By David Bandurski — As China’s poison milk scandal refused to slip into the past this weekend, Wen Jiabao promised a strong new approach to food safety issues. Addressing the Asia-Europe summit meeting on Saturday, Wen said China was pushing through a food safety law that would prohibit addition of harmful chemicals in foods and empower the government to “ban the sale of and recall unsafe food products if companies fail to do so voluntarily after products are found to be contaminated.” [Frontpage image by Darren Hester available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
The new law, it seems, cannot come quickly enough.
China’s latest melamine-tainted food incident — this time affecting chicken eggs and related products — has quietly emerged over the past ten days. Even as it is beleaguered with recalls from three neighboring economies, however, China’s largest egg products manufacturer, Dalian Hanwei Enterprise Group, has failed to announce its own recalls or to explain publicly what action it is taking.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Han Wei profile available at Dalian Hanwei’s official website.]

As Wen Jiabao’s tough talk at the Saturday summit was relayed by media inside and outside China authorities in Hong Kong announced that chicken eggs imported from China were contaminated with melamine, the chemical at the center of the recent dairy scandal. Hong Kong, which hypothesized that melamine contamination might have stemmed from chicken feed, said it would expand testing to include meat products.
But so far, China’s government has responded to problems in the egg products industry with resounding silence, even while these problems point potentially to more widespread melamine contamination.
This was not the first hint of trouble. Japan’s Yomiuri Shinbun reported back on October 17 that importer Mitsui & Co. had found melamine in egg powder imported from China. And South Korea destroyed 23 tons of Chinese egg products on October 22 after detecting excessive levels of the chemical. In both cases, tainted egg products were slated for use, or were used, in a variety of downstream food products, including baked goods.
But neither the Japanese nor the South Korean recalls were reported in China, and so far coverage of Hong Kong’s announcement in China’s media is sparse, pointing to possible propaganda directions on reporting (we are in the process of checking with sources).
The prize for timely and comprehensive reporting goes to the online edition of Caijing magazine, which reported the full story yesterday and mentioned other product recalls in Japan and Taiwan.
The first and only print media to report yesterday on Hong Kong’s testing of melamine-tainted eggs were Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily and Yangcheng Evening News, both commercial newspapers. Unlike the Caijing online report, neither story named Dalian Hanwei, the Chinese conglomerate whose products are at the center of recalls in Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong.
This important omission was all too reminiscent of the early stages of the milk powder scandal, in which Sanlu Group, the company most directly implicated, was spared mention.
Southern Metropolis Daily did report yesterday, however, that the eggs were produced in Dalian.

[PG11 of the October 26 edition of the Shenzhen city section of Southern Metropolis Daily, article on eggs at top.]

According to our database search, thirty local commercial newspapers reported today on the discovery in Hong Kong of melamine-tainted eggs from the mainland. Nearly all of the reports were sourced from either Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News, Southern Metropolis Daily or Guangzhou Daily, but only sixteen mentioned Dalian Hanwei by name.
Only two brief news reports based on Hong Kong sources appear in provincial or national party media today, but neither make mention of Dalian Hanwei. These are from Nanfang Daily, the official party mouthpiece of top leaders in Guangdong, and from the online site of the official Xinhua News Agency.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Hong Kong egg recall coverage at the Xinhua News Agency website.]

It is worth nothing, however, that Nanfang Daily gave the story reasonably prominent positioning on the front page:

Guangzhou Daily, one of China’s more commercially oriented party dailies, reported more extensively on Hong Kong’s recall today, mentioning Dalian Hanwei by name. Other commercial papers, including Shanghai’s Oriental Daily, ran the Guangzhou Daily version.
It is interesting to note that while Shenzhen-based QQ.com promoted the story of the Hong Kong announcement to the top of its news page today and gave it the most prominent headline, like this . . .

. . . Beijing-based Sina.com and Sohu.com gave the story slightly less emphasis.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Sina.com.cn news page at 4:35pm, October 27, 2008]

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Sohu.com news page at 4:45pm, October 27, 2008]

Reports in China’s media today could mean the story is beginning to stick, and that a response from the government and/or Dalian Hanwei is forthcoming. Certainly, the news in commercial media and on Web portals today should be enough to get Chinese consumers thinking: Hey, what’s being done about this?
Comments on the news at QQ.com are worth a browse for readers of Chinese.
But the situation is also eerily reminiscent so far of last month’s milk powder scandal, in which the powerful Sanlu Group was initially shielded from scrutiny. More critically, again, there is no indication from the government about what is being done to address consumer safety on this issue.
It is also worth noting a number of further reasons why this latest turn in China’s ongoing food scandal is particularly of interest.
1. The announcements from Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong point to deeper contamination of food products in China, impacting entire production chains.
2. As this article from the recent issue of Study Times affirms, Hu Jintao pledged back on April 2008 that China would “raise the effectiveness of news, reporting at the first available moment” and “increase the transparency of news reporting, not covering up public incidents” (公共事件). What exactly was the first available moment here? News of contaminated eggs goes back at least to October 17, but there has not yet been an official statement and a handul of commercial media (with rare exceptions) are taking the lead only today in regurgitating Hong Kong news.
3. Han Wei, the founder of Dalian Hanwei, is an influential political player (a CPPCC delegate and vice-chairman of the Dalian Federation of Industry and Commerce) and is widely regarded as an inspirational entrepreneur and a role model in the push for rural development. In May this year, Han Wei addressed a United Nations panel on sustainable development. Han is arguably a much better connected individual than the top dogs at Sanlu Group were pre-scandal.
Han Wei has been called China’s “king of hens.” Here he is back in June 2005 talking with China International Radio about his “Ge Ge Da” brand of chicken eggs and what makes them the “finest quality possible”:

We really do a lot to ensure the eggs’ quality. The most important thing is to monitor the quality during the entire process from the ground to the dinner table. First the feed we buy must be healthy, without any harmful additives.

