in fact, is a responsibility, a responsibility of the ruling party. Naturally, reflecting back would mean the airing of differing viewpoints. There is nothing at all unusual about this. If the climate becomes tense [ahead of the anniversary], if actions are taken to suppress [various ideas and activities], this suggests that the CCP is severely lacking in bearing and self-confidence. In my view, the views of the ordinary people, of members of democratic parties, of experts and scholars, and of the politically frustrated — these four categories of viewpoints — must be heeded and respected, and must not be suppressed. It discomforts me to realize that I am voicing ideas here that the ancients voiced more than a thousand years ago.

“Conversations with an Old Comrade” is identified online as having been “reorganized from four conversations with an old comrade of honor and integrity.” But if this is indeed the work of an elderly party member, who could it be?
There have been plenty of guesses. Most submit that this comrade must be a veteran of 1980s reforms in China, probably a member of the Secretariat of the 12th Central Committee of the CCP. Guesses have included Qiao Shi (乔石), Gu Mu (谷牧) and Wan Li (万里).
Others have suggested the work was done by a younger writer imitating the style of a party elder.
Whatever the case, I believe this article, which urges China and the CCP to mark the 60th anniversary of the PRC’s establishment by engaging in deep reflection rather than indulging in empty eulogies, does represent the views shared by leaders of conscience within the CCP.
[Posted by David Bandurski, August 7, 2009, 8:09pm HK]
SELECT DELETED POSTS of “Conversations with an Old Comrade”

By David Bandurski — Two research collections recently published by the China Media Project were among 44 books selected to the celebrity recommendation list at this month’s 2009 Hong Kong Book Fair. Local books on this prestigious list are compiled on the basis of recommendations by 34 Hong Kong celebrities, who also offer reviews of one or more books on the list.
Chinese Media and Political Reform (中國傳媒與政治改革), written by CMP director Qian Gang, was published in August 2008, while A Record of Change in China’s Media (中國傳媒風云錄), co-edited by Qian Gang and Ying Chan, director of the Journalism and Media Studies Centre, was released last fall.

[ABOVE: CMP co-directors Qian Gang and Ying Chan make an appearance with China Media Project book selections at this year’s Hong Kong Book Fair.]

Also on the celebrity recommendation list was Gravestone (墓碑), a book on mass starvation in China in the 1950s and 1960s written by CMP visiting fellow Yang Jisheng.
Yang visited Hong Kong several times on CMP fellowships while conducting research for his book. Yang was also one of the speakers for the China Media Forum, hosted by the China Media Project in October 2007.
[Posted by David Bandurski, July 31, 2009, 9:50am U.S. Eastern Standard Time]

By Qian Gang — A winter, bleak and gloomy, seems to be upon us. On July 14, Beijing Gongmeng Information LLC (hereafter referred to as “Gongmeng”), a non-governmental organization formed by a group of prominent Chinese lawyers, and registered as a private company, was fined 1.42 million yuan by tax authorities. Soon after, the Ministry of Civil Affairs banned the activities of Gongmeng’s research center.
I wrote in my last piece about how Chinese officials are rashly resorting to the use of the political catchphrase “stability is the overriding priority.” But there are other more palpable signs, like the troubles facing Gongmeng, suggesting the political environment in China is growing more tense.
Chinese media have been unable to speak at all on the Gongmeng affair, and this is an icy silence indeed. Aside from a brief report in Guangzhou’s Southern Weekend, we had only two blog entries on the issue. These were re-run by the Rural Issues Online site (三农在线). One of the bloggers was Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), an expert researching contemporary social conflict in China. He hit the nail on the head when he wrote: “The difficulties facing Gongmeng are a tragedy for our entire society.”

[ABOVE: Chinese lawyer Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Gongmeng’s legal representative. Xu has tried numerous rights defense cases. This picture was taken on June 9, 2004, in a petitioner’s village in Beijing. Xu’s blog may be found HERE.]

