By David Bandurski — CMP wrote last week about how a toxic media environment in China contributed to the melamine-tainted milk powder scandal that continues to ripple across the globe. And in Tuesday’s edition of The Wall Street Journal Asia, I argued that the milk powder scandal underscored the fact that China’s press controls are a global problem. [Frontpage image: package label for milk powder manufactured by Sanlu Group, a company at the center of the scandal in China’s dairy industry.]
There are clearly limits to how far China’s media can run in exploring the cover up of the dairy industry scandal and the media’s own share of the responsibility. No media can be expected to discuss directly the role of press controls, or the strict climate of “positive propaganda” enforced in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics.
However, a number of Chinese media continue to discuss more vaguely the question of “media conscience” and the role of corporate public relations in the milk powder scandal.
One of the best examples yesterday came from Hunan’s Shaoxiang Chengbao. The column, featured on page two, is written by Meng Bo (孟波), and is called “N-number of Ways the Media’s Conscience Can Be Bought.”
The editorial likens the way public relations and the pursuit of profit have generally poisoned China’s news media to the dangerous use of the chemical melamine in the manufacture of milk products.
Is it time to coin a new catch phrase for China’s uniquely toxic combination of power, profit and public relations in the media? . . . How about “melamedia”?
Key portions of the Shaoxiang Chengbao editorial are included below:

Pulitzer once said: “A journalist is the lookout on the bridge of the ship of state.” This lookout, however, is routinely blindfolded.
[NOTE: The remainder of Pulitzer’s quote goes: “He notes the passing sail, the little things of interest that dot the horizon in fine weather. He reports the drifting castaway whom the ship can save. He peers through fog and storm to give warning of dangers ahead. He is not thinking of his wages or of the profits of his owners. He is there to watch over the safety and the welfare of the people who trust him.”]
The blinding of the media is customarily achieved by the forcing on of blindfolds through political power. But another way is [for the media] to be bought by power. The Nandan and Fanzhi mining disasters are classic cases in point.
The Sanlu milk powder case once again revealed the sale of the media’s conscience, and a new form of blindfolding. On September 12, a post called “Suggestions on Sanlu Group’s Public Relations Crisis” (三鹿集团危机公关建议) made the rounds on the Web. According to the post, the public relations firm representing Sanlu Group recommended that the company sign a three million yuan advertising deal with [search engine] Baidu and arrange for the deletion of negative news. Baidu has since issued a statement saying they rejected the proposal by Sanlu’s public relations company, and that they have not suppressed search results.
Actually, “news deletion” is just one of many “unspoken rules” in the selling out of the media’s conscience to public relations firms. Beneath this tip of the iceberg is a vast continental shelf [of dirty deals] that would meet with public disapproval.
The most commonly seen form of selling out is the sale of soft content. The genius of soft content lies in this word “soft.” It is like a needle hidden in softness, there but concealed, an invisible menace. By the time you’ve realized it is a piece of soft content you’ve already fallen into the well-laid trap of this “soft advertisement.” It seeks to make an impact by constantly impinging on your attention, like a soft but permeating rain.
Soft advertisements are often buried within the news, and at times are indistinguishable. Because they have broken the boundaries between news and advertising, readers feel they can readily trust them . . .
This “peaceful evolution” of public relations into news is getting worse and worse. The “news safety” (新闻安全) resulting from this “peaceful evolution” of the media is more frightful even than “food safety.” The impact it has on the conscience of the media is more poisonous even than “melamine.” “Melamine” constitutes an open threat, and it can be more easily avoided. But the “melamine” that poisons our news is hidden, and therefore much harder to avoid.
The widespread use of “melamine” in China’s news has resulted in some media in the loss of even the most rudimentary notions of truth and fairness. As media competition intensifies, the exchange between news and money has already become a conscious choice for some media . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, October 9, 2008, 1:21am HK]

Media commercialization, which accelerated in the 1990s, has been the primary engine driving change in China’s media, and has given rise to a group of professional newspapers and magazines, including Southern Weekend, Southern Metropolis Daily and Caijing. Through in-depth reporting and commentary on current affairs, these media have championed universal values in China. Today, however, the forward progress of professional media and the universal values they espouse is being challenged by the rise of a “new nationalism” in China.
LECTURE: “Fighting the Undertow of China’s ‘New Nationalism'”
SPEAKER: Xiao Shu (Chen Min), columnist for Southern Weekend
WHEN: October 13, 2008 (Monday), 5:30pm – 7:00pm
WHERE: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
The lecture will be given in Mandarin, no interpretation provided.
About the Speaker:
Chen Min, best known for his work under the penname Xiao Shu, worked for nearly two decades as an academic historian before entering China’s media. He served for several years as managing editor of China Reform magazine before joining the editorial page at Southern Weekend in 2005. He is the author of several books, including The Truth About Liu Wencai.

By David Bandurski — In news splashed across the major Chinese Web portals today, the official Xinhua News Agency reports that 20 officials have been taken into custody over the July cover-up of a mine explosion in Hebei in which at least 30 workers were killed. According to the Xinhua release, officials and local mine bosses in Hebei’s Yu County worked together to suppress news of the explosion, and secretly buried the bodies of the dead in a neighboring county.
The news is the second national embarrassment for officials in Hebei this fall, after reports last month revealed that local officials in the province covered up problems in July with milk powder manufactured by Shijiazhuang-based Sanlu Group, the company at the center of China’s ongoing dairy scandal.
The explosion was at least the second major accident to occur in Yu County in the last nine months. In December 2007, eight miners were killed in a mine collapse that received only scant coverage by Xinhua. The 2007 accident was not mentioned in today’s Xinhua release.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of today’s news page at QQ.com, headline on mine accident cover up indicated in red.]

