By David Bandurski — The news page at QQ.com yesterday was dominated by media-related stories. There was foreign ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao (刘建超) denying suggestions made by some overseas media that Olympics security procedures discriminated against certain groups of foreigners, including Africans and Mongolians. There was the news story from the Global Times about how Germany’s Stern magazine had offended the Chinese people with its map of China.
But topping the list of news stories, with a big headline splashed across the page, was news, re-run from Xinhua News Agency’s International Herald Leader, that scores of formerly taboo foreign publications were now available in the capital, thanks to the approach of the Olympic Games.
“The Olympics are coming! Foreign publications are coming too!” the article gushed.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of news page at QQ.com, 10:05 pm, July 21, 2008.]

The story said hundreds of employees from China’s “largest importer of printed materials” were busy working overtime to get publications out. Foreign publications would be made available through eight specially designated newsstands within the Olympic park, distributers said.
QQ emphasized in its headline the article’s point that publications would be available to “ordinary city residents” as well. But the newsstands are scheduled to operate until only September 24, after which time, presumably, “ordinary city residents” will be out of luck.
In an interesting illustration of how commercial calculations increasingly call the shots in China’s media, the International Herald Leader sought to sell the foreign publications story with references to America’s Playboy magazine and whether it would be available on Olympic newsstands.
The headline topping the frontpage of the latest edition of the International Herald Leader read, “Playboy’s Olympic Dream,” and the page featured a large image of a foreign male peering at an issue of the magazine. The bottom half of the page was an article about the government’s anti-terrorism efforts in the lead-up to the Games, the headline: “Beijing sounds a people’s war against terrorism.”

[Frontpage of July 21 issue of Xinhua’s International Herald Leader.]

One of the Xinhua publication’s more questionable image choices to go along with the Playboy angle of the story was a view through the gates of the Forbidden City, with the five-colored Olympic rings hanging in the grey sky beyond, and a line of Playboy covers running across the top of the entrance.

[ABOVE: Screenshot from QQ.com of IHL foreign publications story image.]

Will Playboy be available on Olympic newsstands? Responses from distributors, we are told by the International Herald Leader, were “unclear.”
[Posted by David Bandurski, July 22, 2008, 12:13am HK]

By David Bandurski — The word “muckraker,” coined in 1906 by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, has come to typify the hardest of hard-nosed journalism in the West. Words over the weekend from Guangzhou Mayor Zhang Guangning (张广宁) may offer us a moniker more appropriate for tougher Chinese journalists, who labor under an unforgiving system of press controls and are only rarely able to break major stories.
Shall we call them “the nitpickers”?
In a speech made before thousands of swimmers ventured across the Pearl River on Saturday, Mayor Zhang encouraged more media coverage of environmental problems in the Pearl River Delta. He said: “The more the media nitpick, the more we can get people behind the effort to clean up the Pearl River.”
Today, Liu Yikun (刘义昆), a college professor in Wuhan, writes in Changjiang Daily of what he sees as recent shows of tolerance on the part of leaders in Guangdong Province, including Zhang Guangning’s “nitpicking” remark.

[Liu Yikun’s article on media “nitpicking” appears in Changjiang Daily.]

Liu argues that “information openness” and “nitpicking” by China’s media is critical to the overall improvement of governance and the building of “people’s democracy.”
Liu’s piece makes what seems to be a reference to recent unrest in Weng’an, saying that if China wants to prevent “the appearance of large-scale violent events, then media nitpicking is something we need a whole lot more of.”
The title of Liu’s piece gives us another familiar reference, to the “barrier lakes” that were such a concern in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Liu alludes to the words of Wang Yang (汪洋), Guangdong’s party secretary, on July 19, in which he said leaders must listen to the words of the people, and not build up “language barrier lakes.” We might also translate the term as “information barrier lakes.”
A nearly complete translation of Liu’s article follows:

Preventing “Language Barrier Lakes” Requires Nitpicking by the Media
Two things happened on July 19 that speak to the liberal mindedness of leaders in Guangdong Province.
At the recent graduation ceremony of a regular party discipline training session, Provincial Party Secretary Wang Yang (汪洋) demanded that all cadres treat democracy as a value to pursue, that they respect and act according to the will of the people, that they not obstruct the popular will, creating “language barrier lakes” (言塞湖). (Nanfang Daily, July 20).
The same day, the Guangzhou city government held an event in which thousands of people swam across the Pearl River. Mayor Zhang Guangning (张广宁) led the charge into the water, saying: “The more the media nitpick, the more we can get people behind the effort to clean up the Pearl River.” (Information Times, July 20).
Guangzhou’s media are famous for their nitpicking, whether in Guangzhou itself or in other areas, whether big or small, good or bad. In the wake of many news events – the Sun Zhigang affair, the South China Tiger controversy, the [hand, foot and mouth] epidemic in Yueyang, the Wenzhou earthquake – we can see nitpicking Guangzhou media doing what they do. Of course, Mayor Zhang Guangning’s words about media nitpicking and improving water quality in the Pearl River is just one case. If we want to avoid “language barrier lakes” and the appearance of large-scale violent events, then media nitpicking is something we need a whole lot more of.
Media serve as an irreplaceable bridge in openness of information and persuasion of the people. In the South China Tiger controversy, online opinion and [mainstream media] supervision of public opinion combined to become one of the most important forces determining the event’s outcome. Shaanxi Province’s vice-governor, Zhao Zhengyong (赵正永) later said that the government’s inability to face up to supervision of public opinion had lead to a loss of public confidence and the wasting of repeated opportunities to set things right.
Media supervision of public opinion is effective because it provides an open platform. Various kinds of information and viewpoints can meet and argue it out in this public sphere (公共领域), and the ultimate result is a fuller and more accurate picture. As China’s recent history shows, when the media can serve as a channel of communication between the government and the people, it becomes a force for development and progress . . .
When Hu Jintao chatted with Internet users through the Strong Nation Forum on June 20, he said: “We put our emphasis on listening to people’s voices extensively and pooling the people’s wisdom when we take action and make decisions.”
Whether or not tolerance can extend to allowing the Internet and other media to nitpick . . . is not just about the need to prevent “language barrier lakes,” but also about ensuring the achievement of people’s democracy. We need not just the tolerance of government leaders, but institutional guarantees as well.

[Posted July 21, 2008, 3:55pm HK]
UPDATE, July 24:
See also Tang Buxi’s article at Blogging for China, July 23, in which he translates yansaihu (言塞湖) as “bottleneck lake.”

By Cheng Jinfu (程金福) — I don’t know when it was that sporting events, so simple perhaps at their origin, became inextricably linked with politics. As we are often reminded lately, many countries boycotted the Olympic Games when they were hosted by Hitler’s Germany back in 1936. And of course, it was table tennis that brokered improving relations between China and the United States in 1971 after years of stand off. [Homepage: Image of Qing general and reformer Zeng Guofan, see below.]
Just last month, when Spain became the European Cup champions, the whole nation was jubilant, the king and the president both came out to celebrate, and we all got a glimpse of sports and politics working hand-in-hand.
Now, as the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games approach, the Olympic emblem of five interlocking rings, representing unity among nations, has morphed into a horrifying image of interlocking handcuffs on the Reporters Without Borders Web site.
Nowadays, it is pointless even to think that we can separate sports from politics.

