Best known for his tenure as managing editor of Southern Weekend, one of China’s most progressive newspapers, Qian Gang is one of China’s foremost journalists. Qian was also a co-creator and executive editor of “News Probe,” CCTV’s pioneering weekly investigative news program with nearly 20 million viewers. Qian collected historical documents for Chinese Boy Students, a book and five-hour documentary series on 120 young Chinese students sent to universities in the United States by the Qing government in the late 19th century. He is also the author of The Great China Earthquake (唐山大地震), a book of reportage about the 1976 earthquake at Tangshan in which 250,000 people were killed.

David isdirector of the China Media Project. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanisation and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press). His writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Wall Street Journal, Index on Censorship, Hong Kong Free Press, the South China Morning Post and others. He received a Human Rights Press Award in 2007 for an explanatory feature about China’s Internet censorship guidelines. He has a Master’s degree from Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism.

By Emma Lupano — For much of this year, Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily has borne the brunt of attacks against China’s liberal press. But the latest publication to take the heat is Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), a liberal history-related journal regarded generally as one of China’s most outspoken publications.
News surfaced this month that the journal has come under attack from an unspecified senior official after running a lengthy article in September that praised former premier Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) for his progressive leadership in Sichuan in the 1970s, before he was ousted amid the unrest that followed democracy demonstrations in Beijing in 1989.
The Zhao Ziyang piece is the first full-length article on the former top leader since democracy protests were violently suppressed on June 4, 1989.
Yanhuang Chunqiu has grown bolder over the last couple of years, broaching historical and political topics that often totter on the edge of taboo.
In 2007, for example, the journal published a lengthy work by Xie Tao (谢韬) on the prospects for democracy in China. [More from ESWN here]. In an interview following the Xie Tao article, the journal’s publisher, Du Daozheng (杜导正), a well-known reform figure, said that before Xie’s article went to press he had “put the likelihood of getting into trouble at about 10 or 20 percent.”

[ABOVE: Sun Zhen, former bureau chief of Xinhua News Agency, who was close to former premier Zhao Ziyang when he was party secretary of Sichuan province.]

Positive coverage of the former premier is at the very least a dangerous “line ball,” if not an outright breach of propaganda discipline.
Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan reported last week that a senior party official, angered by the Zhao Ziyang article, had approached the journal’s publisher, the Yanhuang Cultural Association, and officials in the Ministry of Culture seeking the removal of several top editors, including Du Daozheng.
Age was given as the pretext for the removal of Du Daozheng, who is 85, and the others.
But Yazhou Zhoukan revealed that the real reason for the attempted shakeup was the 7,000-word article on Zhao Ziyang, which “a former key leader from Zhongnanhai disliked.”
The article in question was written by Sun Zhen, a party journalist who was made chief of the Sichuan bureau of the official Xinhua News Agency in the early 1970s, during which time Zhao Ziyang served as the province’s party secretary and carried out bold, market-oriented rural reforms.
Although the title of Sun Zhen’s article, “My relationship with the Sichuan Party Secretary in the late stages of the Cultural Revolution,” does not immediately make its subject matter clear, the article is an overwhelmingly favorable assessment of Zhao Ziyang.
With what is probably a touch of hyperbole, Yazhou Zhoukan called the shakeup at Yanhuang Chunqiu “the biggest drama in media purge since June 4, 1989,” but the fate of the publication and its top editors is as yet unknown, and Du Daozheng told the Sydney Morning Herald on November 18 that he rejected the decision by the Ministry of Culture saying he was too old to run the journal:

I said the government’s official retirement age doesn’t apply to non-government enterprises like us; if I work until I’m 120 that’s got nothing to do with you . . . It seems like we’re playing chess. This is not the result they expected, and they don’t know what move to make next.

Du told the Australian newspaper that he plans another essay on Zhao Ziyang for the December issue.
Du and his magazine, founded in 1991, can count on the support of a group of influential party elders, including retired generals Xiao Ke (萧克) and Zhang Aiping (张爱萍).
In a fairly clear indication of the uncertainty currently surrounding Yanhuang Chunqiu‘s fate, the entire Zhao Ziyang article remains available on the journal’s website:

革后期我与四川省委书记的交往
孙 振
2008年第9期 炎黄春秋杂志865
改革难，要想在乱时谋改革更难。身为中共四川省委书记的赵紫阳同志，在十年动乱的“文化大革命”后期，临危受命，心系民生，为解决城乡人民的温饱，冒着被打成反革命的政治风险，运用巧妙迂回的方法，谋求农村的经济改革。以后，“要吃米找万里，要吃粮找紫阳”的民谣在中华大地流传开来。
一
　　我原本不认识紫阳同志，几年以前，我任新华社江苏分社社长时，在一次江苏省委扩大会议上传达中央工作会议精神，最初听到赵紫阳这个名字。20世纪60年代，毛泽东同志可能是初次见到赵紫阳同志，把赵紫阳看做是一个年轻有为的干部，也可能是在国民经济困难时期，为了活跃会议的气氛，饶有兴趣地问起赵紫阳的出生地。赵紫阳回答说是河南滑县人。毛泽东同志当场兴致勃勃地说：“滑者水之骨也。”
　　我见到紫阳同志，纯属巧合。在上世纪70年代初，可能因“文化大革命”造成的混乱，到了不可收拾的地步，需要在省际之间交流干部，我从新华社江苏分社调到四川分社任社长，紫阳同志不久也从内蒙古自治区调广东省委，又从广东省委调到四川来做省委书记兼成都军区政委。
　　由于四川省的“文化大革命”中派别争斗极为严重，“文革”成了“武革”，除了飞机以外，大炮、坦克、机枪、步枪、地雷、手榴弹等等各式武器，全都用上了。就连我们四川分社的办公楼墙壁上，都是弹痕累累。我曾经开玩笑地说，这些武斗留下的弹洞，不要抹掉，可以用做警示后人。我曾在去四川的船上写诗一首，诗中写道：“不管翻腾千里浪，唯思处乱写新闻。”
　　赵紫阳同志虽在1932年加入共青团，但正式加入中共是1938年初，所以基本上属于“三八式”干部。就是在20世纪抗日战争爆发以后，于1938年底前参加革命工作的干部。不过他开始便任县委书记，很快连任多地多届地委书记，接着任省委书记。这在当时省市以上主要领导干部中，还是以红军时期出身的干部为主体的年代，赵紫阳便也是后起之秀了。就是这个后起之秀，一方大员，在那动乱年代的四川，也是困难重重！
　　这时候“文革”武斗的硝烟虽然已经渐渐散去，但是，成都市的大街小巷和机关大院仍旧贴满了大字报，矛头直指周恩来总理和省市主要领导同志。“造反派”仍然随便关押和批斗省市领导干部，四川省仍是极端无政府状态，机关、学校、工厂涣散瘫痪。工农业生产日渐下降，人民生活极端困难，连在四川最普通的辣椒粉也要凭票供应。
　　紫阳同志刚刚来到四川，他的两位主要助手，省委书记段君毅和赵苍碧，立刻被“造反派”绑架关押起来。这可以说是对刚到四川的紫阳同志当头一棒。
　　“文化大革命”争斗的核心问题，是谋权夺位。半路来了个赵紫阳，官高位重，出现了一道谋权夺位障碍，自然成了四川各路造反派“英雄”的众矢之的。一波未平，一波又起。赵紫阳到四川不满一个月，成都市的大街小巷，就出现了反对赵紫阳的巨型横幅标语：
　　“赵紫阳是哪路人马！”
　　“以生产压革命，没有好下场！”
　　“谁反对文化大革命，谁就是死路一条！”
　　面对争权夺位疯狂的四川、面对极端无政府状态的四川、面对工农业生产濒临崩溃的四川，紫阳同志虽然主持工作，实际上也无法运用他手中的权力，想干什么，也干不成。这是他从小参加工作以来，不曾遇到过的难堪局面。
　　他整天忙于应付“造反派”的纠缠，难得安心开会研究问题，难得安心吃一餐晚饭，难得安心睡一夜好觉。他也不知哪天突然会被“造反派”关押起来。经过战争磨练的人，不怕关押，不怕受苦，不怕折磨。怕的是因他而造成更大的混乱，怕的是他在四川一事无成，有负于四川人民！
二
　　一天傍晚，我刚吃过晚饭，接到省委办公厅的电话：“今天晚上，紫阳同志请你和他一起出去。”据我所知，全省上下，包括驾驶员在内，都亲切地称呼赵紫阳为紫阳同志。
　　“有什么事情吗？”在那个动乱的年代，省委是经常在晚上开会的。
　　“我们也不知道什么事情，紫阳同志要你准备好洗漱用品晚上十点在家里等他。”这时候我已经完全明白了，紫阳是要约我一起住到金牛坝招待所去。当年，紫阳同志曾多次约我住到远离市区的这个招待所去，目的是为了避开造反派的干扰。
　　金牛坝招待所是四川省委的一个小招待所。四川人将川西平原称为川西坝子，作为对平原的爱称。许多地方，也将本乡本村的一块平坦的地方，爱称为坪坝。金牛坝更不是一般的坪坝，传说在夜晚时候，有人见过一条金牛，金光闪烁，在这里的田间奔跑。这个故事，反映了当地人民对于美好生活的向往，对于富裕农村的憧憬。
　　金牛坝招待所是毛主席曾经住过的地方，各路造反派的“英雄”，一时还不敢骚扰。当晚，脱离了“文化大革命”的噪音，紫阳和我都睡了一夜好觉。
　　第二天中午，当紫阳同志和我步入食堂的时候，只听见服务员大声地喊叫：“吃干饭的首长，请坐到右边，吃面食的首长，请坐到左边！”
　　听到服务员这样喊叫，我和紫阳同志都不约而同地笑了起来。紫阳同志当然也很明白“吃干饭”的意思，他风趣幽默又轻声地对我说：
　　“我们都是吃干饭的，走，吃干饭去。”
　　又是一个深夜，紫阳同志没有和我预约，就来到了我的家里。他见到了我，拉住我的手说：“到你家来坐坐。”
　　这时正是全国人民哀悼周恩来总理的时候，窃夺中央领导地位的野心家竟然制造清华大学的所谓反击右倾翻案风的新闻，叫嚷要把“文化大革命”进行到底。
　　紫阳同志用手擦了一下沾满雾气的眼镜，心情沉重地说：“看样子还要乱一阵子哩！”“再乱下去，四川受害，全国人民受苦。”“再乱下去，还是什么事情也办不成。”
　　紫阳同志摇了摇头继续说道：“你还记得吗，金牛坝招待所的服务员，叫喊我们吃饭的时候，说是吃干饭的首长坐在右边，我当时就说，我们是吃干饭的首长，坐到右边去了。什么事情都干不成，当然就是吃干饭的了。”
　　他继续说道：“最近我是反复想过了，困守在成都，整天应付那些麻烦事情，一事无成，还不如到农村去走走，也许可能发现一些问题，解决一些问题，做一点对人民有益的事情。”
　　“你这个主意太好了，我也想跟你一起走，行吗？”
　　“好啊，就这样说定了，我们一起走。你就等电话通知吧。”他学着半像半不像的四川腔音，又含有浓厚的他家乡韵味，高兴地对我这样说。
　　这天晚上，他在我家里一直谈到十二点以后，才悄悄地离开。紫阳和我的谈话内容，在当时是绝对违禁的。要是泄露出去，我们都会被扣上“反革命”的帽子，锒铛入狱。在“反革命”这三个字之前，还可能要加当时的流行用词，就是“‘走资派’还在走”，“策划于密室”，妄图“点火于基层”的罪名。
三
　　1976年的一天上午，紫阳同志乘了一辆白色小型的面包车，连驾驶员在内可以乘坐七人。我上车以后，看到车上有紫阳同志和他的秘书、驾驶员三人。我和紫阳同志一起出行，但是，我不是他的随员，紫阳也没有把我看做是他的随员。我是一个新闻记者，我有我的新闻采访工作任务。
　　他每到一地，从来不准地方党政机关派人迎送，实际上是微服私访。他常常是到了一个地方，直接插入田间地头与广大农民、基层干部交谈，了解他们的心声和想法。紫阳同志的所作所为使我强烈地感觉到他是一个善于联系群众的人，处处为群众着想的优秀领导干部。
　　紫阳同志这次出行，一共走了十多个县市，到过绵阳、广元、绵竹、西充、广安、南充、郎中等地。他每到一地，就直接访问当地基层干部和农民，和他们一起走到田间地头，亲切交谈，了解情况。
　　他在成都平原的水田地区，听到当地农民说：
　　“三三见九，不如二五一十”。
　　紫阳参加革命工作以来，长期做县委书记和地委书记，对农村情况相当熟悉，后来担任中共省委和中央局的领导工作，他仍然经常到基层去，不仅了解农村和农业生产情况，而且对农民怀有深厚的情感。现在他到四川农村，听到了农民提出的问题，其实他心里早就十分明白农民所提这些问题的内容，但是另一方面有鉴于当时还在“文化大革命”期间，正在追究他是“哪路人马”的时候，他不便于明白表示反对学大寨种植双季稻的意见，这就是领导干部乱时谋改革的难处，他还得徉作饶有兴味地问道：
　　“你们说的是什么意思？”
　　当地农民告诉他，这几年来，上级号召农业学大寨，要推广种植双季稻，再种一季小麦。双季稻加一季小麦，就是一年种三季。可是，这样做并不高产，每季平均亩产三百斤，就是说“三三见九”。如果只种两季，每亩稻子可产五百多斤，每亩小麦也可产到五多百斤，这就是“二五一十”。种两季比种三季庄稼，多产一百斤，这样一算，就是“三三见九，不如二五一十”了。
　　紫阳同志继续亲切地问道：
　　“种三季的工本怎么样呢？”
　　当地农民说：“种三季的人力和肥料，至少也要增加五分之一。为了种三季庄稼，必须抢季节，争时间，起早摸黑，忙得昏头昏脑，鸡飞狗跳。如果能够多种多收，多花点劳力和肥料，我们农民不在乎，可是，现在是多种多亏多吃苦。”他们看了一眼紫阳同志，继续说道：“看样子，你这位同志像是外地人，我们没有顾虑，说句实在话，要我们学大寨，越学越穷，这种事情，谁愿意干呢！表面上大家天天上工，实际上大家天天磨洋工！”
　　成都平原是四川主要产粮区，紫阳同志深知成都平原水温低，日照少，不能因为要学大寨就强行推广种植双季稻。他又向农民问道：“三三见九，不如二五一十。这笔账，你们自己已经算得清清楚楚了。为什么不改过来呢？”
　　在场的基层干部和农民，几乎是异口同声地说：“不行啊！”
　　“为什么不行呢？”
　　基层干部说：
　　“上级号召我们学大寨，推广双季稻，要是改过来，不种双季稻，上级要批评我们是倒退了。”
　　“中国农民真好啊，他们相信中国共产党，党叫干什么就干什么。可是我们不能滥用人民对我们的信任，不切实际地要求农民种双季稻，伤害了人民的积极性。一定要实事求是，尊重人民的首创精神。”我想紫阳同志的内心一定是这样想的。
　　紫阳同志坚定而委婉地对大家说：
　　“学大寨，是学大寨的精神，就是要苦干实干，努力增产粮食。可是大寨并没有种双季稻，也没有种三季庄稼。成都平原多阴雨天气，日照不足，灌溉用水的温度较低，可能不适合种植双季稻。你们已经有了实践经验，三三见九，不如二五一十。我看，不管是种两季，还是种三季，只要能够增产粮食就好。粮食增产了，用事实来说话，你们的底气就足了。”
　　“请问你贵姓？”生产队的干部，感到刚才这位领导干部的言谈，说到农民心坎上了，但是他们还不知道，这位领导干部是谁，能不能依着他的意思去做，表现出有点不安。
　　紫阳同志的秘书笑着回答说：
　　“他是赵紫阳同志，是我们省上任不久的省委书记。”
　　“紫阳同志，你刚才讲的太好了，这样我们的手脚就放开了，今年就依着你说的来做。”
四
　　紫阳同志还走访了几个山区的农村，因为紫阳同志长期关注农村工作，对发展农业生产很有经验，发现了山区农民学大寨，不讲具体条件，不从实际出发，只管深翻土地的情况。他说：
　　“深翻土地，也要因地制宜。在土层厚的地方，可以深翻，也应该深翻，有利于保墒，有利于农作物的生长。但是也不是越深越好，要看种植什么庄稼，水稻和小麦，根须长度差不多，深翻四五寸左右就可以了，翻得太深了，把生土翻上来，也不利于庄稼生长，还浪费了劳动力。”
　　有的农民问：“种玉米呢？”
　　“种玉米，就要翻得深一点，因为玉米的根又粗又长，杆子也高，土地就要翻得深一点，玉米才能充分吸收营养和水分，杆子也才能站立得稳，不易倒伏。”
　　有的农民问：“要是种红薯呢？”
　　“种红薯也要深翻土地，因为红薯生长在地下，薯块大，深沟高垅，薯块在土里才能伸展开来，才能丰收。”
　　“像我们这个山区，要不要深翻土地呢？”
　　“这要看土层深浅，土层浅的不能深翻。如果深翻，那就会造成水土流失，粮食反而要减产了。”紫阳同志想了一想又说：“你们提的这些问题，其实你们都懂。你们都是种地的能人里手，哪有不懂这些道理的呢！我刚才说的这些道理，也都是从农民朋友那里学来的。”和他一起蹲在田埂上的干部和农民，听他这么说，几乎一起轰然笑了起来。
　　紫阳同志继续说道：
　　“从你们的笑声里，可以听得出来，我说你们是种地的能人里手，说对了吧！可是你们懂得的问题，为什么又偏要在这里提出来呢？”
　　生产队干部压低了声音，吞吞吐吐地说：
　　“上级号召我们学大寨，有一项要求，就是深翻土地，我们能不做吗！”
　　紫阳同志叹了口气说：
　　“学大寨，是学大寨的苦干实干精神，可是大寨人并没有说，在你们这里怎样深翻土地。从今以后，翻不翻地，怎样翻地，翻深翻浅，都由你们这些种地的人做主，一定要把大家的积极性调动起来，努力增产粮食。你们看，这样行不行！”
　　大家异口同声地说：“行！”
　　这是在场的基层干部的回答，也是千百万农民的回答。
　　走访中，紫阳同志听到最多的是自留地的问题。一般地区的农民，由于“共产风”的不良影响，对于耕作集体所有的土地，缺乏积极性，但是，他们把自留地看做是命根子，千方百计冲破极左思潮的障碍，还是要把自留地种好的。紫阳看到当地农民自留地种得不好，其中的原因，他也是十分清楚的。就是在“文化大革命”中，极左思潮被推到了顶点，把农民的这一点自留地，看做是资本主义尾巴，强迫农民把资本主义尾巴割掉，把自留地收归集体所有，农民流着眼泪，忍痛把自留地也抛荒了。这种情况完全是“人祸”！
　　紫阳同志说：“中央多次发布的关于农村工作的文件，都说农民要有自留地，这些文件并没有收回，就说明文件中的有关规定仍然有效。再说自留地，大多是门前地，门前地都是最好的地，也是耕作最方便的地，应该种好。”
　　“对，对，对！这位同志说得对，既然是门前地，就不是尾巴地，应该种好。”这个农民的话又引起了一阵轰然大笑。
　　在那个年代，别说是农民，谁也搞不清什么是资本主义，什么是社会主义，都是跟着起哄。紫阳同志不便直说割资本主义尾巴不对，就用了个“门前地”的名字，而农民就把“门前地”与“尾巴地”对立起来说了，虽然不通，却很生动有趣。
　　当地的干部农民，见到气氛活跃，又有人说：
　　“我们这里还有一户人家单干，也受到了批判。对是不对呢？”
　　“你们说说，这户人家是个什么情况呢？”
　　“这户人家单门独户，一家孤零零地住在一个山凹里，距离我们生产队（村庄）三里多路，他不愿意来回走路，不到生产队来劳动，他就单干了。”
　　“是呀，那么远的路，怎么能叫人家到你们这里来，参加集体生产劳动呢，既耽误了劳动时间，也浪费了劳动力，人家单干有人家的具体情况。如果人家增产了，生产队就要派人去调查研究，总结人家的经验；如果人家单干，生产不如你们，他就会自愿跑来，要求参加你们的生产队；他高兴，你们也高兴。我看你们生产队，如果人数太多，都挤在一块地里劳动，也不方便，也可分成若干小组，便于管理，也有利于提高劳动效率，各组之间还可以开展劳动竞赛。你们看这个办法好不好？”
　　紫阳同志关于农村工作的意愿已经这样明白表示出来了。在场的基层干部和农民连连齐声回应说：
　　“好，好，好！”
五
　　1976年8月15日至16日，四川省松潘地区发生三次七级以上的强烈地震，造成了人民群众的生命财产的严重损失。距离地震中心数百公里的成都市，也有明显的震感。紫阳同志连夜召开省委常委会议，布置了抗震救灾工作。省委紧急布置抗震救灾工作的消息，第二天就在成都市传播开来，可大街上却贴满了造反派们刷写的“反对用抗震救灾压革命”的大字报。紫阳同志心系灾区，心系农村，他不顾喧嚣的杂音干扰，第二天一大早就奔赴松潘地震灾区。
　　在地震中心地区，紫阳同志深入到一户农家观察。四级左右的余震发生了，他立即藏到身边一个木制的桌子底下，屋顶上残存的瓦片，叮叮当当地塌落下来，因为有桌子挡着，他才没有被瓦片砸着。他兴奋地对我说：
　　“刚才我说的情景，可以说是我在地震灾区亲身经历的故事。在地震灾区，要告诉广大人民，利用一切可以利用的空间，作为应急的藏身之处，是个可以减少伤亡的好办法。我在地震灾区发生的故事，现在还只可对你讲讲而已，不可对外言传。否则，不知又要制造出什么流言蜚语来了。”
　　我理解地说：
　　“我知道，那天在省委开会，讨论抗震救灾，突然来了较大的余震，会上有几个一向坚持‘以革命为中心’，而反对在灾区以抗震救灾为中心的所谓‘英雄’，狼狈逃跑了。现在，要是听说你在地震灾区，藏在桌子底下的故事，犹如捞到了救命稻草，定会攻击你是贪生怕死。我向你保证，现在绝对不会说出去。不过若干年以后，我要是说出去，可能就是一段脍炙人口的美谈哩！”
　　紫阳说：“后来的事情由后人评说罢。”
六
　　我真正听到“要吃米找万里，要吃粮找紫阳”这个民谣，是我在1980年从四川省调到北京新华通讯总社以后。当我一听到这个全国人民都盛传的民谣时，打心眼里为紫阳同志高兴。他在“文革”动乱的年代，曾经深入农村，半公开地进行调查研究，为了改善农民生活，直接向农民宣传他自己关于农业生产的意见。早在“文革”前他与陶铸在广东省就试验过“包产到组”，宣扬过“包产到组”的好处。因此在“文化大革命”终结以后，他自然地也可以说是顺理成章地执行中共十一届三中全会的关于改革开放的指导思想，与安徽省一起，在四川省大力推行类似“包产到户”的政策，使四川省农业生产迅速得到了恢复。
　　紫阳同志向来反对和厌恶那种道听途说、人云亦云的思想作风，在“文革”那个特殊的历史年代，在极为困难的条件下，他坚持实事求是的思想路线，始终怀着对人民群众的深厚感情，尊重他们的首创精神，从实际出发，敢于改革，在广大农村改革的早春时节，唱响了广为流传的音韵。“要吃粮找紫阳”的民谣，也是人民对紫阳的最为美好的赞誉！
　　2008年7月26日，写于北京皇亭子
　　（作者孙振，1942年16岁时加入中共，曾任新华社党组成员、摄影部主任）
（责任编辑　杜导正）

[Posted by Emma Lupano, November 22, 2008, 9:45am]

By David Bandurski — At first glance, Control 2.0 seems to herald a more open-handed approach to news and information in China, promising rapid coverage of sudden-breaking news events. But it has worked with growing effectiveness this year as an open hand that deals a back-handed slap to the news, and that sends international media spinning into orbit. [Frontpage image by cbcastro available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]
What we consume from Xinhua News Agency and the usual suspects (People’s Daily, local party newspapers, etc.) in the immediate aftermath of sudden-breaking news events, or tufa shijian (突发事件), is pretty much the best we can expect in China. And the same goes for international coverage.
The basic point you can glean from coverage so far of the Longnan riots, whatever the source, is that we are all, thanks to the party’s more active approach to shaping news coverage, consuming and transmitting the same “authoritative” CCP facts.
We are tops spinning in place.
When news of the incident in Longnan broke on Tuesday, it was from three official sources:

1. An article in the official Gansu Daily
2. An official Xinhua News Agency release [English version here]
3. An official statement from the news office of the Longnan City People’s Government

Here are all three of these sources as they appeared online Tuesday afternoon.