Workers from the Lijiawa (李家洼) Mine where the accident occurred came from Sichuan, Chongqing, northeast China and other areas, the Xinhua report said.
This accident and cover-up bears striking resemblance to the “Gold Nugget Case” reported by China Youth Daily journalist and CMP fellow Liu Chang in June 2002, in which eleven reporters, including four from Xinhua, were found to have accepted bribes from mine owners and local officials in exchange for keeping quiet about an explosion in which 37 workers died.
There is no indication yet from the Hebei case whether journalists have been implicated in the cover-up, and details about how the case came to light after more than two months have not yet been released.
Like the more recent Hebei case, the explosion in the “Gold Nugget Case” was caused by the unlawful storage of explosive materials, and the bodies of dead miners were eventually located at makeshift burial sites and in abandoned mine shafts.
FURTHER READING:
July 2008 Chongqing Evening Post coverage of the cover-up of a mining accident in Chongqing
July 2008 Legal Daily coverage of the cover-up of a mining accident in Shanxi province.
March 2008 Xinhua coverage of the cover-up of a mining accident in Heilongjiang province
[Posted by David Bandurski on September 7, 2008, 11:12am HK]

Throughout Chinese history, those relying on violence to survive have comprised an important part of society, and have in large part determined the rise and fall of dynasties. How can we understand their behavior? How can we calculate the costs and benefits of violence? In this lecture, “Blood Reward: The Costs and Benefits of Violence in Chinese History,” the speaker’s unique exploration of these questions fills in a gap that has been neglected by economists and historians.
LECTURE: “Blood Reward: The Costs and Benefits of Violence in Chinese History”
SPEAKER: Wu Si, editor in chief of Yanhuang Chunqiu
WHEN: Friday, October 10, 2008, 5:30pm to 7:00pm
WHERE: The University of Hong Kong, Library Extension 9 (LE9)
The lecture will be given in Mandarin, no interpretation provided.
About the Speaker:
Currently editor in chief of Yanhuang Chunqiu magazine, Wu Si was formerly a top editor at Farmer Daily newspaper and Bridge magazine. He has written several books on history, including Unwritten Rules and Blood Reward.

By David Bandurski — In early August, as the stage was set for the Beijing Olympic Games and news about poisonous milk powder was being suppressed by corporations and officials, scores of print media and major Web portals across China ran a story about how the dairy brand Sanlu, now at the center of the dairy industry scandal, had been honored in an award campaign called “30 Years: Brands that Have Changed the Lives of Chinese.”
No one could have seen it so clearly then, but the “30 Years” award campaign, hosted by Huaxia Times in cooperation with China Central Television, Sina.com, China National Radio and other media organizations, was the plainest illustration of a media system gone horribly rotten, in which media are pushed to profit richly from falsehoods even as public interest news is systematically suppressed.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Xinhua website coverage showing Sanlu PR manager Jia Jingxue (being held up) as an official bearer of the Olympic flame.]

The August 6 article reporting the “30 Years” honor bestowed on Sanlu was written by Miao Wanfu (苗万福) and appeared virtually everywhere — in scores of newspapers, at the website of the official People’s Daily, at Tianya, at Sina, and at a leading food industry website, to mention just a few.
And who is Miao Wanfu?
As the Oriental Daily and others have reported, Miao runs Sanlu’s internal public relations machine. But readers of the above “news” would never have guessed as much. Miao is identified — when a byline appears at all — as “correspondent Miao Wanfu” (通讯员苗万福).
On the People’s Daily website, Miao manages to come off as a staff reporter for the CCP’s top daily. And when the report runs subsequently at China’s leading food industry website it is attributed again to “correspondent Miao Wanfu.” We are told that the news comes from “People’s Daily Online.”
Misrepresentations of this sort are perpetuated across China’s media, where a lack of professional standards means “news” space is stuffed routinely with material from valuable advertising clients.
Here is “correspondent” Miao Wanfu again for People’s Daily Online, and for Hebei Daily. And here he is apparently reporting for the Central Propaganda Department’s Guangming Daily in June 2006 about the purchase of a stake in Sanlu by New Zealand’s Fronterra Group.
When Southern Metropolis Daily broached the topic last week of how Chinese media had contributed to the tragedy of China’s tainted milk crisis it was opening up a great big can of worms.
There are many hard and searching questions to answer. As the newspaper asked, why, before the breakthrough report by Oriental Daily journalist Jian Guangzhou (简光洲), did media suggest only that “certain brands” of milk powder had problems? And why, even as questions were beginning to surface about the safety of milk powder from Sanlu, were the company’s supposed contributions to the lives of ordinary Chinese being trumpeted so loudly.
Chinese media will not be given an opportunity to delve very deeply into these questions. The answers, after all, point to the ugliness of state media controls and the failure of media policy as well as to runaway commercial greed. The Chinese media’s role in the tainted milk crisis should remind us again just how poisonous the combination of rigorous press controls and unfettered commercialization can be.
Another Sanlu public relations manager, Jia Jingxue (贾静雪), is perhaps the best icon for the false messages drummed into the Chinese public about the company’s products even as news of life-and-death importance was being suppressed in the interest of corporate profits and China’s Olympic image.
As the Olympic torch — the “sacred flame,” as it was generally called in China’s media — made its way through the city of Shijiazhuang on July 30, Sanlu’s Jia Jingxue was official torch bearer number 36, right behind local cultural official Zhou Jian (周健), and the two of them struck the following memorable pose.

A simple Chinese-language search for “Jia Jingxue” makes it clear that she was one of the most prolific contributors to the relay of lies about Sanlu that were perpetuated throughout China’s media.
Take, for example, this August 2007 news report from China Food Quality News (中国食品质量报), the newspaper designated by China’s State Council as the primary vehicle for disseminating food quality and supervision policies and regulations.