Gongmeng’s fate is rooted in the nature of its emergence and identity. It is a corporation in name, but in fact works as a non-governmental organization (NGO) that does legal assistance work. The organization represented the plaintiffs in China’s poisoned milk scandal, and was involved in the case of Deng Yujiao (邓玉娇), the waitress who stabbed a local official, as well as the Yang Jia (杨佳) case. Why did it not register as a social organization? Because registering as a social organization is much more difficult than setting up a private enterprise.
China’s constitution states that citizens enjoy freedom of association [Chapter II, Article 35], but has this freedom ever been realized? Registering social organizations requires association with a “sponsoring unit” approved by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and there is a further requirement that “there is no social organization with the same or similar scope of operation within the same jurisdiction.” If you don’t wish to be “yamen-ized” (衙门化), or co-opted into the bureaucracy, then your only alternative is to commercialize. But once you have taken this route, you fall into the snare of taxation authorities, opening yourself up to fraud charges.
There have been many guesses as to the precise reasons for Gongmeng’s troubles. I don’t wish to add my own speculation here. But we should pay close attention as this situation unfolds, observing the potentially serious political signs emerging from the Gongmeng story.
It is no secret that China’s political reform process has long been hamstrung. Still, it is not entirely accurate to say that the Chinese Communist Party is utterly indifferent to political reform. CCP political theorists have long expended effort to carve out what they see as the safest and most reliable proposals for Chinese political reform. More recently, they have publicized a “60 year schedule,” counting from 1980, that has China establishing democratic politics (民主政治) by 2040. [See Gongjian (攻坚), pg. 45, by Zhou Tianyong (周天勇)、Wang Changjiang (王长江) and Wang Anling (王安岭)].
This “democratic politics” would of course come with the precondition that the CCP’s leadership position be preserved, that the party would maintain control over official appointments (党管干部), over the military (党管军队) and the media (党管新闻). This means that even according to the most progressive political reform plan party theorists can muster, China will still not have general elections, a private-sector military or freedom of speech in 30 year’s time.
But the CCP has planned to “test the waters” (试水) in two areas in particular — the first is “civil society,” or minjian (民间), the second is religion. The party has talked about “bringing into play the active role of civil society organizations and religion” (发挥民间组织和宗教的积极作用), creating a “modern civil society” by 2020 (形成现代的公民社会). It was a positive sign for NGOs like Gongmeng that the party should venture language like this.
In fact, mainland China had quite a lively civil society during the Republican Era. But in the half century since the CCP came to power in 1949, the nation has been under the party’s comprehensive control, and socialism has made space only for the “ism” and has left “society” out in the cold. Since the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, the term “civil society” (公民社会) has appeared more regularly in China’s media.
An active civil society is an indispensable median zone between the government and the public. It plays a positive role in promoting information sharing, reducing conflict and encouraging people to be good citizens. Whether in Taiwan or Hong Kong, a civil society is an absolutely necessary factor in the process of social development. After the earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, the government recognized the tremendous potential of NGOs and volunteers.
I accept the argument for gradual political reform. The CCP bears substantial historical burdens, and citizens must become more mature and engaged, and if political reform leapt straight to core changes to the system, this might be too hasty. Working toward the development of civil society, and protecting the basic rights of citizens, might be an effective way to move forward in a steady manner. But senior leaders in the CCP remain coy about civil society development. The term “civil society” is not a sensitive one in China, and party theorists have generally treated it as a positive factor, and sometimes even actively advocated it. Strangely, though, party leaders have never used the term in speeches or official documents.
If NGOs are cravenly obedient, they might continue in China without incident. But if, like Gongmeng, they work determinedly toward democracy, rule of law and social justice, making their presence felt in major legal cases, they will find opposition from the authorities.
Steadily through the years news has emerged from the mainland about NGOs being harassed and shut down. They have pressed ahead through a political minefield, one terrible explosion following another. In this sense, actions against NGOs have been unexceptional occurrences. But the Gongmeng affair has andcome at time when we are again hearing language from the leadership about stability being the overriding priority, and we must therefore pay close attention.
It is chilling indeed to see an NGO to be targeted in such a way. The party now seems to regard even the most moderate forces of change as a scourge on its leadership. And the only explanation for this can be that hardline, extreme elements within the party are making their influence felt. These are dangerous signs!
[Translated by David Bandurski]