The Gansu Daily version was actually on the front page of the print newspaper, what one might under other circumstances have seen as a welcome sign of change.
In the past, what we’ve generally seen are embarrassing local stories pushed to the back or avoided altogether in local party dailies, while coverage comes predominately from commercial newspapers in other cities or provinces.
If you insist on seeing the glass as half full, you can cite this as one of your reasons for optimism.
Anyhow, the Gansu Daily story read:

“Mass Petition Incident Occurs in Longnan City’s Wudu District”
Gansu Daily reporting. At approximately 9am on November 17, more than 30 residents facing eviction and relocation in Dongjiang Township, Wudu District, Longnan City, gathered at the office of the party committee to voice [their views] on the problem of the relocation of Longnan’s administrative center.
The party committee and relevant departments quickly received their petitions. As the petitioners would not be satisfied, the mass of onlookers continued to grow, reaching as many as 2,000 people. In the early hours of November 18, a number of petitioners attacked the offices of the party committee and other government offices, causing damage to vehicles and other office facilities. By 2am [on the 18th] most of the masses gathered had already left.
After receiving a report [on the incident], the provincial party committee and provincial government had given the case a high level of priority. At 5pm on November 17, Party Secretary Lu Hao (陆浩) and Governor Xu Shousheng (徐守盛) issued their instructions. In the early hours of November 18, Lu Hao called an urgent meeting to carry out special research on the Longnan Mass Petitioning Incident (陇南群体性上访事件), seeking opinion on disposal [of the crisis] and demanding that the Longnan Party Committee and the city government take measures to quickly bring the situation under control, ensuring social stability and securing the smooth resumption of post-quake reconstruction efforts.

While Gansu Daily‘s version of the story led meager print coverage of the story on November 18, including in the Legal Mirror and Shenzhen Evening News, the Xinhua News Agency version dominated coverage on the Internet, where we saw reports from:

*Phoenix Online [CHINESE]
*Reuters news agency [CHINESE] (adding material from the Longnan city government statement)
*UPI [ENGLISH]
*CNN Website [ENGLISH] (Xinhua version + a few Chinese chatroom comments)
*AFP [ENGLISH]

Like the CNN website, the AFP version frosted what was basically a Xinhua report with a brief reference to Chinese internet posts and a couple of paragraphs of background:

The official state media did not offer further details on the dispute, but government-backed land grabs, often in collusion with developers, have become one of China’s most sensitive social issues . . .
Gansu neighbours Sichuan province, which was at the epicentre of the May 12 earthquake that left up to 88,000 people dead or missing.

It is no surprise, of course, to see international newswires relying largely on Xinhua for these initial news reports. Even if they do have the resources to dispatch reporters to the scene, this takes time.
In a report late Wednesday, the strongest foreign wire report of the day, the AFP reached three additional sources by phone, including a party employee, a hotel receptionist and an unnamed local policeman. Reuters coverage on Wednesday supplemented official facts with quotes from a “hotel worker” and from a foreign risk analyst in Beijing (not related to Longnan).
None of the foreign wire reports available differed substantially from the official story.
The most notable coverage of the Longnan story on Tuesday came from Caijing Online, the now fairly autonomous online edition of the leading current affairs magazine Caijing.

Caijing led with a map infographic of Longnan from the original Gansu Daily report, and supplemented facts from Gansu Daily and the Longnan government statement with background material on the recent history of urban development in Longnan, probably drawn from prior news coverage and other material in the public domain:

After the re-drawing of [city] districts in 2004, Longnan City used many means to intensify local development. One important measure was a strategy (“东扩西进、南北贯通”战略) for Wudu District, which involved a decision to develop the Dongjiang New District on the foundation of Wudu District’s Dongjiang Township (东江镇). After this, residents in Dongjiang Township were faced with a wide-scale land requisition campaign, and the majority of residents have lived ever since in transitional demolition and relocation quarters waiting to move into resettlement homes.
Beginning in March 2008, there was news that the city’s administrative center would be moved . . . and this made the residents of Wudu District uneasy. They were concerned that once they had lost the advantages of an administrative center, the overall development of Wudu would be impacted. The news that the administrative center would be relocated created an even bigger stir in Dongjiang Township, where residents worried that relocating the administrative center would mean related developments would cease, including preparation for their resettlement homes, and that the issues of land and subsistence would not be resolved for them. With these concerns, they went through many different means and channels to voice their opposition to the relocation of the administrative center.
On this matter, the Longnan city government on a number of occasions held meetings to say that the removal of the administrative center was a rumor, that “the party committee and the government have no intention of relocating” and that their “determination to build a bright new city in Wudu had not changed …”

Caijing‘s own augmentation of the official version of events actually influenced coverage at two newspapers the next day [See top of list below]. Here’s a taste of where coverage was being sourced at the fifty-odd party and commercial newspapers that ran the story on Wednesday.

Chongqing Morning Post (Sources material from Caijing Online and Gansu Daily)
Southern Metropolis Daily (Sources material from Caijing Online and Gansu Daily)
Shenzhen News (Sources material from Xinhua News Agency via People’s Daily Online)
The Beijing News (Sources material from Gansu Daily and “other sources,” basically Xinhua)
Changsha Evening News (Sources material from Xinhua but rewrites lead to focus on “a few people with ulterior motives”)
Jinan Daily (Uses shortened version of the Xinhua report)
Beijing Times (Uses Gansu Daily version)

[ABOVE: Page A14 of Wednesday’s Southern Metropolis Daily runs state media coverage of riots in Longnan plus some Caijing Online material.]

[ABOVE: Page 11 of Wednesday’s Chongqing Evening Post with coverage of the Longnan riots from the official Gansu Daily.]

The two papers using some Caijing Online material were a rare but notable exception to what was otherwise exclusively official information. All other reports were sourced from Xinhua News Agency, Gansu Daily and the Longnan government’s official statement.
A smattering of editorials on the Internet reflected on the Longnan incident, some pointing the finger at the local government.
The AFP noted one People’s Daily Online editorial in its Wednesday report, with the misleading suggestion that this was “an unusual move apparently aimed at placating the protesters.” It was not. And reporters are warned against assuming material at People’s Daily Online have even an iota of the gravitas of articles appearing in People’s Daily, the official party mouthpiece.
The most strongly worded editorial, in fact, came from CN Hubei, and was available by late Tuesday night:

Water is a soft and yielding substance, but stir it up and it surges with unimaginable power. That is why the ancients said: “As water can float a vessel, so can it capsize it.” Ordinary people are the water, and the government is the boat, and if the vessel and the water cannot exist in harmony then the result is difficult to predict, and ghastly to contemplate. We have as our best examples a number of dynasties with strong soldiers and sturdy horses that were overthrown by ordinary people. We have some officials who don’t understand this most elementary of principles, who treat the ordinary people as weak and amenable water. This is bound to raise the ire of the masses, creating conflict, destroying the goodwill between the party and the masses, between cadres and the masses, and impacting the development of harmony and the economy. Should these profound lessons not alarm us and cause us to reflect more deeply?
Gansu Daily reported on November 18: at November 17 at around 9am, more than 30 residents facing demolition and removal [from their residences] gathered to petition in Dongjiang Township (东江镇) of Wudu District (武都区) in Longnan City (陇南市), expressing [their opposition] regarding the relocation of Longnan’s administrative center (行政中心). The office of the party secretary and relevant government offices moved quickly to hear their petitions, but those petitioning were not to be discouraged and the crowd of onlookers continued to grow, reaching as many as 2,000 people. In the early morning hours of November 18, a number of petitioners assaulted the administrative building of the local party committee, damaging a number of vehicles and some office equipment. The area had already been mostly deserted by 2am.
Our Great Leader Mao Zedong once said: “In this world there is no such thing as love without reason, nor hate without reason.” Most ordinary Chinese are the kind of people who see lightning and fear that their ears will be shaken, who fear for their heads when leaves drop from the trees . . . Sometimes, all it takes is a fart from an official to send them running for the hills. This time around, when they’ve actually eaten bear heart and panther gall, daring to attack the office of the party secretary and destroy vehicles, exchanging their cotton trousers for leather ones — there must be a reason. Dogs leap the wall when they’re desperate, and rabbits gnash their teeth. These ordinary people once had houses to live in, but after demolition and removal [of these properties], the compensation they have received doesn’t enable them to buy homes. Tell me, how could they not petition?

Chinese news coverage today (Thursday, November 20) is again dominated by Xinhua News Agency and Gansu Daily. Thirty print news articles and three editorials are returned in our database of 300+ mainland newspapers with a search on “Longnan” and “incident” (陇南 and 事件).
Here are some examples:

Information Times (Xinhua release)
Shijiazhuang Daily (Xinhua release)
Sichuan Legal Daily (Xinhua release)
Tianjin Daily (Xinhua release)
Xin’an Evening News (Xinhua release)
Hainan Daily (Xinhua release)
Legal Daily (Bylines a compilation of official news sources, mostly from Gansu provincial level)
Shanghai Morning Post (Xinhua release)
Chongqing Morning Post (Xinhua, China News Service and China National Radio)
Harbin Daily (Xinhua release)
Spring City Evening Post (Xinhua and China News Service)
The Beijing News (Xinhua and other official sources)
Wuhan Evening Post (Xinhua release)

Official coverage is obviously everywhere today. But lest readers of English feel left out of the party message, here is the Xinhua version for international consumption from China Daily:

Police departments must standardize procedures for law enforcement and build harmonious relations with the people, the country’s top public security official said on Tuesday.
Speaking at a teleconference with local police heads, State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu said police should “be fully aware of the challenge brought by the global financial crisis and try their best to maintain social stability” . . .
Meng’s comments come in the wake of a clash between protestors and police in Longnan, Gansu province.
On Monday, thousands of people, angered by a property dispute, stormed the city’s Party headquarters, smashing windows, burning cars, and injuring more than 60 government workers and police, a statement from the local government said yesterday.
The situation is now “under control”, it said.
The Xinhua News Agency reported yesterday that the protesters have left the site and order has been restored . . .

Or, if you prefer the Gansu Daily version, you can read a mouthful about how order has been restored, how leaders are doing their utmost, and how everything is just, well, hunky-dory — except for those nasty petitioners “with ulterior motives”:

Things returned to normal on November 19 after a mass incident in which the office of the party committee was attacked. During the reporter’s interviews today, cadres and the masses all expressed their desire for stability and harmonious development, and their earnest hope for the quick rebuilding of their homes damaged during the earthquake [in May].
At 9am on November 19, most shops along the streets of Wudu District had opened their doors for business. People came and went on the street outside the gate to the offices of the Longnan Party Committee . . . [See Southern Metropolis Daily eyewitness refutation of this last statment below.]
One cadre said: “Our Longnan has just recently suffered seriously from the earthquake disaster, and it is one of the areas affected most seriously. After the earthquake happened, the party and the government cared very much about the disaster area, and everyone in the throughout the nation and the province did their utmost to support the area, providing the Longnan disaster area with materials and financial support. Now the rebuilding plan for the Longnan District has already been set down, and work has begun already for many projects. The work of rebuilding in the disaster area is going forward urgently, and during a time like this it is very bad to have such an incident as this [riot] occur. This not only affects the normal operation of society, but also affects the work of rebuilding after the disaster. The masses in the disaster area do not approve of such behavior . . .

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Gansu Daily November 20 coverage of Longnan via China.com]

Another key component of Xinhua coverage today is the news that Gansu Party Secretary Lu Hao (陆浩) said during a November 18 meeting with top provincial leaders that officials needed to “reflect back deeply” (深刻反思) on the Longnan incident to ensure a “harmonious and stable environment for economic and social development.”

Gansu Party Secretary Lu Hao said to cadres from various offices of the party and government that [all] needed to reflect back deeply on this mass incident, earnestly seeking its lessons . . . using effective measures to quickly handle social contradictions of various kinds and to create a harmonious and stable environment for economic and social development.

