By Emma Lupano — Just one week after the arrest in Beijing of Li Min, a CCTV journalist accused of taking bribes while covering a story in Shanxi, Chinese media reported last week that Guan Jian, another Beijing journalist, had been “taken away” by the police in early December while on a reporting stint to the same province. [Frontpage Image: “Locked and Chained” by Darwin Bell available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
It is still not clear precisely what circumstances led to the arrest of Guan, a journalist from Network News (网络报). Accounts in Chinese media say the journalist went to Shanxi province to investigate a local real estate company.
Media reports have said that Guan Jian was spirited away from a hotel lobby where he was waiting on the afternoon of December 1, when five men forced the reporter into a silver Volkswagen Touareg. Evidence of the “kidnapping,” as some called it, came as hotel video surveillance footage was made public by The Beijing News on December 15.
The day after the footage became national news, one of Guan’s co-workers, Li Chuyi, wrote on his weblog that Guan had been found. A partial translation of the blog post can be found at ESWN. Here is a portion:

At 3pm on December 15, 2008, I received a telephone call from the family of Guan Jian. At 12:32pm, a man claiming to be with the Hebei province Zhangjiakou city police department economic crime investigation squad used Guan Jian’s mobile phone to call them. The man said that Guan Jian was taken away by Zhangjiakou police at 6pm on December 1 from the Jinjiang Star Hotel and is presently criminally detained by the Zhangjiakou police. The man asked the family to bring some money and medicine over. When asked why, the man said that the medicine was for Guan Jian’s coronary heart ailment, high cholesterol and high blood pressure, while the money was for improving Guan Jian’s living conditions at the detention center. Why was Guan Jian taken away? What crime did he commit? Why did they notify the family fourteen days later? The Zhangjiakou policeman refused to answer any of these questions. At 5pm, I contacted the Zhangjiakou city police department economic crime investigation squad on behalf of my work unit. I asked about Guan Jian’s present condition, the reason why he was detained and why they waited so long before informing the family. A police officer named Tian gave unfriendly answers such as “It is not convenient to say,” “It was necessary for the case,” “We informed Guan Jian’s family at noon today.”

Li Chuyi argued that police from Zhangjiakou had violated China’s Criminal Law, which requires notification of local police (in this case, Taiyuan) in the event of cross-jurisdictional arrests, and also specifies that family members be notified within 24 hours of the arrest. Zhangjiakou police have since admitted that they arrested the reporter in Taiyuan.
After initial coverage by The Beijing News, scores of Chinese newspapers followed up on the story and many editorial pages questioned the tactics used by Hebei police to arrest Guan Jian.
One of the first commentaries came from Wang Gangqiao (王刚桥), an academic, in The Beijing News on December 16. A partial translation follows:

“Detention by law is OK, but secret arrest is not”
Guan Jian, a journalist from Beijing’s Network News mysteriously disappeared in Shanxi province while carrying out reporting in the region. According to surveillance video from the hotel [where the detention occurred], Guan Jian was taken away on December 1 at around 6pm by five people who restrained his arms and forced him into a Volkswagen Touareg. . .
This news left people astonished. Guan Jian has been missing for half a month already, and it was a week ago that his family went to Shanxi province to complain to police. The police opened a case file and launched an investigation, making a preliminary determination that the reporter was “missing.” Shanxi authorities, the victim’s family and his employer put great effort and resources into tracking down this missing person — then we learn out of the blue that the “missing person” was led away by police. Even those with little or not background in the administration of justice would ask to obvious questions: why didn’t police inform the family about the arrest? Even though police authorities in Shanxi said yesterday that Zhangjiakou police made contact with Taiyuan police before taking Guan Jian away, why was it that Guan’s family received no explanation before this? And what are the crimes for which Guan is begin “taken away”? Is his being “taken away” a matter of “summons” (拘传) or of “detention” (拘留)?
The arrest of a journalist in Taiyuan by Zhangjiakou police has bewildered the public, and the police should give the public, including Guan Jian and his family, a single reasonable explanation. If the “taking away” of the suspect was not conducted according to laws and regulations, then those specific police personnel responsible should face proper legal consequences . . . The police cannot arrest people in secret, because justice without procedure is not justice at all.

A December 16 editorial in Kunming’s Spring City Evening News by Nuo Song (傩送) used the Guan Jian case to discuss the social role and plight of journalists working in China today. The editorial accused “certain government authorities” of leaving reporters on their one in the fight against injustice:

“Journalist cannot bear on their weak shoulder the entire burden of social justice”
Cases of journalists facing violence have become nothing new in recent years. According to survey conducted by China Youth Daily, journalists rank third on a list of most dangerous professions [in China], falling just behind police and miners. With successive versions of “[outside] police entering Beijing to seize journalists” arising from Liaoning and Shanxi provinces, editorial pages at many media have explored the question: how do we protect journalists’ legal right to carry out reporting? And now, with [reporter] Guan Jian missing, people are once again asking: how do we ensure that the bodily safety of journalists is not violated in the process of carrying out reporting?
But this write cares even more about another question. Namely, who is it that puts journalists in harm’s way?
We live in an age in which journalists are “all powerful.” Journalists aren’t just lookouts on the prow, reporters of the truth, or capable detectives — many dark aspects of our society receive the attention of the government only after journalists have revealed them, and we can see this in the Loufan (娄烦) landslide incident and the Sanlu milk powder scandal. Journalists have become the courageous front-line soldiers in the battle to expose social ills, and this is a very dignified thing. But what is regrettable is that they don’t have the hand-to-hand combat skills of 007, and once they are set upon by dark forces they can only surrender to them.
There are many journalists who, like Guan Jian, exceed the call of duty and go beyond the range of their capabilities, and thereby court danger. In many ways this “going beyond” on the part of journalists owes to the fact that certain government authorities are remiss in their duties.
Looking at the case of Guan Jian’s “disappearance”, we can see at least these two major failings [on the part of the government]. First of all, [while a people’s congress official is reportedly linked to Guan’s detention] the position of deputy director of a local people’s congress means the official in question counts as a national public servant (国家公职人员), and according to the Law on Public Servants, civil servants must not engage in business activities and must not hold positions within companies or profit-making entities. When this deputy director of the local people’s congress took office and was simultaneously a corporate executive at a real estate company, did the local government not know about this, or just pretend not to see?
Secondly, if a Shanxi [real estate] company is suspected of having acted against regulations, should it be necessary to rely on a Beijing journalist traveling thousands of kilometres away to investigate the case? What are the local branches of the national government and the judiciary departments doing exactly? . . .

