By David Bandurski — This spring in China has been marked by vitriolic controversy, an outright verbal “war,” between China’s “patriots” and the so-called “traitors” (汉奸) who tout “universal values,” or pushi jiazhi (普世价值) to the imagined detriment of national interests. The recent demotion of well-known columnist and Nandu Weekly deputy editor Chang Ping (长平), who was widely denounced in China as a “talking head for the foreign enemy inside our country” after offering a more moderate view on unrest in Tibet and its aftermath, marked a new low and underscored the complex issues troubling greater freedom of expression in China. [Frontpage Image: Screenshot of coverage of screening of schoolchildren for hand, foot and mouth disease in Anqing, from Anqing News Online, May 10, 2008.]
But the backlash — commentator Leung Man-tao recently termed it “logical violence” (逻辑上的暴力) — led by China’s “angry youth” and others against what they have simplistically labeled “Western values” is ultimately bankrupt, an ugly and unfortunate symptom that will vanish when the fever subsides.
Why? Because while the values Chang Ping and others have espoused may seem unwelcome as China faces the specter of “separatism”, they offer the only feasible path for China’s achievement of broad social stability and public well-being (not to mention respect internationally). And, however grudgingly, many of China’s leaders have already recognized this fact.
This is one of the saddest ironies of the anti-CNN campaign and the recent wave of witch-hunt nationalism.
While many Chinese have vocally railed against the apparent failure of “Westerners” to acknowledge the dramatic progress China has made over the the last three decades — a point worth talking about — the atavistic display of blind red hysteria seems to support the perception that nothing has changed at all.

[The “red heart,” a decades-old talisman of ideological control in China, returns amidst the recent campaign against the “anti-China wave” (反华浪潮). One line reads: “You should fire Chang Ping!”]

Few question that China is in the midst of a period of broad transition. This is not just about economic restructuring and double-digit GDP growth, but about widespread social change.
A confluence of factors — a rising middle class, increased access to information (however imperfect), a growing awareness of legal rights, the growth of Internet and new techologies — have already transformed the fabric of Chinese society. And China’s changing society has changing expectations that cannot be satisfied by an appeal to empty notions of a “collective value system” (集体价值观).
When a Chinese family cannot find affordable housing or healthcare in the city, are you going to tell them it’s all for the “collective good”? When county leaders fleece local peasants, steal their farmland and dissipate the funds on kitsch rococo palaces, can you say with a straight face that it’s all for the “collective good”?
The idea that the “collective good” can be achieved only by protecting individual rights is gaining ground in China not because hostile “Western” governments have infiltrated China’s value system with Trojan horses like Southern Metropolis Daily, but because there is no practicable alternative.
Top party leaders outside the extreme left may disagree, for example, about how quickly China’s press can move toward a more independent role, but in principle they understand the value of freedom of speech. Which is why Gongjian: A Report on Political Reform in China After the 17th Party Congress, the book by top Central Party School scholars purported to have favor with Hu Jintao, says in chapter one (before detailing press controls) that “freedom of speech is an inevitable development trend.”
If we move away from divisive issues like Tibet, it’s not hard to see how values like freedom of speech directly impact the welfare of ordinary Chinese, even those who are still simmering over CNN anchor Jack Cafferty.
Take, for example, the following editorial from a concerned father that appeared in The Beijing News yesterday. The editorial addresses inadequacies in local media coverage of the hand, foot and mouth disease epidemic that has killed 34 children and infected an estimated 25,000 in recent weeks.
The author expresses concern about the implications for Chinese living in smaller and less developed cities when local leaders control their access to crucial information about public health threats. But there is a buried question here too about the threat local neglect and secrecy pose to public health on a national scale.
———-

