By David Bandurski — As China’s top quality inspection official sought to alleviate lingering concerns today over the safety of Chinese dairy products in the midst of the “Sanlu Milk Powder” scandal, Chinese media poked about the issue of who should bear responsibility and how, and Web users continued to voice their anger and frustration.
At China Youth Daily, columnist Liu Yibin (刘以宾) picked up on a phrase used recently by Premier Wen Jiabao in which he said dairy enterprises would, “without exception,” be “cleaned up” and dealt with firmly. Liu suggested that the best medicine for such enterprises might instead be to simply allow them to “die.”
“It would be best for enterprises lacking conscience just to die,” he wrote (没良心的企业最好死掉).

[ABOVE: “Mad in China” label photographed by Andrew Huff, available under Creative Commons license at Flickr.com.]

The sentiment struck a chord with many Web users.
“Well said! You’ve spoken what was in my heart!” effused one reader. “Take Mengniu, for example, and all of it poisonous milk . . . They should be punished severely. Their lives should not be spared, and their family’s assets should be seized. Only through such strong measures can we rid ourselves of all of China’s scourges!!!!!”
“Death to them all!” roared another user in Beijing.
“Let’s give these wolves the heavy punishments they deserve,” wrote another participant from Heilongjiang province.
Others turned with venom on the system and its policies, and raised the problem of corporate abuses in other areas of popular concern.
“We demand safe products, not products that are exempted from inspection. Such exemptions are ridiculously unreasonable,” wrote a reader from Liupanshui City.
“If you open your eyes a bit further you have to wonder how many of the foods you eat are harmful. The freaking problem isn’t this or that person, or this or that company, but the whole set of policies in effect. Sure, we can cross the river by feeling the stones. But what if there are no stones? Why don’t we look back? Must we continue to court death? Healthcare reforms are just one example.
“‘It would be best for enterprises lacking conscience just to die . . . ‘ China’s real-estate industry is the most lacking in conscience. They’ve robbed generations of their hard-earned money and brewed up hordes of housing slaves.”
Portions of Liu Yibin’s editorial in China Youth Daily follow:

“Death is Only Fair for Enterprises Lacking Conscience”
As he visited children affected by the “Sanlu Milk Powder” affair, Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out: “This incident reveals that government inspections were insufficient, and shows us that a number of enterprises lack professional and social morals, what we call in common speech ‘lacking conscience’.” We need not only to hold leaders accountable, he said, but we must “firmly clean them up and deal with them, with no exceptions.”
Enterprises lacking conscience would be best to die off – this is not a rash conclusion but one arising rather from good sense.
[Product problems are to some degree unavoidable]. . . However, tolerance has its basic preconditions or “bottom line,” and that is that product quality issues be accidental, local and fragmentary in nature. If enterprises are not active and deliberate [in product quality issues], these can be considered objective faults, and when problems do occur they should blame themselves out of a sense of conscience. In the event that they pass this bottom line, particularly if they are reduced to the point of acting willfully against conscience, then they cannot be forgiven, and they should die (应该死掉).
. . . The real problem is that no local government wishes that its enterprises die, particularly those that contribute to GDP and generate tax revenues. Some leaders knew [about problems] earlier on, and we can’t rule out that some few might have encouraged them. From this standpoint, in “firmly cleaning them up and dealing with them, with no exceptions” we must break through the barrier of local protectionism.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 24, 2008, 1:53pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Since it was founded in 2003, the China Media Project has hosted close to forty journalism fellows, representing the very best of professional journalism and media scholarship in China. The research undertaken by our fellows has offered important insight into the process of change in China’s media, and into the problems that continue to face journalists on the mainland.
In cooperation with Hong Kong’s Cosmos Books, CMP has now published a collection of fifteen essays from former CMP fellows and guest speakers, offering original perspectives on everything from the launch of the feisty Southern Weekend to the rise of the Chinese weblog.

Copies of the book are now available at Cosmos Books locations in Hong Kong, and will be available soon on the publisher’s website.
Chapters in the book include: “Launching Southern Weekend,” by Zuo Fang; “Ten Years at Caijing,” an account of one of China’s leading business and current affairs magazines by its founder and editor in chief, Hu Shuli; “Libel Law in China,” and account by lawyer Pu Zhiqiang of the history of libel in China and his observations based on defendants he has represented; “Rebuilding and Renewal in China,” an essay by political reform activist and scholar Chen Ziming; “Gradual Reform in China’s Media,” observations on changes in China’s media by veteran journalist Yang Jisheng.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 23, 2008, 3:30pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Continuing our series of Chinese voices on the topic of economic and political reform — see previous posts here and here — we offer readers a translation of a recent talk by former People’s Daily editor in chief Zhou Ruijin (周瑞金). Zhou is best known to most as “Huang Fuping” (皇甫平), a nom de plume he used to pen a series of essays in 1991 that had a decisive impact on the debate over China’s future path of development.

[ABOVE: Chinese flag photographed by Philip McMaster available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]

At the outset of the 1990s, following the June 4, 1989, crackdown on democracy protesters in Beijing, China was thrown into internal political turmoil over the direction of reforms. There was a resurgence of leftist elements within the Communist Party who resisted economic reforms as part of a general charge against liberalization (自由化).
The essays of “Huang Fuping” voiced strong support for Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and answered the leftist debate over whether China’s reforms were really “surnamed She (socialism) or surnamed Zi (capitalism)” (姓社还是姓资). Zhou Ruijin was serving at the time as deputy editor in chief of Shanghai’s Liberation Daily.
On September 6, Zhou Ruijin spoke in Guangzhou as part of the Lingnan Auditorium Series (岭南大讲堂). In his talk Zhou discussed political reform and “institutional renewal” as the heart of China’s latest round of social and political debate over the direction of reforms.
Portions of Zhou Ruijin’s talk follow:

Guangdong is on the front lines of reform and opening, and Guangdong’s reformers are bold, not afraid to be the first to make a move. From Comrade Ren Zhongyi (任仲夷) to Comrade Yuan Geng (袁庚) — all of these characters form a whole generation of reform leaders with a strong sense of idealism and possessed of strong contemporary political awareness. Guangdong’s reforms are again been passed along, although they hang precariously by a thread. This year Premier Wen Jiabao came to Guangdong on an inspection visit and gave his hearty approval to the latest round of Guangdong’s though liberation movement, and he talked about new reform tasks that needed to be tackled. Here once again is the hope that Guangdong will fulfill its longstanding role as a window, model and experiment for the rest of the nation, that its soldiers will march at the front of the formation, that it will blaze new trails.
Investigations into China’s third major debate over reform
The achievements of market reforms over the past 30 years have been witnessed by everyone. But market reforms have also accumulated a number of problems, and in 2004 a major debate broke out. At that time some people seized on the loss of state-owned assets in the process of state enterprise reform, and they used these extreme cases to deny the entire process of enterprise reform. At the same time they took exception to housing reforms, education reforms and healthcare reforms. As these problems touched on issues of immediate concern to the rights of ordinary people, they really reverberated. This round of [social] debate is different from the previous two debates over the commodity economy (商品经济) and the market economy in that it is not primarily ideological in nature, but rather about very real questions of popular interests and livelihood, and so debate has persisted much longer.
In January 2006 I wrote a piece called “Reforms Cannot Be Shaken.” I felt that on the problems we are now facing the two sides of the debate were not greatly at odds. I also acknowledged six problems with market reforms. First, there is the widening of the three big gaps, between domestic regions, between the city and the countryside, and between rich and poor. Figures released by the World Bank show that China’s Gini coefficient has risen from 16 percent prior to reform and opening to 47 percent, surpassing not only the international warning line of 40 percent but surpassing that of all developed nations. Secondly, social undertakings been severely impeded. In the process of economic development, social undertakings have been overlooked. Work in healthcare, education and culture, for example, have fallen behind. The battle against SARS in 2003 made this even more obvious, exposing the weakness of healthcare infrastructure in the countryside. In 2004, the central party promoted the idea of people-based and scientific development, and this offered a new view of development that is comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable. It is not only the economy that must develop, but also politics, society and culture. Social and economic development have to go hand in hand . . . Only in this way can we achieve sustainable development. Everyone has witnessed the change in recent years, as GDP has grown rapidly and tax revenues have expanded, that many areas have built huge buildings and renovated old city neighborhoods. Government buildings have been erected with lavishness, but education, health and culture have not been given the priority they should. Many rural children cannot attend school, many urban and township residents cannot afford to buy homes and endure poor living conditions, etc. In particular, a social safety net has not yet been established. This has brought about the third problem, which is the prominence of problems of basic livelihood. For example, difficulties finding employment, going to school, seeing the doctor, finding a place to live, growing crime, etc., issues that concern ordinary people — all of these are accumulating, and cannot be resolved in one fell swoop. The fourth issue is that our method of development is rough and unrefined. A high-level of input and consumption has brought serious waste of energy, raw materials and assets. Figures in 2006 told us that while we produced four percent of the world’s economic output, we consumed 32 percent of the world’s steel, 40 percent of its concrete, 25 percent of its aluminum, 23 percent of its copper, 30 percent of its zinc and 18 percent of its nickel, and 31 percent of new demand for oil was generated by China. Fifth, we have ecological destruction and pollution of the environment, and one particularly serious problem is the shortage of potable water. The sixth problem is the spread of corruption, of collusion between officials and business interests, of exchange between money and power. The general mood of society is poor, and issues of crime and safety still need to be dealt with.
Both sides of our major debate have the same view of these six problems, but they disagree as to their causes. One side believes that they are a direct result of market reforms, that having a market economy necessarily means that gaps will widen, that the divide between rich and poor will expand, and corruption become rampant. The other side believes that market reforms have not yet been soundly implemented, that the problem is not the general move in the direction of a market economy but rather problems in the specific route chosen to reform, that power has interfered in the market, that power and capital have combined forces, and this has widened the wealth gap and brought the spread of corruption. That is to say, that these problems arise from lagging political reform. In my piece “Reforms Cannot Be Shaken,” I wrote from a theoretical perspective about major shifts in the nature of key problems, that the government’s system for administrative management had not changed, that the shift had not yet been made toward a public service model of government, realizing that after basic material subsistence issues had been resolved we needed to go further in providing fair and effective public goods, such as education, healthcare, housing, pensions, judicial fairness, information symmetry, democratic rights, etc. And so I said that we are right now “holding the bowl level with both hands to eat meat” (端起碗来吃肉), suggesting we have resolved the problem of food and clothing but we still “set down our chopsticks to curse our mothers”, meaning that it is still tough for us to get work, find a home, afford the doctor, get an education, find justice under the law, and we still do not have transparent information, or the right to participate or express our views, etc. This is the result of market reforms not going far enough.
After that essay was published it found favor with the central party, and once they had looked into its background (发表背景) they expressed immediate support. Not long after, in early March, as the “two meetings” were going into session, President Hu Jintao visited with the Shanghai delegation and gave a speech called, “We Must Unshakingly Promote Reform and Opening,” and he said we must improve the scientific basis of reform and opening decisions and raise coordination [with other pressing issues] of reform and opening moves. He was talking about letting all people taste the fruits of reform and opening. This is the note the central party has struck in this third major debate.
Changing methods of development to break through development problems
So why is it that market reforms have accumulated so many problems along with their achievements? There are now many different analyses of this question from a theoretical perspective, and most boil down to the basic point that we have only been doing market economics but have not commensurately carried out political reforms, that the reallocation of resources has not placed the market in the leading position but has allowed unchecked power to enter the marketplace. This has caused a growing gap between rich and poor and fueled the spread of corruption. Mr. Chen Zhiwu, a professor of finance at Yale University, has researched this topic over the last two years. In one of his articles he points out that no country that has carried out privatization and market economics — no matter whether it is the United States, Britain, Germany, Russia or the transitional countries of Eastern Europe — has a gap in national income as large as China’s. Chen Zhiwu believes that privatization and the market economy are not root causes of runaway income disparities. He believes that the problem lies in the fact that China lack an effective mechanism for putting power in check, and so all resources are controlled by administrative power, and must go through state-owned enterprises and state-run banks, etc., which means that vast majority of resources affecting ordinary people are allocated by the government. As government power is subject to no checks and balances, and as resource allocation is handled by the government on behalf of the market through a state system, these resources and their opportunities are necessarily meted out among those with power and with connections to power. More resources are allocated to the “first world,” comprising places like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, then come other provinces and autonomous regions of the second world, and then come the counties, which receive yet fewer resources . . . Chen Zhiwu believes that this marriage between the pyramid of income and the pyramid of power speaks to fact that whoever has power and connections can access riches, can seek out and find opportunities for work at a higher income. This is another way of saying that those seeking wealth and higher income must travel the road where power and business intersect (官商勾结的道路). When the government steps in for the market in allocating resources, the governing principle of resource allocation is not efficiency — allocation is not market driven. Nor does allocation occur under the principle of fairness — there is no system by which citizens can check power and ask questions. Therefore, the only principle [of resource allocation] is power. This kind of economy is a power economy. He believes this is a principle reason for the growing gap between rich and poor and the spread of corruption.
Looking at the crux of the problems lately facing [China], what is the way forward for reform? This requires a new round of thought liberation (解放思想) so that we can slice anew through reforms. First of all, if this latest thought liberation differs from those in the past, this lies primarily in the fact that the previous two liberations of thought were ideological in nature, while this time the focus is on adjusting the structure of benefit distribution [in our country]. Previous liberations were about returning benefit to the people, while this time emphasizes returning rights to the people, about granting rights to citizens. The party’s 17th Congress talked about the right to know, right to express, right to participate and right to monitor, about the need to protect the rights demands of the citizens, including carrying out fair and effective allocation of public goods. Previous thought liberations focused on resolving problems on the level of thought. It was enough to raise recognition and awareness. This time around the focus is on institutional renewal (制度创新), on the building of regulations and mechanisms, improving the socialist market economic system on the basis of the legal system. The adjustment of benefit patterns and the granting of rights to the people, these are institutional matters in and of themselves. So we can only achieve these two goals through institutional renewal and regulatory protections . . .
The task of this latest round of thought liberation is to break through traditional modes and concepts of development, on the one hand setting up new development methods to promote economic development, on the other hand changing the political mode of “omnipotence” (全能主义). So the focus of this round of thought liberation is the deepening of political reform, promoting institutional reform and constructive development in a “four-in-one” model encompassing the economy, politics, culture and society.