We can only assume on the basis of coverage at present that Lu Hao’s call for “reflection,” or fansi (反思), was not read as an invitation to more independent-minded non-party newspapers to look more deeply into the Longnan incident.
But is there really no news coverage that wanders away from the sanitized state version?
We find the one lone Chinese example in print today in the only place it would probably occur to most China watchers to look for it: Southern Metropolis Daily.

Most of the key facts in the Southern Metropolis Daily report are taken from official sources, including Xinhua and Gansu Daily. But the reporter is apparently on the scene, and the news report is sprinkled with direct observation, including an account that directly contradicts the Gansu Daily report that has people “coming and going” outside the party committee headquarters:

Yesterday, this reporter visited the site at the offices of the party committee where the incident occured and saw that the area was already under lockdown, with police positioned at both ends of the street. According to information this reporter obtained from the police, things will return to normal once order has been restored to key stretches of road and arterial roads . . .
. . . In a television report explaining the [Longnan] incident on the local Wudu TV this reporter saw a spokesperson for the city government of Longnan emphasizing that police had been order not to use weapons in conficts with the masses . . .
. . . Hearing rumors from the public that the city would be under curfew beginning at 10pm, this reporter learned from a dispatcher at the 110 emergency service number that a curfew was not in effect for the city. However [the dispatch said], the police have advised city residents “to go out seldomly at night if they have no business, and to do things as normal if they have business.”

We’ll have to keep an eye out over the next few days to see if Southern Metropolis Daily‘s reporter on the ground — or anyone else — digs up anything interesting.
So far, though, it seems that Control 2.0 is working quite effectively. And that rings true whether you’re reading Harbin Daily or the Las Vegas Sun.
FURTHER READING:
“China at last tries to report the news first,” Reuters, November 20, 2008 [A “writ” from propaganda authorities? Sure, this was it.]
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 20, 2008, 4:32pm HK]

By Emma Lupano — As the internet has grown rapidly in China in recent years, there has been an attendant upsurge in cases where ordinary citizens (公民), or “netizens” (网民), are arrested, jailed or otherwise punished for things they dared to write. The latest case to have Web users up in arms involves the alleged sacking of a substitute professor at Hubei University for Nationalities after the teacher wrote an entry on his personal weblog criticizing the school’s anniversary celebrations. [Frontpage photo by Amy Pony available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The case, involving 50 year-old teacher Guo Guanglin (郭广林), has drawn a flurry of coverage in the commercial media over the last week, and it has once again resurrected that age-old term denoting the violent repression of speech — “to incur guilt by one’s words,” or wenziyu (文字狱).
In Chinese, the three-character phrase has great economy of meaning. Packed inside is the basic notion, very much a reality during China’s dynastic past, that one could incur guilt simply by virtue of inferences the emperor and his associates might make from one’s writings. Guilt, in other words, could be read between the lines.
“To incur guilt by one’s words” is now an increasingly popular buzzword denoting official action taken against ordinary citizens who speak their minds in spaces — like blogs, chatrooms and SMS messages — where the line between the personal and the public is blurred. But the term can also be used to point generally to more egregious examples of censorship.
A related and more direct phrase in Chinese is “incurring guilt by one’s words,” or yin yan huo zui (因言获罪).
A decision by China’s General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) in early 2007 to ban eight books was vigorously attacked by journalists, scholars and others, and “wenziyu” was tossed around. The incident was highly embarrasing for GAPP’s man-in-charge, Wu Shulin (邬书林). [Click here for Wu Shulin’s comments on the ban from the SCMP via Danwei.org].
One of the most classic “wenziyu” cases in recent years was the arrest in 2006 of government worker Qin Zhongfei (秦中飞), who wrote a satirical poem about local leaders in Chongqing and distributed it by SMS to personal friends. The case is often referred to now as the “Pengshui SMS case.”
The first Chinese newspaper to run with the story of substitute professor Guo Guanglin was Hebei’s commercial Chutian Metropolis Daily (楚天都市报). In a page four story on November 7, the paper reported that Guo was dismissed after writing a post on his personal weblog in which he criticized the way Hubei University for Nationalities had managed a celebration of the school’s 70th anniversary.

The Chutian Metropolis Daily story said that on October 9, when Guo was still under the employment of Hubei University for Nationalities, he made a blog post called something like, “Dubious, Unclear and Superficial” (不明不白、不三不四、不痛不痒), in which he said essentially that the anniversary ceremony had veered from its purpose and served only as a narrow money-making ploy. “Seeing it made people sick,” Guo allegedly wrote. 
As soon as the post hit the Web, other blogs and websites began republishing it, often giving it conspicuous placement, according to Chutian Metropolis Daily. The post also drew waves of comments from web users.
Guo was subsequently dismissed by the school, and the Chutian Metropolis Daily report quoted him saying he believed he had been dismissed because university officials were unhappy with his post.
Earlier this week, CMP fellow Zhang Ming, himself a well-known Chinese blogger, wrote an editorial for Southern Metropolis Daily in which he criticized the Guo Guanglin case, relating it to the Pengshui SMS case, what he called “incurring guilt through SMS” (手机短信文字狱).
An outspoken critic of China’s higher education system, Zhang Ming also condemns the habitual subordination of university professors to school officials. He expresses the hope that more people will stand up and say “unpleasantries” (不中听的话): “But to be perfectily honest, if we had more of these death-seekers [who speak unpleasantries] in our universities we could at the very least lessen the pace of their decline,” he said.

[ABOVE: Zhang Ming’s editorial on the Guo Guanglin case and “wenziyu” at Southern Metropolis Daily, November 10, 2008.]

“Once Again, Guilt by Blog” (又见博客文字狱)
The idea that one can incur guilt by one’s words is something all emperors relish. As we know from our history books, the Chinese empire as an institution ended with the Xinhai Revolution back in 1911. And yet, emperors in disguise, particularly local despots, have never as a race disappeared. In the information age, we’ve seen case after case of guilt incurred by SMS . . . and now we have guilt by blog (博客文字狱). A substitute teacher at Hubei University for Nationalities was sacked recently for criticizing on his own blog the overwrought luxury of a ceremony held in honor of the school’s anniversary.
Last year, when I criticized the chief of a school on my personal weblog, many friends told me I was fortunate not to have been sacked after my post created such a big stir. Actually, I had mentally prepared myself at the time for dismissal. Had the school sacked me, I feel certain they would have found a proper pretext, just like these other instances of guilt by SMS. Even though they didn’t dismiss me, I know the school and related departments were very unhappy with my exposure of the institution’s darker side.
Officials are only human, and they like hearing pleasantries. If something negative happens one day in their own courtyard, their first instinct is to stave off reporters, afraid that their dark secrets will be revealed to the outside world . . . Whoever the leader, they all talk about how opinions should be expressed through the proper channels. But what if you do voice [your opinions] through the proper channels? Speaking from my own personal experience I can say that this is as worthless as dropping a stone into the sea, except that if you do things badly it can have the exact opposite effect. As soon as you make a report, the guy on the receiving end of the criticism knows it, and because leaders at the top tend to trust leaders at the middle, you’re the one who has to go fleeing for the hills like a bandit.
Compared with the stir I caused last year, this professor from Hubei University for Nationalities caused no harm and revealed nothing untoward. And still the school’s leaders were unhappy. An anniversary is an occassion when school leaders flaunt their achievements. You can pass by not flattering them, but saying ugly things, now how is that acceptable? And so this teacher of ours can only head down the road of dismissal.
Cases like this of incurring guilt by words at a university has to make us ask ourselves: what kind of places are our universities? Are they yamen‘s like these county-level bureaucracies, where we see cases of “SMS wenziyu” happening all the time? What kind of relationship do university teachers have to the leaders who control them at various levels? Is it a simple hierarchical relationship [like that in the official bureaucracy]? In other words, can we say that professors are subordinate and department heads and school officials their superiors? In my opinion, according to the past norms and international practice, professors should not be subordinate to school managers.
But this personal opinion is regarded in Chinese universities as anathema. Without exception, school officials believe professors are their subordinates no matter how knowledgeable they may be, or how strong their connections are. Actually, I believe the vast majority of professors think this way too. This is to say, within universities the relationships between the professor and the department head, the department head and the colleage head, the college head and the school president, is like those between lower-level county government functionaries and department heads, department heads and the party secretary — relationships of superiors to subordinates. Separated by professors with so many levels of bureaucracy, school leaders already regard it as a mark of respect, of regarding your expertise, that they do not see you as a mere slave.
Regardless of how resentful we feel, we have to admit that incurring guilt for one’s words, no matter what the form, is understandable within the government bureaucracy. In circumstances when there is such a storm in a government department, (where) power implies everything, which means that if you have the power you can control even the words of your people, (to speak) unpleasant words does not mean to take risks? To tell the truth, if in our universities there were a little more people taking risks like this, then at least the decline of our university would slow down. In such vertical hierarchies of officialdom, power means everything. Isn’t it like asking for death to speak curses or unpleasantries about the person who controls you? But to be perfectily honest, if we had more of these death-seekers in our universities we could at the very least lessen the pace of their decline.

[Posted by Emma Lupano, November 13, 2008, 4:14pm HK]

By David Bandurski — The rights movement by taxi drivers in China is a long and discouraging saga, stretching back at least to the mid-1990s. However officials in Chongqing might have characterized the root causes of last week’s taxi strike — rising fees, unlicensed taxi operators and fuel shortages — the larger story is one of systematic abuse by taxi cartels with the active help and participation of local party and government officials.
Xujun Eberlein wrote on November 9 that . . .

Evidently, China is changing. It would have been better if the government noticed the problems before an extreme measure like a strike had to be taken, but that might be too high an expectation of any government.

. . . and yet the truth is that these problems have festered in China for more than a decade.
CMP fellow Wang Keqin‘s (王克勤) breakthrough report six years ago was the boldest attempt on record to expose and grapple with these problems. It was followed by the drafting of a reform plan for the industry by the Development Research Center of the State Council that Wang says eventually fizzled in China’s vast bureaucracy.
Wang tells us too — look for an updated chapter in CMP’s volume on investigative reporting in China, to be published by Hong Kong University Press in 2009 — that former Premier Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) had criticized corruption in the taxi industry as early as 2001:

Wang found a 2001 article from China Market magazine quoting Premier Zhu Rongji, the head of China’s cabinet, as criticizing the nationwide taxi industry before a meeting of Party leaders. According to a researcher cited in the China Market report, Zhu Rongji compared the tactics of taxi companies to those of the Green Gang, a mafia-style crime group that had operated in pre-Communist Shanghai. The premier, said the article, had even sent his wife on an undercover fact-finding mission in which she rode taxis and spoke with drivers about their situation.

Chinese media reported yesterday that taxi strikes have now occurred in at least two other provinces.
The important thing to recognize first of all is that the issues underlying these taxi strikes are not newly emerging, nor are they news to party officials.
But the handling of these incidents reveals some interesting trends (and inconsistencies) in China’s press control policy. There is a great deal of ground to cover, but we’ll do our best.
When the taxi strike occurred in Chongqing last week, news coverage unfolded as a virtual textbook case in Hu Jintao’s new, more active approach to “guidance of public opinion,” what one top Chinese editor aptly called on a recent visit to Hong Kong, “Control 2.0.”
As we wrote in our analysis of Hu Jintao’s June 2008 media policy speech, the March unrest in Tibet and the May 12 Sichuan earthquake offered party leaders very different lessons about information control.
In the case of Tibet, China sealed off the region, creating a vacuum in which international media took the lead in the agenda setting process. Many leaders felt that these actions had meant that China completely lost control of the agenda.
By contrast, coverage of the Sichuan quake was relatively open, particularly during the early stages, and this enabled China to set the agenda and project a favorable international image.
Hu reiterated this point in his June speech, in which he said:

In the struggle that followed the recent earthquake disaster, we quickly released information about the disaster and the relief effort . . . earning high praise from cadres and the people, and also earning the esteem of the international community.