By David Bandurski — Not so long ago, the suppression of any and all information about mass incidents in China was a matter of virtual certainty. But Chinese officials have surprised over the past year. They have often been right on top of strikes, riots and opinion storms. And crisis management has been, at least on the surface, more about press conferences and press releases, and less about police muscle.
At CMP, we have used the term Control 2.0 to talk about an emerging new order of information management and control in China, something more nuanced and clever, and something altogether more Hu Jintao.
But the government’s handling of the recent situation in Shishou, Hubei province, raises serious questions about whether Hu Jintao’s policy of first reporting is actually drawing support among the leadership.
There were more explicit rumblings of Control 2.0 in early 2007, when Hu talked about “using” the Internet more actively to more effectively achieve “guidance of public opinion.” But in June 2008, when Hu spoke in a pivotal address at People’s Daily of a “new pattern of public opinion guidance” for the information age, the framework of Control 2.0 was more clearly drawn [MORE on “guidance” and “channeling”].
Hu’s policy of “grabbing the initiative” in news coverage of sudden-breaking events, including mass incidents, has been stretching its wings ever since the riots in Weng’an, Guizhou province, one year ago. We have had since then: Menglian in Yunnan (孟连事件), Longnan in Gansu (甘肃陇南), Jishou in Hunan (湖南吉首非法集资事件), taxi strikes in a number of areas, a primitive armed conflict in Dongfang, Hainan (海南东方械斗事件), and incidents in Ningxia’s Haiyuan (海南东方械斗事件) and Jiangxi’s Nankang (江西南康事件).
In all of these cases, we have seen must faster response on the part of the government, which has moved to release limited information quickly through official media, such as Xinhua News Agency. Is this openness? Or as a correspondent of the Telegraph recently asked: “Is this because media restrictions have been lifted, allowing news of riots to spread . . . ?”
No. And a thousand times, no.
For news stories that are especially sensitive politically — like that surrounding the verdict in the Yang Jia case, the corruption case against former Shanxi governor Yu Youjun (于幼军), and the more recent corruption case against Shenzhen mayor Xu Zongheng (许宗衡) — media controls are as strict, or stricter, than ever. And controls are also more nuanced than ever. Many so-called “negative reports” are handled by limiting coverage, even at People’s Daily and CCTV, to news bulletin style releases from Xinhua News Agency, and in-depth reporting is strictly controlled.
Media controls this year are tighter even than in 2008, owing especially to the 20th anniversary of June 4 and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the P.R.C.
So we have to see these overtures of “transparency” within the context of tightening control.
To understand what kind of “transparency” we are looking at, in fact, we would do well to return to the words of Jiang Zemin, the policy author of “guidance of public opinion,” on that very subject. It was Jiang Zemin who said after June 4, 1989: “There are things that should be transparent, or must be transparent; there other things that cannot be made transparent right away; then there are those things that must not be made transparent.”
Is that clear?
The difference with Control 2.0 is that the party is moving from a defensive position, as passive controllers and censors, to a more active position. That is to say, they are now on the offensive.
Control 2.0 is control that makes a shrewdly realistic assessment of China’s new information environment — the result of the Internet, predominantly — and recognizes there are some events that cannot be entirely controlled. So the core of Control 2.0 is reporting at the first possible moment those news events that cannot be concealed, getting the government’s official explanation and version of the facts out first. This preempts other media, including international media.
By getting the information out, officials can get the “peripheral media” (especially influential portal news sites, but also commercial newspapers) to work for them. These media feed off of the original Xinhua reports, amplifying their effect. Those same reports, with only slight permutations in many cases, become AFP, Reuters and AP reports. Finally, using those methods that create the smallest stir, you kill the information it is most critical to keep under wraps, keeping rabble-rousing professional media away, and punishing those media that “don’t listen.”
BUT. In the recent Shishou incident, Xinhua News Agency did not report the news at the first available moment, and it was five days before Hubei provincial leaders relayed the news that “the incident had been calmed.”
This handling of the incident has drawn some criticism from the same official media, including People’s Daily, that have been drumming home Hu’s point about “taking the initiative” in news reporting, the Control 2.0 mantra. People’s Daily wrote back on June 25 that:

Weng’an was a seminal moment for the government’s new approach to information control and the handling of important news events. Guizhou’s top leader, Shi Zongyuan (石宗源), said during this year’s meeting of the National People’s Congress that a policy of information transparency had been the key to calming down the crisis at Weng’an.
As in the case of Weng’an, the Shishou mass incident originated with a death under suspicious circumstances, in which the explanation provided by police did not satisfy the family members of the victim and the general public.
The problem was that the authorities did not work fast or effective enough in getting out “the government’s point of view.” Meanwhile, posts in Internet forums multiplied.

The People’s Daily piece concluded by repeating Hu Jintao’s gospel of media control:

In the age of the Web, everyone can potentially be a source of information and a wellspring of opinion. It is as though everyone has a microphone before them. This has raised the bar on the need for public opinion channeling. Faced with sudden-breaking issues, it is not sufficient for the government and mainstream [official] media to release information. They must also move quickly to understand the pulse of new information emerging on the Internet, reacting quickly to public doubts. This requires that governments, and especially propaganda offices, be equipped with the ability to rapidly and accurately compile and analyze public opinion.