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 16, 2008, 11:46am HK]

By David Bandurski — Earlier this week we posted the latest reform related piece by prominent party scholar Li Junru (李君如), in which he argues that China has made substantial progress over the last 30 years not only on economic reform but also on political reform. Li said party leaders had “promoted democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic governance and democratic monitoring” and had worked hard “to ensure the citizens’ right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to monitor (知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权). [Frontpage Image of Mao at Tiananmen by Davidfg available at Flickr under Creative Commons license.]
But in an editorial in yesterday’s edition of Southern Metropolis Daily, Nanjing professor Shao Jian (邵建) wrote of the failure to implement democracy at the county and township level as a primary cause leading to abuse of power and cases of mass social unrest like those seen recently in Weng’an and Menglian.
Shao’s piece does not address Li Junru’s remarks directly, but opens up the issue of political reform by addressing remarks over the weekend by economist Zhang Wuchang (张五常), who rather boldly suggested that China had already arrived at “what is in Chinese history, and even in human history, the best system.”
Before leaping into Shao’s Southern Metropolis Daily editorial it is worth noting that while “political reform” has persisted as a topic in China’s media over the last year, there is no particular indication that the issue is growing, and it is premature to suggest, as some commentators have, that change is in the air.
In fact, the language of “political reform”, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革) has moderated somewhat since last year’s 17th National Congress. The following is a graph plotting all articles in the mainland media (300+ newspapers) making use of the term “political reform” since October 2007:

There is a drop in November 2007, following the peak that came with the 17th National Congress, and a large peak again with the National People’s Congress and a wave of discussion about “super-ministry reform.”
We are probably approaching another October peak, and can expect to see more intensified coverage (on a statistical basis) of issues like “intra-party democracy” (党内民主) and “thought liberation” (解放思想).
As for real and substantial progress on political reform — don’t hold your breath. Having said that, we are hearing some interesting voices on political reform and democracy. Shao Jian’s editorial follows in full:

“There is No Such Thing as the Best System, Only a Better System”
By Shao Jian (邵建)
At a market economics forum hosted recently in Beijing, participants held that “the system and rules in various regions of China have experienced huge change over the last 30 years, and clear signs of this can be seen in the protection of private property, the steady decline of the public economy, and in the gradual development of private enterprise, which now comprises half of the overall economy.” On this basis, Chinese economist Zhang Wuchang (张五常) asserted: “Over the last 30 years China has groped about and found what is in Chinese history, and even in human history, the best system.” From the standpoint of “political correctness” (政治正确), this statement is not a problem naturally. But for so-called systems, no matter what kind we’re talking about, there is really no such thing as “the best.”
China has gone through 30 years of reform, and the main thrust has been economic reform, whose achievements were enumerated by the forum participants above. But I personally do not share their optimism. Not long ago I saw some numbers about how state-owned assets account for more than 75 percent of total assets, and that by contrast total private assets (民间总资产) account for less than 25 percent. Assuming these figures are accurate, we cannot really say that that we’re seeing the steady decline of the public economy, nor can we say that the private economy accounts for half of the overall economy. Unless we accelerate economic reform, even with another 30 years we will not reach the point where half of the economy is private. This cannot be called a market economy, but only a “Chinese market economy” (中国市场经济). Theoretically speaking, a market economy should not have such a robust state-owned economy.
Market economies are about opening up rights and benefits to the people, not about government power. When inequality persists between rights and power (权力和权利), the market’s basic character cannot be competition. The problem is that when power creeps inside, can we really expect rights and interests (权利) on the one hand and power (权力) on the other to enter into fair competition? Needless to say, in many state monopolized sectors rights are excluded altogether and there is no competition whatsoever to speak of.
The obstacles to further economic reform in China clearly do not lie in the economy, but in another critical place. In my view, the crux of the Weng’an and Menglian incidents is the fact that democracy has not been properly carried out at the county and township levels. Some commentators have attributed the Weng’an incident to local government bureaucracy, saying that after the incident occurred key local officials were unable to make decisions properly . . . But this view is only skin-deep. The logic of an official, after all, is to be responsible to whomever invests him with power. If those above invest officials with power they are naturally going to handle matters according to the designs and purposes of these superiors. As in the case of Menglian, they will not hesitate to mobilize police power against the villagers. Two points in Yunnan province’s report [on the Menglian incident] should particularly draw our attention. The first is that the local rubber company had long provided the county party secretary with a luxury off-road vehicle for his own personal use. The second is that a small number of county leaders were stakeholders in the rubber enterprise and received shares of the profits . . . We can quite plainly determine in whose interests police were mobilized. These two incidents were not at all about improper handling [by party bureaucrats]. Instead, they bring institutional dilemmas into sharp relief. If we do not deal [with such issues] from this standpoint [of institutional failures], it is hard to envision fundamental change of any sort.
I must emphasize that I am not a negativist, but there is little need for us to harp on our achievements. If we dwell a bit more on our problems this will allow us to seek further improvements. I am confident that on this question my sentiments as here expressed will appeal to common sense. But Mr. Zhang Wuchang tells us instead that right now at this very moment we have the best system in human history. One of the themes of the above-mentioned forum was how China can pursue further reforms looking back now on these three decades. Zhang’s logic tell us we need not do anything at all. We are already the best. I think the popular expression contradicts [this reasoning] most succinctly: “There is no such thing as best, only better.” Zhang’s words fail to recognize this. In point of fact, humanity cannot arrive at the best in terms of choosing systems. As Churchill once said concerning democracy, it is the worst form of government except that humanity has not yet been able to find a better one. And so we see that even in democratic societies the assessment of the democratic system is only that it is the least awful.
[Churchill said: “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”]
In terms of the market economy and democratization, if our system reforms are not yet complete we need to make further shifts – and aside from putting our nose to the grinding wheel there are no other choices.
(The writer is a professor at Nanjing Xiaozhuang University)

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 12, 2008, 9:52pm HK]

By David Bandurski — As we approach the next lively session of the 17th CCP Central Committee — this will be the third plenum for any poor soul who’s counting — the process of “preparing public opinion,” or yulun zhunbei (舆论准备), has already begun. Preparing opinion for what, exactly? Well, that’s almost anyone’s guess. [Frontpage Image: Tiananmen Square photographed by Noneck available under Creative Commons license at Flickr].
But a major policy piece in yesterday’s edition of Beijing Daily, and splashed up at top Web portals and newspapers, gives readers a mouthful about political reform, or what is called in Chinese “political system reform,” or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革).
The Beijing Daily piece is written by Li Junru (李君如), the vice president of China’s Central Party School (CCPS), the top training facility for CCP leaders. Directly above Li at CCPS is newly-minted politburo standing committee member and probable Hu Jintao successor in 2012 Xi Jinping (习近平).
One of the CCP’s top academicians, Li Junru is generally seen as a proponent of ideas associated with President Hu Jintao. He has been an active voice in praising the policies of Hu, particularly efforts to promote “intra-party democracy,” or dangnei minzhu (党内民主).
Li’s central point in the Beijing Daily piece is to take issue with the notion that China’s reform up to now has been predominantly economic in nature, and that political reform has waited in the wings. Political reform, Li says, has always been an “integral part” of the overall reform process.
For the moment, we will spare readers an analysis of Li’s points — which again and again elicit the eye-rolling response, “Yes, but . . . ” — and offer the fullest translation we can of the text given time restrictions:

For many years now a certain kind of public opinion has held that reform in China began with economic reforms, that China’s reform has primarily consisted of reforms to the economic system, and that up to now perhaps no political reforms have taken place. This is a misunderstanding.
Everyone is concerned about China’s reform and opening, particularly about political reform (政治体制改革) and the building of democratic politics (民主政治建设), and this is a normal thing to see. Because as an integral part of our country’s overall reform, political reform must deepen along with economic and social development, and it must be steadily promoted as interest in political participation grows among the people. In fact, our party places great priority on this question. We needn’t look to the future, for it was raised at last year’s 17th National Congress that “people’s democracy is the life of socialism,” and the Second Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee said [back in February this year] that we “must lift up even higher the flag of people’s democracy.”
For many years now a certain kind of public opinion has held that reform in China began with economic reforms, that China’s reform has primarily consisted of reforms to the economic system, and that up to now perhaps no political reforms have taken place. This is a misunderstanding. Because the basic fact it fails to recognize is that the reason the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee [in 1978] could raise the task of reform was because that year’s debate over the standard for measuring the truth created an atmosphere of thought liberation and made possible the advancement of democratic politics (民主政治). One need only read Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s essay, “Looking Ahead with Emancipated Minds, a Practical and Realistic Mindset and a Sense of Solidarity,” to have a sense that from the very beginning China’s reforms happened as democratic politics was driven forward. Seeing as ours is a vast nation of more than a billion people, and our party has tens of millions of members, we can expect to have all kinds of opinions. And this determines that carrying out reform and opening and modernization in China without democracy is unfeasible, and not promoting democracy in an orderly manner is also unfeasible.
One important reason why people have had misimpressions about China’s political reform is that we have spent a lot of time researching Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s strategic thinking, but not enough time researching his tactical thinking about leading reforms. When we look at these 30 years of reform and opening we can see that our party has been both strategic and tactical in the process of promoting political reform.
Political reform in China has at least eight methods and characteristics, and these characteristics and methods have already brought profound changes to Chinese society over the last 30 years.
Looking at this from the vantage point of tactics and strategy, political reform in China has at least eight methods and characteristics that deserve our attention and priority:
The first is that [the party] has linked political reform and economic reform, using reforms to the economic system to advance [political reforms]. When the household responsibility system was instituted, for example, this dissolved the people’s communes that had been referred to as one of the “three red flags,” and this brought the set up of organs of political power at the township level – county-level people’s congresses were established, and delegates from the county level down were directly elected by citizens. In fact, over the last 30 years, every advance in economic reforms has been matched with a deepening of political reform, and this process has never halted. Institutional reforms that we have instituted more recently also have this character. This reform process within State Council institutions that people have termed “super-ministry reform” is a major move toward deepening reform of the administrative system; it is a necessary step in developing the socialist market economy, and it is also an integral part of the deepening of political reforms and an important aspect of the development of socialist democracy (社会主义民主). In particular, this [“super-ministry”] reform has great significance for changing the orientation of our government, in working toward a service-oriented, responsible and clean government under rule of law, and in bringing about a mechanism for the mutual checking and coordination of the powers of decision-making, administration and monitoring.
Second is the linking of democracy development and the building of rule of law, emphasizing that democracy must by systematized, have legal sanction and promote the running of state affairs according to the law. Addressing the “Cultural Revolution” mindset equating democracy with anarchy, and the tendency to periodic surges of populism, Deng Xiaoping emphasized early in the reform and opening process that democracy had to be systematized and have legal sanction. Over the past 30 years, we have amended and improved our Constitution, abolishing clauses and regulations that do not accord with the Constitution and the democratic spirit. We have laid out a whole series of laws and regulations, including a Criminal Law, a Civil Law, a Code of Criminal Procedure and a Law of Civil Procedure. We have, moreover, created a system of lawyers, and we have built a fair, efficient and authoritative judicial system, and have carried out judicial reforms with the goal of ensuring that judicial organs and prosecutorial organs carry out trial proceedings independently and in a fair manner as specified by law. A society with thousands of years of autocratic tradition is in the process of changing to a society under rule of law.
Third is the tying of political reform to the respect and protection of human rights, ensuring the whole society’s right to equal participation (平等参与) and right to equal development (平等发展). Ever since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee [in 1978] we have been working to set things right, thoroughly correcting the trampling of human rights that has occurred in the past, and undertaking a large-scale rehabilitation of unjust cases. Since reform and opening was instituted, we have not only developed the economy, working hard to ensure citizens’ right to subsistence and right to development, but we have also permitted and supported citizens in taking part in various non-public sectors of the economy, affirming that the political identities of new social strata are “builders for the work of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” We instituted the personal identification system, permitting citizens to freely seek employment including in other domestic areas; we instituted an entry and exit system permitting citizens to go overseas to study or travel. In recent years we have taken further steps to build democratic mechanisms, diversify the forms of democracy, widen the channels for democracy, and have in accordance with the law promoted democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic governance and democratic monitoring, working hard to ensure the citizens’ right to know, right to participate, right to express and right to monitor (知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权). These reforms have safeguarded citizens’ human rights, and they have stirred up the vigor and vitality of Chinese society.
Fourth is the linking together of the development of democracy and rule of law and the improvement of grass-roots self-governing institutions, allowing the people to experience first-hand the material benefits of reform. Within China’s political system, the set-up in the countryside and in urban districts and enterprises of village committees, community committees, professional committees and other autonomous peoples’ organizations is a major distinguishing characteristic. Since the onset of the reform and opening policy, we have not only carried out direct elections for village committees and township reform experiments throughout the countryside, but we have also uniformly carried out systems of openness in government affairs and openness in village affairs. We have also made clear strides in the building of communities (社区建设). Moreover, the building of grassroots democracy is now linking up with the project of building a harmonious society, for which improvement of democracy is a focus, and this has found broad support among the masses.
Fifth is the linking together of governance by the ruling party according to the law and the principle of legal participation in the government affairs by parties not in power. Many people probably do not understand what it means that the China democracy parties (中国民主党派) participate in politics. Within our political system, while China’s eight democracy parties and federations of industry and commerce are not political parties, they are parties that participate in government affairs. There are four basic points to this process of participation: 1) participation in government, including serving in leadership positions within the national government; 2) participating in the deciding of state policies and principles and in negotiation for the selection of leaders; 3) participating in the management of state affairs; 4) participating in the formulation and implementation of national principles, policies, laws and regulations. This can be seen particularly in the degree of participation of democracy party delegates and non-party affiliated delegates in the people’s congress, the standing committee of the NPC and in special committees of the NPC. These [changes] were set down in the Central Committee’s 1989 document. Over the last several years, with the support of the ruling party, the role of participating parties in democratic politics in China has grown larger and larger.
六是把党内民主与人民民主结合起来，以党内民主来带动人民民主。中国共产党是一个大党，有7300多万党员，比欧洲一些国家的国民还要多。党要保持先进性，并且在引领全社会的民主政治发展中体现先进性，必须积极推进党内民主。中国共产党已经充分意识到这一问题的重要性和紧迫性。十七大报告在保障党员民主权利、完善党代会制度、严格实行民主集中制、改革党内选举制度等方面，提出了一系列创新的思路和举措。特别是在选拔任用干部问题上，已经废除了终身制，完善了以民主为原则的干部任免制度，给广大德才兼备的从政人员提供了竞聘上岗的机会，等等。这些党内民主举措，也为广大人民群众提供了民主的知情权、参与权和监督权。
七是把党内监督、行政监督、法律监督与公民直接监督结合起来，建立和完善了公民舆论监督和信访制度。十一届三中全会的一大功绩，就是重新建立了中央纪律检查委员会。这几年，在党内监督方面进行了一系列制度创新，并且把党内监督与群众举报结合起来，成效显著。特别是媒体介入监督序列，对于中国民主政治的发展起了很大作用。
八是把选举票决民主与协商民主结合起来，完善了公民有序的政治参与形式。人民通过选举、投票行使权利和人民内部各方面在重大决策之前进行充分协商，尽可能就共同性问题取得一致意见，是我国社会主义民主的两种重要形式。改革开放30年来，中国的选举票决民主不断完善和发展，不仅在公民自治组织的范围内实行了直接选举制度，而且在其它实行间接选举的领域扩大了差额选举，完善了候选人提名方式；特别是在党内民主发展进程中，扩大了基层党组织领导班子成员直接选举和中央、地方党委成员差额选举的范围，实行了候选人无记名投票推荐等民主形式。与此同时，中国的协商民主也在进一步完善和发展。特别是，中国人民政治协商会议这一中国特有的重要民主政治形式，按照政治协商、民主监督、参政议政这三大职能，推动和组织中国各党派、各界别、各民族的政协委员，在党和政府重大决策之前和决策执行过程中，积极参与民主协商、民主监督，很有成效；各级政府也主动实施民主恳谈会、听证会等制度；各人民团体在民主协商中也发挥了积极作用。
应该讲，中国民主政治的这八个方面特点还在发展中，不能说都搞得很好了，但是，这八个方面或者说至少这八个方面，确实是中国政治体制改革的一些具体做法和重要特点，这些做法和特点已经使得中国社会在这30年中发生了极为深刻的变化。那些认为中国只搞经济体制改革，不搞政治体制改革的人，不仅看不到这些基本事实，而且陷入了自身的逻辑悖论。因为他们解释不了，为什么在一个他们认为“高度集权的专制社会”中，会允许公民在市场经济中自由发展，会出现那么成功的市场体系和经济发展。所以，观察和研究中国政治体制改革的特点及其走势，必须立足中国现实，客观地全面地认识中国的改革实践。
-中国的民主政治还刚刚起步，中国的政治体制改革必然还要继续深化
在这里还要强调一点，我们观察中国问题，观察中国的政治体制改革，不仅要观察做了什么，还要从这些已经做的事实中，深入地观察中国政治体制改革和民主政治发展的走势。
作为中国问题的观察者和研究者，我希望大家注意，改革开放以来中国在建设和发展政治文明的过程中出现了三大值得重视的走势：公民有序的政治参与，民主的制度化、法律化，是中国民主政治发展的一大走势；通过党内民主来带动人民民主，是中国民主政治发展的第二大走势；中国共产党在宪法和法律的范围内活动，坚持依法治国、依宪治国，是中国民主政治发展的第三大走势。这三大走势的指向很明确，最终将在中国建立一个坚持中国共产党的领导、人民当家作主和依法治国有机统一的社会主义民主政治体制。
以上是我这几年观察和研究中国政治发展的一些体会。我并不认为中国在民主政治发展方面已经做得很好了，相反，我倒是认为，中国的民主政治还刚刚起步，中国的政治体制改革必然还要继续深化。但是，在中国进行任何一项改革，都必须根据中国的实际，才能健康、有序地发展。我们致力于探索的，应该是、也只能是符合中国的历史和今天国情的，能够真正给中国人民带来安定和幸福的政治体制和民主政治形式。在民主政治的问题上，我们既向人家学习，也不妄自菲薄；既积极推进，也不盲目发展、急于求成。我相信，我们中国人在经济上能够创造出令世人瞩目的奇迹，在政治上也能够创造出既顺应时代发展的进步潮流又具有鲜明中国特色的民主政治体制。
(作者李君如 系中央党校副校长)