The article, “Sanlu Group Promotes Use of Chinese Herbal Medicine to Prevent Illness Among Dairy Cows,” has a double byline that reads somewhat ambiguously: “China Food Quality News reporting (Jia Jingxuan reporter Shi Wei).”
While Chinese media insiders might understand that the odd placement of names before and after the title “reporter” suggests this is a corporate press release placed directly in the newspaper, ordinary readers would have no way of recognizing this. Jia Jingxue is effectively passed off as a staff reporter for China’s top newspaper devoted to issues of food quality and safety.
Why would China Food Quality News allow this to happen? Because Sanlu is as valuable as advertisers come.
For a glimpse at how profit-oriented this government-designated food quality mouthpiece has become, you need only visit their home page, a sloppy collage of corporate logos — Jiuhe Foods, Bright Dairy and Foods, Yurun, Wahaha, Shineway Group, and of course Sanlu, to name just a handful.
In July this year, just days before her participation in the Olympic torch relay, Jia Jingxue was writing for the local party daily in Shijiazhuang. The article appeared at several major Websites, including Sina.com, with a logo and link to Shijiazhuang Daily and a byline that read: “From this newspaper, Jia Jingxue reporting” (本报讯, 贾静雪).
On September 1, just two weeks before the scandal broke, Jia appeared as a reporter for the official Hebei Daily as well as the official Hebei Economic Daily. The article was called, “Sanlu is Honored with the Nation’s Only Science Progress Award for the Dairy Industry,” and it also appeared on the official Website of the Hebei provincial government.
The examples go on and on. As the screenshot below attests, the same Jia Jingxue has apparently also been a correspondent for the official China National Radio.

In sickening parallel to the quality problems plaguing other consumer products, examples like these are flagrant abuses of the trust of the Chinese media consumer. Poisonous milk has its parallel in poisonous media.
But the complicity of China’s media is doubly disturbing because it underlines a dangerous trend resulting directly from the party’s policy on media — an amplification of falsehood driven by the narrowest commercial ends attended by state news censorship that suppresses information that is critical to the well-being of ordinary Chinese.
As the tainted milk scandal shows only too clearly, this is a volatile combination.
Sanlu, no doubt, is just the tip of the iceberg. And unless the media are given greater freedom to monitor officials and corporations on behalf of the people, the cruel and cynical contrast between public relations ploys and hidden realities will persist.
Consider this chilling study in contrasts.
On August 12, a rosy piece of soft news on China’s top food quality website reported that Sanlu was generously giving free cases of milk powder to “Olympic babies” born on the first day of the Games.
The final line of the “news article” shouted out with exclamation points:

“Sanlu milk powder says ‘Let’s go!’ to the babies of the Olympics. Let’s use high-technology, high-standard and high-nutrition Sanlu milk powder to say ‘Let’s go!’ for the future of China!”

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 28, 2008, 2:15pm]

By David Bandurski — As China’s top quality inspection official sought to alleviate lingering concerns today over the safety of Chinese dairy products in the midst of the “Sanlu Milk Powder” scandal, Chinese media poked about the issue of who should bear responsibility and how, and Web users continued to voice their anger and frustration.
At China Youth Daily, columnist Liu Yibin (刘以宾) picked up on a phrase used recently by Premier Wen Jiabao in which he said dairy enterprises would, “without exception,” be “cleaned up” and dealt with firmly. Liu suggested that the best medicine for such enterprises might instead be to simply allow them to “die.”
“It would be best for enterprises lacking conscience just to die,” he wrote (没良心的企业最好死掉).

[ABOVE: “Mad in China” label photographed by Andrew Huff, available under Creative Commons license at Flickr.com.]

The sentiment struck a chord with many Web users.
“Well said! You’ve spoken what was in my heart!” effused one reader. “Take Mengniu, for example, and all of it poisonous milk . . . They should be punished severely. Their lives should not be spared, and their family’s assets should be seized. Only through such strong measures can we rid ourselves of all of China’s scourges!!!!!”
“Death to them all!” roared another user in Beijing.
“Let’s give these wolves the heavy punishments they deserve,” wrote another participant from Heilongjiang province.
Others turned with venom on the system and its policies, and raised the problem of corporate abuses in other areas of popular concern.
“We demand safe products, not products that are exempted from inspection. Such exemptions are ridiculously unreasonable,” wrote a reader from Liupanshui City.
“If you open your eyes a bit further you have to wonder how many of the foods you eat are harmful. The freaking problem isn’t this or that person, or this or that company, but the whole set of policies in effect. Sure, we can cross the river by feeling the stones. But what if there are no stones? Why don’t we look back? Must we continue to court death? Healthcare reforms are just one example.
“‘It would be best for enterprises lacking conscience just to die . . . ‘ China’s real-estate industry is the most lacking in conscience. They’ve robbed generations of their hard-earned money and brewed up hordes of housing slaves.”
Portions of Liu Yibin’s editorial in China Youth Daily follow:

“Death is Only Fair for Enterprises Lacking Conscience”
As he visited children affected by the “Sanlu Milk Powder” affair, Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out: “This incident reveals that government inspections were insufficient, and shows us that a number of enterprises lack professional and social morals, what we call in common speech ‘lacking conscience’.” We need not only to hold leaders accountable, he said, but we must “firmly clean them up and deal with them, with no exceptions.”
Enterprises lacking conscience would be best to die off – this is not a rash conclusion but one arising rather from good sense.
[Product problems are to some degree unavoidable]. . . However, tolerance has its basic preconditions or “bottom line,” and that is that product quality issues be accidental, local and fragmentary in nature. If enterprises are not active and deliberate [in product quality issues], these can be considered objective faults, and when problems do occur they should blame themselves out of a sense of conscience. In the event that they pass this bottom line, particularly if they are reduced to the point of acting willfully against conscience, then they cannot be forgiven, and they should die (应该死掉).
. . . The real problem is that no local government wishes that its enterprises die, particularly those that contribute to GDP and generate tax revenues. Some leaders knew [about problems] earlier on, and we can’t rule out that some few might have encouraged them. From this standpoint, in “firmly cleaning them up and dealing with them, with no exceptions” we must break through the barrier of local protectionism.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 24, 2008, 1:53pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Since it was founded in 2003, the China Media Project has hosted close to forty journalism fellows, representing the very best of professional journalism and media scholarship in China. The research undertaken by our fellows has offered important insight into the process of change in China’s media, and into the problems that continue to face journalists on the mainland.
In cooperation with Hong Kong’s Cosmos Books, CMP has now published a collection of fifteen essays from former CMP fellows and guest speakers, offering original perspectives on everything from the launch of the feisty Southern Weekend to the rise of the Chinese weblog.

