By David Bandurski — The attack last week on a Belgian television crew in Henan province has drawn condemnation from foreign media, NGOs and governments, particularly as it follows China’s recent extension of relaxed rules for foreign journalists. A statement issued by the Foreign Correspondent’s Club of China said “eight thugs” had stopped the van in which journalist Tom Van de Weghe and his crew were traveling and “punched them into submission.” [Frontpage Image: “TV Reporter” by David on Formosa available at Flickr under Creative Commons license].
China’s Foreign Ministry said during a press briefing only yesterday that China was looking into the incident. [Xinhua English-language report of December 2 here].
And how quickly the results are coming in!
A Xinhua News Agency report today, featured at a number of major Web portals, says preliminary findings suggest the Belgian crew was attacked not by thugs hired by the local government, but by AIDS sufferers concerned that a foreign news report might impact their “image.”
Evidently, officials at Henan’s Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the office that announced the findings, think people are actually going to believe this version.
We’ll say no more. Here it is:

“Belgian Journalists Reporting in Henan Meet Resistance from AIDS Sufferers”
Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 3, Henan Channel (Gui Tao, Gui Juan reporting) — On December 2, Wang Yuejin (王跃进), deputy head of the Foreign News Office of the Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the People’s Government of Henan Province, issued preliminary findings in the investigation into dispatches from foreign news agencies alleging that three Belgian journalists were “violently attacked” (暴力袭击) while reporting in Henan.
Wang Yuejin said that based on their preliminary understanding [of the situation], journalist Tom Van de Weghe (汤伟) and his crew from the Belgian Vlaamse Radio-en Televiaieomroep (Flemish Radio and Television Network) arrived at Shaungmiao Village (双庙村) in Gangwang Township (岗王乡) of Zhecheng County (柘城县) in Henan’s Shanqiu City (商丘市) on November 27 to carry out interviews. Because this village was at the time carrying out an election at the expiration of office terms, they could not proceed with their interviews, and so they headed for Zhoukou City (周口市). At around 4:30pm that afternoon, they returned to this village to carry out interviews but were refused by villagers. Afterwards, as they were on route to Sui County they were followed by a number of AIDS sufferers and township and village workers from Gangwang Township. As they reached Sui County, these people barred the way of the vehicle in which Van de Weghe and his crew were traveling, and some of the AIDS sufferers, fearing the impact the news report might have on their image, demanded that Van de Weghe relinquish his tapes and memory cards, which he refused. The two sides then got into a tussle, and the villagers forcibly kept back (留下) the tapes, memory cards and other articles.
Wang Yuejin said they are still in the process of verifying the concrete details of the incident.
Henan’s provincial government formed a united investigation team on December 2, which headed for Shangqiu City to investigate the matter.

MORE READING:
“Belgian TV crew beaten, robbed in China,” CBC, November 29, 2008
“China investigates attack on Belgian journalists,” Associated Press via IHT, December 2, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, December 3, 2008, 12:17pm HK]

By David Bandurski — As the December 18 anniversary of 30 years of economic reform in China approaches, there is no better time to reflect back on changes in China’s media. In an interview that appeared in yesterday’s edition of the Economic Observer, journalism professor Chen Lidan (陈力丹), of Renmin University, discusses his personal experiences as a press worker and researcher. [Frontpage Image: Chen Lidan appears at the Zhejiang University website].
Chen’s interview covers a range of topics, from the earliest debates over the nature of news — and whether it is dangerously bourgeois to conceive of it as a “commercial product” — to attempts in the 1980s to draft a Chinese press law.
One of the boldest passages is Chen’s repudiation of the CCP’s supreme media control notion of “guidance of public opinion,” a point that arises only much later in the interview:

I’m no longer interested in guidance of public opinion as an expert question. Guidance of public opinion is not a serious academic question, but rather a political demand. Public opinion is a naturally existing ecology of opinions. Opinions in society are diverse, and public opinion is diverse. It is wrong to insist that opinions in society be channeled in one direction in a concerted manner. Uniformity of opinion is abnormal. Only diversity of opinion is a normal thing.

The Economic Observer mines this passage for the simple gem of an idea that gives the interview its headline:

“Only Diversity of Opinion Is a Normal Thing”
Economic Observer: You were born in the 1950s, and I’m supposing you had big dreams when you were young.
Chen Lidan: I had no dreams. People of my generation, our ideals were all about “being resigned to the arrangements of the party.” I entered junior high school in the 1960s. At that time the message was all about studying Lei Feng, about having a single red heart and preparedness on many fronts (一颗红心多种准备), about heading for the countryside an the border regions — all in service of the party. At that time there was neither the social basis nor the social environment for dreams. Could such an environment permit you to dream?
Economic Observer: Did children all think at the time of growing up and being scientists?
Chen Lidan: We wanted to be peasants, and workers — that was the most glorious thing to be. How could we be scientists? That was about earning a reputation for yourself, something entirely bourgeois.
Economic Observer: Can you talk about your experiences reading books and newspapers before the Open Door Policy?
Chen Lidan: On July 13, 1968, I went to to the Eighth Work Division of the Heilongjiang Production and Construction Brigade (黑龙江生产建设兵团第八团), where I became a full-time propaganda reporter. My present professional life can be seen as going back to 1970. I become head of the reporting division [in Heilongjiang] in 1971, and in March 1973, when the reporting group was disbanded, I was sent to the division’s maintenance depot to work as a statistician, and in fact what I was doing was still putting together reports. At that time I had few connections with the media, save with the Soldier Corps Daily (兵团战士报), which was all news about the various divisions. There were also Heilongjiang Daily and People’s Daily, but I seldom read them. We belonged then to the paramilitary network, and the Liberation Army Daily was more common than People’s Daily. After that it was the division’s radio station, mainly devoted to news (my responsibility), songs, and quotations [from Chairman Mao]. There was nothing more, for those were meager times.
In August 1973, five months after I was sent to the maintenance depot, I returned to Beijing to study journalism at Peking University. After graduation I worked the nightshift as first reader of Guangming Daily, my job being to read the paper everyday. When I was a graduate student I was again studying journalism, and I was reading newspapers day in and day out. So my connection with media was unbroken. But there was not much to read in these papers, in fact. I seldom listened to the radio, and television was common only after the mid-1980s . . .
Economic Observer: In that time, what things made the deepest impression on you?
Chen Yidan: When I was studying at Peking University, even while we were called “learners” (学员), I basically studied nothing in that three years. At that time, information was very strictly controlled at Peking University, the environment virtually entirely sealed off. My distaste for the “Gang of Four” was merely a kind of instinct. On April 4, 1976, I took the opportunity as I was heading home (I was living in Dongcheng District at the time) to pass through Tiananmen Square, and I was touched, but I had no clear inkling of politics at the time. In January that year, as a number of us were returning home to Beijing by boat through Tianjin after internships with Yantai Daily (烟台日报), we heard on the radio on the way that Premier Zhou Enlai had passed away . . .
The Tangshan earthquake struck in 1976, and we accepted our graduation certificates in the earthquake shelters. I was sent to the editor-in-chief’s office at Guangming Daily to serve as editor on the night shift . . .
Economic Observer: After the Cultural Revolution, how did the process of setting things right (拨乱反正) happen in the arena of press studies?
Chen Lidan: First of all, those to first carry out deep introspection on the press weren’t journalism researchers, but two female youth in their twenties. On November 13, 1978, People’s Daily published an article by Lin Chun (林春) and Li Yinhe (李银河) called, “We Must Actively Promote Democracy and Strengthen Rule of Law” (要大大发扬民主和加强法制), the first time the making of a press law was raised.
That article made use of the words of Mao Zedong, saying that “the most precious freedoms of the people are those of speech, assembly, association, belief and person.” The article said that the reason Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four” could take just a few sentences in criticism of them and strike out against others as counterrevolutionaries, and the reason they could turn the newspapers into mouthpieces of their clique, was because the people were as yet unable to protect their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. In order that these rights be realized, Lin Chun and Li Yinhe advocated “first making a clear and complete account of the democratic rights of the people in various laws, giving them a legal force that no one can oppose.” These ideas still glitter with rays of thought.
Economic Observer: A great deal of work was also done by those in the press for the creation of press laws.
Chen Lidan: Beginning in the 1980s, people in the press started clamoring about the creation of a press law. A number of my fellow graduate students, including Zhang Zonghou (张宗厚), Sun Xupei (孙旭培) and Zhang Huanzhang (张焕章) of China Youth Daily‘s press research academy, all wrote articles on this subject. In January 1984, the National People’s Congress instructed Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟), then deputy director of the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Committee (教科文委员会), to take charge of this work [toward a press law], and for this purpose at Press Law Research Center (新闻法研究室) was created within the Press Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It irregularly published a periodical called Press Law Bulletin (新闻法通讯). By 1988, three separate drafts of a press law had been created by the Press Law Research Center of the Press Institute at CASS, by a press law drafting group in Shanghai, and by a press law drafting group within the General Administration of Press and Publications. In March 1989, Comrade Deng Xiaoping even said: “We must seize particularly on the creation of laws, including laws and regulations on assembly, association, procession, demonstration, the press and publishing.”
For a number of reasons, the work of creating a press law gradually came to an end, and it has not to this day made it onto the [NPC] agenda. But a social consensus has already emerged around the making of laws to protect the various freedoms of the people. The preciousness of this recognition [of the importance of protecting rights] is best expressed in the words of the essay by Lin Chun and Li Yinhe: “These rights must be had. A system of law (and rule of law) must be achieved. This is a conviction to which the people have arrived through the experience of most bitter suffering, at the cost of their own blood and of their own lives.”
Economic Observer: After the Cultural Revolution, how did the press begin the process of reflecting back?
Chen Lidan: The first thing everyone asked at the time was, “What is news?” After that it was, “What is the nature and function of the newspaper?” People were “crafty” at that time. Over here they would admit the point that newspapers were tools in the struggle of the classes, but over here they would emphasize that papers were tools of public opinion in society. During that time, a lot of essays were trending in the latter direction.
In December 1980, CASS held a forum to discuss the book The Theoretical Foundation of Journalism (新闻理论基础), by Renmin University of China professor Gan Xifen (甘惜分). The forum lasted three days, and a number of the teachers present continued to insist on the point that newspapers, radio and television were tools of class struggle.
One teacher turned to some words Mao Zedong had said to two radio broadcasters on the rostrum at Tiananmen in 1968, the basic point of which was that radio was important. This teacher also gave the example that political change in Iraq had happened because [the Socialist Baath Party] had first gained control of the radio towers — and this was testament to the fact that radio was a tool of class struggle. One of my classmates, Sun Xupei, said somewhat sardonically that seizing political control meant not only seizing radio towers, but also train stations, airports, telegraph towers, and of what nature were these? Perhaps these were also tools of class struggle. That teacher was extremely upset, but he said nothing.
The essential character of media is not as “tools of class struggle. The most basic function of media is to transmit information, and that is news, no matter what kind of newspaper you’re talking about, even if its a party newspaper. Talking about this now, this idea seems elementary, but in the 1980s it was hard to say such things.
Economic Observer: Aside from tearing down “quotation journalism” (语录新闻学), what other theoretical discussions were going on in press studies in the 1980s?
Chen Lidan: Beginning in 1983, I participated in three separate discussions about “whether news is a commercial product or not” (新闻是不是商品). A lot of people in the 1980s felt that news was not a commercial products, and people still criticized the idea that news was a commercial products as a bourgeois point of view. In 1982, the 12th National Congress raised the idea of “a planned commercial economy” (有计划的商品经济), and [China] began to acknowledge the idea of a market economy. I wrote one very long essay that gave an overview at the third discussion about the commercial nature of the news — as of today, it still has never been published.