In the Midst of the Epidemic, Where Was Fuyang’s Media?
By Liu Cai (刘采)
I’m the father of a five year-old, and after the media reported the discovery of hand, foot and mouth disease (EV71) in Fuyang, I was really concerned about this epidemic. I made a note of the place where the disease had originated and went to Fuyang News Online, the news site run jointly by major mainstream media there. What I discovered seemed totally unusual.
Through all of April the people of Fuyang were enshrouded with the terror of a mysterious disease. But in the “Fuyang News” column at Fuyang News Online I saw not a single report about transmission of the disease prior to April 28.
It was not until April 28 that Fuyang News Online ran two items of news concerning the epidemic. They were, “Our City Deploys Comprehensive Prevention and Control Work” and “Song Weiping (宋卫平) and Sun Yunfei (孙云飞) to Inspect Prevention and Control Work.”
On April 29 there was more news, but it was mostly things like “Song Weiping Emphasizes Need to Both Prevent and Control Disease and Promote Economic Growth“, and “Sun Yunfei Points to Victory in Prevention and Control Work“. Aside from these there were stories like “Fuyang Natural Park: Strollers Flock Out to Enjoy the Views” and “Enjoying the Spring Light: Stories From the Daily Lives of Fuyang Residents” and other bits of news to show that the people of Fuyang were living in comfort and peace. And there reports like “A Green Spring of Devotion” and “Everything for Our Children” that sang the praises of those on the front lines battling the epidemic.
But clearly this is not how things were. During this epidemic, not only did the Fuyang media not serve their role as “sentinels” (哨兵), failing to warn society, moreover they aided the local government in covering up their shortcomings, manufacturing achievements and creating a false picture of events. In the face of life and death, they turned their backs and showed callous disregard.
Fuyang is not an isolated example. Many local governments see their local media as toys to play with. Prefectural-level media (地市级媒体) are merely platforms to air government releases, having perhaps utterly lost all function as agents of watchdog journalism. This is a disaster for those who live in undeveloped cities and regions. My warning is that we must not allow our smaller cities to become blind spots of watchdog journalism!
(Liu Cai is a father currently living in Beijing)

[Posted by David Bandurski, May 11, 2008 4pm HK]

By David Bandurski — It was just over a week ago that China’s long-awaited national ordinance on openness of information took effect, mandating “active disclosure” by local governments of a whole range of policy-related information. While some observers have suggested the ordinance could be a historic step forward in bringing about greater government transparency in China, others have questioned the ability and willingness of party leaders to carry out the legislation’s mandates. [See Bandurski, “China’s Gloomy Governance Reform“, FEER, March 2007].
Media reports this week suggest we may now have our first test case of citizens using the ordinance to access information about government behavior.
According to a report in China’s Legal Daily newspaper, Huang Youjian (黄由俭), Deng Bosong (邓柏松) and three other plaintiffs from Rucheng County (汝城县) in the Hunan city of Chenzhou (郴州) have filed a case in a local court demanding the release of information about the restructuring of the county’s water utility.
A notice of case filing has not yet been released by the court, the Beijing News reported yesterday.
The plaintiffs, who allege that local officials acted illegally when the utility underwent restructuring, have pushed for action for more than five years.

View Larger Map
In July of last year, the local government conducted its own investigation, but the resulting report was never made public. Huang Youjian and others repeatedly pressed county leaders to make the report available, but their requests were denied, according to the Legal Daily report.
On May 4, the first formal work day after the ordinance took effect on May 1, the plaintiffs submitted an information access request (政府信息公开申请书) to the local county government asking it publicize the report resulting from last year’s investigation into the utility restructuring.
Their request was rebuffed by local government leaders, who said the information fell outside the scope defined by the national ordinance.
On May 5, Huang, Deng and the others filed an administrative proceeding (行政诉讼) with the Chenzhou Intermediate People’s Court charging the Rucheng county government with “failure to release information” (信息不公开).
According to unnamed sources quoted by the Beijing News, top Rucheng county officials convened a meeting on May 7 to study the report in question and determine whether it should be released.
In an editorial in today’s Chengdu Commercial Daily, columnist Yang Tao (杨涛) said the Hunan case could be an important test of the ordinance and the independence of China’s judicial system.
Officials from the city and county-level legislation offices (法制办) had argued somewhat “creatively”, Yang wrote sarcastically, that because the investigation materials were references provided for official participation in policy-making and were not results and conclusions (不是对事件的处理结果和结论), they did not fall within the scope of information to be disclosed.
“But I’m not exactly clear about the legal basis of this creative reading,” Yang wrote.