[ABOVE: Image from the RSF website of 2008 Olympics handcuffs.]

Ever since 1949, China’s relations with the West have been marked by frequent tension and less frequent ease. From the earliest days of PRC rule ideological hostilities drove a wedge between China and the West, between China’s socialism and the West’s capitalism. Tensions deepened in the years following June 4, 1989, as the West imposed sanctions against China, employing economic means to urge China to part ways with its politics of brutality.
Today, ideology seldom takes center stage in international relations. China and the U.S. have established a number of strategic partnerships on issues like anti-terrorism and trade. As China’s economic power grows, China and the global economy are increasingly interdependent, and economic sanctions long ago ceased to be an effective means of dealing with China.
This is perhaps one important reason why a major international sports event like the Olympics is now seen by many in the West as an opportunity to pressure China to improve its human rights situation on a range of issues, including freedom of speech.
China no longer stubbornly asserts the superiority of its socialism over the capitalist countries of the West, and it can be said that international dialogue has successfully broken through this myth of China’s isolationist period. Faced with the fact of Western civilization and its advancement, China also hopes to project a favorable image of its own civilization. This is why it made the Olympic pledges it did, in areas ranging from environmental protection to air quality to the relaxation of restrictions on foreign journalists.
We cannot expect that all of these pledges will be carried out to the fullest extent possible, but at the very least they tell us that China today is no longer as obstinate as it once was, that it is beginning to learn the art of compromise.
The Olympics are an opportunity and a turning point. For China, these international pledges are an opportunity to push for improvements that have been waiting in the wings for years. China is not stubbornly unaware of its own problems. At the same time, another powerful impetus is China’s earnest wish to present a favorable image internationally, and not only as an economic superpower.
For many in the West, this is an opportunity to apply pressure on China and bring it in line with Western, or global, values. On the issue of Tibet, for example, many in the West hope that China can engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama and relax its tight grip on Tibet. On the issue of human rights, in cases like that of activist Hu Jia, many in the West hope China will improve its human rights situation. On the issue of speech freedoms, many in the West hope that China can put an end to its manipulation of the media.
But while both sides could be said to share common goals and interests, lack of trust has always been a problem in mutual relations between China and the West. And distrust is particularly strong on the Chinese side.
Having faced decades of shame at the hands of foreign powers, before and since the so-called “Eight-Power Allied Forces” (八国联军) attacked China in 1901, and having lived through decades of ideological opposition, Chinese can often interpret Western hopes and ideals as “anti-China” attacks.
Some academics in China accept the idea of “universal values” and hope that China will adopt them. Meanwhile, many Chinese oppose these values out of “nationalist” resistance. This opposition is grounded in deep layers of historical experience with outsiders, which gives the resistance camp the upper hand and defines the social mainstream. This makes it difficult for China and the West converse on a basis of mutual trust and rational understanding.
Many Chinese believe that banners hung in various locations in Paris during the international torch relay and bearing “Free Tibet” slogans must have had the behind-the-scenes support of the French government, and this perception clearly arises from a lack of understanding about how democratic governments work.

[NOTE: Many Chinese were reading online in April 2008 that a banner on the city hall building in Paris had a “Free Tibet” slogan. In fact, my own searches suggest that “Free Tibet” banners were placed in other locations by RSF and the City Council building in fact had a banner bearing the slogan, “Paris supports human rights around the world”].

Many people in China believe that when non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accept contributions they must necessarily take marching orders from donors and become mouthpieces of anti-China forces, and this perception arises from a lack of understanding about the character of NGOs.
Many Chinese also believe that pressure on China from Western countries must stem from an “anti-China” ideology or a sense of “fear” or “jealousy” about China’s rise. They do not think it is possible that these criticisms are made with sincerity or out of good-natured hopes. This arises from an underestimation of Western societies and their degree of goodwill.
We should not be under any illusions. People in the West are not perfect, Western countries certainly consider their own national interests, and they are not entirely free of the influence of ideology. There are still many people in the West who are fearful of the historical lessons of communism and who feel hostility toward China. But does this mean China should throw the baby out with the bathwater and cut itself off from the West and everything it stands for?
In China’s current social climate, it is a dangerous business to speak in defense of the West. There is now soaring demand for language expressing opposition to the West, however intolerant it may be.
But this attitude of blind resistance does more harm than good for China’s continued progress and development. China has a popular saying about the advantage of using the strengths of others to remedy one’s own weaknesses (取他人之长补我之短). If we are to put this idea to practice, we must apply wisdom and reason as we look at ourselves and the West.
The late-Qing Dynasty military general and reformer Zeng Guofan (曾国藩) presumably felt and understood the hatred Chinese had harbored against outsiders since the Southern Song Dynasty.
This hatred had, by Zeng’s time, already congealed into a historical tradition that favored violent resistance over peace and negotiation. Each time conflict arose between China and outsiders, the emphasis was on resisting and fighting back. Yue Fei (岳飞), a general of the Southern Song who supported war against the Liao invaders, became a popular patriotic hero. By contrast Qin Hui (秦桧), who brokered peace with the Jin empire, was vilified as a traitor. For a long time after, Chinese visiting the city of Hangzhou would spit on the statues of Qin Hui and his wife on display there to express their patriotism.

[ABOVE: Image of statues of Qin Hui and Lady Wang kneeling in Hangzhou, via Wikipedia.]