FURTHER READING:
“New headway with its Party building concept,” China Daily, November 7, 2007
Full text of Hu’s speech to the 17th National Congress, October 24, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 11, 2008, 4:20pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Following incidents of online violence and breaches of personal privacy, there has been some talk in China about the need to define so-called “human flesh searches” (or “crowdsourcing“) as a criminal offense. But as I remarked when interviewed for a recent news story on the subject, these searches are merely tools, and they can be used to advance any number of agendas. [Frontpage image by Thomas Hawk available under Creative Commons at Flickr.]
In yesterday’s edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post, however, Yang Tao (杨涛), a government prosecutor from Jiangxi province, made the point far more eloquently in explaining why targeting “human flesh searches” through China’s Criminal Law is a slippery distraction.
Yang’s editorial follows:

“’Human Flesh Searches’ Have No Original Sin”
By Yang Tao (杨涛)
Beating attacks had occurred for some time recently at various locations in Jiangxi’s Yichun City, including the Nonghua Center on Yuanshan Avenue and the Sports Center, all involving a middle-aged male targeting unaccompanied woman. These did not involve robbery or sexual assault, but were attacks on the head with an iron hammer. For a time, women [in the city] were very apprehensive. Then a citizen posted a message on the Internet called, “Calling on a Human Flesh Search for the Head-Chopper,” which drew close to a hundred responses and more than 2,000 visits . Included in the responses were descriptions of six similar attacks, and the characteristics of the attacker started to emerge. On September 1, the police centered on a suspect and took him into custody (Jiangnan Metropolis Daily, September 6). If we say that the “Tongxu (铜须) Gate” and “cat mutilation” incidents of 2006 . . . show the negative effects of the so-called “human flesh search”, well then, the “Head-Chopping Case” (敲头案) is a classic case of citizens using the Internet to seek justice. In fact, there have been many cases like the “Head-Chopping Case,” including the “Case of the Kneeling Deputy Mayor” and “Tiger-Gate.”
Not long ago, National People’s Congress Standing Committee member Zhu Zhigang (朱志刚) talked about “online wanted posters” (网上通缉) and “human flesh searches” disclosing the surnames of citizens, personal phone numbers and other basic information. He said this behavior was a serious violation of citizens’ basic rights, that its consequences were even graver than the sale of personal information, and proposed that “human flesh searches” be regulated in the Criminal Law.
I heartily disagree with this suggestion. The rights-violating behavior egged on by various “human flesh searches” is not presently without legal restrictions. If “human flesh searches” involve insult to another person this can fall under civil infringement, and can give rise to a civil suit. Severe cases may incur punishment for “defamation” (侮辱罪) or “slander” (诽谤罪). Cases involving violations of privacy are also cases of civil infringement and can give rise to civil suits. The only matter worth debating is whether if “human flesh searches” involve serious (情节严重) violations of privacy Criminal Law can be applied in determining punishment. Therefore, what makes it hard to punish “human flesh search” cases is not the absence of relevant legal regulation but rather how those harmed can effectively obtain proof [of wrongdoing]. This is because those Web users releasing private information and spreading rumors and insults are hiding on the Internet, and those who suffer at their hands find it difficult to turn up relevant evidence to support protection of their own rights.
If we view “human flesh searches” themselves as having “original sin,” and if we seek to directly regulate such behavior as a crime, well then, I must regrettably point out that this will be a major blow to the efforts of ordinary people to seek justice. Looking again at the “Head-Chopping Case,” we have to wonder if it were not for a “human flesh search” whether a profile of the attacker would have emerged so quickly and whether the case would have been broken in good time. And seeing as we have been unable, even as “human flesh searches” have given rise to rights infringement, to effectively turn up evidence and locate perpetrators, how is it that we think that once we have regulated “human flesh searches” under criminal law it will become easier to get our hands on evidence and find those responsible?
We can see from the “Head-Chopping Case” that “human flesh searches” can be used as tools to seek justice. Making “human flesh searches” a crime should be rejected from a value standpoint. Like the proposed “real-name registration system for the Web” (网络实名制) that met with the disapproval of the vast majority of people, making “human flesh searches” a crime is unrealistic and impracticable. Concerning “human flesh search engines,” these double-edged swords, we can only “choose the lesser of two evils” and remain tolerant of their existence. And of course we should do our utmost after the fact [of wrongdoing] to punish and regulate [such acts as necessary].