Copies of the book are now available at Cosmos Books locations in Hong Kong, and will be available soon on the publisher’s website.
Chapters in the book include: “Launching Southern Weekend,” by Zuo Fang; “Ten Years at Caijing,” an account of one of China’s leading business and current affairs magazines by its founder and editor in chief, Hu Shuli; “Libel Law in China,” and account by lawyer Pu Zhiqiang of the history of libel in China and his observations based on defendants he has represented; “Rebuilding and Renewal in China,” an essay by political reform activist and scholar Chen Ziming; “Gradual Reform in China’s Media,” observations on changes in China’s media by veteran journalist Yang Jisheng.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 23, 2008, 3:30pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Continuing our series of Chinese voices on the topic of economic and political reform — see previous posts here and here — we offer readers a translation of a recent talk by former People’s Daily editor in chief Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金). Zhou is best known to most as “Huang Fuping” (皇甫平), a nom de plume he used to pen a series of essays in 1991 that had a decisive impact on the debate over China’s future path of development.

[ABOVE: Chinese flag photographed by Philip McMaster available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]

At the outset of the 1990s, following the June 4, 1989, crackdown on democracy protesters in Beijing, China was thrown into internal political turmoil over the direction of reforms. There was a resurgence of leftist elements within the Communist Party who resisted economic reforms as part of a general charge against liberalization (自由化).
The essays of “Huang Fuping” voiced strong support for Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and answered the leftist debate over whether China’s reforms were really “surnamed She (socialism) or surnamed Zi (capitalism)” (姓社还是姓资). Zhou Ruijin was serving at the time as deputy editor in chief of Shanghai’s Liberation Daily.
On September 6, Zhou Ruijin spoke in Guangzhou as part of the Lingnan Auditorium Series (岭南大讲堂). In his talk Zhou discussed political reform and “institutional renewal” as the heart of China’s latest round of social and political debate over the direction of reforms.
Portions of Zhou Ruijin’s talk follow:

Guangdong is on the front lines of reform and opening, and Guangdong’s reformers are bold, not afraid to be the first to make a move. From Comrade Ren Zhongyi (任仲夷) to Comrade Yuan Geng (袁庚) — all of these characters form a whole generation of reform leaders with a strong sense of idealism and possessed of strong contemporary political awareness. Guangdong’s reforms are again been passed along, although they hang precariously by a thread. This year Premier Wen Jiabao came to Guangdong on an inspection visit and gave his hearty approval to the latest round of Guangdong’s though liberation movement, and he talked about new reform tasks that needed to be tackled. Here once again is the hope that Guangdong will fulfill its longstanding role as a window, model and experiment for the rest of the nation, that its soldiers will march at the front of the formation, that it will blaze new trails.
Investigations into China’s third major debate over reform
The achievements of market reforms over the past 30 years have been witnessed by everyone. But market reforms have also accumulated a number of problems, and in 2004 a major debate broke out. At that time some people seized on the loss of state-owned assets in the process of state enterprise reform, and they used these extreme cases to deny the entire process of enterprise reform. At the same time they took exception to housing reforms, education reforms and healthcare reforms. As these problems touched on issues of immediate concern to the rights of ordinary people, they really reverberated. This round of [social] debate is different from the previous two debates over the commodity economy (商品经济) and the market economy in that it is not primarily ideological in nature, but rather about very real questions of popular interests and livelihood, and so debate has persisted much longer.
In January 2006 I wrote a piece called “Reforms Cannot Be Shaken.” I felt that on the problems we are now facing the two sides of the debate were not greatly at odds. I also acknowledged six problems with market reforms. First, there is the widening of the three big gaps, between domestic regions, between the city and the countryside, and between rich and poor. Figures released by the World Bank show that China’s Gini coefficient has risen from 16 percent prior to reform and opening to 47 percent, surpassing not only the international warning line of 40 percent but surpassing that of all developed nations. Secondly, social undertakings been severely impeded. In the process of economic development, social undertakings have been overlooked. Work in healthcare, education and culture, for example, have fallen behind. The battle against SARS in 2003 made this even more obvious, exposing the weakness of healthcare infrastructure in the countryside. In 2004, the central party promoted the idea of people-based and scientific development, and this offered a new view of development that is comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable. It is not only the economy that must develop, but also politics, society and culture. Social and economic development have to go hand in hand . . . Only in this way can we achieve sustainable development. Everyone has witnessed the change in recent years, as GDP has grown rapidly and tax revenues have expanded, that many areas have built huge buildings and renovated old city neighborhoods. Government buildings have been erected with lavishness, but education, health and culture have not been given the priority they should. Many rural children cannot attend school, many urban and township residents cannot afford to buy homes and endure poor living conditions, etc. In particular, a social safety net has not yet been established. This has brought about the third problem, which is the prominence of problems of basic livelihood. For example, difficulties finding employment, going to school, seeing the doctor, finding a place to live, growing crime, etc., issues that concern ordinary people — all of these are accumulating, and cannot be resolved in one fell swoop. The fourth issue is that our method of development is rough and unrefined. A high-level of input and consumption has brought serious waste of energy, raw materials and assets. Figures in 2006 told us that while we produced four percent of the world’s economic output, we consumed 32 percent of the world’s steel, 40 percent of its concrete, 25 percent of its aluminum, 23 percent of its copper, 30 percent of its zinc and 18 percent of its nickel, and 31 percent of new demand for oil was generated by China. Fifth, we have ecological destruction and pollution of the environment, and one particularly serious problem is the shortage of potable water. The sixth problem is the spread of corruption, of collusion between officials and business interests, of exchange between money and power. The general mood of society is poor, and issues of crime and safety still need to be dealt with.
Both sides of our major debate have the same view of these six problems, but they disagree as to their causes. One side believes that they are a direct result of market reforms, that having a market economy necessarily means that gaps will widen, that the divide between rich and poor will expand, and corruption become rampant. The other side believes that market reforms have not yet been soundly implemented, that the problem is not the general move in the direction of a market economy but rather problems in the specific route chosen to reform, that power has interfered in the market, that power and capital have combined forces, and this has widened the wealth gap and brought the spread of corruption. That is to say, that these problems arise from lagging political reform. In my piece “Reforms Cannot Be Shaken,” I wrote from a theoretical perspective about major shifts in the nature of key problems, that the government’s system for administrative management had not changed, that the shift had not yet been made toward a public service model of government, realizing that after basic material subsistence issues had been resolved we needed to go further in providing fair and effective public goods, such as education, healthcare, housing, pensions, judicial fairness, information symmetry, democratic rights, etc. And so I said that we are right now “holding the bowl level with both hands to eat meat” (端起碗来吃肉), suggesting we have resolved the problem of food and clothing but we still “set down our chopsticks to curse our mothers”, meaning that it is still tough for us to get work, find a home, afford the doctor, get an education, find justice under the law, and we still do not have transparent information, or the right to participate or express our views, etc. This is the result of market reforms not going far enough.
After that essay was published it found favor with the central party, and once they had looked into its background (发表背景) they expressed immediate support. Not long after, in early March, as the “two meetings” were going into session, President Hu Jintao visited with the Shanghai delegation and gave a speech called, “We Must Unshakingly Promote Reform and Opening,” and he said we must improve the scientific basis of reform and opening decisions and raise coordination [with other pressing issues] of reform and opening moves. He was talking about letting all people taste the fruits of reform and opening. This is the note the central party has struck in this third major debate.
Changing methods of development to break through development problems
So why is it that market reforms have accumulated so many problems along with their achievements? There are now many different analyses of this question from a theoretical perspective, and most boil down to the basic point that we have only been doing market economics but have not commensurately carried out political reforms, that the reallocation of resources has not placed the market in the leading position but has allowed unchecked power to enter the marketplace. This has caused a growing gap between rich and poor and fueled the spread of corruption. Mr. Chen Zhiwu, a professor of finance at Yale University, has researched this topic over the last two years. In one of his articles he points out that no country that has carried out privatization and market economics — no matter whether it is the United States, Britain, Germany, Russia or the transitional countries of Eastern Europe — has a gap in national income as large as China’s. Chen Zhiwu believes that privatization and the market economy are not root causes of runaway income disparities. He believes that the problem lies in the fact that China lack an effective mechanism for putting power in check, and so all resources are controlled by administrative power, and must go through state-owned enterprises and state-run banks, etc., which means that vast majority of resources affecting ordinary people are allocated by the government. As government power is subject to no checks and balances, and as resource allocation is handled by the government on behalf of the market through a state system, these resources and their opportunities are necessarily meted out among those with power and with connections to power. More resources are allocated to the “first world,” comprising places like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, then come other provinces and autonomous regions of the second world, and then come the counties, which receive yet fewer resources . . . Chen Zhiwu believes that this marriage between the pyramid of income and the pyramid of power speaks to fact that whoever has power and connections can access riches, can seek out and find opportunities for work at a higher income. This is another way of saying that those seeking wealth and higher income must travel the road where power and business intersect (官商勾结的道路). When the government steps in for the market in allocating resources, the governing principle of resource allocation is not efficiency — allocation is not market driven. Nor does allocation occur under the principle of fairness — there is no system by which citizens can check power and ask questions. Therefore, the only principle [of resource allocation] is power. This kind of economy is a power economy. He believes this is a principle reason for the growing gap between rich and poor and the spread of corruption.
Looking at the crux of the problems lately facing [China], what is the way forward for reform? This requires a new round of thought liberation (解放思想) so that we can slice anew through reforms. First of all, if this latest thought liberation differs from those in the past, this lies primarily in the fact that the previous two liberations of thought were ideological in nature, while this time the focus is on adjusting the structure of benefit distribution [in our country]. Previous liberations were about returning benefit to the people, while this time emphasizes returning rights to the people, about granting rights to citizens. The party’s 17th Congress talked about the right to know, right to express, right to participate and right to monitor, about the need to protect the rights demands of the citizens, including carrying out fair and effective allocation of public goods. Previous thought liberations focused on resolving problems on the level of thought. It was enough to raise recognition and awareness. This time around the focus is on institutional renewal (制度创新), on the building of regulations and mechanisms, improving the socialist market economic system on the basis of the legal system. The adjustment of benefit patterns and the granting of rights to the people, these are institutional matters in and of themselves. So we can only achieve these two goals through institutional renewal and regulatory protections . . .
The task of this latest round of thought liberation is to break through traditional modes and concepts of development, on the one hand setting up new development methods to promote economic development, on the other hand changing the political mode of “omnipotence” (全能主义). So the focus of this round of thought liberation is the deepening of political reform, promoting institutional reform and constructive development in a “four-in-one” model encompassing the economy, politics, culture and society.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 16, 2008, 11:46am HK]

By David Bandurski — Earlier this week we posted the latest reform related piece by prominent party scholar Li Junru (李君如), in which he argues that China has made substantial progress over the last 30 years not only on economic reform but also on political reform. Li said party leaders had “promoted democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic governance and democratic monitoring” and had worked hard “to ensure the citizens’ right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to monitor (知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权). [Frontpage Image of Mao at Tiananmen by Davidfg available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]
But in an editorial in yesterday’s edition of Southern Metropolis Daily, Nanjing professor Shao Jian (邵建) wrote of the failure to implement democracy at the county and township level as a primary cause leading to abuse of power and cases of mass social unrest like those seen recently in Weng’an and Menglian.
Shao’s piece does not address Li Junru’s remarks directly, but opens up the issue of political reform by addressing remarks over the weekend by economist Zhang Wuchang (张五常), who rather boldly suggested that China had already arrived at “what is in Chinese history, and even in human history, the best system.”
Before leaping into Shao’s Southern Metropolis Daily editorial it is worth noting that while “political reform” has persisted as a topic in China’s media over the last year, there is no particular indication that the issue is growing, and it is premature to suggest, as some commentators have, that change is in the air.
In fact, the language of “political reform”, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革) has moderated somewhat since last year’s 17th National Congress. The following is a graph plotting all articles in the mainland media (300+ newspapers) making use of the term “political reform” since October 2007:

There is a drop in November 2007, following the peak that came with the 17th National Congress, and a large peak again with the National People’s Congress and a wave of discussion about “super-ministry reform.”
We are probably approaching another October peak, and can expect to see more intensified coverage (on a statistical basis) of issues like “intra-party democracy” (党内民主) and “thought liberation” (解放思想).
As for real and substantial progress on political reform — don’t hold your breath. Having said that, we are hearing some interesting voices on political reform and democracy. Shao Jian’s editorial follows in full:

“There is No Such Thing as the Best System, Only a Better System”
By Shao Jian (邵建)
At a market economics forum hosted recently in Beijing, participants held that “the system and rules in various regions of China have experienced huge change over the last 30 years, and clear signs of this can be seen in the protection of private property, the steady decline of the public economy, and in the gradual development of private enterprise, which now comprises half of the overall economy.” On this basis, Chinese economist Zhang Wuchang (张五常) asserted: “Over the last 30 years China has groped about and found what is in Chinese history, and even in human history, the best system.” From the standpoint of “political correctness” (政治正确), this statement is not a problem naturally. But for so-called systems, no matter what kind we’re talking about, there is really no such thing as “the best.”
China has gone through 30 years of reform, and the main thrust has been economic reform, whose achievements were enumerated by the forum participants above. But I personally do not share their optimism. Not long ago I saw some numbers about how state-owned assets account for more than 75 percent of total assets, and that by contrast total private assets (民间总资产) account for less than 25 percent. Assuming these figures are accurate, we cannot really say that that we’re seeing the steady decline of the public economy, nor can we say that the private economy accounts for half of the overall economy. Unless we accelerate economic reform, even with another 30 years we will not reach the point where half of the economy is private. This cannot be called a market economy, but only a “Chinese market economy” (中国市场经济). Theoretically speaking, a market economy should not have such a robust state-owned economy.
Market economies are about opening up rights and benefits to the people, not about government power. When inequality persists between rights and power (权力和权利), the market’s basic character cannot be competition. The problem is that when power creeps inside, can we really expect rights and interests (权利) on the one hand and power (权力) on the other to enter into fair competition? Needless to say, in many state monopolized sectors rights are excluded altogether and there is no competition whatsoever to speak of.
The obstacles to further economic reform in China clearly do not lie in the economy, but in another critical place. In my view, the crux of the Weng’an and Menglian incidents is the fact that democracy has not been properly carried out at the county and township levels. Some commentators have attributed the Weng’an incident to local government bureaucracy, saying that after the incident occurred key local officials were unable to make decisions properly . . . But this view is only skin-deep. The logic of an official, after all, is to be responsible to whomever invests him with power. If those above invest officials with power they are naturally going to handle matters according to the designs and purposes of these superiors. As in the case of Menglian, they will not hesitate to mobilize police power against the villagers. Two points in Yunnan province’s report [on the Menglian incident] should particularly draw our attention. The first is that the local rubber company had long provided the county party secretary with a luxury off-road vehicle for his own personal use. The second is that a small number of county leaders were stakeholders in the rubber enterprise and received shares of the profits . . . We can quite plainly determine in whose interests police were mobilized. These two incidents were not at all about improper handling [by party bureaucrats]. Instead, they bring institutional dilemmas into sharp relief. If we do not deal [with such issues] from this standpoint [of institutional failures], it is hard to envision fundamental change of any sort.
I must emphasize that I am not a negativist, but there is little need for us to harp on our achievements. If we dwell a bit more on our problems this will allow us to seek further improvements. I am confident that on this question my sentiments as here expressed will appeal to common sense. But Mr. Zhang Wuchang tells us instead that right now at this very moment we have the best system in human history. One of the themes of the above-mentioned forum was how China can pursue further reforms looking back now on these three decades. Zhang’s logic tell us we need not do anything at all. We are already the best. I think the popular expression contradicts [this reasoning] most succinctly: “There is no such thing as best, only better.” Zhang’s words fail to recognize this. In point of fact, humanity cannot arrive at the best in terms of choosing systems. As Churchill once said concerning democracy, it is the worst form of government except that humanity has not yet been able to find a better one. And so we see that even in democratic societies the assessment of the democratic system is only that it is the least awful.
[Churchill said: “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”]
In terms of the market economy and democratization, if our system reforms are not yet complete we need to make further shifts – and aside from putting our nose to the grinding wheel there are no other choices.
(The writer is a professor at Nanjing Xiaozhuang University)

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 12, 2008, 9:52pm HK]

By David Bandurski — As we approach the next lively session of the 17th CCP Central Committee — this will be the third plenum for any poor soul who’s counting — the process of “preparing public opinion,” or yulun zhunbei (舆论准备), has already begun. Preparing opinion for what, exactly? Well, that’s almost anyone’s guess. [Frontpage Image: Tiananmen Square photographed by Noneck available under Creative Commons license at Flickr].
But a major policy piece in yesterday’s edition of Beijing Daily, and splashed up at top Web portals and newspapers, gives readers a mouthful about political reform, or what is called in Chinese “political system reform,” or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革).
The Beijing Daily piece is written by Li Junru (李君如), the vice president of China’s Central Party School (CCPS), the top training facility for CCP leaders. Directly above Li at CCPS is newly-minted politburo standing committee member and probable Hu Jintao successor in 2012 Xi Jinping (习近平).
One of the CCP’s top academicians, Li Junru is generally seen as a proponent of ideas associated with President Hu Jintao. He has been an active voice in praising the policies of Hu, particularly efforts to promote “intra-party democracy,” or dangnei minzhu (党内民主).
Li’s central point in the Beijing Daily piece is to take issue with the notion that China’s reform up to now has been predominantly economic in nature, and that political reform has waited in the wings. Political reform, Li says, has always been an “integral part” of the overall reform process.
For the moment, we will spare readers an analysis of Li’s points — which again and again elicit the eye-rolling response, “Yes, but . . . ” — and offer the fullest translation we can of the text given time restrictions:

For many years now a certain kind of public opinion has held that reform in China began with economic reforms, that China’s reform has primarily consisted of reforms to the economic system, and that up to now perhaps no political reforms have taken place. This is a misunderstanding.
Everyone is concerned about China’s reform and opening, particularly about political reform (政治体制改革) and the building of democratic politics (民主政治建设), and this is a normal thing to see. Because as an integral part of our country’s overall reform, political reform must deepen along with economic and social development, and it must be steadily promoted as interest in political participation grows among the people. In fact, our party places great priority on this question. We needn’t look to the future, for it was raised at last year’s 17th National Congress that “people’s democracy is the life of socialism,” and the Second Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee said [back in February this year] that we “must lift up even higher the flag of people’s democracy.”
For many years now a certain kind of public opinion has held that reform in China began with economic reforms, that China’s reform has primarily consisted of reforms to the economic system, and that up to now perhaps no political reforms have taken place. This is a misunderstanding. Because the basic fact it fails to recognize is that the reason the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee [in 1978] could raise the task of reform was because that year’s debate over the standard for measuring the truth created an atmosphere of thought liberation and made possible the advancement of democratic politics (民主政治). One need only read Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s essay, “Looking Ahead with Emancipated Minds, a Practical and Realistic Mindset and a Sense of Solidarity,” to have a sense that from the very beginning China’s reforms happened as democratic politics was driven forward. Seeing as ours is a vast nation of more than a billion people, and our party has tens of millions of members, we can expect to have all kinds of opinions. And this determines that carrying out reform and opening and modernization in China without democracy is unfeasible, and not promoting democracy in an orderly manner is also unfeasible.
One important reason why people have had misimpressions about China’s political reform is that we have spent a lot of time researching Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s strategic thinking, but not enough time researching his tactical thinking about leading reforms. When we look at these 30 years of reform and opening we can see that our party has been both strategic and tactical in the process of promoting political reform.
Political reform in China has at least eight methods and characteristics, and these characteristics and methods have already brought profound changes to Chinese society over the last 30 years.
Looking at this from the vantage point of tactics and strategy, political reform in China has at least eight methods and characteristics that deserve our attention and priority:
The first is that [the party] has linked political reform and economic reform, using reforms to the economic system to advance [political reforms]. When the household responsibility system was instituted, for example, this dissolved the people’s communes that had been referred to as one of the “three red flags,” and this brought the set up of organs of political power at the township level – county-level people’s congresses were established, and delegates from the county level down were directly elected by citizens. In fact, over the last 30 years, every advance in economic reforms has been matched with a deepening of political reform, and this process has never halted. Institutional reforms that we have instituted more recently also have this character. This reform process within State Council institutions that people have termed “super-ministry reform” is a major move toward deepening reform of the administrative system; it is a necessary step in developing the socialist market economy, and it is also an integral part of the deepening of political reforms and an important aspect of the development of socialist democracy (社会主义民主). In particular, this [“super-ministry”] reform has great significance for changing the orientation of our government, in working toward a service-oriented, responsible and clean government under rule of law, and in bringing about a mechanism for the mutual checking and coordination of the powers of decision-making, administration and monitoring.
Second is the linking of democracy development and the building of rule of law, emphasizing that democracy must by systematized, have legal sanction and promote the running of state affairs according to the law. Addressing the “Cultural Revolution” mindset equating democracy with anarchy, and the tendency to periodic surges of populism, Deng Xiaoping emphasized early in the reform and opening process that democracy had to be systematized and have legal sanction. Over the past 30 years, we have amended and improved our Constitution, abolishing clauses and regulations that do not accord with the Constitution and the democratic spirit. We have laid out a whole series of laws and regulations, including a Criminal Law, a Civil Law, a Code of Criminal Procedure and a Law of Civil Procedure. We have, moreover, created a system of lawyers, and we have built a fair, efficient and authoritative judicial system, and have carried out judicial reforms with the goal of ensuring that judicial organs and prosecutorial organs carry out trial proceedings independently and in a fair manner as specified by law. A society with thousands of years of autocratic tradition is in the process of changing to a society under rule of law.