Toward the end of the Qing Dynasty, as China endured the gunboat diplomacy of Western powers, many insisted that China fight back even in the face of continuous defeats. Negotiation of any kind amounted to treachery, and fighting to the death was the ultimate expression of patriotism.
Only Zeng Guofan and his successor, Li Hongzhang (李鸿章), dared faced accusations of treason to embark on a self-strengthening movement that meant learning from and facing up to the technological strength of the West.
Modern Chinese history has branded these men as traitors. But looking back today, while it can be said that negotiations for peace meant relinquishing territory, and that self-strengthening ultimately failed, we should admire the extraordinary sober-mindedness of these men, who struggled against the grain and took practical actions in view of China’s social and historical circumstances. Most importantly, they opened up a new path by which China could learn from the West. They showed wisdom and reason in their actions.
In its Olympic year, China has been plagued with natural and human disasters. China has experienced a great deal – from the storm over the international torch relay, to unrest in Tibet, to the Sichuan earthquake.
What lessons will China take away from these experiences? That, of course, will depend on the attitude each of us takes in approaching and understanding these experiences. Can we welcome the West (and even their criticisms) with wisdom and reason?
Where are you hiding, all of you Zeng Guofans?
[Posted by Cheng Jinfu, July 15, 2008, 3:35pm HK]
—————————————
Below is a Chinese version of my editorial. Readers will note that there are some differences in the language of the two versions.
奥运年的反思
原本可能极为单纯的体育不知何时与政治开始了千丝万缕的关系，当2008年西班牙国家队赢得欧洲国家杯足球赛冠军的时候，西班牙举国欢腾，国王与总统出面欢庆，人们看到了政治；当中美关系持续僵化多年难解的时候，乒乓球成了政治大使；当奥运会在希特勒统治下的德国举办的时候，很多国家开始抵制；当2008年奥运于中国举办的时候，原本象征团结的五环旗在“记者无国界”的网站上变成了狰狞恐怖的手铐五环、、、、、、今天，体育再想和政治切割，事实上已不可能。
中国在1949年之后，与西方世界一直维持着一种紧张多而缓和少的关系，从早期的意识形态的敌视，中国以社会主义与西方的资本主义划清界限，西方则对中国的共产主义体制深怀警惕；到1989年之后西方的经济制裁，西方试图通过经济的手段迫使中国走出野蛮政治。时至今日，意识形态已甚少走向国际政治的前台，中美之间也可以凭借反恐、贸易等议题结成战略伙伴关系；在中国经济实力日益强大的背景下，国际经济的相互依赖越来越强，经济制裁对中国早已失效。于是，奥运体育似乎成了西方世界当前所能找到的唯一可能有效地推动中国“政治改善”的路径。因为今天的中国已不再固执地宣称我是“君子”，它是“小人”，国际交流的频繁已经打破了当初闭塞时的“神话”，面对西方世界的文明与发达的现实，中国也希望展现自己文明的形象，这才做出种种奥运的许诺，包括环境上空气质量的改善，包括外国记者新闻采访限制的放松等等。我们不能期望这些承诺完全变成现实，但至少展现了，今日中国不再固执，它开始在学习妥协。
奥运是一个契机，对于中国来说，中国也许可以用国际承诺来推动多年积弊的改善，中国并非对自身的问题固执无知；同时也许是更为突出的动机，中国迫切希望展现自己良好的国际形象，不仅仅是一个经济强国。对于西方世界来说，这是一个向中国施压，迫使中国按照西方的思路改善的良机，譬如在西藏问题上，西方希望中国能进行对话，以改变对西藏的管制；譬如在胡佳事件的议题上，西方希望中国能改善人权，扩大言论空间；譬如在新闻自由的议题上，西方希望中国能取消对新闻的控制、、、、、、
但是，中西对话从来都缺乏相互信任的基础。特别是中国，在经历了八国联军的民族屈辱之后，在经历了意识形态的多年对立之后，西方世界所有的对于中国的希望，都极有可能演变成为“反华”的解读。面对西方的种种价值观，一部分中国学者以“普世主义”的认同而希望中国接受和采纳，一部分中国人则以“民族主义”的反抗而加以抵触；而中国独特的历史积淀，又使得后者每每占据上风，成了社会主流，从而使得中西交流依然缺乏互信基础上的同情，也缺乏理性基础上的理解。
在中国，很多人以为法国州议会大厦上的藏独标语一定是有着法国政府在幕后的支持，这分明是一种对西方民主政治中政府角色的陌生；很多人以为，非政府组织接受捐赠就一定会任人指使，甚至会成为反华势力的代言人，这分明是对非政府组织的性质的无知。很多人以为，西方对中国的施压，要么是出于“反华”的意识形态，要么是出于对中国崛起的“恐惧”或“嫉妒”，而根本不可能有真诚的动机和善良的愿望，这同样是对西方文明程度的漠视。
不错，西方世界里没有圣人，它也有国家利益，它也不可能完全没有意识形态，出于对共产主义历史教训的恐惧而仇视中国的人也大有人在。但中国是否可以因此而因噎废食呢？
当今中国的社会心态下，为西方辩护是危险的，而抵触西方，无论如何偏执，都是有市场的。这样的社会心态，对于中国的进步与未来发展，无论如何都是弊大于利的。取他人之长补我之短，是中国人比较普通的智慧。但这样普通的智慧要想发挥作用，不仅需要明智，还需要理智。
中国清朝末期的曾国藩曾经深感南宋屈辱之后中国人对于外族的仇视，每有冲突，言必开战，抗争抵触，决不言和。岳飞言战，成了爱国英雄，秦桧言和，成了卖国之贼。及至清末，朝野上下，无视西方船坚炮利，一味言战，且屡败屡战，言和成了卖国，战死成了爱国。唯有曾国藩冒着卖国贼的骂名，一方面不囿于书生之见，身体力行，另一方面嘱托其继任者李鸿章，在承受屈辱言和的同时，兴办洋务，学习西方的长处，为我所用。师徒二人在中国近代史上长久承受着“卖国贼”的骂名。今日回首，虽言和丢失了国土，洋务也未竟功业，但他们以难能可贵的清醒，不为社会潮流所趋，审时度势，为中国赢得了和平的社会环境，开启了虚心学习外族西方的新路。这是一种明智，更是一种理智。
奥运之年，天灾人祸不断，中国经历了太多，圣火传递风波、西藏骚乱、四川地震、、、、、、
但中国能借此形成怎样的反思呢？当年的曾国藩影响了近半个世纪的中国社会，今日中国的曾国藩何在？

By David Bandurski — Global Times, a newspaper published by the official People’s Daily, has played a powerful role this year in pushing back against criticism of China in the international media on a wide range of stories, from unrest in Tibet (and the ensuing anti-CNN controversy) to protests during the international leg of the Olympic torch relay.
One of the newspaper’s specialties this year has been personal and ugly attacks on the Paris-based NGO Reporters Without Borders and its founder, Robert Menard. RSF has clearly made criticism of China a priority this year, and Global Times has returned the volleys with eye-for-an-eye savagery.

[ABOVE: Global Times online section on China as seen through foreign eyes.]

Global Times reports on RSF have invariably been presented to readers as lurid exposes uncovering dirty truths about the organization. But the sourcing of information in these stories does little to convince the disinterested reader that they offer an even-handed account.
Many of the accusations rest on the comments of Cuban writer Nestor Baguer as quoted by Jean-Guy Allard, a former Canadian journalist who now works for Granma, a Cuban propaganda rag, in his book on Menard. Raising further red flags, Baguer apparently (on his own admission, via Allard) infiltrated RSF while working undercover for the Cuban government and posing as a dissident. Not exactly the makings of a credible whisteblower.
I am not in any position to contradict or disprove the allegations against RSF or Menard — nor do I have any interest one way or the other — but the trail of information in the Global Times articles is disputable to say the least, and they are part of a clear pattern at this increasingly influential newspaper.
Global Times has enjoyed immense commercial success in the last few years, and it is virtually unchallenged (thanks to official restrictions) as a purveyor of news about the wider world. Some of China’s top professional media, including Caijing magazine, now regard the newspaper as a direct competitor.
Here is one of my favorite revelations from the most recent attack launched by writer Tao Duanfang (陶短房) against RSF:

A source familiar with the situation told this reporter that the National Endowment for Democracy states clearly on its Web site that organizations receiving funding must not organize acts against the United States [Enjoy the nearly full story in English at China Daily.].

