By David Bandurski — For those of us outside the pale of Chinese politics, the leftist bluster that emerges at times from the CCP is simply impossible to take seriously. We are more likely to titter than to tremble when we hear bombast about “hostile Western forces” or the “running dogs of America and Europe.” More likely than not, we pay it no attention at all. [Frontpage Image: “Mao Zedong in Tianfu Square”, by NewChengdu available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
So it has been with the latest political manifesto from China’s left — a rant riddled with buzzwords old and new that has caused not a hiccup outside China, but has given intense heartburn to more moderate scholars and officials in China.
The editorial — really too important to titter about — was written by General Xu Tianliang (徐天亮), director of the political department of China’s National Defense University, and it appeared in the November 10 edition of the official People’s Daily.
It spoke in grandiose terms about the need for China’s leaders to be “thoroughly vigilant” in recognizing the threat posed by “hostile forces” in the ideological sphere. But more importantly, it was an open challenge to pro-reform leaders on the eve of a critical anniversary next month that will mark 30 years of economic and social reform in China.

[ABOVE: Page 7 “Theory” page of People’s Daily on November 10, with the editorial by Xu Tianliang marked in red.]

December 18 is the 30th anniversary of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee, an event regarded generally as a pivotal moment in the modern political history of China.
The plenum marked Deng Xiaoping’s re-emergence and the onset of economic, social and political reforms. It also repudiated the errors and excesses of the CCP’s left and the cult of personality surrounding Mao Zedong, and adopted the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, technology, defense).
Through the 1980s, Deng oversaw a diminishing of the importance of ideology in China. But in the aftermath of the June 4, 1989, crackdown on democracy demonstrators in Beijing, the political climate shifted once again to the left, and ideological rhetoric denouncing “bourgeois liberalization” returned.
A People’s Daily editorial following the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union, quoted by Kalpana Misra in a work on “neo-left” and “neo-right” theory in China, bears remembering as we turn to Xu’s more recent pronouncements:

Chairman Mao was the first to raise this question . . . [t]he actual development over the past few decades has fully proved that the hostile forces at home and abroad have never stopped attempting to subvert the Communist Party’s leadership and undermine the socialist system — they are largely relying on the ‘war without smoke of gunpowder’ for fulfilling their goal. We will grieve if, instead of gaining a keen insight into the real threat of peaceful evolution, we lower our guard against it.

Deng Xiaoping famously cut off the ascendancy of China’s left in the early 1990s with a call to cease ideological wrangling about whether the nation’s economic reform policies were “surnamed Capitalism or surnamed Socialism” (姓资姓社).
Xu Tianliang’s November 10 editorial is an attempt to reinvigorate this ideological debate about the past and future of China’s reforms. Xu, in fact, seems at points to be calling for a kind of fifth modernization — of socialist ideology.
China, says Xu in one section, must master new information technologies in order to project itself ideologically and to “safeguard our nation’s ideological security” (意识形态安全).
Toward this end, in the “great project of building a modern transmission system with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色现代传播体系), China’s media would play a crucial role :

We must clearly recognize the importance of improving our country’s international transmission [of ideas and information] to the safeguarding of our nation’s ideological security. Numerous facts have revealed that in this age of rapid development of information technologies, whoever has mastery of cutting-edge transmission methods, and whoever’s transmission capabilities are strongest, can achieve more widespread transfer of their thinking, culture and value concepts, and thereby more effectively influence the world. Our matching of strength with hostile forces in the ideological sphere is to a definite degree also a matching of strength in the transmission [of ideas and information]. Right now, our material goods are seen the world round, but our spiritual and cultural goods find limited [representation] on the international market. Building and strengthening our international transmission capacity is critical to preserving our ideological security, to recasting the greatness of the Chinese people, and to China truly becoming a great world power. In the great project of building a modern transmission system with Chinese characteristics (中国特色现代传播体系), the mainstream media bear a great weight of responsibility.

In an eery echo of the August 1991 People’s Daily language about the need for “keen insight into the real threat of peaceful evolution,” Xu’s editorial calls on China’s leaders to be more keenly alert to the “struggle” in the ideological sphere, particularly in the new information age.
“As we concentrate our efforts on carrying out modernization, we must not even for a moment grow lax in our ideological work,” Xu writes.
For supporters, who voiced their views across an array of websites, from Tianya to the fervently leftist Wuyou Zhixiang (乌有之乡), Xu’s words were like the ecstatic utterance of a Nietschean Zarathustra. Xu had smashed his lamp to startle awake party leaders who have lost touch with “the lofty goals of Communism” under a bombardment of foreign ideas like democracy and human rights.
The editorial, said one googly-eyed admirer in a Chinese internet forum, is “a great party paper article such as we have not seen in many years.”
“I support the author of the article,” exclaimed another. “We definitely must be aware of and stave off hostile Western forces! At the same time, we need to urgently make our own voices heard! We can’t let the West control the power of speech!”
Xu Tianliang’s editorial underscores a deep and fundamental debate within the CCP about how to commemorate the 30th anniversary of China’s Open Door policy. Critically, it also underscores the sensitive political climate in which Chinese journalists are now working — and there is no better illustration of that than recent troubles at Yanhuang Chunqiu.
There is much more to say, but for now we offer a full translation of Xu’s editorial. We welcome further thoughts and analysis — after all of you are done tittering, of course.