4. Some of the problem products in question were apparently manufactured by Dalian Hanwei Food Co. Ltd, a joint venture between Dalian Hanwei and Denmark’s Sanovo, although this needs to be confirmed. Reports from RRT News and Reuters suggest the joint venture is the source of problem products. So far, however, Sanovo has not responded to recalls in Asia. [More on the joint venture from the Dalian government website].
5. Eggs were actively touted and actively consumed by many Chinese as a safe alternative source of nutrition for adults and children during the recent milk scandal. Check out articles making dietary recommendations like this one, this one (graf six), and this one from Peoples Daily Online, recommending an egg a day.
FURTHER SOURCES:
“Premier says China to ensure safe food,” Associated Press, October 26, 2008
“Hong Kong tests more China food after egg scare,” Associated Press, October 26, 2008
“Premier says China to ensure safe food,” AP via MSNBC, October 26, 2008
Caijing online reporting on melamine contaminated eggs, October 26, 2008
“Good Mountains, Good Water, Good Eggs,” Hexun (Chinese), August 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 27, 2008, 2:53pm]

By David Bandurski — It’s been more than two weeks since Shanxi Daily, the official party mouthpiece of top leaders in the northern province, reported that the mayor of one of its largest cities had given out 960,000 personal namecards in an effort to address work safety issues. But the reports and editorials continue to fly in what has become yet another opportunity to discuss how China’s leaders can and should be responsive to the needs and views of the people.
The story began with a news report printed on the front page of Shanxi Daily on October 4, not on October 5 as the official Xinhua News Agency suggested yesterday.

[ABOVE: Front page of the October 4, 2008, edition of Shanxi Daily, story about Changzhi’s mayor circled at bottom.]

The Shanxi Daily story, which ran at many of China’s top news portals, reported that leaders in the city of Changzhi had “printed and distributed” 960,000 “special” namecards bearing the phone numbers of the mayor and party secretary.
The article quoted one astonished city resident as exclaiming: “Never did it occur to me that now we would be able to call the party secretary and the mayor directly to let them know what’s going on.”
The news met with varied responses from internet users, ranging from the skeptical . . .

“Oh, this is all just about face!”
“I’m not so sure. This needs to be verified.”

. . . to the abrasively curious . . .

“How much did the cards cost, and who’s paying for them?”

. . . to the downright nasty . . .

“Who will answer the phone? His cute little secretary, or his mistress?”

But some actually saw the move as more than an empty gesture, saying the city’s leaders were being open and proactive in the face of urgent work safety problems that have plagued the province. A number of public administration scholars in Beijing reportedly dubbed the action “Changzhi’s New Deal” (长治新政).
Xinhua reported that by October 21, Google searches of the phrase “Changzhi/960,000 namecards” (长治96万张名片) turned up more than 126,000 results. That search comes back with about 130,000 results today, whatever that signifies.
Suffice to say, the Changzhi namecard story has been the focus of some interesting discussion about how leaders can be more responsive to the public in resolving various social and political issues — and how the people should participate, not forgetting Hu Jintao’s words to the 17th National Congress about “protecting the people’s right to know, participate, express and supervise” (保障人民的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权).
It is also worth nothing that internet users have been circulating a purported “notice” from party leaders in Changzhi saying the 960,000 figure reported by Shanxi Daily was incorrect, and that only 96 namecards were distributed. Xinhua claims to have debunked this story. They report confirming with someone at the party’s office in Changzhi that they had indeed distributed 960,000 cards, “10,000 to officers of the Public Security Bureau, 50,000 to coal miners, 100,000 to city residents and their families, and 800,000 to families in the countryside.”
According to Xinhua’s calculation, that means there is now one official namecard for every 3.4 people in the city.
But is this really a “New Deal” for the people of Changzhi?
In today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, blogger and columnist Wu Yue San Ren (五岳散人) offers his own perspective on the namecard story.