One of the key characteristics of Control 2.0 is the active setting of the agenda through rapid but selective news coverage by critical state media such as Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television and People’s Daily.
This is what Hu Jintao meant when he said in June that the media needs to “actively set the agenda” (主动设置议题), an echo of April remarks (post-Tibet) in which he said state media needed to keep a firm grasp on initiative in reporting (报道的主动权):

We must perfect our system of news release, and improve our system for news reports on sudden-breaking public events, releasing authoritative information at the earliest moment, raising timeliness, increasing transparency, and firmly grasping the initiative in news propaganda work.

“Initiative” on the part of core state media is complemented by traditional control tactics, notably propaganda department directives that instruct media to stay within the bounds of coverage by Xinhua, People’s Daily and company.
The Chongqing taxi strike began at approximately 5:30am on November 3. An “authoritative” Xinhua version was out by afternoon, and from that point on state news coverage drove the agenda.
News hit papers across the country the next morning, like these stories from Shanghai’s Wen Hui Bao, Changsha Evening Post, Southern Metropolis Daily (online version of newspaper page A14), Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post . . .

. . . and many, many more — all using virtually identical versions of the same Xinhua News Agency report.
According to our database search, the Xinhua report ran in at least 100 newspapers across the country on November 4, both party and commercial. Here is a portion of that story:

“Four factors become the ‘fuse’ in the transport strike”
On the morning of November 3, as many Chongqing residents were preparing to “hail a cab” to get to work, trying to make trains and airline flights, they discovered that the taxis they generally saw running through the streets were nowhere to be seen.
Wide-scale taxi strike occurs in the primary urban area of Chongqing city.
Taxi strike affects the lives of the public.
Even since October 30, whispers of a transport strike on November 3 had passed through the taxi industry in Chongqing. On the morning of November 3 rumors of a transport strike became real.
The reporter learned from police officials in Chongqing that around 5:30am on the morning [of November 3] a number of taxi owners and drivers arrived at Chongqing’s Guanyin Bridge, Yanggong Bridge (杨公桥) and a number of other important sections of road and began urging taxis on the road to participate in a transport strike. A number of taxis still in operation were attacked and vandalized.
By around 7am no more taxis could be seen on the streets and in the alleys of Chongqing. Along a stretch of New South Road in Chongqing’s Yubei District, the reporter saw a number of disgruntled passengers waiting for taxis. When they heard there was a transport strike they hurried off to catch buses. The reporter personally witnessed that taxis were not to be seen at least six Chongqing districts . . .
Even though the transport strike has brought inconveniences for city residents, many people and web users have expressed their understanding of the strike, and believe the objective of [of drivers] is not to increase prices but to get the government and companies to lower regulatory fees and to fight against instances of corruption.
The reporter learned that taxi operators in Chongqing had on several occasions expressed to government offices that they were troubled by fuel shortages, low taxi fares, numerous penalties and other problems, but their complaints went unresolved and the problems grew worse and worse . . .

In the days that followed, editorials in most of the major commercial newspapers added some variety to “coverage” of the strike, but news coverage was solidly Xinhua News Agency.
A follow-up Xinhua news report on November 5 explained the actions taken by the Chongqing government to resolve the strike:

Xinhua News Agency, Chongqing, November 4 (reporters Wang Jintao, Zhu Wei) — The reporters learned from the Chongqing Committee of Communications (重庆市交委) on the 4th that by 2pm on the 4th half of the taxis in the principal city area had resumed operations. A spokesperson from the Chongqing Municipal Government said on the 4th that the raising of “taxi portions” (份儿钱) [levied on drivers] by taxi companies without first seeking [government] approval was an illegal practice, and the city government has decided to staunchly correct this practice of daring to raise industry fees, instructing taxi companies to return “taxi portions” to their 2007 level. As to this, a number of taxi companies have expressed their support [for this measure].
Liang Peijun (梁培军), head of the Chongqing Committee of Communications, said that by 2pm on the 4th half of the city’s taxis had resumed operations. Chongqing now has 34 taxi companies with fleets of 100 or more vehicles, and a total of close to 8,000 taxis.
But the reporters saw that on the streets the majority of taxis still had their overhead lights switched off because they were afraid of [their cars] being vandalized or intercepted. The reporters also learned that a number of working taxis are being operated by taxi company personnel, relatives, friends and other relief drivers.
Liang Peijun said that in order to get taxis back on the road taxi companies had pledged to drivers that they would bear all costs stemming from vandalization and that they would waive today’s “taxi portions.” But a number of drivers continued to fear for their safe operation.
Concerning the cessation of operations by taxis in the city, a spokesperson for the Chongqing Municipal Government said the causes of the incident were natural gas refueling difficulties, the operation of illegal taxis and a number of other factors, but the primary reason was as 50 to 70 yuan increase this year in the daily “taxi portion” [charged to drivers] by taxi companies [in the city], resulting in an annual income decline of more than 20,000 yuan for taxi operators. This placed serious pressure on taxi drivers, exacerbated their difficulties, and caused this social incident.
After the incident occurred, the Chongqing Party Committee and the city government looked earnestly into the matter. The Chongqing government said formally that the raising of “taxi portions” (份儿钱) [levied on drivers] by taxi companies without first seeking [government] approval was an illegal practice.

The series of Xinhua reports on the Chongqing taxi strike is important evidence of the changing nature of media control in China, of the emergence of Control 2.0. But we can also glimpse important changes in the Xinhua coverage itself.
One of the most noticeable changes is the use by Xinhua of the term “transport strike,” or bayun (罢运), which points clearly to a rights struggle and is far less neutral in tone than the “mass incident” designation generally used for such news by state media.
If the business of media control was business as usual in China, Monday’s taxi strike in Chongqing might have become just another obscure “mass incident” (群体性事件) swept onto the dust heap of official party statistics. But this time Xinhua does not flinch from the slightly more incendiary “strike,” and the word is promoted to the headline at many newspapers.
For the record, this is not the first time the term “transport strike” has been applied in China’s media, but it does seem to be the first time it has been used in authoritative state media news releases.
In the past, party media have almost universally used more ambiguous or sanitized terms like “ceased operation”, or tingyun (停运), to refer to strikes by taxi drivers — the rare exception is Guangdong’s more liberal Nanfang Daily. When protests staged by taxi drivers have been reported, as several have since the turn of the century, it is commercial media that have stepped up and used the term “strike.”
When drivers staged protests in Ningxia’s Yinchuan in July 2004, the story was carried in close to 60 papers nationwide. But only 16 used the term “transport strike” to refer to the Yinchuan incident, and with the exception of Xi’an Daily and Nanfang Daily, all were commercial newspapers (or hybrids): Weekly Digest (每周文摘), Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚报), 重庆晨报, 华西都市报, New Express (新快报), Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报), Lanzhou Morning Post (兰州晨报), Youth Daily Shanghai (青年报上海), Chengdu Evening News (成都晚报), Chongqing Evening News (重庆晚报), and Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报).
Returning to coverage of the Chongqing strike last week, a subsequent face-to-face consultation between Chongqing officials and taxi drivers, broadcast live on November 6, added another layer to the official version of the story at mid-week and showed just how effective the party’s new hybrid approach to information (essentially, throwing open the windows for state media and closing the doors on commercial media) can be.
The day of the live-broadcast consultation, a veteran journalist at the Beijing Evening News commented on changes in state media coverage of the taxi strike story. He noted the dominance of Xinhua reports and the use of the term “strike.”
But the journalist also suggested that the party’s version of the root causes of the strike was insufficient. In a reference to China’s recent poisonous milk scandal, he wrote that the “problem of management fees (管理费) is the melamine of the taxi industry [in China], and if this festering problem isn’t dealt with then problems will likely persist”:

I trust that a lot of readers of this paper could not put down the report yesterday about taxi drivers in Chongqing staging a strike. I’m confident that I read a few reports more [on this] than your average reader, and aside from this report [as it appeared in the Beijing Evening News] I read a number of other papers. The content was largely the same, bearing only slight differences, or no differences at all, and they were all according to Xinhua News Agency dispatches, or the “Xinhua viewpoint” (新华视点). The headlines were somewhat different, like “Chongqing taxis hold large-scale strike,” or “Collective strike by Chongqing taxis,” etc.
This was an impartial, objective and rather detailed and truthful news report with a high degree of credibility. As a journalist with thirty years of experience, I saw a number of things that were well worth exploring, and I want to share these with readers.
According to the Xinhua report “a wide-scale taxi strike occured in the primary urban area of Chongqing.” According to convention, we generally avoid mention of the term “transport strike” (罢运) or “workers strike” (罢工) in news reports because these have a rather obvious tint of class struggle about them. For events of this nature, which of course are quite normal occurrences in many countries, we generally append the term “mass incidents” (群体性事件). But the problem with this term “mass incidents” is its total lack of specificity. What kind of “mass”? Which “mass”? “Transport strike” is quite clear by comparison — it means that the taxi drivers have gone on strike, and there’s no ambiguity, no mistaken impression that taxi companies are also taking part [this is drivers against companies, in other words]. Ordinarily, transport strikes or work strikes entail workers upholding and pleading for their own economic rights against the government or companies.
This is precisely the case in this Chongqing taxi strike. The Xinhua News Agency report says: “Even though the transport strike has brought inconveniences for city residents, many people and web users have expressed their understanding of the strike, and believe the objective of [of drivers] is not to increase prices but to get the government and companies to lower regulatory fees and to fight against instances of corruption.”
. . . Liang Peijun (梁培军), deputy head of the Chongqing Committee of Communications said in his analysis of the four reasons behind the transport strike that the primary reason was a conflict between drivers and taxi companies over distribution of payments. This analysis is accurate, but it is insufficient, falling short of the key source of conflict. The problem of management fees (管理费) is the melamine of the taxi industry [in China], and if this festering problem isn’t dealt with then problems will likely persist with periods of varying intensity. This transport strike could be considered a rather intense case [of manifestation of underlying tensions].

As Xinhua continued to dominate the news, and the facts therefore remained unchanged, one could only turn to the editorial pages for fresher voices.
On November 9, for example, a professor from Shanghai’s Fudan University wrote an editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily called, “Why Is It That [They] Can Resolve Their Problems Only By Striking?,” that urged the government to look into the question of why nothing was done earlier about problems in Chongqing’s taxi industry:

I noticed that the government in Chongqing has issued a stern notice to those lawbreakers who thwarted the normal operations of the city [by striking violently], and that those who violated the law must face the necessary punishment. This is completely understandable. But we should distinguish those extreme acts that occured in the midst of a “transport strike” set off because relevant government offices did not take timely action. Specifically, we should draw a line before and after the government took action. The government cannot escape blame for those acts that took place before this line, and so it cannot unilaterally seek responsibility for them. And as for the long period of inaction and negligence on the part of departments in charge [transportation department, etc], responsibility should be sought according to the law.

Judging by the example of Chongqing, one might have supposed protests by taxi drivers this week in Hainan and Gansu would be handled in much the same way, with Xinhua News Agency monopolizing the facts. So far, that doesn’t seem to have entirely happened.
On the first day of coverage yesterday, some reports in commercial media were dominated by official news. For example, the Chongqing Evening Post, a commercial newspaper in the city where last week’s taxi strike occurred, sourced its news from Xinhua and People’s Daily.
In a separate report on the Sanya strike yesterday, The Beijing News relied on reports from Xinhua News Agency but added details from Hainan Special Zone News (海南特区报) and Nanguo Metropolis Daily (南国都市报). The paper’s news coverage was accompanied by an editorial in which Liu Hongbo (刘洪波) expressed the hope that moves to resolve the disputes in Chongqing and Sanya signaled that China has moved away from violent confrontation and into an era of rational negotiation between various interests.
Giving today’s coverage a quick glance, it seems there is little variety in news coverage, a suggestion that perhaps the party has reigned in any independent reporting — that is, reporting NOT by Xinhua. But we’ll need a bit of time to see how coverage plays out.
Once again, it is in the editorial pages that things are really getting interesting. One area in particular is the discussion of demands by taxi drivers that they be allowed to form their own association to defend their rights and interests.
Here, for example, is Yang Tao (杨涛) on page 30 of today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, in a piece whose call against taxi industry cartels bears strong echoes of Wang Keqin’s 2002 investigative report into the industry:

. . . And so I think that if we want to change this chaotic state of affairs in which “taxi portions” (份儿钱) are far too high, then we must break through the monopolization of the taxi industry, thoroughly introducing competitive mechanisms, dissolving taxi companies [which mediate licensing and control access to the industry], dissolving “taxi portions” and allowing drivers to be regulated directly by the government . . .
Another advantage of giving taxi drivers “their own organization” is that if they are legally organized then this will prevent the emergence of underground organizations [such as taxi mafias], benefitting social order and stability. Those taxi drivers who participated in taxi strikes to uphold their own vested interests “attacked and vandalized” “more than 10 taxis normally operating” because they hoped these drivers would not “hitch a ride,” that they would not seek to benefit from their misfortunes and that they could unite in action. If a lawful organization existed to coordinate their activities, it might serve as a check on its members and this sort of vandalism might be prevented.