“Sound Ideological Work Demands Clear Understanding”
People’s Daily
November 10, 2008
Xu Tianliang (徐天亮)
Our party has always placed great emphasis on ideological work. In the age of information and economic globalization, there have been many changes to the complexion of the ideological sphere. Doing adequate ideological requires that we remain thoroughly vigilant, no matter when or under what situation.
We must have a clear understanding of the utmost importance of the party’s ideological work . . . Ideology is the central manifestation of the will of the ruling class, the soul of the body social, and it provides the theoretical justification, thought foundation and spiritual support for the leadership of the ruling class. In this sense, ideological work is a critical task that protects the leadership position of the party. Great problems will result if economic work is not done properly. So too will great problems result if ideological work is not done properly. As we concentrate our efforts on carrying out modernization, we must not grow lax in our ideological work for even a moment. We must also recognize that the development of thought, morality and culture with ideology at its core constitutes critical soft power that contributes to the building of comprehensive national strength . . .
We must have a clear understanding of the nature of struggle in the ideological domain. Historical experience demonstrates the absolute necessity of having a clear understanding and scientific grasp of the nature of the struggle in the ideological domain . . . In recent years, our party has put a strong emphasis on ideological work, thoroughly promoting the work of arming ourselves with theory (理论武装工作), doing news propaganda work, building of thoughts and morals, carrying out literary and artistic creation, and promoting the development and flourishing of socialist culture, providing a common foundation of political theory for the concerted efforts of people of all ethnic groups as well as great spiritual motivation and intellectual support. At the same time, we must clearly see the continuing urgency and complexity of the struggle for and against infiltration in the ideological sphere, that hostile forces have intensified destructive acts of infiltration against our country in the ideological sphere. First, they are always using such topics as freedom, democracy, human rights, ethnicity and religion to carry out rumor-mondering attacks on our nation. Second, they have made it their stock-in-trade to broaden the [apparent] scope of various problems, taking simple issues and complicating them, taking ordinary issues and politicizing them, ultimately pointing the finger of blame at the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and at the socialist system. Third, they use media, particularly the Internet and other modern media, to vilify and demonize our nation. We must have a clear understanding of this, having a keen but not overly sensitive, cool-headed but not dull, treatment of problems in the ideological sphere, working to enhance our conscientiousness in doing ideological work well.
We must be clear in recognizing the basic tasks of ideological work. Our struggle against hostile forces in the ideological sphere is at its base a matching of strength between the socialist value system (社会主义价值体系) and the capitalist value system (资本主义价值体系). Therefore, the basic task in strengthening ideological work is to energetically promote the building of the social core value system (社会主义核心价值体系). The party’s report to the 17th National Congress says that the socialist core value system is the essential embodiment of socialist ideology. All of those world views, methods, social ideals, spiritual supports, and moral precepts that best reveal the basic demands of socialism and the basic principles of socialism must be gathered together under the core value system, in order that they might provide us with basic guidance for the strengthening of ideological construction. We must persist in the unshakeable position of Marxism in the ideological sphere, promoting the popularity of contemporary Chinese Marxism, firmly establishing the basic theoretical foundation of socialist ideology; we must unshakably persist in the great ideals of communism and the common ideals of socialism with Chinese characteristics, holding high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, firmly establishing the basic political foundation of the socialist ideology; we must unshakably persist in promoting a nationalist spirit with patriotism at its core and a contemporary spirit with reform and renewal at its core . . . fostering among the entire people an enterprising spirit; we must unshakably persist in the central task of building civic morals, so that the socialist view of honor and shame becomes the guiding principle of the behavior of all citizens.
We must clearly recognize the importance of improving our country’s international transmission [of ideas and information] to the safeguarding of our nation’s ideological security. Numerous facts have revealed that in this age of rapid development of information technologies, whoever has mastery of cutting-edge transmission methods, and whoever’s transmission capabilities are strongest, can achieve more widespread transfer of their thinking, culture and value concepts, and thereby more effectively influence the world. Our matching of strength with hostile forces in the ideological sphere is to a definite degree also a matching of strength in the transmission [of ideas and information]. Right now, our material goods are seen the world round, but our spiritual and cultural goods find limited [representation] on the international market. Building and strengthening our international transmission capacity is critical to preserving our ideological security, to recasting the greatness of the Chinese people, and to China truly becoming a great world power. In the great project of building a modern transmission system with Chinese characteristics (中国特色现代传播体系), the mainstream media bear a great weight of responsibility.
We must clearly recognize that the key to doing ideological work well lies in the prioritization [of ideological work] and the enhancement of leadership [in this area] by the whole party. Comrades throughout the party, but particularly comrades who carry out propaganda work, must have ideological backbone (意识形态这根弦), must give ideological work a high priority, and must enhance their political awareness, their political sensitivity and their political perceptiveness. While we cannot say that propaganda work and ideological work are equal to one another, they are intimately connected. Propaganda work is the principle vehicle of ideological work, and [we can say that] ideology is the soul of propaganda work. We cannot view all propaganda and cultural work as ideological work, but perhaps all propaganda and cultural work bears elements and shadows of ideology. We must certainly, according to the demands of the CCP central committee under the presidency of comrade Hu Jintao, earnestly improve our leadership on ideological work, striving to raise our capacity to do ideological work effectively, conscientiously summarizing the party’s successes in the area of ideological work, deepening our research of the characteristics and laws governing ideological work under the conditions [created by] information technologies, economic globalization and the market economy, raising our capacity and ability to control our overall ideological interests, and energetically promoting the scientific development of the press and propaganda (新闻宣传事业).

MORE READING:
[Xu Tianliang listed as a delegate to the 17th National Congress in October 2007, after alternate members and disclipline inspection committee members are added. He does not appear in the People’s Daily list of August 3, 2008.].
[News on Xu Tianliang’s visit to the earthquake zone in Longnan, Gansu, in June 2008, includes a photo of Xu.]
[On a less serious note, get your greeting cards, signed by Xu Tianliang, here.]
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 26, 2008, 3:43pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Zhang Zhiguo (张志国), the party secretary of Xifeng County in the Liaoning city of Tieling, became the focus of a sustained national media attack in January this year after news emerged that he had sent police to Beijing to arrest journalist Zhu Wenna (朱文娜) for an investigative report on local county land deals.
The affair cooled down after February 5, when Zhang was removed as Xifeng’s party secretary by top leaders in Tieling. [SEE “China’s feudal county cadres: ‘defamed’ and dangerous,” CMP, December 2008].
But now, once again, national newspapers are up in arms about Zhang Zhiguo, who seems to have returned to good standing — and has perhaps even been promoted.

[ABOVE: Online coverage of the latest Zhang Zhiguo controversy shows the former county secretary as he appeared on local Tieling television in January 2008.]

Reporting Zhang Zhiguo’s apparent return to politics on Monday, China Youth Daily said the case “looked like an act of revenge against public opinion.” The report began:

Zhang Zhiguo, former party secretary of Xifeng County in Liaoning’s Tieling City, has been reinstated, his position as vice president of the Joint Project Management Office of Tieling City [in charge of light rail projects]. On November 20, Tieling TV, [the official local party TV station], reported Zhang Zhiguo’s new position in its nightly “Tieling News” program.
As soon as the news was out, web users expressed their consternation at major web portals . . .

Seeking to control damage from the story, authorities in Liaoning issued a press release through the official Xinhua News Agency saying that “up to now, the standing committee of the CCP in Tieling has not met on the question of whether new work will be arranged for Zhang Zhiguo, and has made no decision whatsoever about whether new arrangements will be made [for Zhang].”
The Zhang Zhiguo controversy broke in January 2008 after the leader was apparently angered by a Faren Magazine report published on January 2, 2008, about local Liaoning businesswoman Zhao Junping (赵俊萍), who was detained for seven months in Xifeng County, Liaoning, before being tried and found guilty on charges of defamation and tax evasion in a case that appeared to be a vendetta by Secretary Zhang involving a contested land seizure.
The day after the story broke, the local prosecutor’s office in Xifeng County ordered Zhao Junhua (赵俊华), the older sister of local Xifeng businesswoman Zhao Junping, to appear for questioning. Zhao Junhua told China Youth Daily last January that she was pressured with accusations that she had paid the Faren Magazine reporter for the negative story. It was not possible, reasoned her interrogators, that a reporter would travel from Beijing to Liaoning for a story unless she had been offered payment.
The next day, Xifeng County’s propaganda chief, Li Fulu (李福路), and the head of the county’s politics and law committee (政法委), Zhou Jingyu (周静宇), paid a visit to the offices of Faren Magazine in Beijing to speak with the editor in chief. That afternoon, a group of Xifeng police officers entered the magazine’s offices with an order for summons and detention. They said a “defamation” case had already been opened against the reporter Zhu Wenna and demanded to speak with her about it.
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 26, 2008, 9:19am HK]

Yes, a short notice indeed. But CMP is please to announce, for all who can make it, a talk this evening by veteran documentary filmmaker Zhao Yanying, who will discuss the origin and process of her recent documentary, Old Hu’s Golden Monkey (2007). The documentary tells the story of Hu Zhenlin and his companion, a rare golden monkey. The film screened at Qatar’s Aljazeera International Film Festival, as well as other international documentary festivals.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER:
Zhao Yanying has been making documentary programs ever since beginning her career with Beijing Television in 1983, upon graduation from the People’s University of China. Zhao regards documentary not just as a profession but as a way of life, demanding detachment from superficial concerns and a deep engagement with one’s subject.