FURTHER READINGS:
“Chinese reporter chasing corruption claims disappears“, Reuters, December 16, 2008
“Guan Jian’s case needs procedural justice“, Xi’an Evening News, December 17, 2008
“How can they notify family members of the journalist’s arrest 14 days after the fact?“, Chengdu Evening News, December 17, 2008
ON THE LI MIN CASE:
“Shanxi prosecutor goes to Beijing to arrest CCTV’s female reporter“, People’s Daily Online, December 8, 2008
“CCTV Reporter’s Arrest Causes a Stir“, Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2008
[Posted by Emma Lupano, December 22, 2008, 2:53pm HK]

By David Bandurski — When Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a speech Thursday morning in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People to honor the thirtieth anniversary of economic reforms in the country, his words pointed to a leftward shift in Chinese politics — a possible reaction in part against the recent Charter 08, a manifesto signed by prominent Chinese intellectuals calling for broad political reform.
According to our preliminary analysis of Hu’s speech, more left-trending keywords like “socialism”, “Marx” and the “Four Basic Principles” were prominent in Thursday’s speech — noticeably more so than in Hu’s 17th Congress address last year.
Here are a few keywords whose overall use Thursday surpassed that of Hu’s 17th National Congress speech, which was in fact 10,000 words longer than Thursday’s 18,000 words.

[SWCC = “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”]

More moderate terms, such as “democratic politics” and “intraparty democracy” were less prominent.
Perhaps more importantly, a number of erstwhile Jiang Zemin terms made an unexpected return.
Toward the beginning of his speech, Hu Jintao resurrected the Jiang-era notion of “westernization and separatism”, the idea that hostile Western forces aim to co-opt Chinese and weaken China by exploiting territorial tensions (Taiwan, Tibet, etc.).
In another section of his speech, dealing with institutional reforms as a guarantee for further development, Hu Jintao resurrected the xenophobic Jiang-era phrase “[We must] never copy,” referring to the political and economic models of the West.
Terms we were on the lookout for ahead of last year’s 17th National Congress but which never materialized, including “constitutionalism”, “civil society” and “citizen’s rights”, were absent from Thursday’s speech as well.
FURTHER READING:
“Wuyouzhixiang PK Wen Jiabao,” ESWN, December 21, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, December 20, 2008, 1:09am HK]

By David Bandurski — Today is the 30th birthday of economic reforms in China. And as a tribute to both sides in the ongoing debate in China over the spirit of reforms, we share with readers two recent writings on the subject. [Frontpage Photo: “Great Candles” by BodHack available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
In the December issue of the Chinese journal Yanhuang Chunqiu, writer Yang Min argues that the successes of China’s reform era owe not to unique “Chinese characteristics,” but rather to China’s adoption of universal values that are a product of the human cultural experience.
“The secret to China’s miracle lies not in its differences from the world, but rather in its affinities,” Yang writes.
Yang’s article has ruffled the feathers of Chinese leftists at the socialist website Utopia, which offered its own rebuttal of the essay on December 8.

[Screenshot of Yanhuang Chunqiu online, Deng Xiaoping appears with American President Jimmy Carter on a visit to the U.S. from January 29 to February 4, 1979]

Portions of the Yanhuang Chunqiu and Utopia articles follow:

“Reform and Opening and Universal Values”
By Yang Min (杨民)
China can boast major accomplishments in its 30 years of reform. This is especially true for the economy, with average annual GDP growth of 9.8 percent, urban and rural incomes rising 40 and 30 times respectively between 1978 and 2008, Chinese GDP accounting for five percent of the world’s total in 2007, up from just one percent in 1978, and China’s portion of global foreign trade rising from less than one percent to eight percent. Such a massive economy, with such rapid growth over such an extended period of time — this is something that has not been seen in recent history, what has been widely labeled as “China’s miracle.” The very life of this miracle and of economic reforms is inseparable from universal values.
The secret to China’s miracle lies not in its differences from the world, but rather in its affinities.
There is a popular wisdom that says that says that “China’s miracle” is the product of China’s having taken a path that is different from that of other countries and regions, that it has arisen not from “copying” but from “unique Chinese characteristics” (中国特色). There are even a number of investors and speculators outside China who have bet on the unique merits [of China], researching the so-called “Chinese mode” (中国模式), or “Beijing Consensus” (北京共识). These terms are not entirely without merit. From a certain perspective it is safe to say that the modernization drives of all nations are unique in one way or another, and this means China’s modernization necessarily has its own Chinese characteristics.
It may be true that a number of Chinese characteristics are preconditions and assurances of China’s rise, such as the upholding of the leadership of the CCP, the system of centralization (举国体制), etc. However, it is not enough to have these “special characteristics” alone, these “differences” or “non-imitations,” because we have upheld the leadership of the CCP and the system of centralization since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. If it were true that we could create a “Chinese miracle” by relying only on these “Chinese characteristics,” on these “differences” we have with other countries, then China would not have gone to the brink of economic collapse prior to reforms, and tens of millions of people would not have died in the tragedy of the Great Leap Forward.
Clearly, in searching for the secret of “China’s miracle,” we must look not only to China’s supposed differences with the rest of the world, but more to the point to the differences between China today and China in the past. It is not hard to come to the realization in what created “China’s miracle” was reform and opening, was the introduction of the market economy, of democracy, freedom, rule of law, human rights and other concepts that are universal values. Progress in our society over the last 30 years is inseparable from reform and opening and the practice of universal values in China. Of course you can also say that “reform and opening” is a Chinese characteristic, but what exactly is this special characteristic? At its base, the special characteristic is the study and borrowing from developed nations of civilized ideas that have universal value.
Therefore, “China’s rise” actually relies upon things that are “the same,” and represents the success of “the drawing of lessons from other countries” (拿来主义). It is principally the success of “sameness,” and not the success of “difference.” We can say that these 30 years of reform and opening represent the success of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and that they represent also the flowering in China of human culture imbued with universal values . . .
When we look back on the past 30 years, we see that China’s opening and reform began with the process of opening. Opening drove reform, and reform drove development. From the economy to society, successful reforms relied at every step on the study of the methods of advanced nations.
The Cultural Revolution was a major disaster for China. But what direction should [China] take in turning away from the Cultural Revolution? Deng Xiaoping, one of the century’s greats, clearly recognized the most effective path: opening to the outside world. In 1978, he not only went himself to the United States, Japan and other developed nations, but he also sent a hundred or so observation groups out into the world to seek the secrets of rapid development in developed nations. Very quickly, a consensus emerged throughout the CCP: Western nations were more advanced than us, and there were many cultural traits that deserved our study. National isolation was a dead-end. China must open its doors to the outside world.
Opening meant not just a geographical opening of the doors to the nation, nor did it carry a purely economic meaning about trade with other nations. More importantly, it meant tearing down the bulwarks the sealed China’s value system off and opposed [incursion]. It meant moving toward a more equal and rational vision that could allow the acceptance of all of humanity’s cultural assets with an attitude of tolerance and study. The most important asset was the adoption of the market economy.
In November 1979, when Deng Xiaoping met with the head of the editorial committee for America’s Encyclopedia Britannica, Frank Gibney Jr., and others, he pointed out that: “It is an error to hold that the market economy belongs only to capitalist societies” . . . “Why can’t socialism do the market economy?” . . . “Socialism can also do the market economy.” Deng Xiaoping’s meaning in these statements was clear, and that is that the market economy has universal value. In the southern dialogues (南方谈话) of 1992, he again emphasized that planning and the market were both economic tools, not core differences between socialism and capitalism . . .
The ideological debate has never abated over whether the market economy is surnamed “Socialism” or surnamed “Capitalism,” but in actual practice the marketization of the economic sector was staunchly carried out from the beginning of reform and opening.
The core value of the market economy is freedom. Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen, who has been called the “conscience of economics,” has drawn a number of salient results from his substantial experience analyzing many developing nations: Freedom is the core value of the market economy, and development means the expansion of freedoms; freedom is the primary goal of development, and also an indispensable tool toward promoting development.
China’s 30 years of reform offer the best possible annotation for Sen’s theories.
In the days of the planned economy, control was our sole “talisman,” and it permeated every aspect of people’s lives . . . Everything was to be controlled, and nothing was free. Lack of political freedoms [in that time] go without saying, and 800 million Chinese had only a single mind . . . It was the same economically. It wasn’t just that the top leadership decided what factories were to produce — they even decided what farmers would plant in the fields. They even talked such nonsense as, “We want only socialist grass, and we don’t want capitalist seedlings” (宁要社会主义的草，不要资本主义的苗). Under such controls, what impetus could people possibly have to produce, and is it any wonder that people starved?