“If the mayor morphs into an octopus he’ll still be swamped”
The mayor of Shanxi’s Changzhi City (长治市) publicized his own telephone number, and says he printed 960,000 copies of his personal namecard to distribute to city residents, so that they can inform him of hidden production safety issues. As soon as word got out, this became a red-hot focus in the news. Many praised the action for placing the focus on the popular voice, and some went so far as to call it “Changzhi’s New Deal” (长治新政). But there are many reasons for taking issue with his actions, and my reasons are very simple: even if leaders morph into octopi they cannot possibly answer every phone call, so this gesture is worthless.
Here’s what I’m thinking. A place as big as Changzhi is most certainly going to see countless problems, and even if you went through the days without eating or sleeping you couldn’t possibly answer all of those calls. So in the end this phone number is entirely for show. You think, perhaps, that the mayor is manning the phones? Even if he grew eight hands he couldn’t answer them all. And if he has a secretary answering calls on his behalf, how is this any different from listening to the daily reports that reach his desk? These are all materials that have gone through a vetting process. The mayor . . . cannot by such means ensure his city is well-governed. He must be a good city manager, and his responsibility is to delegate specific tasks to others, not to go himself and sweep the streets clean.
As an outsider, of course, I can’t simply dismiss this as an act of image building (形象工程), nor can I say the gesture is entirely without meaning. It’s just that to call this some kind of “New Deal” is just too unrealistic. All of these “opinion boxes” and “mayor’s hotlines”, and these “mayor’s mailboxes” we’ve made such a fuss about on the Web — what is it they are missing? If changing fixed opinion boxes and fixed telephone lines into mobile numbers is a “New Deal,” then just look at how simple it is to turn over a new leaf politically.
This so-called “New Deal” in fact exposes two old problems. The first is that no matter what the problem, it has to be voiced at the very top before anything can be done to resolve it or give it attention. We live in a place where what the leader says, goes — in the language of political studies, all decisions must in the end come from the very highest levels. Meanwhile, everyone else in various government departments sends up mixed messages or completely muzzles matters in order to lessen the risk of political decision-making. There are many matters that stand no chance of resolution unless they happen to make it into the hands of those who head up the government. This means that weak leadership and daily negligence continue unabated. And the method of resolution that comes to us now is this “New Deal” that has never ever been new. The new deal is not new, and problems go on as ever . . .
So I won’t dismiss this as a mere act of image building or a “political show” (政治秀), but I’m inclined to think it’s an empty gesture . . . To simply dismiss this as a “political show” or to simply praise it as a “New Deal” is to overlook the most critical point — that when the fundamentals go unchanged, even actions with the best of intentions amount to the mere addressing of symptoms in lieu of a cure.
This whole affair is proof once again of the basic soundness of this principle. All of this publicizing of phone numbers, whether its at the provincial level or the city level, or even phone numbers higher up the ladder, this is about this or that politician doing his little bit to the extent that he can. But as to the results of these efforts, they are dissipated again and again in the fruitless efforts and skepticism of ordinary people . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 23, 2008, 3:41pm]

By David Bandurski — The internet is growing rapidly in China, and it is set increasingly on a collision course with entrenched local party officials who fear the greater scrutiny it brings. There have been many documented examples in recent years, most notably the Chongqing SMS case in 2006 and the Shanxi open letter case last year. [Frontpage image by Marcio Eugenio available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
In yesterday’s edition of Southern Metropolis Daily, blogger Ten Years Chopping Timber analyzed two separate 2008 cases in which local officials handled cases of online “rumor” in different ways with markedly different results:

“When it comes to online gossip, why can’t officials swallow their pride?”
The internet has promoted economic development and and social progress, and it has also wrought trouble for many, in particular public figures (公众人物) such as party officials. Because information on the web travels so quickly, with a complex trajectory, and because it is difficult to trace information to its source, people find it tough to work out what’s real and what’s fake, and damaging rumors can emerge from nowhere. An ancient saying goes, “It must be true what all men say” (三人成虎), and on the internet we’re talking not just about three people spreading gossip, but one hundred or one thousand times that many.
We can’t turn back to the olden days of inscribed bamboo slips or hot-metal typesetting, so how should officials handle gossip, and in particular rumor, that they find disadvantageous? Recently, Wang Weicheng (王伟成), mayor of Changzhou, offered us a very good exemplar. Someone spread gossip on the web saying that Wang’s relatives had used the political power at their disposal to seek personal gain, and they offered some level of detail. Things being as they are, with the public generally doubtful about the moral character of officials, this news was definitely damaging. I don’t doubt that it is within Mayor Wang’s power to mobilize police and begin investigating the case, ferreting out those responsible and arresting them under charges of slander. But this is not how Mayor Wang handled the situation. Instead, he posted his own message as an ordinary web user, writing from Changzhou’s Dragon City Teahouse, and replied to the charges. This response met with widespread approval from web users, and one user writing under the alias “We can get by” said: “I’ll saying nothing for the time being on the merits of his argument, but the situation today being as it is, for this mayor to decide to face questions from web users openly on the web is something that should be supported.”
It is perceptive of Mayor Wang to handle things in this way, because if he were to abuse official power to deal with online gossip it would probably have the opposite result. So long as we’ve had societies, speech and writing, gossip about kings and bureaucrats has never stopped . . .
. . . But when some officials face gossip on the internet . . . they wield their public power as a deterrent. At the beginning of the year a post made the rounds on the internet from a female college student charging a ministerial-level official in Shaanxi of “corruption and lechery” in peremptory tones. My initial feeling on seeing the post was that it wasn’t reliable, because the style was flowery and exaggerated. But many web users readily believed what was said about the official. The local police intervened immediately, opening an official investigation and eventually determining that the post was orchestrated by a local businessman, Zhang Shengli (张胜利). Thereupon, a warrant was put out for the businessman’s arrest, and the highway toll service center he was under contract to run was forcibly taken over. If Zhang Shengli really did seek revenge on this ministerial-level official, slandering him with rumors, then naturally he should bear legal responsibility accordingly. What Mayor Wang said in his post holds true for this ministerial-level official: “The mayor is a person too, and his personal dignity must also be protected under the law.” And he can first refute the online gossip; next, if he believes his personal dignity is being insulted, he can make a report and ask relevant departments to get to the bottom of the case; finally, he can bring a libel suit. Is a high ministerial official unable to condescend to use the internet to combat rumors, or to stand in the role of plaintiff and argue for his own rights? Perhaps this ministerial-level official feels he is above appearing as an ordinary web user or a plaintiff? He is confident, no doubt, that by virtue of his power he has a tougher and more straightforward way of tidying up “rumor mongers.” Nevertheless, using these old methods and lashing back did not have a positive impact on the public relations crisis facing this ministerial-level officials. Quite to the contrary, it fed public feelings that the “rumors” were indeed credible, and the “rumor monger” conversely received widespread public sympathy.
Both this ministerial-level official and Mayor Wang can be considered “old revolutionaries facing new problems,” but the crisis management approaches of the two men are so different, and there is a world of difference too between the results.