The national openness of information ordinance establishes “disclosure as the rule, and nondisclosure as the exception.” For this reason, governments must have a clear legal basis for nondisclosure. According to the language of the ordinance, only government information that concerns national or commercial secrets, or personal privacy are not to be disclosed. There is no legal basis whatsoever for the idea [suggested by Chenzhou and Rucheng officials] that [materials] “provided for offical participation in policy-making” fall outside the scope of disclosure. In fact, the “investigation materials concerning the former water utility” are not matters of state secrecy, commercial secrecy or personal privacy, so how is it within the power of the Rucheng county government to suppress them?
The national ordinance stipulates that government information that concerns the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or other organizations, and which requires the knowledge and participation of the public, should be actively disclosed (主动公开). According to news reports, the investigation materials dealing with the water utility arose in the first place from concerns voiced by Huang Youjian and a number of old Rucheng cadres that there had been a series of problems with the utility’s restructuring process. These persons persisted in making petitions until the Rucheng county government launched an investigation into the restructuring of the utility involving many work units and enterprises. Put another way, the investigation materials concern the vital interests of Huang Youjian and many citizens, and they constitute government information requiring the broad knowledge and participation of the public. Rucheng government organs have an obligation to actively disclose them.

Rucheng officials could behave in this way, Yang wrote, because it was their prerogative to determine whether the information in question was a matter of “state secrecy, commercial secrecy or personal privacy.”
According to the ordinance, in the event that government offices cannot determine whether information should be released, reports for a determination should be made in accordance with national laws and regulations to the “relevant administrative department or that department at the same administrative level dealing with secrecy” (有关主管部门或者同级保密工作部门).
The problem is that offices making “secrecy” determinations fall under the jurisdiction of local governments, which means officials can make their own determinations about whether or not to release information. If the cases then go to court, the question becomes whether judges can render independent verdicts, or whether they will be influenced by local party leaders.
Yang concluded:

Therefore, this first domestic case of litigation on information release is in fact a test of whether the courts can neutrally and fair-mindedly apply the law to re-examine the determinations of secrecy organs rather than be led off by the nose. I hope that this first domestic case of litigation on information release can open up for us a road to sunshine governance.

[Posted by David Bandurski, April 9, 2008, 5:21pm HK]

By David Bandurski — Veteran journalist Zhang Ping (张平) may have been removed this week from his post as deputy editor of Nandu Weekly — but he has certainly not been silenced. His latest editorial appears at the bottom of the main editorial page of today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, tucked in snugly next to an announcement of an upcoming public talk by CASS scholar Xu Youyu (徐友渔) on the subject of “Rationality and Patriotism.”
CMP is still trying to ascertain the exact nature of the pressure that came down on the well-known columnist and editor, who writes under the penname Chang Ping (长平). There is little doubt, however, that Zhang’s recent writings on the issue of Tibet and Chinese nationalism prompted Chinese Web users and other mainstream Chinese media to heap scorn and vitriol on Southern Metropolis Daily, the publisher of Nandu Weekly.
While the actions forcing the move against Zhang are unfortunate, it is important to note that he has not been prevented from writing.
Today’s editorial, while dealing more indirectly with the controversy over previous comments by “Chang Ping”, shows the newspaper’s determination to press for more rational and open discussion on the basis of such universal values as freedom of expression.

[Chang Ping’s latest article appears on today’s editorial page in Southern Metropolis Daily.]

The controversy surrounding Chang Ping began back on April 4, when the columnist posted on his personal Weblog a piece entitled, “Where Does the Truth About Lhasa Come From?” The article also ran on the Chinese language edition of the British Financial Times under the title, “Tibet: Truth and Nationalist Sentiment.” [Find a full English translation at ESWN].

[Chang Ping’s April 4 editorial appears on the Financial Times Chinese-language site.]

In his editorial, Chang urged Chinese to coolly consider their own prejudices on the issue of Tibet and nationalism:

If we use nationalism as the weapon to resist the westerners, then how can we persuade the ethnic minorities to abandon their nationalism and join the mainstream nation-building? The Dаlai Lаma asked the Chinese government to reassess him, so what kind of person is he really? Apart from the official government position, will the media be permitted to discuss the matter freely and uncover more truths? [Translation by ESWN].