There was also a discussion about “exemplary reports” (典型报道) that at the time grew very fierce. Toward the end of 1986, the Chinese Journalism Society held its annual meeting, and I wrote a piece called, “Playing Down the Concept of Exemplary Reports.” The idea might have been a bit ahead of its time, and the voices in opposition were very loud indeed. Most [opposition] came from the chief editors of various local and regional party newspapers, where they were doing these kinds of reports [about exemplary communist heroes] on a daily basis, so what I was saying amounted to a negation of their work. I realized only later that this was not just a matter of business, but still very much a matter of theories of the press. It touched on the issue of how we understand the role of the media. The news is a factual report of something that has just happened, and it has to have news value. Exemplary reports praised [actions that were seen as] advanced, and how could that be news!
Economic Observer: Is it fair to say that the book Ten Discussions on Press Theory (新闻理论十讲) represents your ideas about the last three decades?
Chen Lidan: I suppose so. Those are my views within the bounds of what I can express. There was one chapter in the book that was a criticism of the bourgeois notion of freedom of speech, or claimed to reveal the falsehood of freedom of speech. Well, in that discussion in the book, I talked about what “freedom of speech” meant from a totally positive perspective . . .
In our press theory, we don’t dare to speak the word “freedom” too boldly, because we can only feel empty in our hearts. In 1986, I wrote an essay talking about “absolute freedom of the press” (绝对的出版自由), and as a result this essay was sent up [to authorities] during the purges of 1990 and 1991 [following June 4, 1989]. To this day, however, no one has argued over these points [of theory] with me. There’s no way they can argue these points with me, because I make reference to the original words of Engels, and Engels wrote more than once about “absolute freedom of the press.” In 1980, Red Flag magazine published an article that talked about the meaning of freedom, and it spoke a truth, saying that in the West the work most widely published is the Christian bible and next comes the writings of Lenin. The article pointed out that they publish Lenin’s work so widely [in the West] in order that it can be criticized. This explanation is of course ridiculous and illogical. Lenin’s ideology is perhaps in direct opposition to the West, but the fact that his published works are second only to the bible at least tells us that Lenin’s writings can be freely published in Western society — as for who is reading them, and why, that’s another question altogether.
Economic Observer: Is there any relationship between the “public opinion studies” referred to in these textbooks [in the interviewers hands?] and your previous book Public Opinion?
Chen Lidan: There is some relationship, but not a great deal. That “Public Opinion Studies” is a topic [i.e., project] undertaken by the Academy of Social Sciences Fund [SEE a list in Chinese of projects proposed for Tsinghua University and approved in 2004 here], and it has to concern itself here and there with “guidance of public opinion.” I’m no longer interested in guidance of public opinion as an expert question. Guidance of public opinion is not a serious academic question, but rather a political demand. Public opinion is a naturally existing ecology of opinions. Opinions in society are diverse, and public opinion is diverse. It is wrong to insist that opinions in society be channeled in one direction in a concerted manner. Uniformity of opinion is abnormal. Only diversity of opinion is a normal thing.
Economic Observer: This year is the 30th anniversary of economic reforms. What were you doing in 1978?
Chen Lidan: It was in 1978 that I tested into the graduate school of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. I had at the time a very poor theoretical grasp of the overall national political situation. I just felt that there were major problems with the Cultural Revolution and that we must criticize the leftist trend in thought. I was unhappy with a number of methods employed by the central party, but I was totally at a loss as to where these problems arose and how they should be analyzed.
On November 13 that year, the article by Lin Chun and Li Yinhe . . . appeared on page three of People’s Daily and armed me with the theoretical basis to analyze the problems of the Cultural Revolution — and that was the democratic system, the protections of the democratic system and rule of law. On November 16, Xinhua News Agency released 242 words from the party secretary of Beijing on the rehabilitation of those involved in the April 5 Tiananmen Incident. That December the Third Plenary Meeting of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee opened, and I read over and over the bulletin from the meetings and Deng Xiaoping’s speech, “Liberating Thought, Seeking the Truth Through Facts, Looking Ahead in Unity” (解放思想，实事求是，团结一致向前看). They were utterly inspiring.
And it was from that time on that I became clear about various issues . . . and the building of democracy, of a society ruled by law, and the pursuit of freedom of the spirit became firmly held beliefs of mine. I was 27 years old in 1978, a time by which one’s ideas should already be mature, but in the atmosphere of the first couple of years after the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, when people spoke in set phrases all day long, spoke words forced on them, it was difficult to form a habit of thinking for oneself.
Economic Observer: If you were to write a phrase to describe the 1980s, what would it be?
Chen Lidan: The 80s were an active and stimulating time, in which people’s ideas were constantly colliding, and there was a tolerant space for stimulation and activity. This was true even though the space would constantly expand and contract, heading left and then right. In fact, it was precisely because there was this constant tugging left or right that there was space for activity.
After the 1990s, the system of press studies in system had basically been built, particularly in the area of press theory, and any time someone opened their mouth it was with a particular approach. Of course, after 1992 there was open space for press research, and this space emerged primarily under the stimulation of the market economy. In the 1980s, all disciplines were doing things that fell within the category of “politics,” they were all flying the flag of political reform, including press reform. But after the 1990s, people discovered that there was a speciality terrain outside of politics where a great deal could be done, and a lot of developments were made.
But looking back now, it seems that the thing most troubling press studies lately is still press theory. If we can make breakthroughs in press theory, I’m afraid things would be a bit better.
Economic Observer: The philosopher Li Zehou (李泽厚) believes that compared to the 1980s, the 90s were a time when “ideas were weak and academics were highlighted.” Do you agree with this view?
Chen Lidan: . . . The 1990s. I think they weren’t a time of “weak ideas in which academics were highlighted.” There is thought in academics too. I think it should be that “politics were weak and academics highlighted.”
Economic Observer: You think there were still ideas in the 1990s?
Chen Lidan: Ideas in the 1990s emerged largely within academia. They came out tortuously, and in the name of academics and academic study. This was unlike the 1980s, when they could emerge directly under the slogan of “political reform.” So in the 1990s, many ideas were hidden away within academia. This includes a lot of Western concepts and comparative study, which have ideas but are indirect. Now we can actually say “freedom of speech,” and what we use is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. But would this have happened in the 1980s? At that time people didn’t even know such a thing existed. Now our own government has signed this covenant on civil rights, and so I can say it boldly and confidently. I think we can use different words and say that “politics is weak.” Everyone does their utmost to keep their distance from politics.
Economic Observer: Next year is the 90th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. What influence do you think this movement had on press studies in China?
Chen Lidan: In my view, the May Fourth Movement, aside from voicing the slogans of “science” and “democracy,” had a fierce sense of freedom. It broke through the conformity and uniformity of the ancient Chinese academic discipline and inaugurated an all-encompassing era of academic diversity, bringing into being modern literature, philosophy, history, linguistics and other independent disciplines and schools of thought. After 30 years of development in press studies in China, we’re at last able in this kind of social context to announce our own independence as an academic discipline. It can be said that only in the May Fourth era did press studies [in China] have an entirely independent status.
如果用一句话来表达五四以前新闻学启蒙者对新闻学的基本认识，梁启超所讲的“报馆有益于国事”是最恰当不过。儒家传统中的实用理性，始终是那个时期的新闻学启蒙者的出发点和归宿；商品经济、自由理性、现代社会对精神交往的普遍需求等问题，在他们的论述中基本上是空白。
如果用一句话来表达五四时期新闻学的特点，邵飘萍讲的“以新闻为本位”最为恰当。就像文学以文学为本位、哲学以哲学为本位一样，对一向与“国事”交织在一起的新闻来说，摆脱政治的旋涡，成为独立的研究对象，不能不说是新闻学的一次革命。五四新文化补充了中国传统的学术研究中所缺乏的个体自由意识，否则，新闻学也许将永远以启蒙的形式被固定在 “国事”的卵翼之下。
如果用一句话表达五四以后新闻学的主题，那就是1930年当时的中共中央总书记向忠发讲的“报纸是一种阶级斗争的工具”。十月革命并没有给中国带来马克思恩格斯的新闻思想，而只带来了并不完整的列宁以及斯大林关于党报工作的论述。随着中国政治出现新的两军对垒，具有独立品格的新闻学逐渐消失了，新闻学的主题在一个新的认识层次上由政治统帅了。
1978年“文革”结束以后，人们终于小心翼翼地再次说出 “新闻机构的第一位任务是提供新闻”这样一个最普通的常识，并且不得不从头开始明确新闻的定义、新闻价值、言论出版自由、舆论监督、新闻法等常识。这只是补课，以便在新闻学研究的更高层次——也就是人类信息沟通的层次上——迅速跟上世界的步伐。
在那篇文章的最后，我写了一段话：“尽管改革已经开始，中国依然缺乏与这种学术研究相适应的现代化传播工业体系以及现代化的新闻体制，因而，中国新闻学的现代化道路将是曲折而漫长的，它需要伟大的五四文化精神的照耀。在这个意义上，五四时期创立的中国新闻学不应被人们遗忘，也不会再被遗忘。”