UPDATE, 1:53pm:
In today’s edition of The Beijing News, freelance columnist Wu Yue San Ren (五岳散人) offers his own perspective on the internet post by Changzhou Mayor Wang Weicheng:

Having a dialogue with public opinion has always been a kind of top-down process, basically leaders placing opinion boxes outside their doors and saying they are willing to hear opinions. The people write letters and slip them in, but as to whether these ever make it into the government’s hands and whether problems are actually handled, this has to be ensured by specific operational mechanisms.
The emergence of the internet has changed this old method, and exchanges have now become more direct and interactive.
Now it is entirely possible for politicians to voice their own opinions at the first opportunity, and for ordinary people to face their computer screens and speak their minds. Everyone can put their views out there, and everyone can decide on the merits of the case. In the past we always dealt with matters secretly, but if we build habits and mechanisms for dialogue, the old “black box” way of doing things will fall away naturally.
But there is another reason I feel respect for this [Changzhou] mayor. As the reader knows, there have been numerous cases in recent years of web users questioning officials in text messages or in chat rooms, but these officials responded not by explanation and interaction but rather by arresting those involved and charging them with “rumor and slander.” These responses exacerbated matters and damaged the reputations of the local governments involved. Here we have the same sort of situation, and while this mayor has similarly raised accusations of “rumor and slander,” he has chosen to deal with the situation without resorting to strong-arm tactics, instead using his own right to free expression.
What is positive about the mayor responding with his own web post is that the internet is already increasingly becoming a channel for public expression, and if this channel comes to include interaction with officials it could truly become a platform promoting equal dialogue, discussion and participation in state affairs.

FURTHER READING:
“Their Own Worst Enemy,” by James Fallows, The Atlantic
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 21, 2008, 12:03am HK]

By David Bandurski — The Beijing government has implemented new regulations requiring all first-time visitors to any of the city’s more than 1,500 internet bars to have their pictures taken and their ID cards scanned on site, according to a report by The Beijing News earlier this week. The regulations require that all internet bars be installed with registration terminals by the end of this year. [Frontpage Image: Inside a Chinese internet bar, by NewChengdu available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
According to the report, city residents will be required to stand before government-issued image terminals before being cleared to go online, and their photographs and scanned ID cards will be sent instantly to a monitoring platform at the Beijing Cultural Law Enforcement Agency, where the information will be stored.
But never fear. The Beijing News reassures us that the entire process will take just 30 seconds.
The newspaper quoted Li Fei (李菲), a spokesperson for the Beijing Cultural Law Enforcement Agency, as saying the policy was aimed at preventing “ID sharing” (一证多用). The monitoring platform will allow enforcement officials to target any terminal at any internet bar in the city to compare the user with registered information.
Writing about the new regulations on Friday, a columnist at China Youth Daily raised concerns they might leave web users “entirely naked,” exposing their private information and correspondence to enforcement officials.
Portions of the China Youth Daily editorial follow:

In recent years, clampdowns on Beijing’s “black internet bars,” the decrease in the number of accidents in internet bars and regulations on the industry have all stemmed from this kind of high-pressure control from enforcement bodies. It’s only that while ordinary people like this writer enjoy the peace and order the comes with this high-pressure control, we must also give up the freedom and convenience of online rights we once enjoyed. As one web user said, taking pictures of web users in this way, and scanning their IDs, means internet bars are no different from airports — only in airports what people are looking for is security, but in internet bars people are looking for a piece of freedom and comfort.
And now they are installing a monitoring system. And now they are storing photographs and personal information. According to reports, this is all in order to better prevent “ID sharing.” Because “in the monitoring center, personnel will be able to target any terminal at any internet bar in the city to compare the user with registered information.” But in this monitoring system that renders users “naked,” how will the freedom and privacy of citizens using the internet be protected? The Beijing Cultural Law Enforcement Agency reassures us that these controls end with the enforcement team’s monitoring platform, and that we “have no need to be concerned about the leaking of personal information.” But aside from worrying that personal information might be leaked to others, we also worry that the freedom of our online communication and the privacy of our conversations will be betrayed by public power. Under this platform of “monitoring of any terminal at any internet bar in the city,” won’t monitoring mean that enforcement officials will have the right or the opportunity to view our chat histories? Can they not read our private correspondence at will? Won’t any and all online behavior fall under the eyes of the enforcement officials? If this is the case, then all web users really are “entirely naked,” if only before a limited number of enforcement personnel.
The “fear is often greater than the danger,” but in consideration of citizens’ rights, there is always a need to be sufficiently alert to intrusions by public power. Overseas, even when urgent necessities bring new restrictions on personal liberties these tend to meet with great public skepticism. This was true of the U.S. Patriot Act passed after the 911 attacks . . . Even though it arose from the urgent need to respond to terrorism, this law still drew fierce opposition from various quarters of society from the first day it was issued, and it particularly raised concerns among the public that the government might invade the privacy of citizens. Shouldn’t our enforcement and regulatory authorities think carefully about whether it is truly necessary to carry out such monitoring on every web user in internet bars?