Zhao has won a number of national and international awards for her documentaries, which also include: Teacher Jiao’s House, Xinazhuoga Goddess of the Forest and Lighting of Candle (winner of first prize at the 2001 REEL China Documentary Biennale)
5:30pm to 7pm
November 25, 2008 (Tue)
Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
Enquiries: Ms Rain Li (2219 4434/[email protected])

Ying Chan, an award-winning journalist and Hong Kong native, established the Journalism and Media Studies Centre in July 1999. She set up the Master of Journalism programme, launched Hong Kong’s first fellowships for working journalists, and forged extensive ties between HKU and the news industry. At HKU, Chan is a Board member of the Social Sciences Faculty and an adjunct research fellow of the E-Business Technology Institute. Chan’s honours include a Nieman Fellowship at Harvard University, a George Polk Award for journalistic excellence and an International Press Freedom Award by the Committee to Protect Journalists. She taught at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism and was on the board of the Asian American Journalists Association. Chan has a bachelor’s degree (social sciences) from HKU and a master’s from the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Best known for his tenure as managing editor of Southern Weekend, one of China’s most progressive newspapers, Qian Gang is one of China’s foremost journalists. Qian was also a co-creator and executive editor of “News Probe,” CCTV’s pioneering weekly investigative news program with nearly 20 million viewers. Qian collected historical documents for Chinese Boy Students, a book and five-hour documentary series on 120 young Chinese students sent to universities in the United States by the Qing government in the late 19th century. He is also the author of The Great China Earthquake (唐山大地震), a book of reportage about the 1976 earthquake at Tangshan in which 250,000 people were killed.

David isdirector of the China Media Project. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanisation and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press). His writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Wall Street Journal, Index on Censorship, Hong Kong Free Press, the South China Morning Post and others. He received a Human Rights Press Award in 2007 for an explanatory feature about China’s Internet censorship guidelines. He has a Master’s degree from Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism.

By Emma Lupano — For much of this year, Guangdong’s Southern Metropolis Daily has borne the brunt of attacks against China’s liberal press. But the latest publication to take the heat is Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), a liberal history-related journal regarded generally as one of China’s most outspoken publications.
News surfaced this month that the journal has come under attack from an unspecified senior official after running a lengthy article in September that praised former premier Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) for his progressive leadership in Sichuan in the 1970s, before he was ousted amid the unrest that followed democracy demonstrations in Beijing in 1989.
The Zhao Ziyang piece is the first full-length article on the former top leader since democracy protests were violently suppressed on June 4, 1989.
Yanhuang Chunqiu has grown bolder over the last couple of years, broaching historical and political topics that often totter on the edge of taboo.
In 2007, for example, the journal published a lengthy work by Xie Tao (谢韬) on the prospects for democracy in China. [More from ESWN here]. In an interview following the Xie Tao article, the journal’s publisher, Du Daozheng (杜导正), a well-known reform figure, said that before Xie’s article went to press he had “put the likelihood of getting into trouble at about 10 or 20 percent.”

[ABOVE: Sun Zhen, former bureau chief of Xinhua News Agency, who was close to former premier Zhao Ziyang when he was party secretary of Sichuan province.]

Positive coverage of the former premier is at the very least a dangerous “line ball,” if not an outright breach of propaganda discipline.
Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan reported last week that a senior party official, angered by the Zhao Ziyang article, had approached the journal’s publisher, the Yanhuang Cultural Association, and officials in the Ministry of Culture seeking the removal of several top editors, including Du Daozheng.
Age was given as the pretext for the removal of Du Daozheng, who is 85, and the others.
But Yazhou Zhoukan revealed that the real reason for the attempted shakeup was the 7,000-word article on Zhao Ziyang, which “a former key leader from Zhongnanhai disliked.”
The article in question was written by Sun Zhen, a party journalist who was made chief of the Sichuan bureau of the official Xinhua News Agency in the early 1970s, during which time Zhao Ziyang served as the province’s party secretary and carried out bold, market-oriented rural reforms.
Although the title of Sun Zhen’s article, “My relationship with the Sichuan Party Secretary in the late stages of the Cultural Revolution,” does not immediately make its subject matter clear, the article is an overwhelmingly favorable assessment of Zhao Ziyang.
With what is probably a touch of hyperbole, Yazhou Zhoukan called the shakeup at Yanhuang Chunqiu “the biggest drama in media purge since June 4, 1989,” but the fate of the publication and its top editors is as yet unknown, and Du Daozheng told the Sydney Morning Herald on November 18 that he rejected the decision by the Ministry of Culture saying he was too old to run the journal:

I said the government’s official retirement age doesn’t apply to non-government enterprises like us; if I work until I’m 120 that’s got nothing to do with you . . . It seems like we’re playing chess. This is not the result they expected, and they don’t know what move to make next.

Du told the Australian newspaper that he plans another essay on Zhao Ziyang for the December issue.
Du and his magazine, founded in 1991, can count on the support of a group of influential party elders, including retired generals Xiao Ke (萧克) and Zhang Aiping (张爱萍).
In a fairly clear indication of the uncertainty currently surrounding Yanhuang Chunqiu‘s fate, the entire Zhao Ziyang article remains available on the journal’s website:

革后期我与四川省委书记的交往
孙 振
2008年第9期 炎黄春秋杂志865
改革难，要想在乱时谋改革更难。身为中共四川省委书记的赵紫阳同志，在十年动乱的“文化大革命”后期，临危受命，心系民生，为解决城乡人民的温饱，冒着被打成反革命的政治风险，运用巧妙迂回的方法，谋求农村的经济改革。以后，“要吃米找万里，要吃粮找紫阳”的民谣在中华大地流传开来。
一
　　我原本不认识紫阳同志，几年以前，我任新华社江苏分社社长时，在一次江苏省委扩大会议上传达中央工作会议精神，最初听到赵紫阳这个名字。20世纪60年代，毛泽东同志可能是初次见到赵紫阳同志，把赵紫阳看做是一个年轻有为的干部，也可能是在国民经济困难时期，为了活跃会议的气氛，饶有兴趣地问起赵紫阳的出生地。赵紫阳回答说是河南滑县人。毛泽东同志当场兴致勃勃地说：“滑者水之骨也。”
　　我见到紫阳同志，纯属巧合。在上世纪70年代初，可能因“文化大革命”造成的混乱，到了不可收拾的地步，需要在省际之间交流干部，我从新华社江苏分社调到四川分社任社长，紫阳同志不久也从内蒙古自治区调广东省委，又从广东省委调到四川来做省委书记兼成都军区政委。
　　由于四川省的“文化大革命”中派别争斗极为严重，“文革”成了“武革”，除了飞机以外，大炮、坦克、机枪、步枪、地雷、手榴弹等等各式武器，全都用上了。就连我们四川分社的办公楼墙壁上，都是弹痕累累。我曾经开玩笑地说，这些武斗留下的弹洞，不要抹掉，可以用做警示后人。我曾在去四川的船上写诗一首，诗中写道：“不管翻腾千里浪，唯思处乱写新闻。”
　　赵紫阳同志虽在1932年加入共青团，但正式加入中共是1938年初，所以基本上属于“三八式”干部。就是在20世纪抗日战争爆发以后，于1938年底前参加革命工作的干部。不过他开始便任县委书记，很快连任多地多届地委书记，接着任省委书记。这在当时省市以上主要领导干部中，还是以红军时期出身的干部为主体的年代，赵紫阳便也是后起之秀了。就是这个后起之秀，一方大员，在那动乱年代的四川，也是困难重重！
　　这时候“文革”武斗的硝烟虽然已经渐渐散去，但是，成都市的大街小巷和机关大院仍旧贴满了大字报，矛头直指周恩来总理和省市主要领导同志。“造反派”仍然随便关押和批斗省市领导干部，四川省仍是极端无政府状态，机关、学校、工厂涣散瘫痪。工农业生产日渐下降，人民生活极端困难，连在四川最普通的辣椒粉也要凭票供应。
　　紫阳同志刚刚来到四川，他的两位主要助手，省委书记段君毅和赵苍碧，立刻被“造反派”绑架关押起来。这可以说是对刚到四川的紫阳同志当头一棒。
　　“文化大革命”争斗的核心问题，是谋权夺位。半路来了个赵紫阳，官高位重，出现了一道谋权夺位障碍，自然成了四川各路造反派“英雄”的众矢之的。一波未平，一波又起。赵紫阳到四川不满一个月，成都市的大街小巷，就出现了反对赵紫阳的巨型横幅标语：
　　“赵紫阳是哪路人马！”
　　“以生产压革命，没有好下场！”
　　“谁反对文化大革命，谁就是死路一条！”
　　面对争权夺位疯狂的四川、面对极端无政府状态的四川、面对工农业生产濒临崩溃的四川，紫阳同志虽然主持工作，实际上也无法运用他手中的权力，想干什么，也干不成。这是他从小参加工作以来，不曾遇到过的难堪局面。
　　他整天忙于应付“造反派”的纠缠，难得安心开会研究问题，难得安心吃一餐晚饭，难得安心睡一夜好觉。他也不知哪天突然会被“造反派”关押起来。经过战争磨练的人，不怕关押，不怕受苦，不怕折磨。怕的是因他而造成更大的混乱，怕的是他在四川一事无成，有负于四川人民！
二
　　一天傍晚，我刚吃过晚饭，接到省委办公厅的电话：“今天晚上，紫阳同志请你和他一起出去。”据我所知，全省上下，包括驾驶员在内，都亲切地称呼赵紫阳为紫阳同志。
　　“有什么事情吗？”在那个动乱的年代，省委是经常在晚上开会的。
　　“我们也不知道什么事情，紫阳同志要你准备好洗漱用品晚上十点在家里等他。”这时候我已经完全明白了，紫阳是要约我一起住到金牛坝招待所去。当年，紫阳同志曾多次约我住到远离市区的这个招待所去，目的是为了避开造反派的干扰。
　　金牛坝招待所是四川省委的一个小招待所。四川人将川西平原称为川西坝子，作为对平原的爱称。许多地方，也将本乡本村的一块平坦的地方，爱称为坪坝。金牛坝更不是一般的坪坝，传说在夜晚时候，有人见过一条金牛，金光闪烁，在这里的田间奔跑。这个故事，反映了当地人民对于美好生活的向往，对于富裕农村的憧憬。
　　金牛坝招待所是毛主席曾经住过的地方，各路造反派的“英雄”，一时还不敢骚扰。当晚，脱离了“文化大革命”的噪音，紫阳和我都睡了一夜好觉。
　　第二天中午，当紫阳同志和我步入食堂的时候，只听见服务员大声地喊叫：“吃干饭的首长，请坐到右边，吃面食的首长，请坐到左边！”
　　听到服务员这样喊叫，我和紫阳同志都不约而同地笑了起来。紫阳同志当然也很明白“吃干饭”的意思，他风趣幽默又轻声地对我说：
　　“我们都是吃干饭的，走，吃干饭去。”
　　又是一个深夜，紫阳同志没有和我预约，就来到了我的家里。他见到了我，拉住我的手说：“到你家来坐坐。”
　　这时正是全国人民哀悼周恩来总理的时候，窃夺中央领导地位的野心家竟然制造清华大学的所谓反击右倾翻案风的新闻，叫嚷要把“文化大革命”进行到底。
　　紫阳同志用手擦了一下沾满雾气的眼镜，心情沉重地说：“看样子还要乱一阵子哩！”“再乱下去，四川受害，全国人民受苦。”“再乱下去，还是什么事情也办不成。”
　　紫阳同志摇了摇头继续说道：“你还记得吗，金牛坝招待所的服务员，叫喊我们吃饭的时候，说是吃干饭的首长坐在右边，我当时就说，我们是吃干饭的首长，坐到右边去了。什么事情都干不成，当然就是吃干饭的了。”
　　他继续说道：“最近我是反复想过了，困守在成都，整天应付那些麻烦事情，一事无成，还不如到农村去走走，也许可能发现一些问题，解决一些问题，做一点对人民有益的事情。”
　　“你这个主意太好了，我也想跟你一起走，行吗？”
　　“好啊，就这样说定了，我们一起走。你就等电话通知吧。”他学着半像半不像的四川腔音，又含有浓厚的他家乡韵味，高兴地对我这样说。
　　这天晚上，他在我家里一直谈到十二点以后，才悄悄地离开。紫阳和我的谈话内容，在当时是绝对违禁的。要是泄露出去，我们都会被扣上“反革命”的帽子，锒铛入狱。在“反革命”这三个字之前，还可能要加当时的流行用词，就是“‘走资派’还在走”，“策划于密室”，妄图“点火于基层”的罪名。
三
　　1976年的一天上午，紫阳同志乘了一辆白色小型的面包车，连驾驶员在内可以乘坐七人。我上车以后，看到车上有紫阳同志和他的秘书、驾驶员三人。我和紫阳同志一起出行，但是，我不是他的随员，紫阳也没有把我看做是他的随员。我是一个新闻记者，我有我的新闻采访工作任务。
　　他每到一地，从来不准地方党政机关派人迎送，实际上是微服私访。他常常是到了一个地方，直接插入田间地头与广大农民、基层干部交谈，了解他们的心声和想法。紫阳同志的所作所为使我强烈地感觉到他是一个善于联系群众的人，处处为群众着想的优秀领导干部。
　　紫阳同志这次出行，一共走了十多个县市，到过绵阳、广元、绵竹、西充、广安、南充、郎中等地。他每到一地，就直接访问当地基层干部和农民，和他们一起走到田间地头，亲切交谈，了解情况。
　　他在成都平原的水田地区，听到当地农民说：
　　“三三见九，不如二五一十”。
　　紫阳参加革命工作以来，长期做县委书记和地委书记，对农村情况相当熟悉，后来担任中共省委和中央局的领导工作，他仍然经常到基层去，不仅了解农村和农业生产情况，而且对农民怀有深厚的情感。现在他到四川农村，听到了农民提出的问题，其实他心里早就十分明白农民所提这些问题的内容，但是另一方面有鉴于当时还在“文化大革命”期间，正在追究他是“哪路人马”的时候，他不便于明白表示反对学大寨种植双季稻的意见，这就是领导干部乱时谋改革的难处，他还得徉作饶有兴味地问道：
　　“你们说的是什么意思？”
　　当地农民告诉他，这几年来，上级号召农业学大寨，要推广种植双季稻，再种一季小麦。双季稻加一季小麦，就是一年种三季。可是，这样做并不高产，每季平均亩产三百斤，就是说“三三见九”。如果只种两季，每亩稻子可产五百多斤，每亩小麦也可产到五多百斤，这就是“二五一十”。种两季比种三季庄稼，多产一百斤，这样一算，就是“三三见九，不如二五一十”了。
　　紫阳同志继续亲切地问道：
　　“种三季的工本怎么样呢？”
　　当地农民说：“种三季的人力和肥料，至少也要增加五分之一。为了种三季庄稼，必须抢季节，争时间，起早摸黑，忙得昏头昏脑，鸡飞狗跳。如果能够多种多收，多花点劳力和肥料，我们农民不在乎，可是，现在是多种多亏多吃苦。”他们看了一眼紫阳同志，继续说道：“看样子，你这位同志像是外地人，我们没有顾虑，说句实在话，要我们学大寨，越学越穷，这种事情，谁愿意干呢！表面上大家天天上工，实际上大家天天磨洋工！”