The following is a rebuttal of Yang Min’s piece at the website Utopia:

“Yanhuang Chunqiu’s Mythologizing on Universal Values Is Actually a Capitalist Restoration“— criticizing Yang Min’s “Reform and Opening and Universal Values”
The December edition of Yanhuang Chunqiu published an article by Yang Min called “Reform and Opening and Universal Values,” which prattles on in an attempt to deify universal values, saying they are connected “as life to death” to [China’s] reform and opening . . . Why does this Yang insist on elevating universal values? From head to tail, the fine print of Yang’s article clearly exposes his evil goal beyond any doubt — a capitalist restoration.
First of all, it opposes the Marxist doctrine of class struggle, promoting bourgeois universal values, carrying out theoretical propaganda for a capitalist restoration.
Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out in “Losing our Fantasies, Preparing for Struggle” (丢掉幻想，准备斗争) that: “In class struggle, some classes are victorious while others are annihilated. This is history, the history of civilization for thousands of years.” . . . Democracy, freedom, human rights, and even the market economy all have class nature. These universal values that are said to transcend class are merely tricks used by the apologists of capitalism to deceive others and promote capitalist values or push the restoration of the capitalist system.
Yang’s article says that when we look back over the last 30 years “successful reforms, whether economic or social, have all taken their cues from the methods of advanced nations.” Who are these advanced nations? They are “the United States, Japan and other developed nations.” We have [Yang says] studied the universal values of these advanced capitalist nations.
The reactionaries in America, Japan and Europe often throw around the big clubs of democracy, freedom and human rights to attack our country and interfere with our domestic politics. As though only they really talk about democracy and freedom, and respect human rights. This is thoroughly a fabrication. Under the veil of democratizing the Middle East, American imperialism invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and now threatens Iran. American general elections are merely a matter of choosing between the Democratic and Republican parties . . . Human rights has ever been a plaything of the bourgeois classes, and capitalism had its start by exploiting and enslaving the black man. Over the last century and more, so many lives have been taken by the wars and incursions of capitalism, and the exploitation now continues as it always has. Look at the new social classes in our own country. We have illegal mine bosses, and brick kiln operators [who enslave workers], factory bosses who exploit the blood and sweat of the workers . . . These bourgeois intellectuals in our country, including Yang Min, are for the revival of capitalism, for a reversion to capitalism, for a joining up with global capitalism, and they speak with the same accents as the reactionaries of America and Japan, welcoming attacks on Chinese socialism.
Not only this, but they carry out irrational attacks against those of us comrades who have not forgotten the class struggle and who continue to uphold Marxism . . .
Yang’s article praises the economic theories of liberalism, holding that “the core value of the market economy is freedom.” He is swept off his feet by Amartya Sen, and admires his [notion that] “freedom is the core value of the market economy, and development means the expanding freedoms; freedom is the primary objective of development, and an indispensable tool in promoting development.” Yang’s article also says that China’s 30 years of reform are the best annotation for Sen’s theories . . .
But the economic crises that the capitalist world has suffered over the past century stem from the disorderly, unplanned and uncontrolled free competition of the capitalist market economy.

[Posted by David Bandurski, December 18, 2008, 11:47am HK]

By David Bandurski — Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan has reported that the Chinese journal Yanhuang Chunqiu, which has lately faced pressure from authorities, is now officially out of the woods [more from ESWN here]. The Hong Kong weekly also reports that the group behind the action against Yanhuang Chunqiu was the propaganda department’s news commentary group (NCG), or yueping zu (中宣部阅评组). Sound familiar?
When Freezing Point, the weekly supplement of China Youth Daily, was shut down in January 2006, the action also stemmed from a criticism issued by the NCG.
In his open letter protesting the move, Freezing Point editor Li Datong (李大同) openly mentioned the NCG’s role, calling the group a “sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of China’s media.” [Here is Roland Soong’s translation of Li Datong’s open letter, in which he renders yueping zu as “Criticism Group”].
In a separate open letter protesting the shutdown of Freezing Point, former party officials and newspaper bosses called for the disbanding of the NCG.
If what Yazhou Zhoukan is now reporting is true, the NCG is alive and well as an informal organ of post-facto censorship. But the Yanhuang Chunqiu affair has played out very differently from what we saw two years ago, and this might suggest some measure of change to the group’s role and influence.
Little is actually known about the secretive NCG. But for a taste of who they are, we point readers to several of our own past writings on the group.
“China’s Shadow Censor Commissars,” published in the March 2006 edition of Far Eastern Economic Review [subscription only], gives an overview of the NCG and their role since the 1990s and their part in the shutdown of Freezing Point.
“Garden of Falsehood,” published in the Spring 2008 edition of Index on Censorship, includes examples of (sometimes comical) NCG criticisms.
For readers of Chinese, we recommend Qian Gang’s essay, “From Liu Binyan to Freezing Point” (从宾雁到冰点), which tells the story of how celebrated journalist Liu Binyan (刘宾雁) was “struggled against” (揪斗) as a right-roader at the outset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
As Liu Binyan sat across from his accusers, his most vicious critic was none other than Liu Zuyu (刘祖禹), the leftist propaganda official who sat at the helm of the NCG when the group targeted Freezing Point forty years later.

“Liu Binyan! You must toss aside this guise of yours and honestly face the fact that you are guilty of opposing the CCP and opposing socialism!”
This “most vicious” Liu Zuyu is today head of the Central Propaganda Department’s News Commentary Group.