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 19, 2008, 12:14am]

By Liu Jiaying and David Bandurski — Journalists in China already face countless challenges as they try to push the limits on news and editorial coverage — a rigorous system of press controls from the top, lateral pressure and intimidation from local governments, commercial pressures and dwindling resources for investigative reporting, the ever-present risk of libel in a savage judicial environment. The list goes on and on.
But a series of crucial events this year, including unrest in Tibet and China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games, revealed an emerging challenge for journalists in China: the rise of “new nationalism,” or xin guojia zhuyi (新国家主义).
“New nationalism” and its impact on journalism in China was the topic of a talk on October 13 by CMP fellow Xiao Shu, an editorial writer for Southern Weekend newspaper and the author of several books, including The Truth About Liu Wencai.

[ABOVE: Senior Straits Times journalist Ching Cheong addresses a question to CMP fellow Xiao Shu at this week’s talk.]

“2008 was a peculiar year, which saw iconic commercial media like Southern Weekend plagued with attacks from new nationalism,” Xiao told a packed audience at the university’s Foundation Chamber. “The situation grew serious.”
The talk, “‘New Nationalism’ and China’s Media,” was hosted by the China Media Project of the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, where Xiao is currently a visiting fellow.
The “attacks” to which Xiao referred were criticisms launched on China’s internet and in its mainstream press this year against influential commercial newspapers that have become associated with a more independent brand of journalism in China even as state media controls persist. Southern Weekend and Southern Metropolis Daily, newspapers published in the comparatively open environment of China’s southern Guangdong province, are notable examples.
As Xiao explained, China’s “commercial” newspapers date back to the economic reform push of the early 1990s, and are a unique product of China’s old command system and economic and social change.
In other places in the world it is only natural for media to be private, and there is nothing at all exceptional about commercially driven media. But in China media operate under a dual system (双轨制), said Xiao, in which a powerful planned system is wedded with commercial forces. While Southern Weekend, for example, is “commercial” in the sense that it must support itself and fight for survival in the media marketplace, it is controlled and managed by a Communist Party newspaper, Nanfang Daily.
When the process of media commercialization began, the government’s primary impetus was to “remove fiscal burdens,” said Xiao. At the time, all media were state supported.
But commercial media also offered new opportunities for professional journalists who sought a more active role for media outside its traditional role as a “mouthpiece” of the party. Over time, said Xiao, commercial media began taking on a much more important role, preparing China’s transition to a civil society. Unlike the party papers — the traditional “mouthpieces” — from which they emanated, commercial newspapers increasingly became the voice of the people, reporting key public interest stories and relaying issues of popular concern to the leadership.
While China’s commercial media today are far from a Fourth Estate, they bear a social responsibility that is “weightier and more complex,” said Xiao.
“The commercial media have become an avenue of redress. They have become the engine pulling China’s civil society along,” he said.
Xiao cited the 2003 Sun Zhigang case and the 2007 Chongqing nail house as examples of commercial media driving news coverage and promoting change in public policy.
Commercial media have played an crucial role, said Xiao, in “wedging out a new public space in the cracks of personal rights” and pushing limited participation in public dialogue on a range of issues. And this has given citizens an important opportunity to learn how to discuss public affairs in a civil manner, to “become accustomed to debate.”
“Right now, online debate in our country takes the form of attack, because we have not yet had proper training and experience in the debate process,” Xiao said.
But as a younger generation emerges in China with a sense of entitlement and national pride, they are increasingly battling against more liberal voices in China’s media that push for social and political reform. Younger and more educated Chinese, those who have benefitted most from reforms, often resist change to the status quo, and often stridently.
This “new nationalism,” said Xiao, differs from its predecessor, a nationalism promoted by the Communist Party leadership under comprehensive state control. While young Chinese appreciate and benefit from changes in Chinese society, of which commercial media are an important part, they have come to resent calls for more liberal or universal values, such as freedom of speech and democracy, issued by bolder commercial media.
This year this “new nationalism” turned on commercial media with a new vengeance, said Xiao. This could be seen most readily in the controversy surrounding an April 3 essay by columnist Chang Ping (长平), “How To Find Out the Truth About Lhasa,” in which the Nandu Weekly deputy editor turned Chinese reasoning about bias on Tibet in the Western media on what he saw as unfair Chinese coverage.
Chang was branded a traitor by angry internet users, who also turned their anger on Nandu Weekly publisher Southern Metropolis Daily, a newspaper regarded by some as the leading proponent of “Western” ideas at the expense of China’s core interests.
The Chang Ping controversy, which others have called a “war on the liberal media,” put strong pressure on commercial media under the Nanfang Daily Group, including Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend, despite the fact that the controversial Chang Ping column had been written for the Chinese-language website of the Financial Times.
As Southern Metropolis Daily buckled under the weight of public opinion, news came that Chang Ping had been removed as deputy editor of Nandu Weekly. While this news was never substantiated — Chang remains with the publication and writes actively today — it reflected the very real pressure this current of “new nationalism” brought to bear not just on Chang’s views on Tibet, but on Southern Metropolis Daily and other commercial media as vehicles for more liberal debate on such issues.
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 17, 2008, 2:15pm HK]