[Posted December 2, 2008, 12:02pm HK]

By Emma Lupano — A heated debate about ethical journalism spread through China’s media last October after China Youth Daily exposed the country’s latest “gag fee” case, in which scores of journalists accepted payoffs from a mine boss in Shanxi to suppress the story of a work-related death. [Frontpage photo: “Lucky Chinese Money” by Vanessa Pike-Russell available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
Last week, just as the Linfen “gag fee” case faded from the national spotlight, China Youth Daily whipped up another hot-button media ethics issue, reporting on the apparently widespread practice of publishing articles in exchange for payments generally referred to in Chinese as “publishing fees,” or fabiaofei (发表费).
The China Youth Daily investigation focused on the national magazine Reportage (报告文学), a once respected vehicle for serious literary journalism that has faced a dramatic decline in both circulation and esteem since its heyday in the 1980s.
In order to expose payment for placement at Reportage, a China Youth Daily reporter approached the magazine pretending to be the representative of a company that wished to have an article published. A magazine editor surnamed Wang gave the journalist detailed information about the relevant fees and how the fictional company could have its “advertisement” published.

 

ABOVE: China Youth Daily‘s November 20 report on Reportage, outlined in red.

A complete translation of China Youth Daily‘s report can be found at the Zhongnanhai blog. But here are some of our own excerpts: 

“A ‘national level publication’ openly sells article space. The fixed price is 1,000 yuan for a 1,000 word piece” 
“We determine our fee according to the number of words, normally a 20,000 word article costs 30,000 yuan, which includes five or six images. There might be some margin to discuss prices in more detail once we have seen the draft,” an editor surnamed Wang said in a phone exchange.
Recently, this newspaper was told by a source that just by paying money one could have a large article published in the national journal Reportage. The price [they said] was clearly set — 1,000 yuan per 1,000 words. Our journalist went undercover to contact the magazine to confirm whether or not this illegal practice, which is prohibited by the State Administration of Press and Publications, was still going on.
Our reporter phoned the editorial office of Reportage pretending to be an employee from a company wishing to publish a soft advertisement. An editor from Reportage, surnamed Wang, replied immediately, without asking for any additional information about the company: “Yes, we can do it, have you got someone who can write it? . . . At the moment we do not have enough editors on staff, so it would be better if you could write the piece yourselves and then submit it to us.”
Regarding specifications for the article, this Wang gave the falling directions: “Normally, so long as the content and the language of the text are coherent and smooth, this is fine. According to our needs at the moment, you can write something related to the scientific view of development, maybe giving some details of your company’s own development. Our editors can make appropriate changes, too. Normally, all the articles [we receive] can be published.”
“But doesn’t Reportage have a high literary standard for their articles?”, our reporter asked. “We have two categories of articles. The first kind is published free of charge, and in this case the quality obviously has to be quite high, both in terms of readability and culturally. But for those that are like soft advertisements, if they say what they mean clearly and are basically wholesome that’s sufficient.
As the reporter pressed on with other questions regarding fees, this Wang did not hesitate in her responses: “We need to see how many words and how many pictures you want to publish. The number of words in the piece determines the price, and normally we require 30,000 yuan for an article running to 20,000 words, and this includes five or six image. If you need one of our journalists to write the article instead, we require the fixed amount up front and an additional 5,000 yuan for royalty fees.

The China Youth Daily report also quotes an “insider” referred to only as “Mr. Shen” as saying that this practice is not new to Reportage.

“This magazine has been using this way of ‘circulating money’ for some years already. To have an article published in Reportage is really easy. The standard of the writing is not high. You just fork over some money and the article makes it.”