Word went round in 2007 that Liu Zuyu was no longer a member of the NCG, but little birds now tell us he is back.
[Posted by David Bandurski, December 16, 2008, 1:53pm HK]

By David Bandurski — We are now just one week away from the official anniversary of 30 years of economic reform in China, and more voices are speaking up about the nation’s future. Earlier this week, more than 300 intellectuals, lawyers, business people and human rights defenders signed an open letter, “Charter 08,” that said “the decline of the current system has reached the point where change is no longer optional” [English translation by Perry Link here]. [Frontpage: Beijing government building by “Buck82” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
There is no question that “Charter 08,” which calls for separation of powers (ever a tinderbox term in China), legislative democracy and a new Chinese constitution, will infuriate Chinese leaders already on high alert for a series of sensitive anniversaries this year and next. And there are reports already that dissident Liu Xiaobo has been detained for his role in drafting the letter.
But the party’s own prominent scholars are stepping into the spotlight too.
This week, a number of newspapers ran an interview with Yu Keping (俞可平), a liberal party scholar who serves as director of the Central Translation Bureau, a CCP think tank, and is an outspoken proponent of democracy.
Yu has said in the past that China is evolving toward “its own unique form of democracy.” [See ESWN’s translation of Yu’s essay, “Democracy is a Good Thing“].
China News Service coverage of Yu Keping’s comments on the fight against official corruption appeared in several major papers, including Guangzhou’s New Express and Southern Metropolis Daily.

[ABOVE: Yesterday’s coverage of Yu Keping’s remarks in Southern Metropolis Daily.]

In the China News Service article, Yu Keping argues that as China looks ahead to further reforms “one important area of breakthrough will have to be government corruption.” Specifically, Yu takes issue with the present one-dimensional focus on monitoring of officials in the present anti-corruption regime, which fails to take into account the need for more fundamental change to institutions.
A partial translation follows:

Professor Yu Keping (俞可平), director of the Central Translation Bureau, who became a familiar name at home and overseas for his article, “Democracy is a Good Thing,” has said amidst the 30th anniversary of the Open Door Policy that reforms in China have reached a critical point that demands a “breakthrough.” In an interview with our reporter recently, Yu Keping said he believed that one important area of breakthrough will have to be government corruption.
“. . . According to China’s traditional culture, corruption is acceptable in all but two areas — the first is teaching, the second is medicine. These two areas have been seen as representing the conscience of society. Regrettably, these two areas have already begun to degenerate. The reasons for this, aside from personal factors, stem primarily from the social environment, and particularly from the serious problem of official corruption. Government officials play an especially important role in China, defining the direction of society as a whole. It is inevitable that this kind of environment [of official corruption] should affect the educational and medical sectors.”
Yu Keping, who in past research has expressed optimism on the question of corruption, has now begun to consider anew the serious nature of government corruption [in China], and he hopes to lead people away form some misconceptions about corruption and the monitoring of power.
Yu Keping pointed out in particular that as soon as discussion in academia and in the media turns to the fight against corruption these days, the topic inevitably turns to the question of power monitoring. While this view is basically correct, he says, it is incomplete.
“Practically speaking, the party and the government have already paid sufficient attention to the monitoring of power in recent years, and many inspection mechanisms have been established from the central government down to the local governments . . . a whole series of [discipline] inspection mechanisms have taken the stage one after another. I can be said that no country has, like us, been so expansive and so specific in the making of regulations, so that we even have a special rule for the entertainment of guests with public money, specifying only “four dishes and one soup.” Aside from this punishments can’t be said to be too light — how many corrupt officials have been killed or locked away? There has been no shortage of awards for clean officials, and anti-corruption education has been emphasized every year, every month, every day even. We’ve done so much and reaped results, but why is the corruption problem still so serious? This requires that we do some earnest self-examination. I believe we need some breakthroughs on the question of corruption. This includes both conceptual and institutional breakthroughs. ”
If compensation is sufficient, why does corruption persist?
Yu Keping believes that officials are already compensated adequately, but corruption persists nevertheless, and the numbers are more and more stupefying. What do they need with so much money? “There are many reasons for official corruption. Some people are corrupt in their natures . . . but this kind of corrupt official is extremely rare. Another two types of official corruption should be given our utmost attention: the first is the keeping of mistresses, and the second is [corruption lavished on the] sons and daughters [of officials]. According to authoritative media reports, 95 percent of all corrupt officials have mistresses. In fact, they would more accurately be called “second wives” or “third wives.” These relationships are not romantic but rather pure instances of the exchange of sex and power. These “mistresses” are not after love but after money. Aside from this, a number of corrupt officials send their sons and daughters overseas to study, even buying homes and cars for them, and this requires a great deal of money.”
Therefore, Yu Keping said, “If we only emphasize the monitoring of power in fighting corruption . . . then the results will be limited. As we improve our capacity for monitoring power, we need to go beyond power monitoring in seeking points of breakthrough. As the central party leadership has emphasized, in fighting corruption we need to begin by getting to the root of the problem, particularly the issues of the selection and appointment of officials, restraints on power, responsibility systems for cadres, and transparency in government affairs,” building a system of clean governance.
On the issue of cadre responsibility systems (干部责任体制) as they currently stand, Yu Keping said he believed that creating responsibility systems (干部问责制) marked a point of real progress in our building of a responsible government. But some responsibility systems, [he said], needed to be reformed. For example, we have these systems called “the first person responsible system” (第一责任人负责制) and “the single vote rejection system” (一票否决制), which as systems sound well and good, but which are inherently insufficient. This is a bit like “political contracting” (政治承包). If you make the official in the top post take on all of the responsibility [for a given problem], whatever the problem is, then you must also give him the appropriate degree of power. Absolute responsibility requires absolute power. And absolute power by definition surpasses all monitoring. So the problem that arises is this: if you let him take on absolute responsibility, then you must give him absolute power, but absolute power will inevitably result in a failure of monitoring and supervision. If you want to effectively monitor officials in top posts (一把手) you cannot give them absolute power, but if you do not give them absolute power, you cannot let him take on total responsibility.

[Posted by David Bandurski, December 11, 2008, 11:37am HK]

The Journalism and Media Studies Centre, HKU is pleased to host a public lecture and exhibit on: “Doubleness: Photography of Chien-Chi Chang” on 13 December, 2008(Saturday). Chien-Chi Chang is an accomplished photographer and member of the prestigious photographic cooperative Magnum Photos. He will present four projects at the lecture; The Chain; I do I do I do; Double Happiness; and China Town.
Each photograph deftly captures the synergy between him and his subjects without being intrusive. Chang’s purposeful style of repeating a particular scene and moment in a series of photographs of different people results in a clever conveyance of ‘doubleness’ in the partnership of his subjects. In the tireless pursuit of truth, these unadorned works reveal Chang’s fascination about relationships and his concern for the human condition. Working along the margins of documentary, journalism and art, the photographs and videos in this lecture not only document injustice; but more importantly, they lead us to confront the issues, the people and, in the end, ourselves.

Speaker: Mr. Chien-chi Chang
Date: 13 Dec 2008 (Saturday)
Time: 7pm to 8:30pm
Venue: Agnés b Cinema! Hong Kong Arts Centre, 2 Harbour Road, Wanchai
Language: English
*Exhibition of students’ work at 6 p.m./Lecture 7-8:30 p.m.
Admission is free. For details and online registration, please visit this link.
About the Speaker:
Chien-Chi Chang, born in Taiwan in 1961, joined the agency in 1995. He currently lives and works in Taipei and New York City. For more about Magnum Photos, please visit www.magnumphotos.com
This event is co-sponsored by Muse Magazine. For enquiries contact Kylie Chan at [email protected] or 2219-4416.