By David Bandurski — CMP raised questions last week about China’s handling of the toxic milk scandal after hints emerged in a handful of Chinese media that products with production dates before September 14 (the date the scandal surrounding Sanlu Group broke) were still on store shelves and were being pushed with aggressive sales campaigns. China finally announced yesterday that it has ordered a nationwide recall of all dairy products manufactured before this date. [Front page photo by Muffet available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]
Portions of today’s report from AFP follow:

China has urgently ordered all dairy products more than a month old to be pulled from shop shelves nationwide in its latest step to end a scandal over contaminated milk, state press reported Wednesday.
All dairy products made before September 14 will have to be tested for the industrial chemical melamine that has been responsible for killing four babies and leaving more than 53,000 others sick, Xinhua news agency said.
It was citing an “urgent notice” jointly issued by six central government departments, although there was no explanation as to why the dairy products were not immediately recalled when the scandal broke last month.
The notice was not published on the websites of those government departments, which included the health ministry, on Wednesday.

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 15, 2008, 9:58pm]

By David Bandurski — When it comes to responsible global behavior on poverty alleviation, development assistance, resource conservation and environmental protection, China tops the charts. That is, according to a recent report from the government’s own scientific research institution, the Chinese Academy of Sciences. But China’s number one ranking is not the real shocker. Are you sitting down? When the academy puzzled out its “national responsibility” rankings, part of its first so-called National Health Report (国家健康报告), the United States came in dead last.
Briefly, Chinese readers at China Elections and Governance wrote:

User wwuuio99:
This research report is just as much nonsense as those of the Mao era, when the ruling party taught us daily that two-thirds of the world population were living in extreme misery and that we Chinese were the most prosperous in the world. This is once again a set of emperor’s new clothes made especially for the ruling party.
zwb0919:
When all of the words circulating in a nation are fake, you can guess what level of credibility rankings have?
XJHSY:
Science cannot just raise viewpoints that go against universal knowledge. It has to back them up with proof and reasoning. Otherwise, these people who go against universal knowledge, if they “have viewpoints but not arguments,” are just charlatans, just like with this Chinese Academy of Sciences report.

Writing over the weekend about this gem of a scientific study, columnist Chang Ping — who drew harsh criticism earlier this year for his more even-handed views on unrest in Tibet — picked apart the report’s problematic use in its rankings of the Chinese word “guojia” (国家), which could translate as “country,” “nation,” “land” or “state.”
A full translation of Chang Ping’s editorial follows:

What exactly is a guojia?
By Chang Ping
The Chinese Academy of Science has released its National Health Report, and I hear it’s “the first [of its kind] in the world.” I think this is not only a first but also an original. It is original not only in its topic, but also in its methods of research. On the index of global “responsible nations” in the report, China is listed at the top and the United States comes in dead last. That result has floored a lot of people. Many people want to know what exactly this big result on “national responsibility” for China means.
As a rule, the concepts used in academic research must be applied consistently from beginning to end. I have not yet seen the original text of the Chinese Academy of Science report, but it is apparent from news reports that the concept of the “nation” (guojia, 国家) is applied rather vaguely. China News Service relays the report’s definition of “national responsibility” as: “In the age of globalization, a nation must take on responsibility not only for the subsistence, development, safety, health, prosperity and sustainable development of its citizens, but must at the same time the nation must, as a member of the international community, bear responsibility for the safety, health, prosperity and sustainable development of all of humanity. The two of these aspects together constitute national responsibility.” On first hearing, this seems to be well thought out. But those who observe carefully will note that the former and latter uses of “nation” are not consistent. The first refers to the national government, and is identical to the English word “government.” The second refers to a community that encompasses the citizenry, territory and state system, what is expressed in English with the words “country” or “nation.”
Before I came across this news, I had been in my own slump of sorts. Before the National Holiday editors at Southern Weekend had asked me to explore a set of questions: “What have you done for your guojia? What has your guojia done for you? What more can your guojia do for you?” I felt I had no answers because I had no clear idea what these various guojia’s” pointed to. Subsequently, I discovered answers to this questionnaire by professor Ding Xueliang (丁学良) and I was again faced with these questions. On his blog, he wrote: “The concept of the guojia (国家) gives rises to four different words in English: state, country, land and nation. The differences between these are not readily discernible in Chinese. The word ‘country’ focuses on territory and the people while the word ‘state’ refers primarily to state political power.” As professor Ding answered each question [posed by Southern Weekend] he was specific in each case about his definition of guojia (国家).
Actually, this concept is often used vaguely. This has already resulted in messy thinking, and even constituted an ideological snare. Some people, for example, say things like: “The guojia has raised you, and you have the nerve to grumble about the guojia.” This sounds reasonable at first, until you realize that these two guojia‘s are different concepts. The first one points to those people who live on this piece of land. The second one refers to a specific government organization.
When the students of “May 4th” accused the Duan Qirui (段祺瑞) government of selling out the nation, the nation (guo/国) they were speaking of was clearly not the government but the interests of the citizens. We call them the “patriotic youth” (爱国青年) because they opposed authorities who did not represent the interests of the people.
The fact that this word guojia can be stuffed with so many meanings makes the exchange of ideas difficult. Not only in English, but even in ancient Chinese these concepts were much clearer. In the pre-Qin period (先秦), the character for “country”, guo (国), meant country, and the character for family, jia (家), meant family. The combined use of “country” and “family” is a product of the integration of family-country in Confucianism. Even so, the term guojia referred more to “the world” (天下) and less to royal power. And so the emperors always had to consider how they could “keep the world at peace and benefit the people” (安国家而利人民).
When we say this word guojia today we refer mostly to political power and the government, what is denoted in English political philosophy as the state. I’m guessing that in the Chinese Academy of Sciences report the term guojia also principally has this meaning. Of course, even if we limit it to this concept [of the guojia], “national responsibility” remains a very difficult thing to calculate. As a propaganda slogan, this term “national responsibility” can be used. But for academic research and as a basis for ranking, it is not a very scientific concept. Let me give you an example. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, America’s Hoover administration employed a policy of noninterference, which exacerbated matters. After Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president, his New Deal was an opposite policy of economic intervention that led America out of the shadows. Can you say which of these policies represents America’s “national responsibility”? The same is true in China. If you look before and after reform and opening, many policies are radically different. Before, there were only nationalized factories. Now, there are private industries. Before, work units allocated housing. Now, people purchase their own homes. Before, we could only watch the “eight official dramas” (八个样板戏). Now, we can watch Hollywood blockbusters . . . So what does this “national responsibility” at the Chinese Academy of Sciences point to?
Rigorously speaking, we can only discuss the responsibility of a number of specific government administrations or eras. While policies can have historical continuity — the current financial crisis, for example, is an extreme result of the 1980s conservatism of Thatcher and Reagan, itself a reaction to the development to extremes of Keynesian economics after Roosevelt’s New Deal — every administration can have its own very different approaches to the indicators studied by the Chinese Academy of Science, such as arms reduction, the elimination of poverty, development assistance, resource conservation and environmental protection. Is the Chinese Academy of Science relying on the policies of the current administration [in America]? If that is the case, it should be explained that this is a bottom ranking of the “Bush government” and not “America,” but that would amount to free propaganda for Barack Obama, which I suppose does not accord with the academy’s intentions. So instead they use this fuzzy concept of the guojia.