　　成都平原是四川主要产粮区，紫阳同志深知成都平原水温低，日照少，不能因为要学大寨就强行推广种植双季稻。他又向农民问道：“三三见九，不如二五一十。这笔账，你们自己已经算得清清楚楚了。为什么不改过来呢？”
　　在场的基层干部和农民，几乎是异口同声地说：“不行啊！”
　　“为什么不行呢？”
　　基层干部说：
　　“上级号召我们学大寨，推广双季稻，要是改过来，不种双季稻，上级要批评我们是倒退了。”
　　“中国农民真好啊，他们相信中国共产党，党叫干什么就干什么。可是我们不能滥用人民对我们的信任，不切实际地要求农民种双季稻，伤害了人民的积极性。一定要实事求是，尊重人民的首创精神。”我想紫阳同志的内心一定是这样想的。
　　紫阳同志坚定而委婉地对大家说：
　　“学大寨，是学大寨的精神，就是要苦干实干，努力增产粮食。可是大寨并没有种双季稻，也没有种三季庄稼。成都平原多阴雨天气，日照不足，灌溉用水的温度较低，可能不适合种植双季稻。你们已经有了实践经验，三三见九，不如二五一十。我看，不管是种两季，还是种三季，只要能够增产粮食就好。粮食增产了，用事实来说话，你们的底气就足了。”
　　“请问你贵姓？”生产队的干部，感到刚才这位领导干部的言谈，说到农民心坎上了，但是他们还不知道，这位领导干部是谁，能不能依着他的意思去做，表现出有点不安。
　　紫阳同志的秘书笑着回答说：
　　“他是赵紫阳同志，是我们省上任不久的省委书记。”
　　“紫阳同志，你刚才讲的太好了，这样我们的手脚就放开了，今年就依着你说的来做。”
四
　　紫阳同志还走访了几个山区的农村，因为紫阳同志长期关注农村工作，对发展农业生产很有经验，发现了山区农民学大寨，不讲具体条件，不从实际出发，只管深翻土地的情况。他说：
　　“深翻土地，也要因地制宜。在土层厚的地方，可以深翻，也应该深翻，有利于保墒，有利于农作物的生长。但是也不是越深越好，要看种植什么庄稼，水稻和小麦，根须长度差不多，深翻四五寸左右就可以了，翻得太深了，把生土翻上来，也不利于庄稼生长，还浪费了劳动力。”
　　有的农民问：“种玉米呢？”
　　“种玉米，就要翻得深一点，因为玉米的根又粗又长，杆子也高，土地就要翻得深一点，玉米才能充分吸收营养和水分，杆子也才能站立得稳，不易倒伏。”
　　有的农民问：“要是种红薯呢？”
　　“种红薯也要深翻土地，因为红薯生长在地下，薯块大，深沟高垅，薯块在土里才能伸展开来，才能丰收。”
　　“像我们这个山区，要不要深翻土地呢？”
　　“这要看土层深浅，土层浅的不能深翻。如果深翻，那就会造成水土流失，粮食反而要减产了。”紫阳同志想了一想又说：“你们提的这些问题，其实你们都懂。你们都是种地的能人里手，哪有不懂这些道理的呢！我刚才说的这些道理，也都是从农民朋友那里学来的。”和他一起蹲在田埂上的干部和农民，听他这么说，几乎一起轰然笑了起来。
　　紫阳同志继续说道：
　　“从你们的笑声里，可以听得出来，我说你们是种地的能人里手，说对了吧！可是你们懂得的问题，为什么又偏要在这里提出来呢？”
　　生产队干部压低了声音，吞吞吐吐地说：
　　“上级号召我们学大寨，有一项要求，就是深翻土地，我们能不做吗！”
　　紫阳同志叹了口气说：
　　“学大寨，是学大寨的苦干实干精神，可是大寨人并没有说，在你们这里怎样深翻土地。从今以后，翻不翻地，怎样翻地，翻深翻浅，都由你们这些种地的人做主，一定要把大家的积极性调动起来，努力增产粮食。你们看，这样行不行！”
　　大家异口同声地说：“行！”
　　这是在场的基层干部的回答，也是千百万农民的回答。
　　走访中，紫阳同志听到最多的是自留地的问题。一般地区的农民，由于“共产风”的不良影响，对于耕作集体所有的土地，缺乏积极性，但是，他们把自留地看做是命根子，千方百计冲破极左思潮的障碍，还是要把自留地种好的。紫阳看到当地农民自留地种得不好，其中的原因，他也是十分清楚的。就是在“文化大革命”中，极左思潮被推到了顶点，把农民的这一点自留地，看做是资本主义尾巴，强迫农民把资本主义尾巴割掉，把自留地收归集体所有，农民流着眼泪，忍痛把自留地也抛荒了。这种情况完全是“人祸”！
　　紫阳同志说：“中央多次发布的关于农村工作的文件，都说农民要有自留地，这些文件并没有收回，就说明文件中的有关规定仍然有效。再说自留地，大多是门前地，门前地都是最好的地，也是耕作最方便的地，应该种好。”
　　“对，对，对！这位同志说得对，既然是门前地，就不是尾巴地，应该种好。”这个农民的话又引起了一阵轰然大笑。
　　在那个年代，别说是农民，谁也搞不清什么是资本主义，什么是社会主义，都是跟着起哄。紫阳同志不便直说割资本主义尾巴不对，就用了个“门前地”的名字，而农民就把“门前地”与“尾巴地”对立起来说了，虽然不通，却很生动有趣。
　　当地的干部农民，见到气氛活跃，又有人说：
　　“我们这里还有一户人家单干，也受到了批判。对是不对呢？”
　　“你们说说，这户人家是个什么情况呢？”
　　“这户人家单门独户，一家孤零零地住在一个山凹里，距离我们生产队（村庄）三里多路，他不愿意来回走路，不到生产队来劳动，他就单干了。”
　　“是呀，那么远的路，怎么能叫人家到你们这里来，参加集体生产劳动呢，既耽误了劳动时间，也浪费了劳动力，人家单干有人家的具体情况。如果人家增产了，生产队就要派人去调查研究，总结人家的经验；如果人家单干，生产不如你们，他就会自愿跑来，要求参加你们的生产队；他高兴，你们也高兴。我看你们生产队，如果人数太多，都挤在一块地里劳动，也不方便，也可分成若干小组，便于管理，也有利于提高劳动效率，各组之间还可以开展劳动竞赛。你们看这个办法好不好？”
　　紫阳同志关于农村工作的意愿已经这样明白表示出来了。在场的基层干部和农民连连齐声回应说：
　　“好，好，好！”
五
　　1976年8月15日至16日，四川省松潘地区发生三次七级以上的强烈地震，造成了人民群众的生命财产的严重损失。距离地震中心数百公里的成都市，也有明显的震感。紫阳同志连夜召开省委常委会议，布置了抗震救灾工作。省委紧急布置抗震救灾工作的消息，第二天就在成都市传播开来，可大街上却贴满了造反派们刷写的“反对用抗震救灾压革命”的大字报。紫阳同志心系灾区，心系农村，他不顾喧嚣的杂音干扰，第二天一大早就奔赴松潘地震灾区。
　　在地震中心地区，紫阳同志深入到一户农家观察。四级左右的余震发生了，他立即藏到身边一个木制的桌子底下，屋顶上残存的瓦片，叮叮当当地塌落下来，因为有桌子挡着，他才没有被瓦片砸着。他兴奋地对我说：
　　“刚才我说的情景，可以说是我在地震灾区亲身经历的故事。在地震灾区，要告诉广大人民，利用一切可以利用的空间，作为应急的藏身之处，是个可以减少伤亡的好办法。我在地震灾区发生的故事，现在还只可对你讲讲而已，不可对外言传。否则，不知又要制造出什么流言蜚语来了。”
　　我理解地说：
　　“我知道，那天在省委开会，讨论抗震救灾，突然来了较大的余震，会上有几个一向坚持‘以革命为中心’，而反对在灾区以抗震救灾为中心的所谓‘英雄’，狼狈逃跑了。现在，要是听说你在地震灾区，藏在桌子底下的故事，犹如捞到了救命稻草，定会攻击你是贪生怕死。我向你保证，现在绝对不会说出去。不过若干年以后，我要是说出去，可能就是一段脍炙人口的美谈哩！”
　　紫阳说：“后来的事情由后人评说罢。”
六
　　我真正听到“要吃米找万里，要吃粮找紫阳”这个民谣，是我在1980年从四川省调到北京新华通讯总社以后。当我一听到这个全国人民都盛传的民谣时，打心眼里为紫阳同志高兴。他在“文革”动乱的年代，曾经深入农村，半公开地进行调查研究，为了改善农民生活，直接向农民宣传他自己关于农业生产的意见。早在“文革”前他与陶铸在广东省就试验过“包产到组”，宣扬过“包产到组”的好处。因此在“文化大革命”终结以后，他自然地也可以说是顺理成章地执行中共十一届三中全会的关于改革开放的指导思想，与安徽省一起，在四川省大力推行类似“包产到户”的政策，使四川省农业生产迅速得到了恢复。
　　紫阳同志向来反对和厌恶那种道听途说、人云亦云的思想作风，在“文革”那个特殊的历史年代，在极为困难的条件下，他坚持实事求是的思想路线，始终怀着对人民群众的深厚感情，尊重他们的首创精神，从实际出发，敢于改革，在广大农村改革的早春时节，唱响了广为流传的音韵。“要吃粮找紫阳”的民谣，也是人民对紫阳的最为美好的赞誉！
　　2008年7月26日，写于北京皇亭子
　　（作者孙振，1942年16岁时加入中共，曾任新华社党组成员、摄影部主任）
（责任编辑　杜导正）