When asked to comment on the magazine’s practice of accepting payment for contributions, Reportage editor-in-chief Wu Shuang seemed to find nothing wrong.
“We are a cultural magazine, we don’t do news,” he told China Youth Daily. “[These are] the so-called paid contributions. There are some companies that want to publicize themselves, so they get in touch with us about publishing an article. They use our space, but it falls to us to print the article and to check it. We bear these costs, so why shouldn’t they pay us a little fee?”
Wu said, moreover, that this practice was commonplace through China’s cultural industry.
On weblogs and other commentaries on the case, a number of writers naturally linked the pay-for-play practice to the process of media commercialization that has progressed full-steam-ahead in China since the mid-1990s.
Blogger Wei Yingjie (魏英杰) wrote a commentary at QQ.com that voiced a total lack of surprise about China Youth Daily‘s revelations. Isn’t this the way all of these publications work?
Here is a portion of Wei’s piece, translated by Joel Martinsen over at Danwei.org:

On November 20, when China Youth Daily ran the article “‘National Publication’ Sells Article Space for 1,000 yuan per 1,000 characters,” my first reaction was bafflement. Not because of the exposure of Reportage‘s dirty deeds; I simply found it odd that this newspaper had taken a sudden interest in the “pay-to-print” phenomenon. Isn’t that an open secret in the industry? Isn’t selling off pages just day-to-day business at those key periodicals?
Sure, I’ll admit that it isn’t proper to think that. As illegal dealings clearly prohibited by law, paid articles and compensated news should be relentlessly exposed, and no exposure comes too late. Hence, didn’t the newspaper display an utterly uncompromising attitude by turning over so many column inches to this report? Maybe the magazine’s executive editor respond without batting an eyelash because of that same indifference: “China Youth Daily knows the way things are because we’re both in the same line of work. Name me someone who doesn’t do it.” The guy’s in trouble because those unwritten rules haven’t been legitimized as “written rules.”

Wei also took issue with the notion, which added to the newsiness of the China Youth Daily, that Reportage was a “national publication.”

But there’s another thing: it’s not really accurate to call Reportage a “national publication.” The magazine was founded in 2000 (it is unrelated to an earlier publication of the same name) out of Hubei’s Contemporary Writers (当代作家, some sources say “Contemporary Literature,” 当代文学) and is published under the authority of Changjiang Literature and Arts Press. In 2002, the publisher invited the China Reportage Association to assume editing duties, and the magazine moved north to Beijing. But the magazine still lists itself under the administration of Hubei’s Provincial Administration of Press and Publication. The magazine is hardly a “national publication” and might not enjoy the same sort of “consideration.”

Since the Reportage scandal broke, the online Donghu Commentary (东湖评论) has published a number of responses to the case, including one in which columnist Deng Ziqing (邓子庆) compares the “publishing fee” phenomenon with the “gag fee” phenomenon, thus drawing a straight line between two of the latest hot spots in media ethics in China.
The editorial, which was republished in Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News on November 25, suggested that Chinese academics are only too familiar with the “pay for play” practice, and speculated that “researchers and university professors were not at all surprised by this news.”
Portions of the Deng Ziqing editorial follow:

What is the difference between the “publishing fee” and the “gag fee”?
Recently, this newspaper [China Youth Daily] was told by a source that just by paying money one could have a large article published in the national journal Reportage. The price [they said] was clearly set — 1,000 yuan per 1,000 words. Our journalist went undercover to contact the magazine to confirm whether or not this illegal practice, which is prohibited by the State Administration of Press and Publications, was still going on . . . [China Youth Daily, November 20].
I’m confident that many researchers and university professors were not at all surprised by this news, and many of them have probably personally experienced the “pay for print” phenomenon. Yes, so it is with national-level publications — you pay them and they print you. I believe that while these “publishing fees” and the “gag fees” that so recently caused a stir are different approaches, they yield the same result. The “gag fee” mutually benefits the mine owner and the journalist; the “publishing fee” is a “win-win exchange” between the writer and the editor.
If you are afraid of a negative report, you can pay money to have it removed; if you wish to have a positive report, you can pay money to have it published.” This is as good an explanation as any of the phenomenon of “paid-for news.” Gag fees basically mean that anything can be withheld in the face of money, whether it has news value or not. Here, we can view thesis papers as a kind of report, and in the face of “publishing fees” academic magazines do not care whether something is of quality or not — so long as you pay according to their standards, it can be published. Can you say the “publishing fee” is not cut from the same fabric as the “gag fee”?
In my view, even the publishing serious academic works faces this same problem, that without paying a “publishing fee” they have trouble getting published, and this type of academic corruption has already reached the point where action has to be taken. If this environment persists, there will be not place for quality works while shoddy ones will be everywhere, to the point where good authors will cease to improve their ideas. The quality of scientific papers will go from bad to worse, and, in the long term, this will be a disservice to scientific development in our country.
I believe that apart from fostering sound and ethical practices among journalists and academics, we must severely punish those responsible for “gag fee” and “publishing fee” cases, killing one as they say to send a warning to hundreds. At the same time, relevant units, particularly universities, should change the concept by which the publishing of thesis papers determine graduation and promotion, and should establish expert panels to focus on whether papers already published show plagiarism, whether they have any influence [of thought], are full of old ideas or show creative new concepts. We can’t simply look at whether papers are published or not.
Obviously, another necessary step in order to avoid the decadence of science and literature is for the administrations involved to reinforce their dynamism in supervising news companies and individuals. If a company has to control itself, that is a situation in which the left hand controls the right hand — so this “publication fee” trend could become worse and worse. As Wan Junchao, associate professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at Qinghua University, puts it: “Thee kinds of paid-for reports are really not an exceptional phenomenon. All the media occupy some position in this big environment. If you add the decline of professional ethics among news employees and the flagging resolve of related departments to punish them, all these factors encourage the propagation of paid-for news”.

FURTHER READING:
Zhang Tieying (张铁鹰) comments on the Reportage affair at Donghu Commentary
“Deep Shame on Reportage for Paid-for Reports,” China News Service, November 21, 2008
“Paid for No News and Paid-For News,” Liu Haiming (刘海明) Donghu Commentary
“Media That Openly Sell Space Display the Restlessness of Our Society,” Zhang Rusheng (张如晟), Donghu Commentary
[Posted by Emma Lupano, November 28, 2008, 9:33am HK]

By David Bandurski — CMP wrote recently about some limited discussion in China’s media about a number of recent cases in which Chinese citizens have “incurred guilt through their words.” This week, in the latest instance of this basic violation of China’s constitutionally guaranteed right to “freedom of expression,” a professor at Shanghai’s East China University of Political Science and Law is reportedly under investigation after his students reported him to local police for alleged anti-government views. [Frontpage Image: “Cultural Revolution for sale” by El Freddy available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]
In an editorial on page A31 of today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, Wang Xiaoyu (王晓渔) reflects on the Yang Shiqun (杨师群) case and its significance.
Importantly, Wang points out that this case differs from other recent wenziyu (文字狱) cases in that it has happened at a national educational institution in a major Chinese city.
A portion of the editorial follows:

“‘Incurring Guilt by One’s Words’ at Universities of Political Science and Law”
By Wang Xiaoyu (王晓渔)
At Tianya Chat (天涯杂谈) and other sites a post has appeared causing passionate debate among Web users, and that post excerpts a portion from the blog of Yang Shiqun (杨师群), a teacher in the cultural institute of East China University of Political Science and Law, which revealed that [some of Yang’s] students had gone to the public security bureau and [Shanghai’s] municipal education committee to report that certain content in Yang’s class had been critical of the government, and that relevant government departments had already [responded to the report] by launching a formal investigation. The post has now been deleted from Yang Shiqun’s blog, and there is no way to learn the latest developments, but many responses from web users support Yang Shiqun’s right to express his own opinions.
In recent years, cases in which people incur guilt by their words have occurred time and again, like the “Pengshui SMS Case” . . . . [See CMP’s recent post on this topic] . . . All of these cases have occurred in regions where economic development has lagged, and at government offices at the county or city level or below, which have a poor appreciation for the concept of rule of law. As citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of expression in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, these above-listed cases have been quickly corrected once revealed to the outside, and officials concerned have resigned or been removed . . . [Summarizes Xifeng case and anger over current developments].
The Yang Shiqun incident naturally causes some to recall the 2005 Lu Xuesong (卢雪松) case. [In that case,] Lu Xueong, an instructor at Jilin College of the Arts, was formally accused by her students and stripped of her teaching credentials after she discussed with them how China Youth Daily and other media had covered [Hu Jie’s unauthorized] documentary Searching for Lin Zhao’s Soul (寻找林昭的灵魂). The Lu Xuesong affair drew a great deal of attention from the academic community, and after it happened friends of mine in the academic community were basically in consensus that this owed largely to the fact that Jilin College of the Arts was a rather insular local academy, and if such a thing were to happen at a national institution in a major city things would turn out differently. But when we look at the Yang Shiqun case it is hard to be optimistic. East China University of Political Science and Law is not located in Xifeng or Pengshui. That a university professor at a college of political science and law would be incriminated by their own words — this is something more absurd than one would expect to find even in the genre of fantasy.

FURTHER READING: (Updated November 28, 2008)
“These Cases Lately of Students Accusing Teachers are Simply Ridiculous,” Zhang Ming, Zhujiang Evening Post, November 28, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 27, 2008, 12:37pm]

By David Bandurski — For those of us outside the pale of Chinese politics, the leftist bluster that emerges at times from the CCP is simply impossible to take seriously. We are more likely to titter than to tremble when we hear bombast about “hostile Western forces” or the “running dogs of America and Europe.” More likely than not, we pay it no attention at all. [Frontpage Image: “Mao Zedong in Tianfu Square”, by NewChengdu available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
So it has been with the latest political manifesto from China’s left — a rant riddled with buzzwords old and new that has caused not a hiccup outside China, but has given intense heartburn to more moderate scholars and officials in China.
The editorial — really too important to titter about — was written by General Xu Tianliang (徐天亮), director of the political department of China’s National Defense University, and it appeared in the November 10 edition of the official People’s Daily.
It spoke in grandiose terms about the need for China’s leaders to be “thoroughly vigilant” in recognizing the threat posed by “hostile forces” in the ideological sphere. But more importantly, it was an open challenge to pro-reform leaders on the eve of a critical anniversary next month that will mark 30 years of economic and social reform in China.

[ABOVE: Page 7 “Theory” page of People’s Daily on November 10, with the editorial by Xu Tianliang marked in red.]

December 18 is the 30th anniversary of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee, an event regarded generally as a pivotal moment in the modern political history of China.
The plenum marked Deng Xiaoping’s re-emergence and the onset of economic, social and political reforms. It also repudiated the errors and excesses of the CCP’s left and the cult of personality surrounding Mao Zedong, and adopted the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, technology, defense).
Through the 1980s, Deng oversaw a diminishing of the importance of ideology in China. But in the aftermath of the June 4, 1989, crackdown on democracy demonstrators in Beijing, the political climate shifted once again to the left, and ideological rhetoric denouncing “bourgeois liberalization” returned.
A People’s Daily editorial following the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union, quoted by Kalpana Misra in a work on “neo-left” and “neo-right” theory in China, bears remembering as we turn to Xu’s more recent pronouncements:

Chairman Mao was the first to raise this question . . . [t]he actual development over the past few decades has fully proved that the hostile forces at home and abroad have never stopped attempting to subvert the Communist Party’s leadership and undermine the socialist system — they are largely relying on the ‘war without smoke of gunpowder’ for fulfilling their goal. We will grieve if, instead of gaining a keen insight into the real threat of peaceful evolution, we lower our guard against it.

Deng Xiaoping famously cut off the ascendancy of China’s left in the early 1990s with a call to cease ideological wrangling about whether the nation’s economic reform policies were “surnamed Capitalism or surnamed Socialism” (姓资姓社).
Xu Tianliang’s November 10 editorial is an attempt to reinvigorate this ideological debate about the past and future of China’s reforms. Xu, in fact, seems at points to be calling for a kind of fifth modernization — of socialist ideology.
China, says Xu in one section, must master new information technologies in order to project itself ideologically and to “safeguard our nation’s ideological security” (意识形态安全).
Toward this end, in the “great project of building a modern transmission system with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色现代传播体系), China’s media would play a crucial role :

We must clearly recognize the importance of improving our country’s international transmission [of ideas and information] to the safeguarding of our nation’s ideological security. Numerous facts have revealed that in this age of rapid development of information technologies, whoever has mastery of cutting-edge transmission methods, and whoever’s transmission capabilities are strongest, can achieve more widespread transfer of their thinking, culture and value concepts, and thereby more effectively influence the world. Our matching of strength with hostile forces in the ideological sphere is to a definite degree also a matching of strength in the transmission [of ideas and information]. Right now, our material goods are seen the world round, but our spiritual and cultural goods find limited [representation] on the international market. Building and strengthening our international transmission capacity is critical to preserving our ideological security, to recasting the greatness of the Chinese people, and to China truly becoming a great world power. In the great project of building a modern transmission system with Chinese characteristics (中国特色现代传播体系), the mainstream media bear a great weight of responsibility.