FURTHER READING:
“What have you done for your country?“, ESWN, October 4, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 13, 2008, 12:01am]

By David Bandurski — Given state propaganda controls, hard-hitting coverage of the melamine-tainted milk scandal is now impossible for China’s media. But facts lurking in reports from a handful of Chinese newspapers in recent days beg serious questions about the government’s handling of a scandal China’s leaders want very much to put behind them.
Specifically, there are indications that dairy companies and retailers are now employing aggressive sales promotion campaigns to offload products manufactured in the months before the scandal came to light — products that could be harmful despite government reassurances.

[ABOVE: The October 9, 2008, issue of Nanfang Daily includes coverage of widespread sales campaigns for dairy products in China.]

A report in Thursday’s Information Times newspaper said Mengniu and Yili, two dairy companies at the center of the tainted milk scandal, were pulling ice cream from store shelves in Guangzhou this week. As the report points out, Hong Kong announced back on September 18 that it had found high levels of melamine contamination in eight of thirty products tested from Yili Industrial Group.
What was Hong Kong’s response? First off, the SAR recalled all Yili products, not just those eight types that tested positive for contamination. Here is the rest of the response as reported by the BBC:

“I call on the public not to consume any products of this brand,” said Constance Chan, controller for the territory’s Food Safety Centre.
She added that the government had asked Yili to stop supplying products to Hong Kong.

The Information Times report suggests — although it cannot state so explicitly — that even now, almost a month after the scandal broke, dangerous products are still on shelves in Guangzhou.
The report also lets us now that when Yili ice creams finally were “pulled from shelves” (下架) in Guangzhou this week, they were not being “recalled” (召回) for quality concerns. Instead, Yili representatives told the Information Times, the products were being pulled because the company was carrying out a comprehensive “re-labeling” campaign.
An unnamed “industry insider” speculated to the newspaper that the Mengniu and Yili products were in fact being pulled as a result of the test results announced in Hong Kong. If that is true, why has it taken so long to remove the products? And why, again, are the companies the one’s taking the initiative?
China’s leaders are reassuring the public that milk products are now safe. What does that mean, specifically?
It means that new dairy products — those manufactured after September 14 — are safe, as indicated in this Xinhua story.
That sounds great. But how is it that not ALL products possibly contaminated with melamine have been systemically removed from store shelves across China?
This question looms large between the lines of the Information Daily report, which also describes the aggressive sales campaigns retail chains in Guangzhou are using to get rid of milk products manufactured before the all-important date of September 14.
After describing city-wide retail campaigns slashing prices on dairy products by around 25 percent and offering everything from “buy one case get one free” to “buy one case get three free,” the Information Daily reporters use the voice of a consumer to deliver a key fact:

Even as dairy companies are determined to find a market with strong sales campaigns, the reporter noticed that perhaps no one pulled out money to actually buy. In the space of ten minutes, the reporter saw eight different customers drawn by the “big sale.” But after they looked carefully they lowered their heads and walked away. A Ms. Wu said angrily to the reporter: “These liquid milks were manufactured in July and August, before they even found melamine. Who would buy that? No wonder they’re so cheap!”