By David Bandurski — As hard news, particularly investigative reporting, faces intensifying pressure in China, one of the rare bright spots on China’s media landscape is the genre of the current affairs commentary, or shiping (时评). Since at least 2002, but particularly since 2005, editorial space at major newspapers and on the Internet in China has grown substantially, and writers from diverse backgrounds now express increasingly diverse views on a range of news topics and critical issues. [Frontpage: “Chinese writing practice,” by Matt Hamm available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
Last week, for example, writers all over China drew out the social and institutional lessons of the alleged firing of professor Yang Shiqun for “counter-revolutionary” teachings.
Searching for a fresh perspective on the Yang case, readers might have stumbled upon this commentary in Changjiang Daily, arguing that Yang’s case is a blatant violation of academic freedoms, and that the pair of female students who informed on the professor fail to understand the true spirit of “revolution,” which requires the interchange of differing viewpoints.
They might have found this editorial at Zhejiang Online, cautioning media and the public against criticizing these tattle-tale pupils too viciously before all the facts in the case are known. Or they might have read this commentary by Qu Weiguo (曲卫国), provocatively invoking the words of columnist Chang Ping’s (长平) controversial Tibet editorial earlier this year, saying that “only in an open opinion environment that permits full revelation and discussion do we have the opportunity to progress toward truth and justice.”
And if readers were hungry for an inane reading of the case from the extreme left, they were sure to find it at the leftist website Utopia (乌有之乡), where one writer argued that the whole affair was a mark of social progress — because, get this, students are actually questioning their teachers. [SEE Southern Metropolis Daily for a thorough review of the Yang Shiqun case, including an interview with the professor, in English at ESWN].
But as current affairs commentaries play an ever more prominent role in Chinese society, more attention is turning to the “movement” itself — its vagaries, strengths and basic motivations.
Chinese commentaries are in fact a more complicated phenomenon than they might seem at first glance. They point, superficially at least, to broader participation in public debate — we use the term very loosely — on a range of social issues.
But press controls have arguably grown stronger in China since 2004, and this is a factor in the development of the commentary too. That may seem counter-intuitive at first, but as the space for news has diminished at China’s more dynamic commercial media (and information is increasingly monopolized by “authoritative” state media), the editorial pages have become the refugee camps of professional journalism in China. [Nanfang Daily on the link between commentary development and “guidance of public opinion“].
We can’t possibly encompass the debate over the rise of the Chinese commentary in this space. Suffice to say this is a trend for media watchers to watch. As one commentator wrote on his Sina.com Weblog, in a piece called, “A Commentary on Commentaries“:

“Commentaries have already become the weathervanes of the media. To be without a commentary section means a media trails behind the trends, that it dares not speak up, that it is not mainstream, that it is out of touch with the people . . . In the information age, it is impossible to imagine media without commentary sections.”

Below we provide excerpts from just a couple of recent editorials discussing the phenomenon of the Chinese commentary. The first, by Wang Dahao (王大豪), appeared at Donghu Commentary (东湖评论) on December 1, and argued that unreasonable commentaries have become a “common danger” in China.
The second, which appeared in the December 3 edition of China Youth Daily, and subsequently in the Oriental Morning Post, urged those who are snobby about the apparent stylistic weaknesses of the commentary to be more understanding of how this genre differs from its cousin, the essay.

“Commentaries Lacking Rationality Have Already Become a Common Danger to Society”
There are a number of areas where Chinese people can be ugly, and commentaries have perhaps made the greatest contribution to the weeding out of ugliness. But then, the commentary field is imperfect. There are some commentary writers who simply can’t get used to the idea of accepting criticism from others. This is a persistent condition from which commentaries suffer. The duty of the commentary field has always been to reveal and root out the ugliness of society, but commentaries tend to turn a blind eye to their own ugliness. And the greatest ugliness of the commentary field is intolerance toward those who point out one’s own ugliness.
For a number of negative social phenomena, the mindset of some commentary writers is not that of the doctor seeking to heal the sick, but rather of mob violence against the already injured. When doctors conduct surgery, they stitch as well as cut, they give blood even as they draw it, and the basic goal is to mitigate pain, not to do harm. Mob violence is different, the objective being to attack, plunder and burn out of the narrow desire to conquer. The editorials of these writers brim with the violence of shameful intellectual attack. This is not the attitude with which a doctor treats a patient, but the attitude of a thug toward his victim. This is not the healthy and rational attitude a writer of commentaries should have . . .
If a person cannot recognize themselves with rationality and objectivity, how can they possibly see their own society objectively and rationally? And how can they possibly write commentaries that benefit social progress?

“From the Essay to the Commentary”
China Youth Daily, December 4, 2008
There has been a lot of debate lately about the successes and failures of commentary writing (时评) [in China]. The rise of the commentary in China’s media landscape of late is an encouraging sign. While the good is intermingled with the bad in the various commentary pages, the general vitality of commentary is far preferable to silence.
Some have expressed disatisfaction with the current state of commentary writing, and they are focusing on stylistic matters. Some domestic writers of commentary are converted essayists (杂文作者), and a number of readers are admirers of the essay. Perhaps they take Lu Xun’s essays as a measure of commentary pieces, and find that the words lack sufficient humor, that they are not breezy or witty enough, and so find them pale and disappointing. It’s certainly true that Lu Xun’s essays have particularly aesthetic value, but there is no need whatsoever for Chinese current affairs commentaries today to draw near to them. Good speech is speech that holds itself accountable, speech that seeks to advance public policy and promotes institutional input. It is most important that its style be clear, simple, accurate and well-knit. Commentaries do not exclude expression of feeling. But more often than not, they should set forth facts, evince reason, and win out with rationality — not simply rely on the release of emotion.
Commentary writers today are basically of two groups. The first are the erstwhile essayists that now write commentaries, and the second are those who write commentaries as experts or scholars. Generally, essayists are marked by a sensitivity to style and write prolifically. Experts and scholars, on the other hand, are distinguished by their combination of depth and expertise. The publishing cycles of newspapers demand that there be professionals whose primary work is the writing of commentaries, but at the same time there is a need for experts and scholars to maintain the depth of commentaries. Many affairs, whether international or domestic, are complex issues . . . Often, through different competing opinions, we can find more insightful thoughts. This really requires that an attitude of humility be encouraged in commentaries. I can disagree with your point of view, but I respect your right to express your opinion. We can’t have a winner-take-all approach.
China is at a point of historical transition. New problems and new things are emerging all the time. Many conflicts happening now are new to ordinary Chinese, who don’t know how to handle them. Nor do leaders have experience [with such things], and there are no ready-made panaceas. If we wish to do things well, then we must draw on the wisdom of the masses.
At this point, commentaries have just begun to develop — they are very uneven, and not easy and smooth enough. Given this situation, we need to have a bit more goodwill and a bit less hypercriticism. The emergence of the commentary and its acceptance by society is a mark of social progress in China today, a sign of the general advancement of culture, and also an embodiment of the value of freedom of expression in China.