[Posted by Emma Lupano, November 22, 2008, 9:45am]

By David Bandurski — At first glance, Control 2.0 seems to herald a more open-handed approach to news and information in China, promising rapid coverage of sudden-breaking news events. But it has worked with growing effectiveness this year as an open hand that deals a back-handed slap to the news, and that sends international media spinning into orbit. [Frontpage image by cbcastro available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]
What we consume from Xinhua News Agency and the usual suspects (People’s Daily, local party newspapers, etc.) in the immediate aftermath of sudden-breaking news events, or tufa shijian (突发事件), is pretty much the best we can expect in China. And the same goes for international coverage.
The basic point you can glean from coverage so far of the Longnan riots, whatever the source, is that we are all, thanks to the party’s more active approach to shaping news coverage, consuming and transmitting the same “authoritative” CCP facts.
We are tops spinning in place.
When news of the incident in Longnan broke on Tuesday, it was from three official sources:

1. An article in the official Gansu Daily
2. An official Xinhua News Agency release [English version here]
3. An official statement from the news office of the Longnan City People’s Government

Here are all three of these sources as they appeared online Tuesday afternoon.

The Gansu Daily version was actually on the front page of the print newspaper, what one might under other circumstances have seen as a welcome sign of change.
In the past, what we’ve generally seen are embarrassing local stories pushed to the back or avoided altogether in local party dailies, while coverage comes predominately from commercial newspapers in other cities or provinces.
If you insist on seeing the glass as half full, you can cite this as one of your reasons for optimism.
Anyhow, the Gansu Daily story read:

“Mass Petition Incident Occurs in Longnan City’s Wudu District”
Gansu Daily reporting. At approximately 9am on November 17, more than 30 residents facing eviction and relocation in Dongjiang Township, Wudu District, Longnan City, gathered at the office of the party committee to voice [their views] on the problem of the relocation of Longnan’s administrative center.
The party committee and relevant departments quickly received their petitions. As the petitioners would not be satisfied, the mass of onlookers continued to grow, reaching as many as 2,000 people. In the early hours of November 18, a number of petitioners attacked the offices of the party committee and other government offices, causing damage to vehicles and other office facilities. By 2am [on the 18th] most of the masses gathered had already left.
After receiving a report [on the incident], the provincial party committee and provincial government had given the case a high level of priority. At 5pm on November 17, Party Secretary Lu Hao (陆浩) and Governor Xu Shousheng (徐守盛) issued their instructions. In the early hours of November 18, Lu Hao called an urgent meeting to carry out special research on the Longnan Mass Petitioning Incident (陇南群体性上访事件), seeking opinion on disposal [of the crisis] and demanding that the Longnan Party Committee and the city government take measures to quickly bring the situation under control, ensuring social stability and securing the smooth resumption of post-quake reconstruction efforts.

While Gansu Daily‘s version of the story led meager print coverage of the story on November 18, including in the Legal Mirror and Shenzhen Evening News, the Xinhua News Agency version dominated coverage on the Internet, where we saw reports from:

*Phoenix Online [CHINESE]
*Reuters news agency [CHINESE] (adding material from the Longnan city government statement)
*UPI [ENGLISH]
*CNN Website [ENGLISH] (Xinhua version + a few Chinese chatroom comments)
*AFP [ENGLISH]

Like the CNN website, the AFP version frosted what was basically a Xinhua report with a brief reference to Chinese internet posts and a couple of paragraphs of background:

The official state media did not offer further details on the dispute, but government-backed land grabs, often in collusion with developers, have become one of China’s most sensitive social issues . . .
Gansu neighbours Sichuan province, which was at the epicentre of the May 12 earthquake that left up to 88,000 people dead or missing.

It is no surprise, of course, to see international newswires relying largely on Xinhua for these initial news reports. Even if they do have the resources to dispatch reporters to the scene, this takes time.
In a report late Wednesday, the strongest foreign wire report of the day, the AFP reached three additional sources by phone, including a party employee, a hotel receptionist and an unnamed local policeman. Reuters coverage on Wednesday supplemented official facts with quotes from a “hotel worker” and from a foreign risk analyst in Beijing (not related to Longnan).
None of the foreign wire reports available differed substantially from the official story.
The most notable coverage of the Longnan story on Tuesday came from Caijing Online, the now fairly autonomous online edition of the leading current affairs magazine Caijing.

Caijing led with a map infographic of Longnan from the original Gansu Daily report, and supplemented facts from Gansu Daily and the Longnan government statement with background material on the recent history of urban development in Longnan, probably drawn from prior news coverage and other material in the public domain:

After the re-drawing of [city] districts in 2004, Longnan City used many means to intensify local development. One important measure was a strategy (“东扩西进、南北贯通”战略) for Wudu District, which involved a decision to develop the Dongjiang New District on the foundation of Wudu District’s Dongjiang Township (东江镇). After this, residents in Dongjiang Township were faced with a wide-scale land requisition campaign, and the majority of residents have lived ever since in transitional demolition and relocation quarters waiting to move into resettlement homes.
Beginning in March 2008, there was news that the city’s administrative center would be moved . . . and this made the residents of Wudu District uneasy. They were concerned that once they had lost the advantages of an administrative center, the overall development of Wudu would be impacted. The news that the administrative center would be relocated created an even bigger stir in Dongjiang Township, where residents worried that relocating the administrative center would mean related developments would cease, including preparation for their resettlement homes, and that the issues of land and subsistence would not be resolved for them. With these concerns, they went through many different means and channels to voice their opposition to the relocation of the administrative center.
On this matter, the Longnan city government on a number of occasions held meetings to say that the removal of the administrative center was a rumor, that “the party committee and the government have no intention of relocating” and that their “determination to build a bright new city in Wudu had not changed …”

Caijing‘s own augmentation of the official version of events actually influenced coverage at two newspapers the next day [See top of list below]. Here’s a taste of where coverage was being sourced at the fifty-odd party and commercial newspapers that ran the story on Wednesday.

Chongqing Morning Post (Sources material from Caijing Online and Gansu Daily)
Southern Metropolis Daily (Sources material from Caijing Online and Gansu Daily)
Shenzhen News (Sources material from Xinhua News Agency via People’s Daily Online)
The Beijing News (Sources material from Gansu Daily and “other sources,” basically Xinhua)
Changsha Evening News (Sources material from Xinhua but rewrites lead to focus on “a few people with ulterior motives”)
Jinan Daily (Uses shortened version of the Xinhua report)
Beijing Times (Uses Gansu Daily version)

[ABOVE: Page A14 of Wednesday’s Southern Metropolis Daily runs state media coverage of riots in Longnan plus some Caijing Online material.]

[ABOVE: Page 11 of Wednesday’s Chongqing Evening Post with coverage of the Longnan riots from the official Gansu Daily.]