In an eery echo of the August 1991 People’s Daily language about the need for “keen insight into the real threat of peaceful evolution,” Xu’s editorial calls on China’s leaders to be more keenly alert to the “struggle” in the ideological sphere, particularly in the new information age.
“As we concentrate our efforts on carrying out modernization, we must not even for a moment grow lax in our ideological work,” Xu writes.
For supporters, who voiced their views across an array of websites, from Tianya to the fervently leftist Wuyou Zhixiang (乌有之乡), Xu’s words were like the ecstatic utterance of a Nietschean Zarathustra. Xu had smashed his lamp to startle awake party leaders who have lost touch with “the lofty goals of Communism” under a bombardment of foreign ideas like democracy and human rights.
The editorial, said one googly-eyed admirer in a Chinese internet forum, is “a great party paper article such as we have not seen in many years.”
“I support the author of the article,” exclaimed another. “We definitely must be aware of and stave off hostile Western forces! At the same time, we need to urgently make our own voices heard! We can’t let the West control the power of speech!”
Xu Tianliang’s editorial underscores a deep and fundamental debate within the CCP about how to commemorate the 30th anniversary of China’s Open Door policy. Critically, it also underscores the sensitive political climate in which Chinese journalists are now working — and there is no better illustration of that than recent troubles at Yanhuang Chunqiu.
There is much more to say, but for now we offer a full translation of Xu’s editorial. We welcome further thoughts and analysis — after all of you are done tittering, of course.

“Sound Ideological Work Demands Clear Understanding”
People’s Daily
November 10, 2008
Xu Tianliang (徐天亮)
Our party has always placed great emphasis on ideological work. In the age of information and economic globalization, there have been many changes to the complexion of the ideological sphere. Doing adequate ideological requires that we remain thoroughly vigilant, no matter when or under what situation.
We must have a clear understanding of the utmost importance of the party’s ideological work . . . Ideology is the central manifestation of the will of the ruling class, the soul of the body social, and it provides the theoretical justification, thought foundation and spiritual support for the leadership of the ruling class. In this sense, ideological work is a critical task that protects the leadership position of the party. Great problems will result if economic work is not done properly. So too will great problems result if ideological work is not done properly. As we concentrate our efforts on carrying out modernization, we must not grow lax in our ideological work for even a moment. We must also recognize that the development of thought, morality and culture with ideology at its core constitutes critical soft power that contributes to the building of comprehensive national strength . . .
We must have a clear understanding of the nature of struggle in the ideological domain. Historical experience demonstrates the absolute necessity of having a clear understanding and scientific grasp of the nature of the struggle in the ideological domain . . . In recent years, our party has put a strong emphasis on ideological work, thoroughly promoting the work of arming ourselves with theory (理论武装工作), doing news propaganda work, building of thoughts and morals, carrying out literary and artistic creation, and promoting the development and flourishing of socialist culture, providing a common foundation of political theory for the concerted efforts of people of all ethnic groups as well as great spiritual motivation and intellectual support. At the same time, we must clearly see the continuing urgency and complexity of the struggle for and against infiltration in the ideological sphere, that hostile forces have intensified destructive acts of infiltration against our country in the ideological sphere. First, they are always using such topics as freedom, democracy, human rights, ethnicity and religion to carry out rumor-mondering attacks on our nation. Second, they have made it their stock-in-trade to broaden the [apparent] scope of various problems, taking simple issues and complicating them, taking ordinary issues and politicizing them, ultimately pointing the finger of blame at the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and at the socialist system. Third, they use media, particularly the Internet and other modern media, to vilify and demonize our nation. We must have a clear understanding of this, having a keen but not overly sensitive, cool-headed but not dull, treatment of problems in the ideological sphere, working to enhance our conscientiousness in doing ideological work well.
We must be clear in recognizing the basic tasks of ideological work. Our struggle against hostile forces in the ideological sphere is at its base a matching of strength between the socialist value system (社会主义价值体系) and the capitalist value system (资本主义价值体系). Therefore, the basic task in strengthening ideological work is to energetically promote the building of the social core value system (社会主义核心价值体系). The party’s report to the 17th National Congress says that the socialist core value system is the essential embodiment of socialist ideology. All of those world views, methods, social ideals, spiritual supports, and moral precepts that best reveal the basic demands of socialism and the basic principles of socialism must be gathered together under the core value system, in order that they might provide us with basic guidance for the strengthening of ideological construction. We must persist in the unshakeable position of Marxism in the ideological sphere, promoting the popularity of contemporary Chinese Marxism, firmly establishing the basic theoretical foundation of socialist ideology; we must unshakably persist in the great ideals of communism and the common ideals of socialism with Chinese characteristics, holding high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, firmly establishing the basic political foundation of the socialist ideology; we must unshakably persist in promoting a nationalist spirit with patriotism at its core and a contemporary spirit with reform and renewal at its core . . . fostering among the entire people an enterprising spirit; we must unshakably persist in the central task of building civic morals, so that the socialist view of honor and shame becomes the guiding principle of the behavior of all citizens.
We must clearly recognize the importance of improving our country’s international transmission [of ideas and information] to the safeguarding of our nation’s ideological security. Numerous facts have revealed that in this age of rapid development of information technologies, whoever has mastery of cutting-edge transmission methods, and whoever’s transmission capabilities are strongest, can achieve more widespread transfer of their thinking, culture and value concepts, and thereby more effectively influence the world. Our matching of strength with hostile forces in the ideological sphere is to a definite degree also a matching of strength in the transmission [of ideas and information]. Right now, our material goods are seen the world round, but our spiritual and cultural goods find limited [representation] on the international market. Building and strengthening our international transmission capacity is critical to preserving our ideological security, to recasting the greatness of the Chinese people, and to China truly becoming a great world power. In the great project of building a modern transmission system with Chinese characteristics (中国特色现代传播体系), the mainstream media bear a great weight of responsibility.
We must clearly recognize that the key to doing ideological work well lies in the prioritization [of ideological work] and the enhancement of leadership [in this area] by the whole party. Comrades throughout the party, but particularly comrades who carry out propaganda work, must have ideological backbone (意识形态这根弦), must give ideological work a high priority, and must enhance their political awareness, their political sensitivity and their political perceptiveness. While we cannot say that propaganda work and ideological work are equal to one another, they are intimately connected. Propaganda work is the principle vehicle of ideological work, and [we can say that] ideology is the soul of propaganda work. We cannot view all propaganda and cultural work as ideological work, but perhaps all propaganda and cultural work bears elements and shadows of ideology. We must certainly, according to the demands of the CCP central committee under the presidency of comrade Hu Jintao, earnestly improve our leadership on ideological work, striving to raise our capacity to do ideological work effectively, conscientiously summarizing the party’s successes in the area of ideological work, deepening our research of the characteristics and laws governing ideological work under the conditions [created by] information technologies, economic globalization and the market economy, raising our capacity and ability to control our overall ideological interests, and energetically promoting the scientific development of the press and propaganda (新闻宣传事业).