[Posted by David Bandurski, December 8, 2008, 10:25am HK]

By David Bandurski — The attack last week on a Belgian television crew in Henan province has drawn condemnation from foreign media, NGOs and governments, particularly as it follows China’s recent extension of relaxed rules for foreign journalists. A statement issued by the Foreign Correspondent’s Club of China said “eight thugs” had stopped the van in which journalist Tom Van de Weghe and his crew were traveling and “punched them into submission.” [Frontpage Image: “TV Reporter” by David on Formosa available at Flickr under Creative Commons license].
China’s Foreign Ministry said during a press briefing only yesterday that China was looking into the incident. [Xinhua English-language report of December 2 here].
And how quickly the results are coming in!
A Xinhua News Agency report today, featured at a number of major Web portals, says preliminary findings suggest the Belgian crew was attacked not by thugs hired by the local government, but by AIDS sufferers concerned that a foreign news report might impact their “image.”
Evidently, officials at Henan’s Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the office that announced the findings, think people are actually going to believe this version.
We’ll say no more. Here it is:

“Belgian Journalists Reporting in Henan Meet Resistance from AIDS Sufferers”
Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 3, Henan Channel (Gui Tao, Gui Juan reporting) — On December 2, Wang Yuejin (王跃进), deputy head of the Foreign News Office of the Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the People’s Government of Henan Province, issued preliminary findings in the investigation into dispatches from foreign news agencies alleging that three Belgian journalists were “violently attacked” (暴力袭击) while reporting in Henan.
Wang Yuejin said that based on their preliminary understanding [of the situation], journalist Tom Van de Weghe (汤伟) and his crew from the Belgian Vlaamse Radio-en Televiaieomroep (Flemish Radio and Television Network) arrived at Shaungmiao Village (双庙村) in Gangwang Township (岗王乡) of Zhecheng County (柘城县) in Henan’s Shanqiu City (商丘市) on November 27 to carry out interviews. Because this village was at the time carrying out an election at the expiration of office terms, they could not proceed with their interviews, and so they headed for Zhoukou City (周口市). At around 4:30pm that afternoon, they returned to this village to carry out interviews but were refused by villagers. Afterwards, as they were on route to Sui County they were followed by a number of AIDS sufferers and township and village workers from Gangwang Township. As they reached Sui County, these people barred the way of the vehicle in which Van de Weghe and his crew were traveling, and some of the AIDS sufferers, fearing the impact the news report might have on their image, demanded that Van de Weghe relinquish his tapes and memory cards, which he refused. The two sides then got into a tussle, and the villagers forcibly kept back (留下) the tapes, memory cards and other articles.
Wang Yuejin said they are still in the process of verifying the concrete details of the incident.
Henan’s provincial government formed a united investigation team on December 2, which headed for Shangqiu City to investigate the matter.

MORE READING:
“Belgian TV crew beaten, robbed in China,” CBC, November 29, 2008
“China investigates attack on Belgian journalists,” Associated Press via IHT, December 2, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, December 3, 2008, 12:17pm HK]

By David Bandurski — As the December 18 anniversary of 30 years of economic reform in China approaches, there is no better time to reflect back on changes in China’s media. In an interview that appeared in yesterday’s edition of the Economic Observer, journalism professor Chen Lidan (陈力丹), of Renmin University, discusses his personal experiences as a press worker and researcher. [Frontpage Image: Chen Lidan appears at the Zhejiang University website].
Chen’s interview covers a range of topics, from the earliest debates over the nature of news — and whether it is dangerously bourgeois to conceive of it as a “commercial product” — to attempts in the 1980s to draft a Chinese press law.
One of the boldest passages is Chen’s repudiation of the CCP’s supreme media control notion of “guidance of public opinion,” a point that arises only much later in the interview:

I’m no longer interested in guidance of public opinion as an expert question. Guidance of public opinion is not a serious academic question, but rather a political demand. Public opinion is a naturally existing ecology of opinions. Opinions in society are diverse, and public opinion is diverse. It is wrong to insist that opinions in society be channeled in one direction in a concerted manner. Uniformity of opinion is abnormal. Only diversity of opinion is a normal thing.

The Economic Observer mines this passage for the simple gem of an idea that gives the interview its headline:

“Only Diversity of Opinion Is a Normal Thing”
Economic Observer: You were born in the 1950s, and I’m supposing you had big dreams when you were young.
Chen Lidan: I had no dreams. People of my generation, our ideals were all about “being resigned to the arrangements of the party.” I entered junior high school in the 1960s. At that time the message was all about studying Lei Feng, about having a single red heart and preparedness on many fronts (一颗红心多种准备), about heading for the countryside an the border regions — all in service of the party. At that time there was neither the social basis nor the social environment for dreams. Could such an environment permit you to dream?
Economic Observer: Did children all think at the time of growing up and being scientists?
Chen Lidan: We wanted to be peasants, and workers — that was the most glorious thing to be. How could we be scientists? That was about earning a reputation for yourself, something entirely bourgeois.
Economic Observer: Can you talk about your experiences reading books and newspapers before the Open Door Policy?
Chen Lidan: On July 13, 1968, I went to to the Eighth Work Division of the Heilongjiang Production and Construction Brigade (黑龙江生产建设兵团第八团), where I became a full-time propaganda reporter. My present professional life can be seen as going back to 1970. I become head of the reporting division [in Heilongjiang] in 1971, and in March 1973, when the reporting group was disbanded, I was sent to the division’s maintenance depot to work as a statistician, and in fact what I was doing was still putting together reports. At that time I had few connections with the media, save with the Soldier Corps Daily (兵团战士报), which was all news about the various divisions. There were also Heilongjiang Daily and People’s Daily, but I seldom read them. We belonged then to the paramilitary network, and the Liberation Army Daily was more common than People’s Daily. After that it was the division’s radio station, mainly devoted to news (my responsibility), songs, and quotations [from Chairman Mao]. There was nothing more, for those were meager times.
In August 1973, five months after I was sent to the maintenance depot, I returned to Beijing to study journalism at Peking University. After graduation I worked the nightshift as first reader of Guangming Daily, my job being to read the paper everyday. When I was a graduate student I was again studying journalism, and I was reading newspapers day in and day out. So my connection with media was unbroken. But there was not much to read in these papers, in fact. I seldom listened to the radio, and television was common only after the mid-1980s . . .
Economic Observer: In that time, what things made the deepest impression on you?
Chen Yidan: When I was studying at Peking University, even while we were called “learners” (学员), I basically studied nothing in that three years. At that time, information was very strictly controlled at Peking University, the environment virtually entirely sealed off. My distaste for the “Gang of Four” was merely a kind of instinct. On April 4, 1976, I took the opportunity as I was heading home (I was living in Dongcheng District at the time) to pass through Tiananmen Square, and I was touched, but I had no clear inkling of politics at the time. In January that year, as a number of us were returning home to Beijing by boat through Tianjin after internships with Yantai Daily (烟台日报), we heard on the radio on the way that Premier Zhou Enlai had passed away . . .
The Tangshan earthquake struck in 1976, and we accepted our graduation certificates in the earthquake shelters. I was sent to the editor-in-chief’s office at Guangming Daily to serve as editor on the night shift . . .
Economic Observer: After the Cultural Revolution, how did the process of setting things right (拨乱反正) happen in the arena of press studies?
Chen Lidan: First of all, those to first carry out deep introspection on the press weren’t journalism researchers, but two female youth in their twenties. On November 13, 1978, People’s Daily published an article by Lin Chun (林春) and Li Yinhe (李银河) called, “We Must Actively Promote Democracy and Strengthen Rule of Law” (要大大发扬民主和加强法制), the first time the making of a press law was raised.
That article made use of the words of Mao Zedong, saying that “the most precious freedoms of the people are those of speech, assembly, association, belief and person.” The article said that the reason Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four” could take just a few sentences in criticism of them and strike out against others as counterrevolutionaries, and the reason they could turn the newspapers into mouthpieces of their clique, was because the people were as yet unable to protect their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In order that these rights be realized, Lin Chun and Li Yinhe advocated “first making a clear and complete account of the democratic rights of the people in various laws, giving them a legal force that no one can oppose.” These ideas still glitter with rays of thought.
Economic Observer: A great deal of work was also done by those in the press for the creation of press laws.
Chen Lidan: Beginning in the 1980s, people in the press started clamoring about the creation of a press law. A number of my fellow graduate students, including Zhang Zonghou (张宗厚), Sun Xupei (孙旭培) and Zhang Huanzhang (张焕章) of China Youth Daily‘s press research academy, all wrote articles on this subject. In January 1984, the National People’s Congress instructed Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟), then deputy director of the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Committee (教科文委员会), to take charge of this work [toward a press law], and for this purpose at Press Law Research Center (新闻法研究室) was created within the Press Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It irregularly published a periodical called Press Law Bulletin (新闻法通讯). By 1988, three separate drafts of a press law had been created by the Press Law Research Center of the Press Institute at CASS, by a press law drafting group in Shanghai, and by a press law drafting group within the General Administration of Press and Publications. In March 1989, Comrade Deng Xiaoping even said: “We must seize particularly on the creation of laws, including laws and regulations on assembly, association, procession, demonstration, the press and publishing.”
For a number of reasons, the work of creating a press law gradually came to an end, and it has not to this day made it onto the [NPC] agenda. But a social consensus has already emerged around the making of laws to protect the various freedoms of the people. The preciousness of this recognition [of the importance of protecting rights] is best expressed in the words of the essay by Lin Chun and Li Yinhe: “These rights must be had. A system of law (and rule of law) must be achieved. This is a conviction to which the people have arrived through the experience of most bitter suffering, at the cost of their own blood and of their own lives.”
Economic Observer: After the Cultural Revolution, how did the press begin the process of reflecting back?
Chen Lidan: The first thing everyone asked at the time was, “What is news?” After that it was, “What is the nature and function of the newspaper?” People were “crafty” at that time. Over here they would admit the point that newspapers were tools in the struggle of the classes, but over here they would emphasize that papers were tools of public opinion in society. During that time, a lot of essays were trending in the latter direction.
In December 1980, CASS held a forum to discuss the book The Theoretical Foundation of Journalism (新闻理论基础), by Renmin University of China professor Gan Xifen (甘惜分). The forum lasted three days, and a number of the teachers present continued to insist on the point that newspapers, radio and television were tools of class struggle.
One teacher turned to some words Mao Zedong had said to two radio broadcasters on the rostrum at Tiananmen in 1968, the basic point of which was that radio was important. This teacher also gave the example that political change in Iraq had happened because [the Socialist Baath Party] had first gained control of the radio towers — and this was testament to the fact that radio was a tool of class struggle. One of my classmates, Sun Xupei, said somewhat sardonically that seizing political control meant not only seizing radio towers, but also train stations, airports, telegraph towers, and of what nature were these? Perhaps these were also tools of class struggle. That teacher was extremely upset, but he said nothing.
The essential character of media is not as “tools of class struggle. The most basic function of media is to transmit information, and that is news, no matter what kind of newspaper you’re talking about, even if its a party newspaper. Talking about this now, this idea seems elementary, but in the 1980s it was hard to say such things.
Economic Observer: Aside from tearing down “quotation journalism” (语录新闻学), what other theoretical discussions were going on in press studies in the 1980s?
Chen Lidan: Beginning in 1983, I participated in three separate discussions about “whether news is a commercial product or not” (新闻是不是商品). A lot of people in the 1980s felt that news was not a commercial products, and people still criticized the idea that news was a commercial products as a bourgeois point of view. In 1982, the 12th National Congress raised the idea of “a planned commercial economy” (有计划的商品经济), and [China] began to acknowledge the idea of a market economy. I wrote one very long essay that gave an overview at the third discussion about the commercial nature of the news — as of today, it still has never been published.