Yang’s editorial was featured in the news section at QQ.com, where it drew hundreds of comments from Web users, including:

From Shenyang:
“Human flesh searches” are tools. If you take a cooking knife and put it in the kitchen it can be used to cut up meat and vegetables. But if you kill someone with that knife it becomes a weapon — and the guilt lies not with the knife itself, but with the person.
From Xining City:
We need to be reasonable in making laws. Do you think that just because there are corrupt officials we should sentence anyone who is an official? If you must sentence them then I welcome it.

FURTHER READING:
“Chinese Human Flesh Search Engine Goes Global,” ESWN, April 11, 2008
“The yellow, violent mob culture of a BBS,” Danwei.org, January 16, 2008,
“Letting loose fair game in cyberspace,” China Daily, August 28, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 9, 2008, 11:02am HK]

By David Bandurski — Much coverage of the Chen Shui-ban graft case in China’s official state media has sought to drive home sobering lessons about the faults and foibles of democracy, and particularly of Taiwanese democracy. But in the commentary section of today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, CMP researcher Joseph Cheng argues that there are more important lessons to be drawn from Taiwan’s experiences.

[ABOVE: “Red Shirts,” a photo by Nomadize licensed at flickr under Creative Commons.]

Even in Southern Metropolis Daily‘s rather expurgated version the editorial is strong. We offer our translation without further ado:

How Should We Read the Chen Shui-bian Graft Case?
By Cheng Jinfu (程金福)
On August 31, Southern Metropolis Daily ran an interview with former New Party chairman Xie Qida (谢启大) in its Commentary Weekly section discussing the impact of the Chen Shui-bian graft scandal on Taiwan. Reading the piece, I found it beneficial, but there are three points I think we must not overlook concerning the case as it has evolved to its present situation.
The first thing we should see is democracy at work. Joseph Schumpeter once argued that the basic nature of democracy is to give citizens the ability to replace one government with another. If only the government can be changed, if only the voters can choose between (at least two) different political platforms, then the threat of tyranny can be prevented. Looking back on Chen Shui-bian’s eight years in office, the dangers of tyranny are astonishing: the “procuratorate” was paralyzed, becoming little more than an empty shell; corruption investigators kept cases under wraps and refused to investigate; Wu Kun-shih (吴淑珍) [the father of Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen] used the president’s power to make business deals; and as the graft case cropped up, even with hordes of red-clad protesters [calling for Chen’s resignation], the Chen family still firmly held their ground. Just try to imagine. If the Ma government had not replaced the Chen government, and if the DPP had remained in power despite Chen’s exit, would the corruption of Chen Shui-bian’s family have been aired out and justice served, even with documentary evidence provided by Swiss authorities?
Secondly, we see the power of the judicial system. Taiwan’s judicial system is independent in Taiwan’s political structure. But in the “Chen era,” when, as Xie Qida (谢启大) has put it, there “was a problem with the head assigned by the chief executive” (“由行政长官指派的那个头有问题”), the independent judiciary was rendered incapable in practice of having the effect it should have, and the actions of former Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau Chief Yeh Mao-sheng (叶茂盛) in keeping a lid on the case is a clear illustration of this.
Fortunately, democracy is not only an effective mechanism of staving off the dangers of tyranny, but it also has effective mechanisms allowing it to correct its own errors. The people may have been hoodwinked into electing Chen Shui-bian, but they can also come to their senses and make changes. Xie Qida said: “Taiwan’s judiciary has a history going back 60 years, and there are some pretty good people there. So long as they are around there is still hope.” We can see this process at work in the investigation into Chen and his family that has unfolded since August 14.
Thirdly, we see the efforts of the media. When news of Chen Shui-bian’s alleged money laundering activities was brought to light, Taiwan’s media went to great lengths to keep up with the case. Political commentary programs of all kinds invited a range of people to offer background, comments and information — political figures, media people, well-known commentators, legal experts and professors, people involved in the investigation, and even people with relevant experience from business and financial circles. Of course we could see in the media at times glimpses of pettiness and nastiness and ploys to get the upper hand commercially, and it is not difficult to see how the media can in pursuing the truth slide across the line into slander. But in my view, so long as media do not lose sight of the politics itself in this process, so long as they do not veer from the principle of truth-seeking and fact-seeking, so long as they do not relinquish their responsibility to the public interest, all of this excess noise and temper is a price the public should be willing to accept. There is no such thing in this world as a free lunch, and there is no such thing as a perfect media.
Ethnic divisions within Taiwan . . . confrontation between the “green” and the “blue”; all of these issues are about Taiwan’s progress toward “localizing” democracy (民主迈进的”本土”问题). These are also tests facing democracy as a result of historical experience, present frictions, cultural adaptation, etc. But from these I also see a more positive side to democracy, and positive inspiration for our own building of democracy and efforts to fight corruption. Taiwanese democracy has experienced birth pains with Chen Shui-bian. But what is fortunate is that Chen Shui-bian has exposed the worst acts of falsehood and corruption a political figure can muster, and this ultimately serves the judicial pursuit justice, and it serves to encourage and educate the media. Only in this way can the people of Taiwan through time and practice become mature citizens. And this once again reminds us that if our moral expectations of political leaders do not rest on the checks and balances of a democratic system, this is a dangerous thing indeed.