On April 11, Beijing Evening News – a commercial spin-off of the capital’s official Beijing Daily – ran an editorial by Wen Feng (文峰) attacking Chang Ping’s views in the April 3 essay. It was called, “Southern Metro’s Chang Ping and the Freedom to Rumor-monger.” [See Danwei.org’s “The Internet wages war on the liberal media”].
Chang Ping’s editorial today, “Even Reports with Errors Need a Bit of Breathing Room,” discusses the urgency of freedom of expression in China today by turning to a recent defamation case involving China Central Television in which the court’s decision harbors possible shades of the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court verdict in the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan case.
Chang makes only passing reference to the recent wave of attacks against his opinions. In a clear reference to the Wen Feng editorial in Beijing Evening News, Chang says: “In the hands of some, my support of this right [to freedom of expression] has been twisted into the ‘freedom to rumor-monger’ (造谣自由), and here I am trying once again to explain myself.”
The writer’s invocation of Justice Brennan’s famous words about the need to give media “breathing space” — that errors are inevitable in free debate, and even certain false statements must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to survive — reflects back on many important stories in China over the last two months, not least the question of the truth about unrest in Tibet.
Chang Ping’s editorial follows in full.
－－－－－－－－－－－

News Reports with Errors Also Need “Breathing Space”
By Chang Ping (长平)
In March last year, China Central Television’s Weekly Quality Report (每周质量报告) (an investigative news program dealing with issues of consumer and product safety) reported on the case of a Hebei textile factory producing what it called “poisonous cloth” (毒毛巾). The factory in question took the case to court, arguing that while its cloth had been found substandard on inspection by relevant government authorities, it did not contain powerful carcinogens [as the program had alleged]. The company demanded CCTV apologize and pay damages. After hearing the case, the court dismissed the factory’s case on the following grounds: 1) While the company had a right to an objective assessment by the public, the media’s right to carry out watchdog reporting was protected under the law; 2) CCTV’s investigative program was based on the use of physically harmful dieing agents by some cloth manufacturers, posing a danger to public well-being; 3) Relevant government authorities had recently determined there were quality problems with the products in question; 4) Cloth safety was a matter of public interest, and manufacturers had an obligation to tolerate scrutiny by the media and the public.
This case naturally recalls the famous [U.S.] case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In March 1960 the New York Times ran a full-page political advertisement calling on readers to support the civil rights movement [led by Martin Luther King Jr]. The advertisement described actions taken against civil rights demonstrators [in Montgomery, Alabama], with some of the facts given inaccurately. Montgomery commissioner L.B. Sullivan brought a defamation case against the New York Times to defend his reputation and seek damages. Supreme Court Justice Brennan raised the standard of “actual malice,” placing the burden on the plaintiff in defamation cases involving public incidents or public figures to . . . prove that media showed actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth. In the end, the court ruled in favor of the New York Times.
The significance of the NYT v. Sullivan case lies in its protection of freedom of expression. As Justice Brennan pointed out: “That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that even certain false statements must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they need . . . to survive.”
Additionally, media in practice are not scientists. If they are expected to disseminate information in a timely manner and at the same time ensure each and every detail is free of error, they would have no way of working. This would mean killing off watchdog journalism (舆论监督). Only when information is aired out do we have an opportunity to reveal error, and only in this way can we arrive at the truth.
As a landmark decision in the history of journalism, the NYT v. Sullivan case established new internationally accepted principles and propelled a half-century of press development. The case established two important points. The first was the idea of matters of public interest (公共事件) and the public figure (公众人物). The second was the standard of actual malice (实际恶意). Both points have importance for media practice in China. For some matters of public interest information sources are tightly controlled and journalists find it difficult to carry out reporting. Demanding pure accuracy of every word translates to a prohibition against speaking at all. This is especially true in the age of new media, with tools like the Internet and SMS messaging. When public incidents happen, people demand information so that they can mitigate their fears and learn the facts. But as the exchange of inaccurate information is on the rise, the police, asking nothing of actual malice or the social consequences, mobilize against the crime of “disseminating rumors.” This undoubtedly inhibits citizens’ right to freedom of expression. In the hands of some, my support of this right has been twisted into the “freedom to rumor-monger” (造谣自由), and here I’m trying once again to explain myself.
The NYT v. Sullivan case has not been established in Chinese law. But it has entered into the decision rendered by our courts in recent years as legal experts have introduced and promoted its principles. Several years ago, for example, the above arguments were outlined clearly in the decisions rendered by the courts in the libel case launched by sports star Fan Zhiyi (范志毅) against Oriental Sports Daily, and in the “poisonous cloth” case [I referred to as I began this editorial].
It should be pointed out that the CCTV case has not been widely affirmed on the Internet, but instead has met with much suspicion. This is because CCTV, as a state media organization, is invested with government authority. [This raises the question of whether] the core of the case is about media reporting on matters of public interest, or about government authority in a standoff with private interests. More importantly, in many cases concerning government authority and incidents [or matters] of public interest, not even a drop of the spirit of the Sullivan decision is evident. In the April 28 railway disaster, for example, a Web user from Shandong province was detained by police for five days for posting inaccurate information (exaggerating the number of dead).
I hope that inaccurate information and false statements can enjoy greater breathing space in more news reports from local media, in more voices raising doubts about government authority, so that media can have an opportunity to correct inaccuracies and eventually achieve balance and dynamism.