That’s of course a slightly alarmist way of saying that the NED is very up front about not funding acts of aggression against the United States (though I can’t find anything to substantiate this on the NED Web site). But it all sounds so wonderfully mischievous when Tao obtains this (allegedly) already public information from an unnamed source.
In its latest attack on Western media generally — a response to charges that China has not lived up to its Olympic promise of openness — Global Times sought last Wednesday to expose the spuriousness of “freedom of speech.”
One can not help but wonder whether these quotes are presented faithfully, and what in particular this editor from the Houstin Chronicle, whose name I have not yet managed to track down, really said.
The section is called, “Behind the Zeal for ‘Freedom of Speech'”:

One foreign reporter who has for years taken part in reporting of the Olympic Games said that among the press corps for every Olympics there are bound to be a few who do not focus on the sports field but who absorb themselves in finding or cooking up news. Before the Athens Olympics began, a certain British reporter wriggled his way into the unfinished Olympic sports ground and wrote a piece criticizing the Athens Olympics, saying there were “major security loopholes.” This [foreign] reporter said that critical news reports were a part of Olympic reports, and he believes that the first few days are extremely important, and that if all goes smoothely then public opinion will quickly follow . . .
Powell [?], a professor of journalism at Stockholm University, told the Global Times reporter that Western media views on China are longstanding, and that the media will first think of China in a certain way and then go in search of evidence in support. When they find it, they blow it out of proportion. When they don’t find it they say “China is not open enough.” Under such conditions, no matter what China does, it finds it difficult to satisfy Western media. Powell says that what China wants to show is its sunny side, and there’s no way officials will agree to welcome reporters for interviews in the remote countryside. But what Western media seek is the dark side, and they are determined to go there . . .
Jennifer (詹妮弗), editor of America’s Houstin Chronicle, says that “freedom of speech is linked to social responsibility and that journalists in the U.S. have lately enjoyed too much ‘freedom of speech’ and lost sight of social responsibility. In reporting news events they tend to come to conclusions first and then find material to support their conclusions. On the surface, they are exercising ‘freedom of speech’, but in actuality they violate the principles of objectivity and fairness.” She says that in the past she relied primarily on U.S. media to understand China. Now a number of Americans, including herself, no longer believe the U.S. media, and they manage to get their information through other channels, including Chinese media, and reach their own conclusions through comparison.

[Posted by David Bandurski, July 11, 2008, 2:35pm]

By David Bandurski — After last month’s China Internet Research Conference, held at the University of Hong Kong, a number of journalists sitting on the sidelines noted that there had been insufficient discussion of the growing role played by China’s Web commentators, or wangluo pinglunyuan (网络评论员), which Chinese Web users have playfully nicknamed the “Fifty Cent Party” (五毛党).
So I set out to learn as much as I could about these “commentators” and their role in China’s Internet censorship system. Readers can see my findings in the latest issue of Far Eastern Economic Review. It’s subscriber only, unfortunately.
But here’s a teaser:

They have been called the “Fifty Cent Party,” the “red vests” and the “red vanguard.” But China’s growing armies of Web commentators – instigated, trained and financed by party organizations – have just one mission: to safeguard the interests of the Communist Party by infiltrating and policing a rapidly growing Chinese Internet. They set out to neutralize undesirable public opinion by pushing pro-Party views through chat rooms and Web forums. They report dangerous content to authorities.
By some estimates, these commentary teams now comprise as many as 280,000 members nationwide, and they show just how serious China’s leaders are about the political challenges posed by the Web. More importantly, they offer tangible clues about China’s next generation of information controls – what President Hu Jintao last month called “a new pattern of public opinion guidance.”

Former Freezing Point editor Li Datong mentions the “Internet commentators” in this recent OpenDemocracy post, which also includes a link to this early Times of India article alluding to the groups.
Last May, Berkeley’s China Digital Times offered this helpful translation of blogger’s comments on the “Fifty Cent Party.”
Readers might also see my piece last year on China’s use of teams of Internet censors under the auspices of “professional associations” with international corporate membership. The “volunteers” at groups like BAOM are also essentially “Web commentators” or (colloquially) “Fifty Cent Party.”
[Posted July 7, 2008, 3:15pm HK]

By Qian Gang — The following story is re-published here with the kind permission of Britain’s Index on Censorship magazine, whose Spring issue dealt with freedom of speech and media control in China. It is the story of one writer’s journey to professional journalism through a history bathed in slogans, falsehood and violence.

[ABOVE: CMP Director Qian Gang at age 14 on Tiananmen Square, in 1967.]

The pdf for the English article can be accessed here: journey-of-a-red-heart.pdf
Those who read Chinese are encouraged to read the original here, which is longer and more complete.
Readers may also want to bear in mind the “red heart movement” (红心运动) in support of China and the Olympics that has taken this year on China’s Internet.
[Posted July 4, 2008, 5:35pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Since national legislation on government information release took effect in China on May 1 this year, Chinese media have taken to the topic of information openness in a big way. And while the lasting effects of the National Ordinance on Openness of Government Information (政府信息公开条例) remain to be seen, there can little doubt that media have used the very fact of the law’s existence to advance discussion of its spirit — the value of timely information sharing.
Here is what the term “information openness”, or xinxi gongkai (信息公开), has looked like in China’s media over the past year. There is clear upward trend in coverage, cresting in May as the legislation took effect and the Sichuan earthquake further underscored the importance of information access.

[ABOVE: Data plots number of article occurrences for the term “information openness” (信息公开) in more than 300 mainland newspapers from June 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008, based on the WiseNews database.]

On May 21 China Newsweekly reported a “tide” of formal information release requests (信息公开申请) filed by Chinese citizens under the new national legislation.
On May 4, Beijing resident Chen Yuhua (陈育华) made a request to the Beijing Public Security Bureau demanding to know how management fees levied by the city since 2003 on dog owners had been used. Beijing resident Zhan Jiang (湛江) applied to the Environmental Protection Bureau of Beijing’s Haiding District to find out why rights defense cases brought by homeowners against property developers had not been handled.
Shanghai lawyer Yan Yiming (严义明) filed requests with both the Anhui Provincial Health Department and the Fuyang (阜阳) city government wanting them to make public the reasons why they had not issued information on the outbreak of hand, foot and mouth disease in a timely manner.
According to Chinese media reports, local hospital officials in Fuyang made a prompt report to health officials when the first child died of hand, foot and mouth disease in the city on March 28, 2008. But it was four weeks before health officials finally released information on the disease.
No sooner had the legislation taken effect than media began questioning its inadequacies too, particularly how to ensure compliance by local governments, and how to standardize the information release process.
On May 1, Hang Fuzheng (韩甫政), a lawyer from Cangzhou (沧州) in Hebei province, issued a proposal to the State Council asking that it standardize the “release” process for State Council departments by establishing more rigorous national standards for information release covering a range of areas, including education, sanitation, housing and city planning.
China Newsweekly quoted Peking University law professor Jiang Ming’an (姜明安), a participant in the drafting process, as saying implementation was uneven across the country, and that the legislation was going up against entrenched party habits. “Many government officials do not wish to make information public because they’re used to thinking that ‘not making [information] public is the rule, and making it public is the exception,’” he said.
Information access continues to be an issue accompanying breaking news stories, most recently the Weng’an riots in Guizhou, and the Shaanxi Provincial Government’s coming clean over the South China Tiger scandal.
This morning, Chongqing Morning Post ran a piece from the Procuratorial Daily (检察日报) called “Guizhou’s Weng’an Incident Brings Out the Importance of Information Openness.” The article said:

The mass incident involving the mobbing of the Weng’an County Government by certain people has lately died down. But the so-called ‘Weng’an Incident’ thoroughly demonstrates that mass incidents and gossip are twin brothers, and that if we wish to prevent the occurrence of mass incidents we must be timely and quick in clearing away rumors.