FURTHER READING:
“Wipe off that blood and stand up again,” Taipei Times, August 26, 2008
“Chen Shui-bian denies 31m$ bride accusation,” China Daily, September 4, 2008
“Taiwan graft probe spans four continents,” Reuters, August 30, 2008
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 5, 2008, 4:35pm]

By David Bandurski — Muzzled by propaganda orders in the aftermath of the May 12 Sichuan earthquake — which claimed more than 80,000 lives according to the government’s latest figures — China’s media steered clear of thornier questions about government responsibility and shoddy school construction. But yesterday, as Premier Wen Jiabao returned to the epicenter of the Sichuan quake with words of reassurance, veteran journalist and former CMP fellow Zhai Minglei (翟明磊) broached one of the most sensitive questions through his one-man online “newspaper” Yi Bao.
Can earthquakes be predicted?
The article published yesterday at Yi Bao was written this summer by CMP Director Qian Gang, the author of The Great Tangshan Earthquake. Qian also worked formerly as a journalist at the China Earthquake Administration, where he was chief editor of China Disaster Prevention.
Zhai Minglei explains that in view of the article’s sensitivity it could not be published through mainstream media. His introduction to the piece follows a bold red headline that reads: “Yi Bao Breaks Through Press Restrictions: Exclusive Report.”
The introduction brims with the language of professional obligation. “Blood cannot be shed in vain. We must ask questions. This is where the dignity of our profession lies,” he writes.
The following is a portion of the brief editor’s note that precedes Qian Gang’s article:

Yi Bao Editors Note:
What is printed here is the most important article in the history of Yi Bao to date. In the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, official and other media began hotly hammering home the point that earthquakes cannot be predicted . . . Officials at various levels as well as experts stepped out to say that earthquakes cannot be predicted and that there were no predictions. The Central Publicity Department defined school construction and earthquake prediction as two major areas of reporting that could not be touched. In my view, these two bans are an assault on the vitality of the people and show scorn for their intelligence.
If a people cannot face up to reality and learn from their life experiences, how can they stand in the world?

Zhai Minglei goes on to write that while the ban on coverage of shoddy school construction was to a definite degree broken by mainland media, the question of earthquake prediction was effectively covered up.
The deeper Qian Gang delved into this question, Zhai writes, the more he realized his findings would be difficult to report through mainstream Chinese media.
“Therefore, he entrusted Yi Bao to publish the article on the mainland,” Zhai writes. “Of course, we have already anticipated the risks.”
No stranger to risks, Zhai is certainly taking a calculated one here, and this should be an interesting test of the possibilities of citizen media in China.
A brief portion of Qian Gang’s article follows:

“It is Impossible to Predict a Major Earthquake? No!”
By Qian Gang
The Wenchuan earthquake [on May 12 this year] shook the entire world. This utter destruction coming without warning caused the public to wonder: why couldn’t the Wenchuan earthquake have been forecasted? And why weren’t precautions taken beforehand?
News reports on the Wenchuan earthquake and the degree of information openness was increased [over the past]. But efforts by the media to ask tough questions and reflect back [on the disaster] were choked back, and questions like earthquake prediction were impossible to talk about freely. The public could only watch as language like “earthquake prediction is a tough question worldwide” (or even, “earthquakes cannot be predicted”) became dominant, and they lacked adequate information and the knowledge necessary to work through their doubts and resentment.
And what is the truth?
Today’s talk begins with these two pictures. Can everyone see them clearly? They are maps of the epicenter of the Wenchuan earthquake. Had they been released after the May earthquake in Wenchuan, this would not at all have been strange. But these are maps from 16 years ago, printed in Wenchuan County Journal (汶川县志).

This is an edition of Wenchuan County Journal published in 1992. It already tells us that this area of Wenchuan is vulnerable to earthquake activity, that a fault zone crosses the county and that the geology of the area is very complex.
Wenchuan is still the name of a fault zone. This book is Earthquakes in China, a seminal work in earthquake study by China’s senior seismologist Li Shanbang (李善邦). In this book his mentions the Tianshui-Wenchuan Fault Zone (天水汶川地震带).
And this book, 100 Major 20th Century Disasters in China, is one I edited together with Mr. Geng Qingguo (耿庆国). The book talks about how in 1976 two earthquakes of above magnitude 7 occured at Songpan (松潘) and Pingwu (平武) in Sichuan. Songpan and Pingwu are in the same region as the Wenchuan quake, with Songpan in the Aba (阿坝) region and Pingwu in Mianyang City (绵阳市). This book actually goes so far as to mention that in 1976, before the earthquakes in Songpan and Pingwu, earthquake forecasting workers pinpointed a major quake in the Mt. Longmen area [at the northwest boundary of the Sichuan Basin]. When they determined the earthquake epicenter at the time, one worker sketched a circle on the map and said, “This place is very possibly the epicenter.” That area was Yingxiu (映秀), the epicenter of this year’s Wenchuan earthquake. One cannot help but feel pained by this history and reality. So many years ago, this place, Yingxiu, was determined by our own scientific experts to be the epicenter of a major earthquake.
After the Wenchuan quake struck the public had many questions. Why had this earthquake not been predicted? Why weren’t precautions taken? The following image is of the offices of the earthquake analysis and forecasting division of the Sichuan Provincial Earthquake Administration. So many mysteries are just waiting to see the light of day at those offices . . .

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 3, 2008, 4pm HK]