[Posted by David Bandurski, May 9, 2008, 9:35am HK]

By David Bandurski — It’s purportedly for sale on the Internet at the deal-stealing price of seven dollars. So why is it so impossible to track down a copy of Gongjian: A Report on Political Reform in China After the 17th Party Congress? For starters, the book, purported to be Hu Jintao’s blueprint for political reform, is in high demand among scholars, analysts and journalists. Rumors and conjecture about its existence have been flying ever since last fall’s congress, and everyone is eager to know what it says and what it signifies. [CORRECTION: The book is reportedly now available widely in Beijing bookstores].
A Reuters report last month made passing mention of the book, for which Central Party School vice-director Liu Junru wrote the preface, but offered no details and did not suggest it reflected Hu Jintao’s own views or plans. [CORRECTION: Reuters reporter Chris Buckley did the first detailed report of the study in a February report. See it here.]
The word on the street, though, is that it does.

[ABOVE: Cover of Gongjian: A Report on Political Reform in China After the 17th Party Congress, published by the Xinjiang Production and Building Corps Press in October 2007.]

The report, though circulating among China’s top leadership since last October, has been published by the little-known Xinjiang Production and Building Corps Press, an eccentric choice for such a significant work.
So what has all the quiet fuss been about?
Over the next few weeks, we’ll look more generally at the topic of political reform in China as glimpsed through Gongjian. What sort of path does it blaze? Where does it stand on electoral democracy, intraparty democracy, religious freedom and the growth of civil society?
For the moment, though, we’ll deal more specifically with the media-related portions of the document and how it envisions the role of the press in China.
The report, first of all, is prepared by Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) and Wang Changjiang (王长江), both scholars at China’s Central Party School we mentioned as key figures for journalists to interview in the run up to last year’s Party Congress.
Zhou Tianyong is vice-director of the Research Office of the Central Party School and one of several authors of the Party School’s “Political Reform Research Report” (政治体制改革研究报告), which was published in book form as Political Reform in China in 2004. The preface to Gongjian, written by Li Junru, makes specific mention of the 2004 book.
Wang Changjiang is director of the Central Party School’s Party Building Division (党建部). Wang wrote an essay in May last year called, “Answering a Few Misgivings About Issues Concerning Democracy” (辨析关于民主问题的几个疑虑). Published in Beijing Daily, the article argued that democratization could happen even under a one-party system.
While Gongjian does note in passing in chapter one that “freedom of speech is an inevitable development trend,” it argues that the CCP must continue to control media as a fundamental condition of political reform. Party control of the press, in other words, must remain intact even as the country moves toward so-called “political reform,” or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革).
One of the most revealing formulations employed at the outset of the report is the “three controls,” in which we may be witnessing the birth of a new party catchphrase for the conditions under which the CCP will allow political reform to move ahead, including media control.
Summing up the challenges that will attend efforts at political reform — for example, the party “must eliminate factors of instability that might emerge in the midst of the political reform process, and must ensure that political reform goes ahead step by step and in an orderly manner under the leadership of the CCP” — the authors write:

We must uphold the CCP’s leadership of the political reform process, and we must implement the three controls (三项原则), which are that the party controls the army (党管军队), the party controls cadres (党管干部), and the party controls the press (党管新闻).