Third is the tying of political reform to the respect and protection of human rights, ensuring the whole society’s right to equal participation (平等参与) and right to equal development (平等发展). Ever since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee [in 1978] we have been working to set things right, thoroughly correcting the trampling of human rights that has occurred in the past, and undertaking a large-scale rehabilitation of unjust cases. Since reform and opening was instituted, we have not only developed the economy, working hard to ensure citizens’ right to subsistence and right to development, but we have also permitted and supported citizens in taking part in various non-public sectors of the economy, affirming that the political identities of new social strata are “builders for the work of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” We instituted the personal identification system, permitting citizens to freely seek employment including in other domestic areas; we instituted an entry and exit system permitting citizens to go overseas to study or travel. In recent years we have taken further steps to build democratic mechanisms, diversify the forms of democracy, widen the channels for democracy, and have in accordance with the law promoted democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic governance and democratic monitoring, working hard to ensure the citizens’ right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to monitor (知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权). These reforms have safeguarded citizens’ human rights, and they have stirred up the vigor and vitality of Chinese society.
Fourth is the linking together of the development of democracy and rule of law and the improvement of grass-roots self-governing institutions, allowing the people to experience first-hand the material benefits of reform. Within China’s political system, the set-up in the countryside and in urban districts and enterprises of village committees, community committees, professional committees and other autonomous peoples’ organizations is a major distinguishing characteristic. Since the onset of the reform and opening policy, we have not only carried out direct elections for village committees and township reform experiments throughout the countryside, but we have also uniformly carried out systems of openness in government affairs and openness in village affairs. We have also made clear strides in the building of communities (社区建设). Moreover, the building of grassroots democracy is now linking up with the project of building a harmonious society, for which improvement of democracy is a focus, and this has found broad support among the masses.
Fifth is the linking together of governance by the ruling party according to the law and the principle of legal participation in the government affairs by parties not in power. Many people probably do not understand what it means that the China democracy parties (中国民主党派) participate in politics. Within our political system, while China’s eight democracy parties and federations of industry and commerce are not political parties, they are parties that participate in government affairs. There are four basic points to this process of participation: 1) participation in government, including serving in leadership positions within the national government; 2) participating in the deciding of state policies and principles and in negotiation for the selection of leaders; 3) participating in the management of state affairs; 4) participating in the formulation and implementation of national principles, policies, laws and regulations. This can be seen particularly in the degree of participation of democracy party delegates and non-party affiliated delegates in the people’s congress, the standing committee of the NPC and in special committees of the NPC. These [changes] were set down in the Central Committee’s 1989 document. Over the last several years, with the support of the ruling party, the role of participating parties in democratic politics in China has grown larger and larger.
六是把党内民主与人民民主结合起来，以党内民主来带动人民民主。中国共产党是一个大党，有7300多万党员，比欧洲一些国家的国民还要多。党要保持先进性，并且在引领全社会的民主政治发展中体现先进性，必须积极推进党内民主。中国共产党已经充分意识到这一问题的重要性和紧迫性。十七大报告在保障党员民主权利、完善党代会制度、严格实行民主集中制、改革党内选举制度等方面，提出了一系列创新的思路和举措。特别是在选拔任用干部问题上，已经废除了终身制，完善了以民主为原则的干部任免制度，给广大德才兼备的从政人员提供了竞聘上岗的机会，等等。这些党内民主举措，也为广大人民群众提供了民主的知情权、参与权和监督权。
七是把党内监督、行政监督、法律监督与公民直接监督结合起来，建立和完善了公民舆论监督和信访制度。十一届三中全会的一大功绩，就是重新建立了中央纪律检查委员会。这几年，在党内监督方面进行了一系列制度创新，并且把党内监督与群众举报结合起来，成效显著。特别是媒体介入监督序列，对于中国民主政治的发展起了很大作用。
八是把选举票决民主与协商民主结合起来，完善了公民有序的政治参与形式。人民通过选举、投票行使权利和人民内部各方面在重大决策之前进行充分协商，尽可能就共同性问题取得一致意见，是我国社会主义民主的两种重要形式。改革开放30年来，中国的选举票决民主不断完善和发展，不仅在公民自治组织的范围内实行了直接选举制度，而且在其它实行间接选举的领域扩大了差额选举，完善了候选人提名方式；特别是在党内民主发展进程中，扩大了基层党组织领导班子成员直接选举和中央、地方党委成员差额选举的范围，实行了候选人无记名投票推荐等民主形式。与此同时，中国的协商民主也在进一步完善和发展。特别是，中国人民政治协商会议这一中国特有的重要民主政治形式，按照政治协商、民主监督、参政议政这三大职能，推动和组织中国各党派、各界别、各民族的政协委员，在党和政府重大决策之前和决策执行过程中，积极参与民主协商、民主监督，很有成效；各级政府也主动实施民主恳谈会、听证会等制度；各人民团体在民主协商中也发挥了积极作用。
应该讲，中国民主政治的这八个方面特点还在发展中，不能说都搞得很好了，但是，这八个方面或者说至少这八个方面，确实是中国政治体制改革的一些具体做法和重要特点，这些做法和特点已经使得中国社会在这30年中发生了极为深刻的变化。那些认为中国只搞经济体制改革，不搞政治体制改革的人，不仅看不到这些基本事实，而且陷入了自身的逻辑悖论。因为他们解释不了，为什么在一个他们认为“高度集权的专制社会”中，会允许公民在市场经济中自由发展，会出现那么成功的市场体系和经济发展。所以，观察和研究中国政治体制改革的特点及其走势，必须立足中国现实，客观地全面地认识中国的改革实践。
-中国的民主政治还刚刚起步，中国的政治体制改革必然还要继续深化
在这里还要强调一点，我们观察中国问题，观察中国的政治体制改革，不仅要观察做了什么，还要从这些已经做的事实中，深入地观察中国政治体制改革和民主政治发展的走势。
作为中国问题的观察者和研究者，我希望大家注意，改革开放以来中国在建设和发展政治文明的过程中出现了三大值得重视的走势：公民有序的政治参与，民主的制度化、法律化，是中国民主政治发展的一大走势；通过党内民主来带动人民民主，是中国民主政治发展的第二大走势；中国共产党在宪法和法律的范围内活动，坚持依法治国、依宪治国，是中国民主政治发展的第三大走势。这三大走势的指向很明确，最终将在中国建立一个坚持中国共产党的领导、人民当家作主和依法治国有机统一的社会主义民主政治体制。
以上是我这几年观察和研究中国政治发展的一些体会。我并不认为中国在民主政治发展方面已经做得很好了，相反，我倒是认为，中国的民主政治还刚刚起步，中国的政治体制改革必然还要继续深化。但是，在中国进行任何一项改革，都必须根据中国的实际，才能健康、有序地发展。我们致力于探索的，应该是、也只能是符合中国的历史和今天国情的，能够真正给中国人民带来安定和幸福的政治体制和民主政治形式。在民主政治的问题上，我们既向人家学习，也不妄自菲薄；既积极推进，也不盲目发展、急于求成。我相信，我们中国人在经济上能够创造出令世人瞩目的奇迹，在政治上也能够创造出既顺应时代发展的进步潮流又具有鲜明中国特色的民主政治体制。
(作者李君如 系中央党校副校长)

FURTHER READING:
“New headway with its Party building concept,” China Daily, November 7, 2007
Full text of Hu’s speech to the 17th National Congress, October 24, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 11, 2008, 4:20pm HK]