The two papers using some Caijing Online material were a rare but notable exception to what was otherwise exclusively official information. All other reports were sourced from Xinhua News Agency, Gansu Daily and the Longnan government’s official statement.
A smattering of editorials on the Internet reflected on the Longnan incident, some pointing the finger at the local government.
The AFP noted one People’s Daily Online editorial in its Wednesday report, with the misleading suggestion that this was “an unusual move apparently aimed at placating the protesters.” It was not. And reporters are warned against assuming material at People’s Daily Online have even an iota of the gravitas of articles appearing in People’s Daily, the official party mouthpiece.
The most strongly worded editorial, in fact, came from CN Hubei, and was available by late Tuesday night:

Water is a soft and yielding substance, but stir it up and it surges with unimaginable power. That is why the ancients said: “As water can float a vessel, so can it capsize it.” Ordinary people are the water, and the government is the boat, and if the vessel and the water cannot exist in harmony then the result is difficult to predict, and ghastly to contemplate. We have as our best examples a number of dynasties with strong soldiers and sturdy horses that were overthrown by ordinary people. We have some officials who don’t understand this most elementary of principles, who treat the ordinary people as weak and amenable water. This is bound to raise the ire of the masses, creating conflict, destroying the goodwill between the party and the masses, between cadres and the masses, and impacting the development of harmony and the economy. Should these profound lessons not alarm us and cause us to reflect more deeply?
Gansu Daily reported on November 18: at November 17 at around 9am, more than 30 residents facing demolition and removal [from their residences] gathered to petition in Dongjiang Township (东江镇) of Wudu District (武都区) in Longnan City (陇南市), expressing [their opposition] regarding the relocation of Longnan’s administrative center (行政中心). The office of the party secretary and relevant government offices moved quickly to hear their petitions, but those petitioning were not to be discouraged and the crowd of onlookers continued to grow, reaching as many as 2,000 people. In the early morning hours of November 18, a number of petitioners assaulted the administrative building of the local party committee, damaging a number of vehicles and some office equipment. The area had already been mostly deserted by 2am.
Our Great Leader Mao Zedong once said: “In this world there is no such thing as love without reason, nor hate without reason.” Most ordinary Chinese are the kind of people who see lightning and fear that their ears will be shaken, who fear for their heads when leaves drop from the trees . . . Sometimes, all it takes is a fart from an official to send them running for the hills. This time around, when they’ve actually eaten bear heart and panther gall, daring to attack the office of the party secretary and destroy vehicles, exchanging their cotton trousers for leather ones — there must be a reason. Dogs leap the wall when they’re desperate, and rabbits gnash their teeth. These ordinary people once had houses to live in, but after demolition and removal [of these properties], the compensation they have received doesn’t enable them to buy homes. Tell me, how could they not petition?

Chinese news coverage today (Thursday, November 20) is again dominated by Xinhua News Agency and Gansu Daily. Thirty print news articles and three editorials are returned in our database of 300+ mainland newspapers with a search on “Longnan” and “incident” (陇南 and 事件).
Here are some examples:

Information Times (Xinhua release)
Shijiazhuang Daily (Xinhua release)
Sichuan Legal Daily (Xinhua release)
Tianjin Daily (Xinhua release)
Xin’an Evening News (Xinhua release)
Hainan Daily (Xinhua release)
Legal Daily (Bylines a compilation of official news sources, mostly from Gansu provincial level)
Shanghai Morning Post (Xinhua release)
Chongqing Morning Post (Xinhua, China News Service and China National Radio)
Harbin Daily (Xinhua release)
Spring City Evening Post (Xinhua and China News Service)
The Beijing News (Xinhua and other official sources)
Wuhan Evening Post (Xinhua release)

Official coverage is obviously everywhere today. But lest readers of English feel left out of the party message, here is the Xinhua version for international consumption from China Daily:

Police departments must standardize procedures for law enforcement and build harmonious relations with the people, the country’s top public security official said on Tuesday.
Speaking at a teleconference with local police heads, State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu said police should “be fully aware of the challenge brought by the global financial crisis and try their best to maintain social stability” . . .
Meng’s comments come in the wake of a clash between protestors and police in Longnan, Gansu province.
On Monday, thousands of people, angered by a property dispute, stormed the city’s Party headquarters, smashing windows, burning cars, and injuring more than 60 government workers and police, a statement from the local government said yesterday.
The situation is now “under control”, it said.
The Xinhua News Agency reported yesterday that the protesters have left the site and order has been restored . . .

Or, if you prefer the Gansu Daily version, you can read a mouthful about how order has been restored, how leaders are doing their utmost, and how everything is just, well, hunky-dory — except for those nasty petitioners “with ulterior motives”:

Things returned to normal on November 19 after a mass incident in which the office of the party committee was attacked. During the reporter’s interviews today, cadres and the masses all expressed their desire for stability and harmonious development, and their earnest hope for the quick rebuilding of their homes damaged during the earthquake [in May].
At 9am on November 19, most shops along the streets of Wudu District had opened their doors for business. People came and went on the street outside the gate to the offices of the Longnan Party Committee . . . [See Southern Metropolis Daily eyewitness refutation of this last statment below.]
One cadre said: “Our Longnan has just recently suffered seriously from the earthquake disaster, and it is one of the areas affected most seriously. After the earthquake happened, the party and the government cared very much about the disaster area, and everyone in the throughout the nation and the province did their utmost to support the area, providing the Longnan disaster area with materials and financial support. Now the rebuilding plan for the Longnan District has already been set down, and work has begun already for many projects. The work of rebuilding in the disaster area is going forward urgently, and during a time like this it is very bad to have such an incident as this [riot] occur. This not only affects the normal operation of society, but also affects the work of rebuilding after the disaster. The masses in the disaster area do not approve of such behavior . . .

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Gansu Daily November 20 coverage of Longnan via China.com]

Another key component of Xinhua coverage today is the news that Gansu Party Secretary Lu Hao (陆浩) said during a November 18 meeting with top provincial leaders that officials needed to “reflect back deeply” (深刻反思) on the Longnan incident to ensure a “harmonious and stable environment for economic and social development.”

Gansu Party Secretary Lu Hao said to cadres from various offices of the party and government that [all] needed to reflect back deeply on this mass incident, earnestly seeking its lessons . . . using effective measures to quickly handle social contradictions of various kinds and to create a harmonious and stable environment for economic and social development.

We can only assume on the basis of coverage at present that Lu Hao’s call for “reflection,” or fansi (反思), was not read as an invitation to more independent-minded non-party newspapers to look more deeply into the Longnan incident.
But is there really no news coverage that wanders away from the sanitized state version?
We find the one lone Chinese example in print today in the only place it would probably occur to most China watchers to look for it: Southern Metropolis Daily.

Most of the key facts in the Southern Metropolis Daily report are taken from official sources, including Xinhua and Gansu Daily. But the reporter is apparently on the scene, and the news report is sprinkled with direct observation, including an account that directly contradicts the Gansu Daily report that has people “coming and going” outside the party committee headquarters:

Yesterday, this reporter visited the site at the offices of the party committee where the incident occured and saw that the area was already under lockdown, with police positioned at both ends of the street. According to information this reporter obtained from the police, things will return to normal once order has been restored to key stretches of road and arterial roads . . .
. . . In a television report explaining the [Longnan] incident on the local Wudu TV this reporter saw a spokesperson for the city government of Longnan emphasizing that police had been order not to use weapons in conficts with the masses . . .
. . . Hearing rumors from the public that the city would be under curfew beginning at 10pm, this reporter learned from a dispatcher at the 110 emergency service number that a curfew was not in effect for the city. However [the dispatch said], the police have advised city residents “to go out seldomly at night if they have no business, and to do things as normal if they have business.”