Falling back again on the lessons of USSR disintegration, the authors write that “in the 1980s and early 1990s, as the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe underwent dramatic change, there were many reasons that the party of Socialism progressively lost hold of political power, but one important reason was that the ruling party gave up control of the military, with the result that in the moment of truth the army did not heed the words of the party and even stood on the side of the opposition.”
“The ‘control’ in party control of cadres,” the authors write, “should be understood as both control and leadership.” It essentially means that the role of party leaders is to carry out the policies and work of the party, and be obedient to the party line. “In this way, party control of cadres means that the party leads the work of cadres.” And: “For the Chinese Communist Party, party control of cadres is undebatable.”
Then comes the chapter one section on the press control aspect of the “three controls”:

Party control of the press. The press sytem is an important and integral part of the national political system. Freedom of speech is an inevitable development trend. But in the period of social and economic transition, the question of what function the press should have becomes for us a question that must be met with extreme caution. We believe that when a market economy system is not yet mature, and when the nation’s political culture and the democratic character [of the population] continue to show a marked gap with developed nations, a one-sided emphasis on freedom of speech could potentially create chaos in public opinion, which would be disadvantageous to the stable achievement of transition of the social and economic systems under a situation of centralized political control. Therefore, the party’s leadership and control of the press system is necessary for the stable transition of the social and economic systems, and an important integral component suited to a centralized political system.

The fear, an all-too-familiar one, is that political reform might unleash demands for greater political freedoms and bring the kind of social chaos we saw in the spring of 1989. Hence the imperative, from the CCP’s vantage point, of controlling or “guiding” public opinion by means of press control.
On pages 65 through 67 of the report, in a section called “Improving the Ruling Party’s Influence on the Media,” the authors write that “there are two primary avenues by which the ruling party can influence the media: the first is to control, the second is to use” (一是控制, 二是利用).
The second aspect of this formula is a testament to the priority the CCP now places on finding new ways to “use” and “influence” media as opposed to the old emphasis on “control” (for which “guidance” has been the operating term since 1989).
With a tinge of alarm, the report cites the recent history of “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as urgent lessons in the growing power of media as a vehicle of popular participation in political affairs, a challenge to the party’s leadership:

Traditionally, political parties were the most important tools for the people to express their interests, hopes and expectations. Now, media have also emerged as a tool for political participation, and have played a role of ever-growing importance. This means that the things people accomplished in the past predominantly through political parties they can now accomplish through media channels. As a result, the influence of the ruling party faces [new] challenges. This is especially the case with the development of the Internet and technology, which has not only broken through the monopoly of information by restricted to certain levels of society, but has also broken through national boundaries as restrictions on the dissemination of information, actually usurping a number of roles political parties played in the past. Many members of society no longer view participation of political parties as the only channel for obtaining information . . . People have seen that when media play an independent role they can even have a substantial impact on politics. For example, while the ‘color revolutions’ occurring in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in recent years have complex causes, the control of the media and public opinion is a factor that cannot be overlooked. All of this has meant that the traditional mode of participating in politics via the political party faces many new problems. Faced with the immense utility of the media, nations across the world are all seeking policies for dealing with this issue, striving to enhance their influence on the media. Summed up, there are two primary avenues by which the ruling party can influence the media: the first is to control, the second is to use.

As many of our analyses at CMP attest, China’s media landscape has changed over the last two decades, the CCP’s regime of media control notwithstanding. The complexities of media commercialization, growing journalistic professionalism and the rise of the Internet and other new technologies have demanded the party change its approach to public opinion control.
An important part of this change in recent years has been an intensified focus on “using” media, including the Internet, to further the party’s interests rather than employing a one-dimensional control approach.
It’s not enough, in other words, to silence voices the party views as unfavorable — the party must find new ways to get its message out in an increasingly competitive, market-oriented media environment.
As we’ve written elsewhere, the CCP views media development as a critical factor in a global war for public opinion.
Likewise, many CCP leaders have come to regard “Western” media as pawns working for the interests of Western governments in spreading their ideology and influence — hence the party’s obsession with “color revolutions” and the role of the press.
This is a tactic and/or position we’ve seen frequently in recent weeks, as China has turned its own press apparatus against foreign media.
It was no surprise, therefore, as China’s foreign ministry turned on CNN for comments made by Jack Cafferty, that Chinese media coverage included comments from “famous American scholar” F. William Engdahl alleging that March chaos in Tibet was the “latest ‘color revolution’ cooked up by Washington.” [Xinhua News Agency: “CNN, Cafferty need to make a sincere apology to the Chinese people.”]
Most readers would probably think it fantastical to relate the controversial comments of a single pundit on one major news network to a supposed “color” conspiracy against China’s ruling party. But for China’s leadership this thesis has become a matter of faith and policy in the last few years.
For the authors of Gongjian, the recent history of “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is a lesson in the dangers of freer media, and it underpins the CCP’s determination to “control” and “use” the press.
The reform document suggests control will continue to be the party’s guiding principle for media policy for years to come, that a change in the role of the press is not in the cards even as the party pushes ahead with “political reform.”
Gongjian does make other statements about the need for media development, “supervision by public opinion” and the creation of a press law. Look for more about these topics in a future post.
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 18, 2008]