MORE READING:
[Xu Tianliang listed as a delegate to the 17th National Congress in October 2007, after alternate members and disclipline inspection committee members are added. He does not appear in the People’s Daily list of August 3, 2008.].
[News on Xu Tianliang’s visit to the earthquake zone in Longnan, Gansu, in June 2008, includes a photo of Xu.]
[On a less serious note, get your greeting cards, signed by Xu Tianliang, here.]
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 26, 2008, 3:43pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Zhang Zhiguo (张志国), the party secretary of Xifeng County in the Liaoning city of Tieling, became the focus of a sustained national media attack in January this year after news emerged that he had sent police to Beijing to arrest journalist Zhu Wenna (朱文娜) for an investigative report on local county land deals.
The affair cooled down after February 5, when Zhang was removed as Xifeng’s party secretary by top leaders in Tieling. [SEE “China’s feudal county cadres: ‘defamed’ and dangerous,” CMP, December 2008].
But now, once again, national newspapers are up in arms about Zhang Zhiguo, who seems to have returned to good standing — and has perhaps even been promoted.

[ABOVE: Online coverage of the latest Zhang Zhiguo controversy shows the former county secretary as he appeared on local Tieling television in January 2008.]

Reporting Zhang Zhiguo’s apparent return to politics on Monday, China Youth Daily said the case “looked like an act of revenge against public opinion.” The report began:

Zhang Zhiguo, former party secretary of Xifeng County in Liaoning’s Tieling City, has been reinstated, his position as vice president of the Joint Project Management Office of Tieling City [in charge of light rail projects]. On November 20, Tieling TV, [the official local party TV station], reported Zhang Zhiguo’s new position in its nightly “Tieling News” program.
As soon as the news was out, web users expressed their consternation at major web portals . . .

Seeking to control damage from the story, authorities in Liaoning issued a press release through the official Xinhua News Agency saying that “up to now, the standing committee of the CCP in Tieling has not met on the question of whether new work will be arranged for Zhang Zhiguo, and has made no decision whatsoever about whether new arrangements will be made [for Zhang].”
The Zhang Zhiguo controversy broke in January 2008 after the leader was apparently angered by a Faren Magazine report published on January 2, 2008, about local Liaoning businesswoman Zhao Junping (赵俊萍), who was detained for seven months in Xifeng County, Liaoning, before being tried and found guilty on charges of defamation and tax evasion in a case that appeared to be a vendetta by Secretary Zhang involving a contested land seizure.
The day after the story broke, the local prosecutor’s office in Xifeng County ordered Zhao Junhua (赵俊华), the older sister of local Xifeng businesswoman Zhao Junping, to appear for questioning. Zhao Junhua told China Youth Daily last January that she was pressured with accusations that she had paid the Faren Magazine reporter for the negative story. It was not possible, reasoned her interrogators, that a reporter would travel from Beijing to Liaoning for a story unless she had been offered payment.
The next day, Xifeng County’s propaganda chief, Li Fulu (李福路), and the head of the county’s politics and law committee (政法委), Zhou Jingyu (周静宇), paid a visit to the offices of Faren Magazine in Beijing to speak with the editor in chief. That afternoon, a group of Xifeng police officers entered the magazine’s offices with an order for summons and detention. They said a “defamation” case had already been opened against the reporter Zhu Wenna and demanded to speak with her about it.
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 26, 2008, 9:19am HK]

Yes, a short notice indeed. But CMP is please to announce, for all who can make it, a talk this evening by veteran documentary filmmaker Zhao Yanying, who will discuss the origin and process of her recent documentary, Old Hu’s Golden Monkey (2007). The documentary tells the story of Hu Zhenlin and his companion, a rare golden monkey. The film screened at Qatar’s Aljazeera International Film Festival, as well as other international documentary festivals.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER:
Zhao Yanying has been making documentary programs ever since beginning her career with Beijing Television in 1983, upon graduation from the People’s University of China. Zhao regards documentary not just as a profession but as a way of life, demanding detachment from superficial concerns and a deep engagement with one’s subject.

Zhao has won a number of national and international awards for her documentaries, which also include: Teacher Jiao’s House, Xinazhuoga Goddess of the Forest and Lighting of Candle (winner of first prize at the 2001 REEL China Documentary Biennale)
5:30pm to 7pm
November 25, 2008 (Tue)
Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
Enquiries: Ms Rain Li (2219 4434/[email protected])

Ying Chan, an award-winning journalist and Hong Kong native, established the Journalism and Media Studies Centre in July 1999. She set up the Master of Journalism programme, launched Hong Kong’s first fellowships for working journalists, and forged extensive ties between HKU and the news industry. At HKU, Chan is a Board member of the Social Sciences Faculty and an adjunct research fellow of the E-Business Technology Institute. Chan’s honours include a Nieman Fellowship at Harvard University, a George Polk Award for journalistic excellence and an International Press Freedom Award by the Committee to Protect Journalists. She taught at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism and was on the board of the Asian American Journalists Association. Chan has a bachelor’s degree (social sciences) from HKU and a master’s from the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Best known for his tenure as managing editor of Southern Weekend, one of China’s most progressive newspapers, Qian Gang is one of China’s foremost journalists. Qian was also a co-creator and executive editor of “News Probe,” CCTV’s pioneering weekly investigative news program with nearly 20 million viewers. Qian collected historical documents for Chinese Boy Students, a book and five-hour documentary series on 120 young Chinese students sent to universities in the United States by the Qing government in the late 19th century. He is also the author of The Great China Earthquake (唐山大地震), a book of reportage about the 1976 earthquake at Tangshan in which 250,000 people were killed.