MORE CHINESE EDITORIALS:
“Why [Official] Labor Unions Weren’t Part of the Picture in the Taxi Strikes,” Oriental Morning Post, November 13, 2008
“I’m Afraid the ‘Wenzhou’ Model Won’t Work Either,” Oriental Morning Post, November 13, 2008
“It’s Time for Unified Reform of the Taxi Management System,” The Beijing News, November 13, 2008
“Can Sanya’s Taxi Brothers Actually Form and Organization?” China Youth Daily, November 13, 2008
“Is it Enough that the Mayor of Sanya Has Apologized?” RedNet (Hunan), November 13, 2008
“Leading Cause of Transport Strikes is Industry Monopoly,” Qianlong.com, November 13, 2008 (quotes CMP fellow Zhang Ming on taxi monopolies)
“Taxi Management Must Seek Elimination of Hidden Costs,” Shanghai Morning Post, November 13, 2008 (alludes to problem of taxi cartels with government connections)
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 12, 2008, 3:17pm HK]

By David Bandurski — A quick review of media related news over the last several months might be enough to convince anyone that China’s press environment is a lawless Wild East where journalists hold up the bank and the sheriff rides roughshod over everyone. We’ve had poisonous PR propaganda, the suspension of a muckraking newspaper and cash payoffs of scores of journalists. [Frontpage image by Joe Gratz available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
But is the appropriate answer to all of this chaos more lawmaking on the media front?
The debate over a press law in China goes back at least to the 1980s, when liberal proponents, notably CMP fellow Sun Xupei, pushed unsuccessfully against party hard-liners like Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木) for a law to safeguard freedom of speech.
Sun Xupei continues to maintain that a press law must play a crucial role in advancing press freedom in China. Others worry that under the current climate any press law would necessarily become a “terrible law,” or efa (恶法), that would serve only to restrict press freedom and give added legitimacy to state press controls.
CMP’s recently released book of essays on media issues in China includes an article by legal scholar Wei Yongzheng (魏永征), who argues that the core problems affecting media in China are not legal in nature, but rather boil down to the nature of CCP rule (共产党的党性原则).
This is a complicated question, and if you don’t know where to stake your position, you might hedge your bets by affirming that both sides have their reasons. They certainly do.
But what if — and there is a third position emerging here — we recognize the distinct possibility that a Chinese press law could in various ways become a “terrible law,” or at least a very imperfect law, and yet we affirm that by applying it to press activities we can bring the practice of media control out of the shadows of the propaganda department and into the dim light of Chinese law?
Is it possible, in other words, that a terrible press law in China is preferable to vast and secretive propaganda system? Perhaps China’s media can absorb the hits from a press law and work actively and openly for fairness while effectively neutralizing (over time) its nastiest enemy, the Central Propaganda Department, whose role and purpose might be diminished.
Is a bad law better than no law at all?
Looking at the mini storm of debate over a Chinese press law that has brewed in the editorial pages over the last few days, one has to wonder whether some journalists and scholars aren’t beginning to think very strategically about this, scrapping pie-in-the-sky idealism on speech freedoms for a dirty but possibly important compromise.
The whole thing began with a November 3 editorial in the “Theory” section of the official People’s Daily.
The editorial, attributed to one “Hua Qing” (华清) argued for the “scientific” and “legal” management of the media sector in China in order, as the headline says, to “raise the capacity for public opinion guidance.”

[ABOVE: Article on improving “public opinion guidance” appears on page seven of People’s Daily, November 3, 2008.]

One of the key passages in the People’s Daily editorial said:

Our country is now at a crucial stage of development, with new problems and circumstances emerging constantly, and this state of affairs places new and higher expectations on the building of rule of law in the press sector. [We] must accelerate legislation in the press sector, continuing to optimize laws and regulations relating to press work, in order to provide a legal guarantee for effective press work and for the improvement of public opinion guidance capacity.

Here was a call in the country’s top party newspaper for China to move toward the creation of a press law.
But the People’s Daily piece was shot through with the language of media control, a clear suggestion this was not a call for the kind of press law Sun Xupei and others had championed in the 1980s.
The whole purpose and context of the call in People’s Daily was the improvement of public opinion guidance, a clear reference to what remains the guiding principle of media control in China. But the editorial also reiterated Hu’s encouraging, if so far empty, language at the 17th Party Congress about the need to “ensure the people’s right to know, participate, express and monitor.”
Re-iterating the call of the earlier People’s Daily editorial, the commercial Wuhan Evening Post (武汉晨报) reported yesterday in an article called, “Voices Urge Acceleration of a Press Law,” that:

In the discussion forum [of Hubei journalists, presided over by the deputy head of the provincial propaganda department Li Yizhang (李以章)] a number of viewpoints stood out. For example, that in ’30 years of media under reform and opening, the first 10 years were marked by media reform and no media industry, and the second 20 years were marked by a media industry and no media reform,’ or that ‘the social role of some journalists has shifted from propagandist to whore’, etc. In several panel discussions, a number of delegates urged the creation of a press law to protect the rights and interests of journalists (记者权益) and at the same time improve positive propaganda (正面宣传) and launch a war on vulgar and sensationalistic news (低俗新闻).

Here again was the schizophrenic rhetoric of control and rights. The above-mentioned “delegates” seem to have no problem talking in a single breath about two seemingly distinct and conflicting priorities, protecting the “rights and interests” of journalists on the one hand, and improving “positive propaganda” on the other.
Back on November 7, well-known essayist and CMP fellow Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山) responded to the People’s Daily editorial with a piece called, “Legal Management [of the Media] Need Not Wait for a Press Law.”
Yan opposed the idea of a press law, and he echoed statements made by Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), the head of the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP).

I concur with the basic point of the People’s Daily editorial, that “only by believing in the people, relying on the people, and releasing information in a timely, accurate and comprehensive manner can we set the people’s minds at ease . . . and continually raise the credibility of the government and the news media,” and that “for strengthening management of the media [we] must carry out scientific management, management by rule of law and effective management.” But I think the issue of whether or not this can or cannot be accomplished has precious little to do with the issue of whether or not we have a specific law dealing with the media sector.
Concerning the issue of a press law, I agree with what Liu Binjie, the head of the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) said on July 3 this year when he was a guest at People’s Daily Online’s Strong Nation Forum (强国论坛). When asked why China had no press law, he responded by saying that many countries in the world do not have press laws. The United States does not have a press law [he pointed out], and because they believe that a press law can only serve to interfere in certain aspects of free speech, they have not permitted such laws. He said there were many difficulties in creating a press law, and that it was difficult to know how to approach such a law. There are presently three conditions fueling calls for the creation of a press law. Some people are calling for a press law that would limit the freedoms of news workers. They don’t want you to let things get out, to interview or monitor. They hope there can be some kind of law to control news workers. Clearly, this is irrelevant. Others call for the creation of a press law to protect citizens’ freedom of speech, but this [freedom] is already guaranteed in the constitution, and there is no need to make further laws on this. There are others who want a press law to protect the interest of those concerned, particularly those who are impacted or influenced by news events, and this emphasizes [tighter] control of news organizations, which does not work to the advantage of the strengthening of supervision by public opinion (舆论监督) [or “watchdog journalism”] . . .

Yan goes on to argue that the essential problem facing media in China — the problem that underpins poor protection of journalists, press censorship, bad ethics, you name it — is abuse of official power.

In sum, I believe that if power itself ceases to be above the law, then the laws as they presently stand are sufficient to protect news and watchdog journalism (舆论监督) . . . At present, watchdog journalism bears far too much hope on its shoulders, so that even half-illiterate peasants know that the most effective way [of seeking justice] is to get the media to tell your story, and they see the journalist as an Old Man Justice (青天) who can speak on their behalf. This is too unnatural, really too unnatural.

Insofar as he roots the media’s problems in official power, Yan Lieshan’s arguments resemble those of Wei Yongzheng.
The countering arguments followed quickly on the heels of Yan’s editorial.
The next day’s issue of Southern Metropolis Daily carried two editorials in support of a press law. The first, from Fan Dazhong (范大中), said it was fallacious to look at the example of the United States:

The United States prevents the creation of laws on the press because they have pushed the boundaries of speech freedom as far as they can possibly be pushed, so that no speech whatsoever can incur guilt. Even if we expand our idealism we cannot possibly count on the realization of freedom such as that, so we must reach a pragmatic compromise, seeking a freedom within limitations. The [language in our] constitution cannot protect those who are pursued by the law because of things they said online, those who are accused of slandering others in SMS messages, or those reporters who are “sought in the capital” [by police] because of reports they wrote . . . This being the case, can we really say that the laws as they now stand are sufficient, that we don’t need a press law?

A second editorial came from Zhan Jiang (展江), a former CMP fellow and director of the journalism school at China Youth University for Political Sciences (中国青年政治学院).
Zhan, a liberal scholar with a strong knowledge of international press traditions, was positive about the People’s Daily editorial, its reference to public opinion guidance notwithstanding. He said that this was the “first time in nearly 20 years” that there had been a discussion (in official circles) about rule of law in the media.
He concluded that a “social consensus” seemed to be emerging in China about a press law.
In fact, Zhan seems to twist the party notion of “strengthening guidance,” which is ultimately the business of the propaganda department, into his own concept of better professionalism in the news media to address issues like those apparent in the recent “gag fee” case.
This raises again the question of whether current proponents of a press law, like Zhan Jiang, are hoping for a middle path between the more idealistic law sought by Sun Xupei and others in the political reform climate of the 1980s and more skeptical (realistic?) voices like that of Yan Lieshan who return the question of progress on media freedoms to the immediately insoluble issue of party power.
A nearly complete translation of Zhan Jiang’s editorial follows:

“A consensus is emerging on a Chinese press law”
China has made major accomplishments in the area of law since economic reforms began 30 years ago, but rule of law in the press sector, so crucial to the development of democratic politics, remains a gaping blank spot. Today, as governance according to rule of law has already become national policy, and as the speed to lawmaking has intensified, one sector has remained entirely outside the law, and that is the news and broadcasting sector, which has no specific law on which to rely. This has to a definite degree encumbered social progress and the image of China internationally. I have written many times in recent years to promote national lawmakers to give priority to this issue, and to put the creation of a press law on the five-year agenda (2008-2013) of the National People’s Congress. While the voices [in support of this move] are not exactly vibrant, the idea has lately seen some positive response.
On November 3, [the official] People’s Daily published an article called “Raising Our Capacity for Public Opinion Guidance,” which for the first time in nearly 20 years said that there is a need to “accelerate the building of rule of law in press work, working to realize management [of the press] in accordance with rule of law.” “Our country is now at a crucial stage of development, with new problems and circumstances emerging constantly, and this state of affairs places new and higher expectations on the building of rule of law in the press sector,” the article said. “[We] must accelerate legislation in the press sector, continuing to optimize laws and regulations relating to press work, in order to provide a legal guarantee for effective press work and for the improvement of public opinion guidance capacity.” The article drew a strong response from media both in China and abroad, all of whom believed this was a clear indication that China would put a press law on the agenda. I believe a consensus about a press law is emerging in society . . .
There is a great deal of wrangling in both media or political circles about whether or not a law should be made particularly for the press. Back in the 1980s, a Press Law was placed on the legislative agenda, but it was later scrapped as it faced opposition . . .
In academia, meanwhile, a press law is not regarded as a goal that can realistically be achieved in the near term. And within the journalism profession itself, few have paid attention to the question of a press law at all in recent years. Less than a year ago, I publicly debated the question of a press law with a colleague of mine who is a law professor. When he remarked, “Ah, so here is another Don Quixote!”, there were titters in the audience. This widely recognized legal mind was not without reasons for his views — if a press law was to be promulgated without the proper social consensus, it is very conceivable that it would do harm to the protection of the rights of the media and in fact place greater limitations on freedom of speech.
But when you research the international experience [in this area] you find that the press and the mass media are sometimes now referred to as “social radar” (社会雷达), with the recognition that they are an effective and lost-cost means of scanning the terrain, checking various forms of abuse of power and aiding progress toward good social governance.
In any modern nation under rule of law — whether it is civil law (continental law) or [Anglo-American] common law — rule of law in the press is a matter of consequence. In England and other nations under common law, freedom of speech is guaranteed and protected according to mores and traditions, and while actual practice matters like war or anti-terrorism might pose challenges [to speech] it is a [social] resource that has shown [its value] over the long term.
Nations under the continental law system of Europe generally set down press or media laws (or broadcasting laws). The oldest legislation in history is the Free Press Statute passed by Sweden in 1766. Aside from constitutional guarantees of speech and of the press, France, Sweden, Germany and Russia all have various freedom of speech laws (新闻自由法), press laws (新闻法) or mass media laws (大众传媒法). France’s “Freedom of Speech Law” (新闻自由法) has been translated into Chinese, coming in at more than 10,000 words, and the rights and responsibilities of news media, principally newspapers and periodicals, are spelled out in great detail. In Sweden, the Free Press Statute is a part of constitutional law, and from this we can see the high position given to press law in the continental legal tradition. While Germany does not have a federal law on the press, each of its states has introduced its own press law. At the core of press law in Russia is its mass media law (大众传媒法) of 1991.
Let us look now at China’s progress in rule of law in recent years. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Emergency Responses (突发事件应对法) that took effect in November 2007 stipulates that the government and government offices at various levels release information about emergency situations promptly, accurately, objectively and in a unified manner (及时、准确、客观、统一地发布有关突发事件的新闻信息), and that responsibility will be sought for cases of slow reporting, cover-ups, or the issuing of false reports. The Government Information Disclosure Ordinance (政府信息公开条例) of May 1, 2008, enshrined the new presumption of information openness as a rule and non-disclosure as the exception, and it defined the boundaries between government news release and news reports by the media.
While strictly speaking the above documents belong to the category of administrative regulations, we can see that in practical terms they are changing the secrecy of administrative decision making and the mystery of public affairs. This does more than just improve the image of the central government. Whether for major stories like the Sichuan earthquake or for small stories like a local traffic accident, if public information is opened up in this way, far from creating discord, this will lead popular opinion [toward more normal views and expressions] and do away with the environment in which rumor and speculation thrive. The international community will also look on this favorably. The opposite approach will have exactly the opposite effect.
But administrative measures do not amount to a press law . . .
Looking a the present state of affairs in China, it is most regrettable that apart from the ineffectual Article 35 of the constitution, there is no law directly protecting the media. Where media control is concerned, local officials can suppress speech and avoid press scrutiny (舆论监督) in the name of “positive propaganda” and turn the press into an instrument of self praise. Look, for example, at the Shanxi slave case of 2007, which would never have seen the light of day had it not been for media outside the province.
What’s more, China’s vast media industry is a gumbo of good and bad, and in recent years many media have sought to use their status as a social utility (社会公器) [or a function of government power] to rent-seek (寻租) [or extort cash or advertising contracts from companies, individuals or government officials]. The “cardboard bun hoax” of 2007 and the recent “gag fee” incident are two cases in point, clearly pointing to the fact that media also need to be checked by the law lest they go the same road of corruption we see with unchecked power. The respect of such citizens’ rights as reputation, privacy, copyright (著作权) and representation (肖像权) would also fall under the purview of a future press law. As for ethical bare minimums, a press law would be able to protect freedom of speech and at the same time limit the abuse of the right to interview (采访权), the right to report (报道权) and the right to comment (评论权).
Just as the People’s Daily article said: “Our country is now at a crucial stage of development, with new problems and circumstances emerging constantly, and this state of affairs places new and higher expectations on the building of rule of law in the press sector. [We] must accelerate legislation in the press sector, continuing to optimize laws and regulations relating to press work, in order to provide a legal guarantee for effective press work and for the improvement of public opinion guidance capacity.”
If from this point on [China] works to draft and implement a Press Law, using this as a basis on which to bring about the promises contained in relevant portions of both the constitution [Chapter II, Article 35: Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.] and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNCCPR) [Article 19: Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: For respect of the rights or reputations of others; For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.] then this will benefit the promotion of progress in press work and democratic politics, it will truly preserve the right of the people to know, participate, express and supervise that was promoted at the 17th Party Congress [last year], and it will break the bonds that have for so long held captive China’s international image and soft power.

[Posted by David Bandurski, November 11, 2008, 8:35am HK]

By Emma Lupano and David Bandurski — Dai Xiaojun (戴骁军), the journalist and blogger credited with the scoop on the Linfen “gag fee” case, in which scores of journalists accepted cash to keep the story of a deadly mine accident under wraps, has told Chinese media he believes the full extent of media corruption at Linfen is not reflected in official findings. Dai also revealed that he and his family are now receiving constant threats from anonymous callers. [Frontpage image: Snapshot of register of allegedly bribed journalists taken by Dai Xiaojun.]
According to preliminary findings released last week by the General Administration for Press and Publications (GAPP), 28 journalists from 23 media accepted payoffs at Linfen on September 24 and 25. Of these, only two journalists possessed press cards issued by GAPP, the narrow official standard the government often upholds to determine “real” as opposed to “fake” reporters.
But according to Chinese news coverage, Dai alleges that the cover up in Shanxi is still going on, and he estimates that close to one-hundred journalists were on the scene collecting “hush money,” or “gag fees” (封口费).
The China Youth Daily was the first mainstream newspaper last week to report the story of Dai and how he broke the “gag fee” case on his weblog. Dai’s story has subsequently been followed by many Chinese media.
According to our database search nearly one hundred articles have mentioned his name since the case broke.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of QQ news coverage today of Dai Xiaojun’s interview with Phoenix TV.]

The following is a translation of portions of an article from today’s news section at QQ.com reporting statements Dai Xiaojun has made to various media:

“Exposer of the gag fee case following [the Linfen] mine accident says the mine is still covering up the truth”
After interviews in Beijing with CCTV and Phoenix TV, Dai Xiaojun, the reporter who instantly became famous for exposing the story of journalists receiving “hush money” after a mine disaster in Shanxi, could not stay longer and had to rush back to his home in Taiyuan. Back at home, the threating phone calls are becoming more and more frequent and his wife and son need him more than ever. In an interview with our newspaper yesterday, Dai Xiaojun said he harbors no regrets about exposing the ugly incident and even challenged the latest results of the investigation. “The owner of the mine is still telling lies. He is still hiding the number of the reporters involved and the amount of money they were paid,” Dai said. He said he entered the media industry 22 years ago. Three years ago he became a photographer at the Shanxi bureau of West Times.
In the afternoon of September 25, Dai received a phone call from a friend who works in the media, saying that “there was an incident at a mine in Hongdong county, and reporters are lining up to extort money.” After this phone call, Dai and a fellow blogger called “Live from Shanxi” drove a car from Taiyuan to Hongdong county. They arrived at the office of the Huobaoganhe Coal mine (山西霍宝干河煤矿) in the evening and Dai saw with his own eyes a practice he had long heard about, the distributing of “gag fees.”

The news article later goes on to describe Dai’s lingering doubts about the investigation into the Linfen case.

After news that the mine was distributing hush money to reporters was exposed to the outside, the General Administration for Press and Publication (GAPP) and Shanxi press authorities sent inspectors early on October 25 and 27 to carry out an investigation of the situation. The initial results of these investigations suggest that 28 journalists from 23 media were listed on rosters kept [at a registration desk] at the entrance on September 24 and 25. Of these, two journalists possessed press cards issued by GAPP [the findings suggest]. Talking about these findings, Dai Xiaojun said that “actually there are still very big discrepancies, showing clearly that the owner of the mine continues to lie.”
Dai said that according to his estimates, there were up to 100 people in the mine offices and corridors waiting to receive their gag fees that evening. “If you look at the photographs I took alone, there are already more than 40 people. The owner of the mine is still keeping to full number of journalists under wraps, as well as the amount of money he gave them.”
Dai said his friend has kept some photographs as evidence. Our paper called the blogger “Live from Shanxi” yesterday and he said he has a number of digital photographs as well as short videos. “If the investigative organisations require them, I’d be happy to bring them out,” he said.
[More on media appearances by Dai] . . . On November 1, Dai flew from Shanxi to Beijing to participate in a [TV] program, but as soon as he had landed and switched on his mobile, he received a call from his wife. “There was deep concern in her voice, and she told me that in the space of an hour she had received more than ten threatening phone calls.” Dai said he has received threatening calls directly as well. “They call from unlisted numbers, say something brief and then hang up,” he said, adding that the calls involve not just threats to him but to the safety of his family.
A spokeperson for West Times said in recent interviews with media that Dai Xiaojun is not a formal reporter (正式记者) for the newspaper. Responding to this statement, Dai said his “heart felt cold,” but he stressed that posts made to his own weblog are not in any way associated with West Times.

In a statement issued late last week, the ACJA condemned the practice of offering or accepting “gag fees.” But the official organization was careful to emphasize that such acts in the Linfen case were undertaken primarily by “fake reporters,” so defined not by unprofessional conduct itself but because they were not in possession of officially-issued press cards. [See CMP: “What does it mean to be a ‘real journalist’ in China?“]

[ABOVE: Screenshot of ACJA page on Xinhuanet with large headline on the association’s Linfen “gag fee” statement.]

The ACJA statement followed a press conference on October 29 in which Shanxi officials announced the findings of their preliminary investigation into the Linfen “gag fee” incident.
A translation of the ACJA statement as reported by Xinhua follows:

“All-China Journalists Association issues statement strongly condemning the offering and receiving of ‘gag fees,’ vows to strengthen the campaign against fake reporters”
(Xinhuanet, Beijing, October 31). A representative from the All-China Journalists Association (全国新闻工作者协会/记协for short) issued a statement today on the acceptance of “gag fees” by journalists following an accident at Shanxi’s Huobaoganhe Coal Mine (山西霍宝干河煤矿). They said [the ACJA] strongly condemns the practice of paying “gag fees, and that those ‘black horses’ (害群之马) of the news profession who accepted “gag fees” should be severely punished. [The association vowed that it would] crack down on those members of society (社会人员) who impersonate journalists in order to carry out extort or blackmail, [and said that] news workers’ normal right to interview (正当的采访权益) must be staunchly protected.
On September 20 this year a production accident occurred at the Huobaoganhe Coal Mine in which one worker died. After the accident occurred, 28 people from a total of 23 media arrived on the scene in the name of carrying out reporting (以记者名义) and accepted “gag fees” offered by the mine. After this incident was revealed by some media, it was given a high priority by the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) and by local press officials in Shanxi (山西省新闻出版局), which conducted two investigations. According to preliminary findings, two of the people among those who accepted “gag fees” possessed press cards issued by GAPP and the vast majority were members of society impersonating news outfits . . .
The ACJA representative said the investigation of this incident should be an opportunity to intensify the crackdown on “fake journalists.” Those people who use fake press cards (假记者证) or impersonate journalists to carry out illegal activities, [they said], should be quickly handed over to law-enforcement and their cases handled according to the law, in order that normal news activities can be protected and the purity of news teams (新闻队伍的纯洁) be ensured. At the same time, the All-China Journalists Association staunchly protects news workers’ normal right to interview, and supports normal supervision by public opinion (舆论监督) activities on the part of news workers.