We’ll have to keep an eye out over the next few days to see if Southern Metropolis Daily‘s reporter on the ground — or anyone else — digs up anything interesting.
So far, though, it seems that Control 2.0 is working quite effectively. And that rings true whether you’re reading Harbin Daily or the Las Vegas Sun.
FURTHER READING:
“China at last tries to report the news first,” Reuters, November 20, 2008 [A “writ” from propaganda authorities? Sure, this was it.]
[Posted by David Bandurski, November 20, 2008, 4:32pm HK]

By Emma Lupano — As the internet has grown rapidly in China in recent years, there has been an attendant upsurge in cases where ordinary citizens (公民), or “netizens” (网民), are arrested, jailed or otherwise punished for things they dared to write. The latest case to have Web users up in arms involves the alleged sacking of a substitute professor at Hubei University for Nationalities after the teacher wrote an entry on his personal weblog criticizing the school’s anniversary celebrations. [Frontpage photo by Amy Pony available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The case, involving 50 year-old teacher Guo Guanglin (郭广林), has drawn a flurry of coverage in the commercial media over the last week, and it has once again resurrected that age-old term denoting the violent repression of speech — “to incur guilt by one’s words,” or wenziyu (文字狱).
In Chinese, the three-character phrase has great economy of meaning. Packed inside is the basic notion, very much a reality during China’s dynastic past, that one could incur guilt simply by virtue of inferences the emperor and his associates might make from one’s writings. Guilt, in other words, could be read between the lines.
“To incur guilt by one’s words” is now an increasingly popular buzzword denoting official action taken against ordinary citizens who speak their minds in spaces — like blogs, chatrooms and SMS messages — where the line between the personal and the public is blurred. But the term can also be used to point generally to more egregious examples of censorship.
A related and more direct phrase in Chinese is “incurring guilt by one’s words,” or yin yan huo zui (因言获罪).
A decision by China’s General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) in early 2007 to ban eight books was vigorously attacked by journalists, scholars and others, and “wenziyu” was tossed around. The incident was highly embarrasing for GAPP’s man-in-charge, Wu Shulin (邬书林). [Click here for Wu Shulin’s comments on the ban from the SCMP via Danwei.org].
One of the most classic “wenziyu” cases in recent years was the arrest in 2006 of government worker Qin Zhongfei (秦中飞), who wrote a satirical poem about local leaders in Chongqing and distributed it by SMS to personal friends. The case is often referred to now as the “Pengshui SMS case.”
The first Chinese newspaper to run with the story of substitute professor Guo Guanglin was Hebei’s commercial Chutian Metropolis Daily (楚天都市报). In a page four story on November 7, the paper reported that Guo was dismissed after writing a post on his personal weblog in which he criticized the way Hubei University for Nationalities had managed a celebration of the school’s 70th anniversary.

The Chutian Metropolis Daily story said that on October 9, when Guo was still under the employment of Hubei University for Nationalities, he made a blog post called something like, “Dubious, Unclear and Superficial” (不明不白、不三不四、不痛不痒), in which he said essentially that the anniversary ceremony had veered from its purpose and served only as a narrow money-making ploy. “Seeing it made people sick,” Guo allegedly wrote. 
As soon as the post hit the Web, other blogs and websites began republishing it, often giving it conspicuous placement, according to Chutian Metropolis Daily. The post also drew waves of comments from web users.
Guo was subsequently dismissed by the school, and the Chutian Metropolis Daily report quoted him saying he believed he had been dismissed because university officials were unhappy with his post.
Earlier this week, CMP fellow Zhang Ming, himself a well-known Chinese blogger, wrote an editorial for Southern Metropolis Daily in which he criticized the Guo Guanglin case, relating it to the Pengshui SMS case, what he called “incurring guilt through SMS” (手机短信文字狱).
An outspoken critic of China’s higher education system, Zhang Ming also condemns the habitual subordination of university professors to school officials. He expresses the hope that more people will stand up and say “unpleasantries” (不中听的话): “But to be perfectily honest, if we had more of these death-seekers [who speak unpleasantries] in our universities we could at the very least lessen the pace of their decline,” he said.

[ABOVE: Zhang Ming’s editorial on the Guo Guanglin case and “wenziyu” at Southern Metropolis Daily, November 10, 2008.]

“Once Again, Guilt by Blog” (又见博客文字狱)
The idea that one can incur guilt by one’s words is something all emperors relish. As we know from our history books, the Chinese empire as an institution ended with the Xinhai Revolution back in 1911. And yet, emperors in disguise, particularly local despots, have never as a race disappeared. In the information age, we’ve seen case after case of guilt incurred by SMS . . . and now we have guilt by blog (博客文字狱). A substitute teacher at Hubei University for Nationalities was sacked recently for criticizing on his own blog the overwrought luxury of a ceremony held in honor of the school’s anniversary.
Last year, when I criticized the chief of a school on my personal weblog, many friends told me I was fortunate not to have been sacked after my post created such a big stir. Actually, I had mentally prepared myself at the time for dismissal. Had the school sacked me, I feel certain they would have found a proper pretext, just like these other instances of guilt by SMS. Even though they didn’t dismiss me, I know the school and related departments were very unhappy with my exposure of the institution’s darker side.
Officials are only human, and they like hearing pleasantries. If something negative happens one day in their own courtyard, their first instinct is to stave off reporters, afraid that their dark secrets will be revealed to the outside world . . . Whoever the leader, they all talk about how opinions should be expressed through the proper channels. But what if you do voice [your opinions] through the proper channels? Speaking from my own personal experience I can say that this is as worthless as dropping a stone into the sea, except that if you do things badly it can have the exact opposite effect. As soon as you make a report, the guy on the receiving end of the criticism knows it, and because leaders at the top tend to trust leaders at the middle, you’re the one who has to go fleeing for the hills like a bandit.
Compared with the stir I caused last year, this professor from Hubei University for Nationalities caused no harm and revealed nothing untoward. And still the school’s leaders were unhappy. An anniversary is an occassion when school leaders flaunt their achievements. You can pass by not flattering them, but saying ugly things, now how is that acceptable? And so this teacher of ours can only head down the road of dismissal.
Cases like this of incurring guilt by words at a university has to make us ask ourselves: what kind of places are our universities? Are they yamen‘s like these county-level bureaucracies, where we see cases of “SMS wenziyu” happening all the time? What kind of relationship do university teachers have to the leaders who control them at various levels? Is it a simple hierarchical relationship [like that in the official bureaucracy]? In other words, can we say that professors are subordinate and department heads and school officials their superiors? In my opinion, according to the past norms and international practice, professors should not be subordinate to school managers.
But this personal opinion is regarded in Chinese universities as anathema. Without exception, school officials believe professors are their subordinates no matter how knowledgeable they may be, or how strong their connections are. Actually, I believe the vast majority of professors think this way too. This is to say, within universities the relationships between the professor and the department head, the department head and the colleage head, the college head and the school president, is like those between lower-level county government functionaries and department heads, department heads and the party secretary — relationships of superiors to subordinates. Separated by professors with so many levels of bureaucracy, school leaders already regard it as a mark of respect, of regarding your expertise, that they do not see you as a mere slave.
Regardless of how resentful we feel, we have to admit that incurring guilt for one’s words, no matter what the form, is understandable within the government bureaucracy. In circumstances when there is such a storm in a government department, (where) power implies everything, which means that if you have the power you can control even the words of your people, (to speak) unpleasant words does not mean to take risks? To tell the truth, if in our universities there were a little more people taking risks like this, then at least the decline of our university would slow down. In such vertical hierarchies of officialdom, power means everything. Isn’t it like asking for death to speak curses or unpleasantries about the person who controls you? But to be perfectily honest, if we had more of these death-seekers in our universities we could at the very least lessen the pace of their decline.

[Posted by Emma Lupano, November 13, 2008, 4:14pm HK]