The China Media Project is pleased to extend an invitation to our readers to attend a lecture on April 23 by Li Wenkai, a key figure in China’s newest generation of professional journalists and currently acting head of the editorial page of Southern Metropolis Daily. The title of Li’s talk will be: “The Joys and Misgivings of a Media Upstart: A young editorial writer’s observations on China’s media.”

———–
“The Joys and Misgivings of a Media Upstart: A young editorial writer’s observations on China’s media”
SPEAKER: Li Wenkai, head of editorial page at Southern Metropolis Daily
Lecture will be conducted in putonghua.
When: April 23, 2008 (Wednesday), 5:30pm to 7pm
Where: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, the University of Hong Kong
What are current affairs editorials and why are they necessary? How does one set about writing them? This question is not just for this or that newspaper, but for the whole of Chinese society. Li Wenkai’s journey from the halls of Peking University to the top spot at Southern Metropolis Daily’s editorial page was a short one with few turns. His fellow journalists chided him for rocketing straight to the top without paying his dues. How could someone with so little life experience be put in charge of current affairs editorials at a leading newspaper? But is Li Wenkai’s experience an accident of fate, or does it tell us more about the state of China’s media today?
About the speaker:
One of the key figures in China’s newest generation of professional journalists, Li Wenkai is currently assistant to the editor-in-chief and acting head of the editorial page of Southern Metropolis Daily. From 1994 to 2001 Li studied in the School of International Relations at Peking University, earning a bachelor’s degree and a master’s in French Studies. From 2001 to 2004, Li served as a reporter and editor at Southern Weekly.
THERE IS NO NEED TO RSVP FOR THIS LECTURE.
For further questions, please contact Rain Li at (852) 2219-4001

The China Media Project is pleased to extend an invitation to our readers to attend a lecture on April 16 by Zhang Ming, a professor of political science at Renmin University of China. Zhang, an expert on political systems in China, will discuss the challenges facing China’s push to improve its higher education system.

———-
The Quagmire of China’s “Great Leap Forward” in Higher Education
WHEN: 5:30pm to 7pm, April 16, 2008 (Wednesday)
WHERE: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
China’s “Great Leap Forward” in higher education originated as a reform project in the second half of the 1990s. The idea was to rapidly improve China’s universities by making major capital contributions, but officials gave little thought to the need for structural reforms. The result was the rapid bureaucratization of China’s higher education system, undermining the scholastic environment and encouraging academic corruption. In this lecture, Professor Zhang Ming, one of China’s most active scholar-bloggers, will analyze the root causes of the current predicament facing higher education reform in China, and discuss possible solutions.
About the speaker:
A professor in the political science department at Renmin University of China, Professor Zhang Ming is an expert on the history of political systems and rural politics in China. Professor Zhang is also well known for his commentaries for various Chinese media, and as an active blogger at http://blog.sina.com.cn/zhangming1.
Enquiries: Ms Rain Li (2219 4001/ [email protected])

By David Bandurski – Media reform is an indispensable part of the overall process of economic and political reform in China, veteran magazine editor Hu Shuli (胡舒立) told a packed auditorium at the University of Hong Kong last week.
“What do we mean when we say media reforms and economic and political reforms go together? Broadly speaking, we mean the sharing of ideas,” said Hu, who launched Caijing magazine in April 1998 and helped craft it into one of China’s most respected business publications.