Now we are hearing from media insiders that orders have come down from the propaganda department telling news media not to report critically on the handling of the Shishou incident.
Is it possible that the Shishou incident signals the weakness of Hu Jintao’s bold new media control strategy, a reticence at even the highest levels about the wisdom of opening things up at all — even when the ultimate objective is control?
The response to Shishou, and the reversion to traditional information control tactics in its aftermath, could suggest a reassertion of the old “guidance.”
We’ll have to keep watching.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 29, 2009, 8:09pm HK]

By David Bandurski — There is plenty of discussion in the West about whether the international response to Iran’s election crisis has been strong enough. But the Guangming Daily newspaper, published by China’s Central Propaganda Department, pressed the point yesterday that “Western factors” have been working nefariously behind the scenes to capitalize on a sensitive political situation.
The newspaper said that one important reason the “election crisis” in Iran was becoming “more and more serious” was that “Western forces” were “adding fuel to the fire.”
The article argues that the demonstrations contesting the election results would not have happened at all had Western governments not offered “outside support.”

“It can be said, only with outside ‘support’ would the ‘reform party’ dare to challenge Khamanei and the power of the government.”

After briefly summarizing the pressure applied by Western leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the article enumerates, without a hint of skepticism, all of the charges Iran has leveled against the West, such as the use of special agents and the coordinating of “propaganda” efforts through the BBC and CNN.

[ABOVE: Yesterday’s edition of Guangming Daily discusses Western “interference” in Iran’s internal affairs.]

The article’s author, Li Jiabin (李佳彬), has written a number of such articles in recent days. Li wrote on June 23 that the U.S. government had “demanded that the operator of the Twitter service cooperate with the activities of Iran’s opposition party.” Surely, the newspaper means to say that the U.S. State Department requested that Twitter postpone a scheduled maintenance.
Portions of yesterday’s Guangming Daily article follow:

In addition, they [the Western forces] arranged for intelligence agents and anti-government organizations to “cause trouble and disorder.” Iranian security officials said on June 20 that they had arrested a large numbers of members of Mujahideen militia groups. Those arrested have already admitted that they were trained at in Iraq run by the American military, tasked with sowing chaos after the elections in Iran. Meanwhile, in Britain, there are still Mujahideen command centers which control there movements within Iran. Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said on the 21st that Britain had begun sending large numbers of intelligence agents to Iran ahead of the presidential election, brazenly interfering in the internal politics of Iran. At the same time, he warned France against interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. On June 22, Iran’s foreign ministry called together ambassadors from Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other nations and issued a note of protest, demanding that these countries respect Iran’s election results and cease participation in hostile propaganda and other activities toward Iran. While these nations have denied “meddling” in Iran’s election, it is a widely known secret that Western intelligence agents have long participated in activities to subvert the Iranian regime.
Thirdly, [the West] has used its media and the Internet to foment unrest. After the election crisis occurred, the Western media filled the headlines with coverage of the situation in Iran. CNN, for example, repeatedly interrupted its regular news programming to do several hours of continuous live coverage of demonstrations by Iran’s opposition party. On June 20, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said that in recent news reports on the Iranian elections, Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation had taken on the role of mouthpieces for the United States and Britain and command centers for inciting unrest in Iran with the objective of driving a wedge of separatism among the Iranian people.
At the same time, the Internet became a new platform for the Western media. Even as Iran’s government temporarily suspended mobile phone and Internet services, Western media continued to use Websites or real-time communication tools to obtain photos and video of the protests and demonstrations . . . Western hackers were also active, attacking the computer systems of the Iranian government and the foreign ministry and Websites supportive of President Ahmadinejad.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 25, 2009, 8:55am HK]

By David Bandurski — Have you ever wondered why China persists with a one-party political system? Have you ever scratched your head over why China refuses to check the concentration of political power by separating the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government? Well, my friends, perhaps you’ll find resolution in China’s latest brand of ideological infant formula.
We introduce to you . . . the “Six Why’s.” That’s right, Hu Jintao and his army of CCP theorists have worked out a simple political primer for us all, a kind of FAQ of market-Leninism.
The “Six Why’s,” which could be read as an indirect response to the 20th anniversary of the 1989 student movement, and perhaps the CCP’s answer to Charter 08 and the published journals of former premier Zhao Ziyang, seek to answer basic political questions like, “Why should Marxism be our guiding ideology?”
Launched with great party media fanfare back on June 5, they have gotten precious little attention in the Western media. Why? Most likely because the “Six Why’s” formula, for all of its cozy paternalism, is still mostly an impenetrable mess of dogma.
A comparatively brief summary of the “Six Why’s” can be found at the CCTV International website.
We encourage those readers who have strong Chinese reading ability, a great deal of spare time, and the monumental patience it takes to read official Communist Party twaddle to click into the commentary links provided after each summary point — essays like, “We cannot accept ideological pluralism,” “Cleaving to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” or, “Our nation must not practice privatization.”
In any case, the “Six Why’s” are an important formulation of ideology within the CCP, and for this reason we should pay them ample attention. Books, apparently, have already hit the shelves.
Brief translations of one formulation of the “Six Why’s” (from the CCTV International site) follow:

1. Why must we uphold the guiding role of Marxism in the realm of ideology?
The guiding role of Marxism in China has not been decided by any certain person or by the will of one party, rather it is a choice and circumstance of history, and a choice rendered by the people. Our country’s process of revolution, building and reform has thoroughly shown that without Marxism there would be no new China; without Marxism and its renewed development in China, there would be no Socialism with Chinese characteristics. In these times, the struggle and competition for overall national strength grows fiercer by the day, hostile forces in the West refuse to stomach our nation’s development and strengthening, and as they have never ceased to carry out a strategy of “Westernization” toward us, and a conspiracy of “separatism” . . . In these serious international circumstances, if we were to give up the guiding role of Marxism in the sphere of ideology and pursue a path of pluralistic guiding ideologies, this would mean ensnaring ourselves and tearing down our own defenses [lit: “tear down the Great Wall on our own”].
2. Why is it that only socialism can save China, that only socialism with Chinese characteristics can develop China, and why can’t we take the path of democratic socialism and capitalism?
Socialism with Chinese characteristics is not the old path of being closed up and rigid, nor is it the old wicked socialism under a new banner. It is a socialism marked by a determination to seek reform, a striving toward development, perseverance on the path of openness, putting the people first and promoting harmony . . . Over the last 30 years, it has been socialism with Chinese characteristics that has propelled the Chinese people toward modernization, moved them closer to the world and into the future, successfully achieving the transition from a highly centralized planned economic model to a socialist market economy full of energy and vitality.
3. Why must we continue with the system of people’s congresses, and why can’t we practice “separation of powers”?
The history of many countries in the world teaches us that in developing democracy we can only take our own paths. If we depart from the facts and circumstances of our own country, if we disregard the objective demands of social and economic development, if we blindly copy the systems of other nations, not only will we not achieve the peoples’ hopes of developing democracy, we will damage their interests and for the development of the economy and society, or even court disaster.
4. Why must we persist in the system of cooperation and consultation of various parties with the CCP, and why can we not the Western multi-party system?
Political parties are the engines of politics in the vast majority of countries in the world today, and they have an important role in political life. Employing a political party system that suits the circumstances and features of a nation, and which accommodates its state of social development, is an important precondition of that nation’s development and progress. The system of cooperation and consultation of the CCP with various political parties is a great creation in which our party combined Marxist theories of political parties with the theory of the united front as suited realities in China . . . The system is a historical necessity, and it is both greatly original and highly superior.
5. Why must we persist in a public ownership system in which various types of economic ownership systems co-exist? Why can’t we carry out privatization or a “more pure” form of public ownership?
Persisting in a system of public ownership is a demand and special characteristic of our nation’s socialist economic system, and it meets with the needs and special features of the operation of our national economy. Ours is a populous nation with a weak economic basis and very unequal development. The hardships facing us in our task of advancing economic reforms and socialist modernization are of a seriousness such as the world has never before seen. If the socialist system of public ownership is overturned and we pursue privatization, then the socialist system will no longer exist, and we will then forfeit our basis for leading the people through various obstacles and challenges, for liberating and developing productive forces, and for moving toward common prosperity.
6. Why must we persist in our economic reform policies? Why can’t we turn back?
Economic reform and opening is a necessary historical choice. Our experience has shown that the path and direction of economic reform is entirely correct. The past, present and future of economic reforms lie in the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and in the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 19, 2009, 1:25pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Most news coverage so far of China’s “Green Dam” censorware controversy has dialed the timeline as far back as April 8, 2009. It was on that day that four government departments, including the Ministry of Education, ordered that computers at all primary schools across the country be installed with the so-called “Green Dam – Youth Escort” software to protect China’s youth from harmful content. [Frontpage photo by “Prescott” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The controversy over “Green Dam” may have blown up in just the last week, but coverage of the software itself can in fact be traced back months earlier, to a piece appearing in Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily on January 14, 2009. Though the “Green Dam” software is not the focus of the news report, the story does raise some interesting questions about how the software was conceived and promoted.
The Southern Metropolis Daily article, run on page A32 that day, deals with a January 2009 government campaign against so-called indecent Web columns and content.
By all accounts, the campaign was an aggressive one, resulting in the shutdown and purging of many Web columns and chat forums. But the chief driver behind that campaign was not, in fact, the government — not directly, anyway.
While the government was most certainly calling the shots, the ostensibly non-government Internet Society of China (ISC) was actually wielding the truncheon, beating down Web offerings that were “indecent” or otherwise illegal (Read also: politically and/or socially sensitive).
As I noted in the Far Eastern Economic Review a year and a half ago, organizations like the ISC are now strange animals operating as proxy arms of China’s information control structure. On the surface, they are “civic organizations,” stacked with “voluntary” members like Microsoft, Nokia, Ericsson and others. Behind the scenes — as can only be expected — government officials are pushing larger agendas.
In the December 2007 FEER report, I focused on the Beijing Association of Online Media (BAOM) and its team of content violation informants.
Despite its public face as a professional association with “voluntary” membership from leading Internet companies (including Microsoft China, Baidu, Sina, Sohu, Alibaba, Bokee, Siemens Communication Networks Beijing), ISC clearly (like BAOM) has an enforcement arm too. It is called the Illegal and Indecent Internet Information Informing Center (违法和不良信息举报中心), and Websites took its orders very seriously back in January.
Southern Metropolis Daily wrote:

This reporter noticed that after [the release of] the Informing Center’s report [on content violations], the vast majority of sites shut down whatever was highlighted [by the Informing Center], and they responded quickly. Just like the Cat898 Forum (凯迪社区), for example, Kugou.com closed down its Dong Zhang Xi Wang (东张西望) section, which had been accused of running many vulgar images, at the first available moment yesterday.
This special campaign is no longer limited to those sites named [by the Informing Center]. Many sites not singled out have begun on their own to clean up [their content] and raise the bar on Web postings.

Further down in the article, the “Green Dam – Youth Escort” software emerges, months before its shameful international debut.
Interestingly, the software is mentioned as part of the ISC-led campaign against “vulgar” content. Here is that portion, which is set off with a subtitle that reads: “A green web-surfing software program bought with a pricetag of 41.7 million yuan.”

Aside from exposing [a list of] sites that contain vulgar content, and shutting down illegal and violating websites, the promotion of a green web-surfing software program has also become an important part of this special clean-up campaign.
The Internet Society of China released an urgent notice yesterday demanding that member companies “organize and carry out Internet clean-up campaign work for self-discipline against vulgar content.” That notice says that aside from implementing rigorous self-checks on Website content and cutting off the transmission of vulgar content at its source, [companies] must also take effective preventive measures from client-side computers (从电脑终端上有效防范).
The notice in particular introduced a software program called “Green Dam – Youth Escort”, and ordered that “the Websites of member companies actively provide free downloads and upgrades of this software, or build links with official websites for this software.” This means that most well-trafficked Websites in China, including a few publicly-listed portal sites, will be required to provide downloads of this software.

The January ISC notice plugging “Green Dam” is real. It took a bit of work to dig it out of the Chinese side of the ISC Website, which does not offer a search function, but it is right there where Southern Metropolis Daily said it would be, on January 13, 2009.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of January 13, 2009, notice from the Internet Society of China ordering all members to promote the “Green Dam” software.]

Such an order from the Internet Society of China poses some very troubling questions, particularly now as we are hearing about the alleged use in the “Green Dam” software of proprietary data from a U.S. company.
Information Week wrote yesterday that the IP issue with “Green Dam” could pose legal problems for manufacturers complying with China’s order that the software be installed in all computers.
But what are the possible legal implications for foreign companies and, say, Nasdaq-listed companies who, as a condition of doing business in China, are ISC members and are ordered by this quasi-government “professional association” to promote and even offer downloads of this problematic software?
This just keeps getting messier and messier.
Any professional association in China has to have a government chaperone, or “unit in charge” (业务主管单位). And as long as we are connecting the dots here, it might interest readers to know which government agency is backing up the Internet Society of China.
That’s right, folks. It is the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工业和信息化部), the government agency that started this whole mess in the first place.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 16, 2009, 3:37pm HK]