Today’s main editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily turns to the question of information openness in light of the South China Tiger scandal, arguing that the national ordinance should be seen not only as a force pitting the people against the government but as an act of self-strengthening on the part of the government:

In this way, openness of government information is not just as we tend to think of it, as beneficial only to the monitoring of the government by ordinary people, and not in the particular interest of the government itself. As we can see from the South China Tiger controversy, releasing government information in a timely and efficient manner can also work against the various government offices or officials looking to profit personally and hold ransom the credibility of the system.
Therefore, with the enactment of the National Ordinance on Openness of Government Information as an impetus, and with the South China Tiger controversy as a real example, we can no longer see the movement for seeking information and the truth purely as the monitoring of the government by the people, as a kind of coercion. It is, at the same time, an internal act of self-purification by the government, one method of effective supervision. By means of effective release of information, strong and healthy elements within the government can grow and develop, while those irregular and unhealthy elements can be checked and eliminated.

As readers can see from the graph above, there were more than 800 articles addressing “information openness” appearing in China’s press in June alone. We don’t have time, unfortunately, to go over these in detail. But this is certainly a trend worth watching.
Will China’s media continue to push the issue of information openness along with news coverage of important stories?
It is also worth noting that a number of local governments are now using the newspapers and Internet to publish the “information release catalogs” (信息公开目录) they are required to make available under the ordinance. Here, for example, is a list of contacts and information published recently in Kunming Daily:

昆明市国土资源局西山分局信息公开目录
一、机构职能
（一）部门基本信息
单位名称：昆明市国土资源局西山分局；职责：昆明市国土资源局西山分局是昆明市国土资源局的派出机构，负责西山区行政辖区内土地资源的开发、保护和合理利用；矿产资源的开发、利用、保护工作进行指导、监督、检查，以及地质勘察、测绘的行政管理工作；地址：云南省昆明市二环西路193号；邮箱：[email protected]；电话：0871-8185991
　　
（二）领导班子成员分工及联系电话
李应海：党组书记，负责全局党的建设、干部队伍建设、纪检监察工作，分管工青妇、地政服务中心，联系马街国土所、棕树营国土所。联系电话：8181818
马燕：党组成员、局长，主持分局全面工作，分管局办公室、土地保护利用科，联系福海国土所、前卫国土所。联系电话：8185989
方勇华：党组成员、副局长，协助局长工作，分管地矿与环境科、信访科、土地收购办公室，联系海口国土所、碧鸡国土所、西苑街道办事处。联系电话：8223770
高云华：党组成员、副局长，协助局长工作，分管测绘地籍科、业务办理窗口、国土资源管理行政执法西山大队、西山分局信息分中心，联系团结国土所。联系电话：8228946
段昌：党组成员、办公室主任，协助书记、局长工作，联系永昌国土所、金碧街道办事处。联系电话：8232059
（三）业务部门工作职责及联系电话
办公室工作职责：
⑴协调分局机关日常工作；
⑵负责公文审核、重要文件起草、重要会议组织、文电处理、政务信息、督查、财务、档案、机要、保密工作；
⑶负责分局机关文印及服务工作。
联系电话：8185991
土地保护利用科工作职责：
⑴土地利用总体规划、矿产资源、基本农田规划的编制；
⑵耕地保护工作；
⑶建设项目的用地初审；
⑷农用地转用，土地征收征用审查、汇总、报批工作，农村宅基地年度用地指标管理和审批工作；
⑸土地开发、整理、复垦、耕地占补平衡；
⑹土地使用权划拨、出让、转让、租赁、作价入股的办理。
联系电话：8185987
测绘地籍科工作职责：
⑴国有土地使用权调查、登记、颁证；
⑵集体土地所有权、使用权调查、登记、颁证；
⑶个人已购住房国有土地使用权登记、颁证；
⑷土地使用权抵押登记；
⑸测绘、土地登记中介代理单位资格审查、备案，测绘资料（含勘测定界）审查（验收）；
⑹土地权属纠纷调处；
⑺申请土地登记资料公开查询的单位或个人资格审查。
联系电话：8191556
地矿与环境科工作职责：
⑴对辖区内地质勘查、地质环境、矿产资源开发利用、保护工作指导检查和监督管理；
⑵小型采砂、采矿的登记发证和采砂权转让变更工作；
⑶地热水、矿泉水及矿产资源补偿费的征收管理工作；
⑷矿产资源储量的评审认定、报批、登记、统计及资料的汇总；
⑸矿山地质环境监督及地质灾害调查、评价和防治管理工作，按规定负责工程建设项目地质灾害危险性评估管理工作；
⑹地热水、矿泉水供水井凿井立项审查报批和采矿许可证发证初审工作；
⑺矿业权纠纷调处工作；
联系电话：8229292
土地收购办公室工作职责：
⑴承担拟收购土地的前期调查工作；
⑵按市土地储备中心的委托，实施土地征用、收购和储备土地的管理、前期开发整理；
⑶协助市土地储备中心完成土地移交工作；
⑷国有土地使用权出租土地收益金的收缴工作；
联系电话：8227911
便民服务中心窗口工作职责：
负责国内外及本市投资者和用地、采矿者申请办理审批事项的收件及相关业务咨询的工作；
联系电话：818593
信访科工作职责：
⑴受理电话、信函、来人来访提出的土地、矿产举报、咨询、请求事项；
⑵承办市国土局和西山区人民政府交办的信访处理事项。及时、准确地向职能科室转送专项信访资讯；
⑶参与群体性上访事件的疏导、协调、引导、平息工作；
联系电话：8224668
昆明市国土资源管理行政执法支队西山大队工作职责：
⑴负责辖区内国土资源的巡查工作，宣传《土地管理法》、《矿产资源法》及相关法律法规；
⑵查处辖区内土地、矿产违法和涉嫌犯罪案件；
⑶受理相对人对国土资源违法（犯罪）行为的检举和控告；
⑷立案查处土地、矿产违法案件生效后，申请人民法院强制执行；
⑸将土地、矿产违法涉嫌犯罪的案件移送公安机关；
联系电话：8185373
各国土资源管理所主要职责：
⑴负责辖区内国土资源的巡查工作，宣传《土地管理法》、《矿产资源法》及相关法律法规；
⑵负责辖区内土地及矿产资源调查统计，协助管理测绘工作，核实和上报农房建设用地，协助进行矿产资源探矿权、采矿权的审批，协助完成征地管理工作；
⑶协助编制和修编辖区内的土地利用总体规划，督促并按计划用地；
⑷对辖区内土地、矿产资源、地质灾害、测绘市场等进行监督检查和跟踪管理，协助依法查处辖区内的土地、矿产违法案件，协助调处土地及矿业权纠纷。
二、法律依据
《中华人民共和国土地管理法》、《中华人民共和国城市房产管理法》、《中华人民共和国担保法》、《中华人民共和国土地管理法实施条例》、《中华人民共和国城镇国有土地使用权出让和转让暂行条例》、《云南省土地登记条例》、《划拨土地使用权管理暂行办法》、《中华人民共和国矿产资源法》、国务院《矿产资源开采登记管理办法》（国务院令241号）、《云南省矿产资源开采登记管理办法》、《中华人民共和国测绘法》。
三、业务工作及审批时限
行政许可事项：《采矿许可证》报批及核发（限《矿山建设规模分类表》和《矿产资源储量规模化分标准表》中的小型）。
非行政许可项目：国有土地使用权及他项权利登记（限面积为0.4公顷以下土地登记）、集体土地所有权、使用权登记。
管理服务项目：建设项目用地预审（限于初审）、测绘项目施测资质验证（备案）、国有土地使用权估价报告（备案）。
审批时限：个人已购住房初始登记办理时限由原来的60个工作日减为30个工作日，变更登记为10个工作日，个购补办出让手续办理时限为20个工作日。国有土地使用权初始登记办理时限为45天、变更及抵押登记办理时限为15天（不含权属资料审核、地籍调查、办理出让转让手续时间）。国有土地使用权出让审查时限为5个工作日（不含上报市国土资源局、市政府审批时间、公示时间、缴纳土地出让金及税费占用时间、土地登记发证时间）；《采矿许可证》审(报)批及核发承诺办理时限为15个工作日。建设项目用地预审办理时限为2个工作日（不含上报审批时间）；测绘项目施测资质验证备案办理时限为1个工作日；国有土地使用权估价报告备案办理时限为1个工作日。