In today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, scholar Ding Dong (丁东) adds to the “gag fee” debate, writing about the role of government power in suppressing crucial information, and concludes with a warning that adroitly turns the Chinese term for “watchdog journalism” on its head to warn against official monitoring and control of public opinion.
Ding also invokes two previous stories that were suppressed in Shanxi, those at Lifan and Xiangfen. [For more background on the Lifan landslide, see Roland Soong’s summary at ESWN.]
For readers new to the Lifan story, here’s a quick recap . . . In late August 2008, Sun Chunlong, a reporter for Oriental Outlook magazine published a report online called, “Lifan: the truth in limbo” (娄烦：被拖延的真相), but the report was deleted. Several days later Sun posted an open letter to Shanxi’s acting provincial governor, and three days after that Wen Jiabao officially commented on an internal reference document, or neican (内参), that mentioned that “an informant had published a letter on a blog saying that deaths in a mudslide on August 1 in Shanxi’s Lifan County had been covered up.” Only then there was a turn in the Lifan incident.
Ding writes the following about Sun Chunlong and the gagging of the Lifan story:

When you look at Sun Chunlong’s (孙春龙) experiences in trying to report the truth, it’s not difficult to see that the system of gagging information does not just work on one level. The gag system (封口机制) can at the very least be divided into two types. The first is corruption that comes with money; the second is suppression that arises from power. When company bosses use payouts to suppress information, this is just a clumsy method. If a journalist is short on neither conscience nor cash, this method can quite easily fail. But power is far more effective. In order to prevent bad news from getting out, local officials can mobilize the police, keeping reporters away from the scene of the accident, and they can even threaten the personal safety of journalists. Other government offices play along, working together to present a false front to the news media. Local officials inevitably have their own interests vested in these accidents, and they cover them up so that they will not have to take responsibility or be disciplined, so they can protect their official posts. If watchdog journalism [or “supervision by public opinion”] by domestic media is not restricted, it’s very possible that we will break through this gag system that works for local officials. The censoring of Sun Chunlong’s earliest report online happened ultimately because websites have no power to resist these rules [that work in favor of local officials]. And it’s because these rules exist that reports on the Lifan incident could not serve as warnings against the Xiangfen (襄汾) disaster [that happened subsequently and killed at least 276 people]. These rules, I think, should properly be called ‘power’s supervision of public opinion’ (权力对舆论的监督) [a distortion of “supervision by public opinion,” or “watchdog journalism”]. If the supervision [by power] of public opinion suppresses supervision by public opinion, the gag system will become a normal fixture of our life and society.

[Posted by Emma Lupano and David Bandurski, November 4, 2008, 4:17pm HK]

By Emma Lupano — As scandal continues to plague the food products industry in China, attention is turning again to endemic contamination in yet another Chinese industry — the media. On October 26, China Youth Daily published a report about journalists lining up at the scene of a mining accident to accept cash payments, or “gag fees” (封口费), in exchange for keeping quiet. Since then, newspapers across China have followed up on the story and launched a nationwide discussion about what responsibilities journalists have, and why poor ethics continues to hound the profession.
At the center of this discussion are the questions: what makes a “real reporter,” and what makes a “fake reporter”?
These questions have been asked many times before in China.
In January 2007, the case of journalist Lan Chenzhang (兰成长) became international news. The reporter was beaten to death by company thugs as he tried to uncover a story about illegal mining operations. But local authorities in Shanxi claimed that Lan had been a “fake reporter” merely trying to extort cash from mine bosses.
A lengthy investigative report by CMP fellow Wang Keqin eventually confirmed that Lan had been carrying out “news extortion” (新闻敲诈), but Wang presented a much more nuanced view of how problems in Chinese journalism stem not just from unscrupulous individuals, but rather from corrupt media culture and policy.
Wang particularly took issue with the suggestion by many party officials that separating the “real” journalists from the “fake” journalists was a matter of who had official press credentials and who did not. [Visit this link for CMP’s full discussion of press credentials and “fake reporters.”]
This problematic standard for “fake” and “real” journalists recalls the so-called “Gold Nugget Case” of July 2002, when China Youth Daily reporter and CMP fellow Liu Chang found that eleven reporters, including four from the official Xinhua News Agency, had accepted gag fees (including cash and gold nuggets) to cover up news about an explosion in which 37 workers died.
The discussion of “fake” and “real” reporters re-emerged in April 2007 following the story of Meng Huaihu, former Zhejiang bureau chief for China Commercial Times, who was accused of extorting money from companies using the threat of negative news reports.
The case sparking coverage and commentary this week surrounds a mining accident in Shanxi’s Linfen City (山西临汾市) in which one worker was killed.
According to reports by China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by China’s Communist Youth League, a pit accident occurred at the Linfen mine on September 21, resulting in the death of a 41 year-old worker. Rather than report the accident to higher authorities, the mine decided to cover it up, and distributed gag fees to journalists who came ostensibly to report the story.

[ABOVE: Page 7 China Youth Daily report on October 27, 2008, breaks the story of a mine accident cover-up in Linfen, Shanxi.]

Authorities now say they are investigating the case and that the owner of the mine has been fined 8,000 yuan.
The Zhongnanhai blog has translations of two original China Youth Daily reports here, but a CMP translation of a portion of the first article follows:

In the late evening of September 25, Dai Xiaojun (戴骁军), who writes under the web alias “Tian Ma Xing Kong” (天马行空) drove to the Huobao Ganhe Coal Mine with a colleague with the web alias “Live from Shanxi” (直播山西). The scene they saw on arrival caused Dai Xiaojun, a media professional with more than 20 years of experience, to gasp in amazement. Crowds of journalists were sitting down and chatting in more than ten rooms, and the hallway was jam-packed with more people who were queuing up.
Observing the scene, Dai Xiaojun noticed that two separate registration procedures had been set up downstairs, and in another office on the third floor people surrounded yet another registration desk. After that, bearing slips of paper, people were heading off to another office to close the deal. The visitors [Dai and his colleague] completed these procedures. Then, in still another office, Dai saw a practice he had long heard about, the distributing of “gag fees”. “Line up! There’s a bit for everyone,” [those in charge said].
This old soldier of journalism, [Dai], took out his camera at the top of the third-floor stairwell, adjusted his wide-angle lens and flash and readied his auto focus. At 6:48pm he slipped into a room where six or seven people were surrounding the registration desk and, click click, took two shots in quick succession. Then he went out into the hallway and took three more shots of people lining up. In less than a minute, he had bounded back down to the registration desk in the lobby, where he grabbed a copy of the “Shanxi Huobao Ganhe Mine Limited Co. Office Building Visitors Registration Form” (山西霍宝干河煤矿有限公司办公楼来客登记薄) with one hand while clicking the shutter release button of his camera with the other . . . so that he was able to take a shot of all four registration rosters as photographic evidence.
Dai did not recognize a single one of the many journalists registering as visitors . . . When he looked carefully at the 30 media on the photograph [he had taken of the roster], most of them were economic or science and technology publications, or magazines about law, safety or finance. A certain party daily from Shanxi had three reporters registered, and a certain consumer-related newspaper [like this one?] had two reporters registered . . .

Dai Xiaojun first posted his account of the gag fee incident on his personal weblog (hence the attention in the China Youth Daily lede to web aliases), but the blog was eventually taken down by authorities.
The China Youth Daily was the first mainstream paper to hit the story, even though it took one month. The following day, on October 28, more than 40 media, including The Beijing News (新京报), reported the facts quotiding the China Youth Daily. Among those, ten published editorials or commented about the incident in their “hot spots” (热点). On October 29 other 20 media wrote the story, with only two of them running editorials on the topic. On October 30, 36 more articles on the story were published, mostly as a follow-up from the days before.
The only party newspaper to publish a commentary on the story was the Guangzhou Daily (广州日报), on October 28.
Shanxi Daily (山西日报), the provincial party newspaper for Shanxi province, where the incident occurred, had not run a single story on the incident as of October 30. But commercial papers in the province, including Shanxi Evening News, did run news reports about the gag fee incident today. [See the bottom of this article for links to more editorials in Chinese.] 
The editorial by the Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报) discusses the common practice among mine owners of paying gag fees and its relevance to the question of “fake” and “real” reporters.
The Southern Metropolis Daily begins by calling the Linfen case “old news,” “because stories of this kind are far from new in Shanxi’s mining industry and even across the country,” then moves on to a discussion of “fake” and “real” reporters after briefly mentioning the Lan Chengzhang case.
The editorial’s conclusion takes a jab at the moralistic tone that often characterizes official campaigns against media corruption, in which problems are blamed on individual “fake reporters”:

Actually, I think that the most crucial question is not whether journalists are fake or real, but whether or not they can be successfully “gagged.” Why are there so many “fake journalists” fishing in troubled water to begin with? Any intelligent person in the world can become a transmitter of news, which is to say that anyone can be a journalist. It’s not necessary to carry a press card in your pocket, especially nowadays when information is developing so much. So a “real reporter” may get an ounce of respect from the owner of a mine, while a “fake reporter” becomes Lan Chengzhang. This is all about what kind of influence the disseminator can muster, and what kind of backing he has.
The influence a reporter has isn’t necessarily a function of his or her power of dissemination. This is particularly true in the Internet age, when a story posted on a website or bulletin-board site can inform the whole world in the blink of an eye. But in China today, real influence is decided by special groups of people. If something happens but the right people aren’t there to draw attention to it, those responsible can go right on as though nothing happened at all.
For example, Sun Chunlong (孙春龙), a journalist for Oriental Outlook, used his blog to break the story about the cover-up of the Lifan landslide. And some things that only a few people see, like internal reference documents (内参), can exercise more pressure on than mass media reports.
Besides, those media that hire “real reporters” have real strength to pit against mine owners, so that if the owner of a mine really wants to hush them up he has to pay a suitable price. If he resorts to violence, this is far riskier, so he’s better off just paying up for the peace and quiet he wants. As for those “fake reporters” taking a bit of light for themselves, well that’s just normal too. In those cases where police beat up or kill this or that citizen, it’s generally the “temporary workers” (临时工) [ie: the freelance reporters without official credentials] who are on top of the story first — and why shouldn’t they get to taste the soup for themselves? In all likelihood, these temporary workers are cooperating closely with “real reporters”, and they have the capability to report real stories too, so it is necessary to hush them up too.
The basic reason why fake and real reporters fly like a swarm of bees to cover mine disasters is that in today’s China the spread of information can be controlled, and that mean paying money is an effective way to hush people up. Otherwise, why would a mine boss waste so much money! Let’s think about this. If there was no strong external force capable of controlling the media and telling them what they can and cannot say, they could report the real facts with relative freedom . . . It’s precisely because mouths can be gagged so successfully, particularly those mouths that serve as information channels to key groups of people — and because even if someone exposes it online, it can disappear, as was the fate of Sun Chunlong’s blog report on the Lifan cover-up — that mine owners are willing to pay money, and both real and fake reporters can cash in.
I admire those people who aren’t subdued by force and who are untempted by money, but the majority of people go straight for profit, so in situations like this we see both fake and real reporters sticking together to get rich. Moral crusades against this kind of behavior just end up being anemic and ineffectual . . .
If the rights of the ordinary people are safeguarded, and if ordinary people can negotiate equally with local officials on a basis of legal equality, there will be no room for the buying of silence. The buying of silence is certainly hateful, but even more hateful is the institutional environment that allows silence to be propagated.

MORE CHINESE EDITORIALS:
City Evening News (城市晚报), “The ‘gag fee’ incident shames news media” (封口费事件让新闻媒体蒙羞), 28 October 2008.
Xi’an Evening News (西安晚报), “Re-thinking public information through the ‘gag fee’ problem”(由“封口费”反思信息公开), 28 October 2008.
Guangzhou Daily, “The two big miseries of queuing up to extort hush money” (排队领“封口费”的两大悲哀), 28 October 2008.
Morning News, (新闻晨报), “‘Gag fees’ require a more transparent control of the situation” (“封口费”呼唤监督环境更透明), 28 October 2008.
Shangdong Evening News (齐鲁晚报), “Mine owner pays ‘gag fee’ to cover up mine disaster” (为瞒矿难矿主狂发’封口费’), 28 October 2008.
Shangdong Evening News (齐鲁晚报), “Let’s publish the roster of the journalists who received gag fees during the mine disaster” (请公布矿难中收“封口费”的记者名单), 28 October 2008.
FURTHER READING:
“Shanxi publicizes names of six media guilty of accepting ‘gag fees,'” World Executive Digest, October 31, 2008
“Most bought-off journalists in Shanxi scandal were fakes, says local government,” Danwei.org, October 30, 2008
“Shanxi scandal: coal mine ‘shut up’ cash,” Zhongnanhai Blog, October 29, 2008
“Dark Journalism,” Gady Epstein, Forbes, July 21, 2008
“Out of Control: Chinese Journalists Struggle for Independence and Professionalism,” David Bandurski and Qian Gang, Global Journalist, Spring 2007
“China’s Yellow Journalism,” David Bandurski, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2006
[Posted by Emma Lupano, October 30, 2008, 4:35pm]