For related news on sales campaigns for major milk brands, readers can turn also to this Thursday report from Guangdong’s Nanfang Daily, which quotes one expert as saying the government must be strict in its examination of dairy inventories that are coming out of store rooms after weeks of dismal sales.
Given the practical limitations of product testing and the fact that problems are known to have been widespread (thousands of milk collection stations across China were suspected of contamination), it is impossible for the government to suggest that products on shelves are safe in lieu of effective recalls.
Responding to the Information Times story on QQ.com, Web users expressed anger and frustration:

From 119.141.42:
Putting problem milk out there on sale. Ha! “Meng”niu is right! [“Meng”, “蒙”, is a synonym for “cheat”]. But it seems you can’t cheat those you’d like.
From Shenzhen:
I went to the supermarket to look for myself, and most of the milk products are from before September. And they say nothing contains melamine now. Who would believe that?
From Hezhou City:
Mengniu still has the nerve to say it’s “changing out its packaging.” Mengniu, Mengniu, you cheated once and still you’re still going strong.
From Guangzhou:
If Hong Kong hadn’t discovered problems in its inspections, I don’t think you [companies] would ever have come clean!
From Shanghai:
These products are just now being recalled? Didn’t Hong Kong find problems with them earlier?
From 65.185.139.*:
Look at how much time has passed, and still they talk about “urgently” [removing these products].
From Guangzhou:
Over the last week in Guangzhou, on North Guangzhou Avenue (Meihua Garden) [广州大道北(梅花园)], there’s been a store holding a huge sale on problem milk!! Mengniu, Sanlu are all on sale. This store is called Happy Purchase (乐购).
From 58.62.97.*:
I want Yili, Mengniu and all the rest to go bankrupt! I’m staunchly against them!
From Shenzhen:
I suppose you could buy it for bathing, or for washing your feet.

UPDATE (October 14, 2008):
“China recalls all dairy products over one month old: state press,” AFP, October 14, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, October 11, 2008, 12:01am]

By David Bandurski — CMP wrote last week about how a toxic media environment in China contributed to the melamine-tainted milk powder scandal that continues to ripple across the globe. And in Tuesday’s edition of The Wall Street Journal Asia, I argued that the milk powder scandal underscored the fact that China’s press controls are a global problem. [Frontpage image: package label for milk powder manufactured by Sanlu Group, a company at the center of the scandal in China’s dairy industry.]
There are clearly limits to how far China’s media can run in exploring the cover up of the dairy industry scandal and the media’s own share of the responsibility. No media can be expected to discuss directly the role of press controls, or the strict climate of “positive propaganda” enforced in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics.
However, a number of Chinese media continue to discuss more vaguely the question of “media conscience” and the role of corporate public relations in the milk powder scandal.
One of the best examples yesterday came from Hunan’s Shaoxiang Chengbao. The column, featured on page two, is written by Meng Bo (孟波), and is called “N-number of Ways the Media’s Conscience Can Be Bought.”
The editorial likens the way public relations and the pursuit of profit have generally poisoned China’s news media to the dangerous use of the chemical melamine in the manufacture of milk products.
Is it time to coin a new catch phrase for China’s uniquely toxic combination of power, profit and public relations in the media? . . . How about “melamedia”?
Key portions of the Shaoxiang Chengbao editorial are included below:

Pulitzer once said: “A journalist is the lookout on the bridge of the ship of state.” This lookout, however, is routinely blindfolded.
[NOTE: The remainder of Pulitzer’s quote goes: “He notes the passing sail, the little things of interest that dot the horizon in fine weather. He reports the drifting castaway whom the ship can save. He peers through fog and storm to give warning of dangers ahead. He is not thinking of his wages or of the profits of his owners. He is there to watch over the safety and the welfare of the people who trust him.”]
The blinding of the media is customarily achieved by the forcing on of blindfolds through political power. But another way is [for the media] to be bought by power. The Nandan and Fanzhi mining disasters are classic cases in point.
The Sanlu milk powder case once again revealed the sale of the media’s conscience, and a new form of blindfolding. On September 12, a post called “Suggestions on Sanlu Group’s Public Relations Crisis” (三鹿集团危机公关建议) made the rounds on the Web. According to the post, the public relations firm representing Sanlu Group recommended that the company sign a three million yuan advertising deal with [search engine] Baidu and arrange for the deletion of negative news. Baidu has since issued a statement saying they rejected the proposal by Sanlu’s public relations company, and that they have not suppressed search results.
Actually, “news deletion” is just one of many “unspoken rules” in the selling out of the media’s conscience to public relations firms. Beneath this tip of the iceberg is a vast continental shelf [of dirty deals] that would meet with public disapproval.
The most commonly seen form of selling out is the sale of soft content. The genius of soft content lies in this word “soft.” It is like a needle hidden in softness, there but concealed, an invisible menace. By the time you’ve realized it is a piece of soft content you’ve already fallen into the well-laid trap of this “soft advertisement.” It seeks to make an impact by constantly impinging on your attention, like a soft but permeating rain.
Soft advertisements are often buried within the news, and at times are indistinguishable. Because they have broken the boundaries between news and advertising, readers feel they can readily trust them . . .
This “peaceful evolution” of public relations into news is getting worse and worse. The “news safety” (新闻安全) resulting from this “peaceful evolution” of the media is more frightful even than “food safety.” The impact it has on the conscience of the media is more poisonous even than “melamine.” “Melamine” constitutes an open threat, and it can be more easily avoided. But the “melamine” that poisons our news is hidden, and therefore much harder to avoid.
The widespread use of “melamine” in China’s news has resulted in some media in the loss of even the most rudimentary notions of truth and fairness. As media competition intensifies, the exchange between news and money has already become a conscious choice for some media . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 9, 2008, 1:21am HK]