MORE SOURCES:
QQ.com special page on information openness and the Weng’an mass incident, July 3, 2008
“Government Openness of Information: In Treating Water Upstream, Sunshine is the Greatest Preservative,” China Newsweekly, May 4, 2008.
“A Tide of Information Release Requests Concern Old Issues,” China Newsweekly via NPC website, May 21, 2008.
[Posted by David Bandurski, July 3, 2008, 2:31pm]

By David Bandurski — Last Friday, Chinese President Hu Jintao made his first speech since taking office in 2002 to deal comprehensively with the news media and its role in a changing China. It was a big deal. But it was also a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, masked with enigmatic party jargon. And that, perhaps, is why no one outside China’s press seemed to take notice. [NOTE: We have included the full Chinese text of Hu’s speech at the end of this post.]
The speech — or, given the proper party gravitas, “important speech” (重要讲话) — sent propaganda underlings across China scurrying off to study and carry out (学习贯彻好) its meaning and “spirit” (讲话精神). It came, importantly, on the 60th anniversary of the official People’s Daily, to which Hu made a special inspection visit.
Hu said a lot of things that would make anyone but the hardest core terminology junky yawn. He said the media must play an “active role” in such tasks as “disseminating the socialist core value system” (社会主义核心价值体系) and “creating healthy, rich and lively mainstream public opinion” (健康向上、丰富生动的主流舆论).
Right. But what does all of this MEAN?
Fortunately, Hu has boiled it all down to five essential points for enhancing the [party’s] ability to guide public opinion (舆论引导能力).
The point to recognize first is that all five of Hu’s points are encompassed by “guidance,” a clear sign that media control remains the CCP’s unshakeable top priority (not exactly a surprise):

1. We must adhere to the principle of party spirit in journalism, holding firmly to correct guidance of public opinion (正确舆论导向).
2. We must adhere to people-based [journalism] (以人为本), increasing the affinity (亲和力), attractiveness (吸引力) and appeal (感染力) of news reports.
3. We must continue to reform and renew, enhancing the directedness and effectiveness of public opinion guidance (舆论引导的针对性和实效性).
4. We must strengthen the building of mainstream media and the building of new media (新兴媒体), creating a new pattern of public opinion guidance.
5. We must conscientiously take hold of the building of [propaganda/editorial] teams (队伍建设), enhancing our cohesiveness and fighting strength (凝聚力和战斗力).

Before we get down to each of these points, we would like to call attention to a possibly significant passage in graph three of the full text of Hu’s speech. That section reads:

News and public opinion are on the leading edge of the ideological domain, and they have a major influence on the mental life of society and on people’s mindsets. In contemporary society, along with economic and social development and continued scientific and technological progress, the transmission and obtaining of information has become faster and faster, and the role of news and public opinion have become more and more prominent. Doing the work of news and propaganda well concerns the overall work of the party and the nation, it concerns the overall condition of reforms, and the development of the economy and society, it concerns the long-term stability of the country.

What does this mean? While the news media has generally fallen under the category of “ideological work” encompassing myriad aspects of society — such as education, ideological training, indoctrination through government administered work units, etc — this passage suggests that the CCP is now training its focus more intensely on the management and control of the news media as a means of creating social cohesion and solidifying the party’s own position in society.
In other words, this is about doing “ideological work” in the information age.
Back to Point One of Hu’s Five Points, the policy here sits squarely in the Jiang Zemin tradition, emphasizing “correct guidance of public opinion,” a Jiang-era term that followed the June 4, 1989, crackdown on demonstrators in Beijing. Other familiar characters follow under Point One, including “emphasis on positive propaganda” “singing the main theme,” and “strict adherence to propaganda discipline.”
The only point of terminology departure from Jiang Zemin in Point One is the replacement of the old “theory of weal and woe” (福祸论) — basically, the idea the guided public opinion brings prosperity and chaotic public opinion brings calamity — with “three benefits and three wrongs” (三利, 三误). Hu says:

Correct guidance of public opinion benefits the party, benefits the nation, and benefits the people. Incorrect guidance of public opinion wrongs the party, wrongs the nation, and wrongs the people.