Hu’s talk, “Ten Years at Caijing,” was hosted by the China Media Project of the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, where Hu was recently a visiting fellow.
Tracing the development of what she called “relatively independent” and diverse media with a “popular hue” (民间色彩), Hu stressed that while China’s government has “accommodated” changes in the domestic media industry, it has not been a primary motivating factor.
She also disregarded the idea, which she called an “overseas thesis” (外国结论), that the reasons behind China’s growing media diversity were principally economic.
Included on Hu’s short list of relatively independent media dealing with business and the economy were weekly papers like 21st Century Economic Herald (21世纪经济报道) and The Economic Observer (经济观察报), and such magazines as Business Watch Magazine (商务周刊), New Fortune (新财富) and Business (商界).
Among the principle factors spurring the rise of more “independent” media in China, Hu included a strong “tradition of seeking independence” among journalists, the push for financial independence (freedom from government subsidies), the rise of the advertising sector, and Internet growth.
[Posted March 26, 2008, 12:06pm HK]

By David Bandurski — As Reuters and AFP reported today on the “life or death struggle” in Tibet, they touched unwittingly on one of the most noteworthy aspects of how Tibetan unrest has been handled and reported within China, where the basic formula has been: harsh words for the Tibetans, a harmonious front for the Han. [MAIN PAGE: Tibetan uprisings shown on the Chez Oimdu blog].
The English-language wire reports, which feed on the graphic language of Tibet’s top party leader, Zhang Qingli (张庆黎), will undoubtedly be a source of frustration for Chinese leaders as they attempt to manage the global blowback and present a face of tolerant resolution.
AFP and Reuters both report Zhang Qingli’s words as reflective of China’s official line (which of course they ultimately are as Zhang is Tibet’s top party party leader and enforcer). But the image of Tibet as a “life or death” struggle of “blood and fire” is not being pushed outside the party’s inner circle — nor is it the image top leaders wish to project to the world.
So what happened here?

[ABOVE: Screenshot of “life or death” wire stories as they top a Yahoo! News “China” search this afternoon.]

The source of Zhang’s comments, as quoted by Reuters and AFP, is China Tibet News, an official online news site based in the autonomous region, and the comments originate from an editorial appearing yesterday in Tibet’s official mouthpiece, Tibet Daily. Zhang reportedly made the comments in a closed telecast meeting with other top officials.
A portion of Zhang’s comments are as follows:

We are now fighting a bitter struggle of blood and fire against the Dalai clique, a struggle of life and death. The stability of Tibet concerns the stability of the whole nation, and the safety of Tibet concerns the safety of the whole country.
AFP: “We are currently in an intensely bloody and fiery struggle with the Dalai Lama clique, a life or death struggle with the enemy.”
REUTERS: “We are in the midst of a fierce struggle involving blood and fire, a life and death struggle with the Dalai clique.”

Interestingly, China Tibet News is one of just a few sources available online or anywhere else for Zhang’s comments. They have not appeared on major Web portals. Nor have they appeared in newspapers outside Tibet.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Chinatibetnews.com, an official news portal for the autonomous region.]

A search on Baidu News for the phrase “life and death struggle with the enemy” (“你死我活的敌我斗争”), comes up with Zhang’s editorial from Tibet Daily via the Xinhua News Agency website, and the Phoenix TV website.
A search in the WiseNews database of Chinese language periodicals, covering over 130 major party and commercial newspapers, turns up no reference to “life and death struggle with the enemy” in coverage since the uprising. The database does not include Tibet Daily.
The important point to recognize is that while leaders in Tibet have resorted to the fiery vocabulary of Maoist-era jargon (“people’s war,” for example) to send the message that they will deal with protests with an iron hand, media across the country (party papers, commercial papers and websites) have used more restrained language.
Nowhere is the Maoist-era rhetoric more apparent than in the reference in Zhang Qingli’s editorial and related coverage to the need to “take a clear-cut stand against separatism” (旗帜鲜明地反对分裂). That phrase is of course redolent of Deng Xiaoping’s call in 1983 to “take a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalization” (旗帜鲜明地反对资产阶级自由化).
More poignantly, the phrase recalls the People’s Daily editorial of April 26, 1989, that presaged the crackdown on student demonstrators. The title of that editorial was, “We Must Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Chaos” (旗帜鲜明地反对动乱).
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 19, 2008, 9:53pm]
MORE SOURCES:
“Images and News of Tibet Riots Seep Onto Web, Despite Chinese Authorities’ Clampdown“, China Digital Times, March 19, 2008
“Simmering Resentments Led to Tibetan Backlash,” New York Times, March 18, 2008
Links and roundup of Tibet coverage at Roland Soong’s ESWN.