There was also a discussion about “exemplary reports” (典型报道) that at the time grew very fierce. Toward the end of 1986, the Chinese Journalism Society held its annual meeting, and I wrote a piece called, “Playing Down the Concept of Exemplary Reports.” The idea might have been a bit ahead of its time, and the voices in opposition were very loud indeed. Most [opposition] came from the chief editors of various local and regional party newspapers, where they were doing these kinds of reports [about exemplary communist heroes] on a daily basis, so what I was saying amounted to a negation of their work. I realized only later that this was not just a matter of business, but still very much a matter of theories of the press. It touched on the issue of how we understand the role of the media. The news is a factual report of something that has just happened, and it has to have news value. Exemplary reports praised [actions that were seen as] advanced, and how could that be news!
Economic Observer: Is it fair to say that the book Ten Discussions on Press Theory (新闻理论十讲) represents your ideas about the last three decades?
Chen Lidan: I suppose so. Those are my views within the bounds of what I can express. There was one chapter in the book that was a criticism of the bourgeois notion of freedom of speech, or claimed to reveal the falsehood of freedom of speech. Well, in that discussion in the book, I talked about what “freedom of speech” meant from a totally positive perspective . . .
In our press theory, we don’t dare to speak the word “freedom” too boldly, because we can only feel empty in our hearts. In 1986, I wrote an essay talking about “absolute freedom of the press” (绝对的出版自由), and as a result this essay was sent up [to authorities] during the purges of 1990 and 1991 [following June 4, 1989]. To this day, however, no one has argued over these points [of theory] with me. There’s no way they can argue these points with me, because I make reference to the original words of Engels, and Engels wrote more than once about “absolute freedom of the press.” In 1980, Red Flag magazine published an article that talked about the meaning of freedom, and it spoke a truth, saying that in the West the work most widely published is the Christian bible and next comes the writings of Lenin. The article pointed out that they publish Lenin’s work so widely [in the West] in order that it can be criticized. This explanation is of course ridiculous and illogical. Lenin’s ideology is perhaps in direct opposition to the West, but the fact that his published works are second only to the bible at least tells us that Lenin’s writings can be freely published in Western society — as for who is reading them, and why, that’s another question altogether.
Economic Observer: Is there any relationship between the “public opinion studies” referred to in these textbooks [in the interviewers hands?] and your previous book Public Opinion?
Chen Lidan: There is some relationship, but not a great deal. That “Public Opinion Studies” is a topic [i.e., project] undertaken by the Academy of Social Sciences Fund [SEE a list in Chinese of projects proposed for Tsinghua University and approved in 2004 here], and it has to concern itself here and there with “guidance of public opinion.” I’m no longer interested in guidance of public opinion as an expert question. Guidance of public opinion is not a serious academic question, but rather a political demand. Public opinion is a naturally existing ecology of opinions. Opinions in society are diverse, and public opinion is diverse. It is wrong to insist that opinions in society be channeled in one direction in a concerted manner. Uniformity of opinion is abnormal. Only diversity of opinion is a normal thing.
Economic Observer: This year is the 30th anniversary of economic reforms. What were you doing in 1978?
Chen Lidan: It was in 1978 that I tested into the graduate school of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. I had at the time a very poor theoretical grasp of the overall national political situation. I just felt that there were major problems with the Cultural Revolution and that we must criticize the leftist trend in thought. I was unhappy with a number of methods employed by the central party, but I was totally at a loss as to where these problems arose and how they should be analyzed.
On November 13 that year, the article by Lin Chun and Li Yinhe . . . appeared on page three of People’s Daily and armed me with the theoretical basis to analyze the problems of the Cultural Revolution — and that was the democratic system, the protections of the democratic system and rule of law. On November 16, Xinhua News Agency released 242 words from the party secretary of Beijing on the rehabilitation of those involved in the April 5 Tiananmen Incident. That December the Third Plenary Meeting of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee opened, and I read over and over the bulletin from the meetings and Deng Xiaoping’s speech, “Liberating Thought, Seeking the Truth Through Facts, Looking Ahead in Unity” (解放思想，实事求是，团结一致向前看). They were utterly inspiring.
And it was from that time on that I became clear about various issues . . . and the building of democracy, of a society ruled by law, and the pursuit of freedom of the spirit became firmly held beliefs of mine. I was 27 years old in 1978, a time by which one’s ideas should already be mature, but in the atmosphere of the first couple of years after the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, when people spoke in set phrases all day long, spoke words forced on them, it was difficult to form a habit of thinking for oneself.
Economic Observer: If you were to write a phrase to describe the 1980s, what would it be?
Chen Lidan: The 80s were an active and stimulating time, in which people’s ideas were constantly colliding, and there was a tolerant space for stimulation and activity. This was true even though the space would constantly expand and contract, heading left and then right. In fact, it was precisely because there was this constant tugging left or right that there was space for activity.
After the 1990s, the system of press studies in system had basically been built, particularly in the area of press theory, and any time someone opened their mouth it was with a particular approach. Of course, after 1992 there was open space for press research, and this space emerged primarily under the stimulation of the market economy. In the 1980s, all disciplines were doing things that fell within the category of “politics,” they were all flying the flag of political reform, including press reform. But after the 1990s, people discovered that there was a speciality terrain outside of politics where a great deal could be done, and a lot of developments were made.
But looking back now, it seems that the thing most troubling press studies lately is still press theory. If we can make breakthroughs in press theory, I’m afraid things would be a bit better.
Economic Observer: The philosopher Li Zehou (李泽厚) believes that compared to the 1980s, the 90s were a time when “ideas were weak and academics were highlighted.” Do you agree with this view?
Chen Lidan: . . . The 1990s. I think they weren’t a time of “weak ideas in which academics were highlighted.” There is thought in academics too. I think it should be that “politics were weak and academics highlighted.”
Economic Observer: You think there were still ideas in the 1990s?
Chen Lidan: Ideas in the 1990s emerged largely within academia. They came out tortuously, and in the name of academics and academic study. This was unlike the 1980s, when they could emerge directly under the slogan of “political reform.” So in the 1990s, many ideas were hidden away within academia. This includes a lot of Western concepts and comparative study, which have ideas but are indirect. Now we can actually say “freedom of speech,” and what we use is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But would this have happened in the 1980s? At that time people didn’t even know such a thing existed. Now our own government has signed this covenant on civil rights, and so I can say it boldly and confidently. I think we can use different words and say that “politics is weak.” Everyone does their utmost to keep their distance from politics.
Economic Observer: Next year is the 90th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. What influence do you think this movement had on press studies in China?
Chen Lidan: In my view, the May Fourth Movement, aside from voicing the slogans of “science” and “democracy,” had a fierce sense of freedom. It broke through the conformity and uniformity of the ancient Chinese academic discipline and inaugurated an all-encompassing era of academic diversity, bringing into being modern literature, philosophy, history, linguistics and other independent disciplines and schools of thought. After 30 years of development in press studies in China, we’re at last able in this kind of social context to announce our own independence as an academic discipline. It can be said that only in the May Fourth era did press studies [in China] have an entirely independent status.
如果用一句话来表达五四以前新闻学启蒙者对新闻学的基本认识，梁启超所讲的“报馆有益于国事”是最恰当不过。儒家传统中的实用理性，始终是那个时期的新闻学启蒙者的出发点和归宿；商品经济、自由理性、现代社会对精神交往的普遍需求等问题，在他们的论述中基本上是空白。
如果用一句话来表达五四时期新闻学的特点，邵飘萍讲的“以新闻为本位”最为恰当。就像文学以文学为本位、哲学以哲学为本位一样，对一向与“国事”交织在一起的新闻来说，摆脱政治的旋涡，成为独立的研究对象，不能不说是新闻学的一次革命。五四新文化补充了中国传统的学术研究中所缺乏的个体自由意识，否则，新闻学也许将永远以启蒙的形式被固定在 “国事”的卵翼之下。
如果用一句话表达五四以后新闻学的主题，那就是1930年当时的中共中央总书记向忠发讲的“报纸是一种阶级斗争的工具”。十月革命并没有给中国带来马克思恩格斯的新闻思想，而只带来了并不完整的列宁以及斯大林关于党报工作的论述。随着中国政治出现新的两军对垒，具有独立品格的新闻学逐渐消失了，新闻学的主题在一个新的认识层次上由政治统帅了。
1978年“文革”结束以后，人们终于小心翼翼地再次说出 “新闻机构的第一位任务是提供新闻”这样一个最普通的常识，并且不得不从头开始明确新闻的定义、新闻价值、言论出版自由、舆论监督、新闻法等常识。这只是补课，以便在新闻学研究的更高层次——也就是人类信息沟通的层次上——迅速跟上世界的步伐。
在那篇文章的最后，我写了一段话：“尽管改革已经开始，中国依然缺乏与这种学术研究相适应的现代化传播工业体系以及现代化的新闻体制，因而，中国新闻学的现代化道路将是曲折而漫长的，它需要伟大的五四文化精神的照耀。在这个意义上，五四时期创立的中国新闻学不应被人们遗忘，也不会再被遗忘。”

[Posted December 2, 2008, 12:02pm HK]