Point Two tempers the control policy somewhat with an appeal for media to make their content more relevant to the public. This is not exactly new. Under the vigilant watch of “guidance,” the media has essentially taken this path since the middle of the 1990s, seeking to produce attractive, engaging and commercially viable “media products.”
This development path was given its first official imprimatur by Hu Jintao in January 2003 through the policy of “Three Closenesses” — “closeness to the truth, life and the people.” Not surprisingly, we see the “Three Closenesses” reitereated in Point Two of Hu Jintao’s speech.
The “people-based” notion of Point Two is much more fully Hu Jintao. It recognizes, while relinquishing little or nothing in the way of control, that media are changing and must continue to change. Point Two says that media also have an obligation to reflect the will of the people (民意), but positive as that may seem, the CCP has typically seen its own will as indivisible from that of the people.
We do, however, have an interesting reiteration in Point Two of a Hu Jintao tweak from his political report to the 17th Party Congress last fall.
Those who watched Hu’s report for signals on the question of political reform noticed the appearance of the phrase “protecting the people’s right to know, participate, express and supervise” (保障人民的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权). This was, in fact, a revision of Jiang Zemin’s 2002 political report, which said: “In the matter of cadre selection and appointment, Party members and ordinary people should have more right to know, participate, choose and supervise” (扩大党员和群众对干部选拔任用的知情权、参与权、选择权和监督权).
In Hu’s rendition the term “right to select”, or xuanze quan (选择权), is replaced with the “right to expression”, or biaoda quan (表达权). This language about the “right to expression” makes it into Point Two of Hu’s People’s Daily speech.
The language in Point Two is softer and a bit more fresh, but still shot through with the language of control. At the end of Point Two, for example, Hu says that as news media must observe “correct guidance” as they “report factual news stories.” He also says they should “speak with the truth, speak with news classics, speak with figures.”
This latter language, while still implying control (“news classics” are exemplary stories designed to embody “correct guidance”), is a slightly softer expression — suggesting the party and news media should convince rather than simply suppress. Obviously, one should not get overly excited about such miniscule semantic consolations.
Point Three is an interesting jumble of ideas, again a Gordian Knot of CONTROL and CHANGE. The basic idea seems to be that party leaders need to do a radical rethink on how they conduct the work of press control.
Hu says that “new propaganda work must adhere to emancipation of mind (解放思想), seeking the truth from facts (实事求是) and keeping pace with the times (与时俱进), accomodating new changes to the situation in and outside China, keeping in tune with the new expectations of the people and doing our work well with a spirit of reform and renewal.” Hu talks about renewing concepts, content, forms, methods and tactics, and “doing [propaganda] work according to news principles” (按照新闻传播规律办事).
In some sense, this sounds like it is as much about change as control. But we have to be careful here, and the meaning of these words will be borne out only in the handling of future news events.
One could argue that Hu is talking about news that is truer and more responsive to the demands of China’s public. But he is certainly also talking about a controlled and selective approach to information that creates the public perception of openness and an atmosphere of trust (much like the president’s recent exchange with Web users).
The March unrest in Tibet and the May 12 Sichuan earthquake offered party leaders very different lessons about information control, and we can see the fruits of this in Point Three.
China dealt with Tibet by sealing it off. But this created a vacuum in which international media took control of the agenda setting process, and China’s image suffered as a result. By contrast, coverage of the Sichuan quake was relatively open, particularly during the first week of the disaster. And this allowed China to largely set the agenda and project a favorable international image. Hu says in Point Three:

In the struggle that followed the recent earthquake disaster, we quickly released information about the disaster and the relief effort . . . earning high praise from cadres and the people, and also earning the esteem of the international community.

This is what Hu refers to when he says earlier in Point Three that the media needs to “actively set the agenda” (主动设置议题). This fits with what Hu Jintao said earlier this spring about the need for the media, particularly state media, to “keep a firm grasp” on initiative in reporting (报道的主动权) for disaster stories.
The idea is that, rather than simply suppress news, the party strikes first, defining the direction of coverage. As Hu says:

We must perfect our system of news release, and improve our system for news reports on sudden-breaking public events, releasing authoritative information at the earliest moment, raising timeliness, increasing transparency, and firmly grasping the initiative in news propaganda work.

Point Four of Hu Jintao’s remarks are a somewhat disturbing question mark. He talks about creating a “new pattern” (新格局) for opinion guidance. He seems to mean that party leaders should take a much more realistic and nuanced approach to press control, acknowledging the new social and market realities of the media. “With party newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations in the lead,” he says, “[we must] integrate the metropolitan media (都市类媒体), the Internet media and other various propaganda resources.”
It is too early to scream, “The sky is falling!” But this is a worrying picture. Commercial media and the Internet as untapped “resources” of propaganda? Hu’s “new pattern of public opinion guidance” (舆论引导新格局) is something we will have to watch as it takes shape.
We can, however, infer hints of this “new pattern” from Point Five.
Point Five is about the building of “propaganda teams” (队伍建设). In a traditional Chinese media context, this means building up a solid network of directors at newspapers and television stations, and teams of editors and journalists, who work with the party to enforce propaganda discipline and achieve correct guidance of public opinion.
Given the challenges of the information age, however, we might suppose that Hu Jintao hopes to expand his “guidance” teams beyond these traditional boundaries. How, for example, can he better build “teams” by tapping into the “resources” of commercial media and the Internet?
Good examples of such team building might be the powerful and growing teams of online commentators (网络评论员) that have been dispatched onto the Web at all levels of the national bureaucracy, or the “professional associations” that are increasingly serving as agents of speech control.
For the moment, the reading of Hu’s speech depends very much on how optimistic or pessimistic one is prepared to be. But the overall dynamics have not changed. This is still about CONTROL and about CHANGE, about changing media and changing approaches to control. Readers should not focus narrowly on CONTROL, overlooking real changes in Chinese media and society. Nor should they read too much CHANGE into Hu Jintao’s words, lest they be disappointed.
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胡锦涛在人民日报社考察工作时的讲话(全文)
同志们：
在人民日报创刊60周年之际，我们来到人民日报社，看望大家。首先，我代表党中央，向人民日报创刊60周年表示热烈的祝贺！向报社全体工作人员和离退休老同志致以诚挚的问候！向全国新闻宣传战线的同志们致以崇高的敬意！
人民日报是党中央机关报，党中央对人民日报始终非常重视和关心。60年来，人民日报坚持正确办报方向，积极宣传党的理论和路线方针政策，积极宣传中央的 重大决策部署，及时传播国内外各领域的信息，讴歌真善美，鞭挞假恶丑，为我们党团结带领人民夺取革命、建设、改革的重大胜利作出了重要贡献。特别是改革开放以来，人民日报深入宣传中国特色社会主义理论体系，深入宣传改革开放和社会主义现代化建设的巨大成就，深入宣传广大干部群众团结奋进的先进事迹，高唱奋 进凯歌，弘扬民族精神，为激励全党全国各族人民积极投身改革开放的伟大事业作出了积极贡献。今年以来，人民日报在宣传党的十七大精神，特别是在抗击低温雨雪冰冻灾害、维护西藏社会稳定、筹办北京奥运会、抗震救灾等重大报道中发挥了很好的舆论引导作用。中央对人民日报的工作是充分肯定的。
新闻舆论处在意识形态领域的前沿，对社会精神生活和人们思想意识有着重大影响。当今社会，随着经济社会快速发展和科技不断进步，信息传递和获取越来越快捷，新闻舆论的作用越来越突出。做好新闻宣传工作，关系党和国家工作全局，关系改革和经济社会发展大局，关系国家长治久安。我们要充分认识新闻宣传工作的重大意义，更好地发挥新闻宣传工作在推动经济发展、引导人民思想、培育社会风尚、促进社会和谐等方面的重要作用。
当前，全党全国各族人民正在为实现党的十七大提出的各项任务而奋斗。在前进道路上，我们面临着难得的机遇，也面临着严峻的挑战。我们既要抓住机遇、乘势而上，不断推动经济社会又好又快发展，又要迎接挑战、居安思危，时刻准备应对各方面的困难和风险。特别值得注意的是，当前，世界范围内各种思想文化交流、交融、交锋更加频繁，“西强我弱”的国际舆论格局还没有根本改变，新闻舆论领域的斗争更趋激烈、更趋复杂。在这样的情况下，新闻宣传工作任务更为 艰巨、责任更加重大。
全面贯彻党的十七大精神，高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导，深入贯彻落实科学发展观，继续解放思想， 坚持改革开放，推动科学发展，促进社会和谐，夺取全面建设小康社会新胜利，开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面，需要新闻宣传工作在打牢全党全国各族人民团结 奋斗的共同思想基础方面发挥积极作用，在传播社会主义核心价值体系方面发挥积极作用，在为推进党和国家事业发展凝聚强大精神力量方面发挥积极作用，在营造健康向上、丰富生动的主流舆论方面发挥积极作用，在促进社会和谐方面发挥积极作用。新闻战线的同志一定要充分认识肩负的重大责任，保持奋发有为的精神状态，发扬认真负责的工作作风，兢兢业业做好新闻宣传工作，进一步引导广大干部群众把思想统一到党的十七大精神上来，把力量凝聚到实现党的十七大提出的各项任务上来。当前，新闻宣传工作尤其要为做好抗震救灾和恢复重建、推动经济社会又好又快发展、筹办北京奥运会等工作作出积极贡献。
新形势下，新闻宣传工作要高举旗帜、围绕大局、服务人民、改革创新，坚持正确舆论导向，提高舆论引导能力，营造良好舆论环境，更好地发挥宣传党的主张、弘扬社会正气、通达社情民意、引导社会热点、疏导公众情绪、搞好舆论监督的重要作用。要把提高舆论引导能力放在突出位置，进行深入研究，拿出切实措施，取得新的成效。
第一，必须坚持党性原则，牢牢把握正确舆论导向。舆论引导正确，利党利国利民；舆论引导错误，误党误国误民。要牢固树立政治意识、大局意识、责任意识、阵地意识，把坚持正确导向放在新闻宣传工作的首位，坚持团结稳定鼓劲、正面宣传为主，唱响主旋律，打好主动仗，更加自觉主动地为人民服务、为社会主义服务、为党和国家工作大局服务。要增强政治敏锐性和政治鉴别力，严格宣传纪律，做到守土有责，在重大问题、敏感问题、热点问题上把好关、把好度。
第二，必须坚持以人为本，增强新闻报道的亲和力、吸引力、感染力。坚持以人为本，是做好新闻宣传工作的根本要求。要坚持把实现好、维护好、发展 好最广大人民的根本利益作为新闻宣传工作的出发点和落脚点，坚持贴近实际、贴近生活、贴近群众，把体现党的主张和反映人民心声统一起来，把坚持正确导向和通达社情民意统一起来，尊重人民主体地位，发挥人民首创精神，保证人民的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权。要面向基层、服务群众、深入实际，多报道人民群 众的工作生活，多反映人民群众的利益要求，多宣传人民群众中涌现的先进典型，激励全体人民信心百倍地创造美好生活。同时，要注重在报道新闻事实中体现正确导向，在同群众交流互动中形成社会共识，在加强信息服务中开展思想教育，用事实说话、用典型说话、用数字说话，化解矛盾，理顺情绪，引导各方面群众共同前进。
第三，必须不断改革创新，增强舆论引导的针对性和实效性。新闻宣传工作必须坚持解放思想、实事求是、与时俱进，适应国内外形势的新变化，顺应人民群众的新期待，以改革创新精神做好工作。要坚持用时代要求审视新闻宣传工作，按照新闻传播规律办事，创新观念、创新内容、创新形式、创新方法、创新手段，努力使新闻宣传工作体现时代性、把握规律性、富于创造性，不断提高舆论引导的权威性、公信力、影响力。要认真研究新闻传播的现状和趋势，深入研究各类 受众群体的心理特点和接受习惯，加强舆情分析，主动设置议题，善于因势利导。要完善新闻发布制度，健全突发公共事件新闻报道机制，第一时间发布权威信息， 提高时效性，增加透明度，牢牢掌握新闻宣传工作的主动权。在这次抗震救灾斗争中，我们及时公布震情灾情和抗震救灾情况，深入宣传抗震救灾中涌现出来的先进 集体和模范人物，大力弘扬抗震救灾的伟大精神，为鼓舞广大干部群众坚定信心、团结一致做好抗震救灾各项工作发挥了重要作用，赢得了广大干部群众高度评价， 也得到了国际社会好评。其中的成功经验值得认真总结，并要形成制度长期坚持。
第四，必须加强主流媒体建设和新兴媒体建设，形成舆论引导新格局。要从社会舆论多层次的实际出发，把握媒体分众化、对象化的新趋势，以党报党刊、电台电视台为主，整合都市类媒体、网络媒体等多种宣传资源，努力构建定位明确、特色鲜明、功能互补、覆盖广泛的舆论引导新格局。要把发展主流媒体作为 战略重点，加大支持力度，扩大覆盖面和影响力。互联网已成为思想文化信息的集散地和社会舆论的放大器，我们要充分认识以互联网为代表的新兴媒体的社会影响力，高度重视互联网的建设、运用、管理，努力使互联网成为传播社会主义先进文化的前沿阵地、提供公共文化服务的有效平台、促进人们精神生活健康发展的广阔 空间。
第五，必须切实抓好队伍建设，增强凝聚力和战斗力。做好新闻宣传工作，关键在班子、在队伍、在人才。要大力加强新闻宣传战线领导班子建设，把思想政治坚定、组织能力突出、熟悉新闻宣传工作、富有改革创新精神的优秀干部选拔到领导岗位上来，确保新闻宣传工作的领导权牢牢掌握在忠于马克思主义、忠于党、忠于人民的人手里。要坚持马克思主义新闻观，深化“三项学习教育”活动，引导广大新闻宣传工作者不断提高思想政治水平、增强业务本领，努力建设一支政治强、业务精、作风正、纪律严的新闻宣传队伍。要加强对中青年骨干的培养锻炼，采取多种措施培养造就更多人民群众喜爱的名记者、名编辑、名评论员、名主持 人。广大新闻宣传工作者要加强自身思想道德修养，带头实践社会公德，恪守职业道德，做积极实践社会主义荣辱观的表率。
人民日报具有辉煌的历史、优良的传统，一代又一代人为党的新闻宣传事业付出了大量心血、作出了重要贡献，是一支党和人民信赖的队伍。希望人民日 报的同志认真贯彻中央精神，加倍努力工作，求真务实，开拓创新，勤奋敬业，团结和谐，进一步把人民日报办好，让党放心，让人民满意。

(Posted by David Bandurski, June 25, 2008, 11:10am HK)